Cozlnter- Revohtiondry Diplomacy dnd the Demise Clf Anglo- Aimtrim

cooperdtian, 1820-1823

IVAN Scorn*

HE active collaboration of England and Austria, based upon the personal understanding established between Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich at the Congress of Vienna, collapsed soon after 1815.l A clear neutrality

toward European questions which Castlereagh had established early as his personal policy for erasing friction among the great powers,2 and which the English cabinet soon converted into a doctrine of nonintervention, helped force England and Austria into antagonistic positions. But being unable to lead the European powers in concert, as they had briefly in 1814-1815, English statesmen would not willingly surrender this influence to Austria.

After 1815 the English cabinet preferred to let European affairs drift and to allow problems to resolve themselves. In contrast, Metternich’s tendency (and that of Czar Alexander) was one of interference and the conscious management of the several states and their multifarious relations. These two attitudes soon reflected the divergent ideologies within the context of great power politics. The empirical approach to international affairs, so much in keeping with the English philosophical tradition, in opposition to the rationalistic attitude of the continental states- men, may be seen in the diplomatic documents of the Congress Period. Over the traditionally free relations of the European states

T

*The author is Associate Professor of History at the University of Toledo. 2Research grants from the University of Toledo and the American Philosophical

Society for the summer of 1970 allowed use of the diplomatic archives of France, Italy, England, and Austria to provide a documentary basis for this study.

’ Castlereagh attempted to defend his temporizing attitude, writing privately to George Rose that his respect for Russia’s views did not constitute a “species of blind confidence, which does not belong to the politics of any foreign state . . ..I’ but rather his policy was one of instilling confidence in the Allies, “to make them feel that the existing concert is their only perfect security against the Revolutionary embers, more or less existing in every state of Europe. . . .” (Castlereagh to Rose, 28 Dee. 1815, private dispatch, Londonderry papers, Durham County Record Office, D/Lo/C45 1).

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The Historian (which the Englishmen wished to perpetuate) the Austrian

statesmen wished to impose a regular order. A European concert, with such unity of purpose as Metternich

envisioned, would act much as an executive committee might and give European society a kind of stability it had never known before. But Castlereagh, in his famous paper of 20 May 1820, argued that the Quadruple Alliance, contracted in November 1815, did not constitute a right to interfere in the affairs of a single state. “The alliance of the great powers,” wrote the secretary, “was an Union for the reconquest and liberation of a great proportion of the continent of Europe from the military domina- tion of France. . . . It never was, however, intended as an Union for the Government of the World, or €or the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.”8

Metternich, enjoying the support of the Russian and Prussian sovereigns and profitting from the temporary impotence of the French government, responded with his own famous formula: the Troppau Protocol of 8 December 1820, which described the intervention of one state in the affairs of another as necessary for the well-being of all the states.‘

Metternich’s dogma could be considered an argument in favor of international government to be conducted by the great powers in concert, meeting frequently in congress, as they had at Vienna in 1814-1815. Having in 1819 demonstrated his methods in Germany, wishing to impose a similar authority in Italy, and relying upon Alexander’s support, Metternich appeared in 1820 to be propounding a system of international relations applicable not only to Europe, but the rest of the world. T h e German system, responsive to Austria’s authority, while stabilizing central Europe, promised to become the nucleus for a stable political system embracing all the European states.

The implications in Metternich’s language did not escape the attention of Castlereagh. The foreign secretary condemned in particular those aspects which called for unified police action by

‘Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, &., A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch (New York, 1923), 11. 623 ff. See also: H. Temperley and L. Penson, Foundations oj British Foreign Policy, from Pitt 1792 to Salisbury 1902 (Cambridge, 1938), 48-63, passim.

‘Circular of the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian sovereigns, Troppau, 8 Dec. 1820, cited by Robert Mowat, The European States System. A Study of International Relations (London, I*), 58.

MCmoire secret pour Sa Majestd ImpCriale de toutes les Rursies sur la position dcs choses duns la fCdtration germanique, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (cited henceforth as H.H.S.). Acta segreta der Staatskanzlcr, V/8 Monarchencongrme und Ministerconferemen, 1814/15-1822, fols. 41-42.

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Counter-Revolutionary Diplomacy the powers.8 Metternich did in fact envision leagues in associa- tion: German and Italian confederations cooperating through a unified police system for the suppression of popular movements in Italy. T o control the Italian national movement, Metternich told Cardinal Consalvi, Austria must establish its power at Milan, the center of the movement. Necessary to its containment would be (1) a centralized police and (2) a league of Italian states for the “defense of Italy,” so as to protect Italy from every aggression, internal or external. 7

Such complete control as Metternich envisioned left the English conservatives divided; for if they approved of efficient authority exercised over the revolutionary and republican ele- ments of society, they understood also that the principal benefits went to Austria. If they should approve in principle the Metter- nichian doctrine which promised the kind of international security which all conservative governments desire (law and order, obedient populations), they only alienated their domestic opposition the more. Pressed by a strong liberal opinion in the English cabinet and in the House of Commons, Castlereagh publicly repudiated the Troppau Protocol. Privately, however, to his half-brother, Lord Stewart, Castlereagh recognized Metternich’s difficulties and admitted the legitimacy of Austria’s actions in Italy once the revolution had broken out at Naples in 1818.* He was aware also that a secret clause in the Austro-Neapolitan treaty of 1815 forbade the king of Naples to change the form of his government without Austria’s consent, thus giving a further legitimacy to Austria’s arbitrary actions.

England’s policy of non-intervention in 1820, neutral in appearance, was in fact pro-Austrian and anti-French, particularly with regard to the question of great-power influence in Italy. The vigorous efforts of the French government to exercise its influence

#Castlereagh to Stewart, Foreign Office (cited henceforth as F.O.) 16 Sept. 1820, most secret and confidential, no. 13, Public Record Office, London (cited henceforth as P.R.O.), FO 92/44.

‘Consalvi to Pacca, Vienna, 8 Sept. 1814, cited by P. Ilaria Rinieri, La diplomazia pontijicio nel secolo XIX. Vol. IV: Corrispondenzo inedita dei cardinali Consalui e Pacca nel tempo del Congesso di Vienna, 1814-1815 (Rome, 1908). 5-6. See also: Karl Grossman, “Metternichs Plan eines italischen Bundes,” Historische Bldtter (1931), IV, 37-80, passim.

‘Castlereagh to Stewart, F.O., 29 July 1820, most secret and confidential, no. 13, P.R.O., FO 92/44.

#Charles Fyffe, History of Modern Europe, i792-i878 (Popular ed.; New York, 1896), 483-524. See also: Metternich to Count Ficquelmont, Vienna, 2 Aug. 1820, Narciso Nada, Le relarioni diplomatiche fra l‘llustria e il Regno d i Sardgena. Series I (Istituto Storico Italian0 per l’eth moderna e contemporanea: Rome, 1965). 11, 29-30. See also: Nicomede Bianchi, Storia documentata della diplomazia eurofia in Italia dal 1814 all‘anno 1861 (Turin, 1861), I.

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The Historian in Italy were destined to fail because of intense factional strife within the French government and because co-operation between Paris and any other government was not possible in 1820. In July 1820 the French foreign minister, Count Pasquier, proposed that France and England adopt a common policy toward Italy. These overtures failed to develop.

Simultaneously, Pasquier worked for papal mediation which would perhaps limit Austria‘s activities on the peninsula and preserve the independence of the Italian princes. l1 The papal government did not care to take an active part in Italian affairs. Although it sent a representative to the Congress of Laibach in February 1821,12 its policy had become one of rigid neutrality. Caught between revolution and reaction, the prelates repelled revolutionary influences from the Neapolitan side, while evading Austria’s demands for cooperation against the revolution in Italy.

Franco-Russian cooperation on the I talian question was likewise brief, perhaps promising at the beginning because of Alexander’s tendency to subvert Austria’s position in the peninsula and to favor constitutional progress as a principle for political stability. Ultimately, the czar accepted the notion that revolutions spread by some natural impulse: that if steps are not taken to contain popular movements at some point, revolutions will spring up elsewhere.’* Metternich had already developed his own thesis for the Italian princes, arguing in his numerous memoranda that revolutions are never accidental, but are the contrived work of a minority, the “sect” which undermines the existing order. l6

Castlereagh believed the same thing, but his colleagues in the cabinet prefemed to remain neutral. Having refused to send a plenipotentiary to Troppau the previous year, the ministers would not send one to Laibach. Metternich, recognizing his superior position, wrote Count Stadion in April 1821: “France and

Ciuseppe Grabinski, Dionigi Parquicr e la restauruzione (Florence, 1899). 269-270. See also: D. Pasquier, Histoire de mon temps (Paris, 1894), V, 150-152.

“Pasquier to Caraman, Paris, 23 Dec. 1820, Archives du ministere des affaires btranghres, Paris (cited henceforth as A.E.), Mhoires et documents (cited henceforth as M.D.), Congrts de Laybach, 1820-1821, 718:27.

-The pope’s legate, Cardinal Spina, was not furnished full powers by His Holiness (Dklaration de Msgr. le Cardinal Spina, lCgat de Sa SaintetP, copy, P.R.O., FO 7/162).

”Caraman to Pasquier, Lnibach, 17 Jan. 1821, A.E., M.D., Congrts de Layboch,

“Nello Rosselli, lnghilterru c Regno di Sardegna dal 1815 ul 1837 (Turin, 1954).

* Metternich to Starhemberg, Vienna, 1 Aug. 1820, cited by Nada, Le relaxioni, 11. 29-90: see also: Metternich’s memorandum, “MCmoire pour les cours d‘Italic,” 32-36, passim.

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718:175-176.

170-171.

Coun ter-Revolu tionary Diplomacy England, far from being together, are completely mistrustful of each other. England is with us completely.” l6 This assessment, coming at the end of the Congress of Laibach, really meant that Austria might act freely in Italy. Metternich had accordingly converted the sessions at Laibach into conferences, saying to the czar that the congress should not be considered as being “general among the five powers.” 17

By establishing virtually private conferences, to which the English and French representatives were admitted as observers, and the Italian delegates as something like petitioners, Metternich and Alexander actually created an exclusive executive committee, which was open to none except those who would agree to accept the principles of Troppau.

Metternich was free to act against the Neapolitan revolution, having sent troops toward the south of the peninsula as early as January 1821. l9 With the conclusion of the conge-ess in May 1821, he elaborated a protocol which merely confirmed the statements made at Troppau the previous December. 2o

As a sequel to this series of events, revolution broke out a t Turin. In late April 1821, Austrian troops occupied Piedmont, in order to put down a weak constitutional movement, Simul- taneously, conferences under Austria’s influence were convoked at Florence, Rome, and Naples. These discussions, although not fruitful, were intended to create a greater political unity in the I talian peninsula, to fulfill Metternich’s original prescriptions for keeping the peace: a centralized police force and a league of Italian states, both organized under Austria’s leadership, And thus, having excluded Austria’s rivals, France and Russia, and counting upon England’s continued neutrality, Metternich probably hoped to offer a model for future action by proving the value of his practical philosophy for dealing with revolutions elsewhere in Europe. In reality he had only succeeded in arousing

la Metternich to Stadion, Laibach, 22 April 1821, Clemens Metternich, Mdmoires, documents ct dcrits divers laiss~!s jmr le prince dc Metternich, Chancclier dc cour et d’dtat (Paris, 1881-1886), XXX, 51.

‘‘Gordon to Castlereagh, Laibach, 16 Feb. 1821, no. 3. P.R.O., FO 7/162. lBPasquier to Blacas, Paris, 22 Dec. 1820. A.E., M.D., Congr&s de Laybach, 718:ll. “Blacas to Pasquier, Laibach, 6 Feb. 1821. ib id , 718:420. mDCp&he circulaire, Laibach. 12 May 1821, H.HS., Acta segreta, V/8 Mon-

archencongresse und Ministerconferenzen, 1814/15-1822. fols. 182-184. See also: Paul W. Schroeder, “Austria’s policy at the Congresses of Troppau and Laibach,” lournal of Central European Affairs (July 1962), XXII, 139-152.

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The Historian English distrust while encouraging the French to take more active measures for the recovery of their influence in Italy.

After the Congress of Laibach, Castlereagh found himself estranged from Metternich, his only ally on the continent. He was at the same time confronted by a discontented cabinet which had commenced (with reluctance) to accept Canning’s liberal policies for resolving England’s domestic problems as well as for conducting its foreign relations.

The British cabinet decided in the summer of 1821 that King George should journey to Hanover and there meet Metternich. 22

Castlereagh wanted to enlarge the meeting by having Hardenberg of Prussia attend, but this invitation was declined. 28 Metternich likewise declined at first. But Castlereagh’s personal letter to Metternich, sent as a “private and confidential” message from Aix-la-Chapelle early in October once King George had arrived at Hanover, convinced the Austrian chancellor that a meeting would be useful.24

What transpired at Hanover is not entirely known, except that Metternich did present his memorandum on the Greek question. Cooperation between England and Austria and a set of common principles for action by the several powers were Metternich‘s most general proposals. The chancellor made a reference to the General Alliance, 25 believing that uniform, perhaps universal principles ruled the conduct of the great powers. These may be seen in the title of the mdmoire he prepared for the occasion: La complication duns l‘Orient Puissances allides sur les principes JUT lesquels il s‘est Gtabli lui-m&me.

Metternich‘s mtmoire considered the Eastern question under two headings: (1) its present state, and (2) the common approach

aChateaubriand’s mission to Berlin, from 11 January to 19 April 1821, for the purpose of winning support for French hopes of occupying Savoy, may be considered as indicative of this. See: P. Marane, “Troppau et Laibach, correspondance inedite,” Lc correspondant (10 Aug. 1912).

‘Vladimir Potiemkine, ed., Histoire de la diplomatie, trans. by Xenia Pamphilora and Michel Eristov (Paris, n.d.), I, 384.

nHardenberg to Castlereagh, Berlin, 16 Oct. 1821, private letter, P.R.O., FO 92/46.

Metternich to Esterhazy. Vienna, 9 Oct. 1821, ibid. ’The usual expression employed after 1815 was “General Alliance,” rather

than “Union” or “Confederation.” For Metternich and Castlereagh, the term meant nothing more than the ensemble of the treaties contracted in 1815 (See the full development of this thesis by Maurice Bourquin, Histoire de la Saint-Alliance [Geneva, 19541). However, Bertier de Sauvigny, in his studies of this particular problem, Mems to have identified a mystical, mathematical, and abstract formulation to describe Metternich’s conception of the General Alliance, which tended to attain a universalist character not fundamentally different from Alexander’s original con- ception (G. de Bertier de Sauvigny. “Saint-Alliance et Alliance dans les conceptions de Metternich,” Revue historique (April- June 1960), CCXXIII, 247-249.

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Coun ter-Revolutionary Diplomacy which the powers should take for resolving the question.26 The Metternichian thesis for the conduct of international relations may be seen in the general principles he described for Castlereagh: the aim of the General Alliance should be to maintain peace between Russia and Turkey “. . . on the immutable basis of the existing treaties.” Necessary for achieving this aim would be (1) the reconciliation of the court of St. Petersburg with the Porte, and (2) acceptance as a fact of Czar Alexander’s adherence to the conservative principles of the Alliance. 27 Everything that he had heard from Count Lieven made Metternich believe that Alexander would remain cautious toward the Eastern question.

Castlereagh was evidently seduced by the conservative prin- ciples Metternich had expounded. 2Q The English statesman could not conceal his satisfaction, writing Sidmouth on 28 October that instructions from each of the cabinets (British and Austrian) would henceforth be in general agreement. 80 However, Castle- reagh spoke only of the Greek question in this case, just as Metternich had prepared a memorandum which dealt with the Eastern question alone. Counting upon England’s past perfor- mance and especially Castlereagh’s essential trust in Austria’s stabilizing value, Metternich expected to have a free hand at the Congress of Verona. “I have the conviction,” he wrote the Austrian emperor at the close of the Hanover interview, “that next year we shall have Lord Londonderry at the Congress which will meet in Italy.” al

If any agreements were established between the English foreign secretary and the Austrian chancellor on the question of Spain and the New World, they were concealed. It appears that Castlereagh was prepared to accept Austria’s long-standing policy for intervention in Spain, providing the interventionist role went to some power other than Russia.82 And therefore Castlereagh might have congratulated himself upon his success in advance of

“Mkmoire confidentiel et secret, Hanover, 22 Oct. 1821, P.R.O., FO 92/46. “Zbid. “H. Montgomery Hyde, Princess Lieuen (Boston, 1938), 101. =Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain

*I Castlereagh to Sidmoutb, Hanover, 28 Oct. 1821, secret and confidential,

a Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, 28 Oct. 1821, Metternich, Mdrnoires, 111. 559. ”The opinion, offered by Potiemkine. that Castlereagh and Metternich agreed

to prevent the czar from putting intervention in Greek affairs on the agenda of the forthcoming congress is correct. But the further assumption, that Castlereagh agreed to support the restoration of the Spanish king with the abolition of the constitution, is to be doubted. The date given by Potiemkine for the meeting at Hanover as “printemps de 1822,” is likewise an error, although this may be the fault of the translators (See: Potiemkine, I, 384).

and the European Alliance (London, 1925), 381.

draft no. 14, P.R.O., FO 92/45.

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The Historian the congress’ first session. No power appeared able to interfere in the Spanish question, except France; but neither French opinion nor French finance was prepared for the undertaking. The restored regime of the Bourbons continued to labor under the disadvantage of leading a nation still revolutionary, while still aspiring to join the crowns of France and Spain in some workable political manner.

If these were in fact Castlereagh’s thoughts, he still failed to appreciate Metternich’s finesse. For the Austrian chancellor had turned to Alexander without much delay in order to pursue a policy which would eventually bind France to the Holy Alliance. In this case the internal politics of France aided Metternich‘s program, while the internal politics of England militated against those of Castlereagh. The popularity of the Greek cause had become one of those indeterminate factors which molded English foreign policy, intruding first into the debate in the Commons, then being considered by the Cabinet. Metternich, by contrast, was indifferent to exalted and romantic ideas about national liberation of subjugated Christian peoples. Austria, he said at the end of the Napoleonic wars, required a natural frontier, much as other continental powers relied upon the seas for the delimita- tion of their states and for defense. The Ottoman empire was for Metternich a savage and untamable ocean, giving protection to Austria. 99

Conservative statesmen of every country shared this view. In France the changes made in the king’s council in December 182 1 produced a new direction for its foreign policy. Louis XVIII and his ministers were inclined to divert the public’s interest from the dangerous Eastern question to the relatively safe Spanish question. I n a period of depression and social distress, the need for markets to stimulate France’s slight industrial establishment made a share of the Spanish-American trade a categorical imperative.

French trade rivalry in the New World seemed less important to the British statesmen than the perpetuation of Spanish authority in Latin-American commercial and political affairs. Doubtless, a majority of the British Tories would have accepted the restoration of the Spanish king’s authority in Madrid on a liberal basis. That condition by itself would have allowed for competitive trade in America, the English mercantile establish- ments being more than equal to the challenge of the other states. The same majority of Tories would have accepted also the establishment of an independent monarchial authority in the New

Cited by EmiIe Bourgeois, Manuel hbtorique politique Ctrungdre, VoI. 11: Les rholutions (1789-1830), (3d.: Paris, 1906), 666.

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Counter-Revolutionary Diplomacy World and an extinction of republicanism in South America, providing that English trading interests were protected at the same time. Castlereagh would have led in this solution since his government had not gone beyond advancing diplomatic recogni- tion de facto to the republican regimes in South Amerim34 But he had begun to lose the confidence of the cabinet. The gamble was a great one with respect to protecting British commercial and strategic interests.

After the meeting at Hanover, Castlereagh, to the degree that he had to conspire to save himself and his policies, lost his self- confidence and experienced increasing distrust from his colleagues. Castlereagh began to learn in the early summer, through his diplomats at Paris and Vienna, that Metternich's success in taking Alexander's attention away from the Eastern question would only result in turning every eye toward the Spanish question.3s By this time also the British minister began to realize that Metternich wanted to take Alexander's interest away from the Eastern question while encouraging France to act in concert with the Holy Alliance against Spanish liberalism.

The arrival of Bailli de Tatistscheff at Vienna at the end of June on his second confidential mission for the czar, gave Metternich an opportunity to call for a conference of the powers; 36

but since Gordon, the English ambassador, and Caraman, his French counterpart at Vienna, were given no instructions by their respective government^,^^ only the Holy Alliance could act in concert. 88

Tatistscheffs acceptance of Metternich's position on the Eastern question did not mean that he had accepted the latter's view on the Spanish question or that he was charged by the czar

"Pierre Renouvin, Le XZSe sie'cle. Book I: De 1815 a 1871. L'Europe des nationalitCes et l'gveil de nouweaux mondes. Vol. Five of Historie des relations internationales (Paris, 1954), 89. De jure recognition was accorded Mexico, Columbia. and Argentina in 1825, although it is thought that Castlereagh was preparing to give full diplomatic recognition to the revolted republics just beEore his death (Charles K. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812-1830. Select Documents from the Foreign Office Archives, edited by Sir Charles K . Webster [Oxford, 19381, I, 12). See also: Potiemkine, I, 391. For the commercial causes leading to de facto recognition, see: George Canning, The Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning with a Memoir of His Life (London, 1828). V, 295-296.

=Stuart to Castlereagh, Paris, 9 July 1822, P.R.O., FO 271272. mcastlereagh to Gordon, F.O.. 29 July 1822, no. 11, P.R.O., FO 7/196. mThe French government sent a confidential mission to Vienna, entrusted to

Durand (Metternich to Esterhazy, Vienna, 9 July 1822, reserved, P.R.O., FO 7/175). sB Only Tatistcheff and himself, Metternich declared, were empowered to discuss

the Eastern question, because France and England (like Prussia) had failed so far to send plenipotentiaries to Vienna (Gordon to Castlereagh, Vienna, 28 June, 2 July 1822, P.R.O., FO 7/171).

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The Historian to discuss any other matter than the Eastern question. Yet, Gordon's opinion (like that of Stuart's at Paris) was correct: the more that Alexander turned his attention from the Greek question the more he would be disposed to cooperate on Spain.8e

By the time of the Vienna conferences, beginning in July 1822, Metternich had commenced to draw together several ele- ments which would further Austria's policy. The inability of Louis XVIII to play an independent role in the Spanish question facilitated things.'O The secret efforts of the king's ministers to bring about a settlement between Ferdinand and the S anish

agent to Vienna in order to explain France's Spanish policy and to point out the dangers of an ultra-royalist reaction in France.'l

The failure of the secret negotiations between Paris and Madrid may have caused Metternich to think that the king of France would attend the next congress at Verona. The chancellor certainly counted upon the king of England to make a visit to Vienna. That sovereign's presence would give solidarity to the General Alliance. More especially, the fraternal concord of the rulers would provide unity for the preliminary discussions prior to their departures for Verona.

These assumptions should be qualified however. Metternich had no trust in French policy, which he characterized as two-faced. A date had not yet been set for the congress. Metternich betrayed his personal desire to ex and the Vienna conferences, an action which would eliminate tfe need to bring the sovereigns together at Verona. Yet, the king of Prussia did not intend to come to Vienna, indicating, rather, that he would go directly to Verona from Berlin.48 Alexander had indicated in June that he would attend the Vienna conferences, but in August the date of his arrival was moved forward to the first week of September.'*

liberals prompted the French government to send a confi J ential

*Same to same, Vienna, 2 July Ian, private and confidential, ibid. WStuart to Castlereagh, Paris, 11 July 1822, ibid. Slightly earlier Ferdinand

repulsed Louis' discreet proposal for a moderate settlement which would aatisfy the Spanish liberals, also temper the ultra-royalist sentiment at Paris, while adding to the French king's prestige (Extrait dcs instructions secrktes quc M. b comtc dc La Garde a repcs le 6 juillct de son gouvemcmcnt, dated: Paria, 29 July 1822, H.HS., Acta septa , V/8, Kart. 23, fol. 18).

UStuart to Castlereagh. Paris, 15 July 182p. ibid. 0 Metternich undertook a personal effort, through his ambassador at London,

to encourage the king to go to Vienna, writing that the emperor of Austria had already set time aside for private meetings during the months of August and September (Gordon to Caatlereagh. Vienna, 8 July 1822, secret and confidential, no. 27, P.R.O.. FO 71171).

UGordon to Strangford, Vienna, 9 Aug. 1822, private and confidential, ibid. YLebzeltern to Metternich, 14 June, 1 Aug. 1822, Metternich, Mdmoircs, 111,

580-597, passim.

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Coun ter-Revolu tionary Diplomacy The solidarity of the sovereigns represented but one part of

Metternich’s design; an agenda sufficiently enlarged to satisfy most of the powers would have further gratified Austria’s policy. Metternich’s aims were two-fold but closely related: a diplomatic resolution of the Eastern question which would satisfy both England and Russia; and a diplomatic resolution of the Spanish question which would satisfy both England and France. From the Austrian point of view, achievement of these two goals would mean the preservation of peace; the termination of two dangerous revolutions; the subsidence of the liberal movement more generally; the continued separation of the French and Spanish Bourbons; in short, the maintenance of Austria’s primacy in European affairs.

Gordon sensed these implications, learning at the beginning of July that Metternich would probably connect Tatistscheffs mission with Durand‘s. Concerned with different problems, the two separate missions nonetheless embraced the whole framework of Metternich’s active diplomacy. Tatistscheff insisted, however, that he was charged to discuss only Turkish questions. Durand had been instructed to prepare the ground for close collaboration with Austria on the Spanish question. Metternich’s purpose became the conscious one of changing the parochial character of each envoy’s mission. Castlereagh, far more than Gordon, under- stood Metternich’s tactics.45 On the other hand, Gordon recognized that he was powerless, being merely an observer, and he urged Castlereagh to attend the Vienna conference. 46

Castlereagh seemed reluctant to make the journey. T h e alterna- tives for England were unacceptable to him: absolute abstention, as during the past two congresses; or a one-sided diplomatic duel in which all the advantages already lay with Austria.

English isolation was complete by the summer of 1822. Concurrently, French isolation, a consequence of the defeats of 1814-1815, came to an end. By co-operating with Austria on the Spanish question, France might recover an independence in foreign affairs it had not enjoyed since Napoleon’s time.

Following the United States’ recognition of the South American states and Spain’s protest against that act, along with Britain’s apparent readiness to convert its de fucto recognition of these republics into a de jure recognition, France initiated a diplomatic campaign on two fronts. The French government started secret exchanges with the Spanish king and opened nego-

“Gordon to Castlereagh, Vienna, 8 July 1822, no. 13, P.R.O.. FO 7/171. axbid.

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The Historian tiations with interested cabinets of Europe, in order to determine the consensus of the great powers.47

Three possibilities emerged with this French initiative: (1) a reconciliation between the Spanish king and his liberal opponents in Spain; (2) a concerted diplomacy of the powers, resulting in a settlement of both the Spanish and Latin American questions (for these were inseparable in the view of most principal states- men);48 and (3) a new deliberation of the powers, with the sovereigns and their ministers assembled in congress at Verona, in order to impose their unified will on the rebellious subjects of the Spanish king.

France of course preferred the first alternative. The second plan appealed especially to Castlereagh, whose conception of the concert included principles of international co-operation. 4D The third was most satisfying to Metternich and Alexander.

Castlereagh, despite the resistance he encountered from Metternich on the one hand and his cabinet on the other, remained confident that he could re-establish his system of international relations through conferences. But, being aware of the developing relations between France, Austria, and Russia, he recognized that Metternich's opportunities for promoting the Austrian scheme were excellent. Always practical, Metternich conceived of two equally satisfactory options: a combined, unified action of the powers; or a unilateral action by France on a conservative basis, which would mean French power serving the ideology of the Holy Alliance.

Metternich's flexibility and his desire to support the French king against ultra-royalist sentiment were made known at Paris on 5 July.6o Having established a general understanding with France, he then turned to his ambassador at London, developing his ideas fully, so that Castlereagh might "apprehend my thought in its entirety. . . ."61

Supported by a generous collection of documents, Metternich's analysis possessed two characteristics which Castlereagh could not

"Metternich to Baron Vincent, Vienna, 5 July 1822, copy, P.R.O., FO 7/175. 18 Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, Paris, 2/14 June 1817, Correspondance d u comte

Pozro di Borgo et du comte de Nesselrode depuis la restauration des Bourbons jusqu'au congrCs &Aix-la-Chapelle, 1814-1818 (Paris, 1897), 11, 130-133.

MFor a discussion of Castlereagh's tendency to adopt a new system of continental politics based on frequent conferences and the determination of the majority of his cabinet to repulse this, see: Lord Bathurst to Lord Castlereagh, Downing Street, 20 Oct. 1818; Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh, ed. Charles W . Vane (12 vols. in 3 series: 3d ser.; London, 1848-1853). IV. 55-58.

"Metternich to Baron Vincent. Vienna. 5 July 1822, copy, P.R.O., FO 7/175. '"Metternich to Esterhazy, Vienna, 9 July 1822, reserved, ibid.

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Coun ter-Revolu t ionary Diplomacy fail to recognize: evidence of Austria’s arbitral position and of Metternich‘s awareness of his superiority. 62 Moreover, in an effort to win England over to his side, the chancellor gave a full defense of his counter-revolutionary thesis: that responsible governments only contain radical movements by taking prompt, yet moderate, steps designed to crush the radical left wing of the movement, while depriving the reactionaries on the right of an opportunity to profit from the upheaval.

Austria’s actions in Germany and Italy were the model which Metternich held up for both French and British statesmen. Although he thought the Spanish liberal movement had many more similarities with the German than the Italian, he thought also that the triumph of liberalism in Spain would definitely set Italian liberalism in motion again. Three problems had emerged which the chancellor believed demanded a solution: (1) the secret request of the Neapolitan king for aid against revolutionaries in Italy; (2) the recent differences between Spain and the United States with respect to the Latin American question; and (3) the recent proposal by the Russian government that the Allies should consider taking a hostile action against Spain.

These far-ranging circumstances involved the safety of the Bourbon regime at Naples, and the sensibility of the Russian czar, who wished to act vigorously on behalf of the Spanish king’s threatened authority at Madrid, and also to defend that sovereign’s prerogatives against Anglo-American pretensions.

As there were, atcording to Metternich’s scheme, three causes for a common action of the powers, there were three aims to be achieved by the General Alliance: (1) to establish a common moral principle for the defense of the legitimate Spanish royalty, and all legal thrones; (2) to find the means, without disturbing any fundamental rights of the powers, which would translate that moral principle into action; (3) and by this means of action, to prevent the rise in France of dangers similar to those in Spain, as a consequence of party strife.53

If one analyzes Metternich’s vague and doctrinaire philosophy, it may be seen that he was advocating for Europe the same kind of government he had wished to impose upon Germany and Italy. His reasoning was plain enough, but he insisted upon clarifying it at both Paris and London. Revolution in one place, he argued, meant inevitably revolution in other places. France would be the victim of the liberal movement in Spain, as Naples had been the victim of the same movement in 1818.

If Castlereagh had not yet discovered the exact sense of

- Ib id . Ibid.

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The Historian Metternich’s evolving ideas about European society (a broad problem which the chancellor subsumed under the heading “questions of Europe”), the documents which he sent to London in July 1822 provided Castlereagh with a full statement. His instructions of 9 July to Esterhazy amounted to a summary of the several papers appended to that particular dispatch. Metter- nichs secret instructions to Baron Vincent at Paris revealed more exactly his genuine fear of revolutionary excess, but also betrayed his calculating nature. The Spanish revolution could spread beyond the Iberian peninsula, he believed, but it could also be nipped in the bud. The right force, exercised at the right moment, when the Spanish liberals were least prepared to resist, would bring about the collapse of the movement. In desperation the Spanish liberals would try to precipitate a foreign war, he believed, in order to save their power; the French liberals, becoming sanguine, would welcome the war because it would bring “disorder” and cause the overthrow of the legitimate monarchy in France.54 But a wise government at Paris could manage these factious parties.

Having no faith in a French ministry dominated by the fluctuating Doctrinaires, Metternich was reluctant to map out a precise program for the French government to follow in dealing with the Spanish question. The French ambassador to Vienna (Caraman) Metternich characterized as royalist in name only, and Caraman had done no more than make a mystery of his government’s intentions. But with the arrival of Durand’s mission in July 1822, Metternich was encouraged to think that the French government had at last adopted a conservative policy and even up its aim to establish constitutional governments in Europe. To the degree that Austria could believe that France would not impose its form of government on Spain, Austria would increase its support of France.

Although Metternich by his own account had completed his secret instructions for Vincent by the time Durand arrived at Vienna, the latter’s insistence upon his government’s willingness to accept Austria’s pri.nciples was so convincing that Metternich did not feel compelled to change “a single word” in his dispatch. He only asked one question and gave a single warning to the French monarch. Could the king trust his army?56 A too-zealous support of the Spanish reactionaries by the French ultra-royalists would be as dangerous for the repose of France and Europe, as a too liberal movement in France would be for the royal institutions of France and Europe.

MMetternich to Baron Vincent, Vienna, 9 July 1822, secret, annex no. 3 copy,

‘Ibid. ibid.

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Coun ter-Revolutionary Diplomacy Castlereagh, after studying Metternich’s documents, could

conclude that France would intervene in the Spanish question eventually, thus justifying Metternich’s doctrine of necessary intervention. Nevertheless, no evidence can be produced to show that Castlereagh abruptly lost interest in European affairs. No single document suggests that he believed that the diplomatic trick had gone completely to Metternich. T o the contrary, Castlereagh prepared for the journey to Vienna in order to attend the conferences. Outwardly he was confident. He drafted his own instructions, since he would be England’s plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona. Yet, another kind of evidence suggests that he now neglected foreign affairs, being preoccupied with domestic questions. His inaction, his loss of orientation at the end are generally well known. Until the end of June 1822, he sent the majority of dispatches to his diplomats in Europe himself, leaving the remainder to his close friend, Lord Clanwilliam. During July only four dispatches were sent to Paris; three were signed by Clanwilliam. His last dispatch to Paris, dated 9 August dealt with a minor matter, the Jersey islands. The burden of domestic affairs weighed him down as can be seen in the extensive papers which remain in his private archives.66

By August, when finally he had prepared for his departure to Vienna, Castlereagh was mentally confused, ill enough to be placed under a doctor’s care. Too proud to enter a European congress where he would find England already defeated by a diplomatic coalition, Castlereagh saw that he had become the victim of great power politics at the same time that indiscretions in his private life made him the object of public ridicule. On 12 August he took his own life, after a brief period of intense melan- choly and self-imposed isolation. Ironically, Metternich sent a message the same day, expressing his pleasure that Castlereagh would soon be in Vienna to attend the preliminary discussions. The chancellor’s confidence was great; he believed that perhaps Castlereagh would co-operate on the Spanish question. 67

George Canning succeeded Castlereagh. Wellington agreed to represent England at the congress. His instructions were the same inflexible and non-negotiable ones which Castlereagh had drafted for himself. The cabinet’s principal mandates remained: absolute resistance to the restoration of Ferdinand to his throne by force:

a Castlereagh’s personal policy cannot be fully developed for this period, however, because a great part of his private papers were lost after his death. The remains of his official correspondence, consewed at Mountstewart in North Ireland, contain a great deal concerning domestic affairs for the period 1815-1822, but very little of a diplomatic character.

“Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 12 Aug. 1822, copy, P.R.O., FO 71175.

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The Historian and a refusal to adhere to any protocol which recognized the Spanish king’s rights in South America, or which pronounced the republican governments as being in a state of rebellion against a lawful sovereign. Finally, any project to support Russia’s inter- vention in the Eastern question was to be opposed in the same categorical manner. 68 It followed from this that England’s representative would have to be (as at Troppau and Laibach) no more than an observer.

Upon arriving at Verona, Wellington learned what Castlereagh had known for some time. In advance of the congress, Austria and Russia had established an agreement in principle to have France restore the Spanish king to his throne. Prussia’s adherence was to be expected.6s But the peculiarity of the situation lay in the position taken by the French government. As in 1820, the ministers of Louis XVIII could not decide either way, for they were in profound disagreement on a Spanish policy up to the time of the congress. The president-minister of the council, Villkle, felt that France should preserve its neutrality; and Montmorency, the foreign minister, seemed to accede to this view.60 But Chateaubriand, who as ambassador to London pre- viously, and representing France at the congress, seems to have understood the essential tendency of the English ministers to become isolationists, to give up their influence in European questions.

In the king’s council the play of personalities remained im- portant: Chateaubriand’s extravagance against Montmorency’s caution. 61 Villkle, financier and politician, had no pretensions as regards statecraft; his pragmatic attitude made him the potential backer of any realistic policy. On 31 August, the king sent Montmorency to Vienna with vague instructions to take up preliminary talks with the continental powers prior to the congress. 82

Montmorency fell quickly under the influence of Alexander,

“For an analysis of Castlereagh’s instructions, their origins, and Canning’s subsequent use of them, see: J.E.S. Green, “Castlereagh’s Instructions for the Con- ferences at Vienna, 1822,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (1913), 3d series, VII, 103-128. See also: Irby C. Nichols, “The Eastern Question and the Vienna Conferences, September 1822,’’ Journal of Central European Affairs (April 1961). XXI, 53-66.

su Bourgeois, Manuel politique Ctrangh‘e, 11. 677-678. “If France should intervene in Spain, observed Villkle in a council held on

26 August, it should appear to be an independent act and not as a mandate imposed upon France by Europe (Pierre de la Gorce, Louis XVIIZ [Bth ed.: Paris, 19261, 230).

Qlbid., 237. tB Montmorency to Villkle, 1 Oct. 1822, Count Villkle, Souvenirs et correspond-

ance de VillCle (2d ed.; Paris, 1889), 111, 88-95. passim.

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Counter-Revolutionary Diplomacy who had already arrived at Vienna. Encouraged by the czar’s speculations, he concluded that France had a pre-eminent right and an obligation to intervene in the Spanish question. Having exceeded the spirit, if not the letter of his government’s policy of neutrality, Montmorency decided to take the initiative at the congress.eS When he arrived at Verona on 19 October, he conferred with Metternich. On the following day, at Metternich’s invitation, he read a prepared paper before the assembled ministers. His hypothetical observations, Montmorency said, did not represent his country’s official policy:

(1) If France should be forced to recall its ambassador from Madrid, would the other powers do likewise?

(2) If France should become involved in war with Spain, would the other powers offer their moral support? and what would be the nature of that support?

(3) If France should demand material support in the case of a war with Spain, what would be the form of that material aid?64

At the insistence of the assembled ministers, Montmorency prepared copies of this note for distribution to the sovereigns.

The delay of the Holy Alliance powers in making a reply was perhaps as significant as the swiftness with which Wellington offered British mediation between Spain and France, as an alternative to Montmorency’s questions. When the sovereigns agreed to this, but only in principle,8s Wellington withdrew from the congress.

Montmorency seemed to fear that he had exceeded the inten- tions of his government, and he received such a reproach from Villhle, who wrote that the hypothetical note and its responses from the northern courts left the impression that France had become the agent of the Holy Alliance. This general opinion seemed confirmed inore completely when the Holy Alliance powers signed on 19 November a protocol specifying the conditions

“Same LO same, Innsbruck, 9 Oct. 1822. ibid., 108. MLa Gorce, Louis XVIIZ, 238-239. “Sir Ernest Satow, Guide to Diplomatic Practice (2d. and Sd. revised eds.;

London, New York, and Toronto, 1922), 11, 90-91: Viscount Chateaubriand, Le congrb de VCrone (1st ed.; Leipzig, 1838), I, 161-162. See also: Pasquier, Mdnoires,

Upon receiving Wellington’s offer of mediation, Montmorency was no doubt correct in his reply that since France was disposed toward peace, Britain could hardly find a cause to mediate between Spain and France (La Gorce, Louis XVZIZ, 239).

48 1

V, 451-454.

The Historian under which they would be obliged to act in concert with France. e7

Having received this guarantee for future action, without compromising France’s liberty of action, Montmorency left Verona for Paris on 22 November. He had enlisted the Holy Alliance against possible English reprisals, yet he had preserved his government from the necessity of becoming a signatory of the Holy Alliance. Metternich understood this exactly, warning the sovereigns in a memorandum that while the French plenipotentiaries seemed to be divided, in reality they were pursuing “two distinct objects”: the establishment of an indepen- dent policy, yet enjoying the security which the Allies could offer France. 88

Chateaubriand, who had remained at Verona, left no doubt about his government’s eventual aim to restore Ferdinand to his throne. Anxious to make his policy the official policy, much as Montmorency had done, Chateaubriand proceeded to urge a war policy upon the pacific Villtle.

The divisions meanwhile deepened as a consequence of Chateaubriand’s eagerness and Montmorency’s uncertain oppor- tunism. Eventually Louis XVIII intervened strongly in favor of Villtle’s intermediate solution. France would acknowledge the invitation of the continental powers, yet it would act independ- ently. Thus the Bourbons would scarcely seem to be the creatures of those sovereigns, who, having recently humbled revolutionary France, now invited the restored French monarch to do the same in revolutionary Spain.

The problem of the Bourbons, encountered by later regimes in France, was how to contain the revolution beyond its borders without offending the liberal sentiment within France. Louis implied as much in his council on 25 December 1822, declaring that his aim was two-fold: to end the revolution in Spain and to check the excessive influence of England.70 What he could not

“Three conditions were cited, whereby the Holy Alliance powers would come to the aid of France: (1) if Spain should attack France; (2) if the person of the Spanish king should be in danger; (3) if the Spanish royal family’s right to succession should be threatened (Chateaubriand, Lc congds de Virone, I, 147-149).

“Position des cabinets, 29 Oct. 1822, H.H.S., Acta segreta, V/8 Monarchen- congressen. fols. 165-166.

Bourgeois. Manuel politique dtrangdre, 11, f390-691. ”La Corce, Louis XVZZZ, 247. Chateaubriand had by this time adopted some

part of Richelieu’s program for the restoration of monarchy in Latin America: that the Spanish king, if restored to his throne, would agree to accept autonomous constitutional monarchies in South America under Bourbon kings (See: H. de Lacombe, “Un prkkdent pour Cuba,” Le correspondant [lo May 1898l. 428-429). See also: Chateaubriand, “Lettres au prince de Polignac,” La r m e dc Paris (1 Feb. 1912), 449-468.

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Coun ter-Revolu tionary Diplomacy say openly was that he also wished to regain the loyalty of the French army.

Because of these factors, intervention in Spanish affairs seemed the most appropriate policy for France, not as a conservative power enjoying the mandate of the sovereigns, but as a warlike power imposing its will upon another nation.“ This posture, which would nourish the militaristic pride of the population, would also give to French intervention a national rather than an international character.

Montmorency, who wished to idealize the intervention by France as a Catholic and Christian act of restoring the Spanish monarch’s authority at Madrid, could not countenance the policy which Villkle and the king had decided upon. He consequently surrendered the portfolio of foreign affairs to Chateaubriand, who had already been invited to take his place.72

In February 1823, the French government announced that it would send an army to Spain.73 The expedition arrived at Madrid in May, under the command of the Duke d’AngoulCme. I t thus appeared that France had joined the Holy Alliance and had deserted the liberal position, which it had shared with England since 1815. But it was evident that French policy still contained diametrically opposed principles, and that the king and his ministers had endeavored to heal factionalism with an act of international importance.

The significance of France’s unilateral action is seen best in the light of international relations. England had abandoned the concert. The Holy Alliance appeared to be supreme in European affairs, with Metternich’s doctrine seemingly unchallenged. But France, rather than attach itself to either an English or an Austrian system, had returned to the traditions of the ancien rkgime: cabinet diplomacy and independent sovereign relationships. “It is to Castlereagh’s credit,” writes Green, “that he foresaw what, as we know, did actually take place - an attempt by France to escape from the meshes of the Alliance, in which it was the intention of the Powers to keep her entangled. . . . And already there were

Bourgeois, Manuel polifique CtrungCre, 11, 696, Philip Guedalla, Weflington (New York, 1931), 339.

Montmorency fell on this question of British mediation and the refusal of the Holy Alliance courts to withdraw their collective note which requested France to intervene in Spain; but this did not mean that Louis XVIII had rejected the war policy of Montmorency and Chateaubriand (for the latter succeeded Mont- morency at the foreign ministry). See: Fyffe, History of Modern Europe, 512.

mLa Gorce, Louis X V I I I , 247. Villble advised the British government in December 1822 that France would support Spain if it should decide to restore its authority in Mexico and Peru (R. F. Leslie, The Age of Trumformution, 1789-1871 [New York and Evanston, 19641, 164).

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The Historian not wanting signs that France, chafing under the restrictions imposed on her, was moving away from the Alliance and was preparing for a national policy.” T4

This interpretation, while not wrong, is to a degree a simplistic one; for i t is clear that Louis XVIII and his ministers endeavored to get free of two systems, one dominated by Britain and the other by Austria. These two powers, endeavoring to counter the revolu- tionary movements from Greece to Latin America, had fallen into dispute, allowing for the formation of two ideological camps. Great power rivalries and the emergence of new national and liberal ideas had produced at last an unbridgeable gulf between the conservative and liberal governments. The General Alliance, seemingly unified in 1815 as a consequence of Bonaparte’s fall and the restoration of the legitimate Bourbon dynasties, dissolved entirely during the period 1820-1823.

“J.E.S. Green, “Castlereagh’s Instructions,” 121.

484