Crawford the Passion of World Politics

7/28/2019 Crawford the Passion of World Politics

1/42

The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional RelationshipsAuthor(s): Neta C. CrawfordReviewed work(s):Source: International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 2000), pp. 116-156Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539317 .Accessed: 24/01/2013 17:45

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloade d on Thu, 24 Jan 2013 17:45: 23 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpresshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2539317?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2539317?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress


2/42

T h e P a s s i o n of Neta C. CrawfordW o r ld P o l i t i c s

Propositions on Emotion andEmotional Relationships

Theories of interna-tional politics and security depend on assumptions about emotion that arerarely articulated and which may not be correct. Deterrence theory may befundamentally flawed because its assumptions and policy prescriptions do notfully acknowledge and take into account reasonable human responses to threatand fear. Similarly, liberal theories of cooperation under anarchy and theformation of security communities that stress actors' rational calculation of thebenefits of communication and coordination are deficient to the extent thatthey do not include careful consideration of emotion and emotional relation-ships. Further, it is no wonder that postconflict peacebuilding efforts toofrequently fail and wars reerupt because peace settlements and peacebuildingpolicies play with emotional fire that practitioners scarcely understand butnevertheless seek to manipulate. Systematic analysis of emotion may haveimportant implications for international relations theory and the practices ofdiplomacy, negotiation, and postconflict peacebuilding.

International relations theory has lately tended to ignore explicit considera-tion of "the passions."' Even realists, who highlight insecurity (fear) andnationalism (love and hate), have not systematically studied emotion. Why thisostensible neglect?2 First, the assumption of rationality is ubiquitous in inter-

Neta C. Crawford teaches political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Her most recentbook s Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, eds., How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (NewYork: St. Martin's, 1999).

I thank Jill Breitbarth, Jacklyn Cock, Joshua Goldstein, Peter Katzenstein, Margaret Keane, LilyLing, Rose McDermott, Jonathan Mercer, Linda Miller, Peter Uvin, anonymous reviewers, andrespondents at a Brown University seminar for helpful comments. I am especially grateful to LynnEden for her insightful suggestions.

1. An exception is an excellent paper by Jonathan Mercer entitled "Approaching Emotion inInternational Politics," presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego,California, April 25, 1996. Mercer argues that international relations theory ignores emotion. I thinkemotion is implicit and ubiquitous, but undertheorized.2. Other exceptions include L.H.M. Ling, "Global Passions within Global Interests: Race, Gender,and Culture in Our Postcolonial Order," in Ronen Palan, ed., Global Political Economy: ContemporaryTheories (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Nancy Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitar-ian Intervention," Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 12 (1998), pp. 103-119; Robert Jervis, Perception

International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156? 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

116

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/42

The Passion of World Politics | 117

national relations theory.3 As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye say: "Bothrealism and liberalism are consistent with the assumption that most statebehavior can be interpreted as rational, or at least intelligent activity."4 JamesFearon, while granting the possibility of "emotional commitments," concen-trates on "the problem of explaining how war could occur between genuinelyrational, unitary states."5 And although Kenneth Waltz argues that "one cannot

expect of political leaders the nicely calculated decisions that the word 'ration-ality' suggests," and Hans Morgenthau remarked that "the possibility of con-

and Misperception n International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 356-381; Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, andCommitment (New York: Free Press, 1977); Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World ofDefense Intellectuals," Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718; J. Ann Tickner, Gender inInternational Relations: A Feminist Perspective on Achieving Global Security (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1992); James G. Blight, The Shattered Cnystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the CubanMissile Crisis (Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990); Steven Kull, Minds at War: NuclearReality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers New York: Basic Books, 1988); Ralph K. White,Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations (New York: Free Press, 1984); YaacovVertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in ForeignPolicy Decisionmaking (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 176-180; Neta C.Crawford, "Postmodern Ethical Conditions and a Critical Response," Ethics & International Affairs,Vol. 12 (1998), pp. 121-140; and Margaret Hermann, "One Field, Many Perspectives: Building theFoundations for Dialogue," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 605-624. See also scholars of U.S. and Canadian politics: George E. Marcus and Michael B. MacKuen,"Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvementduring Presidential Campaigns," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993),pp. 672-685; and Richard Nadeau, Richard G. Niemi, and Timothy Amato, "Emotions, IssueImportance, and Political Learning," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 3 (August1995), pp. 558-574. See also Albert 0. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Argumentsfor Capitalism before ts Triumph Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).3.

As Max Weber said,"The

constructionof a purely rational course of action . . . serves the

sociologist as a type.... By comparison with this it is possible to understand the ways in whichactual action is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts . .. in that they account for the deviationfrom the line of conduct which would be expected on the hypothesis that the action was purelyrational." Weber, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and EconomicOrganization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 92. This view has deep philosophicalroots: since Kant, many philosophers have separated emotion from reason and banished passionsfrom careful consideration. An exception is Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problemof Psychological Categories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).4. Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence Revisited," InternationalOrganization, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), pp. 725-753, at p. 728. Keohane says that "much of myown work has deliberately adopted Realist assumptions of egoism, as well as rationality." Keohane,"Empathy and International Regimes," in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 227-236, at p. 227.5. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3(Summer 1995), pp. 379-414, at pp. 393, 382. Even what is meant to be a devastating critique ofthe formal rational approaches to security, Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? RationalChoice and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48, summa-rizes but does not question assumptions of rationality held in formal models.



4/42

International Security 24:4 | 118

structing, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics is worth exploring,"those who investigate "irrational politics" tend to focus on cognitive biases andbounded rationality.6

Second, where studying emotion seems most appropriate, analysis of foreignpolicy decisionmaking has emphasized cognition.7 This focus is under-standable given the interesting insights psychology has mined in the analysisof "cold" cognitive processes, especially in highlighting the effects of cognitiveheuristics and information processing limits. Only more recently has psychol-ogy begun to untangle emotion in a way that may be useful to scholars ofworld politics.

Third, ironically the emotions that security scholars do accept as relevant-fear and hate-seem self-evidently important and are unproblematized. Thistaken-for-granted status, especially of fear, has particularly pernicious effects.Nor have scholars carefully examined other emotions, such as empathy and

love.Finally, there are methodological concerns: emotions seem ephemeral anddeeply internal; valid measures of emotions are not obvious; and it may bedifficult to distinguish "genuine" emotions from their instrumental display.8The ways that psychologists study emotion are not likely to be replicatedanytime soon in foreign policy decision settings, nor is it easy to use archivesto determine how actors felt versus what they argued.9 Further, there is wari-

6. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," inRobert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986),pp. 323-345, at p. 330; and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power andPeace, 6th ed., rev. Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985), p. 7. And though some havechampioned "ideas," their role is generally understood as "always a valuable supplement tointerest-based, rational actor models." John Kurt Jacobsen, "Much Ado about Ideas: The CognitiveFactor in Economic Policy," World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), pp. 283-310, at p. 285(emphasis in original).7. Jervis, Perception and Misperception n International Politics; Deborah Welch Larson, The Origins ofContainment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); andRobert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, with contributions by Patrick M. Morganand Jack L. Snyder, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press,1985).8. There are of course ways to measure the physiological conditions associated with particular

emotions, such as elevated heart rate, blood pressure, and perspiration commonly associated withfear.9. Cognition is also difficult, though not impossible, to observe and measure. Michael D. Youngand Mark Schafer, "Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in InternationalRelations," Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42, Supp. 1 (May 1998), pp. 63-96; and RichardHerrmann, "The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Infer-ences about Perceptions," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 175-203.



5/42

The Passion of World Politics I 119

ness about generalizing from individual to group behavior and the attributesof organizations, including states. These are formidable concerns but not nec-essarily fatal to theorizing and empirical research.

Notwithstanding these issues, there are important reasons to study emotion,not least of which is its fundamental, if mostly unexamined, role in realisttheories. The analysis of emotions has at least three implications for interna-

tional relations theory. First, the common understanding of the attributes ofagents would shift from regarding actors as primarily rational. Indeed, therational-irrational dichotomy in international relations theory may be under-mined and potentially overturned as scholars take advantage of an "emotionalrevolution" in psychology. Second, in terms of systemic processes, it might bemore accurate, as the early realists did, to attribute fear as the engine ofthe security dilemma, rather than primarily structural characteristics or theoffense-defense balance. Fear and other emotions are not only attributes ofagents, they are institutionalized in the structures and processes of world

politics. Third, the processes and analysis of diplomacy, confidence building,and postconflict peacebuilding would more systematically take emotions intoaccount.

This article is intended to clear conceptual ground and review the literatureas preparation for formulating theories of emotion in world politics. I beginby demonstrating that emotion is already part of theories of world politics,although it is usually implicit and undertheorized. I then give a simple defini-tion of emotion, so that theorists of world politics can begin analysis from acommon starting point. Third, I describe several theories of emotion held in

other disciplines. Fourth, I suggest four sets of preliminary propositions aboutemotions and emotional relationships in world politics. The first set consistsof propositions about the incidence and variation of emotions; I argue that wecan expect to see emotions everywhere, but the expression and intensity ofemotions, and the behaviors associated with particular emotions, will vary. Thesecond set focuses on the effects of emotions on perceptions. I claim that theperceptions of others and the attribution of their motives will depend onactors' preexisting emotions, and emotional relationships among actors. Thethird set attacks the division between emotion and cognition, highlighting

the effects of emotions on cognition. The last set of propositions focuses onthe role of emotions in characteristic processes of world politics, namelydeterrence, peacebuilding, and adherence to normative prescriptions. Finally,I briefly return to methodological problems and propose a preliminary re-



6/42


search agenda for studying emotion and emotional relationships in worldpolitics.

The Centrality f Emotion n Realist and Liberal Theories

Although their concepts need clarification, realists may have a head start inthinking about emotion. Robert Gilpin argues that "as Thucydides put it, menare motivated by honor, greed, and, above all, fear."'1 Indeed, fear is centralto Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War: "What made war inevitablewas the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta."11Fear justifies behaviors that might otherwise be difficult to justify, while cour-age, love of one's country, and honor are also important to Thucydides.12Emotions are also central to Hobbes in Leviathan, where passions are animal

appetites and aversions.13 Emotions (after the Latin root motions), or the pas-sions, are natural and inescapable in Leviathan, and Hobbes considers severalemotions, from compassion, desire, honor, and love to contempt, envy, andgrief. Fear is vitally important for Hobbes's account of politics. The state ofnature is fear and a war of all against all; fear brings people out of the state ofnature and into the state: "The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feareof Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodius living; and aHope by their Industry to obtain them.""14 Uncontrollable passion makes usinsecure and explains why we cannot trust others to keep their word or the

peace.15 Clausewitz wrote about the importance of passion in war: "As a totalphenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regardedas a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the

10. Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, Neorealismand Its Critics, pp. 301-321, at p. 305.11. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin, 1986),p. 49.12. "Fear of Persia was our chief motive: though afterwards we thought, too, of our own honourand our own interest.... when tremendous dangers are involved no one can be blamed for lookingto his own interest." Ibid., p. 80.13. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Penguin, 1986), pp. 118-130.14. Ibid., p. 188.15. "For he that performeth first, has no assurance that the other will performe after; because thebonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, withoutthe feare of some coercive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall,and judges of the justnesse of their own fears cannot possibly be supposed." Ibid., p. 196. See alsop. 200.



7/42


creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as aninstrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone." 16

Realists and liberals wrote less of emotions in the twentieth century. Still,passions have a role-for instance, in Quincy Wright's arguments that mutualfear is a cause of war, and that fear of war prompts citizens to keep evenundesirable rulers in power.17 Alfred Vagts suggests that "love of war, bellicos-

ity, is the counterpart of the love of peace; but militarism is more, and some-times less, than the love of war. It covers every system of thinking and valuingand every complex of feelings which rank military institutions and ways abovethe ways of civilian life, carrying military mentality and modes of acting anddecision into the civilian sphere."18 Love and hate are well encapsulated in theidea of nationalism, which remains extremely important to contemporaryrealist theory.19 Morgenthau claims that individual anxieties are the root ofnationalism: "Personal fears are thus transformed into anxiety for the na-tion."20 Further, it is widely believed that men will fight for love of country,

and even more bravely out of their brotherly feelings for their comrades.21 Ina passage that conflates the emotion of fear with the colloquial use of "fear"as reasonable expectation, Waltz argues that "a self-help system is one in whichthose who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others,will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear ofsuch unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tendtoward the creation of balances of power."22 Soldiers will be especially ruthlessif they can be taught to both fear and hate their enemy. John Dower's War

16. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 89.17. Quincy Wright, A Study of War. Second Edition with a Commentary on War since 1942 (Chicago:University of Chicago Press [1942] 1965), pp. 1562, 1222.18. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York: Meridian Books [19371 1959), p. 17.19. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security, Vol.18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124; and Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,"International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39.20. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 125. Morgenthau argues: "Qualitatively, the emotionalintensity of the identification of the individual with his nation stands in inverse proportion to thestability of the particular society as reflected in the sense of security of its members. The greaterthe stability of society and the sense of security of its members, the smaller are the chances forcollective emotions to seek an outlet in aggressive nationalism, and vice versa." Ibid., pp. 122-123.

21. For a discussion, see Anthony Kellet, "The Soldier in Battle: Motivational and BehavioralAspects of the Combat Experience," in Betty Glad, ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (London:Sage, 1990), pp. 215-235; and Joshua Goldstein, "War and Gender," unpublished manuscript,American University. On unit cohesion, see Elizabeth Kier, "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military:Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998),pp. 5-39.22. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 118.



8/42


without Mercy is a chilling account of how hatred was engendered and mobi-lized by both sides in the Pacific theater during World War II to both motivateand justify atrocities, and may have prolonged the war.23

Among scholars of world politics, fear has translated into a belief in the factof insecurity. Harold Lasswell, one of the last international relations theoriststo write extensively about emotion and "emotional insecurities," echoes the

conventional wisdom that passions are biologically based and uncontrollable,and previews the frustration-aggression hypothesis:24 "The expectation thatviolence will ultimately settle the clashing demands of nations and classesmeans that every detail of social change tends to be assessed in terms of itseffect on fighting effectiveness, divides participants in two conflicting camps,segregates attitudes of friendliness and of hostility geographically, and createsprofound emotional insecurities in the process of rearranging the currentpolitical alignment.... The flight into danger becomes an insecurity to endinsecurity."25

Emotion virtually dropped from the radar screen of international relationstheorists in the mid-twentieth century when the rational actor paradigm be-came dominant.26 As Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink say: "Like lawand philosophy, affect and empathy have been swept under the carpet in recentdecades.... The result is politics without passion or principles which is hardlythe politics of the world in which we live."27 Yet, despite the hegemony ofrationalist approaches, mention-if not systematic conceptualization andanalysis-of emotion and emotional relationships has lately increased. Forinstance, Jonathan Mercer argues, "One way to test for the presence of norms

is to look for emotion."28 Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and PeterKatzenstein say that there is an international cultural environment that in-

23. John Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986).Mercer, "Approaching Emotion in International Politics," argues that hate prolonged the war.24. John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal Miller, O.H. Mowret, and Robert R. Sears, in collabora-tion with Clellend S. Ford, Carl Iver Hoverland, and Richard T. Sullenberger, Frustration andAggression (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1939); and Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (NewYork: Bantam Press, 1967).25. Harold Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 57.

Morgenthau, Vagts, and Lasswell did not necessarily suppose a dichotomy between emotion andrationality, though Morgenthau did stress the assumption of rationality26. Although Herbert Simon distinguished "substantive" or ideal-type rational decisionmakingfrom "procedural" rationality, emphasizing cognitive limits, emotion was not a part of the domi-nant framework. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with PoliticalScience," American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (June 1985), pp. 293-304.27. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and PoliticalChange," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887-917, at p. 916.28. Mercer, "Approaching Emotion in International Politics," p. 23.



9/42


cludes emotional relationships, specifically "international patterns of amityand enmity "29 Keohane both takes empathy seriously and attempts to put itinto a rational actor framework. Specifically, Keohane argues that empathy andempathetic interdependence play a "subordinate role" to rational interests, andhe suggests that "if government's definitions of self-interest incorporate em-pathy, they will be more able than otherwise to construct international regimes,since shared interests will be greater."30 Richard

Rorty argues that empathyinfluences respect for human rights: "The emergence of the human rightsculture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge and everythingto hearing sad and sentimental stories.'"31 These are potentially importantarguments; what remains is the development and evaluation of a coherentaccount of passion's role in world politics.

Defining Emotion

While many believe that Charles Darwin was the first to systematically studyemotion-he attempted to describe the expression of universal human emo-tions and locate their antecedents in other species-scholars have long under-taken to define and categorize emotion. Still, biologists, philosophers,anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists have not agreed on a singledefinition of emotion. Moreover, there is disagreement about which "feelings"count as emotion, argument about the biological components of emotion, andeven controversy about whether biological changes associated with emotion(e.g., rapid breathing and heartbeat) precede or follow cognition. These dis-

agreements have deep historical roots.Aristotle, Hippocrates, and other Greek philosophers and physicians spoke

of emotions, as does the Li Chi, a Chinese encyclopedia from the first centuryB.C. Aristotle defined emotion as "those hings by the alteration fwhich men differwith regard o those udgments which pain and pleasure ccompany."32 he origins

29. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culturein National Security," in Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1996), pp. 33-75, at p. 34.30. Keohane, "Empathy and International Regimes," p. 236.

31. Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," in Stephen Shute and SusanHurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993),pp. 111-134, at p. 118. See also Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethicof Care (New York: Routledge, 1993).32. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, trans. with an introduction by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York:Penguin, 1991), p. 141 (emphasis in original). Elsewhere Aristotle said: "For he is by nature a slavewho is capable of belonging to another (and that is why he does so belong), and who participatesin reason so far as to apprehend it but not to possess it; for the animals other than man are



10/42


of the English word "emotion" are found in Latin and French expressions formoving from one place to another, and exciting or stirring up. Emotion wasalso used to describe political or social agitation and popular disturbance.Contemporary dictionaries give definitions in phrases like "agitation of thepassions, or sensibilities, often involving physiological changes." The secondedition of the Oxford English Dictionary describes emotion as a "mental 'feeling'or 'affection' (e.g., of pleasure or pain; desire or aversion, surprise, hope, orfear, etc.) as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness.""Affect" is described as "feeling, desire, or appetite, as opposed to reason."Such characterizations are vague, however, and simultaneously reproduce theconventional view that emotions are unconscious, beyond an actor's control,and separate from cognition.

Further, as Jon Elster says, "The lack of agreement about what emotions areis paralleled by lack of agreement on what emotions there are."33 Aristotle,discusses ten emotions: anger, fear, shame, indignation, envy, jealousy, calm,friendship, favor, and pity Darwin studied the expression of anxiety, grief,dejection, despair, joy, love, devotion, ill temper, sulkiness, determination,hatred, anger, defiance, contempt, disgust, guilt, pride, shame, and modesty.34Although contemporary psychologists also do not agree on a list of emotions,in recent years many have settled on "basic" emotional states including love,fear, anger, joy, sadness, and shame.35

Difficulties in definition and categorization are even greater in a comparativeframework. Aristotle and Darwin argued that emotions were universally rec-ognized and basically the same across cultures, and recent research has lentstrong support to this view.36 Other scholarship shows that emotions andemotional categories are thought of both similarly and differently across cul-tures.37 James Russell argues that differences suggest caution when speakingof "universal" emotions: "Some writers assume that emotions have to be

subservient not to reason, but to feelings." Aristotle, Politics, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 23.33. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1999), p. 241.34. Charles Darwin, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press [1872] 1965). See also Paul Ekman, ed., Darwin and Facial Expression: A Century of Research nReview (New York: Academic Press, 1973).35. A short overview is Randolph R. Cornelius, The Science of Emotion: Research and Tradition n thePsychology of Emotion (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996).36. For example, Paul Ekman, The Face of Man: Expressions of Universal Emotions in a New GuineaVillage (New York: Garland STPM Press, 1980).37. See Richard Shweder, "The Cultural Psychology of the Emotions," in Michael Lewis andJeannette M. Haviland, eds., The Handbook of Emotions (New York: Guilford Press, 1993), pp. 417-431.



11/42


classified as we do in English-in terms of anger, fear, anxiety, depression, andso on. If English language categories regarding emotion are not universal, thenwe have no guarantee that emotion, anger, ear, and so on are labels for universal,biologically fixed categories of nature. Rather, they are hypotheses formulatedby our linguistic ancestors."38

Disagreements on the definition of emotion, and whether there are basic and

universal emotions, go to deep questions of ontology, method, and theory. Itis thus impossible, in a short article, to propose and justify a definition ofemotion that covers all the ground required to develop a theory of emotionfor world politics. Instead, I offer a simple definition designed to be agnosticabout the sources and consequences of emotion. Emotions are the inner statesthat individuals describe o others as feelings, and those feelings may be associatedwith biological, cognitive, and behavioral tates and changes. Thus emotions are firstof all subjective experiences that also have physiological, intersubjective, andcultural components. Feelings are internally experienced, but the meaning

attached to those feelings, the behaviors associated with them, and the recog-nition of emotions in others are cognitively and culturally construed andconstructed. Further, humans have emotional relationships with one anotherthat are characterized by the type and degree of emotional involvement;emotional relationships may be neutral or characterized by degrees of empathyor antipathy and so on. Finally, there are different levels of emotional arousal.This provisional definition should be debated and improved. After the follow-ing review of biological, cognitive, psychodynamic, and social learning theo-ries of emotion, the virtue of a simple definition containing few assumptions

should be apparent.

Conflicting Theories of Emotion

Theories of the sources, operation, and consequences of emotion are found allover the disciplinary map. Aristotle, Machiavelli, Descartes, Spinoza, andHume are probably the most famous philosophers who discussed emotion.

38. James A. Russell, "Culture and the Categorization of Emotion," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 110,No. 3 (November 1991), pp. 426-450, at p. 444 (emphasis in original). See also Russell, "Is ThereUniversal Recognition of Emotion from Facial Expression? A Review of the Cross-Cultural Stud-ies," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 115, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 102-141; Paul Ekman, "StrongEvidence for Universals in Facial Expressions: A Reply to Russell's Mistaken Critique," Psychologi-cal Bulletin, Vol. 115, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 268-287; Carroll E. Izard, "Innate and Universal FacialExpressions: Evidence from Development and Cross-Cultural Research," Psychological Bulletin, Vol.115, No. 2 (March 1994), pp. 288-299; and Linda Camras, Elizabeth A. Holland, and Mary JillPatterson, "Facial Expression," in Lewis and Haviland, The Handbook of Emotions, pp. 199-208.



12/42


Aristotle saw emotion as something that could be manipulated by rhetoric andthat would also affect the reception of arguments. Aristotle was also an earlycognitivist. For instance, he writes about fear as a "certain expectation ofundergoing some destructive experience."39 Rene Descartes in Passions of theSoul viewed emotions as both biological and cognitive, with emotion followingperception. And like Plato, Kant rejected a role for passion in reason, whileDavid Hume argued the opposite: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slaveof the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve andobey them."40

Theories of emotion in psychology are distinguished by their assumptionsabout the source and consequences of emotion.41 Despite the dominance ofcognitive approaches more generally in psychology during the latter half ofthe twentieth century, biological or naturalist conceptions of emotion are theoldest and the most durable, evolving from the ancient Greeks, who thoughtemotions were caused by humours and black bile, to modern neurochemistryFor William James, emotions were bodily sensations. Freud's letter to Einsteinarticulates a biological view of emotion when he asserted that war is a conse-quence of an "active instinct for hatred and destruction" as opposed to the"love instinct."42

Darwin's early work on emotion put emotions and emotional expressionsin an evolutionary biology perspective. His concern, using what he saw as thecontinuity of emotional expressions between animals and humans, was toshow an evolutionary link between animal and human emotion. Contempo-rary evolutionary biologists have continued to compare animal and humanemotions and behavior, arguing that emotions are functional or adaptive. For

39. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric, p. 155.40. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 415. Seealso Robert C. Solomon, "The Philosophy of Emotions," in Lewis and Haviland, The Handbook ofEmotions, pp. 3-15; and William Lyons, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of the Emotions," inK.T. Strongman, ed., International Review of Studies on Emotion, Vol. 2 (New York: John Wiley andSons, 1992), pp. 295-313.41. For more on definition and theories of emotion in psychology, see Paul Ekman and Richard J.Davidson, The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994);and Carroll E. Izard, Jerome Kagan, and Robert B. Zajonc, eds., Emotions, Cognition, and Behavior(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).42. Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" in Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds., War: Studiesfrom Psychology, Sociology, and Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 71-80, at p. 76. Seealso Anthony Stevens, The Roots of War: A Jungian Perspective (New York: Paragon House, 1989).Those influenced by Freud see emotions and emotional relationships as a consequence of bothpsychological development and relationship dynamics. For instance, see Vamik D. Volkan, De-metrios A. Julius, and Joseph V. Montville, eds., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships,Vol. 1, Concepts and Theories (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990).



13/42


example, the function of fear, which includes physiological changes such as arapid heartbeat, is to prepare animals for fighting or running away.43

Biological or naturalistic theories of emotion strongly influenced psychologi-cal theories, moving many students of emotion to examine ever smaller physi-cal structures (such as the hypothalamus, amygdala, and extended amygdalain the human brain) and neurochemical (amino acids, hormones, and neuro-

modulators) processes within and between cells.44 For example, some re-searchers believe that "pathological anxiety" (or fear that is exaggerated inproportion to the fearful stimulus) is a stronger reaction of the same braincircuits that are involved in normal fear responses. Such circuits, located in theamygdala, may display heightened responses to fearful stimuli as a result ofpsychological trauma or repeated exposure to stressful stimuli. This "hyper-excitability" or "sensitization" of fear circuits is related to or caused by theprior action of neuropeptides and hormones.45 Prior experiences, or trauma,may change the biology of the brain, affecting later emotional (and cognitive)

reactions and behavior; the brain learns to be fearful having once or repeatedlyexperienced great fear. Further, fear and anger are closely related at the bio-logical level.

An example in international relations theory of a naturalistic approach toemotion is to suppose that once kindled, ethnic or nationalist hatred are primaland that little can be done, besides separating antagonists, to diffuse suchfeeling. As John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera argued with regard to apossible settlement of the 1999 war in Kosovo: "President Clinton is still

43. See Robert Plutchik, "A General Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion," in Plutchik andHenry Kellerman, eds., Emotion: Theony, Research, and Experience, Vol. 1, Theories of Emotion (NewYork: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 3-33. Paul D. MacLean has described humans as having a "triunebrain" with reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian structures. The paleomammalian partof the brain, he argues, is an inheritance of lower mammals and the site of a hypothesized "limbic"system, which some evolutionary biologists believe is the biological seat of emotion. MacLean,"Sensory and Perceptive Factors in Emotional Functions of the Triune Brain," in Amelie OksenbergRorty, ed., Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 9-36.44. A short overview and synthesis is Ross Buck, "The Biological Affects: A Typology," PsychologicalReview, Vol. 106, No. 2 (April 1999), pp. 301-336. Humans with intact cognitive functions, but withemotion-processing parts of their brain removed or damaged, do not make what we wouldconsider rational decisions. See Antonio P. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the

Human Brain (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1994).45. Jeffrey B. Rosen and Jay Schulkin, "From Normal Fear to Pathological Anxiety," PsychologicalReviezv, Vol. 105, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 325-350; Stephan G. Anagostaras, Michelle D. Craske, andMichael S. Fanselow, "Anxiety: At the Intersection of Genes and Experience," Nature Neuroscience,Vol. 2, No. 9 (September 1999), pp. 780-782; and Ewe Frey and Richard G.M. Morris, "SynapticTagging and Long-Term Potentiation," Nature, February 6, 1997, pp. 533-536. Also Margaret Keane,personal correspondence, May 18, 1999.



14/42


clinging to his position that NATO should accept nothing less than a settlementgiving autonomy to the Albanian Kosovars inside Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.But this goal is not only unattainable, it's also undesirable. Does anyoneseriously believe the Albanian Kosovars and Serbs can live together again?"They continued, "Now Kosovo is consumed by a war that stems from hatredsborn of great cruelties that Albanians and Serbs have inflicted on each otherin the past. This war could have been avoided if they had been separated bypolitical partition at some earlier point. "46

Conversely, cognitive psychology regards emotions as a result of thoughtsand beliefs:47 "Learning, memory, perception, and thought-in short cognitiveactivity-are always key causal aspects of the emotional response pattern."48Further, commitments, goals, and values-motivation-also influence emo-tional response and are related to another critical aspect of the cognitiveapproach, the idea of appraisal, where emotional responses are in part basedon a person's evaluation of an event's significance for their well-being. MagdaArnold argued that humans are constantly deliberating or appraising, and thisinfluences emotional responses such as fear: "We remember what happened tous in the past, how this thing has affected us and what we did about it. Thenwe imagine how it will affect us this time and estimate whether it will beharmful."49 Social learning theory suggests that emotions, and behaviors asso-ciated with emotions (e.g., aggression), are not "natural" but learned andreinforced through social interactions.50 Emotions are amenable to revision bycognitive means. Cognitive psychology also explores the reverse association-how emotions influence cognition.

Social constructivist theories in psychology stress cultural and contextualvariations in emotions and conclude that emotions are not entirely or evenprimarily natural. Rather, "weak" constructivists contend that there is a con-tinuum from the natural to the social-specifically, that much of what isconsidered to be emotion is socially constructed. James Averill argues that

46. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, "Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing," New YorkTimes, April 19, 1999, p. A23.47. For reviews, see Richard S. Lazarus, "Progress on a Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory

of Emotion," American Psychologist, Vol. 46, No. 8 (August 1991), pp. 819-834; and Lazarus, AllenD. Kanner, and Susan Folkman, "Emotions: A Cognitive-Phenomenological Analysis," in Plutchikand Kellerman, Emotion, pp. 189-217.48. Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman, "Emotions," p. 192.49. Quoted in June Crawford, Susan Kippax, Jenny Onyx, Una Gault, and Pam Benton, Emotionand Gender: Constructing Meaning from Memory (London: Sage, 1992), p. 24 (emphasis in original).50. Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,1973).



15/42


"emotions are responses that have been institutionalized by society as a meansof resolving conflicts which exist within social systems."51 "Strong" construc-tivists such as Rom Harre suggest that "emotions can exist only in the recip-rocal exchanges of a social encounter" and that emotions may only beunderstood in their social context, specifically their place in the "local moralorder."52 Claire Armon-Jones outlines four elements to the argument thatemotions are

"socioculturally" constituted. First, "emotions are characterizedby attitudes such as beliefs, judgments, and desires, the contents of which arenot natural, but are determined by the systems of cultural belief, value, andmoral value of particular communities." Second, the attitudes that characterizeemotions are learned, not innate. Third, emotions are context-sensitive sharedexpectations prescribed by social groups for specific social situations. Fourth,"emotions are constituted in order to serve sociocultural functions. . . . torestrain undesirable attitudes and behaviour, and to sustain and endorse cul-tural values."53 Theories of nationalism that stress the social construction of

nations and nationalist sentiments are analogous in their assumptions to thesocial constructivist school of emotion.In sum, naturalist or biological theories of emotion are dominant in Western

culture and psychology. Further, clinical psychiatry appears to offer supportfor biological theories of emotion. On the other hand, evidence from cognitivepsychology supports the argument that emotions and behavioral responses toemotions are learned, and that both feelings and behavior are influenced byhow individuals think about events. Further, social contructivists highlight thecross-cultural variation and the social functions of emotions. Cognitive and

social constructivist theories are usually opposed to biological theories, al-though these approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive; biological,cognitive, and social constructivist approaches to emotion account for findingsat different levels (cellular, behavioral, social, etc.) and explain differentfindings altogether. Specifically, as the research on pathological fear suggests,no one theoretical approach will likely be able to account for the complexrelationships between experience, perception, cognition, culture, and biology.

51. James R. Averill, "Emotion and Anxiety: Sociocultural, Biological, and Psychological Determi-nants," in Rorty, Explaining Emotions, pp. 37-72, at p. 37. Social constructivist theories of emotionare in some senses functional theories and subject to all the critiques appropriate to any functionalaccount.52. Rom Harr6, "An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint," in Harre, ed., The SocialConstruction of Emotions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 2-14, at pp. 5, 6.53. Claire Armon-Jones, "The Thesis of Constructionism," in ibid., pp. 32-55, at pp. 33-34.



16/42


Propositions n Emotion n World Politics

The time is ripe for addressing emotion in world politics and, at the same time,the politically consequential situations of international relations may contrib-ute insights and evidence to work on emotion undertaken in other disciplines.Much more basic work would be required before a comprehensive theory ofemotion in world politics could be constructed and find support. Nevertheless,with appropriate humility, I suggest propositions on the incidence and vari-ation of emotion, as well as emotions' effects on perception, cognition, andprocesses or behavior in world politics that realist, liberal, constructivist, andpoststructuralist scholars may investigate. Several of the propositions articulateassertions about emotions that are implicit in international relations theory Inother instances, I draw on insights from other fields, applying them to theproblems of foreign policy decisionmaking, war, peace, and diplomacy Inarticulating these propositions, I do not assume a sharp division betweencognition and emotion, nor do I assume that biological, cognitive, or construc-tivist approaches are correct. Rather, I am agnostic about theoretical ap-proaches for the reasons given above.

INCIDENCE AND VARIATION OF EMOTION

The theoretical approaches to emotion described above suggest that emotionsare ubiquitous even as the level of feeling, the type of emotional expression,and the behaviors associated with specific emotions vary withiii and acrosscultures. And obviously, individuals also vary in their emotions, emotionalexpression, and behavior over time and in different settings. Further, cognitiveand social constructivist theories of emotion suggest that emotions are malle-able depending on context and social learning.

EXPRESSION. Biological theories of emotion suggest that emotions will beuniversally expressed, although their expression and effects will vary in inten-sity. Emotions are a human (or more generally, animal) characteristic. Strongcultural taboos against expressing particular emotions may make it difficult,however, to notice and study emotions. So, to analyze emotions, researchersmay need to ask different questions than are generally asked by scholars ofworld politics and engage in cross-cultural comparisons during crisis and"normal" decisionmaking periods.

Even though emotions are ubiquitous, they are most likely to be articulatedand noticed in a crisis. Cuban missile crisis participants, for example, spoke ofboth their fear and the potential for escalation to conventional and nuclear war.



17/42

The Passion of World Politics 131

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said, "We are fearful of theseMiG-21s" based in Cuba. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, "Mr. Khrushchev... knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knowsthat we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent thathe has to live under fear of ours."54 British Prime Minister Harold Macmillantold President John F. Kennedy early in the crisis that he was "anxious," and

he expressed empathy for the United States: "I feel very sorry for you and allthe troubles. I've been through them. I only want to tell you how much wefeel for you."55 Members of the Executive Committee of the National SecurityCouncil (ExComm) were concerned not to display fear of the Soviet Union.56As National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy said, "We don't want to lookas if we got scared off from anything."57 On one of the most hectic days of thecrisis, Vice President Lyndon Johnson said: "Every damn place you go, there'sfear. If you walk into Turkey, they've got to be insecure. Berlin. People feel it.They don't know why they feel it and how. But they feel it."58 Only after theCuban missile crisis did some key U.S. decisionmakers stress their fear, if onlyin some cases to say that some of their fear was "mistaken" and the dangersof war were not so great.59 This example suggests that diaries, transcripts, andwhere feasible, post hoc interviews with actors may help scholars understandthe role and consequences of emotions, paying attention to the subtle waysemotions are expressed, managed, and denied, and what happens to those whoexpress emotions in decisionmaking settings.

VARIATION. If emotions and emotional relationships are cognitive and so-cially constructed, one can expect different expressions historically, withinsocieties, and across cultures. Emotions may have differing salience and be-havioral components in different organizational and cultural settings. Cogni-tive theories stress preexisting beliefs and social learning: what actors believeabout a situation will determine, at least in part, their emotional reaction,including behavioral and even physiological components of emotional re-

54. Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: nside the White House during theCuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 60.55. Ibid., pp. 286-287. This raises the question of why leaders believe it important to expressempathy.56. Ibid., p. 91.57. Ibid., p. 238.58. Quoted in ibid., p. 587.59. A more sanguine view of danger and fear in the crisis is McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival:Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 422; see alsopp. 453-458. For a sense of fear and intensity, see Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of theCuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).



18/42


sponse. So there should be cross-cultural variations in the recognition, value,and role of emotions in decisionmaking and action. Research shows bothsimilarities and differences in expression, recognition, value, and even physi-ological associations with emotion across cultures.60 For example, apart fromthe normative commitment to nonviolence that is usually characteristic ofpeaceful societies, in some nonviolent societies, fear of others is associated with

retreat and reassurance, rather than hostility and aggression.61 What factorsinfluence the response to fear?

Particular emotions will likely have different salience and expression withinorganizations, and small informal groups are more likely to be affected byemotion and emotional relationships than larger organizations governed byroutines and characterized by impersonal contact. Indeed, some organizationswill stress certain emotions, if those feelings are considered useful to theirmission, while others may deemphasize emotions. Groups whose memberswork without rigid lines of responsibility and authority, and groups thatdepend on extreme self-sacrifice by individual members, may use positiveemotional appeals more often, and consequently come to rely more on suchappeals in the absence of developing a formal chain of authority or reducingself-sacrifice.

LEARNING. If emotions and emotional relationships are at least to somedegree determined cognitively and socially, then emotions are labile; emotionscan be learned and (with some difficulty) relearned, as can the behavioralcomponents of emotions. Social learning theories may help in unrderstandinghow aggressive nationalist and ethnocentric beliefs and their associated emo-tions are used to mobilize states' populations for war. Specifically, not only arebeliefs socialized, so are emotions and emotional relationships. Further, thelevel of emotion may be manipulated. Clausewitz argues that the "passionsthat are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people."62Whether existing passions may, in any instance, be heightened depends on thehistorical context; the existence of wartime public relations (propaganda) de-partments is a testament to the importance of both implanting and kindlingemotions in domestic populations to mobilize support and sacrifice for war.Conversely, cognitivist and social constructivist understandings of how emo-

60. Batja Mesquita and Nico H. Frijda, "Cultural Variations in Emotions: A Review," PsychologicalBulletin, Vol. 112, No. 2 (March 1992), pp. 179-204.61. Bruce D. Bonta, "Cooperation and Competition in Peaceful Societies," Psychological Bulletin,Vol. 121, No. 2 (March 1997), pp. 299-320.62. Clausewitz, On War, p. 89.



19/42


tions may be shaped by learning implies that even beliefs and emotions thatare tightly linked may be relearned. This emphasis on learning has implica-tions for helping policymakers who seek to contain or eliminate aggressivenationalism.

EMOTION AND PERCEPTION

Diplomats as well as scholars of international relations have long understoodthe importance of perception in world politics. For example, the concept of asecurity dilemma pivots on perceptions of intention, not reality: what onegroup does to defend itself may be percieved as aggressive by another group.Emotions are part of perceptual processes.

INTERPRETATION. Like intentions, emotions may be misperceived. Culturaldistance or difference affects one's ability to interpret others' emotions. Differ-ences between cultures, sexes, and groups' attitudes toward emotion and itsexpression are often stereotyped and exaggerated. Alternatively, differences are

also sometimes not taken into account. Individuals tend to view other group'semotions differently from members of that group's own understanding of theiremotions, and cultural distance may determine the ability to decode emotion.63Who has not heard statements that some other culture is "unemotional" anddoes not value life the way the speaker's culture does, or that some otherculture is "irrational"?64 Cultural distance may also be found within cultures.Specifically, men and women in the West have stereotypes about the level andkind of male versus female emotions. Yet "men and women do not differdramatically in their immediate reports of emotional experience, even in con-

texts that are differently relevant for men and women (control vs. intimacy).This finding raises the possibility that women's 'greater emotionality' is aculturally constructed idea, based on observed differences in emotional expres-sion-differences which are socialized from a very early age."65 Scholars con-cerned with perception ought to attend to the social construction of emotions

63. Jeffery Pittam, Cynthia Gallois, Saburo Iwawaki, and Pieter Kroonenberg, "Australian andJapanese Concepts of Expressive Behavior," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 5(September 1995), pp. 451-473.64. George Kennan's 1946 long telegram is an example. Kennan argues that the Soviet leadership

is "impervious to the logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to the logic of force." Kennan alsodescribes the Soviet leadership and Russian people as fearful. "Moscow Embassy Telegram #511,"in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy andStrategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 50-63, at p. 61.65. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Lucy Robin, Paula Pietromonaco, and Kristen M. Eyssell, "Are Womenthe 'More Emotional' Sex? Evidence from Emotional Experiences in Social Context," Cognition andEmotion, Vol. 12, No. 4 (July 1998), pp. 555-578, at p. 575.



20/42


within and across groups. If one group consistently views another as hostilerather than fearful-and this perception is reinforced by that group's tendencyto issue bellicose statements when it feels threatened-spirals of mispercep-tions seem more likely

EMOTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. Individuals and groups put their relationshipsto others into emotional categories that influence their perceptions of the other,

especially how ambiguous actions and situations are interpreted. Becausemany behaviors are ambiguous, foreign policy decisionmakers constantly at-tribute causes and motives to others' behavior. They must therefore assesswhether what others articulate as the reason for their actions is the true causeor reason. Such assessments are vital to any understanding of a situation andfor determining who is a friend and who is a threat. Attribution may be "quiterational" as Robert Jervis supposes, as decisionmakers analyze the behavior ofothers "in a form something like an equation, assuming what the other expectsto gain from an action must be at least equal to the expected costs and risks."66

More likely, however, the prior emotional relationship between groups mayinfluence the assignment of reasons and intentions (attributions) to others'behavior.

Categories of emotional relationships may be neutral and detached, or morelikely they may be emotional-characterized, for example, by empathy, antipa-thy, or hostility, and affected by ethnocentrism and nationalism. Mercer arguesthat "the more we identify with our group, the more likely we are to discrimi-nate against out-groups.... Group comparisons are not neutral."67 A preexist-ing feeling that a relationship is warm, or one that is characterized by

empathetic understanding with the other, may help actors frame ambiguousbehavior as neutral, positive, or motivated by circumstances rather than hostileintentions. Conversely, fear and antipathy may promote negative evaluations

66. Robert Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," in Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology andDeterrence, pp. 13-33, at p. 15. Policymakers may also attribute internal differences in policypreferences to emotion. For example, ExComm members Paul Nitze and Douglas Dillon thoughtthat Robert McNamara and George Ball were overly cautious in the Cuban missile crisis. Dillonsaid: "I didn't understand then, and I don't understand now, why people worried so much aboutone limited, conventional action leading to nuclear war. The idea is preposterous! The only

explanation I can think of is that Ball's (and McNamara's) relative inexperience in these matterscaused them to draw unwarranted conclusions. I think they may have let their fears run awaywith them, mainly because they had never been through anything like this before." Quoted inBlight, The Shattered Crystal Ball, pp. 80-81.67. Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring1995), pp. 229-252, at p. 251.



21/42


and make a neutral or positive reception of ambiguous behaviors and eventsless likely For example, despite indications that the U.S. bombing of China'sembassy in Belgrade in May 1999 was a targeting error, of which there hadalready been several, some Chinese officials interpreted U.S. intentions in anegative way 68 Had the bombing been of an embassy whose government hadmore positive or neutral relations with the United States, a less sinister attri-

bution of hostile intention would have been more likely.The emotional relationship between interlocutors almost certainly affects the

likelihood of reaching agreement during negotiations. Expressions of increasedempathy may lead to greater flexibility in negotiations, whereas dehumaniza-tion, demonization, and enmity may have the opposite consequences, fosteringharsher interactions and inflexibility Marc Ross argues that as "empathy de-velops, exchanges are more effective, parties are more open to a range ofoptions that speak to each party's interests, and viable agreements becomemore attractive to all."69 Further, just as emotions are labile, emotional relation-

ships may be altered. So the categorization of a group's emotional relationshipto another group, and therefore the behaviors a group deems normativelyobliged to enact, may change if empathy or antipathy are elicited throughcontact.70

68. U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said the embassy bombing "really chilledrelations for almost five months" and slowed U.S. negotiations with China on its entry into theWorld Trade Organization. Quoted in "C.I.A.'s Gaffe? A Male Failing," New York Times, November3, 1999, p. Al0.

69. Marc Howard Ross, The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in ComparativePerspective (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 107-108. See also White, FearfulWarriors; nd Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997). The amount and kind of contact is important: greatercontact and knowledge of cross-group friendship may decrease negative attitudes toward others.See Stephen C. Wright, Arthur Aaron, Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, and Stacy Ropp, "The ExtendedContact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice," Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 73-90. See also Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil:The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).Eliciting empathy may be useful in conflict management. Psychologist Herbert Kelman has longattempted to influence the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by putting the parties together innonthreatening, off-the-record circumstances to promote empathetic understanding among indi-viduals in the two groups. See Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving: The Uses and Limits of a

Therapeutic Model for the Resolution of International Conflicts," in Vamik D. Volkan, Joseph V.Montville, and Demetrios A. Julius, eds., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol. 2,Unofficial Diplomacy at Work (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 145-160.70. Colonizers' increased empathy toward the colonized explains in part the trend toward decolo-nization in the mid-twentieth century. Neta C. Crawford, "Decolonization as an InternationalNorm: The Evolution of Practices, Arguments, and Beliefs," in Laura Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds.,



22/42


THREAT PERCEPTION. Individuals are biased toward threat perception,whether or not a threats exists, though threats are also cognitively processedand their meaning is socially constructed. Evolutionary biology stresses theadaptive function of emotions, suggesting that humans are hardwired to detectthreats so that they can increase the likelihood of surviving them. As ArneOhman argues: "The perceptual system is likely to be biased in the direction

of a low threshold for discovering threat.... the system is biased sometimesto evoke defense in actually non-threatening contexts."71 Threat perception,which happens at a much faster rate than the cognitive processing of potentialthreats, alerts the body to prepare to acquire more information and to respondto the fearful stimulus. Ohman notes that it is "less costly to abort falselyinitialized defense responses than to fail to elicit one when the threat is real."72He further notes that "an anxious mood activates memory information cen-tered on threat, which in turn facilitates processing of threat-related informa-tion."73 Institutionalized tension, as for example during cold wars and armsraces, may heighten the tendency to perceive threats.

Conversely, even though in the natural world some "threats" seem obvious,much of what is considered "threatening" in the social world is cognitivelyprocessed and socially constructed.74 For instance, even the Soviet missile sitesthat the United States discovered in Cuba during October 1962 had to beunderstood as threatening.75 Because the United States was already under thethreat of Soviet-based nuclear weapons, the question was whether Sovietnuclear missiles based in Cuba created a qualitatively different gtate of affairsrequiring a U.S. response. As the president said, "You may say it doesn't makeany difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union

Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sci-ences, 1993), pp. 37-61.71. Arne Ohman, "Fear and Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena: Clinical Phenomenology, Evolu-tionary Perspectives, and Information Processing Mechanisms," in Lewis and Haviland, The Hand-book of Emotions, pp. 511-536, at p. 520.72. Ibid., p. 521.73. Ibid., p. 524.74. Joe Tomaka, Jim Blascovich, Jeffrey Kibler, and John M. Ernst, "Cognitive and PhysiologicalAntecedents of Threat and Challenge Appraisal," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.

73, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 63-72; and Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson, and RaymondDuvall, "Introduction: Constructing Insecurity," in Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, eds.,Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1999), pp. 1-33.75. See Jutta Weldes, "The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba," inWeldes et al., Cultures of Insecurity, pp. 35-62.



23/42


or one that was 90 miles away."76 Gen. Maxwell Taylor saw the Soviet actionas threatening: "I think it was cold-blooded from their point of view, Mr.President. You're quite right in saying that these are just a few more missilestargeted on the United States. However, they can become a very, a ratherimportant adjunct and reinforcement to the strike capability of the SovietUnion. We have no idea how far they will go."77 Undersecretary of State

George Ball argued that the Soviet weapons were "a trading ploy."78 ByOctober 22, President Kennedy seems to have decided that the Soviets' movesin Cuba were linked to their desire to control all of Berlin.79 In sum, cognitiveprocessing and the social construction of meaning in this case helped decision-makers to decide whether the United States was justified in seeing the Sovietmoves as threatening and whether the United States had reason to be afraid.

EMOTION AND COGNITION

Cognition-in particular, information gathering; information processing; cal-

culation of cost, risk, and benefit; use of analogy; and receptivity to argument-is influenced by emotion.

INFORMATION GATHERING AND PROCESSING. Emotions influence the perfor-mance and content of information gathering and processing by individualsand groups. It is commonplace to acknowledge that moderate stress im-proves cognitive performance, whereas too much stress impairs perfor-mance, especially memory and information processing.80 Emotional arousalmay have analogous effects. Thus cognition and emotional relationships allowand shape the identification of threats, whereas emotion may influence the

ability to acquire, prioritize, and sort new information. This can work in severalways.

First, mood influences information processing. Somewhat counterintuitively,individuals in a "bad" or negative mood are more attentive to detail andanalytic than those in a "good" or positive mood. The cognitions of those whoare feeling bad are "characterized by considerable attention to detail, careful,step-by-step analysis of available information, and a high degree of logical

76. May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 90-91.77. Ibid., p. 90.78. Ibid., pp. 99, 100.79. For instance, Kennedy states as much: "This is a probing action preceding Berlin, to seewhether we accept it or not." See ibid., p. 235. He also implies this in his telephone conversationwith British Prime Minister Macmillan on October 22. See ibid., pp. 283-286.80. Janis and Mann, Decision Making; and Vertzberger, The World n Their Minds, p. 178.



24/42


consistency, although probably associated with a lack of creativity" Further,while those who feel good may be more creative, they are more likely to usea "processing strategy that relies heavily on the use of simple heuristics, andthat is characterized by a lack of logical consistency and little attention todetail," resulting in lower performance on "tasks that require analytic, detail-oriented strategies. "81

Second, high anxiety may result in individuals reducing information gath-ering and processing, avoiding those pieces of information that make them feelworse (or emphasizing what makes them feel better), or shutting down com-pletely 82 Josef Stalin froze upon learning of the German invasion of the SovietUnion in 1941, and believed that the attack was an unauthorized action byGerman generals, not a betrayal. Others-for example, Kaiser Wilhelm onlearning about Russian mobilization in July 1914-emphasize a threateninginterpretation of events. Richard Ned Lebow writes:

The Kaiser actually appears to have suffered an acute anxiety reaction on July30. He was withdrawn and irritable, and displayed a sense of helplessness. Healso exaggerated the gravity of the political situation and his own inability todo anything about it. His incredible misinterpretation that morning of theczar's cable is illustrative of his impaired cognitive functioning. The messagemerely repeated the already known fact that Russia had implemented militarypreparations against Austria-Hungary, adding that these measures had com-menced five days previously. Wilhelm misread the cable and concluded thatRussia had begun mobilizing against Germany five days earlier. The Kaiserinstantly reverted to a mood of profound despair and aggressiveness. Hedropped his interest in mediation and talked instead of mobilization in orderto prevent Russia from gaining the upper hand. "I cannot commit myselfto mediation any more," he wrote on the telegram, "since the Czar, whoappealed for it, has at the same time been secretly mobilizing behind my back.It is only a maneuver to keep us dangling and increase the lead he has alreadygained over us. My task is at an end."83

Conversely, moderate fear and anxiety, or a combination of fear and un-avoidable responsibility, may induce individuals to gather more informationabout perceived threats and to work hard to find answers to difficult dilemmas.McGeorge Bundy argues that although the risk of nuclear war during the

81. Norbert Schwarz and Herbert Bless, "Happy and Mindless, but Sad and Smart? The Impactof Affective States on Analytic Reasoning," in Joseph P. Forgas, Emotion and Social Judgements NewYork: Pergamon Press, 1991), pp. 55-71, at p. 56.82. See Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore,Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 115-118; and Janis and Mann, Decision Making.83. Lebow, Between Peace and War, p. 142 (emphasis in original).



25/42


Cuban missile crisis was "small," the "nuclear danger was at least ten timesgreater than either Kennedy or Khrushchev can have wished, and as I read therecord, this danger drove them both toward quick resolution."84 Similarly,James Blight argues that "fear played an adaptive role in the resolution of theCuban missile crisis."85

What accounts for whether fear will lead to better or worse coping in

stressful situations? Blight suggests that foresight is important, as is responsi-bility: "Whereas leaders in 1914 could not foresee the extent of the catastrophicresults of a war, the leaders of the nuclear superpowers can hardly fail toimagine the catastrophic results of a nuclear World War III. This is 'the crystalball effect' that guarantees that no matter what situation leaders of the super-powers may 'find themselves in, they will, if they have not gone mad, see inthe crystal ball the same irremediable nuclear catastrophe."86

But responsibility may cut both ways. Concentration of authority may createa concentration of pressure that amplifies anxiety. Left alone to make enor-

mously fateful decisions, decisionmakers may be overwhelmed by fear. In-deed, if taking only emotions into account, one would expect betterdecisionmaking in democracies or highly bureaucratized states, where there isan effective division of labor, rather than in monarchies, oligarchies, andauthoritarian states. Informing people in advance that they will be held ac-countable for their decisions can also increase the quality of their decisionmak-ing; as Philip Tetlock and Jae Kim argue, "Accountability ... may have createdan optimal level of arousal."87

It may be that overall emotional context (optimistic or pessimistic) also

matters for coping. Specifically, "When there is hopelessness, no amount ofthreat stimulates greater interest and learning. It is only when there is hopethat anxiety alters people's views."88 Further, an individual's experience and

84. Bundy, Danger and Survival, p. 461.85. Blight, The Shattered Crystal Ball, p. 169.86. Ibid., p. 98. Further, responsible individuals may believe that it is their role to find solutions,while prior personal experience of effective crisis decisionmaking may reinforce their confidence.Richard Neustadt recalls that "at the end of a TV interview he did in 1962, [President] Kennedysaid, 'The President bears the burden of the responsibility; advisors can move on to fresh advice."'Quoted in ibid., pp. 135-136.

87. Philip E. Tetlock and Jae I1 Kim, "Accountability and Judgement Processes in a PersonalityPrediction Task," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 52, No. 4 (April 1987), pp. 700-709,at p. 707. See also Jennifer S. Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock, "Accounting for the Effects of Account-ability," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 125, No. 2 (March 1999), pp. 255-275.88. Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato, "Emotions, Issue Importance, and Political Learning," p. 569.Other emotions, such as sadness or a disappointing sense of betrayal, may contribute to anindividual's sense of hopelessness: "Threat alone is not sufficient because it may cause one to



26/42


training may promote a sense of competence and hopefulness about theirability to manage. As Jervis notes, "The presence or absence of instructions onhow to cope with danger and discussion of the effectiveness of countermea-sures greatly affect the influence of fear."89

Finally, emotions, particularly emotional relationships with others in thedecisionmaking group, can affect individual information processing in thecontext of group decisionmaking. Thus Irving Janis noted cognitive, affiliative,and egocentric constraints on "vigilant information processing."90 To managethese constraints, decisionmakers use cognitive heuristics, affiliative prac-tices such as following the party line, concurrence seeking (groupthink)and suppression of dissent, and egocentric practices such as defensive avoid-ance.

EVALUATION. Emotions influence actors' understanding of the past andsense of what is possible in the future in four ways; emotions influence recall,the use of analogy, the evaluation of past choices, and the consideration ofcounterfactuals. The link between emotions and recall goes both ways: particu-lar memories are linked to particular emotions and, conversely, current emo-tions influence the recall of memories.91 For example, the experience of fearmay prompt memories focused on threat.92 On the other hand, thinking about

withdraw. Hope alone is insufficient because it may lead to wishful thinking. Yet the combinationof perceiving a threat to one's values or goals but having some hope of success can triggerincreased information gathering. It does so by increasing the perceived importance of the subject."Ibid., p. 570. See also Richard S. Lazarus, "Hope: An Emotion and a Vital Coping'Resource againstDespair," Social Research, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 653-678.89. Jervis, Perception and Misperception n International Politics, p. 374. But although drills, standardoperating procedures, and strict routines may help individuals ignore or productively use theirfear, these behaviors can also lead to inflexibility and overconfidence. So, for better crisis decision-making, decisionmakers ought to be experienced but not too experienced, and if they are afraid,hopeful.90. Cognitive constraints (such as lack of time or preexisting beliefs) limit the amount and qualityof information processing; affiliative constraints, which arise in group contexts, include the needsfor power, acceptability, consensus, and social support; egocentric constraints arise from strongpersonal motives, emotions, and needs. Irving Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership n Policy Makingand Crisis Management (New York: Free Press, 1989); and Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1972).91. Gordon H. Bower, "Mood and Memory," American Psychologist, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 1981),pp. 129-148; Susan Mineka and Kathleen Nugent, "Mood-Congruent Memory Biases in Anxietyand Depression," in Daniel L. Schacter, ed., Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and SocietiesReconstruct the Past (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 173-193; and StephanB. Hamann, Timothy D. Ely, Scott T. Grafton, and Clinton D. Kilts, "Amygdala Activity Related toEnhanced Memory for Pleasant and Aversive Stimuli," Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March1999), pp. 289-293.92. Ohman, "Fear and Anxiety as Emotional Phenomena," p. 528.



27/42


a past fearful event may cause a person to feel fearful in the present. And whilemuch of the research on emotional memories focuses on fear, other emotionsmay alter neurochemistry and be similarly stored in the brain.

Analogical reasoning, an important aspect of foreign policy decisionmaking,may be affected by emotion. Yuen Foong Khong, argues that "analogies arecognitive devices that 'help' policy makers perform six diagnostic tasks centralto political decision-making. Analogies (1) help define the nature of the situ-ation confronting the policymaker, (2) help assess the stakes, and (3) provideprescriptions. They help evaluate options by (4) predicting their chances ofsuccess, (5) evaluating their moral rightness, and (6) warning about dangersassociated with the options."93 Individuals should use historical analogies thatfit in terms of sharing important characteristics or causal features with thepresent situation, yet analogies are often poorly chosen. Decisionmakers whofeel overwhelmed in unprecedented and dangerous situations may search foranalogies and try to apply the lessons of the past to the present crisis as a wayof coping with anxiety, yet it is not clear why some historical anal