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Course Material 1. Overview of Process Safety 2. Compliance with standards 3. Process Hazard Analysis 4. Standard Operating Procedures 5. Safe Work Procedures 6. Mechanical Integrity 7. Management of Change 8. Auditing Process Safety systems 9. Emergency response procedures

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Course Material. Overview of Process Safety Compliance with standards Process Hazard Analysis Standard Operating Procedures Safe Work Procedures Mechanical Integrity Management of Change Auditing Process Safety systems Emergency response procedures. 5. Safe Work Procedures. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Course Material

Course Material

1. Overview of Process Safety2. Compliance with standards3. Process Hazard Analysis4. Standard Operating Procedures5. Safe Work Procedures6. Mechanical Integrity7. Management of Change8. Auditing Process Safety systems9. Emergency response procedures

Page 2: Course Material

5. Safe Work Procedures

Process Safety Management for

Biofuels

This material was produced under grant SH-19479-09-60-F-36 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4)

Page 3: Course Material

5. Safe Work Procedures

Process Safety Management for

Biofuels

This material was produced under grant SH-19479-09-60-F-36 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. It does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Department of Labor, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.

29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4)

Page 4: Course Material

Piper Alpha Oil Platform Explosion

Page 5: Course Material

Failure of Lock out / Tag out Procedure

Page 6: Course Material

Permit-To-Work System

Safe Work Permit

Page 7: Course Material

Safe Work Procedures Lock out / Tag out

Page 8: Course Material

Each Craft Should have Their Own Lock

Page 9: Course Material

Lock out / tag out

Safe Work Permit

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147

Page 10: Course Material

Try the Lock Out

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.147

Page 11: Course Material

Additional Information

Additional information on Lock out / Tag out procedures can be found in the document

referenced in the below link.

Page 12: Course Material

Hot Work Permit

29 CFR 1910.119 (k)

Page 13: Course Material

Hot Work Permit Requirements

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.252

Page 14: Course Material

Hot Work Permit Failure

Page 15: Course Material

Closing the PermitJoint inspection when the nonroutine work is complete

1. Valve alignment2. Blinds removed3. Sewer drains

reopened4. Vents5. Rotating equipment6. Locks and tags7. Utilities8. Barricades removed

Page 16: Course Material

Confined Space Fatalities

Page 17: Course Material

CSB Bulletin

Page 18: Course Material

Confined Space Entry Permit

Safe Work Procedures

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS

Permit-Required Confined Spaces (PRCS) standard 29 CFR 1910.146

Page 19: Course Material

“Opening Process Equipment” Fatalities

29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4)

www.csb.gov

Page 20: Course Material

“Opening Process Equipment” Fatalities

29 CFR 1910.119 (f)(4)

www.csb.gov

Page 21: Course Material

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001www.csb.gov

CSB Video on BP Amoco IncidentCan be viewed from video time 6:45 – 10:20

Page 22: Course Material

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001www.csb.gov

Fact: Three maintenance workers were fatally injured.

1. Why?The workers were working on the “Polymer Catch Tank”.

The polymer catch tank was still pressurized.

The workers partially removed the cover.

Page 23: Course Material

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001www.csb.gov

Fact: The polymer catch tank was still pressurized

2. Why?Loss of gas venting capability by catch tank.

Decomposition generating gas in core of vessel.

Pressure gauge was inoperative.

No de-energizing procedure for vessel.

Page 24: Course Material

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001www.csb.gov

Fact: There was no de-energizing procedure for tank.

3. Why?Pressure gauge and drain used as indication of de-

energized status.

Process had been shut down, was not operative.

Outdated vessel cleaning procedure was being used.

Page 25: Course Material

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001www.csb.gov

Fact: Outdated vessel cleaning procedure was being used.

4. Why?Foaming of the polymer product was not well understood by operations.

The plugging capacity of the foaming polymer was not well understood by operations.

Page 26: Course Material

BP Amoco Incident; Georgia; March, 2001www.csb.gov

Foaming and plugging of product was not well understood by operations.

5. Why?

Operations’ safe work procedures had not been modified to consider foaming of polymer material.

Operations had not taken advantage of opportunities to learn from near misses on product foaming and plugging.

Page 27: Course Material

Applicability of Previous Material

1. Overview of Process Safety2. Compliance with standards3. Process Hazard Analysis4. Standard Operating Procedures5. Safe Work Procedures

Page 28: Course Material

 

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Page 30: Course Material

Remaining Course Material

1. Overview of Process Safety2. Compliance with standards3. Process Hazard Analysis4. Standard Operating Procedures5. Safe Work Procedures6. Mechanical Integrity7. Management of Change8. Auditing Process Safety systems9. Emergency response procedures