Crime as enterprise? – The case of ``transnational organised crime

Crime, Law & Social Change 37: 203–223, 2002.© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

203

Crime as enterprise? The case of “transnational organised crime”

ADAM EDWARDS1 & PETE GILL2

1Nottingham Crime Research Unit, Department of Social Sciences, Nottingham TrentUniversity, Nottingham NG1 4BU, UK (e-mail: [email protected]); 2Centre forCriminal Justice, Liverpool John Moore’s University, Liverpool L7 4DN, UK

Introduction

The compartmentalisation of research into white-collar crime and organisedcrime reflects a broader tendency in criminology to treat crimes of the power-ful as a distinct field of inquiry and policy from that of crimes of the powerlessand/or expressly “dangerous”. A legacy of Edwin Sutherland’s work is toreassemble these intellectual and administrative divisions of labour, to chal-lenge the view, so deeply ingrained in public policy discourse and popularnarratives on crime, that criminality is the exceptional behaviour of patholo-gical, excluded, “others”. Conversely, Sutherland emphasises the capacity ofpowerless and powerful people to learn either law-abiding or law-breakingbehaviour given their differential associations with intimate groups. In thisway Sutherland seeks to transcend the preoccupation of much criminologicaltheory with the reductive relationship between anti-social conditions and anti-social behaviour that precludes, in turn, an understanding of the widespreadlawless behaviour amongst the affluent that he assiduously documents in hiscase studies of “white-collar crime” (1983).

There is, however, a tension between Sutherland’s general conceptualisa-tion of crime as a product of differential association and his specific invest-igation of “crimes committed by persons of respectability and high socialstatus in the course of their occupation”, that is, his definition of “white-collar crime”. At one and the same time this definition has been criticisedfor being too narrow, in excluding the differential associations between the“upperworld” of corporations and the “underworld” of criminal organisations(Ruggiero, 1996: 5, passim), and too broad, in conflating such diverse andoften unrelated activities as bank embezzlement, insider trading, “long-firm”fraud and “fiddling at work” into a nebulous, all-encompassing, category(Nelken, 1997: 896ff). The protracted debates over the meaning of white-collar crime occasioned by Sutherland’s definition, in particular over whichkinds of differential association should be categorised as “corporate”, “or-

204 A. EDWARDS AND P. GILL

ganised” and/or “street” “crime”, exemplify a more pervasive dilemma in theconceptualisation of “crime” and the social reaction to it.

This is whether to employ relatively “elastic” concepts that are sufficientlyflexible to encompass a broad range of practices and thereby enable an under-standing of how, and if, such practices are connected, how they are enabledby the associations between different offenders and victims, and how theseassociations are structured in different social contexts. Alternatively, shouldrelatively “inelastic” concepts be employed that neatly and precisely delimitthe focus of inquiry to highly specific activities in order to better understandtheir particular dynamics. In these terms an elastic conception of white-collarcrime enables the possible connections between, for example, bank embez-zlement and computer crime, to be questioned. The danger of such elasticityis that, in seeking to signify such connections, concepts like white-collarcrime become reified to the point that important differences amongst thepractices they signify are obscured. Conversely, whilst inelastic concepts havethe potential to capture what is specific about a certain practice, this searchfor specificity can abstract certain practices from their social contexts: is itpossible, for example, to understand bank embezzlement in its own terms?This dilemma between generalisation – reification on the one hand and spe-cification – decontextualisation on the other is, of course, at the center of themore fundamental debate over the need to transcend criminology as a meansof understanding “crimes” of the powerful and powerless (Ruggiero, 2000).

The dilemma between generalisation and specification is explored herewith reference to the idea of “Transnational Organised Crime” (TOC), throughwhich many of the ambiguities that characterise popular and academic con-ceptions of the associations between “corporate”, “organised” and “street”crime are being re-stated and challenged. These ambiguities are consideredin relation to findings from a research seminar series on Policy Responsesto Transnational Organised Crime, which has been directed by the authorsand funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.1 The poten-tial of an enterprise model of organised crime to resolve this basic dilemmaand its associated conceptual ambiguities is discussed. It is argued that inswitching the focus of research from an exclusive preoccupation with theattributes of organised criminality to the relationships of exchange between“traders” in “dirty” or “grey” markets it is possible to identify a continuumof licit – illicit markets and corresponding interventions directed at theirregulation. The argument concludes with a discussion of how the notion of“crime as enterprise” needs to be further developed through research intothe rational, emotional and habitual practices of traders in dirty markets, therelated collapse, reproduction or disturbance of these markets and the costsor “externalities” of their regulation for social as well as criminal justice.

CRIME AS ENTERPRISE? 205

The ambiguities of transnational organised crime

The perceived threat of “Transnational Organised Crime” (TOC) has becomean issue of acute interest to politicians, policy-makers and social scientists inthe last decade, yet there is little consensus over the character, or even theexistence, of this purported threat. Critics account for the increasing salienceof TOC in terms of the need for military, security and intelligence agenciesto reinvent their roles in a post-Cold War “new world order”. They arguethat the scope of organised crime remains contained within local territoriesand should be controlled through a combination of local crime control andsocial policy interventions. Conversely, others acknowledge the “reality” ofTOC and the increasing mobility and sophistication of criminal entrepren-eurs. They identify an emerging “global crime problem”, enabled by rapiddevelopments in information and transport technologies and an increasinglyde-regulated global economy. In turn they argue for greater investment in in-ternational law enforcement including the provision of extraordinary powersfor intrusive surveillance.

The aim of the UK ESRC research seminar series was “to examine the the-oretical and empirical foundations of these competing arguments and explorethe potential of alternative conceptions of organised crime in the ‘new worldorder’ with a view to informing policy development”. Given this aim, the spe-cific objectives of the series were, firstly, to examine the evolution of policyresponses to transnational organised crime, including processes of defini-tion, symbolic reassurance, failure, adaptation and innovation; secondly, toquestion these processes of policy change in terms of the available empiricalevidence for the incidence, prevalence and concentration of transnational or-ganised crime; thirdly, to explore conceptual and methodological innovationsin the identification, measurement and explanation of transnational organisedcrime; fourthly, to explore alternative methods of governing transnationalorganised crime with particular reference to the “new governance”; fifthly,to examine the ethics and accountability of policy responses to transnationalorganised crime; and, finally, to cultivate a dialogue amongst academics andpractitioners interested in transnational organised crime and disseminate find-ings from the seminar series to a broader audience of interested parties.

The findings from this series can be organised into three basic themes:

– the conceptual parameters of transnational organised crime;

– the aetiological assumptions in policy debates about the response totransnational organised crime; and

– implications for research into policy change and learning.


The conceptual parameters of TOC

This theme refers to the collection and interpretation of evidence on thepatterns of TOC. It questions the incidence, prevalence and concentrationof TOC. Within this theme findings can be summarised in terms of threeinterrelated tensions: the global versus local scope of organised crime; theexternal versus internal threat of organised crime; and the relations betweenlicit and illicit markets and “entrepreneurs”.

The purported process of globalisation and its consequences for interna-tional security animates much of the discussion about organised crime. Inthe “global village” criminal organisations exploit opportunities for cross-border crime generated by, inter alia: the construction of continental tradingblocs such as the North American Free Trade Association and the EuropeanUnion; developments in communications and transport technologies; and in-creasingly de-regulated international currency markets.

The knowledge-base for the emergence of a “global crime problem” ispremised on two basic measures: the volume of organised crime and intelli-gence reports on the activities of particular criminal organisations/individuals(Gregory, 1998; Gilligan, 1999). Volume measures typically focus on arrestrates, asset seizures and the estimated costs of specific crime problems.2

Global measures of organised crime are provided by Interpol using estimatesof profit turnover based on, for example, the production of drugs in metrictons and the distributor price of a particular drug per kilo. On this basis itis estimated that the annual turnover of illicit drugs traffic is $500 billion(Gregory, 1998: 135). Papers in the series have criticised the methodologyunderpinning the calculation of these costs, in particular the tendency ofauthorities to “dogmatically” multiply seizures by 10 per cent (van Duyne,2000). Moreover, this methodology ignores the multiplier effect of illegaleconomic activity for the creation of wealth and employment opportunities in“licit” economies (Edwards and Gill, 1999).

Conversely, in questioning the very existence of TOC, Hobbs (1998a,b;2000) argues that, for example, in Britain there has been a conspicuous failureto demonstrate the operation of offenders which fit the Hollywood image ofethnically-based, hierarchically structured, “mafia” that orchestrate transna-tional operations like some “shadow” multinational corporation. Instead, inhis case study research of organised crime in English localities, Hobbs re-verses the logic of globalisation found in official narratives to demonstratehow this actually emphasises locality rather than transnationality in the formof organised criminal relations. Serious crime problems, as he prefers to callthem, are only ever experienced locally. What is new in the character of theseproblems is the emergence of criminal networks or coalitions of criminalactors assembled for the purposes of particular jobs. Traditional crime fam-


ilies and their extended kinship relations have, certainly in parts of the UK,disintegrated through the disturbance brought about by slum clearance hous-ing policies and broader processes of urban renewal. From this perspectiveglobalisation is important insofar as it accentuates the diverse and specificallylocal contexts of organised crime. The knowledge-base for this argument isthe conduct of qualitative case studies, especially ethnographies, of particularlocalities in order to reveal and elaborate the actual formation and reproduc-tion of relations between criminal actors and organisations as they are shapedby the changing political-economies of certain localities.

The other dimension to the knowledge-base of those identifying the ex-istence of a global crime problem is the surveillance of particular criminalorganisations and their activities in and across different nation states. Onthis basis, Myers (1996) argues that three Chinese organisations pose themost potent threat to global security, Jamieson (1995) asserts that “by themid-1990s there could be few regions of the world untouched by ItalianMafia pressure or influence, and Voronin (1996) estimates that 40–50% ofthe Russian economy is controlled by organised crime. Common to this per-spective is the articulation of TOC as, predominantly, an external threat towestern economies by the “usual suspects” of Russian Mafia, Cosa Nostra,Colombian Cartels, Jamaican Yardies, Chinese Triads etc., (NCIS, 1999). Inthese terms the perception of organised crime as an external threat formspart of the long-standing intellectual tradition of “criminologies of the other”(Garland, 1996) which have, in particular, predominated in the origins of theconcept of Transnational Organised Crime in US law enforcement discourse(Woodiwiss, 1999). The notion of security is, from this perspective, definedin opposition to external, alien, actors, cultures and organisations. In an ap-praisal of the impact of this perception on security policy in the EuropeanUnion, Bigo (1994) identifies an emerging “security continuum” in which theprocess of European integration is legitimated, in part, through the identific-ation of threats to (Western) European economies and, therefore, the “need”for greater international cooperation amongst EU members in fortifying theexternal borders of the Union against attack (Elvins, 1999; King and Bogusz,2000).

Conversely, Block (1991), Hobbs (1998a) and Rawlinson (1998) chal-lenge this image and its consequent reduction of the complexity of organisedcrime to a crude conception of alien conspiracy. Their work can be under-stood as part of the competing intellectual tradition of “criminologies of theself”. From this perspective organised crime is understood in one sense as aresponse to the demand in western societies for illicit services and, in another,as an indication of the limits encountered by nation-states in exercising sov-


ereign authority over their domestic populations. The common theme here isthat the source of organised crime is endogenous.

The disconnection of illicit and licit economies is exemplified by the lan-guage of the “underworld” and the “black” (sic) market. This perception ofillicit entrepreneurs operating beyond and outside of the legitimate economycan be understood as a logical consequence of the perception of criminalorganisations as external interlopers. It has, however, a more profound im-pact in obscuring the interdependencies between legitimate and illegitimateentrepreneurs. Block (1991), for example, identifies the services provided bycriminal organisations to “upperworld” businesses in dumping toxic waste,whilst “money laundering can be regarded as a service provided by the offi-cial financial sector to conventional organised crime” (Ruggiero, 1998: 121;2000).

Ruggiero (1998; 2000) identifies the existence of such “grey markets”in the trafficking of human beings and illicit arms where “official actors”not only employ the services of conventional organised crime but actuallycompete with criminal organisations to provide these services to other busi-nesses or even set up on their own. These discussions reinforce other analysesthat classify the main economically-motivated crimes – predatory, enterprise,commercial, corporate – and compare them by reference to variables such asthe mode of exchange, their impact on GNP, the place of violence, corruptionand so on (Beare and Naylor, 1999).

The aetiology of TOC

The second theme arising out of the Seminar Series addresses the impact ofthese competing conceptions on the aetiology of TOC in policy discourse.Two interrelated tensions have been identified between: a focus on organisedas distinct from other, corporate and “street” crimes; and on the dispositionsof organised criminals as opposed to the opportunity structures enablingthe commission of organised crimes and/or the social contexts generatingor disturbing the reproduction of organised crime relations.

Within both the research and policy communities the conventional tend-ency has been to treat organised crime as a specialist area that is distinct fromother forms of crime and, by implication, their methods of control, preventionand reduction. As part of his argument about the formation of grey or “dirty”economies, Ruggiero (1998; 2000) identifies the need to examine the interde-pendencies between formal and informal economic practices and, therefore,transcend the artificial distinction between organised crime “proper” and cor-porate or white-collar crime. Similarly, Beare and Naylor (1999) suggest anew framework for the regulation of “criminal exchanges”.


The implications of this shift in focus are substantial as they imply theneed to focus on the nexus of relationships between different types of crime.For example, regarding criminal careers: how is it that individuals becomeorganised and embark upon organised criminal careers? What are the pro-cesses through which individuals are recruited into such careers? What arethe factors, other than incapacitation, that disrupt and/or curtail these careers?Is it actually accurate to talk about organised criminal careers as opposedto the episodic participation of individuals in particular “jobs” and criminalassociations? This focus on the biographies of organised criminals suggeststhe importance of examining the nexus between “serious” and “street” crimes,given the “apprenticeships” served by organised criminals in the commissionof volume crimes. In turn this implies an important policy connection that canbe made between organised crime specialists and the broader community ofcrime prevention, crime reduction and “community safety” practitioners.

The preoccupation of official narratives on organised crime with the ca-reers and attributes of serious criminals and criminal organisations can beunderstood as part of a long-standing criminological concern with the “dis-positions”, or motivational drives, of offenders (Clarke, 1980, inter alia).Over the past two decades there has been a growing interest in comple-menting, if not replacing, this focus on manipulating dispositions, whetherthrough combinations of punishment/deterrence and welfare/rehabilitation,with a focus on reducing the opportunities for committing crime. Clarke hasdeveloped an elaborate framework for the “situational crime prevention” ofvolume crimes such as household burglary, theft of and from automobiles andforms of inter-personal violence.

It is argued that such crimes can be reduced by highly focused interven-tions in the immediate situational environments in which they occur, so as toincrease the risk of apprehension on behalf of offenders, increase the effort ofcommitting the crime and reduce the rewards and proceeds from such crime.More recently, this framework has been developed further to accommodatethe opportunity structures of crime that are generated by people’s “routineactivities” and everyday lifestyles (Felson, 1994; Clarke, 1997). Levi (1998)suggests the application of situational crime prevention principles to the iden-tification and manipulation of opportunities for organised crime is an import-ant form of policy innovation and learning. The application of opportunityreducing techniques implies an investment in identifying the stratagems andmechanisms employed by networks of organised criminals to, for example,communicate with each other and with nominally licit entrepreneurs, trafficillicit goods and services and launder the proceeds of crime. Situational meth-ods could, in principle, be adopted to disrupt these interconnections (Klerks,1999).


There is, however, a vibrant debate over the intended and unintended con-sequences of situational prevention for displacing, diffusing and deflectingcrime from those targets which are protected towards those currently lack-ing the resources and technologies to adopt prevention methods. To this endit is argued that situational crime prevention can potentially accentuate thevictimisation of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged who are unable toacquire or receive situational methods. A further challenge leveled at the situ-ational approach is that it fails to address the broader social contexts that canenable or preclude the reproduction of criminality and victimisation. Hobbs(2000), for example, argues that organised criminal activity needs to be ex-amined in terms of the specific “locales” inhabited by particular “fraternities”- alliances, “firms” and familial/kinship networks – of criminals. Moreover,Goodey (2000) identifies the tendency in situational and more orthodox lawenforcement approaches to the illict trafficking of human beings (regarded asan exemplary instance of TOC) to criminalise individuals, such as Easternand Central European women, who should, more appropriately, be viewed asvictims inveigled into the vice and narcotics industries.

A privileging of social context in the analysis of organised crime revealsa diversity of local experiences each with crucial implications for policy re-form, transfer and learning in the governmental response to this problem.Hobbs (1998), for example, draws a distinction between the dynamics ofserious crime in two English localities, the East End of London and theNorth East of England. In the East End, criminal networks are more protean,reflecting the impact of social, economic and political restructuring on thedisintegration of traditional communities – in particular the effect of slumclearance and urban renewal policies that have “emptied-out” once cohes-ive local communities, displacing them to the Essex and Kent hinterlandsof the East End. Conversely, local communities in the North East of Eng-land have been reproduced over many decades undisturbed by the housingallocation policies or the high turnover of migrant populations experienced inthe contemporary London metropolis. As a consequence, criminal fraternit-ies in the North East of England have a greater longevity than their Londoncounterparts.

The essential point here is that a failure to tailor policy responses to thelocally specific contexts of organised crime is likely to promote a “naïve”emulation of crime control strategies and techniques. At best this will fail toaddress the real causal dynamics of crime in these different contexts and, atworst, prove counterproductive in taking scarce resources away from localwelfare and crime control agencies, thereby actually creating greater uncon-trolled, unregulated, space for illicit entrepreneurial activity (Stelfox, 1999).This points to a more general issue regarding policy that may be de-railed not


only by unintended outcomes. Those who trade within illegal markets willreact to attempts at suppression or disruption and what must be analysed isthe continuing interaction between authorities and traders (cf Ekblom, 1999a,b).

Crime as enterprise? Implications for research, policy change andlearning

Under this third theme it is possible to identify four basic implications ofthe ambiguities in the conceptualisation and aetiology of TOC identified bythe ESRC seminar series, for the research-policy relationship in formulat-ing and implementing responses to organised crime and drawing lessons forreform: the tension between strategies of enforcement, prevention and regu-lation; between public and private responsibilities for security; between thecontribution of government “expert” and professional agencies and multi-agency partnerships; and between the “efficiency”, accountability and ethicsof policy reform.

The official preoccupation with prosecuting organised criminals, dismant-ling criminal organisations and seizing criminal assets is a form of supply-side criminology in which an understanding of “what works” is limited tostrategies of law enforcement, surveillance, mutual legal assistance and ex-ternal border controls etc. In part this reflects the apparent need for periodic“punitive display” (Garland, 1996) that has become an inescapable elementof crime control policy-making in electoral democracies. It reflects also theoverriding concern of official agencies with the identification of the perpetrat-ors of specific offences, since this is the sole basis on which evidence might begathered towards successful enforcement. So, for example, even in the UnitedStates, where the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organisation (RICO)statutes criminalise membership of criminal organisations per se, prosecutorsstill have to prove the commission of some number of predicate offences.

Enforcement, prevention and regulation

If, however, the focus is switched away from offenders, enforcement becomesless compelling as, to put it simply, it is difficult to prosecute a network,situational environment or social context. To this end a number of thinkersare becoming increasingly interested in the regulation of “black” (sic) and“grey” markets so as to minimise their externalities, in particular the socialdamage they inflict (Taylor, 1999: 233–234, Beare and Naylor, 1999). In theseterms it is possible to identify a continuum of actual and potential interven-tions directed at the regulation of interdependent licit and illicit markets (See


ENFORCEMENT

ILLEGAL MARKET LEGAL MARKET

prosecution

admin./civil penalties

disruption

caution compliance notice

`licensing& taxing’

formalinformal

accommodation/collusion

regulatory `capture’

ownership/control self-regulationSource: Gill, 2000, 15

NON-ENFORCEMENT

Figure 1. Enforcement and markets.

Figure 1). The actual mix of enforcement styles is crucially influenced by thenegotiated relationship between regulators and traders. Formally, if a marketis defined as “illegal” then the state seeks its suppression, whereas if it isdefined as “legal” then it may seek to regulate it, to a greater or lesser extentdepending on the nature of the goods and services traded. In reality, however,the situation is more complex.

The ellipses shown here illustrate the variety of regulatory practices withindifferent markets. We do not claim that they are empirically validated; rather,they should be read as broadly indicative. Where enforcement involves sanc-tions, these are more likely to be criminal in the case of illegal markets andadministrative or civil in the case of legal markets. However, the right-handend of “Prosecution” indicates, say, that small number of cases in whichthe Health and Safety Executive does prosecute. Similarly, the left-hand endof “Administrative penalties” can be illustrated by the practice of “fining”airlines where they fly into a country above some given number of illegalmigrants. There is no reason for regulators to seek to disrupt unambiguouslylegal markets; however, for police and customs agencies, this is clearly be-coming an increasingly attractive option because of the “costs” of evidence-gathering and the unpredictability of the outcomes of prosecution. For ex-ample, the Home Secretary’s Objective One for NCIS in 1999/2000 was: toprovide high quality and relevant criminal intelligence leading to (i) the dis-mantling or disruption of criminal enterprises engaged in serious and organ-ised crime, and (ii) the arrest and prosecution of criminals, whose activitiestake place in or impact on the UK (NCIS, 1999, 12).

“Cautioning”, either formal or informal, represents the main official al-ternative to prosecution for police and is broadly comparable to regulatorsissuing compliance notices in legal markets. “Licensing and taxing” is rep-resented as varying in terms of degrees of formality. Formal regulation is


exercised over a number of dangerous products (for example, alcohol, to-bacco and petroleum) that may be legally traded but traders have to buylicenses, are subject to regulations, forms of inspection and the goods soldare frequently subject to specific taxes. Failure to comply with regulationsmay ultimately lead to a loss of license. By definition, illegal traders cannotbe formally licensed as such, but there are a variety of circumstances in whichthey may actually receive an informal “license” to trade from local police orother regulators, any “pay-off” that is being made amounting to a form oftaxation. Examples of such relations can be found among street traders, localdrug dealers or fences, especially where those concerned act as informers forpolice. Of course, traders at this margin are particularly vulnerable to havingtheir “licenses” revoked and being sanctioned.

In the bottom half of the continuum, however, traders escape sanctionsentirely. In legal markets “self-regulation” within an industry will be seen asthe ideal outcome of effective education and self-control. However, this maynot be genuine, reflecting rather a “creative compliance” that honours theletter rather than the spirit of the rules (Baldwin et al., 1998: 20). “Accom-modation and collusion” reflects the fact that all regulatory agencies possessinadequate resources to pursue policies of full enforcement. An inevitableconsequence of their selection of priorities (however this is done) is that muchillegal trading and regulation-avoidance occurs without any regulatory re-sponse. “Regulatory capture” means that, because of shared ideology and/orpersonnel, rewards and/or threats, the traders have “captured” the regulat-ors and ensure non-enforcement. In extreme cases, “Ownership/control”, the“regulators” will actually share in the profitability of the market. The apparentinvolvement of nightclub security staff in dealing drugs for consumption ontheir premises in various English cities is one illustration of this (World inAction, 1996); the partnership between drugs traffickers and government of-ficials in Mexico (Castells, 1997, 276–86) and Morocco (Werdmolder, 1998)are others. This might occur in legal markets if, say, a regulator was to holdshares in a regulated company. Thus, policing may be compared very closelywith “regulatory enforcement” that:

often consists of a more subtle range of techniques of monitoring, in-specting, advising and warning, with prosecution constituting only asmall part of the agency’s activities. (Baldwin et al., 1998, 17)

What determines the specific relationship for police at any particular timeand place will be an array of factors including the resources available to reg-ulators, the nature of their legal mandate, the political, economic and moralnarration of the threat traders pose and the traders’ response and resistance toenforcement. It is important to note here the circularity, or systemic nature,


of the relationship between police as regulators and criminal organisations.The decisions made by police as to their priorities and targets will be madefor a variety of reasons but normally related to ideas of “seriousness”. Whendecisions come to be implemented then they will change the criminal mar-ketplace(s) that police seek to control. Dintino and Martens make the directcomparison between police and regulatory commissions in the US:

. . .the criminal justice system represents a regulatory process, the mostsevere at times, of which the police play a central role. As is often foundin the licit sector, regulatory commissions frequently represent the in-terests of the more powerful segments of an industry, thereby fosteringgreater organization and concentrations of power. Police administrators,in their development and execution of Organized Crime control policymay unconsciously (and at times, consciously) encourage and facilitatethe organization of marketplaces. (Dintino and Martens, 1983, 56–57)

This encapsulates the central paradox: how far does enforcement itself createthe very conditions it is formally meant to suppress? That police give priorityto countering violence is not surprising since it is the greatest challenge tostate legitimacy and is the phenomenon most likely to give rise to publicconcern with security and safety. “Monopoly” is a problem for different reas-ons, primarily ideological. Certainly, within the US ,one finds that the sameideological beliefs in the superiority of the free market that have inspired gov-ernment “trust-busting” since the late nineteenth century exist in the policeworld and have inspired “rackets-busting” against the exercise of exploitativemonopoly power by criminal organisations. To be sure, the American com-mitment to breaking monopolies has more rhetorical than actual strength, butthe commitment remains an important factor in police priority-setting. Thus,Sparrow, for example, suggests that regulatory agencies will want to target the“worst offenders” because of the damage, if they do not, to their credibility,employee morale and the message it gives to others (Sparrow, 1994, xxvi).

But, on the other hand, as Dintino and Martens suggested above, if policeintervene against traders within a competitive market they are likely to suc-ceed through arrest or disruption in driving out of business the smallest orweakest traders and thus actually encourage the growth of a monopoly. Whendisputes arise between traders in a legal market then there are a number ofways of resolving conflicts including the legal system that are not available inillegal markets and therefore violence is less likely to be used (For example,Dintino and Martens, 1983, p. 105). What is likely to increase police inter-vention in a competitive illicit market is the use of violence. If a monopolyhas been established then there will be fewer “turf disputes”, less violenceand therefore less impetus to police intervention (cf Fiorentini and Peltzman,


1995, 26). There is an interesting comparison here with the “company size”hypothesis of prosecution in regulation (Baldwin, 1998, 18–19).

The extent of changes in the market depend, however, not just on the ac-tions of authorities, but also on the adaptability and/or successful resistance oftraders. Overall, what has been discussed here as “negotiated relationships”between regulators and traders extends to a much broader range of interac-tions. Beyond formal or informal negotiations, for example, this will includethe attempt by regulators to calculate the likely outcomes of enforcementpolicies, the “costs” of enforcement in terms of resources, civil rights andethics (Beare and Naylor, 1999) and, at the broadest level, the study of “evolu-tionary struggles” between cops and crooks that might be compared variouslyto arms races or the contest between intelligence and counterintelligence(Ekblom, 1999b).

Public versus private responsibilities for security

The implications of this shift in understanding organised crime in terms of en-terprise are furthered by other developments. Considered as a process ratherthan an institution, policing encompasses the activities and security capacit-ies of statutory authorities other than the police, such as local authorities,schools, health authorities, housing providers etc., private businesses and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pressure-groups, tenants and residentsassociations, special interest groups and so on.

In turn this re-framing of policing has provoked a broader debate aboutthe appropriate division of responsibilities for security between “public” au-thorities and “private” citizens and organisations (Garland, 1996). Skeptics ofthis emerging new division of security labour, certainly in western societies,have regarded it as a strategy used by public authorities to shed responsibilityfor security and further “rationalise” public expenditure. Advocates note thehistorical importance of informal modes of social control, the power of peerpressures and community sanctions, and the consequent need to escape adebilitating faith in the expertise of the “professional” public bureaucracy.Whilst this debate has been conducted largely in terms of the response to“street” crimes and “incivilities”, there are clearly important implications inthe field of organised crime for the division of responsibilities between policeand other public authorities, that will always be subject to the constraints ofscarce public resources, and private organisations and citizens with unequalaccess to actual and potential security resources.


“Go-it-alone” government versus multi-agency governance

This question of responsibility for security relates to a broader debate, againwithin western societies, on the declining capacity of states to command.Notions of “sovereign government” are increasingly replaced by ideas of“governance”, which is more of a process of co-ordination, steering, influ-encing and balancing the interactions of public and private groups (Kooiman,1993). In turn, this shift has been explained in terms of the “knowledge” and“power” problems facing state authorities. The first arises because social andeconomic sub-systems are so impenetrable to outsiders that state authoritiescannot learn how they work or, if the state wishes to control or regulate thesesub-systems, the information required by the state is as diverse and complexas that possessed by the “regulated” and their roles become blurred. Evenif this knowledge problem can be resolved, however, the problem of powerremains as state authorities rarely possess adequate powers and instruments ofpolicy with which to intervene in the processes of the sub-systems (Mayntz,1993).

This problem is compounded by the fact that, if these knowledge andpower issues apply to legal social and economic activities, then they clearlyapply in much greater force when the state seeks to control illegal social activ-ities. State officials are, of course, hampered in their ability to acknowledgethese problems for fear of being seen to forfeit the “right to govern”. It isin this sense that much of the official discourse on TOC in particular, andcrime control in general, is infused with the “punitive populist” discourse of“wars on drugs”, the “fight against crime” and the need to be “tough”. Whatthis means is that the gulf between the symbolic terms in which policies arediscussed and their real impact is probably greater in the area of crime than inany other area of governmental responsibility (Sheptycki, 1998; Levi, 2000).

Yet governments and states are not unitary actors: different agencies havedifferent and sometimes conflicting interests and “crime” is never the onlypolicy with which they are concerned. The increasing recognition of theseproblems has lead to some tentative experiments with the idea of “joined-upgovernment” (JUG) in which complex social-political problems, like TOC,are understood as multi-faceted and in need of multi-agency responses. Inplace of the increasingly specialised division of labour within modern govern-ments that produces highly insular departments, the idea of JUG emphasisesthe importance of governing the diverse determinations that generate complexproblems such as crime. So, for example, it is seen as important to recognise,interpret and govern the strategic relations between crime and education,crime and housing, crime and health provision, crime and employment op-portunities etc. In other words, crime, transnational, organised, or otherwise,is regarded as an emergent product of a complex web of interdependent so-


cial relations. It is these relations that need to be researched and governed,rather than some notion of crime that is abstracted from this real social con-text. Nowhere is this more pressing than in the highly emotive politics oftransnational organised crime.

Efficiency versus accountability

A ubiquitous tension in the policy response to crime and criminality is thatof the need to get something done and the need to continually examine thepolitical and ethical implications of crime control. This tension is particularlyevident in initiatives for the civil forfeiture of assets where the burden of prooffor demonstrating the criminal generation of assets has been based on thebalance of probabilities (McKenna, 2000). Policy makers and public admin-istrations under pressure to respond to perceived problems of crime are, often,impatient with such critical reflection. Yet if the potentially counterproductiveeffects of policy responses discussed above are to be avoided there is a needfor greater reflexivity in questioning the very terms of policy debate.

Subjecting the very terms of debate about TOC to critical scrutiny is not apedantic obstacle to interventions against “obvious” threats but a pre-requisiteof good government. Insular policy-making circles are not noted for theirsuccess compared with those open to broad ranging debate and assistance topolicy in the longer term can only be given by work that does not simply ac-cept as axiomatic the prevailing definitions of the scope, focus and dynamicsof organised crime.

Conclusion

Through this review of the themes and findings emerging from the ESRCseminar series, the notion of “crime as enterprise” has been proposed as ameans of re-thinking the dilemma between the generalisation/reification andspecification/ decontextualisation of crime provoked by Sutherland’s concep-tion of differential association in white-collar crime. It has been argued thatin re-conceptualising crime in terms of the interaction between regulators andtraders in discrete markets it is possible to transcend the problems associatedwith either conflating discrete types of behaviour into catch-all categoriesor focusing so specifically on the attributes of particular practices that theirrelationship to cognate crimes cannot be interpreted. In focusing upon mar-kets of illicit exchange the need to demarcate “white-collar”/corporate from“organised” and “street” crime is rendered redundant. Now, this is, of course,problematic for the criminological goal of identifying, distinguishing andclassifying discrete types of crime and criminal in the service of criminal


justice. If, however, this goal is rejected as the rationale for research andpolicy and replaced with an alternative agenda concerned with the identific-ation and regulation of discrete markets in the service of social justice, thenthis specifically criminological dilemma is resolved through the adoption of apolitical-economic perspective. Such a perspective creates, however, its owndilemmas and our argument concludes by identifying what we take to be thekey challenges facing a political-economic account of illicit enterprise.

Re-defining crime as enterprise does not, of course, remove the ubiquitousproblem of explaining the dispositions of illicit traders nor of the opportun-ities for illicit trade. It does, however, provoke a debate over the appropri-ateness of rational choice models of human agency that have their roots inthe study of market exchange. Even as an account of licit enterprise, rationalactor models can be challenged for misrepresenting the actual behaviour ofentrepreneurs (Hobbs, 2000). Like the customers for their goods and services,entrepreneurs are often driven by routine and habitual preferences, prejudiceand emotional attachments etc. (c.f. Bourdieu, 1990), by virtue of which theyseek to invest their resources and conduct their business with other traders.Indeed the very failure to adopt rational, utility-maximising, approaches tothe calculation of the risks, effort and rewards associated with particular en-terprises is often the reason for their collapse. If this is the case with licitenterprise it is likely to be even more so where illicit trade is concerned.

This is because illicit traders, by definitional fiat, do not possess the de-gree of movement in relatively open markets that licit entrepreneurs do. Theyoften have to depend on introductions to markets from associates of associ-ates etc., and have to control their associations as far as possible to precludesubversion from undercover police and security forces. In this climate of fa-miliarity enmities, jealousies and vendettas disturb the possibilities for thoseefficient, economical and effective calculations that are more readily availableto traders in anonymous, open-ended and legitimate markets (cf. Longrigg,1997). A key challenge for developing our understanding of illicit enterpriseis to pursue a more qualitative interpretation of the actual decision-makingprocesses engaged in by illicit traders. In particular, the hypothesis that act-ors rationally anticipate the actions of those charged with their regulationand take evasive action (Ekblom, 1999a,b) provides a useful starting-pointfor questioning the degree to which different traders approximate to a “per-fect knowledge” about the actual and potential actions of competitors andregulators operating in the markets they inhabit.

In questioning the logic of entrepreneurial practice there is always a dangerof over-emphasising the voluntary exercise of choice by particular traders,especially given the methodological individualism of rational actor models.Whilst more sub-cultural analyses of the habits and emotions of entrepren-


eurs can attenuate this danger, there is a need to understand the structuresof different markets, that is, how they unevenly distribute cultural, economicand political capital amongst competing entrepreneurs and the consequencesof this for the reproduction, stagnation or collapse of particular markets. Forexample, if a market in narcotics in a particular locality is dominated by anoligopoly of “firms” this may stabilise the trade in a particular substance butthis very stability may lead to market stagnation as there are no incentivesto innovate to capture greater market share. Where, conversely, a market isrelatively open-ended innovation and market expansion may occur throughviolent turf wars. The essential point being that an understanding of differentmarket structures is a necessary precursor to explaining how different tradersapprehend the constraints and opportunities provided in these markets andthus why certain markets contract whilst others expand.

Finally this agenda for researching the structure-agency relationships inillicit markets has crucial normative implications for the goals of controlthrough regulation. Perhaps the fundamental opportunity cost of re-definingcrime in terms of enterprise is a potential loss of criminal, as opposed tosocial, justice. Whilst there are powerful arguments for labelling certain en-trepreneurial practices as “criminal” as a precursor to detecting, prosecutingand punishing criminals, not least as recompense for the harms they haveinflicted on their victims, consideration of the externalities of certain inter-ventions against illicit enterprise raise some complex moral dilemmas. If, forexample, the consequence of a law enforcement operation to “incapacitate”a leading firm in a local narcotics market is that a vacuum is opened upin which turf wars over market share intensify the use of lethal violenceamongst competing traders, then has the cure been worse than the ailmentin this instance? Viewing crime as enterprise also raises questions about therole of illicit entrepreneurs in boosting macro-economic growth, providingemployment opportunities where formerly there were none and alleviatingsevere poverty, especially in such developing countries as those in Eastern andCentral Europe (cf. Rawlinson, 2000) and, therefore, the social as opposed tonarrowly criminal, justice of controlling such activity.

It may appear counter-intuitive, to put it mildly, to argue for “transnationalorganised crime” as a method of regional economic development, yet, again,if the terms of conceptual trade are altered from the expressly criminologicaltoward the political-economic it is clear that the consequences of illicit tradecan be beneficial to socially excluded populations, particularly in the absenceof concerted welfare intervention by legitimate public and private authorities.Similarly there are often severe and damaging, albeit unintentional, costsassociated with the maxim of letting criminal justice be done, though theheavens fall in.


The principal message of our argument is that, at the very least, in re-defining crime as enterprise this broader repertoire of conceptual, ethical andpolicy dilemmas can be recognised where they are precluded from discussionby the narrower agenda and vernacular of criminology. To this extent thenotion of crime as enterprise rejects Sutherland’s preoccupation with defin-ing practice in criminological terms, whilst it conforms to his interest in thedifferential associations of the powerful and powerless alike.

Notes

1. The authors thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council for their support forthis seminar series and the participating members of the series for their contributions. Theinterpretation of these contributions remains, however, that of the authors alone (GrantNumber: R451 26 4796 98).

2. For example in 1995 the UK National Criminal Intelligence Service reported the arrest of1378 offenders operative in the UK; the seizure of drugs with a street value of GBP 249million; the seizure of counterfeit sterling worth GBP 29 million; the recovery of propertyworth an estimated GBP 18 million; and estimated the cost of prestige vehicle theft in1994 as GBP 500 million (Clay, 1998: 95).

References

Baldwin, R. et al. (eds.), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).Beare, M.E. and R.T. Naylor, Major Issues Relating to Organized Crime: within the

context of economic relationships, Prepared for Law Commission of Canada, 1999www.lcc.gc.ca/en/papers

Bigo, D., “The European Internal Security Field: stakes in a newly developing area of po-lice intervention”, in M. Anderson and M. den Boer (eds.), Policing Across NationalBoundaries (London: Pinter, 1994).

Block, A., “Organized Crime, Garbage, and Toxic waste: an overview,” in A. Block (ed.),Perspectives on Organized Crime: Essays in Opposition (Kluwer, 1991) pp. 79–104.

Block, A. and W. Chambliss, Organizing Crime (New York: Elsevier, 1981).Bourdieu, P., The Logic of Practice (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990).Castells, M., The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. II, The Power of

Identity (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997).Clarke, R.V., “Situational Crime Prevention: theory and practice”, British Journal of Crimin-

ology 1980 (20), 136–147.Clarke, R.V., Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies 2nd ed. (New York:

Harrow and Heston, 1997).Clay, P., “Taking Transnational Organised Crime Seriously”, International Journal of Risk,

Security and Crime Prevention 1998 (3:2), 93–98.Cressey, D.R., Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organised Crime in

America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).


Dintino, J. and F.T. Martens, Police Intelligence Systems in Crime Control: maintaininga delicate balance in a liberal democracy (C. Thomas Publishing, Springfield Illinois,1983).

Dorn, N. et al., Traffickers: Drug Markets and Law Enforcement (Routledge, London, 1992).Edwards, A., “The (Dis)Connections of Organised crime”, Security Journal 1999 (12:1), 79–

81.Edwards, A. and P. Gill, “Coming to Terms with Transnational Organised Crime”, paper

presented to the inaugural meeting of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Re-search Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (Universityof Leicester, 8th September 1999).

Ekblom, P., Organised crime and the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity, Draft Note(London: Home Office Research and Statistics Department, 1999a).

Ekblom, P., “Can We Make Crime Prevention Adaptive by Learning from Other EvolutionaryStruggles?” Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention 1999b (8:1), 27–51.

Elvins, M., “Evolution of EU Policy on Transnational Organised Crime: a contemporary over-view”, Paper presented to the second meeting of the UK Economic and Social ResearchCouncil’s Research Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational OrganisedCrime (University of Leicester, 15th December 1999).

Felson, M., Crime and Everyday Life 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, Ca: Pine Forge, 1998).Fiorentini, G and S. Peltzman, “Introduction,” in Fiorentini and Peltzman (eds.), The

Economics of Organized Crime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).Garland, D., “Limits of the Sovereign State: Contemporary Crime Control Strategies”, British

Journal of Criminology 1996.Gill, P., Rounding Up the Usual Suspects? Developments in contemporary law enforcement

(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2000).Gilligan, J., “The Role of Interpol in the Fight Against Organised Crime”, Paper presented to

the inaugural meeting of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Research SeminarSeries on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (University of Leicester,8th September 1999).

Goodey, J., “Organised Crime, Its Victims and the European Union”, Paper presented to thefifth meeting of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Research Seminar Series onPolicy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (Home Office, 15th December 2000).

Gregory, F., “Debate: There is a Global Crime Problem”, International Journal of Risk,Security and Crime Prevention 1998 (3:2), 133–137.

Hobbs, D., “Debate: There is not a Global Crime Problem”, International Journal of Risk,Security and Crime Prevention 1998a (3:2), 139–146.

Hobbs, D., “Going Down the Glocal: The Local Context of Organised Crime”, The HowardJournal 1998b (37:4), 407–422.

Hobbs, D., “The Firm: Organisational Logic and Criminal Culture on a Shifting Terrain”,Paper presented to the fifth meeting of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Re-search Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (HomeOffice, 15th December 2000).

Hughes, G., Understanding Crime Prevention (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998).Jamieson, A., “The Transnational Dimension of Italian Organised Crime”, Transnational

Organised Crime 1995 (1:2).King, M. and B. Bogusz, “Implementing European Union Illicit Drug Trafficking Controls in

Central Europe: critical observations from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania”,Paper presented to the fifth meeting of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Re-


search Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (HomeOffice, 15th December 2000).

Klerks, P., “The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organisations: Theoretical nitpickingor a relevant doctrine for investigators? Recent Developments in the Netherlands”, Paperpresented to the inaugural meeting of the Economic and Social Research Council’s Re-search Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (Universityof Leicester, 8th September 1999).

Kooiman, J., “Findings, Speculations and Recommendations”, in J. Kooiman (ed.), ModernGovernance: New Government-Society Interactions (London: Sage, 1993).

Levi, M., “Perspectives on Organised Crime: An Overview”, The Howard Journal of CriminalJustice 1998 (37:4), 335–345.

Levi, M., “Attacking the Money Trail: the research evidence”. Paper presented to the 3rd

meeting of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Research Seminar Serieson Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (University of Cardiff, 5th April2000).

Lidstone, K. et al., Prosecutions by Private Individuals and Non-Police Agencies (RoyalCommission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study 10, 1980).

Longrigg, C., Mafia Women (London: Vintage, 1997).McKenna, F., “Asset Confiscation: the Irish experience”. Paper presented to the 3rd meeting

of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Research Seminar Series on PolicyResponses to Transnational Organised Crime (University of Cardiff, 5th April 2000).

Mayntz, R., “Governing Failures and the Problem of Governability”, in J. Kooiman (ed.),Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (London: Sage, 1993).

Myers III, W.H., “The Emerging Threat of Transnational Organised Crime from the East”,Crime, Law and Social Change 1996 (24).

Naylor, R.T., “Mafias, myths, and Markets: on the theory and practice of enterprise crime,”Transnational Organized Crime 1997 (3:3), Autumn, 1–4.

NCIS, Service Plan 1999–2000 (London: NCIS, 1999).Nelken, D., “White-Collar Crime”, in M. Maguire et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of

Criminology, 2nd Edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997).Raine, L.P. and F.J. Cilluffo, Global Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil (Washington

DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1994).Rawlinson, P., “Russian Organized Crime: A Brief History”, Transnational Organized Crime

1997 (2:2–3), 28–52.Rawlinson, P., “Mafia, Media and Myth: Representations of Russian Organised Crime”, The

Howard Journal 1998 (37:4), 346–358.Rawlinson, P., “Bad Boys in the Baltics?”, Paper presented to the fifth meeting of the Ec-

nomic and Social Research Council’s Research Seminar Series on Policy Responses toTransnational Organised Crime (Home Office, London, 15th December 2000).

Rogovin, C.H. and F.T. Martens, “The Evil That Men Do,” in P.J. Ryan and G.E. Rush (eds.),Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1997) pp.26–36.

Ruggiero, V., Organised and Corporate Crime in Europe. Offers that Can’t Be Refused(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996).

Ruggiero, V., “Transnational Criminal Activities: The Provision of Services in the DirtyEconomies”, International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 1998 (3:2),121–129.

Ruggiero, V., Crime and Markets. Essays in Anti-Criminology (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 2000).


Sheptycki, J., “The Global Cops Cometh”, British Journal of Sociology March 1998.Sparrow, M.K., Imposing Duties: Government’s changing approach to compliance (Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, 1994).Stelfox, P., “Policing Lower Levels of Organised Crime in England and Wales,” The Howard

Journal 1998 (37:4), November, 393–406.Stelfox, P., “Transnational Organised Crime: A selective police perspective”, Paper presented

to the second meeting of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ResearchSeminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (University ofLeicester, 15th December 1999).

Sutherland, E., White Collar Crime: the uncut version (Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York,1983).

Taylor, I., Crime in Context: a critical criminology of market societies (Cambridge, PolityPress, 1999).

Tilly, C., “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in P. Evans et al. (eds.),Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 161–191.

Van Duyne, P., “Money Laundering: links between the ‘underworld’ and ‘upperworld’ ”, Paperpresented to the 3rd meeting of the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ResearchSeminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime (University ofCardiff, 5th April 2000).

Voronin, Y.A., “The Emerging Criminal State: Economic and Political Aspects of OrganisedCrime in Russia”, Transnational Organised Crime 1996 (2:2–3), 53–62.

Werdmolder, H., “Moroccan Organised Crime in the Netherlands”, International Journal ofRisk, Security and Crime Prevention 1998 (3:2), 111–120.

Williams, P. (ed.), Russian Organised Crime: The New Threat (London: Frank Cass, 1997).Woodiwiss, M., “Crime’s Global Reach,” in F. Pearce and Woodiwiss (eds.), Global Crime

Connections: dynamics and control (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1993) pp. 1–31.Woodiwiss, M., “Transnational Organised Crime: Strange Career of an American Concept”

Paper presented to the inaugural meeting of the Economic and Social Research Coun-cil’s Research Seminar Series on Policy Responses to Transnational Organised Crime(University of Leicester, 8th September 1999).

World in Action, broadcast on 28 October and 4 November 1996.

Documents

Crime as enterprise? – The case of ``transnational organised crime