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Counter-conducts in South Africa: Power,Government and Dissent at the WorldSummitCarl Death aa Aberystwyth University, Penglais, Aberystwyth, UKPublished online: 31 Aug 2011.

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Counter-conducts in South Africa: Power, Government and

Dissent at the World Summit

CARL DEATH

Aberystwyth University, Penglais, Aberystwyth, UK

ABSTRACT This article introduces Michel Foucault’s concept of ‘counter-conducts’—

‘struggles against the processes implemented for conducting others’—in order to rethink the

relationship between power and dissent. It proposes an ‘analytics of protest’ to address forms

of resistance, through which this article focuses on the mentalities, practices, and

subjectivities produced at protests in South Africa at the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit

on Sustainable Development. These protests were some of the largest public expressions of

dissent since the end of apartheid, yet the article illuminates the ways in which power and

resistance are mutually reliant and co-constitutive. These summit counter-conducts both

contested and reinforced existing power relations, and were disciplined by discourses of

civility/violence, partnership/disruption, and local/foreign from state authorities and the

media. They were also disciplined by internal discourses of liberal dissent and radical protest

from within the movements themselves. The article concludes that, from a Foucauldian

perspective on counter-conducts, forms of dissent that are strategic, reversible, and flexible

are preferable to those that are sedimented and entrenched.

Keywords: protest, Michel Foucault, Johannesburg Summit, social movements, resistance

Introduction

The UN World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), held in Johannesburg between

26 August and 4 September 2002, was accompanied by the largest street protests in South

Africa since the end of apartheid. Over 20,000 activists and members from groups such as

the Landless Peoples’ Movement and the Anti-Privatisation Forum marched on 31 August

from the township of Alexandra to voice their grievances outside the conference venue in

Sandton, where summit delegates claimed to be reinvigorating the global commitment to

Correspondence Address: Carl Death, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Penglais, Aberyst-

wyth, Ceredigion, SY23 3FE, UK. Email: crd@aber.ac.uk

ISSN 1474-7731 Print/ISSN 1474-774X Online/11/040425–14 # 2011 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/14747731.2011.585844

Globalizations

August 2011, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 425–438

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sustainable development. In this respect the Johannesburg Summit protests were typical of a

broader global ‘return to the streets’ since 1999, particularly associated with protests against

major international summits in Seattle, Genoa, Prague, London and elsewhere (Della Porta

and Tarrow, 2005, p. 12). Such protests present a number of issues for the theorisation of

power and resistance. The Johannesburg protests did not aim to seize state power or set out

a revolutionary programme, but neither did they seek to engage summit delegates in delibera-

tion or debate. In many ways the protests disrupted familiar binaries of political thought: power

and resistance, national and international, and dissent and collaboration, binaries which have

meant that protests tend to be framed in terms of either reform or revolution, governance or

resistance (Maiguashca, 2003). I argue here that such summit protests are tightly interconnected

with the forms of power they resist: their hybrid, rhizomatic forms reveal the mutually consti-

tutive relationship between power and protest.1 Despite this, such forms of dissent are subject to

powerful disciplinary mechanisms, revolving around the dichotomy between liberal dissent and

radical protest constructed within movements themselves, and around binaries of civility/vio-

lence, partnership/disruption, and local/foreign constructed by state authorities and the media.

Summits, such as Johannesburg in 2002, therefore represent powerful sites for the disciplining

of dissent, the production of certain forms of civil society, and for the performance and recon-

stitution of state power.

In order to re-conceptualise the role of these summit protests within global power relations,

this article turns to Foucauldian political thought. A number of recent attempts to theorise

resistance have drawn explicitly on Michel Foucault (Amoore, 2005; Barry, 2001; Bleiker,

2000; Krishna, 2009; Kulynych, 1997; Odysseos, 2011). Despite this, discussions of the

summit protests of the 1990s and 2000s often still seem reliant on many of the conceptual cat-

egories which a Foucauldian perspective seeks to destabilise (see, for example, Stephen, 2009,

p. 484). Furthermore, there has been a degree of reluctance from those writing from a broadly

Foucauldian perspective to engage with social movements, protestors, and organised dissent,

particularly within what has become known as the Anglo-governmentality literature.2 With

these points in mind, and recognising that the possibility, indeed inevitability, of resistance

is at the heart of Foucault’s political thought, this article aims to suggest some ways in

which Foucauldian thought can be operationalised for the study of dissent and protest in inter-

national politics.

To this end, I elaborate Foucault’s notion of counter-conducts, described as ‘the will not to

be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (Foucault, 2007b, p. 75). The idea of

the counter-conduct was developed by Foucault in the context of his work on governmentality,

and denotes the close interrelationship between practices of government and the forms of resist-

ance which oppose them (Cadman, 2010; Odysseos, 2011). Counter-conducts can be studied

through what I have termed an ‘analytics of protest’, examining their mentalities, practices,

and subjectivities, inspired by Mitchell Dean’s (1999) ‘analytics of government’. Such a frame-

work can be applied to the Johannesburg Summit protests of 2002, focusing on the various ways

in which resistance or dissent was produced, conditioned, and disciplined during these protests.3

This approach facilitates a closer examination of how forms of dissent are disciplined both in

terms of their own mentalities, practices, and subjectivities, and also by the forms of govern-

ment to which they are opposed. Seeing protests as counter-conducts can highlight the co-

constitutive relationship between practices of government and forms of dissent, and enables

a more nuanced assessment of forms of dissent than a stark binary between co-optation and

confrontation.

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Counter-conducts, Power, and Protest

Whether addressing summit protests, social movement struggles, counter-hegemonic wars of

movement and position, or foot-dragging infrapolitics (Scott, 1990, p. 183), there has tended

to be an assumption that power and resistance are located at opposing poles (Bond, 2006;

Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Drainville, 2002; Gills, 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The per-

vasive power of this dichotomy is seen in Sankaran Krishna’s argument that the basic dynamic of

world politics is constituted through the relationship between globalized neo-liberalism and

postcolonialism. The latter, for Krishna (2009, p. 2), ‘articulates a politics of resistance to the

inequalities, the exploitation of humans and the environment, and the diminution of political

and ethical choices that come in the wake of globalization’. This assertion of the fundamentally

Manichean opposition between globalisation and postcolonialism, from an author who else-

where stresses hybridity and the erosion of settled identities, indicates the pervasive strength

of the ‘power versus resistance’ dichotomy.

The difficulty of escaping from this dichotomy was explored in a special issue of the Review of

International Studies in 2003, devoted to the theme of ‘Governance and Resistance’. Whilst

some contributors, such as Mark Rupert (2003), tended to re-affirm the fundamental division,

or dialectic relationship, between governance and resistance, others decried the ‘emerging,

but increasingly facile, orthodoxy’ that frames politics ‘in terms of the simple opposition

between governance and resistance’ (Clark, 2003, p. 77). Yet, as Bice Maiguashca (2003,

p. 17) noted in the introduction to this special issue, ‘while recognising this overlap between

the agents of governance and resistance, with the exception of Clark, all our authors either

explicitly or implicitly accept the framing of world politics along these broad lines’.

This conceptual opposition between power and resistance is frequently taken a step further,

with the normative categorisation of specific social movements or protests as either revolution-

aries or collaborators (Stephen, 2009, p. 485). Mark Rupert (2003, p. 195) encapsulates much of

the enthusiasm surrounding the so-called Global Justice Movement when he observes that ‘[a]

new kind of social movement was emerging and seemed to be constructing a new political

culture, forms of political organisation and activity, which were premised upon transnational

solidarity and emergent norms of collective responsibility and reciprocity’. A similar valorisa-

tion of social movement resistance leads to Barry Gills’ (1997, p. 11) call for academics to pos-

ition themselves ‘in conscious alignment with counter-hegemonic movements and dissenting

social forces’. A Foucauldian approach to resistance as counter-conduct challenges these

assumptions that power and resistance are located at opposing poles, and that they are embodied

in particular actors or groups.

An alternative approach starts from Foucault’s rejection of the concept of liberation, with its

assumption of an unencumbered human subject that can be freed or emancipated (Foucault,

1997, p. 282). His attention to various modes of subjectification—or subject-production—

through which relations of power and resistance interpenetrate and overlap, problematises the

assumption that the resisting subject pre-exists the act of resistance (Cadman, 2010, p. 540).

It is this which has led to his concept of resistance being regarded as ‘maddeningly indistinct’

(Kulynych, 1997, p. 328) and politically ‘troubling’ (Pickett, 1996, p. 466). In the particular

context of his work on governmentality, however, the lecture series Security, Territory, Popu-

lation, delivered at the College de France in 1978, elaborates usefully on ways in which resist-

ance might be theorised or described. Rather than attempts to seize political power or material

wealth, Foucault (2007a, p. 194) is interested here in ‘revolts of conduct’, resistance to processes

of governmentality, as distinct from revolts against political sovereignty or economic

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exploitation, and he takes as his example forms of resistance to the Christian Church in the

Middle Ages. He charts how, through movements of asceticism, mysticism, the return to Scrip-

ture, the adoption of eschatological doctrines, and the formation of closed holy communities,

these revolts of conduct mobilised ‘border-elements’ which had been marginalised by the

early Church (Ibid., pp. 204–215). Moreover, these border elements were later partially reincor-

porated within the official history of the Christian Church. When ‘threatened by all these move-

ments of counter-conduct, the Church tries to take them up and adapt them for its own ends’,

leading of course to the Reformation and counter-Reformation (Ibid., p. 215).

In discussing how to label such revolts of conducts, Foucault decides that ‘revolt’ is ‘both too

precise and too strong to designate much more diffuse and subdued forms of resistance’ (Ibid.,

p. 200). On the other hand, ‘disobedience’ is too weak, ‘insubordination’ is too closely linked to

the military, and ‘dissidence’ is ‘exactly suited’ but for the particular context it had acquired in

the Cold War world of the 1970s (Ibid., pp. 200–201). He, therefore, settles on the term

‘counter-conduct’ [French: contre-conduite]; namely a ‘struggle against the processes

implemented for conducting others’ (Ibid., p. 201). These struggles raise the perpetual question

of ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such

an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them’

(Foucault, 2007b, p. 44). This is ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ (Ibid., p. 45), or

‘the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this price’ (Ibid., p. 75), rather

than a complete or total rejection of government. Rather than looking for manifestations of

resistance ‘beyond government’ (Rose, 1999, p. 281), a counter-conducts perspective implies

that resistance is already present within government (Cadman, 2010, p. 540). Forms of resistance

rely upon, and are even implicated within, the strategies, techniques, and power relationships

they oppose since, according to Foucault, ‘the history of the governmental ratio, and the

history of the counter-conducts opposed to it, are inseparable from each other’ (Foucault,

2007a, p. 357).

In order to show how the idea of counter-conducts can be translated into a framework for ana-

lysing protests, Mitchell Dean’s (1999, p. 20) ‘analytics of government’ can be adapted in order

to construct an analytics of protest. Doing so focuses attention on the mentalities, practices, and

subjectivities which constitute forms of resistance.4 The following analysis of the Johannesburg

Summit protests in 2002 shows how the protestors both resisted and reinforced regimes of power

and government. As such it refocuses attention on what John Gibson (2008, p. 436) describes as

the ‘contingencies, limitations, and ambiguities’ of power and government, as manifested at

global summits, which a Foucauldian approach can highlight. This section is not a comprehen-

sive analysis of the summit protests or the movements involved, but instead works to illustrate

the potential benefits of a counter-conducts approach.

Counter-conducts at the Johannesburg Summit

The Johannesburg Summit, coming ten years after the Rio Earth Summit, was regarded by many

as one of the largest political meetings in human history (Munnik and Wilson, 2003; Wapner,

2003). Alongside the journalists, lobbyists, negotiators, and state representatives, many came

to Johannesburg to protest against a range of issues from lack of progress on the Rio ‘Earth

Summit’ agreements, to neo-liberal capitalist hegemony and entrenched global inequality.

The protests at the summit took diverse forms and various manifestations, but the most

visible expression of dissent was the march of the social movements on 31 August, when

between 20,000 and 25,000 people marched from the township of Alexandra to the summit

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convention centre, in opposition to ‘the hoax of the W$$D’ (Munnik and Wilson, 2003, p. 31)

and to label the South African state ‘the local and continental agent of imperialism’ (Appolis,

2002, p. 10). Alongside the mass march there were other forms of protest including a Greenpeace

banner hung on the Koeberg nuclear reactor near Cape Town, the noisy disruption of Colin

Powell’s speech in the Sandton Convention Centre, angry speeches in the Global People’s

Forum, a satirical Greenwash Academy Awards ceremony, a candle-lit march for freedom of

expression, and a pro-Palestinian demonstration outside a university campus over a scheduled

speech by Shimon Peres.

Rather than seeing these protests as ‘counter-hegemonic movements and dissenting social

forces’ (Gills, 1997, p. 11), their myriad forms and close interrelationship with forms of estab-

lished power relationships means they can be usefully viewed as counter-conducts. A counter-

conducts perspective also militates against seeing these protests as one-off or extraordinary

moments, but rather locates them within a longer context of social protest both in South

Africa, and globally. The carnivalesque elements of the marches in Johannesburg resonated

in a post-Seattle era of anti-summit protest, displaying reiterated, repeated, and reinvented prac-

tices and mentalities of dissent (Drainville, 2002, p. 18; O’Neill, 2004; St John, 2008). For South

African observers, the toyi-toying marchers invoked memories of apartheid-era township ungo-

vernability, as well as drawing upon growing discontent towards the governing African National

Congress’ (ANC) neo-liberal economic policies and the cost-recovery strategies of municipal

government, as well as pervasive and continuing environmental and social inequalities and

injustices. Commentators and marchers saw the 2002 march as inaugurating ‘a new phase of

struggle’ in South Africa (Ndung’u, 2003, p. 15; see also Appolis, 2002). The increasing fre-

quency of protest in South Africa post-2002, with peaks in 2004/5 and 2009, has led Doreen

Atkinson (2007, p. 73) to suggest that ‘the “young, unemployed, and angry” stratum of

society may become a permanent fixture of South African politics’. The Johannesburg

Summit provides an illuminating snapshot of these movements, and was itself a foundational

moment in their history. By viewing these protests as Foucauldian counter-conducts they can

be seen as assemblages of mentalities and practices which come to constitute dissenting subjec-

tivities, rather than attempts to seize political power or material resources by pre-existing actors,

interests, or social movements. The following sections, therefore, discuss these summit counter-

conducts in terms of their mentalities, practices, and subjectivities.

Mentalities of Protest

By mentalities I mean the forms of knowledge, rationality, and the fields of visibility employed

in protests and dissent. Just as Dean (1999, p. 11) observed that government is a ‘more or less

calculated and rational activity’, so is there a rationalised and considered element to protests and

forms of resistance. Even the decision to stage a protest at an international summit, for example,

involves planning, organisation, and justification, since it means engaging with, and perhaps pro-

blematising, summit discourses of hierarchy, vision and superiority. Summits explicitly invoke

the mountaineering metaphor, representing these meetings of the great and good as, literally, at

‘the summit’ of global politics. Summit delegates, therefore, perform their roles ‘at the highest

level’ and in full view of the international community and global media, and by joining them on

this highest stage protestors cannot help but reinforce the perception that this is where the peak of

politics is located (Constantinou, 1998, p. 24; Death, 2010b, p. 26).

The protests in Johannesburg explicitly sought to disrupt this summit performance of hierar-

chy and verticality by making visible the unsustainable living conditions of many South

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Africans, and illuminating the contrast between the deprived environs of Alexandra Township

and the spacious and modern Sandton convention centre where the summit was being held (inter-

view: Mashota, 2006). March organisers from the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) pointed out

that ‘the massive unemployment, lack of essential services, housing evictions, water and elec-

tricity cut-offs, environmental degradation, and generalised poverty that is present-day Alexan-

dra sits cheek-by-jowl with the hideous wealth and extravagance of Sandton where the W$$D is

taking place’ (SMI, 2002). Protestors also sought to invoke aesthetic, performative, and moral

registers of knowledge, sometimes in contrast to, and sometimes parallel to, more scientific

and ‘rational’ arguments (Death, 2010b, pp. 148–149; interview: D’Sa, 2006; O’Neill, 2004,

p. 240).

Yet the decision to protest at the summit was not taken lightly by protestors, who were well

aware of the political implications of choosing to engage with such a political event. Engaging

formally with the participatory processes within the summit was rejected by many protestors,

with some activists arguing that ‘besides being toothless [they] are a form of validating the

actual UN process’ (interview: Veriava, 2006). It was also pointed out that the broader ‘valor-

isation of the meetings of the elite and protests’ by activists since Seattle (if not before) has threa-

tened to overshadow the importance of day-to-day organising (Ibid.). On the other hand, the

mass march did have an important performative dimension, particularly for emerging move-

ments keen to establish their radical character and mobilising potential. The same activist was

keen to stress that ‘this was something of a coming out party for us’ (Ibid.). The performative

and symbolic significance of the march as an expression of identity and opposition was absol-

utely crucial in terms of the landscape of South African politics (Appolis, 2002; Bond, 2006,

pp. 109–115; Munnik and Wilson, 2003, p. 3). Indeed, since 2002 new struggles have frequently

invoked the movement of 31 August, or have asserted the foundational status of the march against

the Johannesburg Summit (Bond, 2006; interview: Ngwane, 2006).

Practices of Protest

Protests are not only considered mentalities; they are also concrete practices, techniques, and

technologies: the mass march, the placard, the podium speaker, the emblazoned t-shirt, mask

or costume, the barricade, and so on. The forms and logics of these practices often mirror and

invert more established techniques of government, and particular forms of protest also have

their own histories, traditions, and tactics which discipline their conduct. As such, whilst

many protestors saw their role as liberal dissenters seeking to hold governments to account,

create a space for autonomous civil society association, and lobby on particular interests,

other forms of protest demonstrated a more radical political imagination, demanding the over-

throw of the old order and the establishment of new political formations.

Liberal dissenters at the Johannesburg Summit aimed to make their voices heard by state

representatives, and many were able to take advantage of the extensive provision for UN

‘major groups’ to participate in the official proceedings, through multi-stakeholder dialogue ses-

sions or allotted speeches in the conference plenary (Death, 2010b, pp. 101–102; Munnik and

Wilson, 2003). When these participatory and deliberative mechanisms broke down, or when

summit organisers infringed civil liberties in the name of security, liberal dissenters took to

the streets. A peaceful candle-lit march from Witwatersrand (Wits) University campus in Johan-

nesburg on 24 August 2002, two days before the official opening of the summit, sought to protest

against the arrest and detainment of civil society activists from the Anti-Privatisation Forum

(APF) and the Soldiers Forum, and demanded that the South African state respect their

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constitutional rights to freedom of expression. The unexpected brutality of the police response,

and the firing of tear gas and stun grenades, attracted instantly sympathetic international media

coverage for the protestors (BBC, 2002; CNN, 2002; interview: Mashota, 2006). Activists filmed

the confrontation, arguing that ‘our rights are being trampled upon . . . it is a disgrace that during

the WSSD repression is going on like this’ (APF, 2002a). Such images, together with the

armoured cars and lines of black-suited police, and rumours of National Intelligence Agency

infiltration of movements, led many activists to recall the days of anti-apartheid struggle

(Munnik and Wilson, 2003, p. 3). These practices of liberal dissent resonated effectively with

international media audiences, and with other summit delegates, but they worked simultaneously

to re-inscribe the conventional view that state representatives, and the structures of liberal

democracy, were the proper target and focus of progressive politics. As Jessica Kulynych

(1997, p. 342) points out, such demonstrations can work to ‘verify system legitimacy by focusing

protest toward the formal legal structures of government’ (see also St John, 2008, p. 168).

In contrast, a strand of radical protest within the summit counter-conducts sought to challenge

the representative function of summit participants more directly. Led by the more activist groups

and individuals within the SMI—such as the Landless Peoples’ Movement and the Anti-Priva-

tisation Forum—protestors threatened to shut down the summit and ‘take Sandton’ (Kgosana,

2002; Ngqiyaza and Fatah, 2002). The Citizen reported that ‘marchers threatened the govern-

ment that if it “does not address our issues and do what the people demand, we will do to

them what we did to the apartheid government”’ (Venter, 2002). Such rationalities of resistance

adopted a starker view of politics as fundamentally bipolar. For Vula Mthimkhulu (2002),

writing in the civil society newspaper Global Fire, the summit presented an opportunity to

‘popularize the struggle against forces of evil’, and ‘the genuine enemies masquerading as com-

rades during the Summit’. In this vein more violent visions of political action were articulated,

including placards reading ‘Bomb Sandton’, and there was talk of occupying and blockading the

M1 motorway into Johannesburg (Misbach, 2002). Other radical activists on the left decried the

efforts of SMI marshals to ensure a peaceful march, lamenting that the end result was ‘domesti-

cated’ (Barchiesi, 2002, p. 15; interview: Veriava, 2006).

These more conflictual and radical protests explicitly drew upon on rationalities and reper-

toires of protest remembered or inherited from the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980s, when

the ‘political leadership of the liberation movement espoused a militant form of neo-Marxism

which stressed the hollowness of all state reforms, the impermissibility of participation in official

bodies and the centrality of mass insurrection’ (Fine, 1992, p. 78). Street blockades, tyre-

burning, and stone-throwing at the police have all reappeared in the arsenal of social movement

protest in South Africa since 2002, despite their condemnation by liberal dissenters. The tensions

between direct action, and symbolic or legal forms of protest, have been repeatedly played out

within South African social movements in recent years.

One example of these tensions, and an illustration of how they can discipline the form that

dissent takes, are the differing accounts of the candle-lit march from the Wits University

campus on 24 August. For activist-academics, such as Patrick Bond (2006, p. 109), it was a spon-

taneous solidarity march, coming at sunset after an International Forum on Globalisation teach-

in (see also Munnik and Wilson, 2003, p. 3). In contrast, more radical activists recounted how in

the original plan ‘it wasn’t going to be a candlelight march . . . it was supposed to happen in the

middle of the day’ (interview: McKinley, 2006). The lengthy speeches by the academics at the

teach-in, and their alleged reluctance to join the social movement march, led to a delay of six

hours and gave time for police to mobilise just outside the campus. According to McKinley

(Ibid.), ‘the size of the march was probably about half what it would have been if it had been

Counter-conducts in South Africa 431

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held at the time we were supposed to hold it. And the police would not have been mobilised

because it was going to be a surprise march’. For activists, such as McKinley, this incident

was an example of how international activists and academics, schooled in traditions of liberal

dissent, can discipline more radical local protests.

And of course, understandably to a certain extent, they wanted to have a peaceful march. Our com-rades were like, we’re going to go, it doesn’t matter, what’s going to happen. When the policestopped us, a lot of our comrades just wanted to break through and go. But what happened wasthat some of the more prominent international activists were like [shushing motion]. (Ibid.)

From a counter-conducts perspective, however, such an incident reveals how the lines between

power and resistance are never clear-cut, and complex dynamics between local and global acti-

vists, radicals and moderates, and the presence of the media, the state in the form of the police,

and the academy all come together to discipline dissent in certain ways. This disciplining should

not necessarily be regarded as pacification or domestication, but rather as evidence of the co-

constitution of relations of power and resistance.

Subjectivities of Protest

Through such protest counter-conducts, and the tensions, divisions, and tactical and strategic

debates they engender, various identities and subjectivities are performed and reproduced

(Kulynych, 1997). Whilst, as Roland Bleiker (2000, p. 275) notes, ‘modern thinking patterns

have engendered an urge to discover an authentic essence of dissent’, attempts to identify a

binary split between liberal dissenters and radical protestors are too simple and straightforward.

Such a division does not capture the complexity and rhizomatic nature of political identity in

South Africa, or elsewhere. Many of those who marched in Johannesburg in 2002—and in sub-

sequent protests—had roots in organisations linked or allied to the ANC, for example (APF,

2002b; Death, 2010b, pp. 141–142). Many were demanding more intensive state regulation

of the economy and environment. When the land activists chanted ‘Viva Mugabe’ at the

climax of the march, they were rebuked by anti-privatisation activists who reminded them

that Mugabe would not have tolerated such a public display of popular dissent (interview:

McKinley, 2006). On the other hand, the ANC and their allies regarded ‘responsible’ civil

society actors as important and legitimate partners in the National Democratic Revolution

(ANC, 2002). Rather than a binary conflict between the governed against the governors,

many of those who participate within, and protest against, global summits are bound together

in rhizomatic and ‘transversal’ networks of global governmentality (Bleiker, 2000, p. 274).

Summits are also vitally important sites for the constitution of state authority, and for the

manner in which they can discipline forms of dissent (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009; Gibson,

2008; St John, 2008, p. 183). Boyle and Haggerty (2009, p. 267) detail how the logistics of

mega-events such as summits are ‘opportunities for long-term security legacies, providing the

justification and finances for security and surveillance surges designed to leave an infrastructure

of urban surveillance’. The intensive security processes associated with summits work to disci-

pline participants, as the ‘spectacle of security also attunes individuals to new security realities

and helps to normalize the indignities of personal revelation associated with demands for docu-

ments and requirements to reveal oneself and one’s body through assorted screening practices’

(Ibid., p. 270). The consequences of this are both a strengthening of the coercive and sovereign

powers of the state—which somewhat counterbalances the claims of those who have credited

social movement activism with eroding the power of the state (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998,

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p. 36)—and the attendant disciplining of civil society (e.g. Gibson, 2008, p. 441). For Drainville

(2002, pp. 20–23), summits ‘can be understood to be part of the making of new transnational

subjects’ and function ‘to assemble a global civil society acceptable to globalizing elites’.

Summits are sites in which a whole range of practices are employed in order to produce well-

behaved, efficient and democratic civil societies, and the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 was

an excellent example of how the South African state sought to produce responsible local part-

ners—in direct contrast to the marginalisation of some protestors as uncivil, irresponsible,

and foreign-inspired. These binaries of civility/violence, partnership/disruption, and local/foreign were an important aspect of the creation of particular identities and subjectivities at

the summit.

First, state and media discourses at the Johannesburg Summit sought to draw a clear line

between responsible and peaceful civil society, and potentially violent, disruptive or criminal

elements. President Thabo Mbeki condemned protestors who aimed for the ‘collapse of the

Summit’, and people who ‘do not want any discussion and negotiations’ (Mbeki, 2002a). On

the day following the clash between the candle-lit marchers and the police, an ANC statement

condemned the ‘mindless violence’ which was the work of ‘at best the naıve, and at worst the

agent provocateur’ (ANC, 2002). Protestors were labelled routinely as violent, destructive,

and dangerous, and the South African Sunday Times memorably warned that ‘war veterans

from Zimbabwe, ultra-leftists, disgruntled former soldiers, right-wingers, international anar-

chists, Palestinian and Israeli campaigners and hackers’ were all coming to Johannesburg to

‘shut down’ the summit (Munusamy, 2002). The arrests of 196 protestors during the summit

(all of whom were subsequently released without charge), the use of water cannons and

rubber bullets, the attack on a peaceful candle-lit march in full view of the watching global

media, and the infiltration of social movement organisations by the intelligence services gave

some credence to activist warnings that ‘the ghosts of the South African past are returning

with a vengeance’ (SMI, 2002; see also Ndung’u, 2003). Activists recounted how police chan-

nelled pro-Palestinian marchers into an infamous district of Johannesburg, where journalists

would not follow, alleging that the police ‘knew, that if they go to Hillbrow the media, the

SABC and so forth . . . were not going to follow. So when we got to Hillbrow, that’s when

the cops attacked us’ (interview: Veriava, 2006; see also Ndung’u, 2003).

The second binary of partnership/disruption demonstrates how this rising tension is not

strictly between ‘state’ and ‘civil society’, but rather between those who exercise the right to

protest in ‘normal’, ‘respectable’, and ‘legitimate’ ways, and those on the other hand who are

perceived as ‘uncivil’, ‘rebellious’, or ‘disruptive’. As Gibson (2008, p. 442) recounts in his

analysis of the Miami protests of 2003, US policing practices ‘materialize the distinction

between good protest subjects, who march according to plans disclosed to the relevant auth-

orities well in advance, and bad, disruptive subjects, who require much harder and direct

forms of repression’. A similar polarisation in South Africa has fed into a broader discourse

of transformation, in which development is framed in terms of implementation, service delivery,

efficiency, and ‘getting things done’. Responsible non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and

constructive members of civil society have been enlisted in this project, cast as ‘assistants to

government in service delivery’, part of a ‘social partnership’ together with government and

business to further the ‘common national interest’ (Jensen, 2001, p. 98; Johnson, 2002,

p. 237). In a telling statement during the Johannesburg Summit, Mbeki (2002b) asserted that

‘the people waged a difficult, costly, protracted and successful struggle to end and negate

their role as a protest movement and to transform themselves into a united reconstruction and

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development brigade’. Those unwilling or unable to behave ‘responsibly’ or co-operate in this

development brigade are marginalised and excluded.

The third aspect of this disciplining of civil society by the South African state at the summit

involved dividing (literally and rhetorically) domestic groups from (implicitly suspect) global

movements. In an influential pre-summit article, the ANC’s Michael Sachs (2002) warned

that ‘as we approach the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg

later this year the Seattle movement will, in all likelihood, converge on our biggest city in a fes-

tival of dissent’, and cautioned that international NGOs might manipulate South African social

movements against the ANC. Among his concerns about the Seattle movement was that it was

manifested in a small ‘coterie’ of activists located in Southern capitals, unconnected to popular

and mass struggles, and funded by the North. He clarified that ‘I do not mean to argue that the

Seattle movement is inherently reactionary . . . However, given its Northern origin, its diverse

content and its amorphous form, Seattle’s progressive credentials should not be taken for

granted’ (Ibid.). Well-written and often nuanced, Sachs’ paper nevertheless both caricatures

and homogenises the so-called Seattle movement. Yet it is the repeated insinuation that protests

in Johannesburg were stimulated by foreign agitation rather than ‘real South African grievances’

that provides the discursive context for the violence of the state response. International activists

attending the summit were harassed and constantly monitored by security and intelligence

forces. The Greenpeace protest at the Koeburg nuclear plant, for example, was dismissed and

ridiculed by government minister Valli Moosa as ‘just frankly rich European kids behaviour’

(Turok, 2002, pp. 26–27). More seriously, activist Ann Everleth, a member of the National

Land Committee, was arrested on residency grounds for contravening the apartheid-era

Aliens Control Act (dating from 1991) whilst trying to organise legal representation for arrested

Landless Peoples’ Movement marchers, and informed she was being deported. She spent seven

days in solitary confinement, before a court secured her release (interview: Hargreaves, 2006;

Ndung’u, 2003).

In response to ANC claims that local groups were being led astray by foreign agents provo-

cateurs, local activists replied angrily that the bulk of those protesting were from the (South

African) Landless Peoples’ Movement and the (South African) Anti-Privatisation Forum (inter-

view: Hargreaves, 2006; interview: Mashota, 2006; interview: McKinley, 2006; interview:

Veriava, 2006). For march organiser Dale McKinley, ‘the SMI was a South African mass move-

ment’ (interview: McKinley, 2006). Yet there were, of course, many ‘foreign’ activists in Johan-

nesburg around the World Summit. Moreover, in terms of the practices and mentalities of

protest, older and more ‘local’ forms of resistance drawn from the anti-apartheid struggle

existed alongside newer repertoires of protest adopted from the so-called Seattle movement,

including satire, puppets, costumes, and street theatre (Appolis, 2002, p. 11; O’Neill, 2004; St

John, 2008). As such, identifying whether civil society is ‘local’ or ‘global’ is analytically

complex. It is also politically counter-productive.

The charge of foreign agitation made by the ANC has tended to produce a debate which has

descended into a rather circular and conservative argument about who is ‘more local’. The rather

defensive rhetorical flavour of the contest between the threat of foreign subversion versus the

legitimacy of local movements masks the extent to which domestic/international boundaries

are increasingly blurred in globalised localities like South Africa. Moments like the Johannes-

burg Summit demonstrate the difficulty of identifying where ‘the national’ ends and the ‘the

international’ starts. Dissent has become, in the words of Bleiker (2000, p. 2), a ‘transversal

phenomenon—a political practice that not only transgresses national boundaries, but also ques-

tions the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to constitute and frame the

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conduct of international relations’. Rather than a binary conflict between North and South, or

‘the people’ against ‘the rulers’, many of those who participated in and protested at the

Johannesburg Summit were tightly interconnected through rhizome networks of global

governmentality.

Conclusion

Seeing these protests as counter-conducts, as contingent and hybridised contestations of domi-

nant power relations and regimes of government, means refusing the dichotomy of either ‘pure

resistance’ or co-optation. Politics in South Africa is more complex than either statist imagin-

ations, or some radical intellectuals, wish to make out. Counter-conducts like the summit pro-

tests continually destabilise a reductionist binary in which social forces are either ‘with us or

against us’. This does not mean, however, that a critical attitude is impossible. By considering

the mentalities, practices, and subjectivities dissent produces, it is possible to draw some tenta-

tive conclusions regarding the contribution of various counter-conducts to progressive forms

of politics. Indeed, an analytics of protest is designed to enable such judgements—although

it refuses to provide a pre-set list of criteria for drawing these conclusions. They are inevitably

subjective, contingent, and contextual.

Foucault’s own preferences, especially in his later work, were towards forms of power relation

which were strategic and reversible, rather than states of domination in which power relations

have become sedimented, although he refused to develop this into a universal schema for pro-

gressive politics (Foucault, 1997, p. 283). Inspired by this stance, how do the Johannesburg

counter-conducts measure up? Whilst the mentalities and rationalities of the summit protests

did contest dominant political discourses by drawing attention to the injustices and unsustainable

living conditions of many South Africans, they also tended to reaffirm the World Summit and the

Sandton Convention Centre as the focus of politics, thereby renewing hierarchical and vertical

topographies of power. Similarly, the contested relationship with established and subaltern

regimes of knowledge was provocative and productive, but in the end many protestors framed

their demands in a manner comprehensible within dominant regimes of knowledge. Indeed,

such groups have often prided themselves on the ‘scientificity’ of their claims (Barry, 2001,

p. 167; interview: D’Sa, 2006). These dimensions of the summit protests tend to reinforce sedi-

mented power relationships.

The practices and tactics of the summit counter-conducts, and their attendant policing, worked

to construct a distinction between liberal dissent and more radical protest. These divisions were,

importantly, not between particular groups or movements, but reflect different forms of counter-

conduct. The forms of liberal dissent which sought to establish autonomous civil society spaces,

lobby state representatives within the summit negotiations, and press for the upholding of con-

stitutional rights, did manage to achieve some recognition of their grievances from official

summit, state, and global media audiences. However, as Ndung’u (2003, p. 12) concludes,

‘liberal bourgeois democracy encourages and even fosters dissent within the limits that

cannot threaten its own existence’. On the other hand, even those more radical protestors who

envisaged a more fundamental challenge to capitalist power relations often enact ‘practices of

dissent that are both radically subversive and, at the same time, reflective of the values that

underlie the modern forms of domination they seek to oppose’ (Bleiker, 2000, pp. 106–107).

Yet, it is the rigid, sometimes violent, and antagonistic demands of these radical protestors,

and their attempt ‘to draw the political lines more clearly’ in South Africa (APF, 2002b; inter-

view: McKinley, 2006) that appears more problematic in terms of a Foucauldian ethics of

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flexible and reversible strategic power relations. As Gibson (2008, p. 452) concludes, more

starkly adversarial rationalities of protest produce ‘resistance strategies that tend toward

morose and disempowering confrontations with police forces as a marker of resistance, a

descent into theatrical and prescriptive behaviour that quickly becomes ritualistic and devoid

of political content’. As he points out, there is always a danger that forms of dissent might

create new and oppressive power relations and, as a result, the ‘continual criticism’ of a Foucaul-

dian approach is an important corrective (Barry, 2001, p. 194). This conclusion, reached through

a Foucauldian notion of counter-conducts, is both productive and illuminating, yet it also reveals

why many on the radical left have felt uneasy with Foucauldian conceptions of resistance.

Acknowledgements

This article benefitted from the input of participants at the ‘Disciplining Dissent’ workshop held

at Bristol University in September 2009, as well as detailed comments from Lara Montesinos

Coleman, Karen Tucker, and three anonymous referees.

Notes

1 The description of the relationship between power and protest as ‘hybrid’, ‘transversal’, and ‘rhizomatic’ borrows

from authors such as Roland Bleiker (2000) and Jean-Francois Bayart (1993). These terms have been used by

philosophers, such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, to describe non-hierarchical, de-centred, heterogeneous

power relations, in contrast to the ‘arborescent model of thought’ in which power is conceptualised as a unitary

central trunk with diverse branches. See Deleuze and Guattari (1988, chapter 1).

2 This lacuna has been discussed in more depth elsewhere (Death, 2010a), but it will suffice to note here that many of

the core texts within the Anglo-governmentality literature (Dean, 1999; Miller and Rose, 2008; Rose, 1999) have

little to say about forms of protest, dissent, and resistance.

3 This research was based on fieldwork conducted between 2006 and 2008, and which involved over 45 semi-

structured interviews with participants in the summit (Death, 2010a, 2010b). This article draws on a limited

number of these interviews, particularly with some of the social movement activists.

4 Elsewhere I have deployed an analytics of protest organised around the categories of fields of visibility, regimes of

knowledge, techniques and technologies, and political identities and subjectivities (Death, 2010a, pp. 240–241).

This approach is broadly analogous to the mentalities, practices, and subjectivities described here.

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