Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency ||

Countering Global Terrorism and InsurgencyCalculating the Risk of State-Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan and IraqNatasha UnderhillISBN: 9781137383716DOI: 10.1057/9781137383716Palgrave Macmillan

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Countering Global

Natasha Underhill

Calculating the Risk of State Failure in

Terrorism and Insurgency

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq

New Security Challenges Series

General Editor: Stuart Croft, Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, and Director of the ESRC’s New Security Challenges Programme.

The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations, and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

Titles include:

Natasha UnderhillCOUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM AND INSURGENCYCalculating the Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq

Abdul Haqq BakerEXTREMISTS IN OUR MIDSTConfronting Terror

Robin CameronSUBJECTS OF SECURITYDomestic Effects of Foreign Policy in the War on Terror

Sharyl Cross, Savo Kentera, R. Craig Nation and Radovan Vukadinovic (editors)SHAPING SOUTH EAST EUROPE’S SECURITY COMMUNITY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYTrust, Partnership, Integration

Tom Dyson and Theodore KonstadinidesEUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION IN EU LAW AND IR THEORY

Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (editors)NATO: THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS

Håkan Edström and Dennis GyllensporrePOLITICAL ASPIRATIONS AND PERILS OF SECURITYUnpacking the Military Strategy of the United Nations

Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (editors)PURSUING STRATEGYNATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi

Adrian GallagherGENOCIDE AND ITS THREAT TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank WebsterANTI-WAR ACTIVISMNew Media and Protest in the Information Age

James Gow and Ivan ZverzhanovskiSECURITY, DEMOCRACY AND WAR CRIMESSecurity Sector Transformation in Serbia

10.1057/9781137383716 - Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency, Natasha Underhill

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Toni HaastrupCHARTING TRANSFORMATION THROUGH SECURITYContemporary EU-Africa Relations

Ellen Hallams, Luca Ratti and Ben Zyla (editors)NATO BEYOND 9/11The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance

Carolin HilpertSTRATEGIC CULTURAL CHANGE AND THE CHALLENGE FOR SECURITY POLICYGermany and the Bundeswehr’s Deployment to Afghanistan

Christopher Hobbs, Matthew Moran and Daniel Salisbury (editors)OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYNew Approaches and Opportunities

Paul Jackson and Peter AlbrechtRECONSTRUCTION SECURITY AFTER CONFLICTSecurity Sector Reform in Sierra Leone

Janne Haaland MatlaryEUROPEAN UNION SECURITY DYNAMICSIn the New National Interest

Sebastian Mayer (editor)NATO’s POST-COLD WAR POLITICSThe Changing Provision of Security

Kevork OskanianFEAR, WEAKNESS AND POWER IN THE POST-SOVIET SOUTH CAUCASUSA Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (editors)WHOSE PEACE? CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING

Nathan RogerIMAGE WARFARE IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Aglaya Snetkov and Stephen ArisTHE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS TO SECURITYOther Sides of Afghanistan

Ali Tekin and Paul Andrew WilliamsGEO-POLITICS OF THE EURO-ASIA ENERGY NEXUSThe European Union, Russia and Turkey

New Security Challenges SeriesSeries Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–00216–6 (hardback) and ISBN 978–0–230–00217–3 (paperback)

You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBNs quoted above.

Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England


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Countering Global Terrorism and InsurgencyCalculating the Risk of State Failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq

Natasha UnderhillLecturer in International Relations, Nottingham Trent University, UK


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© Natasha Underhill 2014

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of thispublication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmittedsave with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publicationmay be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2014 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978–1–137–38370–9

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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.


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For my father James Underhill – gone but never forgotten


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vii

Contents

List of Figures and Tables x

Preface xi

1 Understanding Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure 1 The problems of defining terrorism 2 What are the most common types of terrorism? 6 Insurgency 10 The problems of defining insurgency 11 What are the most common types of insurgency? 14 State failure 17 Defining and understanding state failure 17 Assessing and ranking a failed states 22 Summary 27

2 Assessing the Connections between State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism 28

Failed states, terrorism, and insurgency: what are the connections? 30

State failure = a terrorist/insurgent threat? 34 Summary 35

3 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 1 37

The pre-Soviet era 38 The Soviet era (1979–1989) 40 The Taliban era (1994–2001) 43 9/11 and beyond 45 State failure in context: Afghanistan a failed state? 47 Government/state weakness 49 Breakdown/decline of social, political, and economic order 51 Safe havens 53 Porous borders 54 Pools of recruits 55 Availability of weapons 57 Government complicity and support 58


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viii Contents

4 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 2 61

Terrorism in Afghanistan 61 Factors influencing terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan 64 Part 1: Political factors 64 Part 2: Economic factors 72 Part 3: Social/cultural factors 76 Part 4: External and environmental factors 78 Summary 80

5 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 1 83

The creation of a nation-state 84 Pakistan’s rapidly changing leadership 85 Musharraf’s Pakistan 91 Failure in context: Pakistan a failed state? 93 The Pakistani state: connections to terrorism and insurgency 98 Government/state weakness 98 Breakdown and decline of social, political,

and economic order 100 Safe havens 101 Porous borders 101 Pool of recruits 103 Availability of weapons 103 Government complicity/support 104

6 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 2 109

Terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan 109 The origins of state failure, terrorism and

insurgency in Pakistan 112 Part 1: Political factors 112 Part 2: Economic factors 120 Part 3: Social/cultural factors 122 Part 4: External and environmental factors 125 Summary 129

7 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 1 130

The pre-Saddam Hussein era 130 The Saddam Hussein era (1979–2003) 132 US invasion and post-Saddam Iraq 137


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Contents ix

Failure in context: Iraq a failed state? 143 The Iraqi state connections to terrorism and insurgency 146 Safe havens 146 Porous borders 147 Pool of recruits 149 Availability of weapons 150 Government complicity and support 151 Summary 152

8 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 2 153

Part 1: Political factors 153 Part 2: Economic factors 159 Part 3: Social/cultural factors 163 Part 4: External and environmental factors 165 Summary 172

9 Conclusion 174 Main findings of research 179 Concluding observations 186

Notes 189

Bibliography 212

Index 229


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x

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

1.1 Spectrum of state failure 25

1.2 Augmented spectrum of state failure 26

8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2012–2013 169

Tables

1.1 Definitions of terrorism 2

1.2 Definitions of insurgency 14

1.3 Definitions of state failure 19

1.4 Root causes of state failure 22

1.5 Studies and assessments of state failure 24

2.1 Foreign terrorist organisations 31

2.2 Failed states and incidents of terrorism 33

3.1 Afghanistan’s rank in Transparency International’s annual CPI 48

4.1 Terrorist groups in Afghanistan 63

6.1 Terrorist/insurgent groups in Pakistan 111

7.1 Sanctions regimes in Iraq 136

8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2003–2014 168

9.1 Impact of factors used in case studies 180

9.2 Alternative state failure descriptions of the case studies 182


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xi

Preface

It has been argued that the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in international relations and also the beginning of the modern process of state failure. The immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse was that the world was no longer bipolar in its power structure; it was now a US-led unipolar world. Along with this drastic shift came a change in the understanding and focus of transnational threats. The issue of a possible nuclear holocaust was now removed, and replacing it was a new set of threats, including climate change, disease, poverty, the pro-liferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and international organised crime.1 It was also during this time that failed states became a focus of international security studies. At this early stage, however, the issue was not seen as one that posed a risk to the international system or to international security in general. It was instead seen as having temporary or little significance to the world other than in the arena of humanitarian aid.2 In this regard, policy debates in the 1990s centred on a number of core areas, including: humanitarian (through the use of military) intervention (i.e. whether/when/how to intervene in failed states); prevention; conflict resolution and peace-building; and policy responses to particular aspects and/or consequences of state failure (e.g. migration and disease). These were the key threats assigned to the failed states of the world and there was little talk about their connections to the growing trend of transnational terrorism with an Islamic flavour or with the possible ties to the emergence of insurgencies.

This all changed with the events of September 11th 2001, after which there emerged a growing number of arguments claiming that there was a possible or even direct connection between these failed states, ter-rorism, and insurgent activity. Essentially, state failure was now being directly linked to this new era of transnational/international ‘Islamic’ terrorism and was seen as somehow being a key element in preventing further attacks. Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a rapid expansion of global counterterrorism efforts whose focus has been placed solely on the prevention of the development of terrorist bases of operations and terrorist safe havens within these failed states. These attacks, it seemed, have acted as a much-needed wake-up call for international leaders, showing them that it was possible for some of the world’s most neglected states to become centres of global terrorism. This new way


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xii Preface

of thinking essentially emerged from the fact that the perpetrators and planners of these attacks were traced back to one of the world’s poorest states – Afghanistan. As a result, the supposed threats from these failed states began to move to the forefront of counter-terrorism policy, espe-cially that of the US. Since then, this centrality of failed states within the global terrorist nexus has remained a persistent theme in both foreign policy development and counterterrorism policy. It has also now become the mantra of counter-insurgency theorists, who also posit that the world’s failed states are significant players with regard to the emergence of violent insurgent activity. In short, there is a widespread assumption that state failure is central to contemporary global terrorism and insurgency and therefore that addressing state failure is central to countering both phenomena.

The overall aim of this book, therefore, is to try to assess whether or not these types of failed states are more likely to promote terrorism or to facilitate the emergence of insurgencies than other forms of state, i.e. strong states. In order to adequately carry out this assessment, this book aims to answer the following key questions relating to the possible links or connections between failed states, terrorism and insurgency:

• To what extent do failed states play a role in the proliferation of terrorism and emergence of insurgent activity?

• Is it possible to trace a pattern of failure that is more susceptible to attracting or facilitating terrorism and terrorist organisations or to enabling insurgencies to emerge?

• What are the underlying conditions of state failure that allow the infiltration of terrorist organisations or insurgents into the territory of the states concerned?

By addressing these key questions it may be possible to understand whether or not there are any specific links between state failure, terrorism, and insurgency. In addition, the possibility of developing and identifying distinctive patterns of state failure that relate strongly to terrorism and insurgency will be dealt with. In order to address these issues, this book is divided into nine chapters. The first two chapters will focus on understanding terrorism, insurgency and state failure; and with assessing the connections between state failure, terrorism and insurgency.

This will be followed by six chapters based on the three case studies of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. These country studies will focus on a number of key areas, including the historical background, the current


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Preface xiii

levels of state failure, and the domestic and international terrorist threat associated with each country. In this context the challenges posed by trying to deal with the problems contained within them, and will categorise the threats that emanate from these failed states by outlin-ing, for example, how they are used as bases or safe havens by terrorist organisations, how they are used as staging grounds for attacks, and how they can be used to provide financing, recruits, and weapons for terrorist organisations. The ways, if any, in which they play a role in the emergence or facilitation of insurgencies, etc. will also be addressed. As well as that, the existing debates regarding the role played by failed states in the proliferation of terrorism on a global scale will be examined and an assessment of the existing approaches and arguments related to the relationship between state failure and terrorism will be carried out. The concluding chapter provides an overview and general assessment of the key points made throughout, providing the reader with a better understanding of the phenomena of state failure, terrorism, and insur-gency, as well as how these issues interact with one another.


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1

What do we think when we hear the word terrorism? What images are conjured in our minds? Do we see planes crashing into skyscrapers, bombs exploding in marketplaces, masked men armed with guns and bombs? The images that the term terrorism creates vary from person to person. As a concept, terrorism is one of the hardest phenomena to define. There are hundreds of ways to define terrorism and hundreds of more ways to outline its characteristics. The problem with this is that without a solid understanding and definition of the concept, it can never really be understood in its entirety. The aim of this chapter is to try to develop a context for understanding terrorism as clearly as possible. It will begin by trying to define terrorism in the modern context by providing an overview of some of the most commonly used definitions used today, and also by trying to develop a working definition to be used as a basis of understanding for the remainder of this book. From that, this chapter will then move on to look at the various different forms of terrorism that affect our world today. The focus of this section, however, will be on four distinct types of terrorism: ethno-nationalist or ethno-separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and religiously motivated terrorism, in particular Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. Again, this is a monolithic task in and of itself, but it is a necessary step that needs to be taken if a complete understanding of terrorism is to be gained. It must be noted at this early stage, however, that it is not the intention of this book to try to fully define or explain terrorism or indeed state failure. It instead seeks to provide the reader with a base from which they are able to interpret the information, from which they are able to develop their own understandings and ideas.

1Understanding Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure


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2 Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency

The problems of defining terrorism

In order to understand fully what terrorism is, a core definition or understanding is essential. However, there is still no single globally accepted definition of terrorism, which makes fully understanding the concept extremely complex. Over the last two decades there have been approximately 109 active definitions of terrorism used around the world, which adds to the complexity of fully understanding what ter-rorism is or what terrorism looks like.1 Table 1.1 contains just a few of the many listed definitions of terrorism that are in use today. In order to highlight the massive differences of understanding, the table is divided

Table 1.1 Definitions of terrorism

Organisation

US FBI/Code of Federal Regulations 28CFR Section0.85

The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.2

United Nations Draft Convention

Violence against persons or property with the aim of intimidating a population, to force or prevent action by a government or institutional organisation.3

US State Department

Terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.4

US Code Title 22 Section 2656f(d)

The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non- combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.5

European Union Intimidation used to force or prevent government action, to destabilise a state.6

Organisation of the Islamic Conference

Violence or threat thereof against persons, property, environment, resources, stability of state.7

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566

Violence; provoke terror; intimidation in order to force or prevent action by a government or international organisation.8

OECD A terrorist act is an act including, but not limited to, the use of force or violence, causing serious harm to human life with the intent to influence or destabilise any government or public entity and to provoke fear and insecurity in support of a political, religious, ethnic, ideological or similar goal.9

(continued)


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Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure 3

into two groups of definitions: those used by organisations and those used by individual states or countries.

It can be seen from these definitions that there are a number of core concepts or trends that are contained in each definition, but in general none of the definitions agrees 100% with any of the others. These discrepancies add to the confusion about how to define terrorism. and make it difficult to provide a detailed outline of the core characteristics of terrorism. Also, and making things even more confusing, there exists a massive literature base which aims to try to create working definitions and understandings of terrorism. Throughout this literature there is an ongoing debate as to what the definition of terrorism should be and what features this definition should contain. Bruce Hoffman, in his work Inside Terrorism, defines terrorism as being:

The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change … Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider ‘target audience’ that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little12

State/country

India An act of terrorism is comparable to a peacetime war crime. An act of violence carried out by a group against innocents

US Terrorism involves acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or of any State and that appear to be intended:

1. To intimidate or coerce a civilian population2. To influence the policy of a government by

intimidation or coercion3. To affect the conduct of a government by mass

destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.10

Australia Violence or threat of violence against persons/ property; Intimidation with the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause. To coerce or influence a government.11

Table 1.1 Continued


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This definition encompasses many of the elements that are seen as being necessary for an act of violence to become an act of terrorism, i.e. the use of violence, targeting civilians, political motivations, influ-ence and the promotion of fear. These are some of the most common features contained in the literature with regard to the characteristics of terrorism, as well as to the understanding of the concept of terrorism in general. There are, however, various differing viewpoints and opinions on how terrorism should be defined and what features an act of terror-ism should encompass. It has been argued, for instance, that terrorism must contain the following characteristics in order for it to be defined as being a specific act of terrorism: the use of violence; large-scale destruction; threat of same; creation of a climate of terror; and finally the use of intimidation, in order to publicise a cause.13 In essence, if these characteristics are not present, then the act remains an act of violence, not an act of terrorism. Alternatively, Alex P. Schmid et al. define terrorism as the use of arbitrary violence which causes anxiety; the exploitation of emotions; and an act which can be described as being the peacetime equivalent to war.14 Yet, terrorism has also been defined as being a collective action and political act taken in the name of a group based on ethnicity, religion, nationalism, or ideological orientation with the aim to gain political needs through the use of violence and intimidation.15

Many definitions, however, tend to focus specifically on the method of violence used as a tool for creating a working definition, seeing terrorism as being a set of methods or strategies of combat that involve the premeditated use of violence against non-combatants in order to achieve the psychological effect of fear, rather than through the more traditional understandings of the concept.16 Others try to define terrorism as some-thing that can be seen as being a strategy of violence that is designed to promote a desired outcome by instilling fear in the general public that is being targeted.17 One of the major difficulties, however, that emerge when trying to define terrorism is the fact that terrorism is itself is not just an act of violence or a set of identifiable ideologies of a particular movement; it is a set of strategies of combat. As well as that, acts of terrorism are undertaken by a whole host of groups and organisations, each with differing origins, bases, and belief systems, as well as including a number of tactics of ‘terror’ – for example bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings. Therefore, it can be argued that the label ‘terrorism’ is used to describe a wider range of phenomena, not a single act.

If a definition of terrorism is to be created, it needs to avoid being excessively influenced by any one type of terrorism, but the vast variety


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of forms of terrorism that exist also makes it extremely difficult to create a definition that is all-encompassing.18 Terrorism involves the use of violence which is, in the majority of cases, targeted at what are commonly termed ‘non-combatants’ or ‘innocents’, with the purpose of achieving a psychological effect of fear and destruction – or so the belief goes. However, this ‘targeting of civilians’ characteristic has come into question in recent years. There exists much debate about whether or not the targeting of civilians needs to be included in the definition of terrorism. The targeting of civilians, being a central feature of terrorism it is argued, can make the understanding of the concept even more dif-ficult. For instance, it can be debated whether or not examples such as the attacks on the marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of marines, and the attack on the USS Cole, which killed 17 sailors in Yemen in October 2000, were actually acts of terrorism. According to that rationale, these should technically not be classed as being acts of terrorism if one accepts that terrorism cannot involve targeting armed forces; yet they are routinely offered as exam-ples of terrorism.19 Along these lines, it has also been argued that if terrorism is to be defined as attacks against only non-combatant targets, then any attacks that are carried out by groups against ‘armed’ military targets should not be included.20 In addition, definitions of terrorism can also vary as to whether terrorism includes attacks that are carried out only against ‘non-combatant’ targets or whether it can be classed as a tactic of warfare which is used by sub-national groups against all citizens of a state, whether civilian or military, including attacks against an ‘armed’ military.21 Many experts in the field of terrorism studies consider the term an ‘essentially contested concept, debatable at its core, indistinct around its edges, and simultaneously descriptive and pejorative’.22 Also, at the analytical level, there remains no consensual definition of terrorism, with the National Research Council (NRC) noting that there are no ‘precise general definitions of terrorism but rather a multiplicity of overlapping efforts, some more satisfactory than others, but none that are analytically sufficient’.23 Having taken all of the above arguments and details into account, however, for the purpose of this book terrorism is to be defined as the use, or threat of use, of violence that is designed to instil fear or terror in order to achieve political objectives, the type of violence used being that which is usually beyond the bounds of the normally accepted use of violence (for exam-ple the use of hijackings and bombings in contrast to the activities of regular armed forces). It is often, though not always, targeted at civilians and non-combatants, and is designed more to influence the political


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calculations of the government or society concerned, rather than as a purely military tactic to defeat opponents.

What are the most common types of terrorism?

There are so many forms of terrorism in existence today that it has become somewhat of a problem when trying to understand terrorism in its entirety. In today’s world, the label ‘terrorism’ is being attached to almost every act of violence or crime and includes: narco- terrorism, eco-terrorism, cyber-terrorism, pathological terrorism, issue-oriented terrorism, quasi-terrorism, and (probably most strangely) artistic terrorism. Of the existing types of terrorism in the traditional context, however, there are four that are most significant to the modern era of terrorism: ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, and religious terrorism, in particular Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. There are, of course, many other forms of terrorism aside from the aforementioned, including revolutionary terror and left-wing terrorism, which includes a broad range of groups such as Sendero Luminoso and the Red Brigades; however, for the purpose of this work the central focus will remain on the four forms of terrorism listed above.

This section will begin by first looking at the ethno-nationalist/ separatist form of terrorism, which is also often described as being revolutionary terrorism. Ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism is seen as being one of the most dominant forms of terrorism of the 21st century. This form of terrorism is characterised by violence that is used to support the idea of establishing a separate state for a specific national/ethnic group. The main examples of these types of terrorist groups are the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) group. These types of terrorist groups see the threat of being oppressed as a legitimisation for the use of extreme levels of violence, including bombings and kidnappings. The main targets of terrorist groups are usually symbolic symbols that are used to place what is seen as being the ‘blame’ for any and all economic, social, or political injustices that may have occurred in the society in which they exist. The perpetrators of this type of terrorism are individuals or groups with strong nationalist ideas and goals. In the majority of cases they aim to establish an independent state, take control of a certain region, or overthrow the government in order to remove the political system and replace it with one that suits their aims. These types of groups are also classified as being separatist, especially in


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cases where the group is attached to a particular area of land that they see as being their ‘home territory’.24

For the most part, this form of terrorism is carried out by organisa-tions with a well-defined command and control structure; groups that have clear political, social, or economic objectives and a comprehensible ideology or self-interest.25 These types of groups also tend to remain in their country of origin and rarely cross international borders, but there are instances where this has occurred (for example the IRA). These groups also tend to have a narrow appeal, thus limiting their scope outside of their home country. What makes this form of terrorism different from other forms is the fact that its selection of targets tends to be extremely discriminate, for example targeting bankers and govern-ment officials, rather than civilians or non-combatants. This is not to say, however, that these groups have not targeted civilians in attacks, as has been witnessed on numerous occasions with the actions of groups such as the IRA and ETA.

The second form of terrorism which will be examined here is right-wing terrorism. Prior to the current trend of ‘Islamic Terrorism’, right-wing terrorism was one of the most violent and deadly forms of terrorism, especially in the US. The death rates attributed to right-wing terrorism reached the hundreds in the 1990s. The groups and individuals involved in this form of terrorism reject the existing political and social structures of a particular government or political group. There are two core forms of right-wing terrorism: right-wing conservative and right-wing reactionary. Right-wing conservative terrorists seek to preserve the established order within society or to return to the traditions of the past, while continuing to support the current government. Right-wing reactionary terrorists, on the other hand, are groups that seek to over-throw the current political order, thus returning to a past way of life. One of the main examples of a modern right-wing terrorist attack was the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, which resulted in the deaths of 169 people and wounding of over 400 others.26 Other key examples of right-wing terrorist groups noted throughout the literature include the Ku Klux Klan, the neo-Nazi movements, and the anti-abortion move-ments. An example of the acts of terror carried out by European right-wing terrorists, who are also known as the neo-Nazi movement, took place in 1999 in Sweden, when they murdered two police officers, assas-sinated a union leader, planted a car bomb which killed a journalist, and also sent a letter bomb to the Swedish Minister for Justice. Right-wing terrorism in general, however, is often neglected in current literature, due to the fact that it is seen as being somewhat poorly organised, it is


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deemed as being less effective than other forms of terrorism, and that there are not many readily identifiable right-wing terrorist organisa-tions.27 Events such as the 2011 Norway bombings and subsequent shooting rampage, carried out by a single individual and resulting in 80 deaths, however, highlight the fact that right-wing terrorism is still a threat to security.

This brings us to the third form of terrorism which will be outlined here – state-sponsored terrorism. One of the defining features of this particular form of terrorism is that a state or government has been actively engaged in the use of terror against its foreign and domestic enemies.28 State-sponsored terrorism usually occurs when a state pro-vides political, military, or economic support to a specific terrorist group in order to aid them in achieving their goals. It is argued that there are three specific ways that a state can engage in the use of terrorism, namely governmental or state terror, state involvement in terrorism, and/or state sponsorship of terrorism.29 What makes state sponsorship so attractive from the perspective of the terrorist group is the fact that it comes with relatively little cost, i.e. all funding, weapons, training, etc. are provided by the state sponsor. Alternatively, what makes it so attractive to the state or government doing the sponsoring is that it may serve to achieve specific foreign policy objectives without any outward or visible state involvement in the actions. In the modern context, state sponsorship of terrorism is often tied to the provision of safe havens for terrorist groups; havens from where they can train members without fear of disruption from the government or any other outside influence. State-sponsored terrorism has been applied most violently in the regions of Northern Africa and the Middle East, where, for example, anti-Israeli terrorism became state sponsored by the early 1960s. The kidnappings in Tehran 1979 are seen as being a pivotal case of state-sponsored ter-rorism, if not the first ‘modern’ case of state-sponsored terrorism.30 On this occasion, 52 American citizens were taken hostage at US embassy in Tehran by what were claimed to be students. The hostages were held for a total of 444 days by the kidnappers, who claimed that their actions had no ties to any government. However, it was later confirmed that they received full state backing in return for the media coverage and interest generated in the incident. The US President, Jimmy Carter, went on to lose his re-election campaign because of this incident, showing just how powerful terrorism can be.

The US Department of State lists four countries as being official state sponsors of terrorism – Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This list is the most commonly used throughout the literature, but it must be noted


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that the list is not static and changes over time. It can also be argued that it is dependent on the relationships that the US has with specific countries at specific periods in time.31 Iran it is often claimed is the most significant and active sponsor of terrorism, its reason for using this tactic being based on a desire to export the ‘Iranian Revolution’ and to destroy Israel. Iran continues to support such groups as Hezbollah, Hamas, PIJ, and the PLFP through providing them with funding, safe havens, training grounds, and weapons. 32 Other examples include Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, which provided not only support but also a safe haven to a variety of Palestinian terrorist groups, and also provided bases, weapons, and protection to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that opposes the current Iranian regime. Syria is also known to provide a safe haven and support for several terrorist groups, many of which oppose the Middle East peace negotiations. Sudan has also served as a sponsor of terrorism in relation to the provision of a safe haven for members of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the PIJ, and HAMAS. In South Asia, there has been increased concern about recent reports of Pakistani support to terrorist groups and elements active in Kashmir as well as support (especially military) for the Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda.33

This brings us to the final form of terrorism to be discussed here: religiously motivated terrorism, in particular Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. It has been argued that the single most important feature of international terrorism since the end of the Cold War has been the rise of religiously motivated acts of violence and terrorism. The re-emergence of religiously motivated terrorism set in motion extreme changes in the nature, motivations, and capabilities of terrorists. Essentially, religiously motivated terrorism reflects a fundamental belief in the justness of the cause and methods used in the act of terrorism, a justification that emerges from a specific religious belief system. In order to justify the use of terrorism, the religious terrorist views the act itself as being a sacramental or divine act that has been carried out in response to a direct threat to their group’s theological imperative. This then allows the act of terrorism to assume a transcendental or cosmic dimension. One of the central driving forces behind the religious fundamentalists is the fact that they blame all their social and economic problems on what they see as being corrupt leaders and the ‘nefarious’ external forces that support them.34 It is then through this justification process that political concerns are likely to continue to be transformed into religious impulses, which then go on to render them sacred.


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This form of terrorism can emanate from any form of religion, for example Christian fundamentalism or Hindu extremism. However, the overwhelming majority of terrorism today either occurs in Islamic countries, or is undertaken by groups and individuals claiming an Islamic belief system. It must be noted here that this growth in terror-ism with an Islamic slant does not in any way mean that the religion of Islam is intrinsically linked to terrorism. The current form of religiously motivated terrorism did not emerge until the 1980s following the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year. This form of terrorism essentially emerged as a consequence of the violence that had occurred over the previous years in Iran and other Middle Eastern and South Asian countries. In the majority of cases, how-ever, religion is simply used as a veneer to legitimise political objectives that would in other cases not justify the use of violence, especially the use of such tactics as suicide terrorism. Yet there is also a plethora of issues that exist in relation to this argument revolving around the distinctive link between Islam and the use of suicide terrorism, and this must also be taken into consideration. Finally, and possibly most importantly, it must also be noted that religion cannot be said to be the cause of its terrorism, even though it would be easy to assume that this is so.

To summarise then, terrorism is usually a tool used by the weaker of two powers and is seen as being a rational choice when the goals of that particular weaker group are considered as being otherwise impossible to attain. It would therefore be beneficial for us to view terrorism not as being a desperate act by a desperate group of individuals, but instead as a form of political behaviour that is a result of a deliberate choice made by a rational actor, i.e. the terrorist organisation.35 Defining terrorism in a way that will be universally accepted is probably a reality that is never going to happen, at least not in the near future. At best, we can just hope to try to gain a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon and the characteristics that the varying forms of terrorism share. Without a definition, however, one has to argue if we can ever fully understand ter-rorism. Alternatively, one could argue that even if a universally accepted definition of terrorism were to be developed, would it really ever be able to describe all of the varied forms of terrorism that exist today? Having tried to understand the phenomenon of terrorism, the next section here will move to trying to understand the concept of insurgency.

Insurgency

In recent decades, specifically in the period post-9/11, the terms ‘terror-ism’ and ‘insurgency’ have almost become one and the same in terms


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of our understanding of them. According to Smith, it is extremely important for us to differentiate carefully between the two terms, as, once classified under either heading, a movement or group will essentially be given a level of treatment (either formally or by general international consensus) from which it will be difficult for it to extri-cate itself.36 In other words, labelling a group or organisation ‘terrorist’ versus ‘insurgent’ provides a very different context for understanding it and addressing it in a global context. One of the central questions that exist within this field of study is: What is the difference between terrorism and insurgency and why is it important to distinguish between them? In order to try to differentiate between terrorist organi-sations and insurgent groups, this section will aim firstly to analyse the existing definitions of insurgency and will then move on to assess-ing the structure of these movements in terms of their organisation and methods, while finally focusing on the key differences between insurgency and terrorism in a general context.

The problems of defining insurgency

Defining insurgency in the modern context is as difficult, if not more so, as defining terrorism, due to the fact that we understand that terror-ism can exist both as a mode of warfare and as a strategy of insurgency. How then do we separate the two phenomena and isolate insurgency in order to create a working definition? Firstly, it is essential to understand the context of the violence and how it is used. Insurgent violence takes many forms, including revolution, coup d’état, guerrilla tactics, terror-ism, and riot. At their most basic level, insurgencies can be understood as being grassroots uprisings that emerge with the aim of overthrow-ing an established government or set of societal norms that they feel threatened by. In doing so, they employ a range of tactics, including, but not limited to, subversion, guerrilla tactics, and terrorism, and then use these tactics against the established power of states or against the conventional military as a way of exerting their own power and influ-ence. Essentially, it can be argued that an insurgency is not random violence: it is a campaign of violence that is directed and focused with the aim of achieving a specific political outcome or objective. It must be noted here, however, that not all insurgent organisations or groups use guerrilla tactics or terrorism as a method of action.

According to the Terrorism Research Centre, however, political and economic advancements, reductions in unemployment and under-employment, land reforms, transparent governance, and inclusionary conditions for minority political participation have been successful in


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targeting the conditions that lead to insurgencies and its use of both guerrilla warfare and terrorism.37 In this regard then, defining insur-gency in the modern context is much different from defining it in the traditional context. For the purpose of this book, however, the focus will remain on the modern context of insurgency and its definition. Gary Bernsten defines an insurgency as being ‘a protracted struggle by one or more armed groups that employ violence with the goal of over-throwing an existing political order’.38 In other words, it means that insurgency can be understood as being a campaign (usually violent) that is aimed at seizing political power for the specific group carrying out the insurgency. In this context, the term ‘insurgency’ is applied to a large contingent of armed fighters who are focused on advancing their organisation through the use of a common goal or ideology, which then becomes the motivating factor for that group.

Bernsten also notes that ‘an insurgency is not a fight for strategic tar-gets, though insurgents may attack such targets. It is also not a fight for land, though insurgents may seize territory. An insurgency is a fight for control of the population. Insurgents use raw violence to intimidate the population into providing support to their effort or at least into remain-ing neutral’.39 Alternatively, one can define an insurgency as being a protracted political–military activity directed toward completely or par-tially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organisations. Insurgent activity, therefore in this context, is designed to ‘weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy’.40 When defining insurgency, there are a number of common features that tie together the numerous insurgent groups that are most active today, including the following:

• Their desire to control a specific area or territory• Limit ability of government and enhance capability of insurgents• Obtain support of critical segments of society• Isolate government from international diplomatic and material

support and increase support for insurgents• Increase domestic and international legitimacy of insurgent

organisations at the expense of government• Reduce or neutralise government coercive power41

An insurgency can also be defined as an organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion or armed conflict.42 Insurgencies (be they classic or con-temporary) tend to be understood as being protracted conflicts where


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the insurgents involved use their limited assets, grassroots support, and general political will against the target government, which usually has superior resources and outside support. Rather than conventional force-on-force operations, opponents in insurgencies fight for the sup-port of the populace, and this is one of the considerations that need be applied when defining insurgency. Modern insurgencies can take various forms, and can be divided according to their ends, ways and means. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban can be characterised as a reactionary–traditionalist insurgency, fighting to regain political power, oust foreign occupiers, and restore its version of Sharia law. In contrast, a group like Al-Qaeda seeks to regain or maintain sanctuary in a friendly country, while bleeding the US and its allies.43

Twenty-first century insurgencies are affected by globalisation, the Internet, and the explosion of global media. They are often referred to as ‘fourth generation warfare’ or evolved insurgencies.44 Within these, religion can play the role of ideology, and terrorism against the resist-ant population has been a constant feature. In this regard, terrorism and guerrilla action have become commonplace in insurgent activity throughout the modern duration of warfare. According to the US Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the combatant inher-ently prefers a quick, cheap, overwhelming victory over a long, bloody, protracted struggle. As insurgent violence has not achieved the level of revolutionary violence, the availability of weapons to secure territory and repel state armies in open combat is minimal, forcing the focus onto nonconventional weapons and tactics. Understanding these dif-fering features allows easier creation of a definition of insurgency that is separate from that of terrorism or other forms of irregular violence. Table 1.2 below outlines some of the most well-known definitions of insurgency that are in use today.

In addition, to understanding these definitions it is also necessary to understand the differences that exist between it and the phenomenon of terrorism in terms of their paradigm differences. According to Kilcullen, insurgents are regarded as representative of deeper issues or grievance within society, and are seen as using violence within an integrated politico-military strategy, and as a whole-of-government problem rather than a military or law-enforcement issue. In terms of definition, one of the clearest ways to separate insurgents and terrorists is to focus on the point that insurgents use ideology to target government, whereas terrorists target governments (or societies) to advance ideology. However, compli-cating the matter once again is the fact that a terrorist may also simul-taneously be an insurgent and a guerrilla. The following outline gives a clearer breakdown of the differences between insurgents and terrorists:


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1. Insurgentsa. Desire to control a particular area and/or group of peopleb. Motivations include

i. Political ii. Economic iii. Ethnic iv. Religious

c. Once an insurgency reaches a certain size, the insurgency has a fair chance of winning

d. Most insurgent groups employ terrorism as a tactic2. Terrorists

a. Usually small, but fanaticalb. Little likelihood that they can achieve major political goals butc. They are capable of horrendous acts of violence45

What are the most common types of insurgency?

Having outlined the major definitions of insurgency it is now essential to differentiate between the different types of insurgency that are active today. This is extremely difficult, especially in the modern context, as

Table 1.2 Definitions of insurgency

Organisation Definition

Joint Chiefs of Staff US Government (Joint Publication (2009) 3–24 Counterinsurgency Operations)

The organised use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.

US Army Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3–24) (2006)

An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organised, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009)

The organised use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region.

Department of Defense An organised resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage and armed conflict to achieve its aims.


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each insurgency is different and is shaped by conflict-specific factors (e.g. culture, grievance, history) which make placing a specific insur-gency into any one particular category a difficult task. Typologies of insurgency are usually categorised in a number of ways, but there are two that are most common in terms of the modern context of under-standing and analysing insurgencies: by the goals of the insurgent organisation and by the methods and tactics that they use. According to the CIA, the goals of the majority of insurgent groups can be classified into the following categories:46

1. Revolutionary: seek to replace the existing political order with a different system

2. Reformist: do not aim to change existing political order but seek to compel government to alter policies or implement reforms

3. Separatist: seek independence for a specific region4. Resistance: seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a

given territory5. Commercialist: motivated by acquisition of wealth or material

resources

It must be noted, however, that these categories are not rigid in any way and insurgents may change approaches based on circumstances. They may also use different approaches at the same time, thus making it extremely difficult to analyse them in certain situations. Another way to categorise insurgencies is by their organisation’s structure. In the major-ity of cases, an insurgency falls into one of the following categories: political, military, traditional, or urban-cellular.47

A politically organised insurgency is one that has developed through a complex political structure before or at the same time understanding military operations against government. This type of insurgency uses a shadow government rather than military control approach when active. In this context, the military unit should always be subordinate to the political structure. Within this type of insurgency there exist extensive and complex political structures that are developed before military operations are initiated. This shadow government type structure is cre-ated to undermine the authority of the existing regime, thus giving political consolidation to the group, which then precedes the military consolidation of contested areas. This essentially provides the group with more legitimacy in the eyes of its members and its target audience. These types of insurgent group are, however, vulnerable to any real con-certed effort by the government in power that is aimed at neutralising


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their infrastructure. This means that it is seen as being the weakest form of insurgent structure to adopt.

The second type of insurgency is called the military organised insur-gency. In this type, the emphasis is placed on the use of military action against government over the selection of political mobilisation. These types of insurgencies usually have quite weak and ill-defined political structures, and are often dominated by extremely powerful military leaders. They are, in the majority of cases, decentralised in structure, with the armed insurgents serving essentially as the catalyst for mobilis-ing opposition. Their overall aim is to become the focus for their target segment of a specific disaffected population. Once their base of support has been established, they then aim to destroy the regime in power in terms of both challenging its legitimacy and using aggressive military action to gain power and influence.

A traditionally organised insurgency, in contrast, draws on any pre-existing tribal, clan, ethnic, or religious affiliations that may be present in a specific region or area. In doing so, they try to establish a set of social hierarchies which they then aim to put in place as a substitute to the existing political and military structures. This sets a challenge to the existing government in terms of their legitimacy, power, and influence over said element of the population. This type of insurgency rarely exists on its own accord as it has a limited capacity for absorbing economic and military punishment. It is often affected by high levels of leadership conflict, and therefore it is usually found in conjunction with another type of insurgency.

The final type of insurgency looked at here is the urban-cellular form. This type of insurgency is usually centred on and developed in urban areas within a specific town. In terms of organisational structure, it is generally organised around small, semi-autonomous cells. This has a negative impact on the success of these types of insurgency, however, as they often lack hierarchical political and military leadership structures, making them highly unstable. These types of insurgent groups tend to rely more heavily on terrorism as a tactic to counter their inherent weak-ness, which has a negative consequence in terms of limiting their ability to mobilise popular support. In terms of their range of operations, they are usually restricted to being active in small areas where there is more chance of them being captured or targeted by the government or military.

As can be seen from the above breakdown of typologies of insurgency, there are a number of positives and negatives of a group remaining pure in form, and we often see a crossover amongst the elements, again mak-ing insurgent groups harder to define.


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Now that both terrorism and insurgency have been assessed, it is necessary to focus on the concept of state failure and get an understand-ing of how it is defined and what its main features are.

State failure

‘State failure’ is a term that many may be familiar with, but that few actually fully understand. It is a relatively new concept, really only emerging in the modern context following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, ‘state failure’ is a term that has become tied to the global war against terrorism – the common understanding being that the failed states of the world are now the key to preventing terrorism because they are the ones that facilitate terror-ism. But what do we really know about failed states? What do they look like? Where are they? How do you know when a state has failed? These are some of the most common questions surrounding the phenomenon of state failure. Similar to the phenomenon of terrorism, there is really no single definition of what constitutes a failed state, which makes fully understanding it extremely difficult. The aim of this section then is firstly to try to provide the reader with a general understanding of the concept of state failure by providing an overview of some of the most commonly used definitions of state failure that are used today. It will then move on to look at state failure in the context of how it is actually measured and understood, which will allow the reader to understand how a state is actually deemed to have failed in the global context. From this, the section will move on to providing the reader with a new interpretation of state failure by focusing on what is called the spectrum of state failure. This spectrum will first be explained in its current form, and then the augmented version, which is unique to this work, will be outlined. The purpose of this new interpretation will fit into the overall understanding of the relationship between state failure and terrorism, as well as in understanding the case studies of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, which are used in this work in relation to terrorism in the modern world.

Defining and understanding state failure

The emergence of state failure has had an extremely important impact on the international system, especially over the last decade, but what do we actually know about the process? There are numerous differences between the understandings and definitions of state failure, clouding


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our ability to develop a core definition that could be applied universally. Adding to this difficulty is the fact that the concept of state failure has evolved over time. A state in its strongest form is essentially character-ised as being a set of institutions that possess the authority to make the rules that govern the people in one or more societies, and which has both internal and external sovereignty over a definite territory. These states exist mainly to deliver public goods, i.e. security, educa-tion, healthcare, and political and economic protection. These strong states control their territories to the maximum possible level and deliver to their people a complete range of political goods. Strong states also perform well when assessed under such indicators as GDP per capita, economic competition, and social pacification. With regard to this understanding of what a state should be, a strong state can be classified as that which offers high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensures political freedom and civil liberties, and creates envi-ronments that are conducive to the growth of economic opportunity.48 When a state fails to deliver significantly on any of these elements it is said to be in the process of failure. If these basic functions of state are not met, the state can be classed as being, to some degree, a failed state.

State strength in and of itself, however, is a relative concept and there are a number of different ways to measure the overall strength of a state. Three of the main ways that allow us to understand whether a state is heading towards failure are to look at how it functions in the areas of security, politics, and economics. Through understanding any negative aspects that may exist in a given state within the context of these three areas (among others) it becomes easier to ascertain whether or not that state is in the process of failure. We know what a strong state should be, but how do we define a failed state? Similar to the phenomenon of terror-ism, there is no universally accepted definition of a failed state. In basic terms, a failed state is a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions, essentially having no effective control over its territory or borders.49 There are many differing ideas as to how a failed state should be defined. Table 1.3 provides a brief outline of some of the most well-known definitions of state failure that are in existence today.

Prior to 9/11, the threats seen as emanating from these states were focused on the humanitarian issues. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, however, the focus and understanding of failed states and their role on the international scene shifted towards the issues of terrorism and the role that they played in spreading it. This changing perception has resulted in a fluid movement of understanding of the phenom-enon of state failure, and with this shift has come a change in the


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characteristics and definitions contained in the literature. When a state becomes unable to carry out its duties, it begins to deteriorate through a spectrum of failure, the first level being state weakness. Weak states can be understood as being those that have witnessed a significant number of armed challenges to its central authority, where the government has difficulty in controlling its borders and territory, and where the govern-ment has difficulty in providing basic services to its citizens.53 Weak states may be weak solely due to their geographical location, i.e. an area of the world that is prone to natural disasters (e.g. Africa); or they may become weak as a result of physical or fundamental economic con-straints that are placed on them from either an internal or external actor (e.g. through sanctions). These states have also been known to harbour ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other important tensions that may later be transformed into an all-out conflict between these differing groups.

Table 1.3 Definitions of state failure

Source Definition

Institution/organisation

USAID – 2005 FragileStates Strategy

Includes those states that fall along a spectrum of failing, failed, and recovering from crisis – where the central government does not exert effective control over territory, is unable or unwilling to assure provision of vital services, and holds weak or non-existent legitimacy among its citizens.50

National Security Council (NSC) – 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT)

States lacking the capacity to fulfil their sovereign responsibilities, lacking law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert effective control over their entire territory

Organisation forEconomic Cooperationand Development(OECD)

States lacking either the will or the capacity to engage productively with their citizens to ensure security, safeguard human rights, and provide the basic function for development, possessing weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence, or the legacy of civil war.51

World Bank – FragileState’s Index

States characterised by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous post-conflict transitions, weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority.52


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Following from state weakness are the categories of the failing and failed state. Failing states appear quite similar to weak states, except that the issues that the state is facing are at much higher levels. These levels of state failure are significant, but it is the area of the failed state that has gained the most publicity in recent years.

What features make a failed state different and possibly more dan-gerous than these states? The term ‘failed state’ serves as a broad term or label for a phenomenon that can be interpreted in numerous ways. There are three specific elements that categorise failed states from both the legal and political point of view. Firstly, there are geographical and territorial aspects that depict failed states as being associated with internal and endogenous problems, even if these problems have cross-border impacts. Secondly, there is the political aspect, which involves the internal collapse of law and order. Finally, there is what has been termed the functional aspect. When describing what a failed state looks like, it is essentially one that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions; in which there is no control over territory or borders; where the machinery of the state, i.e. the institutions, are unable to function; where the state is incapable of projecting or assert-ing its power and authority within its borders, thus leaving large areas of land completely out of the control of the government; where secu-rity is almost non-existent; and where rising levels of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural hostilities interfere with daily politics. These states provide limited, if any, political goods to their citizens, including a severe lack of education, healthcare, and security. Therefore, it can be argued that a failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the condi-tions of its own existence, i.e. it is no longer sovereign and therefore no longer classified as being a state. There are also high levels of political and economic disenfranchisement of large sectors of the population. Failed states are thus characterised by the gaps that they have in three main crucial areas: where these states are failing to control their borders and territories; that they are failing to meet the most basic needs of the citizen’s e.g. healthcare, security and education; and where they are failing to secure and/or maintain democratic legitimacy. Also, there is the fact that they are not providing effective or transparent governance.

Aside from these characteristics, state failure can also occur from a nation’s geographical, physical, historical, and political circumstances, and in many cases the actions of leaders also play a major role in the pro-cess. There is also the factor of state formation and how this process may impact on the likelihood of a state failing. In many of the nations of the world, the history of state formation and the process of state building


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in many of the world’s nations has been one of violent suppression of ethnic or religious identity, forced compliance with national laws and norms set by distant and unrepresentative elites, and enforced taxation with few services delivered in return.54 As a result, many of these states lack any form of expectation of government or any knowledge of strong statehood. This type of state formation can be seen in many of the African states, as well as in countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

State failure does not, however, just occur through geographical loca-tion, environmental issues, or through external factors. In the major-ity of cases, failure occurs through an internal process. The decisions and failures of leaders and governments have often destroyed states and weakened fragile state polices that already operate on the brink of failure. Therefore, it seems that in many cases the actions of political leaders can be the most culpable factor in state failure, with cases such as that of Sierra Leone (1991) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996) highlighting events that can be traced back to errors in the actions of the state’s leaders. The reasons for state failure are extremely complex and multifaceted, and vary greatly in the specific elements of failure from state to state. In order to gain an insight into this concept, Table 1.4 highlights the range of factors that increase a state’s vulner-ability to and/or likelihood of becoming a failed state. The table covers the four main areas of focus in relation to state failure: the historical context, social/cultural factors, political/state-related factors, and eco-nomic factors, all of which are deemed to be the most significant with regard to predicting state failure.

This leads us to the final level of state failure, which is referred to as a collapsed state. A fully collapsed state is the most extreme ver-sion of a failed state and is a rare phenomenon. Collapsed states have been defined as being mere geographical expressions of a state. These states may have collapsed internally (e.g. Somalia), but they are still recognised by other states and international organisations, such as the United Nations, as being states in the global context. These states lack functioning internal political, social, and economic institutions, exhibiting a total vacuum of authority of any kind. Collapsed states are essentially characterised by a lack of government in any form and by the complete destruction of the governmental institutional system. In a collapsed state there is no monopoly on violence – thus warlords, guerrillas, and other paramilitary groups become a substitute for the state’s armed forces. The world’s most famous and infamous collapsed state is Somalia. Lebanon is another example of a once-collapsed state. Lebanon had reached total collapse just prior to an intervention by Syria


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Table 1.4 Root causes of state failure

Historical Social/cultural Political/state Economic

Historical legacy Culture of violence

Structural inequalities

Rapid urbanisation

Legacy of colonisation

Cultural conflicts Favourable geography

Socioeconomic disruptions

Historical antecedents: political violence, civil war, dictatorship, revolution, occupation

Religion: severe divides between groups within a given territory

Porous borders Divergent economic conditions

Cultural disruptions

Types of regime Weak economy

Divergent social conditions

Declining state authority

Dislocation accompanying rapid modernisation

Nationalistic struggles for autonomy

Divergent political conditions/focus

Poverty

US foreign policy/interference

Institutional capacity (lack of)

Government weakness

Lack of rule of law

Internal political divides

Inability to control territory and/or monopoly of use of violence

in 1990, but exists today as a failing state which retains a government and political institutions that function to the most basic capacity.

Having developed a basic understanding of the categories of state failure, it is now essential to understand how these states are ranked and assessed.

Assessing and ranking a failed state

There have been various efforts over the years to try to measure, assess, and rank the degrees of state failure that exist in the world. Originally,


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many of these efforts were focused on humanitarian and aid-related measurement tools, but the focus has shifted, especially over the last decade, towards assessing failed states under a number of different areas. Some of the best known tools used to measure state failure include such standard indicators as per capita GDP, the UN Human Development Index (HDI), Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report. These tools are then implemented into a large scale ranking system such as that used by the World Bank or the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index. The World Bank and the Foreign Policy Failed States Index, which was created and is maintained by the Fund for Peace (an independent non-profit, non-partisan research and educational organisation) both use similar scoring systems to define which category a state falls into, basically giving each nation a score based on a number of different criteria.55 The underlying theory behind these sorts of measuring tools is that there is a list of meas-ures/assessors/rankings of state weakness that exist which can further assist in the understanding of the process of state weakness and state fail-ure. Table 1.5 outlines some of the most common measuring, assessing, and ranking studies and tools that focus specifically on understanding.

The Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index is the most commonly used index throughout both the academic literature and the policy documents produced by governments across the globe. This index uses 12 indicators to measure a state’s level strength, which are contained in the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST).56 This tool was developed in 1996 by Pauline Baker of the Fund for Peace specifically in relation to its study on state failure. CAST uses a 12-category programme with which to score and rank states.58 The result of the scores assigned to a specifi c state using all of the above indicators produces what is called the Failed State Index. This index ranks states according to their relative strength, weakness, or failure levels. This index is probably the best-known of all of the measurement and ranking tools used in the context of state failure. The World Bank, in its Fragile State Index, opts for a different strategy and ranks states in order of scores received from indicators such as poverty, government effectiveness, demography and unemployment, and military and mac-roeconomic performance, to name but a few.

This study is not too far removed from that of the Failed State Index, but it does result in some differing rankings and positions of states in the world. All of these ranking schemes are based on the general idea of a spectrum of state failure. This was a concept first contained in Foreign Policy (a global international political magazine created in 1970 by Samuel Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel). This spectrum


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Table 1.5 Studies and assessments of state failure

The Political Instability Task Force (CIA-funded data tool hosted by the Centre for Global Policy at George Mason University)

Uses extensive open source date to isolate independent variables generally associated with the onset of severe internal political crisis, including revolutionary and ethnic wars, politicides, and genocides. Based on rigorous statistical analysis, it has identified three factors that correlate highly with internal crises: high infant mortality rate, low trade openness, and low levels of democracy. Focused on state collapse and not on full spectrum of failed and weak states.

Belfer Centre’s Program on Intrastate Conflict, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution (a research association based in the Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Five-year research published in 2004. Used broad set of economic, political and security indicators and distinguished among three categories of weak states: collapsed, failed, and weak. Defines state weakness principally as a function of conflict and human insecurity, but does not rank states according to their level of weakness.

Brookings, Institute for State Effectiveness and Australian National University cooperative research

Proposed a sovereignty index based on 10 core functions that states should perform, and they outline a quantitative framework to assess these core functions in individuals. Their sovereignty index uses over 100 indicators to determine how far short a given state falls in performing its basic functions. The indicators focus especially on the economic components of state function.

USAID 2006 Produced an analysis called Measuring State Failure, which proposed to rank weak states according to 33 indicators of state effectiveness and legitimacy in four governance areas: economic, political, security, and social spheres. This programme was suspended in 2006 along with the entire USAID Fragile States agenda/strategy.

Centre for Global Policy at George Mason – State Fragility Index (academic based research centre)

This ranks country performance in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy across four dimensions including economic development, governance, security, and social development. This resulted in a ranking of 160 developed and developing countries.

Source: Index of State Weakness in the Developing World.57

is based on a five-point grading scale which begins with the strong states, progressing on a downward scale to weak states, failing states, failed states, and finally those states that have completely collapsed. This five-point spectrum has been most commonly used in the Fund


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for Peace’s Failed States Index, which was created in 2005 to monitor and rank the world’s states according to their levels of relative strength. This spectrum is a fluid system and states can move up or down on the spectrum, depending on their situations. Although countries are free to move both up and down, it is much more difficult for a state to progress upwards on the spectrum from failed to strong. It is much easier for a state to move downwards on the spectrum. The five-level spectrum of state failure has been the standard for a number of years, but it is argued here, through the analysis of the different variations of state failure that currently exist, that this spectrum has become too narrowly focused. Figure 1.1 provides a basic outline of the spectrum of state failure:

It is thus deemed necessary to create a more nuanced spectrum, which would encompass a wider range of categories of state failure. There are numerous differing terms and concepts of state failure that are in use in the modern context, but which are missing from the traditional spec-trum. In order to try to address this limitation, this book has developed what is termed here an augmented spectrum of state failure. This aug-mented spectrum is composed of a number of additional factors, provid-ing a more in-depth and all-encompassing spectrum from which to assess the world’s nation states. The development of this augmented spectrum of state failure has numerous positive applications, not only to the study of state failure, but also to the study of terrorism. This benefit is mainly due to its addition of extra categories of state failure. These additional categories have not been plucked from obscurity, but have actually been adapted from numerous sources, including academic literature and policy documents. The first of these new categories, named resilient/enduring states, was adapted from a section of the OECD’s Concepts and Dilemmas

Figure 1.1 Spectrum of state failure

WEAK STATES

FAILING STATES

FAILED STATES

COLLAPSED STATES

STRONG STATES


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of State Building in Fragile Situations report.59 The term ‘resilient state’ has also been used by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in Denmark in a report published in 2010.60 Finally, the term has also been used by the World Bank in the context of African countries, such as Botswana, which they describe as being extremely resilient to the long-term threats that they face to their stability.61 Here the term is used to describe a state that is facing a significant threat to its stability yet is able to function at almost strong state levels.

The second new category added is the faltering state. This term has been used in many instances previously, mainly in reference to the refu-gee crises that emerge from weak states, but the term has been adapted here to characterise a specific type of state, i.e. one which has had a number of challenges to the state which have caused it to become slightly unstable. In these cases, the state loses a level of power and influence in certain areas, but not enough to cause it to lose influence completely.

The third newly created category is called an endemically weak state. This term was used in the work of Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, who defined the endemically weak state as being a state that is not at major risk of conflict, but which is characterised by low growth, anae-mic institutions, and a patrimonial system of political leaderships.62

Figure 1.2 Augmented spectrum of state failure

STRONG STATES

RESILIENT/ENDURING STATES

FALTERING STATES

FRAGILE STATES

ENDEMICALLY WEAK STATES

CRISIS STATES

FAILING STATES

FAILED STATES


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Finally, we have the addition of the category of crisis states. This term was first used as the title of a research organisation that was founded over a decade ago, called the Crisis Research Centre, based at the London School of Economics (the name of this group has now changed to the Crisis States Research Network). This term has been used on a number of occasions to describe the situation that is currently taking place in countries such as Pakistan. Here it will be used to define those states that are in extreme states of crisis, where the government is facing challenges from a number of significant sources, e.g. economic chal-lenges, challenges by militia groups, and growing distrust in the govern-ment. These states are in extremely precarious situations, but have not yet reached the levels of instability that allows them to be classified as being completely failed. Figure 1.2 below shows what this new spectrum of state failure looks like.

Summary

Essentially, there are three main areas of weakness that can be observed in a given society, country, or governmental system that may lead to terrorism or insurgency, as ascertained from the above arguments. Firstly, there is usually acute social, religious, and linguistic diversity among the people of the society, which leads to heightened tensions. Secondly, there are large numbers of political parties in the government that can cause confusion and high levels of tension. Finally, there is the presence of a number of extremist parties, which will inevitably place severe strain on the already troubled electoral system, as well as on the government itself, which again leads to heightened tensions in an already struggling political system.63 It has become somewhat of a con-ventional wisdom that the poorly performing states of our world tend to generate multiple cross-border effects or ‘spillovers’ that include ter-rorism and insurgency, yet we have been slow to develop any theories or strategies to analyse these weak states. There seems to be a shortage of analysis in this area, which could prove to be extremely dangerous for the future. Aside from the general understanding of state failure as an independent phenomenon, there currently exists a large debate on the relationship between state failure and terrorism. These connections have become a core focus of counter-terrorism policies, especially since the events of 9/11, and will be discussed in the following chapter.


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28

Until recently, failed states were not generally viewed as central to the international security agenda. In the post 9/11 world, however, inter-national security experts are coming to the consensus that threats to international security may arise from areas within states or at bounda-ries between states that, for various reasons, are not controlled by state authority.1 These states provide favourable demographic and social conditions, which are key factors in their conduciveness to terrorism or to the development of an insurgency. According to this view, the front lines of the war on terrorism and the increasingly difficult fight against insurgency lie within these failed states. The main argument as to the relevance and relationship between failed states, insurgency, and terrorism revolves around the fact that failed states are easier for terrorist organisations to penetrate and operate from and that they are easier for insurgencies to develop and thrive within. This logic emerges from the fact that failed states lack the ability to project power internally and have incompetent and corrupt law enforcement capacities. It has been long understood that they provide opportunities for terrorist groups to organ-ise, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications centres. In this regard, terrorist groups can essentially develop their own capabilities with little governmental interference. Building on this is the argument that failed states offer terrorist groups larger pools of recruits or potential recruits as they contain larger numbers of disaffected and alienated citizens, for whom political violence is, in the majority of cases, an accepted avenue of behaviour. Failed states, through their inherent incompetence, create political vacuums into which these terrorist groups step. In doing so terrorist groups provide personal security,economic assistance, and other special services to the citizens in return for protection and the time to widen their base of operations.2

2Assessing the Connections between State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism


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Assessing State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism 29

As well as that, much of the modern international relations and terrorism literature focuses on Islamic Fundamentalism as being the causative factor of the current wave of terrorism, but is this really the case? In today’s world, over 80 percent of the top 10 failed states in the world are Islamic ones, which is mainly as a result of history and not solely due to current political, social, and economic climates.3 The high level of deterioration of socio-economic conditions in many Middle Eastern societies is said to be the main contributing factor in the increased levels of terrorism and insurgency witnessed there.4 However, it is extremely doubtful that this is the main reason behind the occurrence of terrorism, as terrorism and insurgency cannot be attributed to a single grievance or causative factor. Interestingly, in recent years a new set of theories and arguments have emerged, focused on the belief that there is actually no significant causal link or pronounced correlation between these failed states and the prolif-eration of terrorism. In fact, these new ideas note that terrorism may actually be less likely to occur in failed states; rather, the focus should shift towards the weak states instead.5 In this regard, failed states are actually, in the majority of cases, undesirable locations for terroristgroups to base their activities, as the terrorist groups face more challen ges and are more vulnerable to third party interference than in stronger states.6 This type of argument is still in the minority among academics and the majority still defend the stance that the world’s failed states are hotbeds for terrorist activity and the emergence of insurgency.

Due to the lack of adequate levels of research in the area, however, the focus of the literature is based on general discussions of state failure and terrorism rather than on detailed empirical studies of the relation-ship and connections between the two phenomena. Therefore the argument that failed states are directly linked to the proliferation of global terrorism has not been subjected to detailed examination. For this reason the ‘failed states breed terrorism’ argument cannot, and should not, be treated as though it were self-evident. One cannot dis-pute that failed states witness serious internal issues and that they can pose a significant international problem; however, the danger is that by using such broad statements, and without having any real statistical analysis or case study cross-comparison, the unsubstantiated argument or unquestioned assumption will form the basis for analysis and policy. The aim of this chapter is therefore to assess what, if any, are the condi-tions contained in failed states that may attract or cause terrorism and insurgency?


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Failed states, terrorism, and insurgency: what are the connections?

Failed states are, in most cases, characterised by high levels of internal turmoil due to such destabilising factors as group grievance, uneven development, population displacement on a massive scale, lack of security, and non-existent or extremely sparse public services. These combine to foster a breeding ground for extreme or radical change through the use of violence. By using tools such as the Fund for Peace Failed State Index and comparing each state with the number of Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) and domestic terrorist groups contained there, it soon becomes apparent that not all failed states are equal when it comes to terrorist activity. The US State Department produces its annual terrorism report, which contains the list of what it designates FTOs. The designation of a group as an FTO results in the US govern-ment blocking assets held in US financial institutions, denying its mem-bers visas, and making it a crime for US citizens or others within US jurisdiction to provide it with support or resources.7 There are currently 47 groups that are listed as being Foreign Terrorist Organisations, and these are listed in Table 2.1.

According to the commonly held arguments in the literature, there should be a direct tie between those states that are at the top of the Failed States Index and the number of FTOs that they are home to. However, it soon becomes apparent that there is a significant lack of correlation between a state’s level of failure and the number of terrorist groups that are based there. Additionally, the placement or ranking of a particular state on the Failed State Index does not appear to exhibit any significant difference with respect to the incidence of terrorism. In fact, there are significant numbers of FTOs and domestic terrorist groups present in states with a low level of failure, as well as within relatively strong democracies. Domestic terrorist organisations, on the other hand, are those organisations that have developed and work solely in the country of their origin. These types of groups rarely carry out acts of terrorism outside of their host country. Often the boundary or distinction between the two types of terrorist groups is not clear. It is thus extremely difficult to determine whether certain groups are to be classified as being domestic or foreign terrorist organisations. This has been the case for groups such as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda in Iraq. Both of these groups have emerged from the core al-Qaeda organisation, but have evolved beyond the initial conception of that


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Table 2.1 Foreign terrorist organisations

Abu Nidal Organisation(ANO)

Abu Sayyaf Group(ASG)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)

Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Al-Shabaab (AS) Ansar al-Islam

Asbat al-Ansar Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

Communist Party of Philippines/New People’sArmy (CPP/NPA)

Continuity Irish Republican Army(CIRA)

Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GI)

Hamas Harakut ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)

Harakut ul-jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)

Hezbollah Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM)

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Kurdistan Worker’s Party

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ)

Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE)

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)

Mujahideen-e Khalq Organisation (MEK)

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)

Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)

Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (17N)

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Revolutionary struggle (RS)

Shining Path (SL)

Tehrik-e Taliban (TTP) United Self-Defence Forces of Columbia (AUC)


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organisation into a semi-hybrid organisation. These groups tend to have characteristics of both foreign and domestic terrorist groups in that they tend to base themselves in one specific country as a base for operations and also tend to carry out the majority of their terrorist activity in that host country.

Aside from the presence of foreign and domestic terrorist organisations within a given state, the number of terrorist attacks also needs to be assessed. Table 2.2 outlines the world’s top 20 failed states and the number of terrorist-related attacks that have taken place in them during the period 2005–2011.8 The findings of this table are interesting with regard to their implications for the argument that failed states and terrorism are intrinsically linked, as there appears to be little terrorist activity in the majority of these failed states – an extremely interesting observation. There are essentially only three countries that are signifi-cantly affected by high levels of terrorist activity/attacks – Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

One of the most significant issues with the existing hypothesis on state failure is that there are failed states that do not exhibit any association with terrorism. It can also be argued that states which are not classified as failed, and that have relatively stronger economic and human development scores, also appear to be prone to both containing terrorist organisations and witnessing the emergence of insurgent threats. This counter-intuitive finding could possibly suggest that a relatively more structured and efficient economic base actually favours the facilitation of terrorist organisations and the emergence of insurgent situations in a specific area than does complete economic collapse and failure. If all failed states were directly linked to being breeding grounds and bases for terrorist organisations or to the emergence of significant insurgencies, then it would be expected that those states listed at the top of the Failed State Index would exhibit extremely high numbers of these incidents but this is not, in the majority of cases, the realitye.g. Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.

Therefore, it would be more convincing or realistic to argue that there are many other factors besides a state’s level of failure that would make it more likely to produce terrorism or insurgent activity. In fact, the decision to actually establish a terrorist base in a specific state does not seem to equate with either the generic quality of state failure inherently attractive to terrorists nor to the particular attractive-ness associated with the breakdown of law and order, e.g. lack of rule of law.10 Also, other states experience failure yet are not targeted by these groups and have no demonstrable association with terrorism or


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33

Table 2.2 Failed states and incidents of terrorism

Rank FSI 2011 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

1 Somalia 25 24 391 396 290 343 446 2 Chad 2 8 4 3 – – – 3 Sudan 19 56 37 25 19 11 21 4 DRC 16 29 33 17 18 13 17 5 Haiti 6 1 – – – – – 6 Zimbabwe 1 – – 4 – – – 7 Afghanistan 389 759 896 924 1,481 2,307 1,732 8 CAR – 3 3 2 2 3 1 9 Iraq 2,993 5,580 5,495 3,027 2,360 2,624 1,66810 Cote d’Ivoire 5 5 3 – – – –11 Guinea 1 1 – – – – 112 Pakistan 408 335 725 1,334 1,410 1,061 1,08713 Yemen 11 8 4 26 33 159 7414 Nigeria 11 48 38 56 18 42 12615 Niger – – 10 2 1 – 116 Kenya 10 6 17 3 1 12 1117 Burundi 38 22 7 14 3 21 1318 Burma 9 21 63 20 4 15 3719 Guinea-Bissau 1 1 – – – – 120 Ethiopia 6 10 5 7 3 2 3

Source: WITS.9

Note: For the purpose of this study, statistics used above only contain the number of incidents under: Armed Attack, Bombing, Suicide, and Assassination.


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insurgents. It is true that certain conditions within failed states may be conducive to the emergence of terrorist groups or to the development of an insurgency, but the problem lies in the fact that these particular problems are not specific to failed states, and democracies also play host to terrorist groups. In fact, it has been argued that many stable western democracies actually contain many of the elements that are more attractive to terrorist organisations (rather than insurgencies) than do those states that have failed. One of the most often-used examples is that of Scandinavia’s welfare system and advanced communications networks, which contrived to make Stockholm and Copenhagen safe havens for terrorist groups such as the Egyptian Gama’a a-Islamiya in the mid-1990s.11

State failure = a terrorist/insurgent threat?

Is it fair to say, then, that the majority of failed states pose little if any significant global security threat and have, in fact, insignificant connections to the spread of international terrorism? It is more likely that if terrorism or an insurgency is going to occur in these states, it will emanate from domestic terrorist groups and not from FTOs. In fact, these states are more likely to pose security threats to their own citizens through, for example, threat of death and injury through civil war, low-level violence; threat of criminality (rape, robbery, expulsion from villages/homes); threats in terms of hunger, disease, etc. than they are through terrorist violence or insurgency. This is similar on an external basis, where failed states often pose threats in terms of spillover to neighbouring states of armed groups, ethnic groups, weapons flows, cross-border criminal-ity, etc. rather than terrorist activity or the development of a full-blown insurgency. Through this understanding of the typical level of threats posed by the majority of failed states, it could be argued that the larger global threat posed by failed states has been exagger-ated. As mentioned earlier, of the top 10 states listed on the Failed State Index for 2011, only three (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq) have any significant levels of terrorist activity, whereas states that are lower on the index, such as Indonesia (63), Philippines (56) and Lebanon (45), contain relatively higher numbers of terrorist groups than the other top 20 failed states listed in the Failed State Index.12 This argument also comes into play in the context of the emergence of insurgencies. State failure does not automatically mean that a state is going to be prone to insurgent activity. Once again, as was


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Assessing State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism 35

the case with the terr orist activity argument, those states located in the top 20 positions on the Failed State Index are not witnessing any form of significant or dangerous insurgency. It seems again that Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq would be the front runners with regard to the existence of insurgent activity.

Summary

The phrase ‘state failure’ has become something of a blanket term used to describe any state that is not functioning to the adequate levels prescribed for a state. As it stands, weak states tend to be categorised together with those that are failing and failed, thus blurring the lines between the varying types of state and their position on the failed state spectrum. Indeed, there has been little attention paid to adequately defining failed states beyond the current conceptual model.13 Thus the centrality that is afforded to this blanket-style argument – that failed states and terrorism or insurgent activity are directly linked – can be seen as being somewhat exaggerated, and can in fact be misleading. It cannot be denied that certain failed states have had direct links to terrorism and insurgency; however, this link is not causal and state failure, in and of itself, does not attract terrorism or insurgencies. It can be argued, then, at the basic level here that whether or not a particular state is attractive to terrorists or conducive to the emergence of insur-gencies is actually contingent on a combination of variables specific to that state. Apart from the cases of Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the world’s top 20 failed states in fact do not exhibit unusually high scores for either number of terrorist groups that are based or are active there. It could therefore be argued that there is no correlation between the position of a state on the Failed State Index and the num-bers of FTOs that it contains within its territory. It can also be argued that there is little, if any, correlation between a highly failed state and the number of terrorist groups based or active there. This will be interesting to assess in a more in-depth manner through the case studies of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Another problem with the current orthodoxy becomes clear when looking at the process of state failure itself. State failure as a phenomenon is caused by a number of variables, issues, and diverse factors. It is, therefore, this divergence that undermines the accuracy of any broad extrapolations that can be derived from the existing hypothesis which, it seems, are based on the premise of a presumed homogeneity among failed states. Certainly one can argue that some failed states have been


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directly associated with international terrorism and the emergence of significant insurgencies, but this link is not a direct one in the major-ity of cases. It would be an exaggeration to definitively argue that failed states never facilitate terrorism, but it must at the same time be highlighted that the factors that give rise to terrorism are not exclusive to failed states, and thus they are not the only type of state that may facilitate terrorism or insurgent action. Despite the prevalent view that there is a direct link between state failure and terrorism, recent evi-dence seems to suggest that such a link can no longer be automatically assumed. One of the main arguments put forward in this chapter is that state failure itself does not necessarily attract or breed or facilitate terrorism. Also it must be noted that the attractiveness of a particular state as a centre for terrorists or insurgents is dependent on a specific set of variables which are active within that specific state. The aim here, however, is not to entirely dismiss the idea that intra-state instability and failure never contribute to the issue of international terrorism or insurgency. Instead, it is argued that in the majority of cases the motiva-tions behind the focus on the role of failed states in terrorism or insur-gency are exaggerated to the point of being dangerous and detrimental to policy development in the area. The overall aim of this work then is to develop an in-depth qualitative understanding of which factors play the most significant role in relation to terrorism and the process of state failure by using a number of cases. This should then make it clearer that there is no one factor of state failure or strength that can make a state the ideal location for terrorist or insurgent activity.


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37

Afghanistan is one of the world’s most war-torn and impoverished nations and has been beset by invasion, violence, and internal upheaval since its creation, having never been a homogeneous ethnic nation, instead existing as a collection of disparate groups divided along ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial lines and forced together by the vagaries of geopolitics. A landlocked and mountainous country, it has suffered from chronic instability and conflict throughout its history, so much so that its current economy and infrastructure are in ruins.1 By September 11, 2001, Afghanistan was arguably one of the world’s worst humanitarian emergencies and was also facing a significant crisis of governance. Afghanistan was ranked at the lowest end of the scale in global measures of human welfare and illicit activities, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Failed States Index. Today, Afghanistan’s population is characterised by deep and multifaceted cleavages, being divided along ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal, and racial lines which make unity an extremely unlikely process. As well as that, the religious framework within Afghanistan is based on a syncretic blend of various interpretations of Islamic doctrine combined with local customs, which mean that there is no one unifying religious element that ties all citizens together. It also means that there is more likely to be increased levels of in-fighting and cross-ideological skirmishes, causing instability within the country.2 The combination of these features has hampered the emergence of a strong state in Afghanistan.

Ethnicity is probably the most important contextual factor shaping Afghanistan, and as a result of the internal and extremely volatile ethnic mixture, there has traditionally been a high propensity for violence and terrorism, often along, but not limited to, ethnic groups. Contemporary Afghanistan shares many of the features that political and social

3Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 1


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scientists have identified as favouring state failure and insurgencies the world over – rough, mountainous terrain, poverty, popular mistrust of the state, large family size, foreign support, and cross-border sanctuar-ies, as well as an easily transportable commodity, in this case opium, for financing.3 However, even though it may share these characteristics with many other countries, the case of Afghanistan is nonetheless unique. Over the last 20 years or more, Afghanistan’s citizens have experienced six governments and half a dozen presidents; more than one third of the population has been displaced several times; over one million peo-ple have been killed; and hundreds more have been handicapped. The impact of these events has changed the physical nature of not only the state itself but also the character of its people.4 The seeds of Afghanistan’s decline had become obvious by the late 1980s, when deepening ethnic tensions, the rise of extremist Islamist ideology and the entrenching of a narcotics economy, were slowly becoming the defining characteristics of the state.5 By 1992 Afghanistan was, according to some, a failing state whose political institutions were practically non-existent.6 This chapter aims to provide a brief historical overview of Afghanistan which should aid in developing an understanding of how and why the Afghanistan of today is facing the issues that it faces.

The pre-Soviet era

Historically, Afghanistan has been the link between Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian sub-continent. Having been used as a tactical target by both regional and international powers as a place of leverage to reach their strategic destinations on numerous occasions, it has subsequently endured several invasions throughout the course of its history. It was at the centre of the so-called Great Game in the 19th Century between Russia and Britain, and also became a key Cold War battleground following the Soviet Invasion in 1979, which led to a major confrontation that drew in the US and Afghanistan’s closest neighbours. These struggles between the Afghan people and external forces have cre-ated their own psychological, traditional, and socio-political issues for Afghanistan.7 The Muslim conquest of Afghanistan essentially began in the seventh century following the creation of several short-lived Muslim dynasties, but it was not until the early eighteenth century that a united state covering most of present-day Afghanistan was developed under Ahmad Shah Durrani, an Afghan tribal leader; this period became known as the Durrani dynasty. Throughout his reign, Durrani consoli-dated chieftainships, minor principalities, and fragmented provinces


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Afghanistan Context – Part 1 39

into one country. The reign of the Durrani line ended in 1818, yet no predominant ruler was to emerge until Dost Muhammad became emir of Afghanistan in 1826.8 The Great Game defines the period of history and was filled with rivalry and conflict between the British and Russian Empires, who were both were vying for supremacy in Central Asia, with a specific focus on Afghanistan. During this time the British tried to replace Dost Muhammad with a former emir who would be more suited to their ruling style, but this decision was to be the cause of the first Afghan War (1838–1842) between the British and the Afghans. Dost was to remain in power until his death in 1863, however, being succeeded by his son Sher Ali. The year 1878 marked the beginning of the Second Afghan War, and just a year later, Sher Ali died and was succeeded by Yakub Khan, once again shifting the power dynamic in Afghanistan. In 1880 Abd ar-Raham Khan was officially recognised as emir, but he died in 1901 and was succeeded by his son Habibullah.9 Habibullah was assassinated in 1919 and his successor, Amanullah, invaded India in 1919, triggering the Third Afghan War.

The Third Afghan War was ended by the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which resulted in Afghanistan gaining full control over its foreign relations. During this time King Amanullah (1919–1929) moved to end his country’s traditional isolation, establishing relations with numerous countries and introducing several reforms intended to modernise Afghanistan. However, even with these progressive ideas, Amanullah was forced to abdicate in January 1929 and Mohammad Zahir Shah succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973.10 On July 17, 1973 the Republic of Afghanistan was born following the end of Zahir Shah’s autocratic rule through a non-violent coup by Mohammad Zahir Daoud Khan. Daoud had seized power with the help of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a pro-Moscow communist party. Daoud’s reign was not a smooth one and his attempts to carry out the badly needed economic and social reforms were met with lit-tle success. Relations between Daoud and the PDPA soon became tense and once his power was consolidated Daoud no longer felt the need for these allies and ordered a crackdown on the party. This resulted in a backlash from the PDPA and on April 27, 1978, Mohammad Daoud was assassinated by a group tied to the PDPA, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal, and Amin Taha, thus overthrowing the regime in an event which became known as the Saur Revolution. On May 1, 1978 Taraki became President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the PDPA, and the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The PDPA implemented a liberal and social agenda


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during its first 18 months of rule, which ran counter to the deeply rooted Afghan traditions. By the summer of 1978, a revolt began in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan and quickly developed into a countrywide insurgency. This revolt also caused fragmentation and internal conflicts within the PDPA and weakened the government. Adding pressure to the already fragile government was the fact that many military officers and soldiers defected to the mujahideen political armed groups and joined military operations against the government. This severe political crisis exhausted the PDPA regime and caused the Soviets to invade and rescue their friendly regime from a total collapse.11

In September 1979, seeing an opportunity to gain influence, Hafizullah Amin seized power from Taraki.12 Little changed under Amin and instability continued to plague his regime. As he moved against the perceived enemies in the PDPA, several rural areas rose in armed rebellion against the new government and by December 1979, party morale was crumbling as the insurgency continued to grow. Also at this time, the party’s long history of factionalism came to a bloody head as the more radical wing of the party sought to wipe out the more moderate wing.13 As the insurgency spread and the Afghan army began to crumble, the regime’s survival became increasingly dependent upon Soviet assistance. By October 1979 relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were tense as Hafizullah Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to stabilise and consolidate his government.14 The armed struggle between the regime and its opponents overshadowed the social, economic, political, and cultural changes within society; violent interaction became one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the state.15 With the extreme levels of mass revolt that they witnessed, the PDPA regime lost control over the mobilisation of society and lost many territories under its control to the opposition. As a result, it was forced from an offensive position to a defensive position on the military, economic, and political fronts.16 Essentially, this combination of popular resistance and intra-elite antagonism set the scene for the invasion of Afghanistan by the regime’s Soviet backer. On December 25, 1979, the Soviet army entered Kabul.

The Soviet era (1979–1989)

Upon entering Afghanistan the Soviets killed Hafizullah Amin, returned Babrak Karmal to Kabul, and installed him as president of the Revolutionary Council, general secretary of the PDPA, and prime minister of the new government.17 However, the regime that had been


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installed by the Soviets in 1980 faced a completely different situation than had been encountered by the original revolutionary regime, and thenewly formed Karmal regime, although backed by 120,000 Soviet troops, was unable to establish its authority outside Kabul. The government essentially only controlled Kabul and other towns in its immediate vicinity, while the mujahideen operated freely in most of the country-side. Almost 80 percent of the countryside, including parts of Herat and Kandahar, eluded effective government control, and as well as that, an overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime and chose, either actively or passively, to support the mujahideen. On several fronts the mujahideen expanded their influence and control and even-tually established their own administrations throughout Afghanistan. The mujahideen made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban areas. By mid-1984 a third of Afghanistan’s population has been uprooted by this instability, with 3.5 million Afghans having fled to Pakistan and over one million to Iran, while hundreds of thousands more became internal refugees.18 Adding to the already chaotic situation in Afghanistan, by May 1985, the seven principal Peshawar-based guerrilla organisations had formed an alliance to coordinate their political and military operations against the Soviet occupation.19 Demoralised, and with no clear victory in sight, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided that the USSR forces had to leave Afghanistan. By the time of the Soviet Party Congress of February 1986, being confronted by limited resources at home and continuing resistance in Afghanistan, Gorbachev was authorised to promote a political compromise in Afghanistan and to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, the Soviet leaders decided to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by the end of 1988.20 The withdrawal began on May 15, 1988 and ended on February 15, 1989. The departure left the country in a shambles and Afghan society with no accepted symbol of political legitimacy.

Following the withdrawal of the last Soviet troops from Afghanistan a bloody civil war took place that shattered the already war-ruined country and forced the Afghans into an even more severe process of fragmentation and instability.21 The people of Afghanistan were left divided into two main factions: the first was the faction who followed the Kabul government under Najibullah and the second were those who supported the numerous mujahideen groups. As a result of this chaotic situation, the majority of the population fell into the hands of divided political groups, extremist military factions, and international organisations.22 Najibullah’s regime, without financial aid and support


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from the Soviets, immediately began to fracture and disintegrate. With this loss of a solid governmental structure came a quest for leadership within Afghanistan between the various ethnic, religious, and political groups who were all vying to form the new national government. During this time, thousands of government military and militia forces aligned themselves with mujahideen groups who, they felt, had similar ethnic, linguistic, or religious backgrounds.23 The expansion of the mujahideen and the increase of their influence in large territories, in particular the establishment of the National Commanders Shura (NCS), altered the bal-ance of power in Afghanistan. The situation was made worse by the fight-ing between the contending forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the founder and leader of Hezb-I Islami, and Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan.

The split between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun elements of Afghan society became more pronounced, with the majority of the non- Pashtun elements of the government’s armed forces joining Ahmed Shah Massoud in the north, while the Pashtun elements joined Hekmatyar and Mawlawi Haghani in the east and Haji Qadir forces in Nangarhar. The Northern Alliances, which were headed by Massoud, Dostam, Sayyed Nader Kyani, and Hezb-e-Wahdat, were able to control the provinces that extended from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kabul. Herat and its neighbouring provinces came under the control of joint ex-government and mujahideen forces led by Ismail Khan. Kandahar was controlled by a mixture of mujahideen and former government forces headed by Mullah Nagibullah Akhund. Finally, the east and the southeast were controlled by the regional ex-military and regional forces led by Mawlawi Haghani and Haji Abdul Ghadir.24 In order to try to stabilise the country, the Peshawar Accords of April 26, 1992 attempted to prevent the complete collapse of Afghanistan by declaring the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), with Sibghatullah Mujadidi, the founder of the Afghan Liberation Front, becoming the head of state for two months, followed by Rabbani for four months.25 At the end of the six months, the plan was that the government would then form a council to choose an interim government, with the aim of coordinat-ing forces and preparing the country for general elections. Hekmatyar did not, however, join the interim government, accusing it of being an illegitimate institution under the influence of the ex-communists and demanding that the northern alliance militia under General Dostam leave Kabul. Soon, Hezb-e-Wahdat joined Hekmatyar in vying for power against the government forces, and Hekmatyar’s forces were able to get closer to Kabul. Due to the fact that there was an absence of a central


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governing institution, each of these armed groups essentially became the ruler of their controlled territory. Large-scale fighting erupted across Kabul and the military and political forces became divided along ethnic lines: Hekmatyar with the ex-Khalqis Pashtuns; Massoud supported mostly by the non-Pashtun; Dostam supported by Uzbeks; and Hezb-e-Wahdat supported by Hazaras.

Later, all these armed ethnic groups divided into two hostile factions: the government forces dominated by the Shura-e-Nezar (Supervisory Council) led by Massoud and Rabbani; and the Shura-e-Hamahangi (Coordinated Council) comprised of Hekmatyar, Dostam, and the Hezb-e-Wahdat.26 On June 25, 1992, the government forces led by Massoud attacked the opposition position in Kabul and captured their headquarters. The result of this assault was the devastation of Kabul, with more than half a million of Kabul’s population fleeing the city, over 3,000 people being killed and a further 19,000 wounded.27 While the struggle for power was taking place in Kabul, the rest of Afghanistan fell under the control of the various regional powers. In Nangarhar, the local forces established a Shura and elected Haji Ghadir, a former mujahideen commander, as governor of this province.28 In the north, Dostam and Ismaeli Shia commander Sayyed Nader Keyani controlled Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan, parts of Kunduz, and Samangan. In the west, Ismail Khan disarmed the local mujahideen and militia groups and controlled Herat, Badghis, Farah, and Ghor.29 Clashes between Dostam and government forces resulted in an alliance between Dostam and Hekmatyar against Massoud and Rabbani-led forces. This separation and division of the country kept it in a constant state of instability and the cycle of violence and the massive mobilisation of the nation in an unclear direction with no popular leadership continued.30 Adding to the already troubled situation in Afghanistan was the eruption of the civil war between the Hekmatyar ISI-supported forces and those led by Rabbani, which further reduced the credibility of the Afghan mujahi-deen leaders. The result of this civil war situation was the emergence of a group of mujahideen that would leave one of the most lasting and devastating effects on Afghanistan.31

The Taliban era (1994–2001)

In early 1990 Afghanistan was crumbling and heading towards complete state failure. The situation soon erupted into a full-fledged civil war and by 1994 the violence in Kabul had spread through the rest of the coun-try. The anarchic political and chaotic social environment produced


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a political vacuum within Afghanistan, which a group known as the Taliban was only too willing to fill. Led by Mullah Omar, the Taliban initially emerged in the Kandahar province in 1994 as a local response to the resistance and militia forces. Between their emergence in 1994 and their capture of Kabul just two years later, the rise of the Taliban movement marked the most dramatic shift of forces in Afghanistan’s recent history.32 In the context of Afghan history, however, the rise of the Taliban is not surprising; the civil war was ravaging Afghanistan and Afghans were desperate for a stabilising counterforce that would put an end to the violence. The speed at which the Taliban were able to take over southern Afghanistan spoke volumes of the high level of political bankruptcy of the mujahideen factions and the exhaustion of the people, who were looking for stability and peace at any cost.33 Even though the people saw the Taliban as being their saviours, their rise was actually more of a military enterprise that aimed to reunite the deeply fragmented Afghanistan, rather than a social or political movement. On November 3, 1994 the Taliban forces began to move on Kandahar, and after only two days of fighting, the group had captured the second larg-est city in Afghanistan.34 Over the next three months, the Taliban seized 12 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces. The levels of bloodshed involved were minimal, as Afghans, who were eager for change in their war-torn country, offered little resistance and welcomed what they saw as Taliban liberation. Over 20,000 madrassas students, many between the ages of 14 to 24, joined the Taliban and marched through Afghanistan. By February 1995, just outside Kabul, the Taliban overran the headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the two feuding mujahideen leaders still controlling the area; the other, Ahmad Shah Massoud, remained entrenched in Kabul. In the spring of 1996, the Taliban laid siege to Kabul, devastating the city.35

As the civil war continued to devastate the country, Massoud and President Rabbani sought the help of Osama bin Laden, who at this time was situated in Sudan. On May 18, 1996 bin Laden arrived in Jalalabad, but instead of helping the cause of Massoud and Rabbani, bin Laden instead chose to lend his support to the Taliban.36 The Taliban were now backed with money, arms, and supplies from bin Laden, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. On September 26, 1996 the Taliban entered Kabul for the second time and this time instead of staying to fight the onslaught Massoud’s forces retreated with the intention of developing a stronger resistance movement in the northern parts of Afghanistan. Upon entering Kabul, the Taliban killed Najibullah and sent a clear mes-sage to the citizens that there was a new and violent power in control


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in Afghanistan. Once in power, the Taliban delivered on their promise to bring security to the country, but security came at the cost of per-sonal freedom and approximately 400,000 people were displaced by the Taliban at this time in Afghanistan.37 Even though the Taliban were able to reunite most of Afghanistan they were still unable to completely end the civil war, which continued to take its toll on the country. In a small sliver of northern Afghanistan territory not under Taliban control, the resistance movement began to form around Massoud. When people in Afghanistan realised the reality of Taliban rule, the resistance found itself getting more powerful.38 On May 26, 1998, as the Taliban battled the Northern Alliance for control of Afghanistan, bin Laden called a press conference in Khost, declaring war against the US. This announcement came at a time when the Taliban were struggling to gain international recognition. Following the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998, the US began to surmise that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had become inextricably linked.39 Saudi Arabia eventually withdrew financial support for the Taliban, leaving Pakistan as Omar’s only external supporter.

Meanwhile, al-Qaeda began to use its base in Afghanistan to mount ever bolder attacks, for example, the attack on the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, which resulted in the deaths of 17 servicemen and which wounded a further 39.40 On September 9, 2001, a terrorist attack took place along the Afghan–Tajikistan border, foreshadowing the history-making violence and terrorism to come. Two militants posing as Arab journalists travelled to the Northern Alliance headquarters to interview Massoud and managed to detonate a bomb which was hidden in the video camera, mortally wounding Massoud, who died shortly after in a hospital in Tajikistan.41 In his last days, Massoud had travelled across Europe warning world leaders that the partnership between the Taliban and al-Qaeda was a threat, not just to Afghanistan, but to the world, but these warnings would come too late and fall on deaf ears.42 Many felt that with Massoud’s death Afghanistan had lost its real leader and that the country was now going to fall further into chaos and instability.

9/11 and beyond

With the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, bin Laden and the Taliban came into the crosshairs of a deeply wounded superpower that was looking for revenge. On September 20, 2001, President Bush issued Mullah Omar with an ultimatum – deliver all leaders of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to the US or be seen as their allies and thus a target of


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reprisals. Omar hesitated to turn over the al-Qaeda leader to the US without clear proof of his crime, which is a trait of the traditional culture of Pashtunwali, the social code that is strictly followed and that dictates if a Pashtun receives a guest they are then bound by honour to protect that guest with their life.43 As a result of this hesitancy, on October 7, 2001, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom, a military campaign aimed to depose the Taliban regime, destroy al-Qaeda, and capture or kill bin Laden and Mullah Omar. With the introduction of elite US forces and unrivalled air power, the Northern Alliance moved swiftly through the countryside, hunting down Taliban and al-Qaeda positions. Mazir-i-Sharif was the first city to fall, and shortly afterwards the Northern Alliance and US forces liberated the cities of Herat and Kabul in quick succession. Less than a month later, US forces overtook Kandahar, Omar’s headquarters – the final Taliban holdout. In 2004, Afghanistan held triumphant national elections and Hamid Karzai was voted President. Initially, Karzai was welcomed by the Afghan citizens, but his popular support quickly began to fade as Afghans became espe-cially angry with the composition of his Parliament, which included several notorious figures from Afghanistan’s past, including former communists from the days of the brutal Soviet occupation, notorious mujahideen warlords, and even ex-Taliban members.44 Karzai struggled to extend the reach of his government beyond Kabul and very quickly many of the country’s same old problems resurfaced: for example drug smuggling, gun running, and warlordism.

The US-led coalition tried to keep the peace, but only managed to slow Afghanistan’s descent into chaos, and as Afghanistan became more and more unstable, the Taliban quietly waited for new orders from Mullah Omar, who was located in the dusty swath of land that makes up the tribal belt that straddles Afghanistan and Pakistan.45 The Presidents in Kabul and Islamabad were both loathe to send their secu-rity forces into this dangerous region, so as a result the Taliban operated there as a parallel government. From this base, the Taliban mounted an increasingly successful effort to retake Afghanistan. By 2006 the Taliban were strong enough to seize several southern provinces, and the Afghan government had to call in US air power to regain control. As 2006 came to a close, the new Taliban proved to be a deadlier and more brutal organisation than the one the US and allied forces had dominated only five years earlier. The new Taliban terror campaign had turned Afghanistan into one of the world’s most dangerous war zones, with international forces from a combined 37 nations remaining unable to stabilise the country. The Taliban insurgency has now gained


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momentum to the point that foreign forces in Afghanistan are dealing with ‘an industrial-strength insurgency’.46

Despite their removal from power in Kabul, the Taliban continue to be the most powerful indigenous force in Afghanistan. This dominance comes from the fact that foreigners have never been able to impose an externally led political order on the country and that these indigenous groups are experts at playing on this fact. The situation in Afghanistan remains extremely fluid and increasingly the more extreme elements of the Taliban are bringing the fighting and destruction into the cities, which has further demoralised the Afghans. As it stands, virtually no part of the nation is safe from the group’s penetration.47 Never a strong state to begin with, Afghanistan was weakened to the point of failure by the three-decade long period of war. The combined effects of the bloody and chaotic formation of the state, the anti-Soviet insurgency, followed by the inter-ethnic civil war, Taliban rule, US-led invasion, and subsequent re-emergence of the Taliban, have collectively contributed to causing massive levels of instability and devastation in Afghanistan. Having addressed the historical background of Afghanistan, an analysis of the country in relation to terrorism now needs to be carried out.

State failure in context: Afghanistan a failed state?

Afghanistan is ranked the fourth most war-torn, fifth most corrupt, seventh most fragile, and sixth weakest state in the world. The pro-cess of state failure in Afghanistan is characterised by weak govern-ance, rampant corruption, lawlessness, ineffective counter-insurgency efforts, uncontrolled organised crime/drug trafficking, and failure to deliver basic services. According to such indicator tools as the Fund for Peace, the CIA World Factbook, the Rural Poverty Portal, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, almost all of Afghanistan’s social, economic, and political indicators worsened significantly and quite rapidly in the period 2009–2010. Afghanistan has a high population growth rate of 2.69 percent; and with this comes an extremely high level of youth bulge, with 44.6 percent of the popu-lation being under the age of 15. It also has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world, with 152 deaths per 1,000 live births.48 The indicator for refugees and displaced persons, according to the Fund for Peace, shows that Afghanistan is still critical in relation to this strain on the country, even though more than 3.7 million Afghan refugees have returned to their homes over the past six years.49 Several mil-lion more Afghani citizens remain in Pakistan and Iran.50 This refugee


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crisis is ongoing and there have been thousands more Afghans who have been made homeless through the once-again increasing levels of violence being witnessed in the country. This has been one of the most detrimental factors to the country’s improvement, as many of those who have chosen to leave have been from the professional classes, thus causing a massive brain drain within the country.

One of the key factors in keeping the violence and terrorist activity alive has been the growing number of group grievances within Afghanistan, which have been a cause of many of the erupting social struggles and violent skirmishes over the past decade. Almost all of Afghanistan’s political and military indicators worsened significantly in 2011, with the legitimacy of the state being particularly hard hit in 2010/2011, due to the considerable drop in support for the Karzai regime. This loss of support came as a direct result of the government’s inability to combat corruption, the growing levels of military violence, and drug trafficking. Many of Karzai’s govern-ment members were seen as being highly corrupt and operating with impunity, and while Karzai had always taken a hard-line approach to combating corruption, his policies did not. This increase in cor-rupt behaviour has had a significant impact on Afghanistan which is evident when looking at the Corruption Perceptions Index scores for 2009, which place Afghanistan 179th out of 180 countries in the world (Table 3.1).51

The capacity of the Afghan government to promote its influence at the national, provincial, and district levels remains limited and Afghanistan still faces significant nation-building issues, including combating the Taliban, widespread poppy cultivation, and the deterioration of many state institutions. Each of these elements results in more chronic pat-terns of violent extremism, corruption, dependence on the illicit drug

Table 3.1 Afghanistan’s rank in Transparency International’s annual CPI

Year Rank Number of countries surveyed

2009 179 1802008 176 1802007 172 1802006 No data 1632005 117 159

Source: Transparency International Annual CPI reports (2012)http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview


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trade, and socioeconomic instability that will continue to undermine Afghanistan’s ability to strengthen state capacity. Although having been classified as a failed state, the reality of the situation is entirely more complex to comprehend within Afghanistan. The US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 notes that Afghanistan will face continued instability and remain a failed state unless employment conditions improve considerably. It predicts that for the next 15 years tribal and sectarian disputes will probably continue to rise, be fought out, and shift constantly in Afghanistan as the various players realign themselves.52 However, while there is every possibility that violence, levels of instability, and levels of terrorism will increase, it is highly unlikely that the country will fail completely or collapse.

It is a fact that Afghanistan is nowhere near the status of being a strong state and probably never will be, but the label of ‘failed state’ does not adequately describe it either. Through the examination of the state in both its historical and modern context, it is argued here that Afghanistan is best suited to be categorised as a crisis/failing state and not a failed state, even though it does periodically display many of the distinctive features of a failed state. This is due to the fact that Afghanistan has been in a constant state of war for the last three decades, yet has managed to survive and continue to function, although at low levels, throughout. It does show some characteristics of state failure, but not across its entire territory, and the government has been able to extend its influence into regions outside of Kabul and its surrounding towns. The level of crisis in Afghanistan may remain high, but the state is seemingly able to function; therefore to term it failed (it is argued here) is incorrect and misleading to the understanding of the situation in Afghanistan today. Tied to the list of factors in the previous chapter, there are usually several structural and historical factors that contribute to an environment that is con-ducive to and that enables terrorism and state failure to occur, the convergence of which creates an environment necessary for terrorist groups to flourish.

Government/state weakness

Due to Afghanistan’s heterogeneous social structure, there has never been a leader who has been able to achieve complete rule in every cor-ner of the country. The idea then of state/government weakness must be modified to fit this unique situation. Essentially, the understanding of a state in the classical Weberian sense cannot directly be applied


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to the Afghan case. The process of state failure in Afghanistan can be characterised by weak governance, rampant corruption, lawlessness, ineffective counter-insurgency efforts, uncontrolled organised crime/drug trafficking, and failure to deliver basic services. The anarchy of the post-Soviet withdrawal, coupled with the repressive Taliban rule, left Afghanistan bereft of political, social, and economic institutions and with a system of centralised authority that the Karzai government has been unable to resuscitate.53 The instability facing Afghanistan today is not based solely on the continuation of some ancient condition; it is the direct result of decades of international dismantling of the tradi-tional structures which have left extremists with an opening to fill the gap and get a foothold in the country. The insurgency in Afghanistan can be divided into three specific zones of strength. The first are those places where the insurgency is now dominant, specifically the south-ern and eastern provinces and a few districts in the North. The second are those places where the insurgency, due to ethnic/social structures, will not be able to make significant gains; i.e. the Hazara-populated areas and Panjshir. Finally, there are those places where the insurgency is growing but has not yet developed into a fully fledged insurgency. These areas include the Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghor, Takhar, Faryab, Jawjan, Samangan, and Badakhshan provinces. As well as that, the Taliban have become the dominant political force in numerous regions of Afghanistan, including Pashtun-majority provinces in the East and South: Paktia, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar, Helmand, Farah, Kunar, and Laghman. The insurgents control the countryside and have a strong presence even inside cities like Kandahar and Ghazni, and the Afghan administration is non-existent outside the major cities.54 The Afghan government has prevented the Taliban from seizing control of any significant district centre or town, but the Taliban have a strong presence in the countryside, especially in southern and eastern areas along the border with Pakistan, which has proved to be extremely detrimental to the success of the US-led mission in Afghanistan.

The overall situation with regard to government/state weakness in Afghanistan does not look like it is going to improve in the immediate future. Without an Afghan government that is representative, efficient, effective, and accountable, and that has domestic and international legitimacy, it is going to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create a climate of security, establish a rule of law, or create an environ-ment for the economy to flourish.55 As a result of this nascent weakness, the resurgent extremist forces were able to re-emerge with ease. This


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means that there are still large swathes of the country that are without central government influence or the presence of international forces. This low level of central government presence outside of Kabul can be attributed to three main factors. The first is related to the provincial and local leaders, whose activities do not support the central govern-ment. Second is the fact that there was no comprehensive vision for incorporating provincial government workers as agents of the central government. Finally, there is the internal political and social discord, which has been compounded by the levels and methods of interna-tional aid to the central government in Kabul.56 Each of these issues, taken on an individual basis, is cause enough for state weakness, but the Afghan state is dealing with these all at once, which is slowly killing the fledgling government and destroying any semblance of stability that might emerge. Recommendations from numerous academics and policy makers focus on the fact that the international community must remain engaged in Afghanistan until it has developed its own institutions that can deal with matters of state security and governance. Without assistance, Afghanistan’s fragile institutions will crumble, repeating the history of the early 1990s, when the country was a hub of international terrorism and drug production.57

Breakdown/decline of social, political, and economic order

The requirements for the state to succeed include creating a broad-based and all-encompassing national government, establishing a functioning security apparatus, and reconstructing the devastated economy, but this has not been a successful process in Afghanistan. The construction of new political, social, and economic institutions in Afghanistan began after the Soviet intervention, but, having largely developed through funding by foreign powers, the state had created hardly any institutions for interacting with society. The key to the development of democracy and prosperity in Afghanistan therefore is to build a viable and capa-ble state with a robust economy, integrated political system, and a universal social system.58 Yet, even though Afghanistan has enjoyed some economic, political, and social growth over the past decade, the country’s recovery remains extremely fragile. In the social sphere, the state remains unable to provide basic public services to its citizens, be they education and health or water and sanitation. This inadequacy has triggered deep-seated frustration and resentment among the popu-lation, especially in the rural areas of Afghanistan, where the govern-ment’s reach and influence are almost non-existent. The nexus between


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instability and insecurity within the country, coupled with the central government’s lack of ability to provide functioning basic services for its citizens, undermines the legitimacy of central government institutions in the eyes of the population. This then fuels the vicious cycle of weak institutions, deteriorating security, minimal opportunities for social and economic advancement, and the rising narcotics economy which keeps the country unstable.59

Afghanistan is not faring any better in the political and economic spheres. Political order and governance in Afghanistan have always largely rested on a mixture of personalised, clientelistic politics, elite alliance, and elite settlement, and as a result the Afghan people lose trust and support for the government, who they see as not doing any-thing to change the situation for the better. By playing upon the local grievances of the people against the ill-performing government and the foreign forces within Afghanistan, the insurgents have succeeded in gaining sympathy and even a significant degree of political legitimacy among the people.60 The Afghan economy is facing the same problems that every state faces when trying to rebuild itself after a period of war, including significant levels of resistance to change from a state-controlled system; the dearth of human capital; corruption; insecurity; and inequalities created by the market system itself.61 The problem with Afghanistan, however, is that it has faced a 30-year long war which shows no signs of slowing down any time soon. Adding to this is the current economic climate, which has put even more pressure on the already fragile government to try to sustain itself and to try to develop a flourishing economy.

Institutional incapacity has become the norm in Afghanistan and in the places where institutions actually exist they are either corrupt or barely functioning. The Afghan government has been working on trying to rebuild its state institutions, but there remain critical infra-structural issues that have not been addressed, such as the lack roads and access to electricity. Up until now it has been the international donors who have almost completely financed the country’s develop-ment budget, a fact that the extremists use as ammunition against the Afghan government, who they portray as being a puppet of foreign forces.62 Even though significant progress has been made in many areas of Afghan society over the last decade, there still remains a significant level of breakdown on social, political, and economic order within the country, which has proved to be a threat to both security and stability and needs to be addressed in order to prevent further violence and the breakdown of the state.


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Safe havens

One of the main facets of the current counterterrorist objective in Afghanistan is to prevent terrorist groups from re-establishing safe havens within its border. The goal of preventing Afghanistan from further becoming a terrorist haven rests on a number of elements: the Afghan security apparatus and whether it will be able to deal with the terrorist attacks; the booming drug trade that underpins its financial resources; the international community’s commitment to the cause of Afghanistan; the coalition forces’ ability to apply political means rather than military power vis-à-vis heavy-handed tactics, and the role of exter-nal actors.63 Historically, the explanations offered to account for the rise of foreign-led terrorist networks active in Afghanistan have variously focused on the political vacuum opened up by the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, the failure of Afghanistan to produce a strong state because of ethnic factionalism, and an internal moral incoherence inherent to the Afghan culture.64 However, none of these elements individually can explain why Afghanistan has become such a target for terrorist and extremist groups. One of the most prevalent arguments as to why Afghanistan has become such an active safe haven is its close proximity to Pakistan. As the Afghan–Pakistani border is essentially wide open to the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements, it provides them with the ability to traverse between the two countries with ease.

With regard to access to these safe havens, there are three major routes into Afghanistan from Pakistan which are not very different from the ones used by the mujahideen in the 1980s.65 The first is the Parachinar way toward the south of Kabul. The Taliban have made serious gains in the Azrah district in the Logar province, a strategic gateway into the south of Kabul. The second is the road through Zabul province toward the south, west, and north. This road is a critical passageway for moving insurgent fighters to the North (Ghazni, Logar, and Wardak), as well as to Kandahar province and through Uruzgan province to the west (Helmand, Herat, and Badghris). The final route is the road through Kunar province and north of the Kabul–Jalalabad road. Without adequate levels of government presence, influence, and control, the situation in Afghanistan will not change in the near future. Until these safe havens and pockets of extreme weakness are addressed there will always be the possibility of Afghanistan’s territory being used as a safe haven for terrorists and other extremist and fundamentalist groups, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Directly linked to the issue of


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safe havens is the extremely porous border that Afghanistan shares with Pakistan, which has acted as a passageway for extremists to pass freely between the two countries.

Porous borders

Afghanistan shares borders with six countries, but it is the border that it shares with Pakistan – the 1,500 mile-long Durand Line – that is the most significant and dangerous.66 Over the course of the current US/NATO mission in Afghanistan, much attention has been paid to the Afghan–Pakistani border, a very porous demarcation line transited at many points by hundreds, if not thousands, of people every day.67 The border itself is poorly defined, cutting through mountain chains and ungoverned territory, essentially being out of the writ of both governments in Islamabad and Kabul. The porous nature of the border means that members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters have created a fluid battle space from where they are able to conduct increasingly coordinated attacks in both countries. The apparent ease of use that the Taliban and other terrorist groups show in their ability to traverse Pakistan’s tribal areas into Afghanistan in order to launch cross-border attacks has become possibly the most contentious issue between the US, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Having being driven from power in Afghanistan by Western forces at the beginning of the invasion, the Taliban took refuge in the Pakistani tribal areas and it has been this ability to maintain a foothold in Pakistan that has been instrumental to their success in sustaining a cross-border insurgency against Afghan and international forces.

Due to the freedom of movement across the border regions, the Taliban and elements of al-Qaeda are now present in almost every Afghan and Pakistani province along the fluid border areas between the two countries. On the Afghan side, the northern border area is defined by difficult-to-access mountain ranges that have made this area almost impossible for any kind of central government control. Conversely, the southern border is a plateau, made up of the province of Baluchistan on the Pakistani side and Nimroz, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces on the Afghan side. It is interesting to note that the Afghan Taliban in southern Afghanistan, adjacent to Baluchistan, does not rely as much on the border area as much as Taliban elements to the north do. Taliban activity is concentrated closer to the border in the north, as the border has less strategic value for the Taliban in the south. The reason for this is in part because the insurgents continue to control the southern


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territory that Western military forces have been unable to wrest away.68 Moreover, the Taliban’s territorial control in southern Afghanistan does not extend to the border, as it does in the north.

The insurgents have expanded the war to the central, northern, and western parts of the country. In 2003 the Taliban controlled 38 out of 364 districts in Afghanistan, but by the end of 2008 they expanded their con-trol to 164 districts, and between October 2008 and April 2009 Taliban attacks increased by 60 percent.69 This could not have been achieved without the availability of the safe havens of the border regions within both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Success in defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan and stabilising the country will be largely determined by events taking place along the Pakistan–Afghan border. There are no short-term solutions to the challenge posed to the Karzai government by the presence of safe havens for the Taliban and other mujahideen across the border in Pakistan. Both the Afghan and Pakistani states are weak, and, as of now, incapable of engaging in effective counter-insurgency in Pashtun areas, let alone coordinating a complex and draining counter-insurgency campaign. Thus the use of the border by the terrorist groups will not realistically cease in the near future.70

Pool of recruits

The people of Afghanistan are some of the world’s most disenfran-chised, poor, abused, neglected, unsecure, and uneducated. The social, economic, and political problems in Afghanistan have merged over time to create an environment where people feel, in many cases, that they have no alternative but to join terrorist groups. In addition, Afghanistan has an extremely high level of youth bulge, which is significant to the situation as, according to a study by Population Action International (PAI), there is a strong correlation between countries that are prone to civil conflicts and those that have a high youth bulge.71 Youth bulges are mostly found in sub-Saharan Africa, southern Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific islands, and there are currently 62 countries which are considered to be ‘very young’ (meaning that two-thirds of their popu-lations are under the age of 30). These include Pakistan, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. In the Muslim world, large populations of idle youth are especially prone to virulent strands of Islam as an alternative force for social mobility.72 Of the 27 largest youth bulge societies in the world, 13 are Muslim. However, demographers are quick to stress that youth bulges do not solely explain these civil conflicts; other underlying issues such as corruption, poverty, ethno-religious tensions, and poor political


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institutions also play a significant contributing role. Nor do they rule out as coincidence the predilection toward social unrest among states with large youth bulges.73

The theory contends that societies that have rapidly growing young populations often end up with rampant unemployment and large pools of disaffected youths who are more susceptible to recruitment into rebel or terrorist groups.74 Countries that contain weak political institutions are seen as being the most vulnerable to youth bulge-related terrorism and social unrest. In Afghanistan, with a population of over 28.3 million people, almost 14.6 million are male, of which almost 6.4 million fall into the age bracket of 15–65 and a further 6.3 million are between the ages of 0–14. With a median age of just 17.6 years, Afghanistan is an extremely youth-centred country. In the case of Afghanistan, this high level of youth bulge is significant and has direct ties to the structure of education provi-sion, in that many of Afghanistan’s youths have little or no access to any form of education and are left with little choice but to join these forms of extremist and terrorist groups. The development of state education in Afghanistan represents a good point of departure for understanding the availability of significant levels of recruits within Afghanistan. From 1978 onwards, a series of continuous wars have inflicted significant damage on the educational sector. Under the Rabbani and Taliban governments (1992–2001) there was complete neglect of the education system and a reintroduction of the policy of re-Islamising education by, for example, teaching extreme versions of the Koran and extremist and fundamental-ist ideals of Islam, which had dire effects on the youth of Afghanistan.75 The lack of a decent education system has been one of the main driving factors behind the Taliban’s ability to recruit so many young Afghan men. The Taliban set up madrassas, or religious schools, across Afghanistan and Pakistan and have provided not only education, but housing, healthcare, and food to those who are the most in need.76 In the post-Taliban era, the Afghan people had high hopes for state education and the Afghan government developed an ambitious position on promoting state-run education to all areas of Afghanistan.

The period 2002–2003 offered an unprecedented opportunity for a deci-sive push in nation-building by the new government, yet once again this opportunity was not taken advantage of and the people of Afghanistan were left to fend for themselves. As a result of this disappointment with the quality of state education, the pendulum began to swing back towards madrassas. This opening was not missed by the Taliban, who used this opportunity to re-establish their madrassas systems and engage the youth of Afghanistan with their cause once again. With schools being one of


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the very few manifestations of state presence in many villages and towns across Afghanistan, the Afghan government needs to understand how significant providing education is to its citizens, as well as in preventing the spread of the Taliban and stabilising the country. The Afghan state and its flawed political, social, and educational systems are, however, not the only contributing factors to such high levels of pools of recruits. The effects of foreign occupation and the rising level of civilian casualties related to this have begun to cause a backlash against the US and NATO forces and have, in many instances, pushed many Afghans towards sup-porting the Taliban and other extremist groups.

The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan escalated in 2010 and in the first six months of the year civilian casualties had increased by 31 percent over the same period in 2009. Three-quarters of all civilian casualties were linked to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), an increase of 53 percent from 2009, while at the same time, civilian casualties attrib-uted to Pro-Government Forces (PGF), decreased by 30 percent compared to the first half of 2009.77 Between January 1 and June 30, 2010, UNAMA HR documented 3,268 casualties, including 1,271 deaths of 2,477 civil-ians, or 76 percent of the total number of civilian casualties for this period.78 The steady increase in civilian casualties is acting against the efforts of the US/NATO forces and, as noted by General Petraeus ‘every Afghan death diminishes our cause’ and potentially provides another recruit to the terrorists.79 Unfortunately Afghanistan remains a melting pot of the necessary elements to create a pool of recruits to be used by terrorist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and it appears that for the near future at least the situation will remain much the same.

Availability of weapons

In those areas of the world where structural violence and terrorism are already severe, the proliferation of weapons and ammunition acceler-ates any existing trends of societal dysfunction, political anarchy, and the undermining of state authority, thus causing the disintegration of the government and creating an environment of state weakness.80 While it has become apparent that there is a correlation between small arms and light weapons proliferation, societal violence, and the general weakening of the social fabric, being able to identify the exact nature of the relationship in a universal fashion is extremely problematic. This proliferation and use of light weapons and small arms within societies around the world can actually be seen as a symptom of deeper problems within the fabric of these societies.81 Insurgent groups have


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been able to utilise available light weaponry, much of which is based on technologies dating back to the 1970s in Afghanistan. For Afghanistan, the problem of small arms proliferation and their misuse is not a new phenomenon. Afghanistan has, for decades now, been the recipient of a ready supply of arms and ammunition, which has had the effect of allowing even the most minor of personal or political disagreements to escalate into an all-out armed conflict. What is striking in Afghanistan’s post-Taliban era, however, is the magnitude of weapons holdings and the level of their penetration into political and economic life. Estimates as to how many uncontrolled small arms and light weapons are held in Afghanistan vary from a few million to more than ten million, or up to one gun for every three citizens in the country.82

For over three decades now a vast supply of weapons has flooded the country, becoming a driver of insecurity and political instability which in turn has fed into the insurgency. This widespread availability of weapons in Afghanistan is a major contributor to the growing levels of insecurity, violent crime, and poverty being witnessed there today. The presence of these weapons inhibits access by civilians to basic services and key infrastructures such as health clinics and education. Although weapons themselves do not cause conflict, easy access to weapons increases the lethality and duration of terrorist violence and conflict, undermines peace, and significantly hampers development.83 In essence, where states are unable to provide a secure environment for their citizens or meet the prerequisite demands of basic human needs, the proliferation of weaponry is both a principal consequence of, and a key contributor to, weak and ineffective governance.84 Social disintegration, linked to gun culture, is more clearly reflected in areas most severely affected by militarisation, such as Afghanistan and it is this militarisation of the civilian population, and most specifically the youth, that makes the rejuvenation of societies an even greater task to achieve. Unfortunately, it appears that Afghanistan is going to remain in its current situation unless a newly formed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme is implemented. Until then it will never be able to truly emerge from ‘under the gun’.

Government complicity and support

The Afghan state has taken a more definitive stance against the prolifera-tion of terrorism and against the extremist groups who operate within its borders. However, by promoting a culture of corruption and a lack of transparency, and by allowing certain extremist groups to exist without


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state interference, the Afghan government has played its own role in the proliferation of terrorism and the increase in state weakness. In a post-war situation, and especially in a case as unique as Afghanistan, the political leaders are of particular importance to overall levels of stability, as institutionally it is these political leaders that will eventually determine the fate of reconstruction efforts.85 Unfortunately, as is the case in many post-conflict countries, the Afghan government has yet to formulate its set of national interests and has instead become driven by the interests of the aid-providing countries, such as the US. Lack of determination and decisiveness can easily be highlighted as one of the main weaknesses, and unfortunately Afghanistan’s political leader-ship lacks a common vision and is only unified by one thing: political survival. As well as that, the recent talks to end the war in Afghanistan between the Afghan government, NATO officials, and Taliban elements have been seen by many as highly controversial. These talks involve face-to-face discussions with Taliban commanders from the highest levels of the group’s leadership, most of whom are using Pakistan as a sanctuary. Afghan leaders have also been holding discussions with the leaders of the Haqqani network, who are considered to be one of the most hard-line guerrilla factions fighting in Afghanistan today. Another group who were involved are the Peshawar Shura, who base themselves in eastern Afghanistan. There have been numerous criticisms about these meetings, focusing on the point that in the end the Afghan government is simply implementing a policy of appeasement to these groups, which will result in further violence and fighting for dominance.

Even though there have been many negative arguments put forward with regard to these talks, the fact remains that they appear to represent the most substantive effort to date to try to negotiate the end of the almost decade-long war. Many American and Afghan officials believe that the Taliban is vulnerable to being split, with potentially large chunks of the movement possibly even defecting to the Afghan government. However, this is not a definitive outcome, and, as mentioned earlier, the Afghan government’s support of these discussions may be providing the Taliban and other groups with a way into the system, giving them the steps necessary to mount another political takeover. Essentially, the Afghan government lacks credibility across a host of fields, includ-ing delivering justice; its patronage of the corrupt and the discredited politicians and political groups; its failure to deliver on economic growth; and its perceived lack of inclusiveness, which has allowed the insurgency to create instability in the country.86 It is the responsibility of the leadership to facilitate the emergence of a common purpose in


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a society through creating reciprocal and equitable relationships among community participants.87 This will in turn increase levels of support for the government by the Afghans, which would then decrease the support received by extremist groups, such as the Taliban. However, in Afghanistan such a situation has not yet prevailed and moreover it may never happen, since the leadership is almost totally disconnected from the society and incapable of understanding this crucial reality and working towards it.88 Along with the current discussion and meetings with the Taliban and other extremist elements, the Afghan government may in fact be playing right into the hands of the terrorists. Continuing on this focus, the next chapter will focus in a more in-depth manner on terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan.


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61

Terrorism in Afghanistan

Defining violence in Afghanistan as being terrorism-related is quite a recent phenomenon, and really only emerged during the period of the end of the Taliban rule. Prior to these events, violence in Afghanistan was usually described as taking the form of rebellions, revolts, militia movements, or acts of tribal warfare or insurgency. The year 1979 marked the beginning of a key turning point in relation to terrorism in Afghanistan. The 1979 Soviet invasion triggered the rise and expansion of post-jihad militant and religious extremist groups. However, it must be noted that at that time these groups were not described as being terrorist in nature, and were instead referred to as being freedom fight-ers. Freedom fighters are seen as being part of a resistance movement, usually against an oppressive government or outside force, compared to a terrorist who uses violence to promote fear (see Table 2.1). This differ-ence of definition may have emerged from the type of tactics used by the mujahideen at that time. The mujahideen tended to use guerrilla warfare tactics in their campaigns against the Soviets and the targets of this warfare were usually military in nature and not civilian or non-combatant. This would have prevented them being classified as a ter-rorist group according to the most well-known definitions of terrorism. A shift occurred, however, in the period immediately following the withdrawal of Soviet troops, whereby the mujahideen were now left to fend for themselves. These unstable mujahideen factions triggered a power struggle and it was at this time that the now-splintered mujahideen factions saw the use of civilian targets in violent political campaigns as being a valid political tool for the first time.

4Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 2


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In the years preceding Taliban rule, the violence witnessed in Afghanistan was mainly ethnic, sectarian, or intra-tribal based and was also used in the context of the political realm, i.e. opposition political groups using violence against each other. When the Taliban came to power in late 1994, their aim was to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan, and with this shift in political focus emerged a change in the patterns and use of violence within the country. The Taliban ini-tially began to use violence as a means of systematically eliminating all other political factions, thus ensuring their complete dominance within Afghanistan. As well as this, Afghanistan has been home to a number of terrorist groups over recent years, for example Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the terrorist groups that are active in Afghanistan.

A significant change in the scope of violence in Afghanistan took place after the 9/11 attacks, when almost all acts of violence within Afghanistan became automatically defined as being ‘terrorist’ in nature. Therefore terrorism in the context of Afghanistan can be divided into two specific eras: pre-9/11 and post-9/11. In the Afghan jihad campaigns of the 1980s, the most extreme and fundamentalist of the Afghan muja-hideen factions led by Rasul Sayyaf and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar did not deploy suicide bombers.2 In fact, the Afghan mujahideen uniformly denounced suicide attack proposals as being against their religion, and at that time it was only Arab volunteers who advocated the use of suicide attacks.3 The acts of terrorism in the second era involved the use of kidnapping, assassination, and (on rare occasions) explosives. The use of suicide bombing as a tactic in the jihad of Afghanistan is a new concept and represents a massive ideological and strategic shift of the Afghan insurgents which was really only observed following the US-led invasion in 2001. In the few short years since, Afghanistan has managed to rank second only to Iraq in the sheer volume of these types of attacks. Since the events of 9/11, and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by US-led forces, the instances of terrorism have increased dramatically. Interestingly, it was not until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that the levels of terrorism and terrorist-related deaths in Afghanistan really hit their peak.

Following the invasion by US forces in 2001 and the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the initial counter-attack by the Taliban took the form of a traditional insurgency and not a terrorist campaign. Essentially the Taliban were fighting a conventional guerrilla war using such tools as mortars, AK-47s, improvised Soviet-era landmines, rocket-propelled grenades, and PK machine guns.4 There were two attempted


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63

Table 4.1 Terrorist groups in Afghanistan

DHKP/C Aden Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)

al-Intiqami al-Pakistani

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)

Saif-ul-Muslimeen

East Turkistan Liberation Organization

Totally Anti-War Group (ATAG)

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Mujahideen Message Front for Defenders of Islam

Hizb-I-Islami

al-Zulfikar Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group

Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)

Jaish-ul-Muslimin Taliban

Islamic Jihad Group (Uzbekistan)

Hikmatul Zihad Jund al-Sham

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Yemen Islamic Jihad

Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)

Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh

Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Black December

Laskar Jihad al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (GAI)

Muslims Against Global Oppression (MAGO)

Shurafa al-Urdun al-Qaeda United Tajik Opposition (UTO)

Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Lashkar-I-Omar

Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)

Abu Nayaf al-Afghani

al-Badr People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)

Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)

Hezb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan

Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe

Afghan Taliban

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Armed Islamic Group Al-Jihad

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) Maktab al-Khadamat Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

Hizb-i-Khalis Iranian Revolutionary Guards

Source: International Crisis Group & National Counter Terrorism Centre.1


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suicide bombings in Kabul in mid-2002, but these were carried out by foreign jihadists with links to al-Qaeda and they had no affiliation with the Taliban. In fact, by the end of 2003 there was still no indig-enous Afghan suicide bomber and the tactic had yet to be used by the Taliban. This all changed on January 27, 2004, when Afghanistan had its first suicide bombing at the hands of a young Afghan citizen. The number of suicide bombings began to increase at a rapid pace follow-ing that event, and by 2005 it became apparent that the majority of these attacks were now being carried out by indigenous Afghans, as well as Pakistani Pashtuns. The 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan were essentially the triggers for the increase in terrorist activity in Afghanistan, but interestingly the rates of terrorist attacks really only increased at an incredibly rapid pace after the US-led inva-sion of Iraq in 2003. The US-troop withdrawal from Iraq has already had a spillover effect on the levels of terrorism in Afghanistan, and the projected 2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may see yet another increase in the levels of violence and terrorism. Having assessed terrorism in Afghanistan, the next section of this study will focus on Afghanistan in relation to its level of state failure and will explore how this impacts on the levels of terrorism and insurgency within the state.

Factors influencing terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan

There are a large number of possible combinations of risk factors that can occur in a given case that will increase the likelihood of terrorism or insurgency.5 Terrorism is never easy to quantify and it is even harder still to try to analyse what possible risk factors exist which increase the likelihood of terrorism occurring in a particular country.6 In order to try to assess the causes and consequences of terrorism in Afghanistan, this section will try to provide an overview of the most oft-mentioned causative factors in order to discover what combination of factors contribute to the current situation taking place through the use of a set of sub-headings, all of which involve a different aspect of Afghani political, social, and economic life.

Part 1: Political factors

In the case of Afghanistan, it is extremely important not to overlook the country’s political history in relation to its regime type and over-all political development, as this demonstrates that legitimacy of governance in Afghanistan has historically been extremely weak. Max


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Weber argues that governments draw their legitimacy from three basic sources: the traditional, the religious, and the legal (‘legal’ meaning in this instance Western-style democracies based on popular representa-tion and the rule of law).7 Weber’s first two sources, traditional and religious, are specifically important to Afghanistan.8 Legitimacy was usually reinforced by other means, i.e. through coercion and brutality, for example, the rule of the Taliban, from 1996 to 2001. This legitimacy was predicated on an accepted source of legitimacy of governance, i.e. religion, but was reinforced by totalitarian methods.9 In other words, in Afghanistan having the authority to rule is quite distinct from being a popular ruling force. Afghanistan’s current political system is that of an Islamic republic. This particular form of government is adopted by many Muslim states. This means that although such a state is, in theory, a theocracy (in that it remains a republic), its laws are required to be compatible with the laws of Islam. Systems of government nor-mally grow from existing traditions, but in Afghanistan they were imposed externally, which may explain why representative democracy cannot, at this time, be seen as a source of legitimacy in the country’s development.10 Although Afghanistan currently has the institutional veneer of a democratic state, its parliamentary and judicial processes mean little to the vast majority of the country.

One of the main problems with the governments of Afghanistan has been that they have usually been composed mainly of expatriate Afghans who have long divorced themselves from the Afghan people and culture and thus do not fully understand the needs of the country.11 This explains in no small measure why a religious source of legitimacy in the form of the Taliban is making such a powerful comeback. Daoud Sultanzoy highlighted this fact when he noted that ‘in the 262 years of our modern history we have never been governed. We have been ruled- or misruled’, adding that ‘it is not the strength of the Taliban; it is the weakness of this government that has driven the people away from the government’.12 It appears then that there is little likelihood of estab-lishing a strong central government in Kabul, which will be genuinely viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people, and which has sig-nificant public support across the country’s ethno-sectarian divides. Thus the extremist elements contained in the country, such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda, have a higher probability of taking control over the country once the US and NATO forces withdraw. The impact of regime type has also had a direct effect on the institutional capacity of the state.

Additionally, the establishment of effective governance is a critical enabler for improving development and security in Afghanistan, yet


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while improving the security situation is a vital first step, progress made to improve the security environment cannot be sustained without parallel improvements in governance and development.13 The state apparatus of Afghanistan and its centre and periphery institutions remain essentially independent of each other, the conse-quence of which means that the structure of government is unitary. Also all political authority is vested in the government in Kabul, thus the powers and responsibilities of the provincial and district adminis-trations are determined by central government.14 Within Afghanistan a lack of any real governance structures or political institutional stability is creating a breeding ground for conflict, further instability, violence and terrorism. This ‘bad’ governance is not merely a weakness but a threat to stable and legitimate order, which the population can identify and use to move towards the insurgency.15 The continued war in Afghanistan has produced national fragmentation, disintegration, and a nation where the social and political institutions have been destroyed or irrevocably altered, especially governmental institutions, the armed forces, and political organisations.16 There is also little centripetal social and economic movement in Afghanistan. which means that in order to achieve success in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, an effective Afghan state needs to be built.17 It can be argued then, that the most crucial issue in deciding the future of Afghanistan is the performance of the state. Having largely developed on the basis of funding by foreign powers interested in the potential of Afghanistan as a political and military buffer, the state had created hardly any institutions for interacting with society. There was no state legal framework, little police presence and no nationwide political parties.18

The institutional weakness in Afghanistan is caused by several factors: the scarcity of qualified and competent human resources; the dominant patron–client tradition (which has negative effects both on recruit-ment of civil servants and the manner in which political agreements are made); the fact that warlords and local commanders continue to exert considerable power (and are part and parcel of the ruling elite); the absence of authoritative and independent mechanisms for finan-cial control and accountability (which together with the significant illicit economy is one of the main causes contributing to the growth of corruption); and the feeble and chaotic conditions which character-ise local governance, to mention a few of the most important.19 The Afghan government’s capacity is also limited because of inadequately educated, trained, and paid staff. Therefore, building good governance


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and effective institutions has proven extremely challenging. The Afghan government has control of roughly 32 percent of the country and even at that, the control that it does have in the green zones is minimal at best in some of the provinces. Given the current unstable conditions in the country, further political and economic fragmentation looms for Afghanistan. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has warned that there is a risk that Afghanistan’s deteriorating situation could soon become irre-versible, noting that a controversial election, a weak government, and a drastic rise in violence and terrorism have caused a backlash of the peo-ple against the government in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been rocked by rising levels of terrorist violence and political turmoil once again in recent months and, describing this period as a critical juncture, Mr Ban Ki-moon said that the situation cannot continue if the country’s allies want to beat back the Taliban and stabilise the current government.20 This is an extremely dangerous situation, as it is not the strength of the Taliban but the failure of the government to govern that has led to the current crisis. Therefore this ongoing lack of institutional capacity means that the situation is not going to improve in the near future until the issue is effectively addressed.21

The combination of excessive political marginalisation (especially of minority groups), high levels of political discontent, and political griev-ances can be catastrophic to a country, especially one as weak and as divided as Afghanistan. In the majority of cases it is the minority groups within a particular country that experience the highest instances of marginalisation, which then leads to an increase in the levels of violent activity. This is due mainly to the fact that these marginalised groups feel that the only way they can make an impact on the repressive regime is to challenge them by violent means. Since 2001, the Afghan government has taken limited steps to increase religious freedom, but serious prob-lems still remain – the result of more than 30 years of continuous war and ongoing insurgency. The residual effects of years of jihad against the Soviet Union, civil strife, Taliban rule, and the still-weak democratic insti-tutions remain obstacles to stability in Afghanistan.22 With the end of the Cold War, and the Soviet withdrawal, dissent among various factions within Afghanistan was translated into an open civil war, and as a result the Taliban were able to consolidate their hold over Afghanistan with little concerted international opposition.23 The return of Afghan refugees in 2002/2003 intensified Afghanistan’s current problems significantly, as the already fragile government had been unable to address the needs of the people. Intolerance in Afghanistan has manifested itself through harassment and violence against religious minorities. The Centre for


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American Progress has developed the following list of what is deems to be the most significant grievances in Afghanistan:

– Religious/cultural grievances– Objections to the presence of foreigners– Tensions between village values and city values– Afghan political decision-making and issue of sovereignty– The inclusion factor on both the national and local scale, more specif-

ically at the local level where people have been forced out of politics– Conflicts over resources and money with certain people being

excluded from such things as contracting businesses– Impunity with which nefarious individuals are supported by

foreigners and allowed to continue what they are doing, usually without challenge

– Warlordism24

According to various reports there is continuing societal discrimination against minorities in Afghanistan, which includes restrictions on religious freedoms. However, there is limited informa-tion about the overall number of victims of the violence and definitive levels of human rights abuses taking place in Afghanistan. With regard to ethnic and religious affiliations, it can be concluded without much doubt that Afghanistan’s minorities are still being significantly affected by the ongoing terrorist violence, particularly where warlords and militia leaders are in control. In terms of relations between the different ethnic groups within Afghanistan, historically the Pashtuns have largely dominated Afghan politics, though other ethnic groups, notably the Tajiks, have, at times, also maintained a strong political influence. This is where much of the antagonism between the ethnic groups stems from. It is the Hazara ethnic group, however, that has been the most harassed and targeted group in Afghanistan. Recent reports also suggest that ethnic tensions are on the rise across the most volatile parts of the country, especially in the Wardak and Baluchistan provinces in relation to these ethnic minorities. The current drive to strike a deal with Taliban leaders, along with the policy of trying to integrate them into the political process, is also causing deep unease within Afghanistan’s minority groups. The leaders of the country’s Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities, which make up close to half of Afghanistan’s population, are vowing to resist, and if necessary fight, any deal that involves bringing members of the Taliban insurgency into a power-sharing arrangement with the government.25 There is a deepening estrangement of Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun communities


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taking place, which is becoming a significant problem, and the fact that this dispute is once again emerging along lines formed during the final years of the Afghan civil war makes the situation even more serious. The fact that these groups, with their bloody histories of fight-ing the Taliban, could arm themselves extremely quickly shows that these are issues not to be taken lightly and will no doubt add to the instability and levels of terrorist violence that is destroying the country.

Within Afghanistan, ideological cleavages, especially in relation to democracy and Islam have also been at the centre of much of the ter-rorist violence over the past decade. There is no relationship, whether political, economic, or social, that is not validated by religion and Islamic ideology in Afghan society today.26 In a country divided by tribal, eth-nic, and religious differences, traditional Islam has always been heralded as bridging the gap between the different ethnic groups. Historically, the struggle between the state’s desire for centralised political control and local communities’ desire to maintain their autonomy has taken an Islamic form because it is easier to gain the cooperation of rival tribes under the banners of religion and ideology.27 Yet, even in these circum-stances, ideology of any type has rarely been the key to political stability in Afghanistan. Issues such as local questions of power, resources, and individual or community advantage are actually much more important in Afghanistan. Yet even though Islam connects almost everybody in Afghanistan, the country remains significantly divided along both ethnic and tribal lines. Since the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan’s internal politics has shifted from an ideological party system to a system of ethno-nationalism; thus many of Afghanistan’s political parties have been created based on a biased representation of certain ethnic inter-ests rather than on ideological common ground. In basic terms, there are two main areas in Afghan politics that have been misunderstood by the international community in relation to the role of ideology. Firstly, the idea that the political realm in Afghanistan has been shaped by the behaviour of individual politics resulting from the long civil war, has not been fully grasped. As a result, the shape of Afghan politics has been transformed to ethnic- nationalism. Secondly, the birth of the Taliban regime has made it more difficult for pro-democratic Afghans to fight against foreign fundamentalists, who have been operating within Afghan society.28 These elements have not been taken into account when trying to assess Afghanistan’s inner issues, thus causing more separation between what the Afghan people want and what the interna-tional community thinks that they want in terms of political ideologies.

Even though Afghanistan has made significant progress towards becoming a fully fledged democratic nation, while at the same time


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reconstructing the country’s political, social, and security institutions, there are still many stages the government needs to pass through before the democratic system is fully operative. In ideological terms, then, one needs to ascertain what the democratic ideal in Afghanistan is. This question has not been asked enough in the context of Afghanistan, and rather than pushing toward the benchmarks of democracy founded on Western values and concepts, an Afghan model of democracy needs to be developed which would, in theory, focus on such elements as protecting human rights, including religious freedoms, addressing the core political needs of the Afghan citizens, etc. Without doing so, democracy will just be a tool forced upon the country by outsiders and will thus never be fully accepted. If too much change is demanded too quickly from the Afghan culture then it is highly likely that rejection will occur, provid-ing an ideological ground for the Taliban’s further re-emergence. In order to identify the Afghan democratic ideal, then, it is essential to separate democracy as a mode of governing from democracy as a value. In other words, the concept of the democratic political system needs to be separated from its association with Western liberal values. In such a situation, where the society has become fragmented, where cultural identity is under threat, and where there is no all-encompassing ideo-logical system in place, radical Islamist ideologies tend to emerge. A lot more needs to be done before Afghanistan can claim to be approaching the status of an absolutely consolidated democracy. Unfortunately, the ideological cleavages within Afghanistan are not going to be diminished in the immediate future, and it seems, if anything, that they may in fact be exacerbating the already volatile situation, thus providing an opening for the Taliban to re-emerge and take over the nation once again.

As well as that, corruption is generally considered to be a symptom and outcome of weak governance. Defined loosely as the abuse of public position for private gain, corruption is a very significant and dan-gerous issue affecting any country. In Afghanistan, corruption reflects the legacy of a continuous period of war, the erosion of state institu-tions, growing tensions among ethnic and tribal groups, and the growth of illicit economic activities, specifically the opium trade.29 Public perceptions of widespread corruption in particular can be extremely significant, as they often result in disenchantment with the govern-ment and hinder efforts to strengthen the government’s credibility and legitimacy, and more generally the overall state-building agenda.30 Afghan perceptions of corruption, the inability of the government to provide essential services, and the general exploitative behaviour of some government officials are all examples of the type of factors that


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are contributing to the success of the insurgents’ campaign.31 One of the more unusual features of corruption in Afghanistan is that it is highly dependent on the drug economy, with drug-financed corruption significantly undermining the state and political system as a whole. The Afghan government’s limited writ and widespread corruption are also seen as being two of the main factors helping to sustain the insurgency in Afghanistan.32 A national survey completed in March 2010 indicated that more than 83 percent of Afghans reported that corruption affects their daily life. Although the commitment by the Afghan government to prevent and address its corruption issues is often questioned, it has nonetheless been open in discussing its concerns and addressing its commitment to fight against it. However, the reality stands that the progress that has been made to date pales against the difficult challenges that Afghanistan faces in its fight against terrorism.

As well as the issue of the extremely high level of corruption, Afghanistan is faced with the issue of an almost complete lack of the rule of law. The rule of law in Afghanistan has never been strong, but after almost 30 years of continuous war, violence, and terrorism, it has been lost almost completely and replaced by the rule of the gun or the rule of the mullah. Over the years, the discontinuity of regime types has resulted in a patchwork of differing and in many ways overlapping laws, elements of different types of legal systems, and an incoherent set of law enforcement and military structures; all of which combine to make Afghanistan’s rule of law extremely incoherent and weak.33 The devel-opment of the rule of law system in Afghanistan post-Taliban has been a lengthy process and still shows no signs of completion or success. One of the main roadblocks with regard to building a new rule of law system is the fact that outside of the major cities, village councils or tribal elders have played the predominant role in resolving disputes and meting out justice, not the central government.34 Afghanistan’s judiciary remains so weak that Afghans increasingly turn to a shadow Taliban court system, especially in rural areas, where people lack access to judicial processes.35 Afghanistan’s weak judicial system, with the independent judicial branches having no proper funding, education, or training to function at an adequate level, has made any possible improvements in security and rule of law almost impossible.

Due to this fragility the government essentially has no real effective nationwide legal system in place, which in turn feeds into the hands of groups such as the Taliban, who offer their version of the rule of law through their Sharia courts. The civil service within Afghanistan is also extremely weak, inefficient, and corrupt, and the many years of


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brain drain have left it with few skilled, competent, or professional civil servants in the new government.36 Unfortunately, the situation does not appear likely to change in the near future. The Afghan citizens, who are desperately longing for improvement, have once again begun to turn their backs on the Afghan government. This is an extremely dangerous position to be in, because, as happened in 1996 following the mujahi-deen rule, the people will have no choice but to turn to the Taliban or a similar type of group once again to provide the countrywide security necessary within the framework of an archaic and repressive system. Realistically, it is impossible to completely eliminate corruption, espe-cially in low-income developing countries, such as Afghanistan, that are suffering from conflict, insecurity, lack of rule of law, ethnic or other fragmentation among their population, weak institutions, fragile states, etc.37 Therefore, re-establishing the rule of law and ending the prevalent corruption must be prerequisites for peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Part 2: Economic factors

Poverty in Afghanistan is widespread, with the government estimat-ing that 42 percent of the country’s total population lives below the national poverty line. As well as that, estimates show that another 20 percent of the people barely live above the line, being highly vulnerable to the risk of falling into poverty.38 The incidence of poverty is obviously more severe in the rural areas, where about 45 percent of the people are classified as poor, compared to 27 percent of the urban population.39 By May 2010, as many as 18 million Afghans were living on less than $2 per day and almost 5.5 million lived below the poverty line.40 Afghanistan’s economic situation has, however, also showed some signs of improvement. Even though this looks like a sign of hope for Afghanistan, it still suffers from an unemployment rate of just over 40 percent, has an $8.5 billion external debt, and a GDP per capita of just $800.41 There has been a reduction in the level of poverty in Afghanistan, but the situation on the ground does not appear to have become any less intolerable for the Afghan citizens. Afghanistan is con-sistently ranked as one of the poorest and least-developed nations in the world. The UNHCR report also directly links poverty to the steadily growing levels of conflict in Afghanistan and notes that the following key determinants of poverty are witnessed across Afghanistan:

– Ineffective institutions: including the disabling economic environ-ment; weak regional governance, service delivery and corruption; weak social protection programming; social inequalities


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– Vulnerability to: conflict; natural disasters; decreasing rule of law; increasing basic costs; increasing population; food insecurity

– Diverse livelihoods42

Poverty varies significantly between the provinces, with it being most severe in the Northeast, Central Highlands, and parts of the Southeast. The provinces of Daikundi, Badakhstan, Zabul, and Paktika represent the largest pockets of poverty in Afghanistan. As well as that, up to 70 percent of Afghans are still food insecure and high global food prices have recently pushed millions more Afghans into high-risk food inse-curity.43 It is interesting to note that the provinces that are by far the most violent of all of Afghanistan’s provinces (such as Helmand and Kandahar) are by no means the poorest. In fact, those provinces that are classified as being the most severely poverty-stricken, including Logar and Balkh, are not significantly affected by terrorism and ter-rorist activity. This is interesting due to the fact that poverty may be an underlying reason why an individual joins or supports a terrorist group, but usually these groups, such as was the case with the Taliban, are formed in the more affluent provinces and use the poorer provinces as targets for recruitment. Poverty plays an extremely important part in the instability in Afghanistan, but it is not the sole factor behind the increase in terrorist activity there. Poverty is only one element in a vast range of issues facing Afghanistan, and without addressing its root causes it will remain an active cause of political and social unrest which feeds into the insurgency. There have, however, been improvements in poverty reduction processes in Afghanistan. For example, 55 percent of Afghans now say that they have electricity, up almost 15 points from 2007; 56 percent now report new or rebuilt roads in their area; and while access to medical care remains a problem, half now report new or rebuilt health clinics, which is obviously a step in the right direction.44 Yet until the issue of poverty is adequately addressed, the poor of Afghanistan will continue to suffer, as will stability and the process of democratisation.

Increasing economic insecurity is jeopardising progress in Afghanistan. The fragile economic situation, coupled with the treach-erous security situation, has posed a serious threat to the stability of the Afghan state. Without economic stability, the situation in Afghanistan cannot be improved. One of the most damaging economic effects in Afghanistan is the uneven distribution of wealth, which has worsened significantly over recent years. Uneven distribution of wealth plays a major role in the attitudes of the Afghan people, especially when it


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relates to the distribution of international aid. Aid effectiveness affects the levels of peace and stability in a country, as poorly delivered aid fails to mitigate the conditions of extreme poverty, thus becoming a significant factor in the spread of insecurity. The overall lack of eco-nomic opportunity and the extreme discrepancies in such areas as aid allocation have caused growing levels of resentment among the Afghans. Although the Afghan government’s domestic revenues are increasing, they remain extremely low, at just over 8 percent of GDP, which accounts for 66 percent of government operating expenditures and just 28 percent of total government spending.45 Foreign assis-tance to Afghanistan accounts for almost half of the licit economy and around 90 percent of all public expenditure, which includes both donor and government spending.46 Therefore how aid is spent has an enormous impact on reconstruction and development as well as on the lives of ordinary Afghan citizens.47

Since 2002 international donors have provided over $25 billion of security-related assistance, compared to just $15 billion for civil reconstruction and development. This paucity of aid is reflected in the comparative per capita figures, which, it is estimated, amount to Afghanistan receiving $57 per capita, whereas Bosnia and East Timor received $679 and $233 per capita respectively.48 The reason for this difference is that a large proportion of aid to Afghanistan has been prescriptive and supply-driven, rather than indigenous and responsive to Afghan needs. This aid has tended to reflect expectations in donor countries rather than what Afghan communities want and need.49 Aid also tends to be centralised, focusing on Kabul and other urban city centres rather on the more rural areas of Afghanistan. This is also the case in relation to government spending, with over 70 percent of the national operation and maintenance budget being spent in Kabul alone.50 Afghanistan’s mostly destitute villages have perhaps seen the least amount of the billions of dollars in foreign aid that have been pumped into the country since the fall of the Taliban government. This absence of funding and resources in many of the provinces has created a favourable situation for the Taliban, where they take advantage of the population’s dissatisfaction with the government and with the foreign presence in the country.51 Insurgent and criminal activity is statistically more likely to spread to areas where there is persistent poverty. It is for these reasons, then, that uneven distribution of wealth is such a seri-ous issue and if not addressed those provinces that are currently being neglected may witness a spread of insecurity and thus terrorism and insurgency.


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Over the decades, Afghanistan’s economy has undergone several rounds of destruction and development, but the economic situation there is still extremely fragile, with an estimated 42 percent of its citizens living below the poverty line.52 Since 2001 the country has made remarkable advances, with legal GDP growing by almost 80 percent.53 On January 26, 2010 the Afghan government received $1.6 billion in debt relief from the World Bank’s International Development Association and the IMF under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. It was also agreed on March 17, 2010 that the Paris Club would cancel the $1.026 billion debt owed to it by Afghanistan.54 However, this economic recovery process is inherently fragile, especially if foreign assistance flows continue to decrease as they have over the past two years. From 2003 to 2008, economic growth was more than 10 percent, but that level dropped due to the global economic crisis and in 2009 reached just 3.4 percent.55 Recovery is inherently fragile and may not be sustainable without prolonged international assistance, and the 2014 deadline for withdrawal of US troops is adding to the increasing possibility of economic stagnation and collapse. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan remains an extremely poor country, one that is highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighbouring countries.56 Adding to this economic pres-sure is the fact that the issue of opium has become such an integral part of the Afghan economy that the challenge of tackling the opium economy is now central to the challenge of building a modern and stable Afghan state and economy. Drug production and drug trafficking remain serious problems in Afghanistan, with the funds gained from the opium trade continuing to be a significant source of funding for insurgents, as well as a source of government corruption. Profits from the drug trade are not only financing local warlords and the political elite, but also sustain the livelihoods of many quite poor people, with an estimated over two million people, or 8 percent of the population, being involved in heroin production.57 There is a strong correlation between insurgency and poppy cultivation and the UNODC Winter Rapid Assessment Survey highlighted this fact when it indicated that almost 80 percent of villages with very poor security conditions grew large numbers of poppies, whereas poppies were grown in only 7 percent of villages unaffected by terrorist-related violence.58

The majority of Afghan opium cultivation remains in southern and south-western Afghanistan, where the insurgency and the Taliban pres-ence are at their highest. Interestingly, some provinces that were previ-ously major producers of opium, such as Nangarhar and Badakhshan,


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have greatly reduced their production, whereas others, such as Kandahar, Nimroz, Balkh, and Farah, have greatly increased opium production, (a fact that may be linked to the movement of Taliban and al-Qaeda who are now more active in these southern regions).59 Within Afghanistan, the cultivation of poppies is concentrated in the south and west of the country, with Helmand province alone accounting for more than half of Afghanistan’s total production. Interestingly, these are also the regions of the country where Afghan government control is the weakest and Taliban control is the strongest.60 This nexus between the narcotics trade and the insurgency has been recognised by both the Afghan government and the US-led forces. It is estimated that each year the insurgency benefits from between $100 and 200 million from the narcotics trade; which also fuels corruption, undermines the rule of law, and jeopardises the prospects of long-term economic growth.61 There is also analytical evidence to prove that there is a direct link between the descent into terrorist violence, an increase in levels of state weakness, and decreased security levels and the upsurge in the production of pop-pies.62 General John B. Craddock, Allied Commander Europe, sums up the situation, noting that ‘the money from the narcotics trade is feeding the insurgency. It buys weapons and pays fighters … it is a cancer fuel-ling the insurgency, contributing to corruption, impeding legitimate commerce and undermining governance’.63 Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Without economic development, the legitimacy of the government is undermined. More worryingly, incentives increase for young men to associate themselves with predatory militias that provide them and their families with income and security. Essentially then, for the case of Afghanistan, economic development is only one of several interconnected pillars on which the state is built.64 Economic development is dependent upon the establishment of the rule of law, which in turn depends on effective government and thus cannot be a reason for the increase in terrorist activity in and of itself. There need to be additional factors which enable terrorism to take root.

Part 3: Social/cultural factors

The Afghan population has nearly quadrupled over the past 60 years, resulting in a very youthful country, with 43 percent of the current population being under the age of 14. Demographically, Afghanistan’s age structure is quite skewed towards the 0–14 year olds, which make up 43.6 percent of the population, which is high when compared to countries such as Ireland (19.7)65, Australia (18.8 percent)66, and Saudi


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Arabia (26.3 percent)67. Overall, less than 2.5 percent of the population are over the age of 65. In terms of links to terrorism and insurgency, these statistics are extremely significant, as it is the 0–14 and 15–30 year-olds that are the main targets for groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In many cases, given the poor level of educa-tion provided by the government and the downturn in the economy, the people within these age groups are left with no alternative but to join militant and extremist groups. An analysis of the breakdown of the population captures the extreme nature of the population imbalance. Such imbalances have exacerbated the already significant unemploy-ment levels, leading to social and political dissatisfaction. Where the educational system and labour force cannot handle such an imbalanced population, the Taliban offers a viable alternative through, for example, financial incentives and familial security. Also, the extremely high level of youth bulge helps to explain why the Taliban encounters little difficulty in attracting new recruits to their cause. The success of the reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan relies largely on the support of the Afghan people, so building that support base despite these trou-bling demographics is an inherently long-term problem that requires a long-term solution.

Prolonged war leads to fatigue and indifference, which leads to violence becoming a way of life, resulting in a culture of violence maturing.68 As a result, the use of coercion and violence as a means of projecting power and dominance becomes commonplace and the citizens come to expect solutions to problems to be found through violence. Violence has for the most part been a constant feature of Afghanistan’s history and it is therefore unsurprising that a culture of violence has emerged in the country. Afghanistan has not always been this way; for example, the 1960s were relatively peaceful times in Afghanistan and became known as the ‘decade of liberalism and mod-ernisation’. It was not until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973, and again after the 1978 coup of President Daoud, that the conflict in Afghanistan began to escalate significantly. This had an extremely negative effect on the people of Afghanistan, especially among those aged between 5 and 15 years, as they would have grown up in a violent environment and therefore would been more susceptible to developing immunity to violence, as opposed to the older generations of Afghans who would have seen Afghanistan during more stable and peaceful times. Many of those Afghans now see violence as being something that is part of Afghanistan’s culture.69 This has become especially apparent with the rise in attacks against American troops in recent years, which


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have come to be seen as retaliation for the civilian deaths caused by allied troops. Many Afghan people see these acts as being wholly justified, with the underlying mentality of ‘an eye for an eye’ playing a major role in Afghani culture. Therefore this embedded culture of violence has significantly hindered the recovery process in Afghanistan, and unless dealt with soon any future hopes for a stable Afghanistan will quickly be dashed.

Part 4: External and environmental factors

This ‘modern’ era of foreign occupation is the latest in a long line of interventions that can be traced back to the British foundation and consolidation of the modern Afghan state. However, the American intervention in Afghanistan and the rapid collapse of the Taliban has introduced an unprecedented Western military presence into central Asia which has had completely unforeseen consequences for its peoples.70 Afghanistan’s long years of unrest have produced a new generation of Islamic militants who are reinforcing the Taliban’s re-emergence. The presence of thousands of western troops in Afghanistan has helped these leaders recruit a new generation of fighters to fight what they call ‘the occupation of their Islamic land by infidels’.71 The insurgents fighting against the US-backed government of President Karzai are a combination of old and new Taliban, where the leaders remain the same but the foot soldiers are new recruits who have joined the Taliban battle against the international forces occupying their land. There is a direct link between the level of foreign troops and the level of security risk in any given province in Afghanistan in terms of troop levels and threat levels across all of Afghanistan’s provinces. In this regard, Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, and Paktika are prime examples, with over 97,000 foreign troops from a number of different countries, such as the US and the UK being stationed there. Each of these provinces is characterised as being an extreme security risk, with the highest incidences of terrorist activity taking place there.

Many now feel that, almost a decade after the US occupation of Afghanistan, security is worse than it has ever been, with a growing number of civilian victims and a much higher level of terrorist attacks taking place against foreign troops. The resistance movement is on the rise once again and the influence of the Taliban is growing, spe-cifically in the south and southeast regions of the country where they have created alliances with other tribal forces against the occupation.72 Unfortunately, peace-building in these areas is lacking and Afghanistan appears to be setting in for a long war, with or without the presence of


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foreign troops. In ideological terms, the foreign military occupation is giving a boost to religious rhetoric and fundamentalism in Afghanistan, which is being used to the utmost levels of benefit to the Taliban through recruitment of the resentful, disgruntled, and angry youth.73 The inherent hatred of foreign occupiers means that the insurgency in Afghanistan can never realistically be defeated by maintaining such a high international troop presence in the country.74 In fact, the presence of foreign forces does not actually even discourage militant attacks; instead, the status of foreign troops as occupiers only fuels the insurgency in Afghanistan and affirms their role as legitimate targets for nationalistic, religious, local political, and self-interested purposes.75 However, to pull out completely, as is the current plan of President Obama who has set the withdrawal date in Afghanistan for 2014 (a process which began in 2011), would mean that the more extreme elements of the Taliban, along with other extremist and terrorist groups, would once again be free to take over the country.

Adding to this is the fact that Afghanistan has long suffered from interference by and conflict with its neighbouring states, but no other country has been as significant in this realm as Pakistan. One of the main underlying reasons for this conflict and interference specifically with Pakistan has been that there has been a long history of offering sanctuary to the other’s opponents, and this has created bitterness and mistrust between the two neighbouring states. This underlying policy of intrusion remains in place to this day and ongoing claims and counterclaims of sheltering each other’s opponents indicate that the same strategies may be continuing.76 Since the emergence of the new political regime in Afghanistan, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been overshadowed by the complex and difficult past between the two countries, notably Pakistan’s support of the Taliban. The post-9/11 era has created a new regional and international environ-ment that required Kabul and Islamabad to cooperate closely to defeat militancy and terrorism. Pakistan has been quite consistent, since the US-led invasion, in supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan and in cooperating with the international coalition. However, Afghanistan and Pakistan have yet to fully overcome the difficulties of the past and shape a new strategic relationship to meet the challenges of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

In fact, Afghanistan’s political leaders have often looked to external factors, especially outside influences, as an explanation for the cur-rent crisis. They tend to lay the blame on ‘foreign conspiracies’ against Afghanistan for the country’s internal political chaos.77 Both Kabul


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and Washington have often expressed the view that Pakistan has not done as much as it could have to counter the cross-border insurgency, which these two governments believe is responsible for keeping adja-cent Afghan provinces unstable. They believe that Pakistan can and must do more than it has so far.78 In this regard, Pakistan has faced the problem of credibility as militants from Pakistan have been cross-ing over into Afghanistan and joining the Taliban. Pakistan also faces problems in convincing post-Taliban Afghan leaders of its sincerity, with Afghanistan continuing to accuse Pakistan of intervention and of the use of the Afghan Taliban as an instrument of Pakistani regional policy.79 In essence it is the nature of these ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan that is critical to defeating terrorism, and thus the prospects for stability in Afghanistan and peace in the entire region will largely be a function of how well the two countries can maintain good relations and meaningful cooperation with the international coalition.80

Summary

Afghanistan is and will remain one of the world’s most active terrorist states. The current democratically elected government has managed to make some general improvements to the stability of Afghanistan, but the situation there remains volatile and balanced on a knife-edge. The overall lack of adequate progress being made by the Afghan govern-ment, especially in the area of security, means that the country may be poised for a return to its pre-9/11 ways. The more extreme elements of the Taliban, along with other extremist and terrorist organisations, have once again emerged and are expanding their influence across the least controlled areas of Afghanistan. The levels of terrorist attacks are also once again on the rise and have begun to take place in areas where the US and other allied troops are in plentiful number and in areas which were once deemed to be the safest in Afghanistan. The US-led invasion of and subsequent war in Afghanistan is now over a decade old, yet the situation in Afghanistan remains extremely unstable. Within this situ-ation, successful counterinsurgency programmes are highly dependent not only on the stability of the central government, but also on the quality of local government and governance, both of which remain extremely poor. With the approach of the complete US troop with-drawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the Afghan army needs to be able to hold its own against the Taliban in major combat missions for years to come. In effect, the US army plans to maintain military pressure on the Taliban until 2014, until such a time that all of the country’s security


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responsibilities can be transferred to the Afghan army. This does not look like a likely outcome, however, with the Afghan army remaining highly dependent on the US. Without this support from foreign troops, and especially from the US, it is predicted that the Afghan military would be rapidly defeated by Taliban forces and the country could return to the situation it faced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It seems inevitable at this point that once the US and foreign forces pull out of the south-eastern Pashtun-dominated areas of Afghanistan, the Taliban will rapidly move in and once again take over these areas.

There exists a combination of two critical problems that are threaten-ing to undermine the mission of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. The first is the overall failure of the counter-insurgency strategy to meet its aims, and second is the disconnect that exists between the political objectives and military operations within Afghanistan.81 Until these issues are dealt with, the transition could end up providing a considerable boost to the insurgency. The role of the Afghan army remains extremely problematic for many reasons, including the ethnic imbalance of recruits, large turnover, weak training, and Taliban infiltration. In the current situation, there appears to be little to indicate that the Afghan army will be able to act autonomously over a large part of the country’s territory by 2014.82 As it stands, the operations carried out by the coalition forces are based mainly in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, but this is highly problematic as jihadist groups do not really exist in these regions, thus highlighting the flawed nature of the counter-terrorism programmes in Afghanistan. Insurgents move more or less freely between Pakistan and areas near Kabul; border security is not guaranteed and will not be in the foreseeable future. Also, the territories under the control of insurgents form a sanctuary not only for the Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami, but also for transnational jihadist move-ments such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tabia. After over a decade of war, Nuristan is the first province almost totally under the control of armed opposition and is once again becoming a sanctuary for transnational jihadist groups. The provinces of Kapisa, Laghman, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Surobi, Paktia, Paktika, Logar, and Ghazni are the areas where the most aggressive players, the various Taliban networks, such as those of Haqqani, Mansur, and Hezb-e-Islami, and various transna-tional groups such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Tabia, are operating.83 This growing autonomy of local powers and insurgents, the weakness of democratic institutions, and a diminishing ability to serve the popu-lation all point to the continuation of the Afghan state’s progressive deterioration. It may be that the only way to contain the threat posed


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by these transnational jihadist groups is to politically reintegrate them into a coalition government in order to isolate the most radical groups, but questions remain as to how effective this could be. Without strengthening the fledgling government institutions this integration process could never work and may lead to deeper fragmentation and disintegration of the country.84

Overall, the case of Afghanistan has been extremely interesting both in terms of the process of state failure and the issue of terrorism, pro-viding an insight into how a state formed through violent means and developed through violent politics can remain functioning even though its stability levels are extremely fragile. The role of outside influences on Afghanistan has been a strong one since its creation and continues to cause massive instability within the country. However, the role of the Afghan government over the years has also been detrimental to the stability of the country and has pushed it towards failure on numerous occasions. With regard to the issue of terrorism in Afghanistan, the role of internal actors coupled with outside influences has once again been extremely significant. The domestic extremist and fundamentalist groups as well as the international and foreign terrorist organisations which have made Afghanistan their base over the years have had the benefit of elements such as large pools of recruits and the existence of a porous border to enable them to take root within the country. The effects that terrorism have had on Afghanistan, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, have been one of the most destabilising factors on the state.


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83

Pakistan is a nation of contradictions: it is one of the front-line allies in the global war on terrorism, yet it is home to some of the most active and dangerous terrorist organisations in the world today. It contains all of the elements necessary for state failure and terrorism to occur: religious fundamentalism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, a history of military dictatorship, and a crumbling society and political infrastructure.1 It is a complicated country, one of religious and political diversity, fractured by class and ethnicity. In its short history it has had three constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973); it has never had a successive elected government; and it has witnessed the resignation of four presi-dents.2 Having also faced the struggle of uniting a population divided by language, culture, and ethnicity, it sadly has the distinction of being both the first state to be created and, in 1971, the first state to break up in the post-Second World War period.3

Dubbed a quintessential ‘failed state’ by global academics and policymakers, it has become a focus of numerous studies on inter-national terrorism and state failure.4 However, the majority of these studies have not delved far enough into Pakistan’s history, nor have they traced the reasons why it has become such a hotbed of terrorist activity. Instead, it is often automatically classified as being a failed state. This chapter will begin with a historical overview of the state, focusing on the creation of the state from 1947 onwards, and will include all major events, both political and social, that have shaped the country since then. The next section of the case study will focus on the phenomenon of state failure in the Pakistani context. This will involve carrying out an in-depth analysis of the Pakistani state as a whole, assessing the level of state failure that is occurring there. The final two sections will deal with the background causes and conditions

5Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 1


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of terrorism in Pakistan and the internal state connections to terrorism and insurgency.

The creation of a nation-state

On August 14, 1947, the state known as Pakistan was officially created but this newly formed state was weak from the outset and faced numer-ous challenges, both internally and externally, as well as a complete lack of social, cultural, and political harmony.5 Structurally, Pakistan was divided into two distinct areas: East and West Pakistan, with 1,600 miles of Indian Territory acting as a division between them.6 The initial 11 year period of independence was an essential time in shaping and moulding Pakistan’s political and administrative profile. Pakistan was envisioned to be a state that all Muslims could call a home. However, when Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Pakistani state and leader of the Muslim League, died in 1948, so too did this idea of what Pakistan was meant to be. Since then the country’s leaders and the mili-tary have ignored this view of Pakistan and have instead turned towards Islam as a means to stabilise the country and have pushed for Pakistan to be a strictly Islamic state. Due to Pakistan’s inability to forge for itself a national identity, there was an intensification of the already simmer-ing ethnic, linguistic, regional, and nationalist issues which essentially went on to fragment further the already weak country.

By 1948 Pakistan had taken part in its first war with India, suffering major losses, not only of land but also of confidence and stature, while internally the country was falling apart. To compensate for its lack of structure, Pakistan developed into a national security state, one in which the military has monopolised power.7 This resulted in national interests and foreign policy being pushed to the forefront of politics and state-building. As a result, such necessary areas as developing political institu-tions, creating a constitution, introducing democracy, and developing a prospering economy became considered a secondary element of the state’s evolution. The leaders of Pakistan over the years have played the largest role in shaping Pakistan into the country of conflict and terror that it has become today. They have, over the decades, left an indelible scar on its political and social stability and structure; beginning with Muhammad Ali Jinnah through to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, and Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan has been on a rollercoaster ride of trials and tribulations. Each leader has left their mark on Pakistan and their actions have turned Pakistan into what it has become today; one of the world’s most dangerous states.8 However, it was the 11 year rule


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Pakistan Context – Part 1 85

of General Zia ul-Haq (1977–1988) that was to have the longest and most damaging legacy of any other leader on Pakistan.

Pakistan’s rapidly changing leadership

Pakistan has been severely wounded by military rule, religious funda-mentalism, the rising tide of Islamism, terrorism, and sectarianism, a collapsing economy, and a jihadi mentality. Within Pakistan there have been two relationships that have dominated the political scene. The first is the relationship between the military and civil society, and the other is between Islam and the state. Pakistan’s tumultuous history began with the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah on September 11, 1948, having ruled the country for less than 13 months at the time.9 Jinnah, also known as Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), was held in the highest esteem by the people of Pakistan.10 Although he managed to sustain the country in its early stages and encourage its growth, he also had a negative legacy that would influence the Pakistan of the future. His ruling style was highly rigid and self-serving, which resulted in other members of government almost always being seen as subordinate to him. Pakistan began its independence as a democratic entity with a parliamentary system, in which the representative aspects of democ-racy were almost destroyed under Jinnah’s domineering position.11 In effect, what resulted was a situation in Pakistan where the Parliament and members of the governing cabinet were given a subordinate and extremely limited role within the state, thus triggering the legacy of domination by political leaders of the entire government structure of Pakistan. Following Jinnah’s sudden death there was a power vacuum created which was hard to fill. Khwaja Nazimuddin was called upon to take over as Governor-General.12

Nazimuddin took the role in a superficial manner, allowing Liaquat Khan to rule through the title of Prime Minister. Liaquat was eager to give the new nation a constitution, but before he could do so he was assassinated in Rawalpindi in October 1951.13 With the the office of Prime Minister going to Nazimuddin the country was now to have an extremely weak head of government, leading to severe riots took place in 1953 in the Punjab area for which Nazimuddin was held responsi-ble. By 1955 the remnants of the Muslim League combined the four provinces of West Pakistan into one administrative unit and Ghulam Mohammad was forced to relinquish his office of governor general of Pakistan. He was succeeded by Iskander Mirza.14 Mirza’s constitution of 1956 embodied numerous objectives in relation to religion and politics,


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the one with the most serious and long-lasting effect being that which declared the country an Islamic republic. Mirza formed an alliance of sorts with the Republican Party and the East Pakistan Awami League and appointed Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy as Prime Minister. The alliance which was short-lived and Suhrawardy suffered a similar fate to his predecessors and was soon ousted from office.15 Thus, unable either to sustain alliances or to govern in accordance to the constitution, the government of Pakistan resembled the chaotic provinces where nobody really held power. Due to increasing rumblings of dissent in East Pakistan and in the NWFP (now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Mirza, on October 7, 1958, proclaimed the 1956 constitution to be abrogated and closed both the national and provincial assemblies. He also banned all political party activity, declaring that the country was now under martial law.

General Mohammad Ayub Khan was made chief martial-law adminis-trator, but he had already had his sights set on an even higher position, and on October 27, 1958 issued Mirza with the ultimatum of either permanent exile from Pakistan or execution. Mirza chose exile and Ayub Khan assumed the role of President. A period of martial law was declared which lasted for 44 months, and it was during this time that many army officers were given posts in the civil service and numerous politicians were excluded from public life under what was called the Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order.16 In 1962 Ayub Khan devel-oped another constitution, this time one more focused on presidential rather than parliamentary rule. This constitution was based on a sys-tem where an indirectly elected president together with a reinforced centralised political system would emphasise the country’s vice regal stance. Ayub Khan remained president through the results of a biased January 1965 election but trouble was on the horizon with regard to the Kashmir issue, with major hostilities emerging between India and Pakistan in September 1965.17 Once again Pakistan faced defeat, and Ayub Kahn’s popularity and influence were at an all-time low. It was then that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto saw an opportunity to emerge from behind Khan’s shadow. Bhutto soon joined the opposition and formed his own political party, called the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).18

By 1969 Ayub Khan knew that he had lost control and influence, and in March of that year announced his retirement. He named General Mohammad Yahya Khan as his successor, which meant that, once again, the country was under martial law. Yahya Khan immediately abolished Ayub Khan’s basic democratic system and abrogated the 1962 constitu-tion. He also issued a Legal Framework Order which reconstituted the


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single unit of West Pakistan into the original four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan.19 Election results were contested from these regions, causing mass riots, the result of which was the emergence of the state of Bangladesh in 1971 – once again Pakistan had lost a princely slice of its territory. On December 20, 1971, Yahya Khan resigned the presidency; however, this time the army was not first in line for the position. Instead it went to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.20 Bhutto immediately pledged to give Pakistan a new constitu-tion and a new style of government. The 1973 constitution, created by Bhutto, was adopted, restoring parliamentary government to Pakistan. Bhutto then stepped down as President and assumed the role of Prime Minister. National elections were scheduled in 1977 which resulted in Bhutto and his party winning by a massive majority.21 The army, on the other hand, had other ideas about the future of the country and, ignoring the results of the election, arrested Bhutto and dissolved his government. On July 5, 1977, General Zia ul-Haq took over leadership of the government, claiming that Bhutto was involved in corruption and a plot to assassinate a political rival, and had him sentenced to death by hanging on April 4, 1979.22 Zia ul-Haq immediately began to mould Pakistan into a strict Islamic state. Almost all of the major issues affecting Pakistan to this day – the militancy of the religious parties, the radical madrassas system, the extremist groups, the drug and gun culture, and the severe increases in sectarian violence – were developed on Zia’s watch.23

Following Bhutto’s death, Zia set his sights on redesigning the politi-cal system of Pakistan, with Islam and strict Islamic principles being his focus. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Iranian Revolution of that same year, Zia was able to push Islamism to the forefront of his programme for political overhaul and the process of directly assisting the mujahideen. It was also during this period that the US became a player in the future of Pakistan. The Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan gave Zia the chance he needed to promote a political system that was guided by Islamic principles and traditions. The Islamisation of Pakistan continued to be a central role in Zia’s policy development for Pakistan. Ronald Reagan became president of the US in 1981 and soon after Pakistan became the third largest recipient of US aid. US intelligence services also encouraged Pakistan’s relations with the radical religious movements in Afghanistan, who they felt could be used as a tool to force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.24 In 1985, following accusations by his opponents of dictatorial tactics, Zia opened elections which once again resulted in Zia remaining leader of Pakistan.


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Zia personally chose Muhammad Khan Junejo to be the country’s new Prime Minister. In December 1985 martial law was officially lifted and the once banned political parties took the opportunity to immediately re-establish themselves. Benazir Bhutto also took this opportunity to return from exile and become leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).25 It so happened that the lifting of martial law coincided with intensified levels of conflict between the country’s ethnic groups, and the long simmering tensions between the Sindhi natives and the Muslim immigrants from India, as well as the formation of the Mujahir Quami Movement (MQM) in the 1980s, now became serious causes for concern, as well as causes of the violence that was being directed at the immigrant community.26

Yet another issue that would be of great importance to the develop-ment of Pakistan involved the narcotics and weapons trade, which initially took root in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Due to the increasing levels of violence in Karachi, as well as in Hyderabad and Quetta, Zia announced in May 1988 that he was once again dissolving the national and provincial parliaments and assemblies, and that he was dismissing the Junejo government. On August 17, 1988 Zia was killed in a plane crash, ending his reign over Pakistan.27 Ghulam Ishaq Khan became acting president and his first act was to declare that elections would take place in November 1988. The results of that election showed that Benazir Bhutto’s PPP had won less than half of the seats in the legisla-ture.28 The PPP did well in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where it was able to form provincial governments. Punjab, however, was won by Nawaz Sharif and the Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Itihad [IJI]). In December of that year Ishaq Khan was formally elected President and Benazir Bhutto became Pakistan’s first female Prime Minister. Bhutto faced numerous challenges once she took over the position of Prime Minister. Although the Soviet Union had withdrawn from Afghanistan, an Afghan communist regime was still in power and more than three million Afghan refugees were still living on Pakistani soil.29 In order to remain in close relations with the army, Bhutto agreed to allow them to sustain the proxy fight against the communist regime in Kabul. She also used the military in her law-and-order campaign in Karachi, where the levels of ethnic unrest were on the increase. As the issues in Sindh remained unresolved, her supporters there began to be annoyed. To show her dominance, Bhutto tried to force Nawaz Sharif to give up his position as the chief minister of Punjab. The problems kept mounting for Bhutto, and soon after her government was charged with corruption. In August 1990, following demands for her removal,


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President Ishaq Khan ruled that the PPP administration had lost the confidence of the people and dismissed the Bhutto administration.

Bhutto was succeeded by Nawaz Sharif, who chose to adopt the Islamisation programme of Zia ul-Haq as his own, as well as bolstering alliances with religious parties, going as far as getting a Shariat Bill passed which made Sharia the law of the land in Pakistan.30 However, Sharif’s popularity did not last, as sustained civil disobedience, acts of lawless-ness and failed economic policies all joined to produce dissatisfaction within Pakistani society. Although the communist regime in Kabul was eliminated, the conditions in Afghanistan remained extremely unsta-ble. The Pakistani military used this as an opportunity to support an ultra-conservative regime (the Taliban), which had come to power in Afghanistan. As well as facing these issues in Afghanistan, internally relations between the Prime Minister, the President, and the army were on the decline. Ishaq Khan struck the first blow against Nawaz Sharif by using his constitutional powers to dismiss the Sharif government and once again dissolve the national assembly.31 The army intervened in the political world again and persuaded both Sharif and Khan to resign. The army replaced them, with Wasim Sajjid taking the office of interim president and Moeen Qureshi acting as interim prime minister. This interim government proved to be an interesting experience in Pakistan’s tumultuous history, with Qureshi proving to be an honest leader who began to implement such needed reforms as exposing corrupt practices in government, cracking down on loan defaulters (a significant prob-lem in Pakistan at the time), and demanding that the country begin to live within its means. National elections were held in October 1993 and the PPP once again came to power with Bhutto as leader, while the PML-N came in second led by Nawaz Sharif.32 In an alliance with the PML-J, led by Junejo, the PPP formed the new civilian government with Bhutto once again leading the country. This time Bhutto managed, with the help of the PML-J, to take control of Punjab. Sharif was able to form a coalition government in the areas of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but the power was squarely in the hands of Bhutto, who then placed Farooq Leghari, a member of her own party, in the role of President.

Even with these changes the country remained extremely unsta-ble and economically unsound. Adding to the increasingly troubled situation was the fact that Pakistan was placed on a state sponsor of terrorism watch list by the US in 1993.33 Bhutto also faced numer-ous political crises as well as facing the issue of her husband’s alleged corruption, and she soon became caught up in dealing with these


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accusations rather than actually running the country. As a result her government floundered and chaos ensued across the nation, with Sindh being affected by yet more sectarian violence and the tribal lead-ers of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa becoming targets for assassinations. In November 1996 President Leghari dismissed Bhutto’s government and the 1997 elections that followed ended with Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N once again taking power.34 By December of that year Sharif had extended his powers so much that even President Leghari was forced to resign. This ‘glory’ did not last for long, however, as Sharif failed to halt the ethnic conflicts in Karachi and Sindh, nor the sectarian violence that had broken out in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, nor the tribal struggles for autonomy taking place in Baluchistan. These issues escalated at alarm-ing rates throughout his term in office, and Sharif also had to deal with an economy that was a shambles as well as an increasing foreign debt.35 Despite all of these issues, Sharif had, by 1998, managed to amass more power than any other previously elected civilian government in Pakistan. Under his leadership the nuclear programme was developed and this resulted in Pakistan detonating nuclear devices in May 1998.36 These tests sent shockwaves around the world, and concerns grew that, due to Pakistan’s instability, such technology could possibly be sold or transferred to groups that might use them in terrorist plots.

It must be noted, however, that although Pakistan’s nuclear pro-gramme had been in the process of development, the specific decision to test a nuclear warhead came as a response to India’s test, which took place before Pakistan’s and was not seen as an act of aggression from its own perspective. Now confronted with growing unrest across the country, Sharif proclaimed a state of emergency which enabled him to rule Pakistan by ordinance and his own special decrees. Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Courts were given greater freedom to mete out Islamic justice across the country. The government had also gone so far as to muzzle the press and ignored almost all the constitutional constraints placed upon it. General Pervez Musharraf came on to the political scene of Pakistan following the forced resignation of General Jehangir Karamat. The popular view within the army was that General Musharraf was planning a challenge to Sharif’s power. On October 12, 1999 Sharif attempted to oust Musharraf while the general was out of Pakistan, but the military had other plans and arrested Sharif.37 Upon his return to Pakistan, Musharraf announced the immediate dissolution of the Sharif government and the suspension of the constitution. However, he did not declare martial law and stated specifically that the fundamental rights contained in the constitution were to be preserved. As the country’s new


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chief executive, Musharraf essentially enabled himself to take over total power; doing so by citing the increasing turmoil in the country as the reason why he needed to control all aspect of the government and military. The situation at that time in Pakistan was dire, with the political, social, and economic institutions in a state of collapse, the economy in complete disarray, and society facing the onslaught of sectarian violence on a daily basis. Pakistan was, at that time, at a critical juncture, once again facing military rule and martial law. With Musharraf in power, relations between Pakistan and the US began to fray, this essentially being caused by numerous issues, including the nuclear arms race with India and Pakistan’s sustained political instability.38

Musharraf’s Pakistan

In June 2001 Musharraf forced the resignation of President Rafique Tarar and declared himself President of Pakistan, also effectively becom-ing head of the government, since the position of prime minister had not been filled since Sharif had been ousted. However, soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Pakistan’s political landscape was dramatically altered. Pakistan, which had significant diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, was slow to put pressure on the Taliban to arrest al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. It was not until the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban was unearthed, thus leading to the US demanding Pakistani assistance, that Musharraf chose to side with the US and pledged to help flush out the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements from both Pakistan itself and from Afghanistan. Musharraf’s choice to form an alliance with the US was met with outrage by the conservative Islamists within Pakistan. Almost immediately following his announce-ment, thousands of pro-Taliban Pakistani volunteers crossed the border into Afghanistan to help fight against US troops. In the period imme-diately following September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the US, the Islamist militant population in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) increased rapidly as Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters from all over the world found refuge in the border lands in Pakistan, with thou-sands more flocking to FATA.39 Waziristan was the target for Pakistani military attacks against the militants. However, this area and other tribal Pashtun regions have been historically off-limits to the central govern-ment and government forces were met with stiff opposition. Musharraf also faced a mutiny of sorts from his own military, who refused to fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. Musharraf’s government had been battling religious extremism at home and he had gone so far as to


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ban some of the more radical and fundamental militant groups, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban, which had long been active in Pakistan.

The issue of Kashmiri terrorism, however, was never mentioned nor dealt with in any significant manner, and political and religiously motivated acts of violence continued to escalate between the Kashmiri Muslim opposition groups and the Indian security forces. This, in turn, caused an increase in both Muslim–Hindu violence and in Sunni–Shia violence in Pakistan. In August 2004 Shaukat Aziz took over as Prime Minister, but Musharraf gave him little power and essentially held on tightly to the reins of power, arguing that the country was too weak for him to return it to a full civilian authority.40 Throughout Musharraf’s reign, Pakistan continued to face increasing levels of sectarian violence. Adding to the country’s already long list of woes was the earthquake that struck in October 2005 in the Kashmir region, killing tens of thou-sands of people. This is an extremely significant event in the case of Pakistan, as it led to an increase in the overall levels of ‘failure’ within the country and aided in the proliferation of support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda alliance. This issue will be discussed in more detail later. By 2007 Musharraf was once again seeking re-election to the presidency, but due to the fact that he remained head of the military, opposition parties and the Supreme Court objected on constitutional grounds. In March of that same year Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, which resulted in a general strike of Pakistani lawyers as well as outbreaks of violence across the country.41 Musharraf declared a state of emergency in November and once again the consti-tution was suspended. The Supreme Court was also dismissed and the new media were severely curtailed. Musharraf subsequently resigned his position as a military leader and was sworn into the presidency as a civilian in that same month. The autumn of that year saw Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif return to Pakistan and begin campaigning for the scheduled January 2008 elections. Sadly, Benazir Bhutto was assassi-nated by a suicide bomber, who shot her and then detonated his device in December 2007 in Rawalpindi, resulting in riots across the country. Musharraf was forced to place the country under a state of emergency once again and postponed the elections until mid-February.

In March the PPP and the PML-N formed a coalition and Yousal Raza Gilani was elected Prime Minister. The coalition, though not as solid as once thought, went ahead with their plan to impeach Musharraf and on August 18, 2008 he resigned from power. Musharraf’s departure marked increased conflict within the coalition. Sharif’s PML-N pulled out of the coalition and decided to put its own candidate forward for


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the presidential elections in September. The election resulted in Ali Zardari becoming President on September 6, 2008. Today, Pakistan may possibly be in danger of collapsing: there is a rebellion in Baluchistan and the FATA areas are out of the control of the state. Noam Chomsky has stated that Pakistan was a paradigm of a failed state that had under-gone an extremely dangerous form of radical Islamisation. The country, he argues, is now in danger of collapsing as it grapples with rebellion, militancy and extremism.42 If it is to survive, Pakistan needs to focus on the issues that are of the utmost importance to providing stability to a country on the brink of failure: the revival of the economy, decen-tralisation of power, decentralisation of provincial autonomy, religious tolerance, and curbing terrorism. For the case of Pakistan the restoration of democracy without military influences and the devolution of admin-istrative and political power are some of the necessary tools needed that will have an effect in saving the country from failure.

Failure in context: Pakistan a failed state?

In order to assess Pakistan’s level of failure in a more accurate manner, an in-depth analysis of its composition and economic and social stabil-ity needs to be carried out. Pakistan has a population of roughly 176.2 million which makes it the seventh most populated country in the world today.43 Pakistan is by no means a strong state when compared to such countries as the US, Ireland, France, or Germany; yet when compared to some of the countries that inhabit the top of the Failed State Index, such as Sudan, Somalia, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Zimbabwe, Pakistan does not fit the typical failed state profile either. Adding to the already long list of woes facing Pakistan, the cur-rent global economic downturn has turned out to be yet another ‘nail in the coffin’ of the state, essentially further undermining stability.44

The question then is where does Pakistan stand in relation it its state strength? As a case study of state failure, Pakistan is interesting but extremely difficult to assess and categorise. What makes it so unusual is that internally it can be divided into three clearly separate entities: the functioning Pakistan, the weak and failing Pakistan, and the failed Pakistan.

The already fragile situation in Pakistan has, especially since the end of 2008, deteriorated even further and has many questioning its viability as a state in the global context. Having elected a civilian gov-ernment under the leadership of Zardari, Pakistan has still not found the stability that it needs to function. Pakistan is basically composed


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of numerous ethnic groups, each having their own political, economic, and social differences. As well as that, the country has an extremely low human development indicator score, especially in the areas of literacy, poverty, and health and social service provision. Pakistan also has a legacy of instability which was inherited at its inception and developed throughout the years. These inherent challenges have been reflected most prominently in the weakness of Pakistan’s politics and political institutions.45 The demographic analysis of Pakistan is extremely interesting and significant for putting its level of failure into context. Demographically Pakistan’s age structure is quite skewed towards 15–64 year olds, and within that category the majority of the population, almost 53 percent, falls in the 15–35 years age bracket. Overall, less than 5 percent of the population are over the age of 65. These statistics are extremely significant, as it is the 15–35 year-olds who are the main targets for groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Along with the dire levels of education provided by the government and the extremely dra-matic downturn in the economy, the people of this age group especially are left with no alternative than to join such militant and extremist groups. Pakistan, as of 2009, had a moderate youth bulge, with the aver-age age being 21 and over 35 percent of Pakistanis under the age of 15.46 This fact has proven to be an extremely negative issue for Pakistan, for (as noted above) as it is this age group that has become the prime tar-get for terrorist recruitment. Without an improvement in life for these people, the current trend of joining militant groups and fighting against the government will not end.

The ethnic composition of Pakistan also adds to the overall instability currently afflicting the country. Punjabis make up almost 45 percent of the entire ethnic composition of the country, followed by the Pashtuns, who make up 15.42 percent, and the Sindhi (14.1 percent). What makes this such a significant issue for the stability of Pakistan is that although the Pashtuns only make up 15.42 percent of the entire ethnic population, they are all mostly located at the Pakistani–Afghan border. This border alliance makes it much easier for mass movement across the border. The ease of movement is facilitated by the code of Pashtunwali, which means that those crossing the border are offered protection by those Pashtun living on the Pakistani side of the border, thus making the Pashtuns one of the most important players in the proliferation of terrorism in Pakistan. There is also a long-standing tension between the ethnic groups, especially between the Pashtuns and the Punjabis. This tension has simmered constantly in the background and flares up randomly across the country in the form of suicide bombings of specific


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targets, such as schools and mosques. Along with this is the issue of religious composition in Pakistan. Islam is the dominant religion in Pakistan, with 95 percent of the population falling under this category. This in and of itself is not actually that significant when it comes to the level of failure of Pakistan. However, it is the fact that, of those Muslims, 75 percent are Sunni and 20 percent are Shia, that makes the situation in Pakistan more unstable, due to the increasing sectarian violence that is spreading across Pakistan. As well as dealing with the infiltration of foreign terrorists, Afghan refugees, and members of the neighbouring Taliban and al-Qaeda, Pakistan is faced with the ongoing struggle between the Shia and Sunni Muslims.47 This has been the cause of extreme levels of instability in Pakistan, both socially and politically.

Apart from the social and political issues that are negatively impact-ing the stability of Pakistan, economically Pakistan seems to be on a downward spiral that is making the rehabilitation of the country almost impossible. Despite having received well over $7 billion dollars from the US since the beginning of 2003, Pakistan is still in a dire economic situa-tion. The statistics of GDP purchasing power and GDP official exchange rates do not appear to be too damaging to Pakistan’s overall levels of economic stability, being $427.3 billion and $167.6 billion respectively. However, the overall GDP growth rate is relatively low at 2.7 percent, and GDP per capita is also extremely low, at just $2,500. This alone is significant, but it is the inflation rate that is causing Pakistan the most damage. At the time of writing inflation in Pakistan stands at 20.3 percent which is completely devaluing both the currency and its trad-ing power. The final issue being faced in the economic realm is the fact that public debt is now at 49.8 percent, which means that Pakistan is increasingly in a dangerous economic position. These statistics alone seem to paint an extremely negative picture of the situation in Pakistan and with due cause, however, these alone cannot accurately portray Pakistan as a failed state.

Pakistan has consistently scored quite poorly in a number of areas within such ranking schemes as the Failed State Index, especially with regard to its legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia; the level of criminalisation and/or delegitimisation of the state; observing a security apparatus that operates as a ‘state within a state’; a significant level in the rise of factionalised elites; and suffering from the effects of intervention of other states or external political actors. As well as the above indicators, Pakistan also scores quite badly, though not as severely, in the areas relating to the mass movement of refugees or internally displaced persons, which has created a number of complex


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humanitarian emergencies; uneven economic development along group lines; the suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law; and the widespread violation of human rights. Even though Pakistan has one of the strongest militaries in the world, it is not equipped to deal with the internal struggles that the country is now facing. This, along with the fact that the government has for so long chosen not to try to disarm the militants, means that the military is now faced with a dual task of trying to stabilise the country while at the same time trying to appease the militants. The contentious and inherently violent nature of Pakistani politics highlights the underlying struggle of the competing networks for the right to power, dominance, and the control of state resources.48 Due to governmental neglect and inability to dominate, as well as an extremely ill-managed economy, Pakistan remains teetering on the brink of state failure.49 The majority of the blame for Pakistan’s uneven development can be associated with failure in governance and its ill-functioning and neglected state institutions.

As well as the above, other issues impacting on Pakistan’s level of state failure range from internal feudalism, neglected and ill-formed social structure, tribalism, human rights abuses, and lack of solid health and education systems – the list goes on and on. As can be ascertained by the above information, although having been classified as a failed state, espe-cially over the last ten years, the reality of the situation is entirely more complex to comprehend. Despite the frequent changes of government that Pakistan has gone through, as well as the periodic bouts of military takeovers that it has witnessed, the country’s political system is surpris-ingly predictable and resilient. Accordingly, the highly volatile and contentious nature of Pakistani politics does not actually reflect the underlying differences of approaches on such issues as policy devel-opment.50 It, in fact, represents the struggle between the competing networks across the country for power and dominance. There is little in Pakistani politics that can be taken at face value, which means that all actors must be analysed to come to a reasonable assessment about the situation there.51 Therefore, one can look at the Pakistani state as being somewhat of a conundrum: it is a failed state, a weak state, and a functioning state all at the same time. Pakistan as the ‘failed state’ focuses mainly on the areas of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These two areas of Pakistan, known as the tribal areas, harbour all of the traits that one would expect to find in a failed state, including lack of govern-ment control, porous borders, ethnic, and linguistic and cultural strife. Pakistan as the ‘weak state’ is focused on the areas of Baluchistan and Sindh. These areas of Pakistan show all the traits of a typical weak state,


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i.e. areas witnessing armed challenges to central authority, difficulty of government in controlling borders, and neglected public services such as education and healthcare.

The final area is Pakistan as the ‘functioning state’. This includes the Pakistan-Administered Northern Areas, the areas around Islamabad and Rawalpindi. These areas witness adequate levels of government control, have education and healthcare systems, and are party to the rule of law. It is for this reason that classifying Pakistan as a typical failed state is extremely dangerous and misleading. Despite the considerable level of difficulties facing Pakistan, it would be erroneous to regard Pakistan as something of a lost cause.52 While violence and instability will very likely increase over the next couple of years, it is on balance unlikely that the country will fail completely or collapse. This unlikelihood of failure comes mainly from the historical context of the creation of the Pakistani state, along with the dominance of the military. There are undoubtedly large swaths of the country that are suffering from severe security, economic, political, and social challenges, yet this has been the situation there almost since Pakistan was created in 1947 and therefore it is safe to say the situation is unlikely to deteriorate into the predicted chaos and collapse. As the history of Pakistan has shown us time and time again, it will in all likelihood continue to shift between being a weak democracy led by weak leaders, to an autocracy ruled by the military. There is always the possibility that Pakistan may indeed disintegrate further and completely collapse, but this scenario is actually highly unlikely. Pakistan is an unique case study in terms of not only its structure but also its overall composition and its historical background.

The extent to which Pakistan as a state differs from the western ideal-ised form of a state has often been linked to the unique reality of state-hood in Pakistan.53 The clarification of the state as a concept and the examination of the state of Pakistan as an individual case study should serve as the theoretical foundation for the classification of Pakistan, not as a failed state, but as one termed an endemically weak crisis state, even though it does periodically display many of the distinctive features of a failed state. In the case of Pakistan, the weakening of the state occurred almost immediately after its foundation and manifested itself quickly in a lack of governance and the visibility of porous borders. Pakistan’s economy actually remains one of the strongest in its ‘neighbourhood’, although on the political front it is still continually being hampered by bad governance choices and internal political instability. Much of Pakistan’s land mass is, in fact, somewhat out of the control of the central government, and those areas that are out of control are plagued


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by extremely divisive factional politics.54 Across the state of Pakistan suicide bombings and other terrorist activities remain commonplace, and this includes the most controlled and populous cities. The return to a newly elected civilian government in late 2008 offers some hope that Pakistan once again will be able to try to develop a long-lasting demo-cratic tradition. However, there is still little to suggest that this civilian government has actually done anything to abate the long-standing factional politics that are so prevalent in the country. Having assessed Pakistan in relation to the level of failure within the state, the next element that needs to be analysed is what the underlying conditions and causes of terrorism in Pakistan are.

The Pakistani state: connections to terrorism and insurgency

There are several historical and structural factors that contribute to an environment that is conducive to and that enables terrorist attacks to be carried out. In Pakistan especially secessionist tendencies are strong, and inter-state border and territorial disputes are ongoing; this adds to the feelings of uncertainty that drain state resources. Along with this are the porous borders and undefined borders along which extreme ideological differences are causing tensions to boil over, leading to more violence. The convergence of these factors, among many, creates the environment necessary for terrorist groups not only to organise and stage attacks, but to gain access to the funds that are necessary to carry out such attacks on the internal, regional, and international levels.


With regard to the situation in Pakistan, what needs to be ascertained is to what extent government and state weakness have played a role in the current terrorist threat and infiltration into the country. The terms ‘strong government’ and ‘strong state’ have never been used in the context of describing Pakistan. Pakistan is today a state teetering on the brink of failure and its government has little if any control over large swaths of territory, especially in the tribal regions of FATA, Waziristan, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. With the war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda raging non-stop in the north west of the country, Pakistan is dealing with some issues relating to state failure. It has been defined as being a failed state throughout the literature, but has been re- categorised in this study as being an endemically weak crisis state, although it still


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shares many of the traits of weak and failed states. Institutions in Pakistan are essentially weak because ‘the ruling classes that run the country prefer a government of men to a government of laws, personal to collective decision-making and private over public interest’.55 They do not work according to normal prescribed procedures, instead acting as an alternative to the decision-making procedures based solely on the ruler’s ideas and impulses. The exception to this rule is the army, which is seen as being the most important and strongest institution in Pakistan. This interest and focus on the army has meant that other political institutions have been neglected to the level of failure in some areas. The weakness of political institutions in Pakistan is prob-ably the main reason for the current levels of instability witnessed there.56 Islamic extremists tend to thrive in an environment where the state has retreated and has no programme for improvement, which is currently being observed in Pakistan, the result of which is that they manage to infiltrate and gain such a significant foothold on the country that the message they spread gains traction and appeal that it would otherwise not.

Within systems with adequate government and state strength, the moderate populace normally might not be sympathetic to radical voices. However, in these weaker states the citizens are at a loss of what to do and who to turn to for support. Therefore, in times of distress, these people will often turn to the extremist groups to provide some semblance of stability. These groups do so as they are extremely regimented and use strict guidelines which enable them to remain tightly organised and efficient. Extremist and terrorist groups are expert at taking advantage of any gaps in government. The danger in Pakistan as it stands is not that the terrorists are going to overtake the entire country or that the state is going to become a nuclear-armed Islamic fundamentalist-run state, but that the government is extremely fragile and is not capable of dealing with the underlying issues that are driving the people towards the terrorist groups. Current US President Barack Obama has noted his worry about the state of affairs in Pakistan on numerous occasions and has also declared that he is not ruling out the possibility in the future of US intervention to address the Islamic extremist issue, which is becoming out of hand there.57 He has noted, however, that he is confident that the Pakistani government is serious about fighting Islamic militants who have infiltrated and in places taken over parts of its territory. What is obvious in Pakistan is that the current civilian government under President Asif Ali Zardari is still unable to provide the basic services that ensure the loyalty of the


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people. If the state of Pakistan cannot establish its writ across its entire territory, it will remain weak and will allow infiltration and takeover by terrorist organisations.

Breakdown and decline of social, political, and economic order

The breakdown and decline of social, political, and economic order within a state often creates the necessary circumstances in which individuals and groups may be willing to join or support terrorist groups. This occurs when the citizens feel that there is no alternative available for them to survive other than to give their support to the terrorist groups. There has been little or no time spent reflecting on the reasons why there is so much social, political, and economic strife in Pakistan, but the aim here is to gain an understanding of these issues and assess their importance. The education and healthcare systems in Pakistan are prime examples of the breakdown of social order within the country. Pakistan inherited its poorly structured education and healthcare system at independence in 1949 and not much has been done to improve them since then. Although the education system has been expanded across many provinces in Pakistan, literacy rates are still only 55 percent. Even this figure is deceiving. In FATA for instance the literacy rate is only 17.4 percent and in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa it reaches just 34.4 percent.58 Government spending on education is also deplorable at just 2.1 percent of GDP, compared to almost 40 percent of GDP spent on the military.59 This is one of the main reasons why the madrassas system has grown so rapidly in Pakistan. In essence, the pub-lic education system has collapsed in the last 50 years due to the lack of any significant budget allowance.

The same picture emerges from the healthcare system in Pakistan. According to Akram and Khan, good healthcare generates positive externalities for the society as a whole and the protection of health is one of the most important roles of a government.60 In addition, the healthcare sector is suffering from poor implementation and govern-ance, uneven quality of services across the provinces, and a weak regu-latory framework, all of which have resulted in extremely poor health grades according to UNICEF.61 The problem with this neglect is that the terrorist groups that have infiltrated the country are all too willing to take over these roles that the government is supposed to implement. Through offering such elements as free education and aid distributed through clean schools, the leaders of these organisations gain both a


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receptive audience and evidence of their own superior credentials to lead.62 Therefore, the situation of basic education and healthcare ranges from weak to non-existent in many parts of Pakistan and this state of affairs has assisted in the process of Islamisation. Without addressing these underlying issues Pakistan is never going to rid itself of the ter-rorist threat.

Safe havens

Pakistan has had a long history of providing safe havens and support for terrorist groups. This pattern continues in Pakistani politics, with the governments, both civilian and military, using these extremist elements for their own personal vendettas and political issues. The extremists were once again put to use by the Pakistani government with the outbreak of a civil war in Afghanistan, during which, while hoping to consolidate their influence and control over Afghanistan, the govern-ment of Pakistan chose the side of the Taliban. This was somewhat of a catalyst to the situation in Pakistan today, which has completely grown out of control. Pakistan plays host to numerous international terrorist organisations and is today one of the main safe havens of groups such as al-Qaeda. The existence and location of safe havens within Pakistan are becoming more expansive than ever before. Numerous experts, including Roy, have focused on the FATA areas as being the key safe haven within Pakistan, as well as the areas along the border to the west, from Baluchistan through to FATA and into Kashmir, which have seen a rapid increase in the level of terrorist activity in recent years.63 Pakistan appears to be one of the new ‘hubs’ of terrorism. The location and subsequent killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May 2011 highlights this fact. Until this safe haven provided by the Pakistan is halted, there will be little chance of the levels of terrorism, not only in Pakistan, but in the region at large, being reduced.

Porous borders

Porous borders are one of the most significant challenges facing the global attempts to halt the spread of terrorism. These porous borders allow terrorists and their recruits to transit in and out of countries for training, ideological re-enforcement, communications, and movement of finances with ease. They also allow such groups to move with ease from one territory to the next to carry out terrorist operations/acts. The Pakistan–Afghanistan border region is widely believed to be the front


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line in the war against Islamic militants. There has been a significant increase in militant activity in the western border region of Pakistan, mainly contained to the FATA provinces, but also branching into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This area is one of the most ungoverned, com-bustible regions in the world. The flow of money, people, and arms between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas has profoundly influ-enced the spread of terrorism between these two countries. Terrorists have been exploiting Pakistan’s lax control of its frontiers for years, including such groups as global terrorists, Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and numerous other tribal militias, extremist networks, and sectarian groups.64 These groups have established refuge in Pakistan and use the porous borders to stage attacks. The region has never been stable in the traditional sense, but since 9/11 it has been in turmoil, with a complete lack of any government writ or power.

For more than a decade Islamic militants have been training in Afghanistan and Pakistan in camps that are based on the border regions between the two countries. According to a report by CNN more than 120 of these training camps are operating between the two countries.65 These camps could not function without the extremely weak and porous borders that exist between Pakistan and Afghanistan and until these borders are adequately addressed there will be little reduction in the number of terrorists willing to carry out attacks. This cross-border fertilisation of terrorism is preventing both Pakistan and Afghanistan from defeating the forces that are threatening their stability. As a result of the border situation, Afghanistan cannot get control over its ter-ritory and therefore cannot defeat the Taliban if they can go across the border into Pakistan as a safe haven.66 It also has a severe effect on the stability of Pakistan, as it cannot root out those groups if they can so easily seek refuge across the border in Afghanistan. This poorly controlled border, coupled with still deteriorating relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, has essentially allowed al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups to increase their activity in the region. Al-Qaeda ele-ments along the border have increased their activity while continuing to support and participate in the Afghan insurgency. According to a report produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, with such terrorist groups as the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) beginning to control large swathes of the tribal areas (FATA) and increasing their influence in the adjoining areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, such as Bannu, Tank, and Kohat, an increase in cross-border attacks has taken place, none of which would be possible without the ease of access provided by the porous borders.67


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Pool of recruits

For a terrorist organisation to be successful it needs to have an avail-able pool of recruits from which to expand its membership. Within this context, the existence of a large youth bulge in society is significant. To highlight the dangers of youth bulge, Shuja Nawaz notes that there are 67 countries in the world with such youth bulges and 60 of them are currently undergoing some kind of civil war or mass killing, including Pakistan.68 Although there is no dominant theory that is universally applicable, there are a number of underlying variables that increase the likelihood for mass radicalisation to occur. The majority of radicalised youth have a strong sense of being discriminated against and feel alienated from society at large. Other aspects that add to the process of radicalisation include lack of adequate education and an overwhelming lack of economic opportu-nity. The problem is then often accentuated in societies which exhibit cultural polarisation, which is unfortunately the case in Pakistani society, which displays virtually all these symptoms.69 Pakistan’s population has grown rapidly from 45.9 million in 1960 to almost 176 million today.70 This population explosion has been accompanied by a youth bulge, with over 35 percent of the male population being between the ages of 15 and 29, and the median age being just 18. As a result of this extremely young demographic, Pakistan is witnessing growing levels of crime, violence, and radical activity.71 By 2030 it is estimated that Pakistan’s population aged below 24 will be upwards of 51 percent of the total population.72 Pakistan’s failing economy is not helping the situation, and for millions of young Pakistani men, ambitions for the future cannot be realised, thus leading to increased frustration. This sense of frustration means that these young men are easily recruited into radical and terrorist organisations. Adding to this pressure on the youth of Pakistan are the influence of the Islamist and terrorist groups, as well as the presence of an embedded extremist infra-structure, the widespread and ever-increasing social networks of Pakistan’s Islamic and politics militants, and a failure of the government to deliver any credible results to the people. Essentially, it will be the orientation of the youth two decades from now that will determine whether Pakistan is a moderate, progressive Islamic state with a medium-sized economy, or an ideologically fixated country that supports a radical vision.73


The gun culture in Pakistan has become completely out of control, and this ease of use of weaponry has been beneficial to terrorist groups such


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as al-Qaeda in the fact that they are able to infiltrate and recruit from a group of citizens, who are already familiar with weapons. With the rising levels of ethno-sectarian strife, a civil war still simmering in neighbour-ing Afghanistan, poor economic conditions, bad governance, and an almost non-existent law and order system in parts, Pakistan’s citizens are dealing with rising levels of frustration and discontent. These feel-ings have led to a rising sense of apathy, while the never-ending social injustices have strengthened the appeal of small arms and light weapons among the Pakistani population. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 acted as the catalyst to the proliferation of small arms in Pakistan. The cross-border flow of weapons from Afghanistan which resulted was quite extensive. As well as that, an estimated 30 percent of the weapons funnelled by US and Pakistani intelligence services to the Afghan resist-ance during that conflict were diverted for other purposes, including arming the Taliban and other extremist groups in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.74 Pakistan has one of the highest per capita rates of gun ownership in the world. Although there are no official state-released figures, rough estimates put the total number of small arms at large in the country at more than 20 million, with about half of them illegally owned. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa alone is believed to have nearly half a mil-lion illegitimate small arms and light weapons in circulation.75

According to the Global Policy Forum (GPF) there exists roughly a ratio of 9 to 1 in relation to the number of illegal weapons to legally licensed weapons in Pakistan.76 The Pakistani Ministry of Interior corroborates this by estimating that there are approximately 18 million illegal weapons in Pakistan compared to some two million weapons held legally.77 The illegal arms market also supplies militant sectarian groups, drug cartels, and general criminals. In addition, the ongoing tribal disputes in the frontier provinces of Baluchistan, Sindh and Punjab are being boosted by the abundant availability of cheap firearms.78 The weakness or absence of state control over territory and borders, which is often linked with violent conflict, means that weapons, primarily of the small arms variety, are readily available. However, although this may not be a central link to terrorism, because much of today’s terrorism involves suicide bombings and IEDs, which are made from readily available ingredients rather than traditional weapons, terrorists sometimes use weapons and access to these small arms to gain access to and to maintain safe havens.

Government complicity/support

Government complicity and/or support may not necessarily be linked to state failure, as governments in non-failed states also support terrorists,


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e.g. Iran (which ranked 32 in the FSI 2010), but state failure may make it more difficult for governments to oppose terrorist groups and/or create additional incentives to support them. This also aids in the necessary cloak of invisibility that terrorist groups need to survive. There is no denying that Pakistan as a state has been harbouring and supporting Islamic terrorist groups for a long time. Beginning with Zia ul-Haq, government support for extremist groups has been part of Pakistan’s for-eign policy. Fearing a threat from India and having a hostile neighbour in Afghanistan, Pakistan has chosen a dangerous strategy of supporting extremist groups to further its political aims and objectives. The ISI, Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, has been the main component used in doing this and has played a significant role in both the development and spread of these groups across South Asia. A num-ber of quotes taken from a UK Ministry of Defence paper, which was leaked in 2006, allege that the ISI has indirectly helped the Taliban and al-Qaeda over the last three to four decades. It states that

Pakistan is not currently stable but on the edge of chaos … the West has turned a blind eye towards existing instability and the indirect protection of al-Qaeda and promotion of terrorism … Indirectly Pakistan, through the ISI, has been supporting terrorism and extremism.79

With little doubt, it can be argued that the ISI supported the Taliban up until the attacks on 9/11, although this is still denied by the Pakistani government. The context of the role played in creating the current problem is that it has been argued that the modern jihadi organisations were brought into existence in the 1980s by the ISI and Saudi intelligence at the insistence of the CIA. The purpose for this support was to create groups that could be used against the troops of the USSR and the pro-Soviet Afghan government in Afghanistan fol-lowing the 1979 invasion. In terms of support for extremist, terrorist, and insurgent groups within Pakistan, many claims have been made in relation to the role played by the government and more specifically of the ISI in supporting such groups. In the period directly following the 9/11 attacks, much of the blame was placed directly on Musharraf, the army, and the ISI for causing an increase in activity of these groups. In this context it has been argued that Musharraf and the ISI were play-ing a double-sided game with both the US and the Pakistani citizens, specifically by allowing and facilitating the growth of Islamic extrem-ism and the mushrooming of thousands of new extremist madrassas in the country.


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The ISI’s first major involvement in Afghanistan came after the Soviet invasion in 1979, when it provided, together with the CIA, weapons, money, intelligence, and training to the Afghan mujahideen. Even at this early stage there were some that questioned the degree to which Pakistani intelligence favoured the extremists and their belief systems over the policies and beliefs of the US. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the ISI continued its support of extremist and terror-ist groups by first supporting resistance fighters, and later the Taliban. Even to this day Pakistan is accused of continuing that support, and numerous US officials have accused the Pakistani government, and espe-cially the ISI, of supporting terrorist groups. Robert Gates, US Defence Secretary, stated in a May 2009 ‘60 Minutes’ interview that Pakistan ‘to a certain extent, play[s] both sides’. Gates goes on to suggest that the ISI has maintained links with groups like al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban as a strategic hedge which will then help Islamabad to gain more influ-ence over Kabul once the US pull out.80 It has been repeatedly reported that Pakistan trains militants and sends them across the border into Afghanistan to carry out attacks against US military forces.

In May 2006, for instance, the British Chief of Staff spoke to the Guardian and stated that, ‘The thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta in Pakistan. It’s the major headquarters.’81 Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in September 2006, then President Pervez Musharraf responded, by saying that ‘it is the most ridiculous thought that the Taliban headquarters can be in Quetta.’82 The ISI was instru-mental in the formation of the Taliban in the early 1990s and ISI’s for-mer head, Hamid Gul, has made no secret of his continued support.83 Given the hardening of the government’s position towards the Taliban and their supporters in the tribal areas of Pakistan, various doubts have been raised over the ISI’s continuing loyalty to the government. The ISI has reportedly helped train Taliban and other insurgents destined for Afghanistan and Kashmir in Quetta, Mansehra, Shamshattu, Parachinar, and other areas in Pakistan. In order to minimise detectability, the ISI has also supplied indirect assistance – including financial assistance – to Taliban training camps.84 There is also significant evidence that the Taliban leadership has a support base in Quetta, Pakistan.85 Some Pakistani military and ISI officials see the Taliban as an important partner in a strategy to promote a friendly Pashtun government in Afghanistan, significant for countering Indian and Iranian influence in the country. Pakistan’s powerful and largely autonomous ISI is widely believed to have provided significant support for militant Kashmiri separatists over the past decade in what is perceived as a proxy war


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against India. In March 2003, the chief of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency reported providing the US with ‘solid documentary proof’ that 70 Islamic militant camps are operating in Pakistani Kashmir.86 There is virtual unanimity that the ISI has continued to provide assistance to Afghan insurgent groups.

In terms of the ongoing issues between Pakistan and India, it is argued here that the Taliban were essentially enabled by the Pakistani ISI in order for them to be used to create trouble and instability in neighbouring India. This threat came to the fore most recently with the 2008 Mumbai bombings. At this time ten men linked with the group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba invaded buildings in Mumbai and killed 164 people. These men left Karachi in Pakistan on November 23, 2008, travelling to India on a hijacked boat. Many had described the events in Mumbai as India’s 9/11. The attacks occurred at the busiest places. Besides hotels and hospitals, terrorists struck at railway stations, Crawford Market, Wadi Bunder, and on the Western Express Highway near the airport. Seven places were been attacked with automatic weapons and grenades. Even with direct evidence of the ties to Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari claimed that the attacks were carried out by non-state actors. However, police reports confirmed that nine of the attackers con-fessed to belonging to Lashkar-e-Taiba (Lashkar-e-Tayyiba), a Pakistani Kashmiri separatist organisation, covertly supported by the ISI.87

There are two main breeding grounds for terrorism in and around Pakistan, namely Kashmir and the border area close to Afghanistan (the Durand Line), and these two areas attract fighters from all over the world. According to Stern, the Pakistani militant groups are killing civil-ians and engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the guise of holy war. The government in Islamabad supports these militants and their religious schools as cheap ways to fight India and educate Pakistan’s youth. This policy, however, is creating a culture of violence that exacerbates internal sectarianism and destabilises the region. Without change, this monster threatens to devour Pakistani society. In an indication of the increasing international understanding of just how significantly jihad threatens to destabilise Pakistan, a report carried by the RAND Corporation argues that it is no longer apparent that the army or ISI exercise complete control over the proxies they have helped to create, some of which are now openly talking about fomenting a fundamentalist revolution in Pakistan itself.88

Afghan insurgent groups fall into three loose fronts along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. The northern front, which includes a large HIG presence, is based in such Afghan provinces as Nuristan, Kunar,


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Laghman, and Nangarhar, as well as across the border in Pakistan. The central front includes a loose amalgam of foreign fighters, including Central Asians and Arabs. They are located in a swath of territory extend-ing from Bajaur to the FATA in Pakistan, and such Afghan provinces as Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika. Mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani has been active in the central front against Afghan and coalition forces. Finally, the southern front, which includes a large Taliban presence, is based in Baluchistan and the FATA, as well as such Afghan provinces as Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan, Zabol, and Paktika. In addition to the Taliban, a number of drug-trafficking and tribal groups have also been active in the southern front. All of these fronts enjoy sanctuary in Pakistan.89 Overall, then, experts generally suspect that Pakistan still provides some support to the Taliban, though probably not to the extent it did in the past. This governmental support and complicity may have been proved without a doubt with the recent capture of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, just 35 miles outside of Islamabad on May 1, 2011. The fact that bin Laden had been using Pakistan as a base and sanctu-ary came as little surprise to many but the close proximity to Pakistan’s capital city left little doubt that the Pakistani government had been supporting him in the preceding years. This has proved to be extremely detrimental to the relationship between Pakistan and the US and has also challenged the role played by Pakistan in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions of which it has been so important.


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109

Terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan

Pakistan has become one of the world’s centres of radical Islamic ideology and its terrorist adherents, with some of the main elements of al-Qaeda and militant Islamic organisations using it as a base. In 2009 alone, for example, there were a total of 2,586 terrorist, insur-gent, and sectarian related terrorist attacks; the highest percentage of attacks being reported from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (1,137), followed by Baluchistan with 792 attacks, FATA with 559, Punjab with 46, Sindh with 30, and 12 in Islamabad.1 This rise in the level of attacks occurred despite a persistent counterterrorism campaign by the Pakistani military, and once again the border regions are the most active when it comes to terrorist attacks. Many of these attacks have been directly attributed to the ease of access that terrorist groups have from Afghanistan into Pakistan and vice versa, with, from January 4 to January 10, 2010 alone, a total of 22 terrorist attacks being carried out in the border regions.2 Support for Islamic militancy in Pakistan did not emerge from a religious base, as is the case in Afghanistan or Iraq, but emerged from the guidelines that were adopted from the policies enforced by the West against the Soviet Union during the invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1988). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the main catalysts for the strengthening of the relationship between the military in Pakistan and its Mullahs – a relationship which resulted in Pakistan moving closer towards Islamic fundamentalism. Essentially it was the failure of Pakistan’s underlying political institutions, rampant corruption, poverty, and denial of equal rights that provided a base for extremist religious beliefs to take root.

6Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 2


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The Deobandi Sunnis were the largest beneficiaries of the Afghan jihad, with their madrassas receiving large amounts of funds during this period. These madrassas quickly became the forefront of jihadi activism and terrorism in Pakistan. The Sunni-dominated groups are the most influential and active of the terrorist organisations in Pakistan, but the Shias also have numerous violent militant terrorist organisations. Their overall influence, however, has lessened significantly over time. It must be noted that not all of the militant religious groups in Pakistan are involved in terrorism, but they do form an important element in the militant Islamic framework within that country. There are two major elements in Pakistani society that use religion as a motivation for acts of terrorism. The first are the sectarian groups that are active in Pakistan. These groups originate and exist in both the Sunni and Shia sects of Pakistan. The second group are the jihadi organisations, the most active of which are Harkat-ul-Mujahideen al-Alami and Karkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami.3 Almost all of the militant groups have had connections with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and most of them obtained their training there. Many of these groups have also been linked with elements of al-Qaeda. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the terrorist and insurgent groups that are most active in Pakistan.

Some observers believe that in addition to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, such jihadi groups in Pakistan as Lashkar-e-Tabia, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen maintain links with al-Qaeda.4 These groups are of mixed sources, i.e. both Shia and Sunni in origin, and many of them operate both internally in Pakistan and on the external level in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and other areas of the world. Following 9/11, Pakistan became a central figure in the global ‘war on terror’, with intelligence cooperation between the US and Pakistan helping to track down and arrest leading al-Qaeda suspects inside Pakistan. Pakistan gave unprecedented support to US forces first during the war to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and then in the long drawn-out war against the remnants of al-Qaeda. The effectiveness of the measures undertaken by the Pakistani government is, however, still a matter of great debate. The efforts made by the government to control al-Qaeda’s terrorist threat have produced some concrete results. For example, the government has apprehended over 1,000 al-Qaeda operatives and foreign militants, including Abu Zubayda (March 2002 in Faisalabad), Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (March 2003 in Rawalpindi), and Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005 in Mardan).

Furthermore, the government has also launched an operation against al-Qaeda in Pakistan’s FATA, which represents the first time in the


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Table 6.1 Terrorist/insurgent groups in Pakistan

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Lashkar-e-Omar Sipah-e-Sahaba

Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan Tehreek-e Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi

Lashkar-e Jhangvi

Sipah-e-MuhammadPakistan

Jamaat-ul-Fuqra NadeemCommando

Popular Front for ArmedResistance

Muslim Unity Army Harakat-ul-Mujahideen Al-alami

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Harakat-ul-Ansar Lashkar-e-Toiba

Jaish-e-Mohammad Harkat-ul Mujahideen Al Badr

Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Lashkar-e-Jabbar Harkat-ul-Jihad-al- Islami

Muttahida Jihad Council Al Barq Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen

Al Jihad Jammu and KashmirNational LiberationArmy

People’s League

Muslim Janbaz Force Kashmir Jehad force Al-Jihad Force

Al Umar Mujahideen Mahaz-e-Azadi Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba

Jammu and KashmirStudents for LiberationFront

Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen Islamic Students League

Tehrik-e-Hurriat-e-Kashmir Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqar Jafaria

Al Mustafa Liberation Fighters

Tehrik-e-Jihad-e-Islami Muslim Mujahideen Al Mujahid Force

Tekrik-e-Jihad Islami Inquilabi Mahaz Al-Rashid Trust

Al-Akhtar Trust Rabita Trust Ummah Tamir-e-Nau

Source: International Crisis Group & National Counter Terrorism Centre.5

history of the country that Pakistan’s military has been deployed in the region.6 Even with these improvements in security and in addressing the issue of terrorism in Pakistan, the overall levels of terrorism and terrorist activity have remained on an upwards trend. The number of terrorist attacks reached a peak in 2009, but the statistics still show that there is a lot of terrorist activity occurring within Pakistan’s border, resulting in an increase in the levels of civilian deaths. This increase in death rates is having a negative effect on the support levels of the Pakistani government and is also causing a massive backlash towards the US. It will be extremely interesting to observe these trends in Pakistan following the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. It maybecome likely that the rates of terrorism following these withdrawals will increase, as the groups who are active along the Afghan–Pakistani


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border gain more freedom of movement. This would have a detrimental effect on the stability of Pakistan, whose government is already some-what fragile. The Pakistani state may not survive a massive influx of terrorist organisations and may in fact succumb to the level of state fail-ure witnessed by Afghanistan and Iraq. If this were to occur, the added element of nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) would mean that Pakistan could be the most threatening terrorist state in the world.

The origins of state failure, terrorism, and insurgency in Pakistan


The aim of this section is to carry out an assessment of the origins of state failure, terrorism, and state failure within Pakistan and also to provide an analysis of the most significant of these indicators for the stability and proliferation of terrorism within Pakistan. Regime type has probably been one of the most important and influential factors as to why Pakistan has been so deeply affected by terrorism. Pakistan is currently under the control of a civilian government in a democratic system. This type of system (representative democratic system) should statistically be the type of system that would be less likely a target and host of terrorism and terrorist organisations. However, in the case of Pakistan, history dictates that it does not stay a democracy for long and usually reverts to being a military autocracy. This constant political dis-ruption throughout its history has left Pakistan with a legacy of violence that is deeply ingrained in its political and social institutions, citizens, and ideology. The majority of the regimes that have controlled Pakistan since its creation in 1947 have in some form or other supported terror-ist groups, both internally and externally, support which has created a legacy that has led to massive instability across the country.7

As well as that, the most dominant and long-running regime type has been the military autocracy, and this has proved to be one of the most destabilising factors for Pakistan. These military autocracies have focused their attention on strengthening the military and have neglected to pay attention to civilian needs and wants, which has resulted in distrust and hatred towards the government by the people, who see it as doing noth-ing more than protecting itself and its own interests.8 This has pushed the citizens towards the terrorist organisations, who they see as being the answers to their problems. Groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have stepped in where the government has faltered and provided the people with such essentials as healthcare and education and have, in


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many parts of the country, more support from the people than does the government.9 If this trend continues, these groups will be able to infiltrate further into the social and political realms of Pakistan and will further threaten the legitimacy of the government.

Pakistan has also been racked with internal turmoil since its crea-tion and has in recent years been pushed into the process of steady decline in state authority.10 Pakistan, having a history of alternating between weak civilian governments and military autocracies, has failed to develop any healthy political institutions, a lasting democracy, an impartial judiciary, or a thriving economy, which does not bode well for the long-term stability of the country.11 The factor of declining state authority is especially relevant for the case of Pakistan, as the country is highly volatile and the impact of extremist and terrorist groups is of the highest level. Without adequate levels of state authority being projected across all areas of the country, the state will remain a constant target of these terrorist organisations. Within Pakistan nowhere has been more out of control than the regions of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These areas have essentially never been under any form of control from the state, and consequently it is in these areas that we are now seeing the highest levels of terrorist activity. FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are outside the writ of the government and have their own semi-political structures in place that are run by extremist factions.12 The government has failed to adequately assert its dominance and influence in these areas, thus resulting in the emergence of extremist groups who are willing to provide the essentials that the citizens need. Swat is a key example of the massive consequences that declining state authority can have on a country. Swat, once the holiday destination for the wealthy in Pakistan, has been taken over by extremist and terrorist militants and has been turned into a sanctuary where they plan and carry out attacks across Pakistan and into Afghanistan.

One of the main reasons as to why this situation in the tribal areas has occurred is that the constitution of Pakistan has been neglected by so many consecutive governments.13 The constitution of Pakistan dictates the state authority, and the layout and distribution of legisla-tive power between the central state and the outside provinces, yet these formal guidelines have never really been applied by either the civilian or military governments. This lack of governmental writ and decades of in-fighting have fostered instability across the region, result-ing in the overall level of authority declining significantly. This causes a significant problem for Pakistan especially, as there are two possible suitors that are only too willing to fill this gap. One scenario is that the


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military once again steps in to take over the role of leader of the state until what they deem to be a suitable government replacement can be found. The other scenario is that the Islamic fundamentalist groups who are spread throughout the country manage to take over or gain more influence and completely destroy what little level of government control and state authority is left, thus turning Pakistan into a collapsed state (which would be much more unlikely to occur under the more stable and structured military rule). Pakistan has had an extremely dif-ficult time in trying to establish stable and effective political institutions which can be directly linked to the ease at which terrorist organisations have been able to infiltrate the country. Pakistan’s political institu-tions, although functioning in areas, remain extremely limited in their influence and ability to carry out the jobs necessary for the state to develop.14 As a result of this the country has found itself becoming ever more vulnerable to terrorist organisations and their influence, especially in the border and tribal areas, where institutional capacity is almost at zero percent in places.

In addition, the Pakistan military and the civilian government have always had a somewhat tenuous relationship and this has not helped to correct the underlying flaws of the political institutions. From the suc-cessive military regimes that have weakened the political institutions, to the corrupt civilian governments that have repeatedly provided the incentive for military coups, it is no surprise that the citizens of Pakistan have never been provided with any stable form of government. According to Rashid, Pakistan’s inability to forge a national identity has led to an intensification of ethnic, linguistic, and regional nationalism, which has splintered and fragmented the country, and this has then aided in the mismanagement and neglect of the institutions of the country.15 Adding to this turmoil is the fact that political parties in Pakistan have been accused on numerous occasions of corruption. Pakistan’s political factions have found it extremely difficult to cooperate with each other as well as to submit to the rule of law, and as a result the country is far from developing a consistent form of government.16 The weakness of the political institutions in Pakistan is one of the main reasons for the failure of democracy to take hold in Pakistan, which in turn has allowed the military to step into power on numerous occasions and overrule the political institutions in Pakistan. However, this was not the only reason for the underlying weakness of both the state and the political institutions in Pakistan.

Provinces such as North and South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur have never been governed by traditional institutions, such as


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a bureaucracy and judiciary, instead being governed by political officers. Thus the people of these areas have little constitutional protection of their rights.17 Because of this lack of institutional capacity, these areas have become the ideal place for militant groups that seek to create a caliphate from which to launch the global jihad to take root.18 Pakistan is not likely to collapse entirely, but the overall ability of the govern-ment to control the country has been called into question on numer-ous occasions. Pakistan’s long-standing institutional structural flaws need to be addressed if the current government is to try to suppress the rising levels of militant violence that are currently sweeping the country. It has been this governmental neglect that essentially enabled the militants to establish a foothold in the tribal areas in the first place, and unless the government can follow the army’s offensive with devel-opment, infrastructure, jobs, and justice, extremist groups will always thrive in the tribal areas.19

Pakistan has a long history of victimising, marginalising, and discrim-inating against its religious, ethnic, and political minorities.20 The polit-ical rivalries amongst these groups have, on numerous occasions, led to violence and terrorism and are one of the main contributing factors to national unrest and instability. The Punjabis’ power is concentrated in the larger and more influential towns of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, and it is from here that the central government has developed. The areas of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa contain mainly Pashtun elements, and provinces such as Baluchistan and Swat are made up of Sindhis, Baluchis, and Mujahirs. Adding to this already simmering tension are the Mujahirs from India, who amount to roughly seven million people.21 The government has seemingly decided to neglect entirely the political rights of these citizens in the tribal areas, instead letting them develop their own ad hoc systems of government. The Afghan refugees living in the border lands of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where there is virtually no political influence or government control, are also feeling the negative effects of this political marginalisation. This has caused extreme levels of discontent and has been one of the most signif-icant factors in the proliferation of terrorist acts. There is also the issue of the underlying provincialism and ethnic rivalries which have contin-ued to impede the process of national integration and which have aided in the further marginalisation of the minorities in the country.

Even Islam, which is seen as being the key uniting force within Pakistan, has proved to be insufficient to prevent the increasing levels of violence relating to political marginalisation. The political process has become stagnant, ideologically corrupt, and ineffective in the


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eyes of certain elements of the community. The structure of the politi-cal system and political parties has also had an impact on the levels of violent activity within the country. Political parties in Pakistan have, in general, been crippled by the regional and ethnic factors that over-shadow the political scene in Pakistan.22 That may be why political disenfranchisement has become a really significant issue especially in Pakistan, and as a result regions such as FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have become sanctuaries for sectarian and international terrorists and centres of arms and drugs trade.23 The recent surge of violent activity and terrorism that is emanating from South Waziristan, and which is being carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), has been caused by grievances against the state. It is interesting to note, however, that the political grievances that are being used as propaganda by these terrorist organisations are not always directly related to the politics and govern-ment of Pakistan. There are numerous other elements that interact to form the basis for terrorist activity, including social, health, and civil rights grievances which are even more compelling for people to turn to violence than are basic political grievances.

Tied to this is the fact that Pakistan’s Islamic ideology has been developed through a somewhat evolutionary process, with the his-torical experience of the country pre- and post-division being an extremely fundamental dimension in the creation of the theoretical development of the country. Pakistan has struggled to create some form of functioning liberal democratic state on one hand, while ensuring that it conforms as much as possible to Islamic orthodoxy on the other.24 This focus on building an ideological state has caused Pakistan to lag behind in almost all the areas that define a functional modern state. However, the most detrimental issue to Pakistan in this realm is focused on the ideological differences within the country, specifically those tied to Islam and its interpretations. The current situation in Pakistan has its origins in the views that were propagated by some of the early politicians of the country, who argued that the ideology of the country was to be Islam. This was to become particu-larly evident in the case of the Zia regime. Pakistan was not created in the name of Islam, but on the understanding that it would be a haven for Muslims from the subcontinent to live peacefully according to their varied practices, beliefs, and customs. What makes Pakistan interesting in this situation is the fact that the basis of nationhood is not territorial, racial, linguistic, or ethnic but is based solely on the fact that they belong to the same faith: Islam. It has been this focus on Islam, coupled with the fact that there is a lack of any other strong


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legitimising identity, that has allowed Pakistan to become dominated by violence and terrorism.25 This is also tied strongly to the process of state formation of the state of Pakistan.

The understanding of the initial process of state formation is crucial to understanding the development of countries and has important consequences for a state’s future development. The inadequacies and failures of some Asian Muslim states, most notably Pakistan, is assumed to be linked to their shared unstable social and religious characteristics. They are perceived as backwards due to tribal and religious affiliation and the role that these play in fuelling extremism. Pakistan’s traumatic birth, the impact of its division between East and West, the bloody secession of Bangladesh, and its insecure boundaries have all changed the idea of Pakistan as a unified nation-state with fixed boundaries and shared identities.26 The geostrategic insecurities created by Pakistan’s historically strained relations with India and Afghanistan have played a key role in the evolution of the state. Most importantly, however, they have also contributed to the militarisation of Pakistani politics. This strongly security-orientated approach has been applied by the coun-try’s ruling elite in its attempt to achieve political order, whereby the state provides security and basic administration, and expects citizens to accept its authority, without necessarily participating in governance. It is this lack of participation which has, in part, caused Pakistan’s politi-cal instability. Historically, Pakistan’s state formation process had been guided by defence matters, with defence spending placing a tremendous financial burden on Pakistan’s state of martial law, and accounting for the largest part of the budget for decades. The underlying motives for state growth in general have been dictated by the necessity to expand the defence budget in order to match India’s military capacity. This could lead to the argument that the basic law guiding Pakistan’s political economy has been to be ready for war.27

Another significant relationship in Pakistan is that between Islam and politics. The relationship that we see in Pakistan between Islam and politics is not a recent or new phenomenon. The use of Islam to mobilise the masses in terms of Pakistani unity up to independence in 1947 was a successful but short-lived phenomenon. Since the mid-1970s, Pakistani leaders have particularly drawn on Islam as a means to challenge opponents and build electoral support and legitimacy for their regimes. The effects of this are clearly visible in today’s Pakistan, with religious extremism on the rise and certain sectors of the military allegedly siding with extremist elements and home-grown Taliban.28 As a direct result of its violent and unstable process of state formation,


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modern Pakistan today contains several key paradoxes which have a detrimental impact on its stability: inefficient bureaucracies alongside effective patronage networks; a principle of justice and protection for all alongside the extraordinary accrual of power to some justified on cultural and political grounds; and the claim to religiously inspired modernity alongside complete intellectual and political capitulation to groups like the Taliban and other religious and political groups.29

Political corruption has been an issue that has dominated Pakistani politics for over 50 years, with four elected governments being dis-missed and overthrown as a result of allegations of corruption and the misuse of power.30 Corruption is a significant obstacle for development in Pakistan and remains an issue that is both widespread and systemic within the system. Corruption exists in many forms, with the following being the most highly affected in Pakistan: police and law enforcement agencies; judiciary and legal professionals; tax and customs; and health and education.31 Against this unstable backdrop the political situation in Pakistan has continued on its downward spiral. The abuses and high levels of institutionalised corruption are wreaking havoc across the country and are thus providing even more shelter for terrorist groups to take refuge under. Over the last four decades, the levels of corruption within the country have grown extremely rapidly. While the bureau-cracy has overstepped its powers and parameters, the judiciary has con-doned the wrongdoings of the army, which has had no qualms about staging coups to overturn civilian dispensations. Many institutions have relied on power wrongfully seized to frame rules that have brought monetary advantages to their members, who have then resorted to protecting corruption, as this has best suited their vested interests.32 Without these institutions functioning to their highest capacity, the situation in Pakistan can never truly be resolved. The terrorist organisa-tions that have flourished in Pakistan rely on the corrupt police forces for protection, the corrupt judiciary to turn a blind eye to their actions; and a corrupt government to provide them with the essential cover that they need to survive.

The rule of law provides a state its legal backbone, and without that backbone the country can no longer function adequately. Throughout its history Pakistan’s rule of law has been used and abused by its many leaders, from Zia to Bhutto, and from Sharif to Musharraf. Within Pakistan the system of the rule of law is seen as merely being another means of political control of the citizens, which leaves individuals vulnerable to abuses from the state. This lack of rule of law has caused much violent reaction from the citizens as well as allowing the


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infiltration into the country of terrorist groups who thrive on the chaos caused by these inadequate institutions. In order for an effective system of rule of law to emerge, institutions such as the police and judiciary must be accessible to all citizens. For Pakistan this had led to numerous violent revolts throughout the country in relation to the issue of polic-ing and the rule of law. This symbolises a change in the current situa-tion in Pakistan which may be extremely beneficial to the underlying current of violence, which is never too far from the surface. Once the people feel that they are being treated fairly by the government, they may lack the spark needed to ignite so many of the frustrations that they feel, thus leading to a reduction in violent activity and terrorism.

For Pakistan, a nationalistic struggle for autonomy among its ethnic groups has manifested itself through the use of Islam as the religious basis for the entire country, which then created its national identity.33 Nationalism aims to bring together the nation under an all-encompassing ideology, but this has proved to be almost impossible in Pakistan, especially with all of its varying underlying ethnic nationalities. The two forms of Islam, Sunni and Shia, both have completely differing doctrinal beliefs. The 1990s were filled with mounting tensions and ethnic clashes between the Sunni and Shia Muslims which resulted in Pakistan being politically unstable.34 The provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh are probably the most visible examples of a nationalistic struggle for autonomy causing violence in Pakistan. Baluch nationalists have clashed violently with the Pakistani government and army on numer-ous occasions, beginning in 1947 right up to today. The province of Sindh is also witnessing a surge of nationalistic tendencies. Sindh has always been characterised by isolation from the central government of Pakistan and has operated under a somewhat repressive and dominant feudal system which varies greatly from that operating in the northern regions. The main difference between the situation in Baluchistan and Sindh is that the nationalist struggle in Sindh is based on the attach-ment of the people from a number of different ethnic groups to the land. As a result of their feelings of neglect from the government, these two provinces have been in constant struggles for autonomy.

Also, the weakness that comes with the lack of government control over these areas has left them open and vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist organisations. Perhaps the most significant and dangerous struggle for autonomy within Pakistan comes from the Pashtuns. The Pashtuns are from the southern province of Afghanistan, called Waziristan. The Pashtun culture is significantly different from that of any other ethnic group in Pakistan: they emphasise the ideas of honour,


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freedom, and bravery and only recognise the Pashtun authority, which is collectively imposed by the community.35 Added to this is the fact that Pakistan has been unable to successfully incorporate the Pashtun into a unified nation-state due to the long-running border dispute (Durand Line) between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Even though almost every area of concern for the survival of Pakistan is affected by national-ism, the most significant issue in relation to the Pashtun community is not in fact their nationalist struggle, but their direct link to Afghanistan and the terrorist groups that inhabit the border regions.


Pakistan is in the middle of an economic crisis, with over 48 million Pakistanis currently surviving on less than $2 dollars per day.36 The danger for Pakistan in relation to poverty is that it is tied directly to the failing education and healthcare systems. Those families that fall under the poverty line in Pakistan are not able to send their children to state-run schools. Instead, they are forced to send them to the madrassas schools, which, in many cases, have been directly tied to the spread of religious fundamentalism. The same issue arises with the healthcare system, where these families are not able to gain access to state-run healthcare and instead turn to those hospitals run by the extremist groups. This growing level of poverty in Pakistan may be forcing people closer to the terrorist groups that the government is trying to destroy. Pakistan is not an equally divided nation and the areas that feel the most pressure from poverty are the tribal areas, such as FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which have always been the least wealthy of Pakistan’s provinces due to the lack of government control there. This issue of poverty ties directly into that of economic marginalisation and the two are quite similar in their effects on the population. Therefore there may be some truth to the theory that poverty aids in the development of and proliferation of terrorism, but there are numerous more complex elements interacting to produce terrorism, not just poverty. Even though the insurgency is garnering more press time, the economic difficulties facing the coun-try are also posing an immediate danger within both Pakistan and the region as a whole. Unless there is an economic turnaround and the standard of living of the average Pakistani improves, the public will hold the government accountable, with unpredictable consequences.37

Pakistan has been in the grip of an economic, political, and security crisis that shows no signs of abating any time soon. This, coupled with a militancy and cross-border insurgency, is threatening to completely topple the newly formed civilian government and challenges the overall


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stability of the country. These threats are ongoing and if left unchecked for too much longer could cause the country to fall completely into state failure. The fragility of the current civilian government has been highlighted by the lack of effective government institutions function-ing in Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy as of 2008 was on the brink of disas-ter, due mainly to extreme structural flaws coupled with the worsening global financial situation and inefficient economic policies. Hagel and Kerry, both US Senators, note that the ‘short-sighted economic policies during the Musharraf era focused on consumption-led growth creating unsustainable trade and fiscal deficits which worsened throughout 2008 and on into 2009’.38 The provinces of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were dealing with crumbling schools, almost non-existent healthcare systems, and a complete lack of any sound infrastructure, whereas areas such as Islamabad and Rawalpindi were being funded for the creation and development of new schools and hospitals. This divide remains in place to this day, and has been the cause of many of the violent out-bursts by Pakistani citizens, who feel that they have been completely marginalised solely due to the region in which they live.

The wealth of the nation is found in those cities and towns closet to the capital, and the further one moves from there the poorer the people become. As a result of this, the people in these poorest areas have become desperate and have time and time again turned to extrem-ist and terrorist groups for fiscal support. The uneven distribution of wealth in Pakistan has become an issue of detrimental importance for the survival of the country. The Pakistani government’s actions in rela-tion to this uneven distribution of wealth also have a lot to do with the increasing levels of terrorism within a given territory. The Pakistani government currently spends roughly 2 percent of its entire Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on education and an even more worrying just 0.5 percent of GDP on healthcare, with the majority of the remainder being filtered into the military. Once again it is the central cities, such as Islamabad and Rawalpindi, that have seen the most fiscal benefit, while the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA, and Baluchistan remain extremely poor. If this process of economic marginalisation and the uneven economic development does not stop, Pakistan is never going to be able to rid itself of the terrorist threat. These terrorist and extrem-ist groups are purposefully targeting such areas as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA because these are the ones that are in most need of help. By preventing them from developing both economically and politically, the current government of Pakistan is doing just what the governments before them have done – providing fuel to the terrorist fire.


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Pakistan has, to some extent, been witness to a process of rapid modernisation which took place following the September 11, 2001 ter-rorist attacks. Once Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the beneficiary of millions of US dollars in aid. These funds were the catalyst for a period of economic modernisation in Pakistan, but the process was not an even one. This disparity can be seen in the provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh, and the tribal areas in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where little of the benefits from the massive influx of funds into Pakistan were seen. Instead, the majority of the money remained in the capital cities, as well as being used to fund the Pakistani army. Therefore as minute parts of the country were flour-ishing under the aid packages the majority of the provinces saw little if nothing of the funds. This then resulted in increasing levels of violent activity, political violence, and terrorism in many cases.

Since modernisation took place rapidly, it has had even more det-rimental effects on social stability, dramatically widening the gaps between individuals’ aspirations and their means of achieving their dreams.39 The current downturn in Pakistan’s economic climate comes on the heels of a quite prosperous era under Pervez Musharraf. Towards the end of 2007 the legitimacy of the government was being called into question and the rate of terrorist attacks began to rise. As the government’s legitimacy and influence grew weaker, the economy also began to wane, placing even more pressure on the already weak govern-ment and thus causing a vicious circle of weakness. During the period 2004–2006, GDP levels in Pakistan averaged roughly 7 percent growth along with an inflation level of 8 percent. By October 2008 inflation had reached a staggering 25 percent. The value of the Pakistani rupee also dropped more than 25 percent while the stock market dropped by almost 40 percent.40 However, the short-term economic issues facing Pakistan tell only part of the story of the development challenges facing the current government. The longer the global economic crises lasts, the more severe and dangerous the situation in Pakistan is going to become. The country is already weak enough without having to deal with any further fiscal challenges, and the weaker the country becomes the easier it is for the terrorist groups to infiltrate, expand, and eventually control.


Pakistan is the prime example of the detrimental effects that a large gap between rich and poor can have on a state. Pakistan’s population has grown from just under 34 million in 1951 to almost 180 million people in 2010, and is predicted to reach over 200 million by 2020. As a result


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Pakistan is now the sixth most populous country in the world. A large majority of Pakistan’s citizens are based along the border cities on the Indus River, with Karachi being Pakistan’s most heavily populated city, followed by Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Peshawar. Within Pakistan the age demographics are skewed significantly to the 15–35 year old group who make up almost 57 percent of the population, with the majority of these being centred in the 20–30 year old category.41 This is followed by the 0–14 year olds, who make up 35 percent of the population. Finally, the 65 and over category makes up just 4.2 percent of the popu-lation.42 This skewed demographic is significant in the case of Pakistan because the target audience of the terrorist organisations is, in most cases, those in the 15–35 age bracket. Adding to this is the alarming rate of both unemployment and inflation, a result of which is the fact that the people of Pakistan are essentially being forced into the arms of extremists, who are providing healthcare, education, and social benefits that the government is not. Pakistan’s diversity is most visible along the cultural lines and less among its linguistic and religious ones. The Punjabis are the largest ethnic group in Pakistan. There are other reli-gious groups in Pakistan, such as Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs but these make up a tiny percentage of the overall population.43 As a result of their minority status, these groups have felt persecuted and have been the target of numerous terrorist and religiously motivated attacks, once again adding to the turmoil in the country.

Ethnically driven insurgencies have played a major role in the failure or breakdown of numerous states across the globe. In the majority of cases the reason behind such insurgencies erupting in the first place is political and economic marginalisation. Baluchistan, for example, has been in the throes of an ethnic conflict since 1948. Experts in the area argue that the rise of secular conflicts in Pakistan is a direct result of the expanding Islamisation process, as well as of the marginalisation of the secular democratic forces within the country.44 This has emanated from the fact that, over the years, both the civilian and military governments have allowed the religious extremist organisations to flourish, even aid-ing their expansion in certain instances. These underlying differences in ethnic composition, religion, and wealth, as well as the underlying cleavages in the country, have meant that Pakistan has never really had a chance to become a strong nation. In fact, following the events of September 11, 2001, they have in fact weakened the state even further. Without adequate attention from the government of Pakistan, these issues are going to continue to fester until they reach, once again, violent proportions.


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In essence, these issues are providing the terrorist and insurgent groups active in Pakistan with the distractions needed for them to take root even further in the country, as well as providing them with the recruits they need to carry out their attacks. If provided with the necessary educa-tion, infrastructure, and opportunities, Pakistan’s increasingly urban and youthful population can make a significant contribution to the econ-omy and eventually also to a broad process of democratisation, through a growing awareness of citizen’s rights and legitimate expectations of the state. However, if they are not absorbed into the economy, there is a risk that they may become disaffected and even vulnerable to recruitment by both sectarian and religious extremists.45 For Pakistan, the conditions for the growth of a violent culture have been in existence since the bloody creation of the state; but it was the jihad in neighbouring Afghanistan that really triggered the expansion of violence in the Pakistani culture. The proliferation of violence is one of the most serious social problems in Pakistan, a fact which is still valid for Pakistan today.46 The constant change in the political field in Pakistan has had a massively negative impact on Pakistani culture, pushing it closer to violence and extrem-ism. The shift between military and civilian rule in Pakistan has histori-cally led to periods of extended violence and chaos, which feeds into the psyche of the people; the violence then becomes entrenched in society and over time becomes the norm. The citizens, in turn, see violence as a valid option for dealing with any issues that they may have in the political and social context, and therefore the cycle of violence becomes normal routine in the society at large.47

As well as that, the madrassas system in Pakistan, which in many areas remains outside the realm of government control, is also pro-viding the setting for the growth of a violent culture. Many of these schools have become radicalised over time and are producing a large number of young men who have become indoctrinated into a radical form of Islam. This radicalisation is adding to the overall culture of violence as these students do not see the negative side of using violence to solve problems, since they see Islam as being a justification for the use of violence to reach a political/social/economic goal. This religious schooling, which is promoting radicalisation and extremism, coupled with the unstable political situation and the history of the Pakistani government using violence against its citizens, has left an indelible mark on Pakistani society and culture. The culture of violence is having a massive negative impact on both the stability of the Pakistani state and the proliferation of terrorism. Interestingly, even though there existed a culture of violence in Pakistan prior to the 9/11 attacks, its


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growth has been massively triggered by outside influences, namely the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are providing the source material necessary to extremist and terrorist groups within Pakistan to extend the culture of violence among a citizenry that has become increasingly anti-American and pro-jihad, especially in the border regions of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.


There have been several common grievances that have caused the out-break and proliferation of terrorism over the years, prominent among those being occupation by a foreign power or foreign intervention. Foreign intervention in Pakistan has been one of the most conten-tious issues, not only for the government but also for the people. The relationship between the US and Pakistan was formed with the negotia-tion of a mutual defence assistance agreement in 1954, which emerged mainly due to the concerns of the US in reference to Soviet Union expansion and Pakistan’s need for security from the threat from India.48 The relationship between Pakistan and India has been constantly shifting, with the two being more relaxed in terms of their political relationship at times to being hostile foes over the years. The first sign of a cooling of the relationship occurred following the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971.49 During this time the perception was formed among the Pakistani people that the US was an ally that could not be trusted, a perception which has lasted to this day. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan marked another significant turning point in this relation-ship, and once again Pakistan was seen as being a valuable ally to the US. It had become a key transit country for arms to the Afghan resist-ance movement. However, it was the relationship after the 9/11 attacks that was to be the greatest challenge for the two nations. The Pakistani government, under Musharraf, was forced to make a choice – either support the US in its ‘war on terror’ or become one of the enemies. This caused a significant backlash against the US, which was seen as using bully tactics against Pakistan in order to get what it wanted.

The US’s almost forceful appeals for Pakistan to become a direct ally in the war on terror has been cited by many terrorist groups as a reason not to trust the US. The most important issue, however, has been the issue of US drone attacks within Pakistan’s borders. Pakistan has vehe-mently opposed the expanded US plan for unmanned drone attacks against militants in its tribal areas, where it is believed Afghan Taliban leaders are in hiding. The missile strikes from these drones have created fierce anti-American sentiment across Pakistan. Baluchistan has been


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especially hard hit by these attacks in the past year. To date, these drone attacks have been limited to Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas on the bor-der with Afghanistan, which are being used as sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. These attacks have actually proven to be a double edged sword for the US with regard to their success. One the one hand, they have successfully killed some of the most prominent militants, including Abu Laith al-libi, a senior level member of al-Qaeda, and Abu Khabab al-Masri, a nuclear weapons expert. One the other hand, how-ever, they have also resulted in civilian deaths and mass destruction, which has outraged the citizens. The attacks not only fuel the militancy but also undermine the government’s effort in the counterinsurgency process. The military operations in the tribal areas have triggered out-rage, disgust, and anger amongst the people there. The drone attacks have also resulted in the displacement of thousands of people, an issue which the Pakistani government is not able to deal with efficiently at the moment, thus adding to the overall levels of instability.

These attacks are not paying off on either side. Although they are killing some of the most dangerous men in the world, they are leav-ing behind a trail of civilian deaths that are causing mass protests and distrust against the US. In essence the US is losing the battle for hearts and minds in Pakistan and may in fact be playing into the hands of the same terrorist groups that they are trying to destroy. There is a debate as to whether these acts themselves can be classified as being terrorist in nature, as they are, in a number of cases, resulting in the deaths of civilians and not any terrorist group members. From the western per-spective the use of these drones and the civilian deaths are often times seen in terms of collateral damage and not as acts of terrorism, yet from the perspective of those being targeted and affected by them, the acts could be described as being terrorist in nature. It is extremely difficult to classify these acts and this may need to be addressed in further debates on the topic.

Also having a massive impact on the stability of the country is the fact that Pakistan and India have been rivals since the separation of the British Indian subcontinent in 1947. At this time the Indian subconti-nent was partitioned into the Hindu-dominated India and the newly formed Muslim state of Pakistan. Almost immediately following this partition there were riots and a massive population movement which resulted in over half a million people being killed and one million becoming homeless.50 Since then the areas of Kashmir and Jammu have remained a key source of dispute between Pakistan and India. For almost 70 years now bilateral relations between Pakistan and India have


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been dominated by the Kashmir issue, leading to suspicion, conflict, violence, and war. The causes of the tensions between Pakistan and India are deeply rooted in their historical contexts. The Kashmir issue has resulted in two wars (1947 and 1965) and a border conflict (Kargil 1999), and has also led to an increase in terrorist and extremist attacks, especially over the last decade. Pakistan and India first went to war in October 1947, the cause of which was the move by Pakistan to back an insurgency in Kashmir. The war lasted until January 1, 1949, when a ceasefire line was established, but the status of the territory remained unsolved. In April 1965, following clashes between border patrols on both sides of the border, and the launch of a covert offensive across the ceasefire line by Pakistan into the Indian-administered sections of Kashmir and Jammu, another war began. This war lasted for three weeks before both sides agreed to desist under a UN-sponsored ceasefire.

By 1971 Indo-Pakistani relations had deteriorated even further, with the eruption of a civil war in Pakistan. This civil war pitted East Pakistan against West Pakistan, with India situated in the middle of the two areas. India invaded Pakistan in support of its people after almost ten million civilians fled East Pakistan across the border. The Pakistani army surrendered and on December 6, 1971, East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh. In relation to Kashmir and Jammu, both sides agreed to recognise the ceasefire line. By 1989 the Kashmir issue had once again flared up and this time an armed resistance broke out against Indian rule in the Kashmir valley. The Kashmir issue has also been one of the most important factors in terms of creating state insta-bility, mainly due to the immense drain on state resources (for example extreme military spending). From the Pakistani perspective, not much has changed in that it still argues that the former states of Jammu and Kashmir are disputed territories and that India is thus illegally occupy-ing them. The only acceptable solution to the issue would be through a UN-mandated ‘free and impartial plebiscite’, which would result in the Kashmiris having the right to choose between Pakistan and India.51 As a result, to this day Pakistan sees the threat from India as being more important to the welfare and security of the state than that from ter-rorism and internal instability. Of the almost $12 billion that Pakistan has received from the US since its agreement to join the ‘war on terror’, the majority has been used to fund the army, which is still based along the Pakistan–India border, as well as other areas of military spending such as weapons, ammunition, and training of soldiers.52 This constant threat from India has led the government of Pakistan to neglect its role as provider of political, social, and economic goods to its citizens, which


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has led to increased instability within its borders. This, in turn, has allowed the country to fall into a weakened state, thus leading to easier access by terrorist groups.

Historically, there have been numerous attempts to try to address the issue. During the 1990s, for example, the governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif both engaged with India in talks surrounding the Kashmir issue in an extremely constructive manner. However, the military were unwilling to support this and acted to stymie all further talks. Bhutto, during the first government, tried to normalise relations with India, yet the military chose to support Pakistan-based Kashmir-orientated groups, which meant that Bhutto’s hard work was to be in vain. A similar situation took place under the leadership of Sharif, who, with the signing of the Lahore Agreement, made some of the most significant steps towards normalising relations with India. Once again, however, the military acted against these progressive measures. In a more modern context, under the leadership of Musharraf, Kashmir once again acted as the pivot point, which almost led to war. The Musharraf regime essentially took a very hard line approach to the Kashmir issue, refusing to renounce Pakistan’s territorial claims over Kashmir, reject-ing Kashmir’s status under the Indian constitution and continuing to support India-oriented jihadi groups.53 This fear and loathing is not just one-sided: within India suspicions of Pakistani intentions remain extremely high, even in the face of progressive talks. This has been highlighted by the fact that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has prioritised political talks with a direct terrorist or security focus over all other aspects of the peace talks. The Pakistani government has shown that it is more than willing to engage with India diplomatically and politically and has also shown that is willing to realistically address the issue of Kashmir.

In March 2011, the PPP-led government resumed negotiations and peace talks with India. Departing from the traditional Pakistani position, the government no longer insisted on linking Pakistan–India relations directly with the Kashmir issue, which is central to the years of hostil-ity, conflict, and war between the two nations. Additionally, India has taken the step of refraining from publicly countering the advances made by the Pakistani government in terms of their efforts to restrain and constrain the India-oriented jihadi groups; in particular, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). While these progressive views are being built on and extended through foreign policy on both sides, there are, however, still challenges emanating from those more hard-line extremist elements that refuse to allay their suspicions of one another. It has been argued that


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Pakistan must place more of its efforts towards countering the anti-India oriented military-backed extremist groups, including the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Adding to this is the fact that Pakistan’s military remains hostile towards India and continues to support groups such as the Pakistan Defence Council (PDC).54 This is going to remain a challenge for both the Pakistani and Indian governments long into the future.

Summary

Pakistan remains one of the central figures in the ongoing battle against extremism and terrorism, yet it remains one of the most significant terrorist hotspots in the world today. Its territory continues to pro-vide terrorist and extremist organisations with a safe haven and there remain questions surrounding the government’s overall effectiveness and willingness to actively target these groups. Pakistan’s willingness to involve itself in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions has been seriously called into question following the May 1, 2011 capture and killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, a city just 35 miles from the capital Islamabad. The level of terrorist activity within the Pakistani state continues to increase and is causing massive damage to the legitimacy of the government. It is also causing increasing levels of anti-American sentiment, which has increased even more rapidly with the current US policy of using drone attacks on the Afghan–Pakistan border regions. The situation in Pakistan is volatile at best and unless certain underlying issues within the state are addressed, the situation will continue to disintegrate even further. This would be detrimental not only to the national interests of the US with regard to battling ter-rorism, but also to the stability of the region at large. In the context of Pakistan, this chapter has highlighted the fact that the combination of regime type, corruption, conflict with neighbouring states, the exist-ence of safe havens, an open pool of recruits, and porous borders has had the most detrimental impact on the evolution of the Pakistani state and on the situation there today. The significance of these findings may be used in the future to develop policies which target Pakistan in rela-tion to both its stability as a nation-state and its role in addressing ter-rorism. However, without adequately addressing these underlying issues there remains little hope that Pakistan can develop into a strong state that is capable of dealing with the terrorist threat without the presence or influence of the US. In fact, it seems likely that, for the foreseeable future, Pakistan will remain one of the most prolific producers of and havens for terrorist and other extremist organisations.


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130

Since its creation in 1920 through to the 2003 invasion by the US, the history of Iraq has been a complex and violent one. Chronic political insta-bility and major internal divisions, being ethnic, sectarian, economic,and inter-tribal in nature, emerged very early in development of the Iraqi state. The abuse of power by Iraq’s leaders was also evident in the early stages of the state’s development, which meant that the country was essentially founded on corruption, dishonesty, and the abuse of power. However, it was to be the era of republican rule in Iraq that would produce the system of politics that became hostage to the will of the leaders, creating ‘a strictly hierarchical power pyramid’ system that would remain in place until the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003.1 The historical background section will be broken into three specific sections or eras: the pre-Saddam Hussein Era, the Saddam Hussein era, and the US-invasion and post-Saddam era.

The pre-Saddam Hussein era

The modern state of Iraq was created when Britain invaded the areas around Basra and Baghdad following the outbreak of the First World War. In 1921 Britain imposed a colonial monarchy on the area and placed a Syrian Sunni, Faysal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashem, in control as King of Iraq.2 At the time of Faysal’s rise to power, the population of Iraq was roughly 2.5–3 million people, and even at this early stage the people were deeply divided along religious, ethnic, linguistic, regional, and tribal lines. From the outset, the government in Iraq became dominated by the minority Sunnis, a fact which further provoked tensions between the Sunni and Shia Muslims. The ethnic composition at that time was quite similar to Iraq today, with approximately 55 percent being Arab

7Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism,and Insurgency in Context – Part 1


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Iraq Context – Part 1 131

Shia, inhabiting the regions south of Baghdad; 20 percent being Arab Sunnis, occupying the areas north of Baghdad; 20 percent being Sunni Kurds in the northern part of the country along the Turkish and Iranian borders; and the balance being made up of various Christian sects, Jews, Yazidis, Mandaeans, and others.3 By 1932 Iraq had gained its formal independence and was officially admitted to the League of Nations as a sovereign state. The eventual overthrow of the British monarchy took the form of a military coup d’état in July 14, 1958, which brought an end to the first phase in the tumultuous history of Iraq. The coup was car-ried out by a number of diverse groups under the control and leadership of Abd al-Salam Arif’ and Abd al-Karim Qasim.4 By late 1958, power lay with Qasim, and under the new constitution he was to hold the posi-tions of Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Commander in Chief of Iraq. There was popular approval and expressions of confidence in the new regime and in Qasim himself, which was rare in Iraqi society, but beneath the surface tensions and differences were emerging. The clear-est of these was the expression of this disunity being the growing rift between Qasim and ‘Arif, which took the form of a struggle for supreme power. As a result of this power struggle, ‘Arif was officially relieved of his political functions on September 30, 1958 and Iraq was plagued with constant instability from 1958 to 1980.5

During this time four successful military coups took place, along with eight failed ones, and there were 15 others that were uncovered before they could be implemented.6 On October 7, 1959, the second of the coup attempts led by pan-Arab Free Officers took place and was swiftly followed be a massive a rally in Mosul. Violence soon engulfed the city, with ‘Kurds fighting Arabs, Christians fighting Muslims, and Arab clans fighting other Arab clans’, a trait that would remain in Iraqi society until today.7 This coup was quickly defeated and it was not until the third coup attempt, on February 9, 1963, led by a coalition of Ba’athists and Nasserites under the leadership of Colonel Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, that Qasim was removed from power and subsequently killed. As a result of this coup, the Ba’athists and pan-Arabs gained control of Iraq, but almost immediately the situation deteriorated rapidly, with both sides having extremely differing views of how the state should be run and about the future of Iraq. ‘Arif’s main focus, once in power, was to maintain his status as leader of the country. In doing so he knowingly neglected the country, paying little attention to the wider economic and social problems of Iraq, leading to widespread political strife and economic and social breakdown. On many levels ‘Arif’s regime, and later that of his brother, was a typical form of military rule backed by


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a myriad of Arab nationalist groups. The ‘Arif brothers ruled for five years and were notable more for their failures than for their accomplish-ments. The first ‘Arif regime never managed to achieve stability in Iraq and divisions within the leadership became even more deeply evident after the death of ‘Arif and the rise to power of his brother.

Neither of the ‘Arifs, however, had managed to create any form of institutional base for their rule outside of the armed forces and, as a result, the social and political foundations of the state remained weak and continued to be vulnerable to threats from disaffected groups (espe-cially those from within the military).8 The political situation in Iraq remained on this knife-edge, with each side refusing to compromise with the other, lasting until July 30, 1968, when, following the seizure of key government buildings in the capital Baghdad in another coup, the Ba’athists returned to power. Just a few days after securing their hold, the Ba’ath had established a full monopoly of power in Iraq and on July 18, 1968 Ahmand Hasna al-Bakr was formally proclaimed President. During the course of the first two years of his rule, al-Bakr became devoted to imposing Ba’athist rule on the country, and to ensuring that all political opposition was destroyed. The ruling Ba’ath regime set out to turn Iraq into a totalitarian state. This was not a new phenomenon in the Iraqi system, and there had been a growing trend towards this form of leadership in Iraq well before the Ba’ath seizure of power.9 During this time corruption and the abuse of power by the ruling elite became com-monplace, which would have lasting effects on Iraq’s political realm. Each of the previous rulers of Iraq had made subtle and not so subtle changes to policy that allowed a person like Saddam Hussein to become a dictator with relative ease. The rise of Saddam Hussein was, therefore, the result of a transformation, on the social level, that was more than several decades in the making. Saddam Hussein’s rapid rise to power was not out of place in the history of Iraq and many of the methods Hussein used, such as excessive violence, of terror tactics, and the influence of propaganda, had already been prefigured in all of the previous regimes. Saddam’s rise was, in fact, highly typical of the characteristics of the Iraqi state itself and was a result of a particular narrative in the history of the Iraqi state, one in which ‘exclusivity, communal mistrust, patronage and the exemplary use of violence were the main elements’.10

The Saddam Hussein era (1979–2003)

On July 16, 1979, al-Bakr formally announced his resignation due to the increasing pressure from Saddam Hussein, and as a result


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Saddam Hussein was sworn in as President, with ‘Izzat al-Duri being appointed vice-president. Almost immediately Saddam began to insert the control of the Ba’ath Party into every sphere of life in Iraq and every organ of state power, including the military, soon came under his direct control. Saddam quickly made it apparent that there would be no toleration of opposition to his regime, implementing the use of militia groups, mass arrests, and public hangings of opposition party leaders and members. Under Saddam the Iraqi state was transformed into what has been termed a ‘dual state’, where, on one side, there was the bureaucracy of government and all other necessary organisa-tions to form the public state of Iraq, and on the other there was the ‘shadow’ state, where the real nexus of power of the Iraqi government was based.11 This shadow state was composed of a series of organisa-tions, networks, and patronised clients who were directly serving the president. However, it must be noted that even though Saddam Hussein’s rule was based on terror and dominance, his rule was not always negative and there can be little doubt of the significant eco-nomic, social, and political reforms that took place under his leader-ship. Apart from the complete control that Saddam Hussein had over every aspect of life in Iraq, it was his use of violence and terror that had the most significant effect on the people of Iraq, in essence creat-ing a state of fear. The following are some of the most brutal events that took place under Saddam’s rule:

1. Political oppression: July 1978 decree: any persons whose ideas conflicted with those of the Ba’ath Party were subject to immediate execution; Kurds and Shia were the main targets

2. Ethnic cleansing: Complete extermination of Kurds was one of the administration’s highest priorities

3. Religious persecution: Ba’ath Party dominated by Sunni Muslims (one-third of entire population). Promoted marginalisation of Shia and purge of Iranian influence

4. Dujail massacre 1982: the July 1982 assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein resulted in slaughter of 148 Shi’ites, including children

5. Barzani clan abductions 1983: Head of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Masoud Barzani fighting Ba’athist oppression. Saddam Hussein ordered abduction and murder of 8,000 members of Barzani’s clan

6. Al-Anfal campaign 1986–1989: Genocide campaign – extermination of ‘every living thing’ in Kurdish north. Approximately 182,000 people slaughtered. Halabja poison gas massacre 1988 killed 5,000 people


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7. Campaign against Marsh Arabs: Shi’ite Marsh Arabs targeted by Hussein through destruction of 95 percent of marshes, which depleted food supply. Reduction of population from 250,000 to approximately 30,000

8. Post-uprising massacres 1991: Aftermath of Operation Desert Storm – US encouraged rebellion against Hussein regime. Resulted in as many as 2,000 killings of Kurdish rebels every day12

Even though these events would have a significant impact on the future of Iraq, it was the Iran/Iraq War and the invasion of Kuwait, followed by the UN-implemented sanctions regime that would have some of the most detrimental effects of Iraq, pushing the already fragile state closer to failure. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, it appeared that the conditions were ripe for outside intervention by Iraq into the now-weakened Iran. In June 1979 the first cross-border skirmishes took place, involving an Iraqi air raid on the Iranian border which killed six people. In 1980, at a meeting of the National Assembly, Saddam announced the abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Saddam Hussein saw this as an opportunity to strike against Iran and shift the balance of power in the region towards Iraq, but this turned out to be a catastrophic miscalculation on Saddam’s part. On September 22, 1980 Saddam ordered a set of pre-emptive attacks on Iran’s military airfields by an aerial bombardment, which was quickly followed by a direct inva-sion of Iranian territory.13 In the first few months of the war, it appeared that Iraq was the dominant side, but by the end of March 1981, the Iranian side had begun to retaliate with force and by September 1981 had managed to drive the Iraqis back from their main hold in Abadan. The Iranians had also inflicted heavy damage on Iraqi oil and industrial installations in Basra and by March 1982, had begun a major offensive which resulted in the recapture of Khorramshahr.14 During this time, an estimated 40,000 Iraqi troops were taken prisoner.15 By autumn of that year, most of the fighting had moved across the border onto Iraqi territory and by June the Iranians had penetrated Basra.

The Iran/Iraq war lasted nearly eight years, from September of 1980 until the ceasefire on August 20, 1988.16 The aftermath of the Iraq/Iran War was disastrous for both sides. The financial burden on the Iraqi state was enormous and by August 1983 Iraq’s foreign reserves has fallen to $3 billion (down from $30 billion at the end of 1980). As well as that, the country was almost entirely dependent on handouts from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The eight years of war crippled the develop-ment of the nation’s economy, infrastructure, education, and healthcare


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systems and pushed the Iraqi state closer towards complete failure. The overall cost in both human and material losses took a massive toll on Iraqi society and the economic costs of the war were staggering. Western sources estimated that nearly 400,000 people had died (roughly a quar-ter Iraqi and three-quarters Iranian), an additional 750,000 people had been wounded, and that the total cost of war was $452.6 billion for Iraq and $644.3 billion for Iran.17 One of the most significant consequences of the war with regard to the stability of the Iraq state was that a foreign debt of over $100 billion had been amassed; a debt level so staggering that it left the country teetering on complete bankruptcy. By the mid-1980s, Iraq had re-established full diplomatic relations with the US, and was also benefiting from the material support of a range of Western states, most notably France and the UK.18

Less than two years after the Iran/Iraq war, Iraq was once again fac-ing another war; this time with Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops moved into Kuwait and within a few hours were in control of the country. This invasion caused an immediate backlash from both the Arab League and the UN. As a response to the invasion, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 661 on August 6, 1990 which banned all imports and exports, allowing only medical supplies to the imported without restrictions, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.19 A total economic and trade embargo was also placed on Iraq and its oil export pipelines were cut off. This resolution imposed multilateral sanc-tions on Iraq which would prove to be the most severe and devastating ever to be imposed on any country in the world. In November 1990 the UN passed Resolution 678, which demanded the unconditional with-drawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, a resolution which authorised the use of military force if Iraq failed to comply. However, Saddam refused to withdraw troops and on January 16, 1991, the allied forces attacked Iraq and subjected it to a devastating six-week aerial bombardment, followed by the engagement of ground troops. Due to the devastation caused by the Iran/Iraq War, Iraq was not capable to defend against such an attack, and by February 24, 1991 Kuwait had been liberated follow-ing a series of air bombardments and a ground campaign. Over two-thirds of the Iraqi army had been destroyed and a further 90,000 troops had been captured.20 A ceasefire was signed on February 28, 1991, but this was just the beginning of a long and devastating process of sanc-tions which would cripple the Iraqi state.

The invasion and the war resulted in at least 100,000 deaths among both the military and the civilian population and some 300,000 wounded, with as many as 2.5 million people being displaced and over


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$170 billion in property and infrastructural damage being caused in Iraq.21 Essentially, Iraq’s infrastructure, including electric power sta-tions, sewage plants, and water treatment facilities, was almost com-pletely destroyed.22 Within a relatively short time, the effects of these enforced shortages were being felt by the Iraqi population, as malnutri-tion and disease took their toll, causing infant mortality rates to rise to levels not seen in Iraq for over 40 years. As a direct result of the sanctions regime, Iraqi citizens went from First World to Third World status at a staggering speed.23 In order to fully comprehend the impact of the sanctions, they need to be broken down into the four distinct phases: the embargo which the UNSC imposed on Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait; the six-week Gulf War of 1991; the further sanctions regime under Resolution 687; and the sanctions under the oil-for-food program. Table 7.1 provides an overview of each of these four phases,

It soon became clear that the effects of the oil-for-food programme were not as significant as has been hoped and, although it did provide some relief to the country, it did little to address the underlying conditions

Table 7.1 Sanctions regimes in Iraq

The UNSC embargo August 1990–April 1991

UNSC Resolution 661 – created a set of conditions which virtually cut Iraq off from the world economy. Included a ban on all trade, an oil embargo, a freezing of Iraqi government financial assets abroad, an arms embargo, suspension of international flights, and a ban on financial transactions.

The air war and the economy January 16, 1991 – start of six-week Desert Storm campaign, which culminated in the eviction of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the end of February.

The first oil-for-food programme Need for funds to finance UN operations in Iraq and provide financial resources to the UN Compensation Fund prompted UNSC to authorise export of $1.6 billion of oil over a six month-period.

Oil-for-food under Resolution 986 Resolution 986 allowing Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months. However, Iraqi government decided to reject Resolution 986, thus plunging economy even deeper into crisis.

Source: Alnasrawi.24


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affecting the country. In 1998, UNICEF published an independent report on the impact of sanctions, which highlighted the dire situation that was emerging in Iraq following the implementation of these sanc-tions. The most significant were those that targeted the foodstuff and medicines entering Iraq. This would cause malnutrition on a massive scale across Iraq and would also result in a rapid increase in the levels of both adult and child mortality. One of the most controversial impacts of the sanctions regime on Iraq was the fact that it actually strengthened the grip of the Saddam regime over the population. Saddam and his dominant leadership role essentially caused the sanctions programme to backfire against the UNSC by the use of a rationing system of the aid. The sanctions programme also hampered any destabilisation of Hussein’s government and instead allowed the leader to reinforce his hold on power.25 The rationing system served as both a political weapon which gave the leader the opportunity to manipulate large sectors of the population and as a constant reminder of the population’s dependence on the Iraqi state.

As well as providing Saddam with an outlet for regaining his control over the country, the sanctions programme also resulted in the elimina-tion of the social forces necessary to destabilise the government, thus further entrenching Saddam’s status. These sanctions would remain in place, in one form or another, until 2003. For the majority of his reign, Saddam Hussein’s regime was in a constant state of decay. In order to bolster his authority, Saddam, like the majority of Iraq’s leaders before him, tried to deflect attention away from Iraq’s numerous problems instead of trying to remedy them. The US-led invasion in 2003 pushed the country over the brink into government disintegration and com-pletely fractured the state. As a result of the invasion, Saddam Hussein removed himself from the country’s already fragile political system and social institutions collapsed; a power vacuum emerged which was left unfilled for too long; the professional classes left, causing a massive brain-drain; millions of people were internally displaced; and sectarian rivalries plunged the country into a well-organised terrorist campaign, an evolving insurgency, and a vicious civil war. Following the invasion, Iraq was essentially left as a shell of a state.

US invasion and post-Saddam Iraq

By April 2003, through the combination of war, sanctions, and rampant criminality, the Iraqi state was on the verge of collapse.26 Upon enter-ing Iraq, the US was severely unprepared for the economic, political,


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social, and cultural conditions that it faced. In the first year of the US occupation, Iraq’s political institutions and state infrastructure were almost completely destroyed, one of the main causes being that there were not enough adequate plans in place to handle the situation that arose following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime.27 The real problem, however, was the fact that the Bush administration did not want to fully engage in a large-scale peacekeeping/nation-building exer-cise. As a result, when the Saddam Hussein regime collapsed a vacuum emerged, which was exacerbated even further by the subsequent US decision to dismantle the Iraqi military, police, and more generally state institutions. The lack of control enforced by the foreign troops in pre-venting the spread of looting and organised crime added to the growing perception among the Iraqis that they were in no way in control of the situation. This lack of confidence in the US forces helped turn a three-week long looting rampage into an organised and politically motivated insurgency.28 With regard to the Iraqi case, the term ‘insurgency’ will be understood as being an organised rebellion which is aimed at over-throwing a constituted or provisional government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. This may or may not involve the use of tactics such as bombings.

In the context of Iraq, then, this was an extremely interesting event whereby the terrorist campaign continued alongside the fledgling insur-gency, thus making it extremely difficult in the majority of instances to differentiate between the two. The events in Fallujah are seen as being the flashpoint or creation point of the insurgency, in other words trig-gering a separate entity from that of the terrorist campaign. On April 28, 2003, following some minor demonstrations against the occupation of local schools and municipal buildings by US forces, violence and acts of terrorism erupted, resulting in the deaths of 15 people and the wound-ing of a further 65.29 Soon after, a second protest resulted in the deaths of three Iraqi civilians and the wounding of 17 US troops. These two events were to become key motives for the expansion of terrorist attacks against US forces, as well as for the proliferation of the growing insurgency into cities and towns bordering Fallujah along the Euphrates River. The situa-tion was compounded even further by the actions that took place under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the newly appointed vice-roy to Iraq, Paul Bremer III. On June 17, 2003 the CPA announced that the Iraqi armed forces in their entirety were to be dissolved. It was also announced that a process of de-Ba’athification was to be implemented, with the aim of ridding Iraq of all the ideological, political, and security excesses that had been incurred under the 35 years of Ba’athist rule in


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Iraq.30 These edicts resulted in upwards of 300,000 Iraqi men becoming unemployed immediately, as well as removing from the already strained government ministries 30,000 of its most experienced administrators.31

Many of those who were now unemployed, and who had military experience, soon gravitated to either the terrorist organisations or the insurgency as a source of financial support and as a source to vent their frustrations against the newly formed government. This resulted in the insurgency not only expanding rapidly, but also taking on a more disci-plined form. By the time of the capture of Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003, the insurgency had taken on a much more fragmented shape, separate from that of the terrorist campaign, and the targets took on a more sectarian aspect. By autumn 2003, the US lacked any significant form of political legitimacy that it could have projected in areas such as Baghdad, which, combined with the rising levels of terrorist violence across the country, forced a change of policy from the US to try to quell the growing frustrations of the Iraqi people. The option of ending the occupation, disbanding the CPA, and transferring sovereignty to a new Iraqi government was put in place, with the hope that it would provide a more stable situation on the ground. On November 12, 2003 President George Bush announced that the US would be transferring sovereignty to Iraq, and on June 28, 2004 the CPA officially handed power over to the Iraqi Interim Government, headed by Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and President Sheik Ghazi al-Yawer.32 However, this transfer of power resulted not in increased stability, but in the intensification of the insur-gency. By mid-2004 the insurgency had gained mass appeal across Iraq (with the exception of the Kurdish areas in the north and a minority area of the Shia south). Of Iraq’s 18 provinces, four were most severely affected by terrorist violence and instability, namely Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. The terrorist violence in these four key areas took a number of different forms.

In Baghdad the violence was largely seen to be carried out between Sunni and Shia sects, whereas in Anbar the violence was attributable to the Sunni insurgency and to al-Qaeda. In Kirkuk, the ongoing struggle between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen was the main source of violence, whereas in Basra and the south the violence largely took the form of an intra-Shia power struggle.33 Amidst the chaos of the insurgency and the rising levels of terrorist and insurgent violence, the task of forming a new Iraqi government continued. There were two elections that took place in 2005, aimed at being the critical turning point in Iraq’s post-regime transition. The first took place in January and the other in December, as well as a constitutional referendum which was held in October. The


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conditions under which the 2005 elections were held were extremely precarious, with the insurgency continuing practically unabated, terrorist violence reaching extremely high levels across many of Iraq’s provinces, a number of the potential candidates foregoing campaigns due to death threats, and a lack of adequate security. Despite this, almost eight million Iraqis voted in the January 30, 2005 elections, the results of which created a 275-member Transitional National Assembly. The result of the elections were unsurprising, with the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) (a coalition of political parties) yielding an overwhelming victory of 48 percent of the total vote, or 140 seats in the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly, the Kurdish Coalition List (KCL) (a combination of the two main ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan: the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) receiving 75 seats, the secu-lar list of Iyad Allawi taking 40 seats, and the Sunni Arabs taking the remaining 17 seats (there had been a Sunni boycott of the elections).34

On April 27, 2005 a new government of Iraq was officially formed, composed of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and Kurdish Coalition List (KCL), with Ibrahim al-Ja’fari named as Prime Minister. This government was purely transitional in nature, accomplished little during its one year reign, and enjoyed little popular legitimacy.35 It did, however, manage to draft the electoral law, known as the Traditional Administrative Law (TAL), for the in all future elections in Iraq. A draft constitution was developed in August 2005, and was endorsed by both Shia and Kurdish members, but not by any Sunni representative. The process was seen as being rushed in order to prevent insurgents and terrorists from taking advantage of the political vacuum arising from an extended transition as well as to allow for a swift handover of power to Iraqis and subse-quent US troop withdrawal.36 The constitutional referendum, which took place on October 15, resulted in the approval of the new Iraqi con-stitution, particularly in the predominantly Shi’ite and Kurdish areas. It was rejected in the Sunni areas, with many Sunni Arab leaders claiming that fraud had kept them from being able to defeat the constitution. Following an investigation by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), however, it was ruled that there was no evidence of fraud and the constitution was deemed to be ratified by public approval. The constitutional process was a disaster for Iraq’s stability and fuelled both the insurgency and the terrorist violence. It also produced a text that was highly ambiguous and that was filled with internal contradictions, all of which would carry the seeds of future discord within the country.37

The referendum was followed by a general election, which took place amid rising levels of terrorist violence on December 15, 2005. This


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election resulted in a turnout of roughly 80 percent of the population, which this time included the Sunni community. The results of the elec-tion were as follows: the UIA won 128 seats in the 275-seat national assembly, the Kurdistan Coalition came in second with 53 seats, the Iraqi Consensus Front was third with 44 seats, Allawi’s NIL won 25 seats, and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue won 11 seats.38 The election resulted in a political deadlock and by the end of April 2006 there was still no government in place, the main reason being that there were high levels of opposition to the UIA’s choice for Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Ja’fari. In mid-April, Ja’fari agreed to step back and was replaced by Jawad al-Maliki on April 26. By that time terrorism in Iraq had reached a peak, with the country facing not only the growing insurgency and terrorist campaign against the Coalition forces, but also an internal struggle in the Sunni community coupled with a Sunni and Shia civil war. The single most influential factor driving the insurgency was the exclusion of Sunnis from the political process, which provided it with rationale, receptivity, and recruits.39

Tensions were also heightened between the Arab and Kurdish com-munities, especially in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Al-Maliki had inherited a country that was on the path to civil war and which barely maintained the façade of constitutional and democratic government. Shi’ite versus Shi’ite tensions and clashes became steadily more seri-ous in the south, whereas Sunni tribal elements clashed with Islamist movements like al-Qaeda, and Kurds, Arabs, and other minorities who were competing for territory and influence in the north.40 These ten-sions came to a head on February 22, 2006 when insurgents attacked the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, a Shi’ite religious landmark. With this act came the realisation that Iraq was now facing not only a growing campaign of terrorism and an increasingly strong insurgency, but also a civil war. This event triggered a massive increase in the levels of sectar-ian violence across Iraq and by the summer of that year the primary threat to Iraqi security had evolved from ‘terrorism’ to ‘insurgency’ to ‘ethnic and sectarian violence’. By early 2006, the Sunni communities in Iraq began to view al-Qaeda as being more of a threat to their safety than the US occupation and there was to be a significant change in momentum towards stability and compromise in 2005 with the Sunni Awakening.41 This began in February 2005, and took the form of a revolt against the increasing levels of terrorism used by AQI against local Iraqis, such as mass killings of males in small towns, increases in the levels of suicide attacks, and an overall increase in the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The Sunni Awakening took place


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in two distinct phases.42 The first phase was the Anbar Awakening, which was a grassroots movement funded by the Iraqi government and which was supported by the US government. This first stage of the Awakening officially began in September 2006 in Ramadi and was led by Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha.

The second phase was the formation of the Awakening Councils (Sons of Iraq programme) in Diyala and Baghdad in mid-2007, which was a US-funded programme led by General Petraeus and supported by US troops.43 This phase aimed to extend the success of the Awakening programme in Anbar into other Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq. It was during this period (January to June 2007) that the surge of US troops also took place. The surge strategy outlined a process whereby an addi-tional 30,000 troops would be added to the already 140,000 marines and soldiers who were deployed in Iraq. The tactic of a troop surge was based on the assumption that securing Baghdad would be essential to prevent a sectarian war between Sunni insurgents and Shia militias, while it would also create the political arena necessary for the two sects to reconcile.44 As a result of the Anbar Awakening, the subsequent Sons of Iraq programme, and the US troop surge, the situation in Anbar province changed dramatically, producing a complete turnaround in a province once thought to be lost beyond all repair.45 These events were important in providing stability to Iraq, but there were two other factors that also played significant roles. The first of these was that Baghdad had been transformed into a Shi’ite-dominated city, thus providing sectarian stability to the capital. The second critical factor was that fact that Iraq’s neighbouring countries began to recognise the Maliki government. Accordingly, both the transformation of Baghdad into a Shi’ite city and the recognition and support of Iraq’s neighbours for the county’s new political leadership have been instrumental in stabilising the country.46 This improvement in security would have positive effects, not only on the security situation in Iraq, but also on the 2010 general elections.

Iraq’s second round of parliamentary elections, which took place on March 7, 2010 were one of Iraq’s most politically competitive and open. Despite the sporadic violent attacks across the country, Shia, Sunni, and Kurds turned out in large numbers to vote for their new parliament. Overshadowing this achievement, however, were the inconclusive election results, the severe division between the campaigning parties and claims of election fraud – all of which served to underscore the monumental challenges facing the central government.47 The initial election results showed Nuri Kamal al-Maliki trailing Ayad Allawi by 80


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seats to 91, with neither side being able to create a coalition that would allow them to create a new government.48 This slim lead was to be chal-lenged by al-Maliki who, on October 1, managed to gain the support of the Shi’ite factions (who had previously been his main opposition). This newly formed alliance allowed al-Maliki to move one step closer to becoming the majority leader in the now 325-member Parliament. Once again claims of fraud were made, but were discounted by a UN-backed recount that declared that there was no evidence of fraud in the elections and that the allocation of seats was to remain unchanged. This growing discontent with the election results, coupled with legal challenges and growing sectarian resentment, produced a political deadlock which remained in place throughout the spring and summer of 2010.49 Al-Maliki was officially returned to power for a second term on December 21, 2010. Overall, the Iraqi elections did not result in the hoped peaceful transition of power, but instead revealed the increasing mistrust within Iraqi society, and specifically among the ruling elites. The elections highlighted just how fragile the country’s political sys-tem, and even more so its political institutions, had become while also showing that Iraq still has a long way to go before it becomes a stable, sovereign, and self-reliant country.50

Failure in context: Iraq a failed state?

Even though Iraq has remained in the top 10 failed states of the world according to the Failed State Index, it nonetheless remains a function-ing state: one that has shown resilience to complete failure and collapse. In the economic realm, Iraq remains on a downward trend which is pre-venting any significant reconstruction taking place. Iraq remains highly indebted, with an external debt of over $52.58 billion. Its GDP purchas-ing power and GDP official exchange rates stand at $113.4 billion and $82.15 billion respectively. Iraq’s GDP growth rate and its GDP per capita remain extremely low at just 0.8 percent and $3,800 respectively. This extremely low rate of GDP per capita means that Iraq does not have the ability to grow rapidly enough to meet the needs of its citizens, thus leading to rampant unemployment, lack of education, and a growing population that is almost entirely reliant on external aid. Inflation in Iraq is extremely low, peaking at just 2.4 percent, which is a significant rise from the rate of −2.8 percent in 2009. Iraq’s unemployment rate has risen to over 15 percent, which together with the lack of education and over 25 percent of the population falling below the poverty line, has proved to be one of the most detrimental factors to Iraq’s stability.51 The


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majority of those unemployed are young males who, without any other sources of income, are prime targets for groups such as al-Qaeda. As well as that, Iraq exhibits extremely low levels of human development, especially in the areas of literacy, poverty, and health and social service provision. There are massive discrepancies in the allocation of these essential resources, with less than 20 percent of Iraq’s population having 100 percent access to water and sanitation and just under two-thirds of the country being able to use more just 12–14 hours of electricity per day. The lack of adequate access to these resources has resulted in many violent outbursts and a growing lack of support for both the govern-ment and the US. The issue of literacy levels in Iraq has also played a significant role in the increasing levels of instability and terrorism.

As it stands, one in five Iraqis aged 10–49 cannot read or write; illiteracy among Iraqi women (24 percent) is more than double that of Iraqi men (11 percent); and rural populations are more adversely affected by illiteracy (25 percent) than urban populations (14 percent). There are also significant differences in illiteracy rates amongst the different governorates of Iraq. The lowest rates of illiteracy appear to be in Diyala, Baghdad, and Kirkuk, which are some of the key areas where the major-ity of terrorism occurs. The highest literacy levels are estimated to be in Dahuk and Sulaimaniyah within the Kurdistan region in the north, and Muthanna, Missan, and Qadissiya in the south. The Shia/Sunni divide has been one of the main driving factors behind the growth of internal terrorist and insurgent attacks within Iraq and has also provided impe-tus for attacks against the Coalition forces and Kurdish minority groups. Unity among the diverse ethnic groups has yet to occur and without it the grievances felt among these groups will continue to destabilise the already fragile Iraqi state. Adding to this instability is the refugee crisis in Iraq. This existed long before the US-led invasion, and was in fact extremely prevalent under Saddam Hussein’s regime, but its effect on the stability of the country has become more significant than ever. The instability in both the Iraqi government and its economic system means that the country is not equipped to deal with the increasing numbers of refugees and IDPs. As well as the negative effects that these IDPs and refugees are having on the stability of the country, they are also provid-ing a source of recruits for groups such as al-Qaeda. These groups offer financial stability, education, and even healthcare to these people in return for support, which allows them to infiltrate towns and villages and carry out attacks without much resistance.

Interestingly, this massive population movement has also been linked to the success of the ‘surge’ in 2007. While the American and Iraqi


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governments celebrated the ‘success’ of the surge, which they claimed contributed to the drop in sectarian violence and insecurity, many international reports and studies argued that it was, in fact, the major population shift that was the main factor in that decline of terrorism.52 Thus the decrease in terrorism in Iraq has not necessarily been a sign of reconciliation, but rather a symptom of the population shift, in which neighbourhoods and cities have been completely redefined. The increase in levels of both IDPs and refugees and the resultant emergence of uneven economic development across group lines has caused back-lash against both the newly formed Iraqi government and the US. This lack of cohesion is just one symptom of Iraq’s fractured political system and ethno-sectarian divisions, but is one that has played a detrimental role in the progression of stability across the country.

Iraq is home to over 2,000 tribes and clans, which are divided between the Sunni, Shia, and Kurd factions. Under the Saddam regime, the political realm was factionalised based on ethnic background, and leadership positions were restricted to a select number of the larger Sunni tribes and clans, including the Jubbar, ad-Dulaym, al-‘Ubayd, Kharzaj, Sammar, al-Mushahada, ‘Aqaydat and Sa’dun. With the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003, however, the protection that these groups once thrived under was removed and there emerged a power vacuum which further catalysed the rise of factionalised elites and created an upsurge in the levels of inter-tribal terrorist violence. Even though Iraq appears to have stabilised somewhat politically, the rise of factional-ised elites is continuing unabated in many parts of the country, par-ticularly in the south. In essence, Iraqi cities had been turned into an international frontier for terrorist and insurgent forces, destroying the country’s infrastructure, creating a new political system defined along ethno-sectarian lines, and pushing the country closer to full-scale civil war. The dismantling policy of the Iraqi military and police institu-tions, the establishment and support the de-Ba’athification process, the emerging sectarian violence in many cities in Iraq, and the subsequent security plan for Baghdad after the 2007 military surge, have all brought new political, economic, and social realities to the region.

They have also drastically and permanently altered the lives of Iraqis and altered the structure of the Iraqi state itself.53 Some of the most devastating results of the occupation have been the establishment of a sectarian political system, the introduction of suicide bombings to Iraq, a significant rise in political assassinations, kidnappings, and unlawful imprisonments, and continuing political failure and corruption. Perhaps one of the most damaging effects of the occupation on the composition of


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Iraqi society has been the increase in intra-ethnic and religious ‘purges’ of many of Iraq’s minorities. Iraq’s minority communities include both reli-gious and ethnic groups. The main Muslim minorities are the Turkomans (3–4 percent of the population – either Shia or Sunni), the Faili Kurds (Shia), and the Shabaks (predominately Shia). Muslims comprise about 96 percent of Iraq’s religious community combined with the Chaldean, Assyrians, Syriacs, and Armenians. Iraq is also home to a number of migrant or refugee communities, the largest being the Palestinians.54

The situation in Iraq is therefore described here as being in a fluid state, especially over the last decade, and makes the assessment of state strength extremely complex to carry out. Therefore, state failure in Iraq is some-what of a conundrum; it is both a failed and functioning state (depending on what area of the country is being assessed). It is witnessing a lack of government control in many areas of the country; it has porous borders; is party to outbreaks of ethnic and social violence; and remains occupied by an external actor. However, it also has many elements that show that it is a functioning state. The elections in 2010 provided the country with its own democratically elected government, which, with the help of the US, is beginning to exert its influence across the country. The legal and judicial systems are troubled but functioning adequately and the educa-tion and healthcare systems, although still fragile, are slowly improving. Also, while the levels of terrorism may be on the increase once again, it would be highly unlikely that they will reach those of 2006–2007. It is also highly unlikely that the country will collapse or fail completely. It is for these reasons that it is argued here that Iraq has yet to reach the status of the traditional ‘failed state’ and according to the newly devel-oped spectrum of state failure, Iraq can be categorised as being a crisis yet functioning state. Having assessed and re-categorised Iraq’s level of state failure, it is now necessary to assess the underlying conditions that enable terrorist and insurgent groups to thrive there.

The Iraqi state: connections to terrorism and insurgency

Safe havens

The denial of safe havens to terrorists has, since 2001, been a key national security concern of the US and has played a major role in the development of counter-terrorism policy. The debate surrounding Iraq being a safe haven for terrorist groups has been ongoing. Al-Qaeda managed to establish enclaves for small periods of time, particularly in Anbar province during 2005, and has been able to recruit and train fighters from inside and outside the country.55 As well as that there have


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been numerous senior al-Qaeda operatives killed or captured in Iraq. Between 2001 and 2008, it was mostly foreign-born terrorists who came to Iraq to fight Americans. At this time al-Qaeda probably numbered in the low thousands and was at its peak strength. More importantly, how-ever, was the fact that its effectiveness had, at this point, far exceeded its their numbers. A stable and prosperous Iraq was not in the interests of AQI. Its strategy was to discredit the US and the interim government by all means possible. It also involved creating a civil war between Sunnis and Shi’ites to completely destabilise Iraq and force the Americans to withdraw, which would in theory leave Iraq open to be another terrorist safe haven.56 Iraq differs from Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, in a number of ways in relation to the issue of safe havens.

Afghanistan under the Taliban consciously provided safe havens to groups such as al-Qaeda. Similarly, in Pakistan, elements of the Pakistani state were arguably complicit in providing safe havens for terrorists. In Iraq, terrorist groups are able to operate because the government does not have full control of its territory, but in general the Iraqi government does not provide support to those groups. Since the Anbar Awakening and the US troop surge, there has been a significant reduction not only in the support for terrorist groups such as AQI, but also in the availability of safe havens within the country.57 The US and Iraqi forces have con-tinued to make progress against these groups and there was a significant reduction in the number of security incidents in Iraq that began in the last half of 2007 and continued through 2009, with a steady downward trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and IED attacks. AQI, though still dangerous, experienced the defection of members, lost key mobilisation areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and funding, and was forced to change targeting priorities. By 2009 Iraq was no longer classified as being a high-level terrorist safe haven, due mainly to the US military presence and the developing leadership of the Iraqi government. Although Iraq may not be the same kind of haven that it was pre-2009, terrorist and insurgent groups continue to view Iraq as a potential or actual safe haven which, with the US troop withdrawal, should be monitored extremely closely to prevent a return to the past.58

Porous borders

Iraq shares its 2,260 mile border with Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria, and it is the porous nature of this border coupled with the neighbouring states that makes this such a significant issue in relation to terrorism in Iraq. It is impossible to protect 100 percent of Iraq’s borders, but significant improvements have been made in


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addressing its porous nature since 2003. However, the situation still remains extremely unstable. Since 2001 the borders have been the key entryway for weapons and jihadists from all over the world who come to fight in the insurgency. Iraq’s neighbours have long been criticised for allegedly failing to stop militants entering and exiting the country. Iraq’s own struggling border security forces remain unable to adequately police its long and porous borders. Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, much focus was placed on the security of Iraq’s borders and an estimated 50,000 paramilitary troops patrolled the borders at the time. In addition, local tribes were paid to monitor the areas where they lived to prevent illegal border crossings.59 With the 2003 invasion and the subsequent edicts released under Bremer’s leadership, almost all of this force was disbanded, leaving Iraq’s border essentially freely open.

Following the rise of terrorism and violence, especially in the period 2006–2007, focus was shifted to Iraq’s international borders and Ports of Entry (POEs). Iraqi and coalition forces began a programme to improve Iraq’s internal security environment and successfully counter AQI insurgents and militia organisations in the cities and provinces.60 The main areas of infiltration came from the borders with Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. These areas feed directly into the Iraqi provinces of Anbar, Ninawa, Karbala, Najaf, and Muthanna – all of which contain the highest levels of extremist organisations, violent conflict, and ter-rorist activity. The US began a process of training border police almost immediately following the 2003 invasion in order to tighten control over the borders with Iraq’s neighbours. As a result of the US-led secu-rity programme, there are approximately 258 control towers positioned along all of Iraq’s borders, which cover roughly 2,170 miles.61 The Iraqi forces have now also shifted focus towards preventing the cross-border flow of foreign fighters, weapons, and funds from Iraq’s neighbours. This is extremely important, as the majority of Iraq’s suicide bombers (75 percent), for example, were cross-border insurgents who originated from Saudi Arabia. The border area between Syria and Iraq has been wit-ness to some of the most violent clashes between US–Iraqi forces and insurgents, and both Iran and Syria continue to be the greatest source of smuggling, including AQI operatives, foreign fighters, and munitions.

Iraq has numerous areas across its borders that are porous, on both the Iraq–Iran and the Iraq–Syria borders. The porous western border with Syria is perhaps one of the most significant, as it is here that multiple routes are available to foreign terrorists to infiltrate Iraq. In the south along the Shatt al-Arab there are also numerous porous areas which allow the illegal crossing of smugglers into Basra. To the north,


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multiple illegal crossing points in Maysan and Wasit provinces facilitate the flow of insurgents and weapons. The weak border in Diyala pro-vides the shortest route to Baghdad.62 Iraq has managed to implement a somewhat successful border control plan, with the employment of 15,000 new border police, but cross-border flows from Iran and Syria remain to be effectively halted. Iraq’s porous border has also has a significant impact on the levels of refugees that are both entering and leaving the country. The UNHCR is currently working with the Iraqi government to try to put an end to the massive displacement issue which is having a detrimental impact on Iraq’s stability. Iraq’s border safety and security is a vital element to the ability of the government to exercise its sovereignty and to prevent terrorism from further destabilis-ing the fragile states. Without this ability, Iraq will remain a country plagued by terrorism and insurgency.

Pool of recruits

Iraq has long provided a valued pool of recruits for terrorist and insur-gent groups, a trend that does not seem to be coming to an end. The post-invasion chaos and dismantlement of Iraqi security forces left many young men, who were militarily trained, unemployed. The peo-ple of Iraq, already war-weary and economically, socially, and politically drained, saw the mounting fatalities as another reason not to trust the government. Even though the number of deaths has decreased signifi-cantly since the peak in levels during the period 2006–2007, there still remains an extremely high level of annual deaths attributed to the ongoing war in Iraq. The killings of Iraqi civilians by US forces gener-ated resentment and made people willing to fight back, thus providing the necessary pool of recruits for terrorist, insurgent, and extremist groups. The situation was made all the worse by the economic situation in Iraq. One of the other main causative factors for the high level of the available pool of recruits is economic based. Iraq’s high rate of unem-ployment, coupled with the extreme youth bulge means that there is a massive potential pool of recruits in Iraq, who, if not adequately addressed, could be the next generation of terrorists and insurgents.

If the overall economic opportunities do not improve adequately these youths represent a potential pool of recruits for terrorism. Since the fall of the Saddam regime, the youth of Iraq especially view the US as being the root cause of the economic, political, and social turmoil afflicting the country. Even with the US troop withdrawal, this feel-ing of frustration has not been removed, and has in fact been turned towards the Iraqi government, which they now view as being the cause


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of the country’s problems. President Bush, in a speech made in 2007, highlighted the importance of this fact and noted that the frustration and hopelessness of the people makes it easier for radical movements and radicals to be able to freely recruit.63 While much progress has been made, both in addressing the economic issues and in reducing the fatal-ity levels, there remain too many problems that are having a negative effect on a large portion of the Iraqi population. Without effective and speedy change in these two key areas, the issue of there being an active pool of recruits in Iraq will not be removed in the near future, thus ena-bling the insurgency and terrorist activity to continue unabated.


According to numerous available reports, Iraq is one of the most heavilyarmed countries in the world and this mass availability of weapons in Iraq has had a massive impact on the spread of the insurgency and on the increasing levels of terrorism and sectarian violence. A massive stockpiling of weapons took place in Iraq under the Ba’athist regime, with numerous munitions dumps being located across the country providing an available supply of both small arms and explosives to the general population. The rapid collapse of the regime following the inva-sion allowed these munitions to become even more widely available and at very low prices to all citizens, militias, insurgents, and terrorist groups. This increase in munitions, combined with the increasing popu-lar disenchantment of the Iraqi population with the occupation, was one of the key factors in the increase in politically motivated violence and terrorism across the country. As early as 2003, the issue of civilian gun ownership in Iraq was a massive concern. The gun culture is per-vasive in Iraq with small arms being readily available on both the legal and the black markets. Besides the availability of guns, Iraqi civilians also have access to other ‘light weapons’, such as mortars, bombs, and even rocket-propelled grenades. The majority of military-style weapons possessed by Iraqi civilians come from three sources: the government arsenals which were looted in 1991, weapons that were provided from Iran in support of the Shia rebels, and those weapons provided to leaders of Sunni and Shia tribal leaders supplied directly by the Iraqi government.64

The collapse of Saddam’s regime and the subsequent destruction of the Iraqi Army by US edict caused the unemployment of thousands of Iraqi troops, all of whom were free to return home without any employ-ment, but with their weapons. It is estimated that there are currently approximately 9.75 million guns in Iraq, but this figure is at best on


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the lower level of estimates, as there is a lack of gun registration in the country, thus making it virtually impossible to gather any viable infor-mation. The availability of weapons had been detrimental to stability in Iraq for many years prior to the invasion, but the invasion resulted in a trigger for their mass proliferation on a scale never witnessed before. This uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Iraq is an issue that has not been fully addressed by either US or Iraqi policy-makers. Even though Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had included disarming Iraq’s many militias as part of his national reconciliation plan, no concrete measures have been drawn up as a means to actually address this challenge. Violence and terrorism in Iraq will continue una-bated unless the availability of weapons is reduced and a proper anti-weapons policy is introduced and monitored by the Iraqi government.

Government complicity and support

Iraq is once again in turmoil, with escalating levels of terrorist violence and an ongoing political deadlock affecting the stability of the country. The government of Iraq appears to be struggling to deal with the coun-try’s many underlying issues since the withdrawal of US troops. As well as that there are now claims emerging that the government may once again be providing support for certain extremist elements in the coun-try, which are in turn feeding into the growing instability.65 Iraq has a long history of its political leaders providing support for extremist and terrorist groups in order to promote their power and influence. Since the 2003 invasion by US-led forces, and the implementation of a new Iraqi government, this process appeared to have come to an end. Recent events have, however, cast a shadow over the validity of, for example, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, and questions have begun to emerge as to the legitimacy of his government. Legitimacy here relates to the degree to which people and groups in society accept the govern-ment, its institutions, and people, and in Iraq this legitimacy has been called to question on numerous occasions in relation to the terrorist threat and the ongoing insurgency. This process of questioning legiti-macy involved three phases: crisis of confidence, conflict of legitimacy, and crisis of legitimacy.66

The future of Iraq looks grim and the government is again criticised as appearing to be doing little to prevent the situation from escalating fur-ther. Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, for example, who was in exile in the Kurdish region of Iraq, lashed out at Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his leadership, arguing that Iraq could soon return to widespread sectarian terrorist violence that could require the return of US forces. In


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fact, there have been many worrying trends that have emerged which may point to a return to a ‘Saddam Hussein’-type situation, which would be devastating to the country. Prime Minister al-Maliki, for exam-ple, became the Chief in Command, Minister for Defence, Minister of the Interior, Chief of Intelligence, and Chief of National Security, which in reality should not be permitted under the new constitution of Iraq.67 With this type of power concentration taking place, many are now questioning if Iraq is heading back to the same kind of regime that prevailed before 2003.

Summary

Iraq contains many of the necessary elements needed for state failure and terrorism to occur: religious fundamentalism; the promotion and use of terrorism by internal non-state groups; the possible availability of weapons of mass destruction; a history of military dictatorship; and a crumbling society and political infrastructure. However, there is a significant difference between Iraq and the previous cases of Pakistan and Afghanistan (although the situation there shares some similarities to Iraq in relation to the influence from outside actors) that make it somewhat untypical as a case study under the auspices of state failure. That difference is that for Iraq, its process of state failure was almost entirely triggered by outside influences, i.e. the US-led invasion in 2003. It is also interesting to note that what began as a terrorist campaign in 2003 had, by 2005, developed into a fully fledged insurgency, coupled with inter-ethnic terrorist violent campaigns. Prior to the invasion Iraq had been a functioning, albeit borderline weak, state ruled by a powerful dictator (Saddam Hussein). The state under the leadership of Hussein was troubled but was by no means a failed or failing state; at best it was a borderline weak state. As a result of this uniqueness, Iraq is seen in the context of being what is termed here a ‘Trigger’ case study under the auspices of terrorism and state failure. This double-edged campaign means that in the context of Iraq, assessing terrorism and ter-rorist violence becomes more difficult in that one has to try to evaluate which acts are tied to the terrorist campaign and which are tied to the insurgency. This will become evident throughout the next chapter, and where relevant the terms insurgency and terrorism have been defined in more detail.


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153

The origins of state failure and terrorism in Iraq are extremely diverse and there are numerous cross-cutting elements that tend to mirror them-selves in a number of the sub-categories listed below. This is especially the case with regard to the indicators of regime type, declining state authority, and institutional lack of capacity, as well as corruption and a lack of rule of law. There is a significant link between the elements con-tained in the social/cultural factors section of demographic imbalances and cultural cleavages and the underlying culture of violence. The aim here is to analyse each of the elements and try to distinguish which are the most detrimental to the stability of Iraq and which are key in the proliferation of terrorism within the country.


For Iraq, regime type has been an influential factor in relation to both state failure and terrorist activity. Throughout its relatively short exist-ence, Iraq’s political landscape has evolved through periods of military rule, dictatorship, and civilian leaderships. This fragmented political his-tory has resulted in an extremely fragile political balance in Iraq which, on numerous occasions, has threatened the stability of the entire state. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 had a direct tie to regime type, specifically impacting on the stability of Iraq as a nation-state and on the levels of terrorist activity. Since the invasion of 2003, the government of Iraq has been drastically altered, once again changing from a dictatorship into a weak but expanding form of democratically elected parliamentary government. The transformation of Iraq’s authoritarian political system into a parliamentary democracy has had a number of negative impacts

8Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism,and Insurgency in Context – Part 2


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on both the stability of the country and terrorist activity. The election process of the government was questioned on numerous occasions and the general consensus amongst the Iraqi citizens with the election of al-Maliki was that the country was once more going to be pushed towards an ethnic/sectarian civil war due to the shift from Sunni to Shia leadership. The effect of this change has been mostly negative, with the al-Maliki government remaining locked in a battle to protect the credibility and legitimacy of the government to an ever-weary Iraqi people. As well as that, the threat of terrorism is a constant reminder to the already fragile democratic government that the country may not be ready to fully embrace its new regime type.

The authority of the Iraqi government, though never strong, has slowly begun to elevate to a level where it can promote its power beyond the borders of the capital city of Baghdad and into the sur-rounding provinces. However, even with this increase in authority, the lack of institutional capacity means that the government remains unable to promote this power across the country as a whole, which has been detrimental to both the stability of the country and to the counter-terrorism/security process. There has been a growing political momentum, since 2003, to encourage institutional development across Iraq in the hope that this would contribute to national reconciliation, mitigate sectarianism, and quell insurgent and terrorist violence. The initial reform efforts involved setting numerous benchmarks aimed at developing a power-sharing initiative, while at the same time developing a federalist-type system in the country. The aim of these initiatives was to try to overcome the underlying political issues, which were directly linked to the power shift among Iraq’s various ethnic com-munities (specifically Sunni, Shia, and Kurd). It was also hoped that the majoritarian features of the political system would be lessened so that the emergence of a more parliamentary democratic system could be implemented. However, these changes have, in fact, had the oppo-site effect on Iraq and have played a significant role in the increase of terrorism.1 Iraq, with the aid of the US, has managed to somewhat successfully establish its new political institutions, especially under the leadership of al-Maliki, but these institutions still lack adequate capacity to carry out their functions to the levels needed to create a fully stable Iraq.

USAID Iraq, the dominant coalition-based organisation in Iraq, has developed what is termed an Administrative Reform Project to address this lack of institutional capacity in Iraq. This reform project aims to strengthen the government’s resource management system


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along with its civil service structures, while also promoting economic diversification. The project also aims to bring essential public services to acceptable levels across Iraq. The overall theory under these reforms is that by strengthening Iraq’s policy and resource management systems at the national, provincial, and local levels, Iraq’s ‘whole-of-government’ capacity will be improved in three key specific areas: Civil Service, National Policy Management, and Administrative Decentralisation.2 It is argued that by improving these areas, the stability of Iraq can be greatly improved and thus as a result the levels of terrorism across the country should decrease. However, a detailed history of institutional reform efforts in Iraq actually shows that institutional reforms have not constituted advancement in the political equilibrium of the country, have not been credible, or have had perverse consequences for the country.3

Accordingly, that would suggest that there are limits on institutional reform and the importance of alternative means of restraining terrorist violence, especially for the case in Iraq. The reconstruction of Iraq’s institutions has not ended with the formation of the al-Maliki led government: the process has a long way to go before the country’s political, social, and economic institutions have developed to a level where they can function without the aid of outside sources. This extremely slow regeneration process has caused a backlash from the Iraqi citizens, especially those outside of Baghdad, where the effects of the reforms have yet to be seen. The Iraqi government needs legitimacy and administrative capacity, two essential elements that it has yet to capture, in order to survive. The only way that this can be achieved is through the creation of government institutions that are linked directly to Iraqi society, i.e. that are free, fair, open, and transparent. These insti-tutions need the capacity to function on all levels and need to provide a link between the country and the central government in Baghdad, something that still remains incomplete. Until the issue of lack of institutional capacity is adequately addressed in Iraq, the authority of the state can never be pushed beyond its already narrow boundaries of the capital of Baghdad and the internal threats to the stability of the country, including increased levels of terrorism and insurgent violence.

Corruption exists in all aspects of Iraqi society and politics, affecting the heads of the government ministries to the security guards at the checkpoints of the country’s borders and cities. Corruption is not a new phenomenon in Iraq and existed under Saddam’s rule, but in Iraq today it has become so endemic that it is making it extremely difficult for the government to function and has taken on a new dimension. It has


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evolved into being almost an ‘institution’ in Iraq. It has been argued that corruption has now become so severe that it has been elevated to a form of ‘irregular warfare’ – with various groups competing for access to posi-tions of power and limited resources thus causing violent conflict. The issue of corruption in Iraq has become so endemic that it has also been described as Iraq’s second insurgency, or the ‘second war in Iraq’.4 There are at least three separate factors that have contributed to the high lev-els of corruption in Iraq. The first was the failure to re-establish any type of financial or quality control on reconstruction work in the post-war period, which foreign contractors were quick to take advantage of. The second factor was that the US and its allies sought to remake the Iraqi state immediately after the invasion without first developing a detailed plan of action. Finally, there was the failure to clarify the mandate of key anti-corruption bodies, including the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), the Commission on Integrity, and the Inspectors General.5

Compared to Middle Eastern standards of corruption in general, Iraq’s corruption levels are seen as being extremely high and can be classed as being almost universal across all sectors of the country, be they political, social, or economic. The following are some of the most prominent ministries where corruption is rampant: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Oil, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Water Resources, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Electricity, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and the Ministry of Science and Technology.6 Some of these institutions stand on such fragile ground that their effectiveness has been seriously compromised and therefore the challenge of addressing corruption in Iraq is limited at best.7 Even with the support of the US, the Iraqi government remains unable to adequately enforce even the most basic and rudimentary anti-corruption laws, which many argue is aiding the re-emerging insurgency.8 This process has been hampered even further by the fact that the justice system in Iraq remains extremely weak and fragile, making the enforcement of anti-corruption laws almost impossible. As well as that, the system is subject to political pressures, intimidation by outside sources and is itself also corrupt in many areas. The excessive levels of corruption across Iraq at both national and local levels of government have created widespread resentment among the Iraqi citizens, who view corruption as a link between the degradation of public services and the rising levels of insecurity and terrorism. Corruption affects the lives of the Iraqis so significantly that opinion polls show that today Iraqis are more concerned with widespread corruption than continuing


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acts of terrorism, viewing them as almost interlinked.9 This high level of corruption has also had an extremely negative impact on the levels of support for the government and often acts as a propaganda tool for the insurgent or terrorist organisations to use against the government in order to gain support.

Beyond the effects that corruption has on the political and social systems in Iraq, it is also having a serious effect on oil production in Iraq, with experts estimating that upwards of 150,000–200,000, and perhaps as many as 500,000, barrels of oil per day are being stolen solely due to corrupt activities.10 It has become so significant that US officials have on numerous occasions stated that corruption is, in certain areas, more responsible than the activities of the insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector. Yet one of the most dangerous aspects of such high levels of corruption is that the funds amassed from corruption often find their way into the hands of insurgents, militias, and/or terrorist organisations. According to one senior Iraqi official, corruption is estimated to cost Iraq $5–7 billion per year, and much of that can be traced from corrupt aid agencies directly to militias and terrorist organisations.11 The Iraqi government has been quite vocal of late with regard to its policies on tackling corruption, but the Office of the Prime Minister remains some-what hostile to the idea of an independent agency dealing with and prosecuting cases of corruption. The lack of accountability then goes on to promote corruption in a vicious cycle, which has many questioning the complicity levels of the government in relation to corruption in its ministries. There has been some progress made, however, and there are sections of the Iraqi government that have shown slow improvement in relation to the application of anti-corruption laws and procedures. Even though this is a promising sign, this change is not happening quickly enough nor is it happening outside the main cities in Iraq. Thus cor-ruption continues to undermine state legitimacy and shows no sign of abating.12

Another significant factor contributing to the instability in Iraq is the nationalistic struggle for autonomy, specifically in terms of the Kurdish community in Iraq. The global Kurdish community is located mainly in the countries of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and of the 20–25 million Kurds in the world, almost 4.5 million of them are located in Iraq, comprising 15–20 percent of the entire Iraqi population. Although Kurdish tribalism is Islamic in nature, religion has traditionally taken a secondary role to Kurdish nationalism and this nationalismhas traditionally overshadowed allegiance to the Iraqi state. The result ofthis is a blurring of the role of Sunni Islam as a cohesive force among


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the Iraqi people and the Kurdish minority. This was evident especially under Ba’athist rule, which, by its pan-Arab definition, excluded the Kurds completely from the political processes of Iraq. Under the Saddam regime, Kurds suffered brutal campaigns of violence and ethnic cleansing, the most notorious being al-Anfal, conducted between 1986 and 1989, which resulted in the deaths of over two million Kurds. These atrocities and the backlash that resulted facilitated the emergence, in 1991, of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). This regional govern-ment emerged in the context of Western/US no-fly zones that provided protection to the Kurds from the Saddam regime. In Iraq, the Kurds are located in an autonomous zone in the north of Iraq comprised of the provinces of Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Diyala. The majority of Kurds see themselves as being an ethnically distinct, autonomous or semi-autonomous component of Iraq, identifying more closely with their ethnic Kurdish identity.13

Following years of repression and violence under this regime it was thought that, with its end, the Kurds would give up their autonomous position. This was not the case, however, and the Kurds remain set on creating a separate state for themselves. Maintaining autonomy is their minimal demand. Since 2003 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been one of the few parts of Iraq that has functioned rela-tively effectively. Ironically, therefore, de facto independence of Kurds has produced a moderately effective functioning state in northern Iraq. The Iraqi constitution, combined with the post-Saddam political situ-ation in Iraq, allowed the Kurds for the first time to gain substantial political strength. The constitution (Article 113) includes protection of the Kurdish autonomy and also officially recognises the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah as a legal autonomous region of Iraq. According to Katzman, this was so significant a move that it meant that Iraq’s neighbours, as well as many in Baghdad, now saw the Iraqi Kurds as a threat, especially in the political realm. This fear has become so severe that Sunni–Shi’ite alliances are even being formed in Iraqi Arab politics to contain the power of the Kurds.14

One of the most significant issues in relation to this autonomy and demand for independence is the issue of Kirkuk and its oil reserves. The Kurds have long argued that this area legally belongs to them and that they should have complete access to both the oil and the revenue generated from its sale. However, these oil fields technically remain part of the national patrimony and the oil remains under federal control, with the Kurds receiving their share of the revenue.15 This has led to an increase in communal violence as the Kurds try to strengthen their


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position by settling Kurds in Kirkuk, while at the same time attempting to expel the city’s Arabs (both Sunni and Shi’ites) along with the Turkomans.16 Even as the US troop surge was at its peak and terrorism across other areas of Iraq was beginning to lessen, there were increas-ing numbers of violent incidents in this region. It appears that the main fear of the Kurds gaining complete control of this area is that the affiliation of Kirkuk to the KRG would give the Kurds enough economic strength to heighten their push for complete independence (Kirkuk sits on roughly 10 percent of Iraq’s overall proven oil reserves). Overall, it would be even more detrimental to the stability of Iraq if further demands for autonomy were to emerge from this region. With the lack of trust in the Iraqi government, it is not difficult to imagine that the Sunni-dominated provinces of Ninawa, Ta’mim, Saladhin, and parts of Anbar could be the next areas to move towards the idea of becoming autonomous regions of Iraq. If this were to happen, it could once again reignite the already fragile battle between Shi’ite and Sunni and might even cause the complete collapse of the country.


Iraq’s economy is still heavily centralised and state-dominated; the rev-enue from oil production comprises roughly two-thirds of Iraq’s GDP, and is the sole basis of over 90 percent of total government revenues. The majority of the population depends on the government for employment, yet Iraq has one of the lowest employment-to-populations ratios in the region. Three of the most influential economic factors affecting Iraq’s stability and the spread of terrorism are poverty, the uneven distribution of wealth, and deepening economic stagnation and these will be assessed here in order to understand their impact on the stability of the country. When assessing poverty, for the case of Iraq, there are a number of differ-ent estimates as to the exact poverty rates, but the majority of them fall between 23 and 30 percent. Almost ten million Iraqis remain in absolute poverty since the invasion in 2003, with the majority of being those under 30 (the prime targets for terrorist group recruitment). This represents, it is argued here, just over 30 percent of the entire population. According to the report, there are several causes for this state of abject poverty:

1. The occupation by the US and the ensuing terrorist violence resulted in a mass of ‘destitute’ people, including widows, orphans, and inter-nally displaced persons (IDPs), amounting to roughly two million people.


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2. The failure of reconstruction efforts resulted in the failure to create employment for Iraqis, leading to increasing unemployment levels and further poverty across the country.

3. The mismanagement of resources due to corruption and a lack of experienced cadres, professionals, and technocrats meant that the vast majority of people were left without even the basic necessary resources needed to survive.

4. The endemic corruption of the government has greatly contributed to the inequity of wealth distribution, which, coupled with a massive mismanagement of the country’s resources, has led to an inflation rate that feeds into the cycle of poverty.17

Many Iraqis live just above the poverty line of $2.20 per day and are highly vulnerable to falling further below this poverty level, as the gap between poverty and destitute in Iraq is just 4.5 percent. In addition, there is large portion of what are termed non-poor living just above the poverty line. Overall, a small reduction in economic growth would substantially increase the poverty rates across Iraq. Iraq’s Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation released its National Strategy for Poverty Reduction in Iraq for 2010–2014 in November 2009, which set targets of reducing poverty in Iraq from seven to five million people within this time frame or from the current levels of over 23 percent to just over 16 percent by 2014.18 The aim is to provide the people of Iraq with a more stable economic life which would then, in theory, provide them with lesser incentives to join terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, who often prey on the poor for recruitment. In doing so, the Iraqi government hopes to prevent the proliferation of terrorist organi-sations across the country, especially in the south and central provinces in Iraq, where poverty is most prevalent. This then leads to the aspect of uneven distribution of wealth across Iraq. The uneven distribution of wealth has been an issue long affecting the people of Iraq and it appears that it is still playing a detrimental role in the country’s overall levels of stability and can directly challenge the legitimacy of the state. The issue of the allocation of aid resources coupled with the allocation of Iraq’s oil revenue has long played a key role in the overall instability of the Iraqi state. The allocation of aid can have a massive impact on the stability of a country, the reason being that those areas that witness the poor allocation of aid are more likely to be faced with increasing pov-erty levels, which thus leads to increased frustration and the possibility of violent outbreaks. This resentment feeds into the spread of both the insurgency and the proliferation of terrorism.


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The allocation of aid has become focused mainly on Baghdad and its surrounding cities, with little of it reaching the areas that are in most need, such as Erbil, Diyala, Al Anbar, and Basra.19 These are the areas of Iraq from where the majority of the terrorist violence and instability emanates and also where the majority of Iraq’s extremist, insurgent and terrorist groups are based. It would therefore seem apparent that a system of revenue distribution which covers these areas would be extremely beneficial, not only to the stability of the country, but also to decreasing the overall levels of terrorism and the spread of terrorism and the insur-gency. Assistance to Iraq has changed substantially over the past years and will continue to evolve throughout the reconstruction of the Iraqi state. From 2003 to 2006 the focus was on restoring essential services, such as health, education, water, and electricity, improving economic opportunities, building the foundation of democracy and governance, and managing conflict. In 2007, the focus shifted to strengthening the effectiveness of government and civil society, expanding private sector opportunities, supporting focused stabilisation activities, and providing humanitarian assistance and support for internally displaced persons. These types of activities continued until 2009 when US assistance began shifting from reconstruction to building Iraq’s capacity to reconstruct and govern itself effectively.20 Aid allocation and its lack of effective-ness has become so significant that the 2005 constitution even con-tained articles that aimed to address these issues by dictating how the country’s resources are to be allocated – noting that the resources must be distributed equitably to allow prosperity throughout the nation. As it stands, the Constitution already specifies that the oil and gas resources belong to all the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates and that the revenues of these resources shall be distributed in a fair manner in all parts of the country to ensure balanced development throughout Iraq.21 The Iraqi constitution recognises the need to allocate resources fairly and equally across the entire country in order to address the growing levels of instability and terrorism. If this aim is to be reached, Iraq’s leaders need to put more effort towards building upon the constitutional framework that has been developed in order to create a strong resource distribution scheme which can be implemented across the entire country.22

The government of Iraq is aware of the significance of aid allocation specifically in relation to the uneven distribution of wealth and has taken steps to improve its planning, monitoring, coordination, tracking and reporting on international aid flows. These are all key components of an effective aid management system. Iraqis still, however, face a void of


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economic trade, high unemployment and underemployment rates, and a large majority of the population being classified as poverty-stricken, which if not addressed, will cause an increase not only in the instability of the country but also in the levels of violence and terrorism.23 This general lack of funding and resources, as well as the economic margin-alisation of many of Iraq’s minority groups, has created a favourable situation for instability and terrorism to arise and proliferate. This has become extremely obvious in provinces such as Al Anbar and Karbala, where insurgent, extremist, and terrorist groups alike take advantage of the population’s dissatisfaction with the government and with the foreign presence in the country. As was the case in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, insurgent and criminal activity is statistically more likely to spread to areas where there is persistent poverty, thus making the uneven distribution of wealth such a serious issue. If these two factors are not addressed in the near future, there will undoubtedly be a mas-sive spread of insecurity in the already fragile provinces as well as an increase in the levels of terrorist violence.

The process of deepening economic stagnation, on the other hand, is putting a strain on the government and is causing a significant threat to the overall stability of the country. Iraq has a long history of economic stagnation despite its vast oil resources – resources that were misman-aged throughout the 1970s under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. Iraq’s tradition of using its economic finances to promote its military and defence spending has taken from the much needed investment in social and economic development programmes. This high level of defence spending is, however, only one of the reasons behind Iraq’s economic stagnation. Iraq’s economy has also suffered from many years of fiscal mismanagement, oil crashes, economic sanctions, two major wars, and (most recently) the US-led invasion and the subsequent insta-bility and insecurity that it has caused.24 The high dependence of the Iraqi state on oil revenues remains a key challenge for the government with regard to economic expansion. Lack of economic opportunity, coupled with a lack of modernisation across all areas of Iraq, has led to a massive backlash against both the Iraqi government and the US-led coalition forces. This is creating a massive pool of future recruits for insurgent and terrorist groups, who have once again begun to entrench themselves in some of the poorest and least policed areas of Iraq, such as Karbala, Al Anbar, and Al Muthanna.

Since the US invasion even more pressure has been placed on the already critical economic situation in Iraq. This has not been aided by the policy of promoting external contractors to carry out internal


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infrastructural reconstruction programmes. The importance of dealing with these economic challenges, however, goes beyond their economic values. They argue that the insurgency in Iraq is partially fuelled by the dissatisfaction of the Iraqi population, particularly in the Sunni areas. Insurgent and terrorist groups recruit from unemployed and disenfran-chised Iraqis who do not see any hope for the future, and who blame the lack of economic and job opportunities on the Iraqi government, the occupation of US forces, and the failure of post-conflict reconstruction efforts.25 Without the improvement in general economic standards in Iraq, the process of modernisation can never really be implemented and this will have catastrophic effects not only on the people of the country but on the stability of the country itself.


Iraq is an Arab-dominated country, with almost 80 percent of the popu-lation being of Arab descent. The ethnic composition of Iraq is one of the main contributing factors to its instability, with differing ethnic groups, namely Shia, Sunni, and Kurd, each having their own political, economic, and social differences. This ethnic breakdown shares close ties to the religious composition and its effects on Iraq. Iraq is also a Muslim-dominated country, with almost 97 percent of the population being Muslim. This fact in and of itself does not have a direct effect on the level of state failure. It is, instead, the internal divisions within the Muslim community that have the most significant effects on Iraq’s stability. Iraq’s Muslims are divided into the majority Shia (60–65 percent) and the minority Sunni (32–37 percent). The ongoing struggle between these two groups has contributed significantly to the growing levels of political and social instability in Iraq. Of all of the cleavages that exist within Iraqi society, it is those of the ethno-sectarian variety that have had the most serious effects, not only on the stability of the country but on the proliferation of the insurgency and terrorist activity. Ethno-sectarian division involves the partition or decentralisation of a state along ethnic and/or sectarian lines. This creates a security dilemma that exists when one community faces a distrustful ‘other’ while at the same time its own defensive actions are viewed as being antagonistic to the security of that ‘other’.26 It has been argued that once conflict or war mobilises these ethnic groups, that war cannot end until the popu-lations are separated into defensible, mostly homogeneous regions.27 These ethno-sectarian cleavages have become even more important to the stability of Iraq in the post-2003 period.


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In the current discourse surrounding the political future of Iraq, there are those who are calling for the complete ethno-sectarian division of Iraq. It is argued that Iraq has three distinctly separate ethno-sectarian communities, namely Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurd, and that each of these should exist in their own ethnic homogeneous state or province.28 There are those, however, who argue against the idea of the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq, noting that this will in no way put an end to the terrorism. Instead, it may in fact increase the levels of violence and terrorism in the country while destabilising the already weak country even further. As historical precedent highlights, and especially in the case of Iraq, the prevalence of inter-sectarian and non-sectarian-based terrorist violence, the disintegration of the Iraqi central government, the alienation and isolation of Iraqi minorities, and the likelihood of opportunistic or defensive neighbours, all suggest that terrorism in Iraq will continue even with the proposed federalisation of the country.29

Additionally, Iraq’s history of war and long-term violence has resulted in there being a ‘culture of violence’ among its citizens, which is having a significant impact not only on the levels of terrorism in the country, but also on the country’s overall stability. The significance of cultural violence is that it promotes structural and overt violence in a given society, which denies human beings their four basic needs: survival, well-being, identity, and freedom, all of which are extremely rare for the Iraqi people.30 The culture of violence in Iraq is based on society’s configuration of norms, practices, and institutions; it is a product of social structural organisation and psycho-cultural dispositions.31 When violence becomes so entrenched in everyday life, such as is the case with Iraq, it becomes extremely difficult to break the cycle and change perceptions about the use and validity of violence. Therefore, when conflict arises, people tend to seek security in increasingly smaller and narrower identity groups. This, it seems, is why the lines of contem-porary armed conflict are increasingly drawn along ethnic, religious, or regional affiliations rather than along ideological or class lines.32 Never has this been more applicable than in the case of Iraq, where the underlying culture of violence is a core feature of the ethno-sectarian conflict that is being fought alongside the evolving insurgency. For Iraq, this concept of a culture of violence has become even more significant since the 2003 US-led invasion. The full effect of this underlying cul-ture was observed almost immediately following the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, with the riots and looting in Baghdad and Fallujah being two of the prime examples. It has also become commonplace for minor disputes to lead to massive outbreaks of violence, conflict, and


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terrorism, which directly challenge not only the reconstruction and security efforts but also the stability of the entire country. This culture of violence, which is entrenched in the psyche of the people, has taken decades to reach the level it has today and will not be eradicated in a short period of time. Policymakers need to try to develop ways to reduce the Iraqi people’s reliance on acts of violence for solving disputes in order to guarantee the stability and security of the country. Without adequately addressing this issue, the levels of terrorism in Iraq are not going to be reduced in the near future.


The US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation triggered a breakdown of the already fragile Iraqi state. Against this backdrop of mounting terrorism, mass exodus, and rampant corruption, the state of Iraq began to crumble at an astounding rate. The invasion triggered huge economic losses, further disruption and devastation of the state’s capacity to function. There was a stunning loss of Iraqi confidence in the occupiers, having witnessed a climate of lawlessness that emboldened surviving regime loyalists other Iraqi nationalists, religious extremists, and organised-crime rings to launch even broader campaigns of terror, murder, and mayhem under their influence. For a brief period, the Iraqi state ceased to exist in any meaningful form and a complete political vacuum emerged. As a result, Iraq descended into a ‘failed state syndrome’, a process that the country had little or no inde-pendent capacity to stop.33 From the period 2003 through to 2010, Iraq went through five phases of instability and war:

• Phase 1: Foreign entry (March 2003–September 2003)• Phase 2: Loss of control (September 2003–March 2006)• Phase 3: Full-scale civil war (March 2006–March 2008)• Phase 4: Turning point (March 2008–March 2009)• Phase 5: Stasis (March 2009–March 2010)34

The Sunni insurgency that emerged in Iraq as a direct result of the invasion was not the product of any one specific politically or socio-economically marginalised group. It was an interesting phenomenon in that it was formed by a dominant group that was seeking to restore a position of power that it had once held, which was then joined by other groups who began to vie for power. From this breakdown of the most commonly affiliated groups in the insurgency, a further division can be


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distinguished comprising of two main active groupings. The first group, who are in the majority, can be described as being Islamic nationalists. The aim of this group is to remove the coalition from Iraq. Their objec-tives include reversing the political developments imposed by foreign oppressors. These groups use Islam as a unifying force in the resistance movement, not as a tool for the promotion of a global jihad. The second group are the minority and more radical of the two. These are composed mainly of Jihadi Salafists and strict ideological Ba’athists. The aim of this group is to oust the occupation from Iraq while also causing the complete collapse of the political system, thus igniting a full-blown civil war.35 Following the invasion ethno-sectarian identities were reified into fixed political cleavages, where politics and identity were fused into the concept of parties. This meant that national issues were now viewed through an ethno-sectarian prism, with the consequence being that particularistic concerns would now generally be the defining elements of national policy.36 The overall result of the invasion and occupation on Iraq was that the country’s entire internal political, social, economic, and security system was destroyed and the country was essentially trig-gered into complete state collapse for an extremely short period of time.

The situation has not improved with the withdrawal of US forces and has in fact deteriorated. At the peak of the occupation there were over 170,000 US troops and more than 500 active bases across Iraq. President Obama declared that the US was leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. However, Iraq still lacks robust political structures or even the basic ability to defend its borders, and the Iraqi central government remains unable to promote its rule across the entire country.37 Levels of terrorist violence are once again increasing and the ethno-sectarian divisions are deepening at a rapid pace. The insurgency is as active as it was at the beginning of the campaign, a fact highlighted by the increasing levels of terrorist attacks. Terrorist organisations are once again openly operating in areas of the country where govern-ment influence is almost non-existent, such as parts of Al Anbar and Karbala. Since the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq on December 18, 2012, there has been a significant increase in levels of violence across the country. A series of deadly attacks are now threatening to push Iraq into a situation of renewed chaos and state failure. During the occupa-tion, armed groups were directly challenging the US forces, which was expected. However, the levels of violence post-withdrawal have shocked many, especially in terms of the growing tensions between Sunnis and Shias, Kurds and Arabs, and Muslims and Christians that are erupting en masse across the country.


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The escalating levels of violence being witnessed in Iraq are taking place in many different parts of the country, thus making it extremely difficult for the government to try to improve the nation’s infrastruc-ture and to prevent the nation from returning to the levels of instability witnessed during the initial stages of the US invasion. It must be noted that the levels of violence have not reached those witnessed during the height of the sectarian conflict (2006–2007), but terrorist, extrem-ist, and insurgent attacks remain an almost daily occurrence, resulting in the deaths of several hundred Iraqis each month. According to the Iraq Body Count (IBC) statistics, prior to the withdrawal of US troops the average death rate was between 223 and 340 per month (2011). For 2012 these numbers have risen and in January alone 451 civilians were reported to have been killed, compared to 390 in January 2011. The IBC also notes that 278 civilians were killed in February 2012, once again an increase from the year before, when 250 had been killed.38 Table 8.1 provides a more in-depth view of the levels of fatalities during the period 2003–2014.

Additionally, as can be seen from Figure 8.1, 2013 has far outreached 2012 in terms of overall levels of fatalities meaning that Iraq is nowhere near the stable country that the US claimed to have left behind follow-ing its, what is argued here, premature withdrawal.

This increase in violence is having a detrimental impact on the overall stability of both the Iraqi government and the country as a whole. The conflicts that Iraq is facing with its neighbouring states are having some of the most significant impacts on the stability of the nation. Iraq is a land-locked country, bordered by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey. Of all of its neighbours, however, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria have the most significant impact on Iraq, in relation to both its stability and security and the terrorism threat. Some of the main issues that exist between Iraq and Iran, for example, are in relation to the border oilfields, the planned oil pipeline between Abadan and Basra, and Iranian assistance to Iraq with regard to electricity and infrastruc-ture, which is where a security dilemma is created. The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 sparked a new era in Iraq–Iran relations, with Iran seizing on the fractured political and vulnerable security situation in Iraq and working vigorously to extend its economic and political reach using both diplomatic and military means.39 Iran’s influence in Iraq remains substantial, but it has waned from a high point in 2005–2008. Some experts have long predicted that Iran’s influence would fade as Iraq asserts its nationhood, as the security situation has improved, and as Arab–Persian differences re-emerge. Iran has sought to achieve its


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168

Table 8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2003–2014

Yr Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

03 3 2 3,977 3,435 546 597 647 794 565 517 486 526

04 610 663 1,004 1,303 654 901 825 874 1,033 1,016 1,652 1,112

05 1,188 1,284 902 1,144 1,392 1,346 1,530 2,276 1,422 1,298 1,467 1,133

06 1,544 1,570 1,946 1,799 2,271 2,571 3,283 2,851 2,559 2,977 3,064 2,886

07 2,970 2,652 2,699 2,538 2,834 2,192 2,690 2,481 1,366 1,295 1,110 987

08 847 1,072 1,637 1,299 890 747 643 682 606 590 535 582

09 372 403 426 567 390 501 407 618 333 435 226 475

10 263 304 336 385 387 385 443 516 254 312 307 218

11 389 254 311 289 381 386 308 401 397 366 279 388

12 524 356 377 392 304 529 469 422 396 290 253 275

13 357 360 403 545 888 659 1,145 1,012 1,221 1,095 903 983

14 1,076 930 1,009 1,013

Source: IBC.40


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goals in Iraq through several strategies: supporting pro-Iranian factions and armed militias, attempting to influence Iraqi political leaders and faction leaders, and building economic ties throughout Iraq that might accrue goodwill to Iran – strategies which have, on numerous occasions, hindered US efforts to stabilise Iraq.41

As of early 2009, there appeared to be a public Iraqi rejection of Iranian political influence over Iraq. Iran’s declining political influence in Iraq was evident mainly through its failure to derail the forging of the US–Iraq Security Agreement that authorised the US military presence beyond December 31, 2008.42 By the end of 2009, Iran’s political influ-ence in Iraq was further jeopardised by an increased political rift between the pro-Iranian Shi’ite factions. Iranian influence is most prevalent in Baghdad, the Kurdish areas of the north, and Shi’ite areas in the south. There are numerous allegations that Iran has been arming and training Shi’ite militias in Iraq, one specifically emanating from General Petraeus. He noted in 2008 that Iran was continuing to arm, train, and direct ‘Special Groups’ – radical and possibly breakaway elements of the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) – and to organise the Special Groups into a ‘Hezbollah-like force to serve [Iran’s] interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces…’.43 Trade relations have also burgeoned, especially following the decrease in terrorism in Iraq after 2007. By the beginning of 2009, the two countries conducted about $4 billion in bilateral trade and also developed a free trade zone around Basra, which buys electricity from Iran. This increase in economic rela-tions continued in 2011, with Iraq, Iran, and Syria signing a $10 billion natural gas deal in which the three states agreed to construct a pipeline originating in southern Iran and extending to Syria.

’12

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

80009000

’13 ’14

Figure 8.1 Iraqi civilian fatalities in 2012–2013


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The relationship between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has also had a massive impact on Iraq, especially in relation to terrorism. It is inevitable that religious issues play a significant role in the Saudi–Iraqi dynamic, but neither government had any religion-based concerns or grievances regarding the other until 2009 and the bombings in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia’s Iraq policy is dominated by four main issues: oil production, domestic stability within Iraq, foreign presence/influence in Iraq, and Iraq’s ongoing political evolution. Saudi Arabia shares its longest bor-der with Iraq, the majority of which is remote, un-demarcated and undefended. The lack of patrolling of this border has resulted in an uncontrolled flow of terrorist operatives in both directions, bringing with them heavy arms pilfered from the former regime. The Saudi gov-ernment’s biggest fear is that disorder will spill over its own borders, bringing with it people who are willing to join al-Qaeda elements who are already active in Saudi Arabia.44 Although foreign jihadists consti-tute a relatively small proportion of the insurgent fighters in Iraq, they make up the vast majority of the suicide bombers, with some analysts estimating as many as 75 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out by Saudis.45 Although the Saudi government is more immediately worried about instability on the kingdom’s northern border than about the internal shape of a future Iraqi government, this does not mean it is unconcerned about the direction of Iraq’s political evolution.46 However, of even greater concern to the Saudis than the stability in Iraq are the ambitions of Iran, Turkey, and Syria in the region. The current crisis between Syria and Iraq is an extremely serious development, which could possibly induce spillover effects on a wide range of issues beyond the development of bilateral relations. However, unlike Iran, Syria remains a relatively marginal player in Iraq.

Nonetheless, Damascus has embarked on a concerted strategy to culti-vate relations with key Iraqi political players across ethnic and sectarian lines. Iraq and Syria have had a tortured relationship for decades, but up until recently relations between the two traditional rivals had seemed to be warming considerably.47 Syria’s alleged ‘blind eye’ to the funnelling of insurgents and arms across its border into Iraq has been a key issue dividing the two countries. The western areas of Iraq adjacent to Syria are largely Sunni, with tribal ties spreading over the border into areas like al-Bukamil and Deir az-Zor, where there has been serious unrest and suspicion of cross-border support. Syria’s failure to prevent Sunni fighters from infiltrating across its 450-mile border with Iraq is the most contentious issue dividing the two countries. Insurgents crossing into Iraq from Syria generally fall into two categories: pro-al-Qaeda jihadists


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transiting from the Gulf and former Iraqi Ba’athists and other Iraqi Sunni elements.48 The Syrian government strongly denies allegations that it is allowing its border to serve as an insurgent gateway. The mag-nitude of the insurgent threat emanating from Syria is difficult to gauge. Even if Damascus provides full cooperation in preventing insurgent and arms traffic across its border, the overall impact of Iraq’s conflict, while positive, would probably not significantly improve Iraq’s internal stability. While the flow of insurgents from Syria into Iraq has garnered significant attention, the flow of refugees from Iraq into Syria exerts a far more destabilising impact.49 The continuous flow of Iraqi refugees into Syria has triggered widespread inflation and severely strained Syria’s already insufficient public services and infrastructure.

The refugees are placing increased pressures on Syria’s subsidised economy, as the country’s worn infrastructure and overburdened pub-lic services are forced to meet even greater demands.50 As well as the growing terrorist threat, Iraq’s government is increasingly worried that a prolonged standoff in neighbouring Syria could upset its own fragile security and fractious political order, especially following the with-drawal of US troops. The Iraqi government is so focused on this issue that, despite the fact that its military is already overstretched, it has stepped up security this month along the 376-mile border with Syria in an attempt to protect itself from the fallout of clashes there.51 Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis it has become apparent that armed groups are increasingly forging links across the Syrian–Iraqi border, which is fuelling sectarian tensions. The UN special envoy to Iraq, Nikolay Mladenov, has warned that the conflict in Syria was ‘affording terrorist networks the occasion to forge links across the (Iraq–Syria) border and expand their support base’. He has also warned that the combination of a divided leadership in Iraq, coupled with unresolved constitutional issues between communities and the growing threat emanating from Syria has resulted in the creation of a ‘fragile and explosive’ situation in Iraq.52 The situation is becoming even more fragile for the already over-stretched al-Maliki government due to the increasing protests by the Sunnis, who feel that they are being mistreated by the Shia-led government. According to reports, clashes between security forces and Sunni tribesman in Anbar province have resulted in the displacement of over 400,000 people.53 These tensions have then been further height-ened by the conflict in Syria which is placing more pressure on the sectarian divide. Al-Maliki had previously noted (2013) the impact that the Syrian war could have on Iraq, highlighting the fact that a victory for the rebels in Syria would spark a sectarian war in Iraq. It seems that


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he was correct and Iraq is now in an extremely precarious position in terms of its security and overall levels of state stability. Therefore, for Iraq, the influence of and conflict with its neighbouring states has had a strong influence, not only on its stability but also on its overall secu-rity levels, as these states have been sources of weapons, funding, and support for both the insurgency and terrorist threat within the country.

Summary

One of the most important aspects with regard to the current situation in Iraq has been the impact of the US-led invasion in 2003. Following this invasion, Iraq was triggered into state failure, which caused massive instability and fragility in all areas of the state. This triggered failure makes Iraq an extremely unique case in relation to the analysis of the connections between terrorism and state failure there. Iraq today remains one of the central figures in the ongoing battle against terror-ism and extremism in the Middle East and has unfortunately become a bastion for militants and extremists all over the world, who use it as a legitimising factor in their pursuit of a global Islamic caliphate. It appears likely that, unless the underlying issues facing the Iraqi state are addressed swiftly and correctly, the state will continue to suffer from high levels of terrorism. The current Iraqi government has made some improvements in the stability of Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, yet the country remains on a knife-edge in relation to its levels of state failure and terrorist activity. The lack of progress in relation to security within Iraq means that the country is nowhere near reaching the targets set by the US (i.e. building a safer and more stable Iraq) upon their initial invasion of Iraq almost a decade ago. In 2011 the levels of terrorist activity rose by almost 20 percent and groups such as al-Qaeda have once again begun to emerge openly in cities across the country.54

In addition, the Arab Spring is having a spillover effect in Iraq and has increased levels of terrorism on the somewhat porous border areas with Syria. Security in Iraq is nowhere near the levels it needs to be in order to allow the government to deal with the terrorist and insurgent threat, and until these issues are addressed the situation in Iraq will remain fragile at best and explosive at worst. The evolution of the state has been marred by the inadequacies and overall bad leadership of its gov-ernments. Under Saddam’s leadership, the state developed a policy of supporting terrorist groups in order to promote its foreign policy objec-tives, which would have detrimental effects on the strength of the state


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and on terrorism within the state. The government Iraq under Nouri al-Maliki appeared at first to be playing an active role in developing the Iraqi state into a democratic system. However, claims of corruption and dictator-like actions against al-Maliki suggest that Iraq may once again be facing a military-style leadership structure. The withdrawal of US forces will have a devastating impact not only on the stability and ter-rorist levels in Iraq, but also for the entire region. In the already fragile Iraq, the government appears to be pushing the country to a turning point with deeply sectarian dimensions, which could lead to another civil war in the country.


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174

Prior to the 2000s, the world’s failed states were seen primarily through the lens of humanitarian issues, and the concept that these states could be the leading players in the era of ‘new’ modern terrorism was unim-aginable. This perception changed with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and since then the role played by failed states in relation to international terrorism, such as the case of Afghanistan, has been given much more attention. However, the majority of failed states have not experienced significant levels of terrorism, nor have they become major source of international terrorism. Although the phenomena of state failure and terrorism have been extensively studied, especially over the past decade, the underlying connections between the two phenomena have remained relatively underexplored. Throughout the chapters of this book there have emerged three key questions, which relate to the possible connec-tions between failed states and terrorism that this book aims to answer:

• To what extent do failed states play a role in the proliferation of terrorism in the global context?

• Is it possible to trace a pattern of state failure that is more susceptible to attracting or facilitating terrorism and terrorist organisations?

• What are the underlying conditions of state failure that allow the infiltration of terrorist organisations into the territory of the states concerned?

As well as the questions listed above, this book also aimed to address the limitations in current research, which include the following:

1. There has been a general lack of analytical and empirical research on the connections between state failure and terrorism, with the

9Conclusion


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Conclusion 175

majority of literature focusing on a limited number of studies and tools for measuring state failure which are already in existence, such as the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index. However, the use of this ranking scheme as a tool for assessing the connections between state failure and terrorism is misguided, as the Failed State Index, for example, only aims to measure state failure not terrorism.

2. There is little, if any, in-depth comparative analysis within the literature with regard to the connections between state failure and terrorism, and where this does occur it usually relies on the most basic understandings of the process of state failure.

3. The current spectrum of state failure and the analytical tools used have become somewhat outdated and fail to address those states that fall ‘in-between’ the set categories of failed states. This is leading to the creation of a ‘one size fits all’ approach to state failure, which needs to be addressed.

This book has aimed to address these limitations and provide a more in-depth analysis of the phenomena of state failure and terrorism in the comparative and analytical context. The areas of terrorism and state failure and their connections have been presented, analysed, and dis-cussed in great detail. All three of the states covered in this book share similar historical experiences and have a dominant Muslim population, which may result in higher levels of extremism and radicalisation, thus leading to a stronger link to the current trend in Islamic-fronted terror-ism. It must be noted, however, that there are a number of differences that exist between these states, specifically with regard to the case of Iraq. Most specifically, Iraq in the context of state failure was unique in the context of this research in that its process of failure was almost entirely triggered by outside forces, i.e. the US-led invasion in 2003. For this reason, Iraq is being termed a ‘Triggered’ case study in state failure, which makes it unique in terms of both its levels of state failure and the existence of terrorism within its territory. This makes Iraq different from the other cases and, even though they share similar structures and beliefs, and has allowed the analysis of a distinctive case to be carried out. There were a number of other possible case studies to choose from, such as Somalia, but it was decided that common cases were the best fit to the research questions rather than any other form of case selection.

The overall aim of this book was to fully understand the concepts of state failure and terrorism on the individual and comparative levels and to assess what, if any, are the specific connections between state failure and terrorism which can be identified. The centrality of focus that is placed


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on the arguments that failed states and terrorism are directly linked in the majority of the literature and policy documents is fundamentally flawed and exaggerated, and may in fact be detrimental to the study of state fail-ure and terrorism. This argument stems from the fact that, as mentioned above, there is a lack of detailed analytical and empirical research on the connections between state failure and terrorism. As well as that, the argu-ment that failed states are directly connected to terrorism has not been subject to detailed examination and in many cases the ‘one size fits all’ approach is used when both discussing and assessing the role played by the process of state failure in relation to terrorism.

The connections between state failure and terrorism have been debated and argued throughout the academic literature, especially over the last decade, with authors such as James A. Piazza, Aidan Hehir, Robert Rotberg, Hamre and Sullivan, Wilkenfield and Gurr, Takeyh and Gvosdev, and Stewart Patrick being the most prolific in their field. Taking some of these main authors into consideration, the following provides an overview of some of their main arguments and critiques:

– Hamre and Sullivan argue that failed states are threats to interna-tional security and the chances that they will become sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach are higher than those for strong, functioning states.1

– Other academic studies, including those by Piazza and Hewitt, and Wilkenfield and Gurr, have also concluded that state failure has direct connections to terrorist activity.2 Piazza hypothesises that state fail-ure helps to foster the conditions necessary to create and/or enable terrorists.3

– Takeyh and Gvosdev argue that failed states lack the ability to project power internally and have incompetent and corrupt law enforcement capacities, thus providing opportunities for terrorist groups to organ-ise, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications centres.4 They also argue that failed states offer terrorist groups larger pools of recruits as they contain larger numbers of disaffected citizens for whom political violence is an accepted avenue of behaviour.

Also, having carried out a large-scale literature review, a number of core arguments were found that are repeated with regard to the connections between state failure and terrorism:

1. Failed states enable and facilitate the emergence of terrorism.2. Failed states are more likely to contain terrorist groups than

non-failed states.


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Conclusion 177

3. Failed state are more to likely have high level of terrorist attacks and contain high numbers of terrorist groups.

4. Failed states are more likely to be used as havens by terrorist organisations/groups.

One of the main critiques of the above arguments is that there is a lack of adequate levels of research in the field. The majority of the literature has focused on general discussions of state failure and terrorism rather than on detailed empirical studies of the relationship and connections between the two phenomena. Because of this limitation, this book has also aimed to negate these arguments and instead argue that in the majority of cases there may in fact be no conclusive relationship between failed states and terrorism. It is argued here, having carried out an in-depth analysis of the literature, that the centrality afforded to the argument that failed states and terrorism are directly linked is, in many cases, exaggerated and misleading. This is tied to an interesting finding of the review: the fact that the countries with the highest number of active terrorist groups are not necessarily the most failed states accord-ing to the Failed State Index. These countries tend to be located more towards the failing to weak level on the spectrum of state failure.

The main arguments contained in this book also highlight that, firstly, there is a significant lack of correlation between a state’s level of failure and the number of terrorist groups that are based there. Secondly, the placement or ranking of a particular state on the Failed State Index does not appear to exhibit any significant difference with respect to the incidence of terrorism. Finally, there are significant num-bers of FTOs and domestic terrorist groups present in states with a low level of failure, as well as in relatively strong democracies. It is argued here that one of the most significant issues with the existing hypothesis on state failure is that there are failed states that do not exhibit any asso-ciation with terrorism. Yet, it can also be argued that states which are not classified as failed, and that have relatively stronger economic and human development scores, also appear to be prone both to contain-ing terrorist organisations and becoming the victim of terrorist attacks. This counter-intuitive finding could possibly suggest that a relatively more structured and efficient economic base actually favours the facili-tation of terrorist organisations in a specific area than does complete economic collapse and failure. If all failed states were directly linked to being breeding grounds and bases for terrorist organisations, then it would be expected that those states listed at the top of the Failed State Index would exhibit extremely high numbers of terrorist groups, but


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this is not, in the majority of cases, the reality: e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. These findings therefore negate the hypothesis contained in such works as Piazza’s ‘Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote terrorism’.5

It must be mentioned, however, that certain failed states have acted as bases and hosts for terrorist groups, but there are no definitive connec-tions in relation to this which can provide an example of which failed state would be more likely to produce terrorism. Therefore, it is more convincing to argue that there are many other factors besides a state’s level of failure that would make it more likely to produce terrorism. Thus the decision to actually establish a terrorist base in a specific state does not seem to equate with either the generic quality of state failure inherently attractive to terrorists nor to the particular attractiveness associated with the level of failure within that state. It must also be high-lighted that other states experience failure, yet are not targeted by these groups and have no demonstrable association with terrorism. Certain conditions within failed states may be conductive to the emergence of terrorist groups, but the problem lies in the fact that these particular problems are not specific to failed states and democracies also play host to terrorist groups. In fact, it has been argued that many western stable democracies actually contain many of the elements that are more attrac-tive to terrorist organisations than do those states that have failed.

Therefore it has been argued throughout this book that the majority of failed states pose little if any significant global security threat and have, in fact, insignificant connections to the spread of international terrorism. It is more likely that if terrorism is going to occur in these states, it will emanate from domestic terrorist groups and not from FTOs. In fact, these states are more likely to pose security threats to their own citizens through threat of death and injury through civil war; low-level violence; threat of criminality (rape, robbery, expulsion from villages/homes); threats in terms of hunger; disease; etc. This is similar on an external basis, where failed states often pose threats in terms of spillover to neighbouring states of armed groups, ethnic groups, weap-ons flows, cross-border criminality, etc. Through this understanding of the typical level of threats posed by the majority of failed states, itcould be argued that the larger global threat posed by failed states has been exaggerated. Of the top 10 states listed on the Failed State Index for 2011, only three (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq) have any significant levels of terrorist activity, whereas states that are lower on the index, such as Indonesia (63), Philippines (56), and Lebanon (45), contain relatively higher numbers of terrorist groups than the other top


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Conclusion 179

20 failed states listed in the Failed State Index.6 This counter-argument of the main authors such as Robert Rotberg and Adeed Dawisha – the augmented spectrum of state failure, the creation of the indicator lists, and more in-depth analysis of the cases in question – has been one of the main contributions to the field of terrorism and state failure.

Main findings of research

The standard version of the spectrum of state failure contains five dif-ferent levels of failure, beginning at strong and moving to weak, failing, failed, and finally collapsed. The augmented spectrum of state failure, specifically devised for this book, contains an additional five categories of failure: resilient/enduring states, faltering states, fragile states, endem-ically weak states, and crisis states. The development of this augmented spectrum of state failure has numerous positive implications for the understanding of the concept of state failure and provides a sophisti-cated understanding of the range and types of states that may be affected by failure. Chapters 3–8 then focused on carrying out a comparative case study analysis of three states currently classified as being failed and that are severely afflicted with terrorist activity – Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This comparative analysis was carried out by applying and assess-ing the impact that the factors identified in Chapters 1 and 2, had on each of the countries in relation to terrorism. It is argued here that the most significant factors in relation to the impact that they have on both the stability of the state and the issue of terrorism in Afghanistan are: regime type; declining state authority and institutional capacity; ideological cleavages; corruption and the lack of rule of law; culture of violence; foreign occupation; and external/foreign intervention; conflict with neighbouring states; safe havens; porous borders; pools of recruits; availability of weapons; and government complicity and support.

For the case of Pakistan, a similar trend emerged with regard to the factors that had the most significant impact on the levels of state fail-ure and terrorism affecting the country. The following are the most influential factors that have had an impact on Pakistan: regime type; declining state authority; corruption and the lack of rule of law; culture of violence; foreign occupation and external/foreign intervention; con-flict with neighbouring states; decline in social and political order; safe havens; porous borders; pool of recruits; and government complicity and support. Finally, having analysed Iraq, there emerged a number of important factors which provided an insight into reasons why the state has become such a hub of terrorist activity. The following are the factors


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which appeared most significant for Iraq in relation to both its level of state failure and terrorism: regime type; declining state authority and institutional capacity; ideological cleavages; corruption and the lack of rule of law; culture of violence; nationalist struggle for autonomy; demographic imbalances; foreign occupation and external/foreign intervention; conflict with neighbouring states; the breakdown/decline of social, political and economic order; the existence of safe havens; porous borders; availability of pools of recruits; the availability of weap-ons; and government complicity and support. Table 9.1 provides an overview of the comparative results of the significance of each of the factors as applied to the case studies.

Table 9.1 Impact of factors used in case studies

Type Factor Afghanistan Pakistan Iraq

Political Regime type X X X

Declining state authority and institutional capacity

X X X

Political marginalisation and political grievances/discontent

Ideological cleavages X X

Corruption and a lack of rule of law

X X X

Nationalistic struggle for autonomy

X

Economic Poverty

Economic marginalisation and/or the uneven distribution of wealth

Rapid modernisation and a deepening economic stagnation

Social/cultural Demographic imbalances and cleavages

X

Culture of violence X X X

External/environmental

Foreign occupation and external/foreign intervention

X X X

Conflict with neighbouring states

X X X

Natural disasters andnatural Resources

(continued)


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Conclusion 181


Weakness and/or absenceof state structures

X

Breakdown/decline of social, political and economic order

Breakdown and decline of social, political and economic

X X

Safe havens Weakness or absence ofstate control of certain regions enables thecreation of safe havens

X X X

Porous borders Weakness of absence of state control allows terrorists and recruits to transit in and out of the country with ease

X X X

Pool of recruits May be caused by e.g. youth bulge, high unemployment rates, and political, social, economic alienation

X X X


X X

Government complicity/support

Not necessarily linked to state failure but state failure may make it more difficult for governments to oppose terrorist groups and/orcreate additionalincentives to support them

X X X

Boxes marked with X denote a significant impact of that factor on the case study

Aside from the factors listed above, there were a number of core distinguishing features specific to the individual case studies that enabled them to be further distinguished from each other with regard to their levels of state failure and terrorist activity. The augmented spectrum of state failure that was developed for this book provided the addition of five new categories of state failure:

– Resilient/enduring state– Faltering state

Table 9.1 Continued

Type Factor Afghanistan Pakistan Iraq


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– Fragile state– Endemically weak state– Crisis state

The addition of the extra categories of state failure may provide a more nuanced understanding of the process of state deterioration in countries across the world that may now be miscategorised as failed according to the current spectrum of state failure. Having carried out the analysis of each of the case studies and applying the newly formed augmented spec-trum of state failure, it is possible to draw up Table 9.2, which provides an outline of the alternative level of state failure for each of the case studies.

Of the three case studies, Afghanistan was, prior to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent US invasion, the closest to fitting the classical ideal or model of what a failed state should be. The government in power at that time, the Taliban, was in control of the majority of the country, but had failed to provide the political, economic, and social institutions neces-sary for a state to survive. The Taliban ruled through a policy of coer-cion and violence and thus created a situation where their power only existed as long as they were able to promote fear among the citizens of the country. This resulted in numerous challenges to their dominance, especially from rival Islamic groups such as the Northern Alliance, led by Massoud. As a result of their inherent weakness in controlling the state in an adequate fashion, de facto regional power centres emerged in all provinces of the country which directly challenged the Taliban’s central government. These de facto regional power centres also facili-tated the emergence of terrorist organisations and extremist groups. These groups flourished in the unstable environment and were able to entrench themselves in areas of Afghanistan, especially those bordering Pakistan. In the case of Afghanistan, the weakness of its border, espe-cially that with Pakistan, coupled with the fragile and flawed govern-ment of the Taliban, pushed it towards failure. For the purpose of this book, Afghanistan is not described as being a failed state; it is instead described as being a crisis/failing state.

Table 9.2 Alternative state failure descriptions of the case studies

StateOriginal spectrum of state failure categorisation

Augmented spectrum of state failure categorisation

Afghanistan Failed state Crisis/failing state

Pakistan Failed state Endemically weak/crisis state

Iraq Failed state Crisis yet functioning state


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Conclusion 183

It was the 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent US invasion that triggered a brief collapse of the state and also created a power vacuum. This enabled terrorism to expand across all regions of Afghanistan, thus challenging the legitimacy of the government and preventing the state from functioning in any decent capacity. Currently, the areas where the insurgency is the strongest are primarily areas controlled by the Taliban, including the northern districts of Kandahar Province, the north-eastern districts of Helmand province, the southern districts of Oruzgan Province, the western districts of Zabul Province, and districts in Paktika, Paktia, Gardez, Wardak, and Logar Provinces. For Afghanistan, its ongoing insurgency stems from three fundamental issues. The first emanates from the lack of state formation and the inability of the central government to establish a significant presence throughout the country. This lack of influence creates instability and also causes power vacuums that extremist and terrorist groups are more than willing and able to fill. The second issue is the failure to make the rural areas secure. This failure makes it impossible to carry out the necessary devel-opment and reconstruction efforts that other parts of Afghanistan are privy to, thus causing resentment and distrust in the government from these areas. This is apparent in such areas as Zabol, Paktika, Paktia, and Nangarhar. Finally, there has been a lack of any meaningful improve-ment in the lives of the majority of people in the southern half of the country. These areas, such as Nimruz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah, are some of the poorest and least developed areas of Afghanistan, and it is from here that the majority of terrorist attacks have emanated.7

For the case of Pakistan, there is an extremely significant regional variation that exists in relation to its level of state failure. Even though Pakistan borders the extremely fragile Afghanistan, it does not share all of its traits listed above. For Pakistan, state failure is province-specific and not a whole-country phenomenon. Pakistan has been described in this book as being a failed, failing, and functioning state all at the same time. The border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan are some of the most dangerous in the world and are, on both sides of the border, highly failed. For Pakistan these regions, specifically FATA, NWFP, and Waziristan, witness little to no government control, have no political, social, or economic institutions, and are essentially lawless in nature. These are the regions of Pakistan that have been described as completely failed and witness the highest levels of terrorist activity. Then there are those areas of Pakistan which function quite effectively and have all of the necessary tools to be classified as functioning. These areas tend to lie in and around the capital city of Islamabad, and include


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the towns of Gurjat, Rawalpindi, and Lahore. These areas contain high levels of government visibility, have the necessary political, social, and economic institutions, and show high levels of support for the govern-ment. However, these areas also witness high levels of terrorist activity and are targets for the numerous extremist terrorist groups active in Pakistan. The areas in between these regions are functioning adequately but remain unstable. They include areas such as Sibi, Multan, Zhob, Sukkur, and Khairpur. It is in these areas that the least amount of ter-rorist activity occurs, but where government influence is weak – which is interesting, as one would assume that due to the inherent weakness they would act as ideal havens for terrorist groups.

The government of Pakistan also has a role to play in relation to terrorism. The Pakistani government, unlike that of Afghanistan and Iraq, has a long history of supporting terrorist groups and of ‘turning a blind eye’ to the actions of these groups. Successive Pakistani govern-ments have promoted Islamic radicalism to further their ambitions in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Throughout the current counterinsurgency and counterterrorism programmes, there have been ongoing claims from Kabul that Pakistani security forces chase al-Qaeda terrorists within Pakistan but make little effort to arrest Taliban fighters or stop them from crossing the border into Afghanistan.8 This support has resulted in the expansion of terrorist groups that have an affiliation to certain elements of the Pakistani government and has also resulted in numerous challenges to the validity of the Pakistani government with regard to its willingness to be involved in counterterrorism and counter-insurgency missions in the region. Due to these ill-conceived Pakistani policies of encouragement and appeasement of the extremist and terrorist groups, fundamentalist Islam in the border regions may now be too powerful to stop unless the countries on both sides of the border address their underlying weaknesses. Violence in Pakistan is not, how-ever, limited to Afghanistan-related issues. The underlying and inherent weaknesses in the tribal regions provide the impetus for violent sectar-ian organisations, such as the Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, to establish operating bases there and expand their campaign of violence. This increase in sectarian violence has also occurred in the south-westernprovince of Baluchistan, where the army and the Baluch Liberation Army have engaged in major skirmishes.9 Pakistani jihadists’ strength, and the growing weakness of the Pakistani state (as seen by its failures during the August 2010 floods) meant that the Pakistani army could not operate against the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda, or any other major terror-ist organisations, even if it wanted to do so. It is therefore likely that,


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Conclusion 185

until the underlying issues affecting the Pakistani state are inadequately addressed, the Taliban will continue to receive sanctuary in Pakistan, thus making it impossible to destroy the Afghan insurgency or quell the increasing levels of violence in Pakistan.10

Unlike Afghanistan and Pakistan, where state failure was inher-ent for a long period of time, failure in Iraq was triggered by outside forces. Although the invasion by the US in 2003 easily toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime, the ability of Western military intervention to suc-ceed came into question very quickly after the removal of Saddam. The US-led coalition was, on its initial arrival, ill-prepared for the multifac-eted insurgency that developed, and as a result the country descended into violence to such a degree that it appeared that there would be no end to the foreign military mission.11 A troop surge and a change in the tactical approach to the growing insurgency coincided with changes in the relationships between the numerous competing factions and forces within Iraq. The confluence of events permitted a political solution, with an Iraqi civilian government being elected, but this did little, if anything, to change the underlying situation. Essentially, external intervention produced state collapse within Iraq, thus triggering an anti-American insurgency. This insurgency combined over time with the underlying ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq to become an inter-ethnic/inter-religious terrorist campaign. Iraq remains distinctly divided into three ethnic regions. The provinces of Dohuk, Erbil, Ta’mim, Suleimaniyah, and Diyala to the north and north east con-tain a Kurdish majority and are, in many ways, autonomous from thecentral government of Iraq. These areas have, since the creation ofthe state, caused tension and violence due to the claims of autonomy by the Kurds in the region. In the areas of Ninevah, Ta’mim, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Baghdad, there exists a majority of Sunni Muslims. These areas of Iraq tend, along with the Kurdish regions, to be least affected by terrorist activity. They do, however, exist as somewhat fragile regions with limited government control and influence in places.

The regions of Iraq that witness the highest levels of both state failure and terrorist activity are those with the Shia Muslim majority. These areas are Karbala, Wasit, Baghdad (which is a highly divided province), Babil, Qadisiyah, Misan, Dhi-Qar, and Basrah. It is too soon to tell how far a functioning state is being re-established in Iraq and it is also too soon to ascertain whether levels of terrorism will decline or increase following the withdrawal of US troops. The situation there remains highly unstable and the government in power faces challenges to its legitimacy from all areas of the country. As well as that, the political,


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social and economic institutions, which were essentially destroyed by the US during the invasion, now only exist and function in the major cities in and around Baghdad.

As can be seen from the above overview, there are subtle underlying differences in the character of state failure and how it relates to terror-ism within each of the case studies. This ties into the overall analysis of the relationship between state failure and terrorism.

Concluding observations

Throughout the book there are numerous findings that both support and challenge the overall arguments and understandings of the con-nections between state failure and terrorism. From the results outlined above, it becomes obvious that there is no one factor that can determine whether a state is more susceptible to terrorism. Rather, it is a combina-tion of factors which, when they reach the ‘perfect storm’ of instability, enable terrorist groups to infiltrate and expand. Some other interesting findings have also emerged throughout the process of this book. Firstly, there is a significant lack of correlation between a state’s level of failure and the number of terrorist groups that are based there. Secondly, the placement or ranking of a particular state on the Failed State Index does not appear to exhibit any significant difference with respect to the incidence of terrorism. Finally, there are significant numbers of Foreign Terrorist Organisations and Domestic Terrorist Organisations present in states with a low level of failure, as well as in relatively strong democ-racies – for example ETA in Spain and the Continuity Irish Republican Army in Ireland. The understanding of the connections between state failure and terrorism gained from this research has provided an important input for the realms of terrorism and state failure. It has a significant impact for our understanding and comprehension of the relationship between state failure and terrorism and also has a signifi-cant impact on the realm of international relations with regard to the study of terrorism in the international context.

This is a growing field of research and the tools developed in this book may be of use in future contextual analysis of state failure and its connections to terrorism on a larger scale. It also has a significant impact on the study of Middle Eastern and South Asian politics, with a specific focus on statehood and the processes of state failure that have occurred in these areas. There is one common element that ties each of these states together, and that is Islam. Although highly contro-versial, it must be noted that the majority of terrorism witnessed in


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Conclusion 187

today’s world occurs in the Islamic world and is undertaken by Islamic groups.12 This has created a tie between Islam and terrorism which has permeated throughout academic literature, policy documents, and new reports. This connection between Islam and terrorism produces an argument which is based around the notion that failed and weak states with Islamic populations may currently be a particular problem rather than those failed states that do not have a majority Islamic presence. Therefore, counter-terrorism policies and future counter-terrorism mis-sions should focus on these Islamic nations of the world. However, it is argued here that, even though the majority of terrorist acts today are carried out by individuals and groups with ties or affiliations towards Islam, this cannot be used as a core reason for all Islamic majority countries to be seen as being threats with regard to terrorism. There are many Islamic countries in the world that do not face the threat from terrorism, nor do they contain high levels of terrorist organisa-tions, such as Qatar and Oman. Therefore, one could argue that the focus on Islamic countries as being definitive threats or possible threats with regard to international terrorism is therefore somewhat erroneous and may cause future problems with regard to the implementation of counter-terrorism policy in these areas of the world.

This book may possibly inspire future research into the area of state failure and terrorism in a different geographical context, such as Africa, which has some of the highest concentrations of state failure, yet comparatively the lowest levels of terrorist activity among these kinds of states. It would prove extremely interesting to carry out such an analysis, specifically on a state such as Somalia, which is an Islamic country and has been consistently one of, if not the most, failed states in the world, yet has not been as directly involved in the current trend of terrorism on any large scale. There are, however, some signs that Somalia may be moving closer towards this trend, with the US in 2006 carrying out attacks against the al-Shabaab terrorist group, who are pro-gressively becoming more aggressive with their use of violence. As well as that, states such as Nigeria (where Boko Haram operates) may also, in the future, become havens for terrorist organisations and are currently witnessing increasing levels of violence in the context of terrorism. This may be a precursor to the shift and evolution of terrorism over the coming years. Essentially, this book has argued that there is no direct correlation between a state’s placement on the Failed State Index and the number of terrorist groups contained there. From this, then, it can be argued that there are other factors, unrelated to the degree or character of state failure, which determine whether a state is likely to experience


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terrorism or indeed become a source of terrorism. State failure and state weakness can make a state more vulnerable or susceptible to terrorism internally, by penetration of foreign terrorist groups, and by becoming safe havens for international terrorism. However, whether or not failed or weak states experience terrorism is dependent on other factors which relate to their historical and political experience and patterns of devel-opment, and which also relate to international and ‘outside’ factors and influences. Therefore, to automatically suggest that a failed state is more likely to be a terrorist state simply due to its failure is misleading at best. There exist many failed states in the world today that do not play a role in terrorism and that are in no way tied to the facilitation or existence of terrorist groups. Overall then, this book has shown that, even though there may be certain features of failed states that make them attractive to terrorist organisations and more prone to terrorist violence, not all failed states are affected by or influence terrorism in the same way or through the same factors.


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189

Preface

1. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, p. 16, Penguin, London.

2. Wolff, Stefan (2006) State Failure in a Regional Context, http://www.stefanwolff.com/working-papers/state-failure.pdf.

1 Understanding Terrorism, Insurgency, and State Failure

1. Schmid, Alex P., Jongman, Albert, J., Michael, Stohl, H., Jan, Brand, Flemming, Peter A., Van Der Poel, Angela, and Thijsse, Rob (1988) Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): Transaction Books.

2. FBI, 28 C. F. R Section 0.85 (1998), Definitions of Terrorism, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.htm.

3. United Nations, United Nations Draft Convention, http://www.un.org/ terrorism/instruments.shtml.

4. United States State Department, Title 22 US Code Section 2656 f(d), http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/22/2656f.html.

5. Ibid. 6. European Union Centre for Freedom, Security and Justice, Article 29 EU Treaty,

http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/criminal/terrorism/fsj_criminal_terrorism_en.htm.

7. Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Towards a Definition of Terrorism, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/definition-terrorism.htm.

8. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1566, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1566(2004).

9. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Clarifying Definitions of Terrorism for the Purpose of Insurance, http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,2340,en_2649_201185_34070430_1_1_1_1,00.html.

10. US Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, US Patriot Act 2001, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.html.

11. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Transnational Terrorism: The Changing Nature of Modern Terrorism, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%205.pdf.

12. Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press.13. Wilkinson, Paul, Nye, Joseph S. and Satoh, Yukio (2003) Addressing the New

International Terrorism; Prevention, Intervention and Multilateral Co-operation, US: Trilateral Commission Brookings Institute, Washington D.C.

14. Schmid, Political Terrorism.

Notes


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15. Ghupta, Dipak (2005) Exploring roots of terrorism, in Bjergo, Tore (ed.) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Realities and Ways Forward, Routledge University Press, New York.

16. Bjergo, Root Causes of Terrorism.17. Bandura, Albert (1990) Mechanisms of moral disengagement, in Reich,

Walter and Hamilton, Lee (eds) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Washington D.C.

18. Roberts, Adam (2002) Can we define terrorism?, Oxford Today – The University Magazine, Vol. 14, No. 2.

19. Held, Virginia (2008) How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence, Oxford University Press, New York.

20. Sinai, Joshua (2008) How to define terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2, No. 4.

21. Ibid.22. Smelser, Neil J. and Mitchell, Faith (eds) (2002) Terrorism – Perspectives from

the Behavioural and Social Sciences, National Academic’s Press, Washington DC.

23. Ibid.24. Moghadam, Assaf (2006) The Roots of Terrorism, Chelsea House Publishing.25. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.26. Bjergo, Root Causes of Terrorism.27. Moghadam, The Roots of Terrorism, p. 57.28. Ibid., p. 58.29. Terrorism Research Unit (2010), State sponsored terrorism, http://www.

terrorism-research.com/state/.30. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.31. United States Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism Annual List,

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.32. Richardson, Louise (2006) What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy,

Containing the Threat, Random House, New York, p. 74.33. Fukuyama, Francis (2006) Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Johns

Hopkins University Press, Maryland.34. Richardson, What Terrorists Want.35. Crenshaw, Martha (1981) The causes of terrorism, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13,

No. 4 July.36. Smith, Haviland (2008) Defining terrorism: it shouldn’t be confused with

insurgency, American Diplomacy, December 2008, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2008/1012/comm/smith_defining.html.

37. Terrorism Research Centre (2009) Differences between Terrorism and Insurgency, Retrieved February 12, 2009, http://www.terrorism-research.com/insurgency/.

38. Bernsten, Gary (2008) Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide, Potomac Books, Washington D.C.

39. Ibid.40. CIA (2012), Guide to Analysis of Insurgency, http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/

product/insurgency.pdf.41. Ibid. 42. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication FM 3–24, Counterinsurgency 3–33.5

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), paragraph 1–2, 2.


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Notes 191

43. National Defence University Press (2010), Insurgency: theory and practice, NDUP, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf.

44. Hammes, T.X. (2006) The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, St. Paul, MN Zenith Press, New York/London.

45. CIA, Guide to Analysis of Insurgency.46. Ibid.47. Ibid.48. Rotberg, R. (2002) Failed states in a world of terror, Foreign, p. 2.49. Crisis Research Centre (2012), Department for International Development at

London School of Economics and Political Science, http://www.crisisstates.com/.

50. United States, Fragile States Strategy 2005, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdaca999.pdf.

51. OECD (2013), OECD Fragile States, http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf.

52. World Bank, Fragile States Index, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/theme-conflict.html

53. Rotberg, Robert I. (2002) The new nature of nation-state failure, The Washington Quarterly, Vol 25, No. 3.

54. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) (2008) Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations: from fragility to resilience, OECD/DAC Discussion Paper Series, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf.

55. World Bank, Fragile States Index.56. Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, Conflict Assessment Tools, http://global.

fundforpeace.org/cewa.57. Rice, Susan E. and Patrick, Stewart (2008) Index of state weakness in the devel-

oping world, Brookings Institute for Peace Studies.58. Ibid.59. OECD, Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations.60. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2010)

Promoting resilient states and constructive state-society relations – legitimacy, transparency and accountability, Special Report No. 168, http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/strategies/spezial168.pdf.

61. World Bank (2009) Making development climate resilient: a World bank strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, World Bank Annual Report, http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Overview_of_Strategy.pdf.

62. Patrick, Stewart and Brown, Kaysie (2007) Greater than the Sum of Its Parts? Asse s s-ing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States, International Peace Academy.

63. Bjergo, Root Causes of Terrorism.

2 Assessing the Connections Between State Failure, Insurgency, and Terrorism

1. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2004) 9/11 Commission Report, W.W Norton & Co Inc, New York, p. 361.

2. Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas (2002) Do terrorist networks need a home?, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 Summer, pp. 97–108.


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192 Notes

3. Ghulam M. Haniff (2009) Is Pakistan a Failed State? Hamara Pakistan, http://hamarapakistan1947.wordpress.com/2009/09/16/is-pakistan-a-failed-state/.

4. ITS (2008) Concepts of Terrorism: Analysis of the rise, decline, trends and risks European Commission FP6 Program, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%205.pdf.

5. Newman, Edward (2007) Weak states, state failure and terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 463–488, and Hehir, Aiden (2007) The myth of the failed state and the war on terror, Journal of Intervention and State-building, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 307–332.

6. Menkhaus, Ken (2003) Quasi-states, nation-building and terrorist safe havens, Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 7–23, and Von Hippel, Karin (2002) The roots of terrorism: probing the myths, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 25, pp. 1–39.

7. Dublin Embassy (2004) Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 – State Department Identifies 40 Foreign Terrorist Organisations, http://dublin.usembassy.gov/ ireland/terror_organisations.html.

8. National Counterterrorism Centre (2012), Worldwide Incidents Tracking System https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&Rcv=Incident&Nf=p_IncidentDate%7CGTEQ+20080101%7C%7Cp_IncidentDate%7CLTEQ+20081231&N=0 and Fund for Peace Failed State Index http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011.

9. National Counterterrorism Centre, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System.10. Hehir, Aiden (2007) The myth of the failed state and the war on terror, Journal

of Intervention and State-building, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 307–332.11. Von Keppel, Giles (2002) Jihad and the Trail of Political Islamism, Belknap

Press, Cambridge, p. 303.12. Fund for Peace (2008) Failed State Index 2011, http://ffp.statesindex.org/

rankings-2011-sortable.13. Innes, M. (2005) Terrorism sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: challenging

conventional assumptions, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 4, p. 298.

3 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 1

1. BBC (2012), Focus on Afghanistan, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12011352.

2. Goodson, Larry P. (2001) Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban, University of Washington Press, Washington D.C, p. 12.

3. Crews, Robert D. and Tarzai, Amin (2008) The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Harvard University Press, USA, p. 11.

4. Nojumi, Neamatollah (2002) The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilisation, Civil War and the Future of the Region, Palgrave, New York, p. 22.

5. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, p. ix.6. Rotberg, Robert (2007) Building a New Afghanistan, Brookings Institute Press,

Washington D.C, p. 57.7. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 74.


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Notes 193

8. InfoPlease (2011) Afghan History – Early History, Pearson Family Education Network, http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/world/afghanistan- history.html.

9. Tanner, Stephen (2009) Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban, Da Capo Press, Philadelphia, p. 218.

10. InfoPlease, Pearson Family Education Network.11. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 15.12. US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action – Background Note: Afghanistan,

November 2008 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm.13. Ritscher, Adam, A Brief History of Afghanistan, http://afghangovernment.

com/briefhistory.htm.14. US Department of State, ‘Diplomacy in Action – Background Note:

Afghanistan’.15. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 14.16. US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action – Background Note: Afghanistan.17. Rubin, Barnett R. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University

Press, London, p. 17.18. Margesson, Rhoda (2007) Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future

Prospects, CRS Report for Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.pdf.

19. US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action – Background Note: Afghanistan.20. Singh, K. R. (2004) Post-war Afghanistan: reconstructing a failed state,

Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 4.21. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 85.22. Crews and Tarzai, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, p. 248.23. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 228.24. Ibid., p. 184.25. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War, p. 73.26. Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, p. 115.27. Rashid, Ahmed (1994) Advantage Rabbani, Far Eastern Economic Review, July

7, 1994, p. 22.28. Coll, Steve and Rupert James (1990) Afghan rebels veto drive for Kabul, The

Washington Post, November 28, 1990, pp. 27–28.29. Gall, Sandy (1994) An interview with Commander Ahmed Shah Massoud,

Asian Affairs Journal, The Royal Society Asian Affairs, Vol. 25, pp. 141–142.30. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 164.31. Rashid, Ahmed (1990) Friendless foe, Far Eastern Economic Review, October

25, p. 18.32. Maley, William (2001) Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban,

Hurst & Company, London, p. 43.33. Ibid., p. 69.34. Tanner, Afghanistan, p. 285.35. Kakar, Kuwan (2000) An Introduction to the Taliban, Institute for Afghan

Studies, Kabul, Afghanistan, p. 23.36. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and

Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, Library of Congress New York, p. 509.

37. National Geographic (2011) Inside the Taliban, http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/channel/episodes/inside-the-taliban/.


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38. Kaplan, Robert D. (2010) Man versus Afghanistan, The Atlantic, April.39. Federation of American Scientists (2008), Report of Accountability Review

Boards – Bombings of US Embassies in Kenya and Dar es Salaam, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/arb/board_daressalaam.html.

40. Perl, Raphael and O’Rourke, Ronald. (2001), Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, January 30, 2001.

41. Junger, Sebastian, Afghanistan’s slain rebel leader, National Geographic http://www.nationalgeographic.com/adventure/0111/junger.html.

42. Oamid Afghanistan News Corporation (2001) Afghanistan’s Massoud says trip to West a success, http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2001/april/apr10c2001.html.

43. Kakar, Palwasha, (2006) Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative Authority, Harvard Law Review 2006, Massachusetts.

44. Dorronsoro, Giles (2009) The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan, Carnegie Endowment for Peace.

45. PBS Frontline (2009), The Return of the Taliban, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/tribal/map.html.

46. Stratfor, The Taliban In Afghanistan: An Assessment, September 28, 2009.47. New York Times, Afghanistan: An Overview, March 24, 2010, http://topics.

nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html.

48. CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

49. Fund for Peace (2010), Failed State Index 2010, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/library/cr-10-99-fs-failedstatesindex2010-1103g.pdf.

50. Fund for Peace (2011), Country Assessment – Afghanistan, http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/states/ccppr11af-countryprofile-afghanistan-11t pdf.

51. Corruption Perception Index (2009), Transparency International, London, UK, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi.

52. US National Council (2008), Global Trends 2025, http://www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocuments/globaltrends.pdf.

53. Brigadier Rashid Wali Janjua (2009) State failure in Afghanistan and security challenges for Pakistan, Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 9–29, http://www.researchgate.net/publication/237510792_STATE_FAILURE_IN_AFGHANISTAN_AND_SECURITY_CHALLENGES_FOR_PAKISTAN.

54. Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan.55. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan.56. Mullen, Rani D. (2008) Democracy building at the precipice in Afghanistan,

Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 55–83.57. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 218.58. Ibid., p. 224.59. Mullen, Democracy Building at the Precipice in Afghanistan.60. Huria, Sonali (2009) Failed states and foreign military intervention: the

Afghanistan imbroglio, IPCS Special Report, No. 67, March.61. Cole, Beth Ellen (2007) Afghanistan’s economy: on the right road, but

still a long way to go, United States Institute for Peace, http://www.usip.org/publications/afghanistans-economy-the-right-road-still-long-way-go.


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62. Ibid.63. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 198.64. Shahrani, Nazif M. (2002) War, factionalism and the state in Afghanistan – in

focus September 11 2001, American Anthropologist, Vol. 104, No. 3.65. Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan.66. Bajoria, Jayshree (2009) The troubled Afghan–Pakistani border,

Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled- afghan-pakistani-border/p14905.

67. Roy and Zahab (2004) Islamist Networks: The Afghan–Pakistan Connection, p. 109.68. STRATFOR (2010) Afghanistan at the crossroads, STRATFOR Global Intelligence.69. Rashid, Ahmed (2009) The Afghan impasse, New York Review of Books,

September 16.70. Sinno, Abdulkader H (2008) Achieve counter-insurgency cooperation in

Afghanistan by resolving the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, NBR Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 5.71. Population Action International (2011) Topic – Afghanistan, http://population

action.org/topics/7-billion/.72. Beehner, Lionel (2007) The effects of youth bulge on civil conflicts,

Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civil-conflicts/p13093.

73. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 192.74. Beehner, The effects of youth bulge on civil conflicts.75. Giustozzi, Antonio (2010) Nation-building is not for all – the politics of

education in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Analysts Network, February.76. Boone, Joe (2010) Afghanistan civilian deaths up 31% this year, says United

Nations, Guardian Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-deaths-up-un.

77. Rogers, Simon (2010) Afghanistan civilian casualties: year by year, month by month, Guardian Online, August 13, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-casualties-statistics#.

78. UNAMA, Afghanistan mid-year report 2010 protection of civilians in armed conflict, August 2010.

79. Giustozzi, Nation-building is not for all – the politics of education in Afghanistan.

80. Louise, Christopher (1995) The social impacts of light weapons availability and proliferation, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, March 1, https://www.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/Social%20Impact%20.pdf.

81. Ibid.82. Bhatia, Michael V. (2008) Afghanistan and Conflict: Armed Groups, Disarmament

and Security in a Post-War Society Routledge Press p. 119.83. OECD (2005) ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)’, Development

Assistance Committee (DAC) OECD – Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention Issues Brief.

84. Louise, ‘The Social Impacts of Light Weapons Availability and Proliferation’.85. Chopan, Saghar and Daud, Malaiz (2009) Political leadership in post-Taliban

Afghanistan: the critical factor, in Afghanistan 1979–2009: in the grip of conflict, The Middle East Institute – Viewpoints Special Edition.

86. Sinha, Shakti (2009) Legitimacy or credibility? The case of Afghanistan, in Afghanistan 1979–2009: in the grip of conflict, The Middle East Institute – Viewpoints Special Edition, Washington D.C.


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87. Chopan and Daud, Political leadership in post-Taliban Afghanistan: the critical factor.

88. Leipold, J. D. (2009) Government reform key to Afghanistan, United States Army, October 27, http://www.army.mil/article/29411/government-reform-key-to-afghanistan-says-kilcullen.

4 Afghanistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 2

1. National Counterterrorism Centre (2011) Report on Terrorism National Counterterrorism Centre Washington D.C http://fas.org/irp/threat/nctc2011.pdf; and Counterterrorism Calendar (2012) Terrorist groups, National Counter Terrorism Centre, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html.

2. Williams, Brian G. (2007) Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan, Islamic Affairs Analyst, September, http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/IAA%20suicide.pdf.

3. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, Library of Congress, p. 129.

4. Williams, Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan. 5. Stern, Jessica (2003) Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill,

pp. 283–288. 6. Ibid. 7. Turner, Bryan S. (ed.) (1970) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, Gerth and

Wright Mills, Oxon New York, p. 36. 8. Johnson, Thomas H. and Mason, Chris M. (2009) Democracy in Afghanistan

is wishful thinking, Christian Science Monitor, August 20, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0820/p09s01-coop.html

9. Ibid.10. Centre for American Progress (2009) Building democracy in Afghanistan.11. Burki, Shireen K. (2010) Bold move to save Afghanistan: bring back a king,

Christian Science Monitor.12. CNN (2010) Can democracy work in Afghanistan, CNN News, http://

afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2009/12/11/can-democracy-work-in-afghanistan/.13. Chief of Staff, Pentagon (2010) Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability

in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, Department of Defence, Washington D.C, April 2010.

14. Evans, Ann, Manning, Nick, Osmani, Yasin, Tulley, Anne, and Wilder, Andrew (2004) A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, World Bank and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

15. Ghani, Ashraf (2009) A ten year framework for Afghanistan, Atlantic Council, April 2009, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5176~v~A_Ten-Year_Framework_for_Afghanistan__Executing_the_Obama_Plan____And_Beyond.pdf

16. Goodson, Larry P. (2001) Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise of the Taliban, University of Washington Press, Washington D.C, p. 204.


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17. Carnegie Endowment for Peace (2009) Finding the right grand strategy in Afghanistan – success in Afghanistan: searching for the right formula, May 12, Transcript of Annual Conference, Washington D.C

18. Rubin, Barnett R. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale University Press New, Haven and London, p. 169.

19. Fange, Anders (2010) The state of the Afghan state, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Germany and Afghanistan.

20. Lane, Tom (2010) UN Leader Ban Ki-moon gives Afghanistan a warning, January 5, BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8440602.stm

21. Ghani, A ten year framework for Afghanistan.22. US Department of State (2009) International Religious Freedom Report 2009 –

Afghanistan, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm.23. Filkins, Dexter (2010) Overture to Taliban jolts Afghan minorities, New York

Times, June 26, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27/world/asia/27afghan.html.

24. Wadhams, Caroline and Cookman, Colin (2010) Assessing peace prospects in Afghanistan – the Peace Jirga and President Karzai’s new peace deal, Centre for American Progress, June 1, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/06/peace_jirga.html.

25. Filkins, Overture to Taliban jolts Afghan minorities.26. Woodrow Wilson Centre (2004) Political transition in Afghanistan: the state,

Islam and civil society, Asia Program, Special Report No. 122, June, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/asiarpt122.pdf.

27. Naysan Adlparvar (2009) Democracy for Afghanistan, Institute of Development Studies, http://www.ids.ac.uk/go/news/democracy-for-afghanistan.

28. Shiri, Arif (2009) Does democracy have a future in Afghanistan? – Flaws in election process casting doubts, Kabul Press, September 19, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4067.

29. Asian Development Bank (2007) Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for Strategy and Action, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf.

30. Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2010) Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption, http://www.iwaweb.org/corruptionSurvey2010/NationalCorruption2010.html.

31. Chief of Staff, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, Washington D.C.

32. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010, A/64/705 S/2010/127, http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf.

33. United States Institute of Peace, Establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan, Special Report 117, March 2004, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr117.pdf.

34. Ibid.35. Harvard National Security Journal (2009) NSJ Analysis: Connecting the Rule of Law

with Afghanistan’s Security Strategy, November 5, http://harvardnsj.org/2009/11/nsj-analysis-connecting-the-rule-of-law-with-afghanistans-security-strategy/.

36. National Human Development Report (2004) Security With a Human Face: challenges and responsibilities, UNDP Afghanistan, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_2004_en.pdf


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37. Asian Development Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan.38. IFAD (2010) Rural poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Rural

Poverty Portal, http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/afghanistan.

39. Ibid.40. CIA, World Factbook (2012) Afghanistan, CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.41. World Health Organization, Country Health Profile, http://www.who.int/gho/

countries/afg.pdf.42. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Mausner, Adam (2010) Agriculture, food and

poverty in Afghanistan: is a population-centric strategy possible?, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, April 26, http://csis.org/publication/agriculture-food-and-poverty-afghanistan.

43. Rural Poverty Portal (2010) Rural Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, International Fund for Agricultural Development Rome, http://www. ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/home/tags/afghanistan.

44. Cordesman, Anthony (2010) Shape, clear, hold, build and transfer: the metrics of the Afghan War, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 12, http://csis.org/files/publication/100112_AfghanLngMetrics.pdf.

45. Budget for 1386 (2007–2008) Afghan Ministry of Finance, and Aid Effectiveness and the Role of Civil Society Organisations, Afghan Ministry of Finance, January 2008, and Improving Aid Effectiveness for Reducing Poverty, Draft, Afghan Government January 2008, p. 1.

46. World Bank (2005) Afghanistan: Managing Public Finance for Development, December.

47. Waldman, Matt (2008) ‘Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan’, ACBAR Advocacy Series, March, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6B8F790E6E26231EC1257412004B5482-Full_Report.pdf.

48. RAND (2005) The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From Congo to Iraq. 49. Waldman, Matt (2008) Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, http://

reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6B8F790E6E26231EC1257412004B5482-Full_Report.pdf.

50. World Bank, Afghanistan. 51. AFP (2009) Afghan insurgency inspiring new fighters: analysts, January

12, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Afghan+insurgency+inspiring+new+fighters%3A+analysts-a01611765724.

52. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Focus on Afghanistan: A Long Road to Recovery, July 2009, http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/focus_on/afghanistan/afghanistan_1.html.

53. Rotberg, Robert (2007) Building a New Afghanistan, p. 12.54. Pentagon (2010) Report on progress toward security and stability in

Afghanistan and United States plans for sustaining the Afghanistan national security forces, Pentagon Congressional Report, April 24, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04)26)10.pdf.

55. USAID (2009) Afghanistan: Economic Growth, Fall Report, http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/economic-growth.

56. CIA, World Factbook – Afghanistan. 57. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 201.58. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010.


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59. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 20560. STRATFOR, Afghanistan at the Crossroads.61. Ibid.62. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010.63. NATO, Afghanistan Report 2009, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/

pdf_2009_03/20090331_090331_afghanistan_report_2009.pdf.64. Rotberg, Building a New Afghanistan, p. 102.65. World Health Organization (2010) Progress in the prevention of injuries in

the WHO European Region, Country Reports, http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/98718/Ireland.pdf.

66. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) Feature article: Population by age, sex, Australian states and territories, Australian Government Bureau of Statistics, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/featurearticlesbyReleaseDate/AE3CAF747F4751CDCA2579CF000F9ABC?OpenDocument.

67. Central Intelligence Agency (2012) Country Study – Saudi Arabia, CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print/country/countrypdf_sa.pdf

68. Tripathi, Deepak (2010) American afflictions – Afghanistan, Iraq and a growing culture of violence, May 13, http://antiisgood.wordpress.com/2010/05/13/american-afflictions-afghanistan-iraq-and-a-growing-culture-of-violence/.

69. Nordland, Rod (2010) Violence up sharply in Afghanistan, NY Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/world/asia/20afghan.html.

70. Mather, Dave, Afghanistan: foreign intervention and social transformation, Critique, Vol. 34, http://www.critiquejournal.net/dmather34.pdf.

71. Harper, Stephen (2009) Foreign troops can’t defeat Afghanistan’s insurgency: Harper, CBC News, March 1, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/03/01/cnn-harper.html.

72. STRATFOR, Afghanistan at the Crossroads.73. Ibid.74. Ibid.75. Nagra, Bunn (2010) US-NATO occupation forces in Afghanistan: pullout or

chased out? Global Research, April 25, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=18853.

76. Rubin, Barnett R. and Siddique, Abubakar, Resolving the Pakistan–Afghanistan Stalemate, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SRoct06.pdf.

77. Rashid, Ahmed (2000) Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, p. 202.

78. International Crisis Group (2007) Pakistan’s tribal areas: appeasing the militants, Asia Report, No. 125, December 11, 2006.

79. Rasul, Bakhsh Rats (2008) Afghanistan and Pakistan: difficult neighbours, in ‘Post-September 11 Afghanistan–Pakistan relations: prospects for counter-insurgency cooperation’, National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 19, No. 5, December, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=361.

80. Ibid.81. Dorronsoro, Giles (2011) Afghanistan: the impossible transition, The Carnegie

Papers, June Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.82. SIGAR (2011) Despite Improvements in MOI’s personnel systems, additional

actions are needed to completely verify ANP payroll costs and workforce


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strength. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, April 25, http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2011-04-25audit-11-10.pdf.

83. Dorronsoro, Afghanistan: the impossible transition.84. Ibid.

5 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Context – Part 1

1. Levy, Bernard-Henry (2003) The Cauldron, New Republic, June 16, p. 31. 2. Hussain, Zahid (2007) Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam

Columbia University Press, New York. 3. Cohen, Stephen Philip (2004) The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings Institution

Washington D.C p. 2 4. Rotberg, Robert (2003) State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror.

Brookings Institute, Washington D.C. 5. Iqbal Academy Scandinavia, Dr. Iqbal’s Poetry, IAS Scandinavia, http://www.

allamaiqbal.com/ias/iqbalspoetryfaisalhanif.html. 6. Haqqani, Husain (2005) Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C. 7. Jones, Rodney (2001) The prospects for state failure in Pakistan: ethnic,

regional and sectarian fissures summary, Session on the Future of Pakistan: Prospects of State Failure, May 1, http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/Pak_statefailure_ExSumm.pdf.

8. Gunaratna, Rohan, Terrorism in Southeast Asia: threat and response. Centre for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper: Series 2 (Islamism in Southeast Asia), No. 1.

9. Kukreja, Veena (2003) Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises Sage Publications, New Delhi.

10. The History of Pakistan (2010) Muhammad Ali Jinnah [1876–1948], Peshawar Pakistan, http://storyofpakistan.com/muhammad-ali-jinnah/.

11. Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan.12. Cohen, Stephen Philip, The nation and state of Pakistan, The Washington

Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 112.13. New World Encyclopaedia – Liaquat Ali Khan, http://www.newworldencyclo-

pedia.org/entry/Liaquat_Ali_Khan, Accessed 12/2/09.14. Britannica (2008), History of Pakistan, Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://

www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/438805/Pakistan/214492/History#ref387253,

15. http://www.storyofpakistan.com/.16. Kapur, Ashok (1991) Pakistan in Crisis, Routledge, London. 17. Lyon, Peter (2008) Roots of Modern Conflict: Conflict between India and Pakistan –

An Encyclopaedia, ABC-CLIO Publications, Washington D.C.18. Pakistan People’s Party (2012) Brief History of Pakistan, http://asiasociety.

org/agha-muhammad/pakistan-political-history. 19. Story of Pakistan.com (2009) Story of Pakistan, http://storyofpakistan.com/

legal-framework-order/. 20. Haqqani, Hussain, Between Mosque and Military.21. Story of Pakistan.com, (2009) Story of Pakistan, http://storyofpakistan.com/

general-elections-1977/.


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22. Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan23. Abbas, Hassan (2009) Pakistan’s Troubled Frontier, The Jamestown Foundation,

Washington D.C 24. Coll, Steve (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and

Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 11 2001, Penguin Books,New York.

25. Global Security, Benazir Bhutto, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/benazir-bhutto.htm.

26. Christi, Ali (2008), MQM – History and Origins, http://www.dawn.com/news/1027569/timeline-a-history-of-mqm.

27. Haqqani, Husain Between Mosque and Military 28. National Assembly of Pakistan (2003) Pakistan: Parliamentary chamber:

National Assembly 1988 Elections, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2241_88.htm.

29. Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan.30. US Library of Congress, Government of Pakistan, http://countrystudies.us/

pakistan/76.htm.31. National Assembly of Pakistan (2011) Pakistan: A Brief Parliamentary History,

Pakistan State Government, http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=75.32. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan.33. United States Department of State (2012), State Sponsors of Terrorism Annual

List,http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.34. Abbas, Hassan (2005) Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and

America’s War on Terror, East Gate Publications, Washington D.C.35. Saeed, Naima (2008), Impact of Globalisation on Pakistan’s Economy, http://

www.pide.org.pk/pdf/psde%2018AGM/ImpactofGlobalizationOnPakistans.pdf,

36. Malik, Iftikhar (2008) The History of Pakistan, Greenwood Publishers, Calafornia.

37. BBC (2010), How the 1999 Pakistan coup unfolded, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6960670.stm.

38. Haqqani, Husain Between Mosque and Military.39. Markey, Daniel (2008) Securing Pakistan’s tribal belt, Council on Foreign

Relations Centre for Preventative Action, Council Special Report No. 36, August.40. Hussain, Zahid (2008) Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe and the

Killing of Benazir Bhutto, I. B. Tauris & Company.41. Gardner, Simon (2007) Pakistan lawyers strike to protest Musharraf purge,

Media Island International, http://mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSISL28295920071205?src=RSS-TOP.

42. Chomsky, Noam (2008) Pakistan: a failed state?, Business Standard, 3 February.

43. CIA World Factbook (2012) Central Intelligence Agency USA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.

44. Fund for Peace (2013) Failed State Index: An Overview, http://ffp.statesindex.org/fsi14-countryanalysis

45. Synnott, Hilary (2009) What is happening in Pakistan, Survival, Vol. 1, No. 51, pp. 61–80.

46. Fund for Peace (2014) Failed State Index, Fund for Peace Washington D.C http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2014.


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47. CBC (2013) Islam’s sectarain split, CNC News, http://www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/map-sectarian-tension/.

48. Schmidt, John R. (2009) The unravelling of Pakistan, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 29–54.

49. Root, Hilton (2005) Pakistan, The Milken Institute Review, Second Quarter, http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2005_6/64_74mr26.pdf

50. Schmidt, The unravelling of Pakistan.51. Lynch, Abigail, Pakistan: the nuclear state at a precipice, http://www.vtu.

edu/PakistanTheNuclearStateatthePrecipice.html.52. Synnott, What is happening in Pakistan.53. Solomon, Hussein and Cornelia, Conem (2004) The state and conflict in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1.

54. Failed State Index, (2009) 2009 Annual Report Country Index, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.

55. Warsyed, A. N. Institutional Weakness, DAWN Pakistan, October 18, 2009, http://www.dawn.com/news/497090/institutional-weaknesses.

56. Ibid.57. US News (2009), Obama worries about weakness of Pakistan’s government,

April 30, 2009,http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2009/04/28/why-the-obama-administration-is-so-worried-about-pakistan.

58. Muhammad, Sultan (2012) Educational statistics of Pakistan, Academy of Educational Planning and Management, http://www.aepam.edu.pk/Files/EducationStatistics/PakistanEducationStatistics2011-12.pdf.

59. See Ministry of Education Pakistan (2012) Education Statistics Pakistan Pakistan-UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/pakistan_pakistan_statistics.html and http://acr.hrschool.org/mainfile.php/0211/410/.

60. Akram, Muhammad and Khan, Faheem Jehangir (2007) Healthcare services and government spending in Pakistan, Working Papers, Pakistan Institute of Development Economic, http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-32.pdf

61. UNICEF (2010) Pakistan: military spending at the expense of children’s health, http://acr.hrschool.org/mainfile.php/0211/410/.

62. Kfir, Isaac (2007) The crisis of Pakistan: a dangerously weak state, Global Politician, http://www.gloria-center.org/meria/2007/09/8.pdf

63. Roy, Oliver (2004) Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection, Columbia University Press.Hurst London

64. Markey, Securing Pakistan’s tribal belt.65. Bindra, Satinder, (2001) India identifies terrorist training camps, CNN, http://

edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/19/inv.afghanistan.camp/.

66. Daniel, (2011) Speech of Senator Hillary Clinton, http://www.thaindian.com/ newsportal/world-news/cross-border-terrorism-hampering-afghanistan- pakistan-clinton_100277373.html.

67. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010c) Military Balance 2009, http://www.iiss.org/publications/military-balance/.

68. Nawaz, Shuja (2009) Pakistan and the Taliban: leaders caught betwixt and between, Foreign Policy, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/10/pakistan_and_the_taliban_leaders_caught_betwixt_and_between.


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69. Urdal, Henrik (2007) The demographics of political violence: youth bulges, insecurity and conflict, in Brainard Lael and Chollet, Derek (eds) Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict and Security in the 21st Century, Brookings Institute, Washington D.C.

70. World Bank (2012) Population growth Pakistan, World Bank Country Studies, http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=population%20Pakistan.

71. Heinsohn, Gunnar (2007) Battle of the youth bulge, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/415unyit.asp.

72. United Nations (2007) World Population Prospects: the 2006 revision, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/English.pdf.

73. Moeed, Yusuf (2008) Prospects of Youth Radicalisation in Pakistan, Brookings Institute for Peace, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/pakistan%20yusuf/10_pakistan_yusuf.pdf.

74. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, In-depth: guns out of control: the continuing threat of small arms, IRIN, http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=8&ReportId=34290.

75. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2006) ‘In-Depth: Guns Out of Control’, http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/58952/8/guns-out-of-control-the-continuing-threat-of-small-arms.

76. Global Policy Forum (2003) 18 million illegal weapons in country, DAWN Daily News Pakistan, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/204-small-arms/42549.html.

77. Ministry of Interior (2008) Illegal gun rates in Pakistan increase, http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/59075/8/south-africa-gun-crime-continues-to-devastate-lives.

78. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009) In-depth: guns out of control: the continuing threat of small arms.

79. BBC (2011) Key quotes from the document, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/5388426.stm.

80. CBS News, Secretary Gates – Interview 60 Minutes, CBS News http://www.cbsnews.com/news/robert-gates-the-soldiers-secretary/.

81. Walsh, Declan (2006) Pakistan sheltering Taliban says British officer, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/may/19/pakistan.alqaida.

82. Council on Foreign Relations (2011) A conversation with Pervez Musharraf, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11540/.

83. Ziring, L. (2004) Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History, Vanguard Books, Lahore.84. Jones, Seth G. (2007) Pakistan’s Dangerous Game, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 1

pp. 15–32.85. Byman, Daniel (2005) Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism,

Cambridge University Press, New York.86. Kronstadt, K. Alan (2003) International terrorism in South Asia, CRS Report

for Congress, November 3, 2003.87. Chossudovsky, Michel (2008) India’s 9/11: who was behind the Mumbai

attacks, Global Research – Centre for Research on Globalisation, http://www.globalresearch.ca/india-s-9-11-who-was-behind-the-mumbai-attacks/11217.

88. Chalk, Peter (2009) Pakistan’s role in the Kashmir insurgency, RAND, http://www.rand.org/blog/2001/09/pakistans-role-in-the-kashmir-insurgency.html

89. Jones, Pakistan’s dangerous game.


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6 Pakistan: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 2

1. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (2010) Pakistan Security Report 2009, http://san-pips.com/.

2. Walsh, Declan (2010) Pakistan suffers record number of deaths due to mili-tant violence, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/11/pakistan-militant-violence-death-toll.

3. Khan, Aarish Ullah (2005) The terrorist threat and the policy response in Pakistan, Policy Paper No. 11, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

4. Lynch, Thomas F. (2008) Sunni and Shia terrorism: differences that matter, Combatting Terrorism Centre, Occasional Paper, December 29.

5. South Asia Terrorism Portal (2011) Terrorism in Pakistan, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm; and Counterterrorism Calendar (2012) Terrorist Groups, National Counter Terrorism Centre, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html.

6. Khan, The terrorist threat and the policy response in Pakistan. 7. Bajoria, Jayshree (2011) The ISI and terrorism: behind the accusations,

Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/isi-terrorism-behind-accusations/p11644.

8. Synnott, Hillary (2009) What is happening in Pakistan, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 76.

9. New America Foundation (2011) FATA: Inside Pakistan’s tribal regions, New American Foundation Online, http://pakistansurvey.org/.

10. Ali, Tariq (2008) The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power, Pocket Books, London, p. 53.

11. Bajoria, Jayshree, Pakistan’s fragile foundations, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2009, http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-fragile-foundations/p18749.

12. Hussain, Zahid (2007) Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam I.B Tauris Books p. 61.

13. Alagappa, Muthiah (2001) Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, California, p. 389.

14. Abbas, Hassan (2005) Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, East Gate Books, New York p. 78.

15. Rashid, Ahmed (2008) Descent into chaos: the US and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, Penguin Books, New York.

16. Haqqani, Hussain, The role of Islam in Pakistan’s future, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2004–2005, http://khakh.yolasite.com/resources/winter_haqqani.pdf.

17. Baker, Aryn (2009) ‘Pakistan’s Army Gets Serious’, TIME Magazine, November 9, p. 33.

18. ibid., p. 34.19. Ibid., p. 35.20. Alam, Muhammad Badar, Pakistan: Marginalisation and discrimination

against the minorities, The Dawn, September 15, 2009, http://www.sacw.net/article1113.html.


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21. Kukreja, Veena (2003) Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, Sage Publications, New Delhi.

22. Cohen, Stephen Philip (2004) The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings, Washington, D.C, p. 30.

23. Bajoria, Pakistan’s fragile foundations.24. Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises.25. Bakhshish Yousaf Chaudhry (2009) The Quaid and the ideology of Pakistan,

DAWN, August 16, 2009, http://notesonpakistan.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/ideology-of-pakistan-in-light-of-quid-e.html

26. Mezzera, Marco and Aftab, Safiya (2009) Democratic and transitional justice cluster: country case study Pakistan – Pakistan state society analysis, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, January 2009.

27. Wilke, Boris (2001) State formation and the military in Pakistan: reflections on the armed forces, their state and some of their competitors, Working Paper No. 2, University of Hamburg, Germany.

28. Mezzera and Aftab, Democratic and transitional justice cluster.29. Christie, Kenneth (2011) Abandoning the state, securing religion: Pakistan’s

identity politics, ECPR Annual Conference, August 25–27, University of Iceland.30. Chene, Marie Overview of corruption in Pakistan, Anti-Corruption

Resource Centre, August 2008, http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=174.

31. Corruption in Pakistan, Anti-Corruption Research Centre, http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query43.cfm.

32. Dawn Editorial (2009), Transparency International ranks Pakistan as the 42nd most corrupt state in the world. http://www.transparency.org.pk/news/newsdec09.php.

33. Haqqani, H. (2005) Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, The Brookings Institution for Peace, Washington D.C.

34. Sinkler, Adrian (2005) Nations in Transition: Pakistan, Thomson Gale, New York.35. Khan, Adeel (2005) Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in

Pakistan, Sage Publications, London, p. 90.36. World Vision (2010) Pakistan: Poverty Unveiled, http://meero.worldvision.

org/sf_pakistan.php.37. Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator John Kerry (2009) Needed: A com-

prehensive US policy towards Pakistan, A Report by the Atlantic Council, February 2009, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/812-pakistan-report-comprehensive-us-policy-needed.

38. Ibid.39. Samuel Huntington (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University,

New Haven, CT.40. Hagel and Kerry, A comprehensive US policy towards Pakistan41. CIA (2009) World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.42. Index Mundi (2009) Pakistan Demographics Profile 2009, http://www.

indexmundi.com/pakistan/demographics_profile.html.43. Encyclopaedia of the Nations (2010) Pakistan – Religions, http://www.

nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Pakistan-RELIGIONS.html.44. Bajoria, Pakistan’s Fragile Foundations, Council on Foreign Relations.


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45. Mezzera and Aftab Democratic and transitional justice cluster.46. Ahmad, Eqbal (1999) The roots of violence in Pakistani society, Akhbar, Vol.

5. http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar/article.php?article=80&category=5&issue=8.

47. Stern, Jessica (2003) Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill, ECCO Publications.

48. Kronstadt, K. Alan (2009) Pakistan–US Relations, Congressional Research Services Report, February 6.

49. Bruno, Greg (2008) US–Pakistan military cooperation, Council on Foreign Relations, June 26, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16644/uspakistan_ military_cooperation.html.

50. BBC (2002) Indo-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/default.stm.

51. International Crisis Group (2010) Steps towards peace: putting Kashmir first, ICC Asia Brief, June.

52. Belasco, Amy (2011) The cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other global war on terror operations since 9/11, Congressional Research Service, March 29, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf; and BBC (2011) Pakistan: US sus-pends $800m of military aid, BBC News South Asia, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14099402.

53. International Crisis Group (2012) Pakistan’s relations with India: beyond Kashmir, ICC Asia Report No. 224, May.

54. Ibid.

7 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism,and Insurgencyin Context – Part 1

1. Dawisha, Adeed (2009) Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation, Princeton University Press, New Jersey/London, p. 28

2. Miller, Deborah (2003) The War Against Iraq, The Lucent Terrorism Library, Farmington Hills USA.

3. Abdullah, Thabit A. J. (2006) Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos: Iraq Since 1989, Nova Scotia: Fernwood Publishing

4. Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Sluglett, Peter (2001) Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, IB Tauris Press, London.

5. Ibid. 6. Abdullah, Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos 7. Tripp, Charles (2007) A History of Iraq, Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge USA. 8. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958. 9. Abdullah, Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos.10. Tripp, A History of Iraq.11. Ibid.12. Head, Tom (2010) The War Crimes of Saddam Hussein, http://civilliberty.

about.com/od/internationalhumanrights/p/saddam_hussein.htm.13. Tripp, A History of Iraq.14. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958.15. Tripp, A History of Iraq.


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Notes 207

16. Global Security, Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm.

17. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958.18. Tripp, A History of Iraq.19. Arnove, Anthony (2000) Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and

War, South End Press, Cambridge, MA.20. Dawisha, Iraq, p. 226.21. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958.22. Arnove, Iraq Under Siege.23. Ibid.24. Alnasrawi, Abbas (2001) Iraq: economic sanctions and consequences, 1990–

2000, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2.25. Mazaheri, Nimah (2010) Iraq and the domestic political effects of economic

sanctions, Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring 2010.26. Dodge, Toby (2005b) ‘Chapter Two: Rebuilding the Iraqi State’, Adelphi

Papers, Vol. 45 No. 372, pp. 25–42.27. Bensahel, Nora, Oliker, Olga, Crane, Keith, Brennan Jr., Richard R., Gregg,

Heather S, Sullivan, Thomas, and Rathmell, Andrew (2008) ‘After Saddam: Pre-war Planning and the Occupation of Iraq’ RAND Corporation Library of Congress Press, Virginia.

28. Dodge, Toby (2005a) Chapter One: Order and violence in post-Saddam Iraq, Adelphi Papers, Vol. 45, No. 372, pp. 9–23

29. Fattah, Hala (2009) A Brief History of Iraq, Library of Congress.30. Ibid. 31. Tripp, A History of Iraq.32. Cordesman, Anthony (2008) Iraq’s Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict,

Praeger Security International, Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

33. Baker, James A. and Hamilton, Lee H. (2009) The Iraq Study Group Report

34. Talanani, Jalal (2005) Shi’ite Alliance wins plurality in Iraq, CNN, February 14, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/13/iraq.main/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD

35. Tripp, A History of Iraq.36. Hiltermann, Joost R. (2006) Elections and constitution writing in Iraq, 2005,

Middle East at the Crossroads, http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2006/aarticles/aHiltermann.pdf

37. Ibid.38. Whitehead, Douglas and Harnmeijer, Jelte (2006) Voting against occupation –

Iraq’s election results, http://earthweb.ess.washington.edu/~jelte/Articles/Ruckus/February2005/IraqElections.pdf

39. Baker, Pauline H. (2005) Iraq as a failed state: lessons from the January elections – October 2004 to April 2005, Fund for Peace, Report No. 4

40. Cordesman, Iraq’s Insurgency.41. Ibid.42. Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling, Jensen (2010) The Iraqi and AQI roles

in the Sunni Awakening, PRISM, Vol. 2, No. 1.43. McCary, John A. (2009) The Anbar Awakening: an alliance of incentives, The

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 43–59.


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208 Notes

44. Lobe, Jim (2007) Iraq: US surge strategy successful in shifting the violence, Inter Press Service, http://antiwar.com/lobe/archives.php?offset=60.

45. McCary, The Anbar Awakening: an alliance of incentives.46. Schwartz, Lowell H. (2009) Is Iraq safe yet?, RAND Corporation, March 5,

http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/03/05/PS.html.47. Strategic Survey (2010) Middle East/Gulf, Strategic Survey, Vol. 110, No. 1,

pp. 201–258.48. New York Times (2010) Iraq Elections, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/

international/countriesandterritories/iraq/elections/index.html.49. Ottaway, Marina and Kaysi, Daniel A. (2010) Winners and losers in the Iraqi elec -

tion battle, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/10/winners-and-losers-in-iraqi-election-battle/cla.

50. Biddle, Stephen, O’Hanlon, Michael E. and Pollack, Kenneth M. (2008) How to leave a stable Iraq, Foreign Affairs, September/October.

51. CIA World Factbook (2010) Iraq, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.

52. See: Agnew, John, Gillespie, Thomas W., and Gonzalez, Jorge (2008) Commentary, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 40, pp. 2285–2295; Gregory, Derek (2008) The biopolitics of Baghdad: counter insurgency and the countercity, Human Geography, Vol. 1 No. 1; Fox, Maggie, Satellite images show ethnic cleanout in Iraq, Reuters, September 19, 2008, http://www. reuters.com/article/idUSN1953066020080919.

53. Dewachi, Omar (2011) Insecurity, Displacement and Public Health Impacts of the American Invasion of Iraq, CostofWar.Org, http://costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/19/attachments/DewachiIraqiRefugees.pdf

54. Taneja, Preti (2007) Assimilation, exodus, eradication: Iraq’s minority communities since 2003, Minority Rights Group International, London.

55. Roggio, Bill (2006) Safe havens and Iraq, Counter-Terrorism Blog, http:// counterterrorismblog.org/2006/05/safe_havens_iraq.php.

56. Kachejian, Kerry C. (2011) Chaos in Iraq: understanding the enemies within, Opposing Views, http://www.opposingviews.com/i/politics/2012-election/chaos-iraq-understanding-enemies-within.

57. United States Department of State (2011) Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf.

58. US-GAO (2011) Combatting Terrorism – US Government Should Improve Its Reporting On Terrorist Safe Havens, United States Government Accountability Office, June 11, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11561.pdf.

59. SCIFORUM (2004) Iraq’s Porous Border, http://www.sciforums.com/ showthread.php?t=39664.

60. Oluic, Steven Gen (2009) Iraq’s border security – key to an Iraqi endstate, Combatting Terrorism Centre – Sentinel, January 15, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/iraq%E2%80%99s-border-security-key-to-an-iraqi-endstate.

61. Daily Times (2005) Iraq’s porous borders challenge frontier forces, Daily Times Online, August 23, http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/foreign/23-Aug-2005/iraq-s-porous-borders-challenge-frontier-forces.

62. Oluic, ‘Iraq’s border security – key to an Iraqi endstate.63. The Guardian (2002) Pentagon sees 5 million child terrorists in Iraq,http://

www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq.64. Stohl, Rachel (2003) Small Arms are Continuing Threat in Iraq, Christian

Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1105/p09s02-coop.html.


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Notes 209

65. Dodge, Toby (2012) The resistible rise of Nuri al-Maliki, OpenDemocracy.net, March 22, http://www.opendemocracy.net/toby-dodge/resistible-rise-of-nuri-al-maliki.

66. Masters, Daniel (2008) Does Regime Type Influence Terrorism? – Evaluating the Home-Grown Vs. Foreign Terrorist Dimension, University of North Carolina, North Carolina , USA.

67. Tawfeeq, Mohammad and Pleitgen, Frederik (2012) Iraqi Vice President predicts return to sectarian violence, CNN, January 13, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/30/world/meast/iraq-al-hashimi/index.html?hpt=imi_c1.

8 Iraq: State Failure, Terrorism, and Insurgencyin Context – Part 2

1. International Crisis Group (2010) Loose ends: Iraq’s security forces between US drawdown and withdrawal, Middle East Report, No. 99, October 26.

2. USAID (2012) Iraq, USAID Iraq, http://iraq.usaid.gov/node/2. 3. Haggard, Stephen and Long, James (2009) On benchmarks: institutions and

violence in Iraq, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of San Diego, http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/6557.pdf.

4. House of Representatives (2007) Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 2007, House of Representatives, Washington D.C, https://house.resource.org/110/org.c-span.201345-1.raw.txt.

5. Al-Ali, Zaid (2009) Iraq: face of corruption, mask of politics, OpenDemocracy.Org http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/iraq-acts-on-corruption.

6. CBS News (2008) Iraq: A State of Corruption, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-state-of-corruption-11-04-2008/.

7. Al-Ali, Zaid (2009) Iraq: face of corruption, mask of politics. 8. Ibid. 9. Gwertzman, Bernard (2011) As the US plans to withdraw its troops, problems

loom in Iraq, Business Insiders, http://www.businessinsider.com/problems-loom-over-iraq-as-the-us-plans-its-troop-withdrawl-this-year-2011-7.

10. Baker, James A. and Hamilton, Lee H. (2009) The Iraq Study Group Report, United States Institute for Peace, Washington D.C.

11. Ibid.12. Baker, Pauline H. (2010) Iraq on the edge, Fund for Peace, Report No. 10,

2009–2010.13. Islamopedia Online (2010) Kurds in Iraq, http://www.islamopediaonline.

org/country-profile/iraq/major-religious-communities/kurds-iraq.14. Katzman, Kenneth (2008) The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq, CRS Report for

Congress, February 5, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101816.pdf.

15. New York Times (2004) Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq, January 9, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/09/opinion/kurdish-autonomy-in-iraq.html.

16. Katzman, The Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq17. UNDP (2009) Outcome Evaluation of UNDP Governance, Crisis Prevention

and Recovery and Poverty Reduction Initiatives in Iraq, http://erc.undp.org/ evaluationadmin/manageevaluation/viewevaluationdetail.html?evalid=3796.

18 Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (2009) National Strategy for Poverty Reduction in Iraq for 2010–2014, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/


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IRFFI/Resources/IraqPovertyReductionStrategyPressReleaseEnglishandArabi.pdf.

19. Anderson, Edward (2008) Practices and Implications of Aid Allocation, UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), May.

20. USAID (2012) Government of Iraq, January 13, http://iraq.usaid.gov/21. Constitution of Iraq, Article 117.3.22. Williams, Paul R. and Simpson, Matthew T. (2008) Rethinking the political

future: an alternative to the ethno-sectarian division of Iraq, PILPG, https://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/ilr/24/documents/Williams-Simpson.pdf?rd=1.

23. Ibid.24. Cordesman, Anthony and Al-Rodhan, Khalid (2007) Gulf Military Forces in an

Era of Asymmetric Wars, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.25. Ibid.26. Jervis, Robert (1978) Cooperation under the security dilemma, World Politics,

Vol. 167, pp. 169–170.27. Kaufmann, Chaim D. (1998) when all else fails: ethnic population transfers

and partitions in the twentieth century, International Security, Vol. 125, No. 12, p. 120.

28. Philips, David L. (2005) Losing Iraq: Inside the Post-War Reconstruction Fiasco, Westview Press, New York, p. 237.

29. Williams and Simpson (2008) Rethinking the political future.30. Rupesinghe, Kumar and Correa, Marical R. (1994) The Culture of Violence,

United Nations University, Japan.31. Ross, Marc Howard (1993) The Culture of Conflict, London: Yale University

Press, p. 21.32. Lederach, J. P. (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided

Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 13.33. Baker, Pauline H. (2004) Iraq as a failed state: a six month progress report –

October 2003 through March 2004, Fund for Peace, Report 2.34. Baker, Pauline H. (2010) Iraq on the edge, Fund for Peace, Report No. 10,

2009–2010.35. Hafez, Mohammed M. (2007) Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology

of Martyrdom, United States Institute for Peace.36. Dawisha, Adeed (2009) Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation,

Princeton University Press, New Jersey.37. Muir, Jim (2011) Last US troops withdraw from Iraq, BBC News, December

18, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16234723.38. Iraq Body Count (2012) Deaths in Iraq – Iraq Body Count Statistics, Iraq

Body Count, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 39. Fulton, Will, Farrar-Wellman, Ariel and Frasco, Robert (2011) Iraq–Iran foreign

relations, Iran Tracker, August 5, http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/iraq-iran-foreign-relations.

40. Iraq Body Count (2012) Deaths in Iraq – Iraq Body Count Statistics, Iraq Body Count, https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/.

41. Katzman, Kenneth (2010) Iran-Iraq Relations, Congressional Research Service, April 15, Report Number 7-5700.

42. Ibid.43. Ibid.44. McMillan, Joseph (2006) Saudi Arabia and Iraq: oil, religion, and an

enduring rivalry, United States Institute for Peace Special Report No. 157.


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45. Bloom, Mia (2007) Grim Saudi export – suicide bombers, LA Times, July 17, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jul/17/opinion/op-suicidebomb17.

46. McMillan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq: oil, religion, and an enduring rivalry.47. Lynch, Mark (2009) The Syrian–Iraqi spat, Foreign Policy, September 2, http://

lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/01/the_syrian_iraqi_spat.48. USIP (2007) Syria’s Relations with Iraq, United States Institute for Peace,

Washington D.C .49. Ibid.50. BBC (2011) Syria: the view from next door, BBC News, November 29, http://

www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15936813.51. Dagher, Sam (2011) Syria chaos worries Iraq, The Wall Street Journal,

November 26, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203764804577059910227806388.html.

52. Al-Jazeera (2014) UN warns of Syria spillover into Iraq, Al-Jazeera, March 28, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/un-warns-syria- spillover-into-iraq-201432821452664854.html.

53. Ibid. 54. OSAC (2012) Iraq 2012 OSAC Crime and Safety Report, US Department

of State – Bureau of Diplomatic Security, https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12114.

9 Conclusion

1. Hamre, John J. and Sullivan, Gordon R. (2002) Toward post-conflict resolu-tion, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 85–96.

2. Hewitt, Joseph J., Wilkenfield, Jonathan, and Gurr, Ted R. (2008) Peace and Conflict 2008, Centre for International Development and Conflict Management.

3. Piazza, James A. (2008) Incubators of terror: do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, pp. 469–488.

4. Takeyh, Ray and Gvosdev, Nikolas (2002) Do terrorist networks need a home?, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 97–108.

5. Piazza ‘Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Terror?’ 6. Fund for Peace (2008) Failed State Index 2011, http://www.fundforpeace.org/

global/library/cr-11-14-fs-failedstatesindex2011-1106p.pdf. 7. Johnson, Thomas H. and Mason, Chris M. (2007) Understanding the Taliban

and insurgency in Afghanistan, ORBIS, Winter. 8. Ibid. 9. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010a) South and Central Asia,

Strategic Survey, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 295–330.10. Dorronsoro, Giles (2010) Afghanistan at the Breaking Point, Carnegie

Endowment for Peace, Washington D.C.11. International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010a) Perspectives, Strategic

Survey, Vol. 110, No. 1, pp. 17–36.12. Pearson Education (2010) Chapter 3: Terrorism in the Global Context,

pearsonhighered.com, http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205005802.pdf.


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212

Abbas, Hassan (2005) Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C.

Abdullah, Thabit A. J. (2006) Dictatorship, Imperialism & Chaos: Iraq Since 1989, Fernwood Publishing, Nova Scotia.

AFP (2009) ‘Afghan insurgency Inspiring New Fighters: Analysts’, January 12, 2009, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Afghan+insurgency+inspiring+new+fighters%3A+ analysts-a01611765724.

Agnew, John, Gillespie, Thomas W. and Gonzalez, Jorge (2008) ‘Commentary’, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 40, pp. 2285–2295.

Ahmad, Eqbal (1999) ‘The Roots of Violence in Pakistani Society’, Akhbar, Vol. 5. No. 4, September, http://www.indowindow.com/akhbar/article.php?article=80&category=5&issue=8.

Akram, Muhammad and Khan, Faheem Jehangir (2007) ‘Healthcare Services and Government Spending in Pakistan’, Pakistan Institute of Development Economic Working Papers, http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-32.pdf.

Alagappa, Muthiah (2001) Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press, California, p. 389.

Al-Ali, Zaid (2009) ‘Iraq: Face of Corruption, Mask of Politics’, Open Democracy July 2, 2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/iraq-acts-on-corruption.

Al-Jabouri, Najim Abed and Sterling, Jensen (2010) ‘The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening’, PRISM, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp.3–18.

Al-Jazeera (2014) UN warns of Syria spillover into Iraq, Al-Jazeera, March 28, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/03/un-warns-syria-spillover-into-iraq-201432821452664854.html.

Ali, Tariq (2008) The Dual: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power, London: Pocket Books.

Alnasrawi, Abbas (2001) ‘Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences,1990–2000’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 205–218.

Anderson, Edward (2008) ‘Practices and Implications of Aid Allocation’, UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), May 2008.

Anti-Corruption Research Centre (2012) Corruption in Pakistan Anti Corruption Research Centre, Denmark, http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query43.cfm.

Arnove, Anthony (2000) Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, South End Press, Cambridge, MA.

Asian Development Bank (2007) ‘Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for Strategy and Action’, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf.

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Abbottabad, 101, 108, 129 abrogated, 86accord, 16, 177activism, 110Afghan, 38–48, 50–60, 62–78, 80–82,

88, 94–95, 102, 104–108, 110–111, 115, 125, 129, 184–185

Afghani, 47, 63–64, 78Afghanistan, 10, 13, 17, 21, 30,

32–35, 37–82, 87–89, 91, 101–102, 104–107, 109–113, 117, 119–120, 122, 124–126, 147, 152, 162, 174, 178–185

Afghans, 39, 41, 44, 46–48, 57, 60, 64–65, 69, 71–74, 77

Africa, 8, 19, 55, 187Agreement, 128, 134, 169agreement, 125, 127agreements, 66aid, 8, 23, 38, 41, 51, 59, 74–75, 87,

100, 122–123, 137, 143, 154–155, 157, 160–161

Algiers, 134Allawi, 139–142Alliance, 45–46, 88, 140, 182alliance, 41–43, 52, 86, 89, 91–92,

94, 143alliances, 78, 86, 89, 158allies, 13, 39, 45, 67, 83, 156Alnasrawi, 136Amanullah, 39American, 8, 59, 68, 77–78, 125, 129,

144, 185Americans, 147Amin, 39–40anarchy, 50, 57Anbar, 139, 142, 146–148, 159,

161–162, 166, 171Anfal, 133, 158ANO, 31Ansar, 31, 111appeasement, 59, 184

AQ, 3, 29, 34, 44, 48, 66, 81, 102, 116–117

AQAP, 31, 63Aqaydat, 145AQI, 31, 141, 147–148AQIM, 31Aqsa, 31Arab, 45, 62, 130–132, 135, 140–141,

148, 158, 163, 167, 172Arabia, 44–45, 77, 134, 147–148,

167, 170Arabian, 31, 63Arabs, 108, 131, 134, 139–141,

159, 166Arbil, 158Arif, 131–132Arifs, 132Armenians, 146arsenals, 150Asbat, 31ASG, 31, 63Asia, 9, 38–39, 55, 78, 105Asian, 10, 117, 186Asians, 108Asif, 99, 107Askariya, 141assassinate, 87assassinated, 39, 85Assassination, 33assassination, 3, 62, 133assassinations, 90, 145assault, 43Assyrians, 146attack, 3, 5, 7, 12, 45, 62, 135attacked, 43, 107, 135, 141attackers, 107attacks, 5, 7, 17–18, 32, 45, 53–55,

62, 64, 77–80, 82, 91, 98, 102, 105–107, 109, 111, 113, 122–127, 129, 134, 138, 141–142, 144, 147, 166–167, 170, 174, 177, 182–183, 187

Index


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230 Index

augmented, 17, 25, 179, 181–182Australia, 3, 76Australian, 24authoritarian, 153autocracies, 112–113autocracy, 97, 112autocratic, 39autonomous, 16, 106, 158–159, 185autonomously, 81autonomy, 22, 81, 90, 93, 119,

157–159, 180, 185Awakening, 141–142, 147Awami, 86Ayad, 139, 142Ayub, 86Azadi, 63, 111Azam, 85Aziz, 92Azrah, 53

Babil, 185Babrak, 39–40background, 47, 83, 94, 97, 130, 145Badakhshan, 50, 75Badakhstan, 73Badghis, 43Badghris, 53Badr, 63, 111Baghdad, 130–132, 139, 142,

144–145, 149, 154–155, 158, 161, 164, 169–170, 185–186

Baghlan, 50Bajaur, 108, 114Balkh, 43, 73, 76Baluch, 119, 184Baluchis, 115Baluchistan, 54, 68, 87, 89–90, 93,

96, 101, 104, 108–109, 115, 119, 121–123, 125, 184

Bangladesh, 31, 63, 87, 117, 127Bannu, 102Barack, 99barracks, 5Barzani, 133Basque, 6, 31Basra, 130, 134, 139, 148, 161, 167,

169Basrah, 185Belfer, 24

Benazir, 84, 88, 92, 128Bhutto, 84, 86–90, 92, 118, 128bilateral, 126, 169–170Bissau, 33Boko, 187bomb, 7, 45bombardment, 134–135bombardments, 135bomber, 64, 92bombers, 62, 148, 170Bombing, 33bombing, 7, 62, 64bombings, 5–6, 8, 45, 64, 98, 104,

107, 138, 145, 170bombs, 1, 150borders, 7, 18–20, 22, 54, 58, 96–98,

101–102, 104, 125, 128–129, 131, 146–148, 154–155, 166, 170, 179–181, 183

Bosnia, 74Botswana, 26Bremer, 138, 148Brigade, 31, 63Brigades, 6Britain, 38, 130British, 39, 78, 106, 126, 131Brookings, 24buffer, 66Bukamil, 170bureaucracy, 115, 133Burhanuddin, 42Burma, 33Burundi, 33Bush, 45, 138–139, 150

cadres, 160caliphate, 115, 172campaign, 8, 11–12, 46, 55, 62, 71,

77, 88, 109, 133, 135–139, 141, 152, 166, 184–185

campaigns, 61–62, 140, 152, 158, 165captured, 16, 43–44, 135, 147CAR, 33cartels, 104Carter, 8CAST, 23catalyst, 16, 101, 104, 122ceasefire, 127, 134–135cells, 16


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Index 231

cellular, 15–16CFR, 2Chad, 33, 93Chaudhry, 92checkpoints, 155chieftainships, 38Christian, 10, 131Christians, 123, 131, 166CIA, 15, 24, 47, 105–106civil, 18–19, 22, 34, 41, 43–45, 47, 55,

57, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 74, 85–86, 89, 101, 103–104, 107, 116, 127, 137, 141, 145, 147, 154–155, 161, 165–166, 173, 178

civilian, 2–3, 5, 57–58, 61, 78, 89–90, 92–93, 98–99, 101, 111–114, 118, 120–121, 123–124, 126, 135, 147, 150, 153, 168–169, 185

civilians, 4–5, 7, 58, 126–127, 138, 149–150, 167

clan, 16, 133clandestine, 2clans, 131, 145cleansing, 133, 158cleavages, 37, 69–70, 123, 153, 163,

166, 179–180clientelistic, 52Coalition, 138, 140–141, 144coalition, 46, 53, 79–82, 89, 92, 108,

131, 140, 143, 148, 154, 162, 166, 169, 185

coerce, 2–3coercion, 3, 65, 77coercive, 12Cole, 5, 45collapse, 17, 20–21, 24, 32, 40, 42, 49,

75, 78, 91, 97, 115, 130, 137–138, 143, 146, 150, 159, 166, 177, 183, 185

COLLAPSED, 25collapsed, 21, 24, 100, 114, 137–138,

179colonial, 130colonisation, 22Columbia, 31combat, 4, 13, 48, 80combatant, 2, 5, 13, 61combatants, 4–5, 7Commando, 111

Commission, 140, 156Communist, 31communist, 39, 41, 88–89communists, 42, 46Conflict, 23–24, 180conflict, 12, 14–16, 19, 24, 26, 37,

39, 57–59, 66, 72–73, 77, 79, 84, 88, 92, 104, 123, 127–129, 138, 148, 151, 156, 161, 163–164, 167, 171–172, 179–180

Conflicts, 68conflicts, 12, 19, 22, 40, 55, 90,

123, 167Congo, 21, 32, 93, 178Congress, 41connections, 27, 29–30, 34, 84, 98,

110, 146, 172, 174–178, 186constitution, 84–87, 90, 113, 128,

131, 140, 152, 158, 161constitutional, 89–90, 92, 115,

139–141, 161, 171contractors, 156, 162controversial, 59, 67, 137Convention, 2conventional, 11, 13, 62convergence, 49, 98Cooperation, 19, 26, 160cooperation, 69, 80, 110, 171Copenhagen, 34Corps, 13–14correlation, 29–30, 35, 55, 57, 75,

177, 186–187corrupt, 9, 28, 47–48, 52, 59, 71, 89,

114–115, 118, 156–157, 176Corruption, 23, 48, 118, 155–156, 180corruption, 19, 47–48, 50, 52, 55, 58,

66, 70–72, 75–76, 87–89, 109, 114, 118, 129–130, 132, 145, 153, 156–157, 160, 165, 173, 179–180

counterforce, 44Counterinsurgency, 13–14counterinsurgency, 80, 108, 126,

129, 184counterterrorism, 108–109, 129, 184counterterrorist, 53coup, 11, 39, 77, 131–132coups, 114, 118, 131CPA, 138–139CPI, 48


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232 Index

CPP, 31Crisis, 27, 63, 111, 182crisis, 19, 24, 27, 37, 40, 48–49, 67,

75, 79, 97–98, 120, 136, 144, 146, 151, 170–171, 179, 182

Cuba, 8culture, 15, 46, 53, 58, 65, 70, 77–78,

83, 87, 103, 107, 119, 124–125, 150, 153, 164–165, 179–180

cyber, 6

Dahuk, 144, 158Daikundi, 73Damascus, 170–171danger, 29, 93, 99, 120Daoud, 39, 65, 77Dawisha, 179DDR, 58debt, 72, 75, 90, 95, 135, 143decentralisation, 93, 163decentralised, 16decline, 38, 51, 89, 100, 113, 145,

179–181, 185declining, 113, 153, 169, 179–180delegitimisation, 95democracies, 30, 34, 65, 177–178democracy, 24, 51, 65, 69–70, 84, 93,

97, 112–114, 153, 161democratisation, 73, 124Demographic, 180demographic, 28, 94, 103, 123,

153, 180demonstrations, 138Denmark, 26dents, 83denying, 30, 105Deobandi, 110destabilis, 149destabilisation, 137destabilise, 2, 107, 137, 144, 147destabilising, 30, 82, 112, 164, 171devolution, 93DHKP, 31, 63dictator, 132, 152, 173dictatorial, 87dictatorship, 22, 83, 152–153Directorate, 105Disarmament, 58disease, 34, 136, 178

disenchantment, 70, 150disenfranchisement, 20, 116disintegration, 57–58, 82, 137, 164displacement, 30, 126, 149, 171Diyala, 139, 142, 144, 149, 158,

161, 185Dohuk, 158, 185Dost, 39Dostam, 42–43DRA, 39DRC, 33drone, 125–126, 129drones, 125–126drug, 46–48, 50–51, 53, 71, 75, 87,

104, 108drugs, 116Dujail, 133Dulaym, 145Durand, 54, 107, 120Duri, 133Durrani, 38–39

economic, 6–9, 11, 16, 18–21, 24, 27–29, 32, 39–40, 47, 50–52, 55, 58–59, 64, 66, 69–70, 72–73, 75–76, 89, 91, 93–97, 100, 103–104, 120–124, 127, 130–131, 135, 137, 143–145, 149–150, 155–156, 159–163, 165–167, 169, 177, 180–184, 186

economically, 89, 95, 121, 149, 165economy, 22, 37–38, 50–52, 66, 71,

74–75, 77, 84–85, 90–91, 93–94, 96–97, 103, 113, 117, 121–122, 124, 134, 136, 159, 162, 171

education, 20, 51, 56–58, 71, 94, 96–97, 100–101, 103, 112, 118, 120–121, 123, 134, 143–144, 161

Eelam, 31Egyptian, 9, 34, 63election, 8, 67, 86–88, 92–93, 140–143,

154elections, 42, 46, 87–90, 92–93,

139–140, 142–143, 146electricity, 52, 73, 76, 144, 161, 167,

169ELN, 31embargo, 135–136emir, 39


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Index 233

empirical, 29, 174, 176–177employment, 11, 49, 149, 159–160Endemically, 182endemically, 26, 97–98Enduring, 46, 62, 122enduring, 25, 179, 181environment, 2, 43, 49, 55, 57–58,

66, 77, 98–99, 148, 182environmental, 21, 78, 125, 165, 180Erbil, 161, 185ETA, 6–7, 31, 186état, 11, 131Ethiopia, 33ethnic, 2–3, 6, 16, 19–21, 24, 34,

37–38, 42–43, 47, 50, 53, 62, 68–70, 72, 81, 84, 88, 90, 94, 96, 114–116, 119, 123, 130, 141, 144–146, 152, 154, 158, 163–164, 170, 178, 185

ethno, 1, 6, 55, 65, 69, 104, 145, 163–164, 166

ETIM, 63Euphrates, 138Europe, 45, 63, 76European, 2, 7execution, 86, 133exile, 86, 88, 151extermination, 133External, 78, 125, 165, 180external, 9, 18–19, 21, 34, 38, 45,

72, 79, 95, 110, 143, 146, 162, 178–180, 185

extremism, 10, 48, 91, 93, 105, 117, 124, 129, 172, 175

Extremist, 99extremist, 27, 38, 41, 50, 53, 56–58,

60–61, 65, 77, 79–80, 82, 87, 94, 99, 101–106, 109, 113, 115, 117, 120, 123, 125, 127–129, 148–149, 151, 161–162, 182–184

extremists, 50, 52, 54, 99, 101, 106, 123–124, 165, 172

faction, 41, 169factional, 98, 145factionalised, 95, 145factionalism, 40, 53factions, 41, 43–44, 59, 61–62, 67,

113–114, 143, 145, 169, 185

Failed, 20, 23, 25, 28, 30, 32–35, 37, 93, 95, 143, 175–179, 182, 186–187

failed, 17–25, 27–30, 32, 34–36, 47, 49, 83, 89–90, 93, 95–99, 104, 113, 131, 135, 143, 146, 152, 165, 174–179, 182–183, 187–188

Failing, 20failing, 19–20, 22, 24, 35, 38, 49, 93,

103, 120, 148, 152, 177–179, 182–183

Failure, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23–25, 27–29, 31, 35, 37, 61, 83, 93, 109, 130, 143, 153

failure, 1, 17–27, 29–30, 32, 34–36, 38, 43, 47, 49–50, 53, 59, 64, 67, 81–83, 92–99, 103–105, 109, 112, 114, 121, 123, 134–135, 143, 145–146, 152–153, 156, 160, 163, 166, 169–170, 172, 174–183, 185–188

Faisalabad, 110Fallujah, 138, 164faltering, 26, 179Farah, 43, 50, 76, 183Faraj, 110FARC, 31Farooq, 89Faryab, 43, 50FATA, 91, 93, 96, 98, 100–102,

108–110, 113, 115–116, 120–122, 125, 183

fatalities, 149, 167–169fear, 2–5, 8, 61, 128, 133, 158–159,

170, 182federalisation, 164federalist, 154feudal, 119feudalism, 96flashpoint, 138Foreign, 23, 30–31, 74, 106, 125, 165,

180, 186foreign, 8, 13, 22, 30, 32, 38–39, 47,

51–53, 57, 64, 66, 69, 74–75, 78–79, 81–82, 84, 90, 95, 108, 110, 125, 128, 134–135, 138, 147–148, 156, 162, 166, 170, 172, 179–180, 185, 188

fractured, 19, 83, 137, 145, 167FRAGILE, 26


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234 Index

Fragile, 19, 23–24, 26, 182fragile, 21, 40, 47, 51–52, 67, 72–73,

75, 82, 93, 99, 112, 134, 137, 143–144, 146, 149, 153–154, 156, 159, 162, 165, 171–173, 179, 182–183, 185

Fragility, 24fragility, 71, 121, 172fragment, 84fragmentation, 40–41, 66–67, 72, 82fragmented, 38, 44, 70, 114, 139, 153framework, 24, 37, 66, 72, 100, 110,

161France, 93, 135fraud, 140, 142–143freedom, 18, 45, 54, 61, 67, 90, 112,

120, 164frontier, 104, 145frontiers, 102FSI, 33, 105FTO, 30FTOs, 30, 34–35, 177–178functioning, 21, 35, 51–52, 82, 93,

96–97, 114, 116, 118, 146, 152, 158, 176, 182–185

Fund, 23–24, 30, 47, 136, 175fundamental, 9, 19, 56, 90, 116, 183Fundamentalism, 29fundamentalism, 10, 79, 83, 109, 120,

152fundamentalist, 1, 6, 9, 53, 62, 82, 99,

107, 114, 184fundamentalists, 9, 69funded, 24, 121, 142funding, 8–9, 51, 66, 71, 74–75, 147,

162, 172Fuqra, 111

GDP, 18, 23, 72, 74–75, 95, 100, 121–122, 143, 159

Genocide, 133genocides, 24geographical, 19–21, 187geopolitics, 37geostrategic, 117Germany, 93Ghadir, 42–43Ghazi, 139Ghazni, 50, 53, 81

Ghor, 43, 50Ghulam, 85, 88Gilani, 92Global, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18,

20, 22, 24, 26, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48–50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62–64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 170, 172, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188

global, 11, 13, 17, 21, 23, 29, 34, 37, 73, 75, 83, 93, 101–102, 110, 115, 121–122, 157, 166, 172, 174, 176, 178

globalisation, 13Gorbachev, 41governance, 11, 19–20, 24, 37, 50–52,

58, 64–66, 70, 72, 76, 80, 96–97, 104, 117, 161

governed, 65, 114–115governing, 14, 43, 70, 85Government, 14, 22, 24, 49, 57–58,

98, 100, 104, 139, 151, 158, 181government, 2–3, 6–8, 11–16, 19–23,

27, 40–43, 46, 48–57, 59–62, 65–68, 70–72, 74–78, 80, 82–83, 85–91, 94, 96–103, 105–108, 110–115, 118–130, 132–133, 136–147, 149–151, 153–157, 159–164, 166–167, 170–173, 179–180, 182–185

governmental, 8, 21, 27–28, 42, 66, 96, 108, 113, 115

governments, 13, 21, 23, 38, 54, 56, 65, 80, 88, 101, 104–105, 113–114, 118, 121, 123, 128–129, 145, 181

governor, 43, 85governorates, 144, 161grassroots, 11, 13, 142grievance, 13, 15, 29–30, 95grievances, 48, 52, 68, 116, 125, 144,

170, 180


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Index 235

growth, 10, 18, 26, 47, 51, 59, 66, 70, 75–76, 85, 95, 105, 117, 121–122, 124–125, 143–144, 160

guerrilla, 11–13, 41, 59, 61–62guerrillas, 21Guinea, 33Gulbuddin, 42, 44, 62–63Gulf, 134, 136, 171gun, 46, 58, 71, 87, 103–104,

150–151guns, 1, 62, 150Gurjat, 184Gvosdev, 176

Habibullah, 39Hafizullah, 40Hagel, 121Haghani, 42Haiti, 33Haji, 42–43Halabja, 133Hamahangi, 43HAMAS, 9Hamas, 9, 31Haqqani, 59, 81, 108Harakat, 31, 63, 111Haram, 187harassment, 67hatred, 79, 112haven, 9, 53, 101–102, 116, 129,

146–147havens, 8–9, 34, 53–55, 101, 104,

129, 146–147, 177, 179–181, 184, 187–188

Hazara, 50, 68HDI, 23, 37health, 51, 58, 73, 94, 96, 100, 116,

118, 144, 161healthcare, 18, 20, 56, 97, 100–101,

112, 120–121, 123, 134, 144, 146Hekmatyar, 42–44, 62Helmand, 50, 53–54, 73, 76, 78,

108, 183Herat, 41–43, 46, 53Hezbollah, 9, 31, 169hierarchical, 16, 130hijacked, 107hijackings, 5Hikmatul, 63

Hindu, 10, 92, 126Hindus, 123historical, 20–21, 38, 47, 49, 83,

97–98, 127, 130, 164, 175, 188historically, 64, 68, 91, 117Homeland, 6homogeneity, 35homogeneous, 37, 163–164hopelessness, 150hostage, 8, 130hostile, 43, 105, 125, 129, 157hostilities, 20, 86hotbed, 83hotspots, 129HUJI, 31, 63HUM, 31humanitarian, 18–19, 23, 37, 96, 135,

161, 174hunting, 46Hussein, 9, 130, 132–134, 137–139,

144, 148, 152, 162, 164, 167, 172, 185

Hyderabad, 88

identity, 21, 70, 84, 114, 117, 119, 158, 164, 166

Ideological, 180ideological, 2–4, 37, 62, 69–70, 79,

98, 101, 116, 138, 164, 166, 179–180

ideologically, 103, 115ideologies, 4, 69–70ideology, 7, 12–13, 38, 69, 109, 112,

116, 119IDPs, 144–145, 159IECI, 140IED, 147IEDs, 104, 141Iftikhar, 92IJU, 31, 63illegal, 12, 104, 148–149illegally, 104, 127illegitimate, 42, 104illicit, 37, 48, 66, 70illiteracy, 144imbalance, 77, 81imbalanced, 77imbalances, 77, 153, 180IMF, 75


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236 Index

impact, 16–17, 20, 38, 48, 65, 67, 74, 95, 113, 116–118, 124, 126, 129, 134, 136–137, 149–150, 157, 159–160, 164, 167, 170–173, 179, 181, 186

impacts, 20, 64, 137, 153, 167implementation, 100, 137, 151, 187implications, 32, 179IMU, 31, 63incentives, 76–77, 105, 160, 181incidents, 32–33, 147, 159independence, 15, 84–85, 100, 117,

131, 158–159independent, 6, 23–24, 27, 66, 71,

127, 157Index, 19, 23–25, 30, 32, 34–35, 37,

48, 93, 95, 143, 175, 177–179, 186–187

index, 1, 23–24, 34, 178India, 3, 39, 84, 86, 88, 90–91, 105,

107, 115, 117, 125–129Indian, 38, 84, 92, 106–107,

126–129indicator, 47, 94, 179indicators, 18, 23–24, 47–48, 95,

112, 153indigenous, 47, 64, 74indirect, 105–106indoctrinated, 124Indonesia, 34, 178Indus, 123ineffective, 47, 50, 58, 115inefficient, 71, 118, 121inequalities, 22, 52, 72infidels, 78infiltrate, 99, 104, 113–114, 122, 144,

148, 186infiltrated, 99–100infiltration, 81, 95, 98, 100, 119,

148, 174inflation, 95, 122–123, 160, 171infrastructural, 136, 163infrastructure, 16, 37, 83, 115, 121,

124, 134, 136, 138, 145, 147, 152, 171

insecure, 73, 117insecurities, 117insecurity, 2, 24, 52, 58, 72–74, 145,

156, 162

instability, 27, 36–37, 40–41, 43, 45, 47, 49–50, 52, 58–59, 66, 69, 73, 82, 90–91, 94–95, 97, 99, 105, 107, 112–113, 115, 117, 126–128, 131, 139, 144, 151, 157, 160–163, 165, 167, 170, 172, 183, 186

Institute, 24, 102institution, 42–43, 99, 156institutional, 1–2, 21, 65–67, 114–115,

132, 153–155, 179–180institutions, 18, 20–22, 26, 30, 38, 48,

50–52, 56, 66–67, 70, 72, 81–82, 91, 94, 96, 99, 109, 112–114, 118–119, 121, 137–138, 143, 151, 154–156, 164, 182–184, 186

insurgencies, 11–13, 15–16, 28, 32, 34–36, 38, 123

Insurgency, 1–32, 34–38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60–62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82–84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108–110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152–154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 170, 172, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188

insurgency, 10–17, 27–30, 34–36, 40, 46–47, 50, 54–55, 58–62, 64, 66–68, 71, 73–77, 79–81, 84, 98, 102, 109, 112, 120, 127, 137–141, 146, 148–152, 156, 160, 163–166, 172, 183–185

Insurgent, 11–12, 57, 74, 163insurgent, 11–16, 32, 34–36, 53, 102,

105, 107, 110–111, 124, 139, 144–147, 149, 154–155, 157, 161–162, 167, 170–172

Insurgents, 12, 14, 81, 170insurgents, 12–13, 15–16, 34, 36, 50,

52, 54–55, 62, 71, 75, 78, 81, 106, 140–142, 148–150, 157, 170–171

integration, 82, 115interference, 22, 28–29, 53, 59, 79interim, 42, 89, 147internal, 18–21, 24, 29–30, 37, 40–41,

51, 53, 69, 79, 82, 84, 96–98, 107, 113, 127, 130, 140–141, 144,


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Index 237

148, 152, 155, 162–163, 166, 170–171

internally, 21, 28, 84, 89, 93, 95, 110, 112, 137, 161, 176, 188

International, 23, 48, 55, 63, 75, 102, 111

international, 2, 7, 9, 11–12, 17–18, 21, 23, 28–29, 34, 36, 38, 41, 45–46, 50–54, 67, 69, 74–75, 78–80, 82, 98, 101, 107, 116, 136, 145, 148, 161, 174, 178, 186–188

intervention, 21, 51, 78, 80, 95, 99, 125, 134, 179–180, 185

intimidate, 2–3, 12intimidation, 2–4, 156invaded, 39, 107, 127, 130invasion, 10, 37, 40, 47, 54, 61–62,

64, 79–80, 87, 91, 104–106, 109, 125, 130, 134–137, 144, 148–149, 151–153, 156, 159, 162, 164–167, 172, 175, 182–183, 185–186

IRA, 6–7, 31Iran, 8–10, 41, 47, 105, 134–135,

147–150, 157, 167, 169–170Iranian, 9–10, 63, 87, 106, 131,

133–135, 167, 169Iranians, 134Iraq, 9, 17, 30–35, 62, 64, 109,

111–112, 125, 130–167, 169–173, 175, 178–182, 184–185

Iraqi, 130–151, 154–173, 185Iraqis, 134, 138, 140–141,

144–145, 156, 159–161, 163, 167

Irbil, 158Ireland, 76, 93, 186Irish, 6, 31, 186irregular, 12–13, 156Ishaq, 88–89ISI, 43, 105–107Islam, 10, 31, 55–56, 63, 65, 69,

84–85, 87, 95, 115–117, 119, 124, 157, 166, 184, 186–187

Islamabad, 46, 54, 79, 97, 106–109, 115, 121, 123, 129, 183

Islami, 31, 42, 63, 81, 88, 110–111

Islamic, 1–2, 6–7, 9–10, 29, 31, 37, 42, 62–63, 65, 69, 78, 84, 86–88, 90, 99, 102–103, 105, 107, 109–111, 114, 116, 134, 157, 166, 172, 175, 182, 184, 187

Islamisation, 87, 89, 93, 101, 123Islamising, 56Islamism, 85, 87Islamist, 38, 70, 91, 103, 141Islamists, 91Islamiyya, 9, 31, 63Ismaeli, 43Ismail, 42–43Israel, 9Israeli, 8Itihad, 88

Jaish, 31, 62–63, 110–111, 129, 169Jalalabad, 44, 53Jalaluddin, 108JAM, 169Jamhoori, 88Jamiat, 42, 111Jammu, 111, 126–127JeM, 63Jews, 123, 131Jhangvi, 31, 63, 110–111, 184Jihad, 9, 31, 63, 110–111jihad, 31, 61–62, 67, 107, 110, 115,

124–125, 166Jihadi, 166jihadi, 85, 105, 110, 128jihadist, 81–82jihadists, 64, 148, 170, 184Jordan, 147–148, 167judicial, 65, 71, 146judiciary, 113, 115, 118–119Junejo, 88–89

Kabul, 40–44, 46–47, 49, 51, 53–54, 64–66, 74, 79, 81, 88–89, 106, 184

Kahn, 86Kamal, 142Kandahar, 41–42, 44, 46, 50, 53–54,

73, 76, 78, 108, 183Karachi, 88, 90, 107, 123Karbala, 148, 162, 166, 185Kargil, 127Karim, 131


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238 Index

Karkat, 110Karmal, 39–41Karzai, 46, 48, 50, 55, 78Kashmir, 9, 86, 92, 101, 106–107,

110–111, 126–128, 184Kashmiri, 92, 106–107Kashmiris, 127Kenya, 33, 45Keyani, 43Khabab, 126Khalid, 110Khan, 39, 42–43, 85–89, 100Khyber, 86, 88–90, 96, 98, 100, 102,

104, 109, 113, 115–116, 120–122, 125

kidnapping, 3, 62kidnappings, 4, 6, 8, 145killed, 5, 7, 38, 40, 43–44, 88, 107,

126, 131, 133–134, 147, 167killing, 51, 92, 101, 103, 107, 126,

129killings, 134, 141, 149Kirkuk, 139, 141, 144, 158–159KRG, 158–159Kunar, 50, 53, 81, 107Kunduz, 43, 50Kurd, 145, 154, 163–164Kurdish, 6, 133–134, 139–141, 144,

151, 157–158, 169, 185Kurdistan, 31, 133, 140–141, 144, 158Kurds, 131, 133, 139, 141–142, 146,

157–159, 166, 185Kuwait, 134–136, 147, 167

Laden, 44–46, 91, 101, 108, 129Lahore, 128, 184Lashkar, 31, 63, 81, 107, 110–111,

128, 184lawless, 89, 183lawlessness, 47, 50, 165laws, 3, 21, 65, 71, 99, 156–157leader, 7, 38, 41–42, 45–46, 49, 59,

84–85, 87–89, 91–92, 108, 114, 131, 133, 137, 143

leaders, 9, 16, 20–21, 41, 43–45, 51, 59, 68, 78–80, 84–85, 97, 100, 117–118, 125, 130, 133, 137, 140, 150–151, 169

leadership, 16, 42–43, 59–60, 85, 87, 90, 93, 106, 128, 131–132, 137, 142, 145, 147–148, 151–152, 154, 162, 171–173

leaderships, 26, 153League, 84–86, 111, 131, 135Lebanon, 5, 21, 34–35, 178legal, 20, 65–66, 71, 75, 118, 143,

146, 150, 158legally, 104, 158Leghari, 89–90Legitimacy, 65, 151legitimacy, 12, 14–16, 19–20, 24,

41, 48, 50, 52, 64–65, 70, 76, 113, 117, 122, 129, 139–140, 151, 154–155, 157, 160, 183, 185

legitimate, 19, 65–66, 76, 79, 124legitimising, 117, 172LeT, 128–129Liaquat, 85liberal, 39, 70, 116liberalism, 77liberated, 46, 135Liberation, 31, 42, 63, 111, 184links, 35, 64, 72, 77, 106, 110, 171literacy, 94, 100, 144literature, 3–4, 7–8, 19, 23, 25, 29–30,

98, 175–177, 187Logar, 50, 53, 73, 81, 183London, 27looting, 138, 164loyalists, 165LTTE, 31

madrassas, 44, 56, 87, 100, 105, 110, 120, 124

Maghreb, 31majoritarian, 154Malaysia, 63Maliki, 141–143, 151–152, 154–155,

171, 173malnutri, 136malnutrition, 137marginalisation, 67, 115, 120–121,

123, 133, 180marginalised, 67, 121, 165martial, 86, 88, 90–91, 117


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Index 239

mass, 3, 40, 83, 87, 94–95, 97, 103, 112, 126, 133, 139, 141, 150–152, 159, 165

massacre, 133massacres, 134Massoud, 42–45, 182MEK, 9, 31militancy, 79, 87, 93, 109, 120, 126militant, 61, 77, 79, 91, 94, 102, 104,

106–107, 109–110, 115militants, 45, 78, 80, 91, 96, 99,

102–103, 106–107, 110, 113, 115, 125–126, 148, 172

militarisation, 58, 117military, 5–6, 8–9, 11–16, 19, 23,

40–44, 46, 48, 53, 55, 61, 66, 71, 78–81, 83–85, 88–93, 96–97, 100–101, 106, 109, 111–114, 117, 121, 123–124, 126–129, 131–135, 138–139, 145, 147, 150, 152–153, 162, 167, 169, 171, 173, 185

militia, 27, 42–44, 61, 68, 133, 148militias, 76, 102, 142, 150–151, 157,

169minorities, 67–68, 115, 141, 146, 164minority, 11, 29, 67–68, 123, 130,

139, 144, 146, 158, 162–163, 166Mirza, 85–86mission, 50, 54, 81, 185missions, 80, 108, 129, 184mistrust, 38, 79, 132, 143mobilisation, 16, 40, 43, 147mobilise, 16, 117modernisation, 22, 122, 162–163, 180modernity, 118Mohammad, 31, 39, 62–63, 85–86,

92, 110–111, 129Mohammadi, 63, 111money, 44, 68, 76, 102, 106, 122monopoly, 21–22, 132Moroccan, 31, 63mortality, 24, 47, 136–137Mosul, 131, 141motivated, 1–2, 9–10, 15, 92, 123,

138, 150motivations, 4, 9motives, 117, 138movements, 7, 11, 61, 87, 141, 150

MQM, 88Muhammad, 39, 84–85, 88, 111Mujadidi, 42Mujahideen, 31, 63, 108, 110–111mujahideen, 40–44, 46, 53, 55, 61–62,

87, 106Mullah, 42, 44–46multilateral, 135Musharraf, 84, 90–92, 105–106, 118,

121–122, 125, 128Muslim, 38, 55, 63, 65, 84–85, 88, 92,

111, 117, 126, 146, 163, 175, 185Muslims, 63, 84, 95, 116, 119,

130–131, 133, 146, 163, 166, 185Muthanna, 144, 148, 162

Nafaz, 63, 111Najibullah, 41, 44Nangarhar, 42–43, 75, 81, 108, 183narcotics, 38, 52, 76, 88nation, 20, 23, 25, 37, 43, 47–48,

56, 66, 69–70, 83–85, 90, 117, 119–121, 123, 129, 134, 138, 153, 161, 167

nationalism, 4, 69, 114, 157nationalistic, 79, 119, 157nationalists, 119, 165–166nationhood, 116, 167Nations, 2, 21, 47, 131nations, 20–21, 37, 46, 72, 125,

128, 187NATO, 54, 57, 59, 65Nawaz, 88–90, 92, 103, 128negotiate, 41, 59negotiations, 9, 128neighbouring, 34, 42, 75, 79, 95, 107,

124, 129, 142, 147, 167, 171–172, 178–180

neighbours, 38, 142, 148, 158, 164, 167

nexus, 51, 76, 133Nidal, 31Nifaz, 111Niger, 33Nigeria, 33, 55, 187Nimroz, 54, 76Ninawa, 148, 159Ninevah, 185


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240 Index

Norway, 8Nouri, 151, 173nuclear, 90–91, 99, 112, 126Nuristan, 40, 81, 107NWFP, 86, 183

Obama, 79, 99, 166occupied, 146occupiers, 13, 79, 165occupying, 14–15, 78, 131OECD, 2, 19, 25oil, 134–136, 157–162, 167, 170oilfields, 167Oman, 187Omar, 44–46, 63, 111Operation, 46, 62, 122, 134operations, 13, 15–16, 28, 32, 40–41,

81, 101, 126, 136operatives, 110, 147–148, 170opium, 38, 70, 75–76opponents, 6, 13, 40, 79, 87, 117opportunities, 28, 52, 124, 149, 161,

163, 176opportunity, 18, 40, 56, 74, 86, 88–89,

134, 137, 162opposition, 16, 40, 43, 62, 67, 81, 86,

91–92, 132–133, 141, 143organisation, 2, 10–12, 15, 19, 23,

27, 30, 32, 46, 103, 107, 154, 164

organisations, 3–4, 11–12, 21, 28, 30–32, 34, 41, 66, 80, 82–83, 100–101, 103, 105, 109–110, 112–114, 116, 119, 123, 129, 139, 148, 157, 160, 166, 174, 177–178, 182, 184, 187–188

organised, 7, 12, 14–16, 47, 50, 99, 137–138, 165

Oruzgan, 108, 183Osama, 44, 91, 101, 108, 129outbreak, 101, 130overthrow, 6, 11–12, 14, 77, 110, 131overview, 1, 17, 38, 48, 62, 64, 83,

110, 136, 176, 180, 186

pacification, 18Pakhtunkhwa, 86, 88–90, 96, 98, 100,

102, 104, 109, 113, 115–116, 120–122, 125

Pakistan, 17, 21, 27, 32–35, 41, 44–47, 50, 53–56, 59, 63, 79–81, 83–129, 147, 152, 162, 178–185

Pakistani, 9, 53–55, 63–64, 80, 83–84, 88–89, 91–92, 94, 96–99, 101–112, 117–122, 124–129, 147, 184–185

Pakistanis, 94, 120Paktia, 50, 78, 81, 108, 183Paktika, 50, 73, 78, 81, 108, 183Palestine, 31Palestinian, 9Palestinians, 146Panjshir, 50Parachinar, 53, 106paramilitary, 21, 148Parliament, 46, 85, 143parliamentary, 65, 85–87, 142,

153–154partition, 126, 163Pashtun, 42–43, 46, 50, 55, 68, 81, 91,

94, 106, 115, 119–120, 126Pashtuns, 43, 64, 68, 94, 119Pashtunwali, 46, 94patronage, 59, 118, 132PDPA, 39–40perception, 18, 125, 138, 174perceptions, 70, 164Pervez, 84, 90, 106, 122Peshawar, 41–42, 59, 123Petraeus, 57, 142, 169phenomena, 1, 4, 11, 29, 174–175,

177phenomenon, 10, 13, 17–18, 20–21,

27, 58, 61, 83, 117, 132, 155, 165, 183

Philippines, 31, 34, 178polarisation, 103police, 7, 66, 107, 118–119, 138, 145,

148–149policies, 15, 27, 48, 89, 106, 109, 121,

129, 157, 184, 187Policy, 23–24, 104, 155policy, 3, 8, 22, 25, 29, 36, 51, 56,

59, 68, 79–80, 84, 96, 105, 107, 128–129, 132, 139, 145–146, 151, 155, 162, 166, 170, 172, 176, 182, 187


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Index 241

Political, 14, 22, 24, 52, 64, 112, 116, 118, 133, 153, 180

political, 2–16, 18, 20–24, 26–29, 37–38, 40–44, 47–48, 50–53, 55–59, 61–62, 64–71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83–97, 99–101, 105, 109, 112–118, 120, 122–125, 127–128, 130–133, 137–143, 145, 149, 151–158, 163–167, 169–171, 176, 179–185, 188

politicides, 24politics, 18, 20, 52, 68–69, 82, 84–85,

94, 96, 98, 101, 103, 116–118, 130, 155, 158, 166, 186

poppies, 75–76Porous, 22, 54, 101, 147, 181porous, 54, 82, 96–98, 101–102, 129,

146–149, 172, 179–180Poverty, 22, 47, 72–73, 160, 180poverty, 23, 38, 55, 58, 72–75, 94,

109, 120, 143–144, 159–160, 162power, 3, 11–16, 19–20, 26, 28, 39–40,

42–47, 53–54, 61–62, 66, 68–69, 77, 84–86, 88–93, 95–96, 102, 113–115, 118, 125, 130–134, 136–137, 139–140, 143, 145, 151–152, 154, 156, 158, 165, 176, 182–183, 185

PPP, 86, 88–89, 92, 128President, 8, 39, 44–46, 77–79, 86–91,

93, 99, 106–107, 132–133, 139, 150–151, 166

president, 40, 86–89, 133presidential, 86, 93procedures, 99, 157processes, 65, 71, 73, 158, 186programme, 23–24, 58, 87, 89–90, 99,

136–137, 142, 148programmes, 80–81, 162–163, 184proliferation, 29, 57–59, 92, 94, 104,

112, 115, 120, 124–125, 138, 151, 153, 160, 163, 174

propaganda, 116, 132, 157protests, 126, 171province, 43–44, 53–54, 76, 78, 81,

119, 142, 146, 164, 171, 183–185provinces, 38, 42, 44, 46, 50, 54,

67–68, 73–75, 78, 80–81, 85–87, 100, 102, 104, 107–108, 113, 115,

119–122, 139–140, 148–149, 154, 158–160, 162, 182, 185

provincial, 48, 51, 66, 86, 88, 93, 155provincialism, 115proxy, 88, 106, 169psychological, 3–5, 38Punjab, 85, 87–89, 104, 109Punjabis, 94, 115, 123purges, 146

Qadir, 42Qadisiyah, 185Qadissiya, 144Qaeda, 9, 13, 30–31, 45–46, 53–54,

57, 63–65, 76–77, 79, 81, 91–92, 94–95, 98, 101–102, 104–106, 109–110, 112, 126, 139, 141, 144, 146–147, 160, 170, 172, 184

Quetta, 88, 106

Rabbani, 42–44, 56radical, 30, 40, 70, 82, 87, 92–93, 99,

103, 109, 124, 150, 166, 169radicalisation, 103, 124, 175radicalised, 103, 124radicalism, 184radicals, 150Rank, 33, 48rank, 22–25, 48, 62ranked, 22, 37, 47, 72, 105ranking, 22–24, 30, 95, 175, 177, 186Rashid, 111, 114Rawalpindi, 39, 85, 92, 97, 110, 115,

121, 123, 184rebellion, 40, 93, 134, 138rebellions, 61rebels, 134, 150, 171reconstruction, 59, 74, 77, 79, 143,

155–156, 160–161, 163, 165, 183recruit, 56–57, 66, 78, 104, 146, 150,

163recruitment, 56, 73, 79, 94, 124,

159–160recruits, 28, 55–57, 77–78, 81–82, 101,

103, 124, 129, 141, 144, 149–150, 162, 176, 179–181

reform, 154–155reforms, 11, 15, 39, 89, 133, 155refuge, 54, 91, 102, 118


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242 Index

refugee, 47, 144, 146refugees, 41, 47, 67, 88, 95, 115,

144–145, 149, 171Regime, 112, 180regime, 9, 15–16, 22, 39–41, 46, 48,

64–65, 67, 69, 71, 79, 88–89, 110, 112, 116, 128–134, 136–139, 144–145, 149–150, 152–154, 158, 164–165, 170, 172, 179–180, 185

regimes, 112, 114, 117, 132, 136region, 6, 14–16, 40, 46, 80, 92,

101–102, 107, 111, 113, 120–121, 129, 134, 144–145, 151, 158–159, 170, 173, 184–185

regional, 38, 42–43, 72, 79–80, 84, 98, 114, 116, 130, 158, 164, 182–183

regions, 8, 49–50, 54–55, 76, 78, 81, 87, 91, 98, 102, 109, 113, 116, 119–120, 125, 129, 131, 159, 161, 163, 181, 183–185

reign, 38–39, 88, 92, 137, 140relationship, 17, 27–28, 57, 69, 79,

85, 108–109, 114, 117, 125, 170, 177, 186

relationships, 9, 60, 85, 185Religion, 22religion, 4, 10, 13, 62, 65, 69, 85, 95,

110, 123, 157, 170Religious, 14, 68, 133religious, 2–3, 6, 9, 16, 19–21, 27,

37, 42, 55–56, 61, 65, 67–70, 79, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 107, 109–110, 115, 117–120, 123–124, 130, 141, 146, 152, 163–165, 170, 185

religiously, 1, 9, 92, 118, 123representative, 13, 50, 65, 85, 112, 140repression, 158repressive, 50, 67, 72, 119Republic, 21, 32, 39, 93, 178Republican, 6, 31, 86, 186resentment, 51, 74, 143, 149, 156,

160, 183resilient, 25–26, 96, 179resistance, 14, 40–41, 44–45, 52, 61,

78, 106, 127, 144, 166Resolution, 2, 24, 135–136

resources, 2, 12–13, 15, 30, 41, 53, 66, 68–69, 74, 96, 98, 127, 136, 144, 156, 160–162

resurgent, 50retaliate, 134retaliation, 78revenue, 28, 158, 160–161, 176revolts, 61, 119Revolution, 9, 39, 87, 134revolution, 10–11, 22, 87, 107Revolutionary, 15, 31, 40, 63revolutionary, 6, 13, 24, 41riots, 85, 87, 92, 126, 164RIRA, 31root, 73, 76, 82, 88, 102, 109, 115,

124, 149rural, 40, 51, 71–72, 74, 144, 183Russia, 38Russian, 39, 104

sabotage, 14Saddam, 9, 130, 132–135, 137–139,

144–145, 148–150, 152, 155, 158, 162, 164, 167, 172, 185

Salafists, 166Salahuddin, 185Salam, 131Samangan, 43, 50Samarra, 141sanctions, 19, 134, 136–137, 162sanctuaries, 116, 126, 176sanctuary, 13, 59, 79, 81, 108, 113,

185Saudi, 44–45, 76, 105, 134, 147–148,

167, 170Saudis, 170Sayyaf, 31, 62–63Sayyed, 42–43secession, 117secessionist, 98sectarian, 37, 49, 62, 65, 87, 90–92,

95, 102, 104, 109–110, 116, 124, 130, 137, 139, 141–143, 145, 150–151, 154, 163–164, 166–167, 170–171, 173, 184

sectarianism, 85, 107, 154Security, 2, 19, 135, 152, 169, 172security, 8, 18–20, 24, 28, 30, 34, 45,

50–53, 65–66, 70–78, 80–81, 84,


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Index 243

92, 95, 97, 111, 117, 120, 125, 127–128, 138, 140–142, 145–149, 154–155, 163–167, 171–172, 176, 178, 184

separation, 43, 69, 126Separatist, 15separatist, 1, 6, 107separatists, 106September, 37, 40, 44–45, 85–86, 91,

93, 106, 122–123, 131, 134, 142, 165

service, 71–72, 86, 94, 144, 155Shabaab, 31, 187Shah, 38–39, 42, 44Sharia, 13, 71, 89Shariat, 63, 89–90, 111Sharif, 42, 46, 88–92, 118, 128Shia, 43, 92, 95, 110, 119, 130–131,

133, 139–142, 144–146, 150, 154, 163, 171, 185

Shias, 110, 166Shinrikyo, 31Shura, 42–43, 59Sindh, 87–88, 90, 96, 104, 109, 119,

122Sindhi, 88, 94Sindhis, 115skirmishes, 37, 48, 134, 184smuggling, 46, 148Social, 22, 58, 76, 122, 156, 163, 180societal, 11, 19, 57, 68societies, 13, 18, 29, 55–58, 103society, 6–7, 12–13, 27, 40–42, 51–52,

60, 66, 69–70, 83, 85, 89, 91, 100, 103, 107, 110, 124, 131, 135, 143, 146, 151–152, 155, 161, 163–164

socioeconomic, 49soldiers, 40, 78, 127, 142Somalia, 21, 33, 93, 175, 187sovereign, 19–20, 131, 143, 166sovereignty, 18, 24, 68, 139, 149Soviet, 10, 17, 38, 40–41, 46–47,

50–51, 53, 61–62, 67, 87–88, 105–106, 109, 125

Soviets, 40–42, 61Spain, 186spectrum, 17, 19, 23–27, 35, 146, 175,

177, 179, 181–182spillover, 34, 64, 170, 172, 178

spillovers, 27sponsor, 8–9, 89sponsored, 1, 6, 8, 127sponsoring, 8sponsors, 8sponsorship, 8stabilisation, 161stabilise, 40, 42, 46, 67, 84, 96, 169stabilised, 145stabilising, 44, 55, 57, 142stability, 2, 26, 44, 51–52, 59, 66–67,

69, 72–74, 80, 82, 84, 93–95, 99, 102, 112–113, 118, 121–122, 124, 126, 129, 132, 135, 139–145, 149, 151, 153–155, 159–165, 167, 170–173, 179

stagnation, 75, 159, 162, 180State, 1–3, 5, 7–9, 11, 13, 15, 17–19,

21, 23–32, 34–35, 37, 42, 47, 61, 83, 93, 95, 109, 130, 143, 153, 175, 177–179, 182, 186–188

state, 1–2, 5–6, 8, 13, 17–30, 32, 34–38, 40, 42–43, 47–53, 56–59, 64–66, 69–71, 73, 75–76, 78, 81–85, 87, 89–93, 95–101, 103–105, 107, 112–114, 116–118, 120–124, 126–135, 137–138, 143–147, 152–153, 155–166, 169, 172–188

statehood, 21, 186STATES, 25–26States, 19, 23–25, 27, 30, 37states, 3, 11, 17–30, 32–36, 55–56,

58, 65, 72, 79–80, 84, 95, 99, 104–105, 117, 123, 127, 129, 135, 143, 147, 149, 167, 169, 172, 174–180, 186–188

Stockholm, 34strategic, 12, 38, 53–54, 62, 79, 106strategies, 4, 27, 79, 169strategy, 4, 11, 13, 23–24, 81,

105–106, 142, 147, 170strength, 18, 23, 25, 36, 47, 50, 65,

67, 93, 99, 146–147, 158–159, 172, 184

STRONG, 25–26strong, 6, 18, 21, 24–26, 30, 37,

46–47, 49–50, 53, 55, 65, 68, 71, 75, 82, 93, 98, 103, 116,


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123, 129, 141, 154, 161, 172, 176–177, 179, 186

structural, 49, 52, 57, 98, 115, 121, 164structure, 7, 11, 15–16, 42, 49, 56, 66,

76, 84–85, 94, 96–97, 103, 116, 145, 173

structures, 7, 15–16, 50, 66, 71, 113, 155, 166, 175, 181

struggle, 12–14, 31, 40, 43, 61, 69, 83, 95–96, 119–120, 131, 139, 141, 157, 163, 180

subcontinent, 116, 126Sudan, 8–9, 32–33, 44, 93, 178suicide, 10, 62, 64, 92, 94, 98, 104,

141, 145, 148, 170Sunni, 92, 95, 110, 119, 130–131,

133, 139–142, 144–146, 150, 154, 157–159, 163–165, 170–171, 184–185

Sunnis, 110, 130–131, 141, 147, 166, 171

Swat, 113, 115Sweden, 7Swedish, 7Syria, 8–9, 21, 147–149, 157, 167,

169–172Syrian, 130, 171

tactic, 5–6, 9, 14, 16, 62, 64, 142tactics, 4, 10–11, 13, 15, 53, 61, 87,

125, 132, 138Tajik, 63, 68Tajikistan, 45Tajiks, 68Taliban, 9, 13, 31, 43–48, 50, 53–65,

67–81, 89, 91–92, 94–95, 98, 101–102, 104–108, 110–112, 116–118, 125–126, 147, 182–185

Taraki, 39–40Tehrik, 31, 63, 92, 102, 111, 116territorial, 20, 55, 98, 116, 128territories, 18, 20, 40, 42, 81, 127territory, 7, 12–13, 15, 18–20, 22, 35,

43, 45, 49, 53–55, 81, 87, 98–101, 104, 108, 121, 127, 129, 134, 141, 147, 174–175

terror, 2, 4–8, 10–11, 17–18, 46, 106, 110, 112, 125, 127, 132–133, 165, 172, 175, 178, 184, 186

Terrorism, 1–32, 34–38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60–64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82–84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108–112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150, 152–154, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 166, 170, 172, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 186, 188

terrorism, 1–14, 16–18, 25, 27–30, 32–37, 45, 47, 49, 51, 56–62, 64, 66–67, 71, 73–74, 76–77, 79–85, 89, 92–94, 98, 101–102, 104–105, 107, 110–112, 115–117, 119–122, 124–126, 129, 138, 141, 144–157, 159–162, 164–165, 167, 169–170, 172–180, 183–188

Terrorist, 30, 63, 111, 166, 186terrorist, 2–3, 6–11, 13, 17, 28–32,

34–36, 45, 48–49, 53–58, 61–62, 64, 67–69, 73, 75–76, 78–80, 82–83, 90–91, 94, 98–103, 105–106, 109–116, 118–129, 137–141, 144–147, 149–155, 157, 159–164, 166–167, 170–172, 174, 176–179, 181–188

terrorists, 7, 9, 13, 32, 35–36, 53, 57, 60, 95, 99, 101–102, 104, 107, 116, 140, 146–149, 176, 178, 181, 184

theory, 23, 56, 65, 70, 103, 120, 147, 155, 160

totalitarian, 65, 132trade, 24, 49, 53, 70, 75–76, 88, 116,

121, 135–136, 162, 169tradition, 66, 98, 162traditional, 4, 6, 12, 15, 25, 38–39, 46,

62, 65, 69, 102, 104, 114, 128, 146, 170

traditionally, 16, 37, 157traditions, 7, 40, 65, 87trafficking, 47–48, 50, 75, 108transformation, 132, 142, 153transition, 81, 139–140, 143transnational, 81–82transparency, 48, 58transparent, 11, 20, 155


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Index 245

tribal, 16, 37–38, 46, 49, 54, 61–62, 69–71, 78, 90–91, 96, 98, 102, 104, 106, 108, 113–115, 117, 120, 122, 125–126, 130, 141, 145, 150, 170, 184

tribalism, 96, 157tribes, 69, 145, 148tribesman, 171trigger, 151triggered, 51, 61, 124–126, 141, 152,

165, 171–172, 175, 183, 185triggering, 39, 85, 185troops, 41, 61, 64, 75, 77–81, 91,

105, 111, 134–135, 138, 142, 148, 150–151, 166–167, 171, 185

troubled, 27, 43, 89, 146, 152tumultuous, 85, 89, 131Tunisian, 63Turkey, 147, 157, 167, 170Turkish, 131Turkistan, 63Turkmen, 139Turkomans, 146, 159

UK, 78, 105, 135UN, 23, 67, 127, 134–136, 143, 171uncontrolled, 47, 50, 58, 151, 170underemployment, 162unemployed, 139, 144, 149, 163unemployment, 11, 23, 56, 72, 123,

143, 150, 160, 162, 181uneven, 30, 73–74, 96, 100, 121, 145,

159–162, 180ungoverned, 54, 102UNHCR, 72, 149UNICEF, 100, 137unrest, 56, 73, 78, 88, 90, 115, 170UNSC, 136–137urban, 15–16, 41, 72, 74, 124, 144USAID, 19, 24, 154USSR, 41, 105Uzbek, 68Uzbekistan, 31, 63Uzbeks, 43

vacuum, 21, 44, 53, 85, 137–138, 140, 145, 165, 183

variables, 24, 35–36, 103

Violence, 2–3, 77, 131, 151, 184violence, 2–6, 9–14, 18–19, 21–22,

28, 30, 34, 37, 43–45, 48–49, 52, 57–59, 61–62, 64, 66–69, 71, 75–78, 87–88, 90–92, 95, 97–98, 103, 107, 112, 115–117, 119, 122, 124–125, 127, 132–133, 138–141, 145–146, 148, 150–155, 158–159, 161–162, 164–167, 176, 178–180, 182, 184–185, 187–188

violent, 7, 12, 21, 39–40, 44, 48, 58, 61, 67, 73, 77, 82, 96, 104, 110, 116–119, 121–124, 130, 142, 144, 148, 152, 156, 159–160, 184

violently, 8, 119volatile, 37, 68, 70, 80, 96, 113, 129vulnerable, 15, 29, 56, 59, 72, 114,

118–119, 124, 132, 160, 167, 188

Wardak, 50, 53, 68, 183warfare, 5, 11–13, 61, 156warlords, 21, 46, 66, 68, 75water, 51, 76, 136, 144, 161Waziristan, 91, 98, 114, 116, 119, 183WEAK, 25–26weak, 16, 19–20, 24, 26–27, 29, 35,

47, 50, 52, 55–56, 58, 64, 67, 70–72, 81, 84–85, 92–93, 96–102, 113, 122, 132, 149, 152–153, 156, 164, 177, 179, 182, 184, 187–188

weakened, 21, 40, 47, 114, 123, 128, 134

weakening, 57, 97weaker, 10, 99, 122weakness, 19–20, 22–24, 27, 49–51,

53, 57, 59, 65–66, 76, 81, 94, 98–99, 104, 114, 119, 122, 181–182, 184, 188

weaknesses, 59, 184wealth, 15, 73–74, 121, 123, 159–162,

180weaponry, 58, 103weapons, 8–9, 13, 34, 57–58, 76, 83,

88, 103–104, 106–107, 112, 126–127, 148–152, 172, 179, 181


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246 Index

West, 84–85, 87, 105, 109, 117, 127western, 34, 55, 75, 78, 97, 102, 126,

148, 170, 178, 183–184withdraw, 15, 41, 65, 135, 147withdrawal, 41, 50, 53, 61, 64, 67,

75, 79, 106, 111, 140, 147, 149, 151, 166–167, 173, 185

wounded, 43, 45, 85, 135writ, 54, 71, 100, 102, 113

Yazidis, 131Yemen, 5, 33, 63youth, 47, 55–56, 58, 77, 79, 94, 103,

107, 149, 181

Zabul, 50, 53, 73, 183Zardari, 93, 99, 107Zia, 85, 87–89, 105, 116, 118Zimbabwe, 33, 93Zulfikar, 63, 84, 86–87


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Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency ||