Borders of Dissent

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Article

Borders of Dissent in South Africa: The

Bushbuckridge Saga

Sagie Narsiah and Brij Maharaj

IntroductionSouth Africa's democratically constituted new regional dispensation has

failed to foster 'spatial consensus'. While national 'spatial emancipation'has been achieved, the struggle for civil liberties continues at the locallevel. The struggle for the em ancipation of local comm unities is evidencedby the num erous disputes declared by indigenous pop ulations and interestgroups over the constitution of the different regions. Since the recon stitutionof the South African spatial matrix, there have been 14 such disputes over

new regional boundaries, the most intense being in the Taung/Kuruman/Kudumane areas of the Northern C ape and North W est provinces, the E astGriqualand area presently in the Eastern Cape province, but containedwithin KwaZ ulu-Natal provinc e, and the Bush buckridge (BBR) area of theNorthern Province. The importance of boundaries cannot be over-emphasised. They

... create the territorial spaces in which we live, distribute power topeople who influence our lives, determine where we vote, create taxbases, construct regional identities, facilitate or impede easy transport,and determine access to public services. (Griggs 1997:2)

More specifically, the boundaries between the Northern Province andMpumalanga which directly impact on the lives of the people of

Bushbuckridge (BBR) are fraught with political and emotional tension.

This is because people have attached certain meanings to these lines . These

mean ings have a geograph ical basis and have dem anded attention bec ause

they impact directly on the m aterial conditions of life of the people of BB R.The lines are viewed as exclusionary in that they exclude the people of BBR

from benefits w hich they perceive they would otherwise be en titled to if theboundaries were moved.

TRANSFORMATION 4 0 (1999) ISSN 0258-7696



Borders of Dissent in South Africa

This dispute in BB R is of interest prim arily because of the tension it hasgenerated at the local, regional and national levels around w hat is essentially

a geog raphica l qu estion. It is all the more significant in tha t while the BBRissue is situated in the post-apartheid era, it repre sents an interplay b etw een

apartheid, geography and identity which has to be deconstructed if anacceptable solution is to be found.

BBR cannot be separated from its apartheid legacy as encapsulated inthe process of 'ba ntustanisation ' which was itself ridden with conflict. T he

nature of this conflict w as quintessentially sp atial in natu re and was playedout at two levels: (i) between an d within establishm ent structures, and (ii)

between establishment structures and the mass democratic movement.

Thus, for example, BBR was an area over which a territorial struggle waswaged betwee n the Lebowa and Gazankulu bantustan s. M ore specifically,

the Lebowa gov ernment claimed land in BB R w hich fell under the controlof Gazankulu (Walt 1982, Surplus Peoples Project 1983). In addition,

struggles were waged between the bantustans and the provinces of theapartheid state, specifically b etween Lebow a and the Transvaal pro vince

(Surplus Peoples Project 1983). How ever, BBR has a history of broade rmobilisation against state structures. In 1989 it was reported that the

Lebow a police harassed com munity mem bers protesting against the scarcityof water supplies (National Land Committee 1990). The people of

Bu shbuckridge w ere among st the first to reb el against the ban tustan systemshortly after the unbann ing of the liberation movement in the early 1990s.

The struggle over the material conditions of existence in the area has

remained resonant in the post-apartheid dispensation. This struggle isencased within a com plex of politics at local, regional an d national leve ls.

At the local level, the people of BBR have formally organised into theBushbuckridge Border Crisis Committee (BB CC ). In 1993 , the Com mission

for the Delimitation/ Demarcation of Regions (CDDR), in revisiting thespatial matrix of South Africa, resolved to situate BBR in the former

Northern Transvaal (now Northern Province) rather than in the former

Eastern Transvaal (Mpum alanga provinc e). This 'spatial dec ision' w as notwell received by the people of Bushbuckridge who engaged the state to

revisit the decision and include them in M pu m ala ng a- he nce , the formationof the BBC C. The BBCC has taken on the character of a social mo vem ent

organisation, and has consistently opposed the central state 's dem arcation

of Bushbuckridge.Th is article aims to analyse the nature of th e border disp ute, p articula rly

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the role of the BBCC in this regard, and will demo nstrate that the dispu te

derives from historically-constituted m aterial conditions of life in the area.

The paper is divided into four sections. The theoretical context for the

paper relating to the nature of social mo bilisation is presented in the firstsection. Thereafter, the struggle in BBR is situated in an historical con text.

Post-apartheid regional delimitation is briefly discussed in the third w hile

the role of the BBCC is assessed in the final section.

Recent Trends in Social MovementsSocial mo bilisation is arguably the single most im portant factor w hich has

contributed to the realisation of a new democratic South African

dispensation. Such mo bilisation has occurred at the m icro-local, the me so-regional, and macro-national levels with the primary demand being the

inclusion of a disenfranchised majority in decision-making processes.

Social mobilisation is still an issue even in the post-apartheid era with

agendas which totally differ from that formulated against the apartheid

state. Similarly, the theoretical frameworks wh ich were used to und erstan d

the nature of social mobilisation under apartheid need to be modified in

trying to understand the nature of social mobilisation in the new era.

There is a vast literature on social movements and social movement

theory. As paradigmatic o rientations in the social sciences hav e shifted, so

too have the theoretical dimensions of social movement theory been

redefined. Escobar and Alvarez (1992:3) summarize the orthodoxy insocial movement theory cogently:

The old is characterised by analysis couched in terms of modernisationand dependency; by definitions of politics anchored in traditionalactors who struggled for the control of the state, particularly theworking class and revolutionary vanguards; and by a view of society

as an entity composed of more or less immutable structures and classrelations that only great changes (large-scale development schemes orrevolutionary upheavals) could significantly alter. In contrast, the newtheories see contemporary social movements as bringing about afundamental transformation in the nature of political practice andtheorizing itself. According to these theorists, an era that wascharacterised by the division of political space into two clearlydemarcated camps (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat) is being leftbehind. In the new situation, a multiplicity of social actors establishtheir presence and spheres of autonomy in a fragmented social andpolitical space. Society itself is largely shaped by the plurality of thesestruggles and the vision of those involved in the new social movements.

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More recent social movement theory may be classified into two main

categories: those referred to as resource-mobilization theory, which is

primarily A merican inspired, and those referred to as the identity-oriented

theory, influenced b y European post-structuralist currents (Mayer 1995).

The American resource-mobilization approach preceded the European

identity or new social movem ents approach (Foweraker 1995). Those who

subscribe to the resource-m obilization theory assum e that social mov emen tsare based on the conflict model of collective action. Collective action is

ubiq uitou s (Mayer 1995) with no fundam ental difference betwe en

institutional and non-institutional action because conflicts of interest are

built into institutionalised power relations. Collective action involves the

rational pursuit of interests by groups (Shefner 1995, Coh en 1985). Theformation of social mov emen ts cannot be explained in terms of the goals

and grievances of the m ovement and are dismissed as explanatory variables

by resource m obilisation theorists (M ayer 1995). The formation of socialmovements depends on changes in resources, dense social-network

organization, and opportunities for collective action (Cohen 1985,

Fow eraker 1995). Social movem ents are likely to succeed by the recognition

of the group as a political actor or by increased material benefits (Cohen

1985).

The resource-mob ilization mo del focuses on the conflict between those

who control scarce resources and those who mount a challenge to this

control (Jennett and Stewart 1990). W hile the resource-mobilization and

political-process p aradigm privileges systemic and m iddle-level variables

- such as political-opportunity space, ideological and organizational

resources, m obilizational networks, leadership, and so on — in explaining

the em ergence and developm ent of movem ents, they show scant regard for

the discursive practices and political identities continua lly bein g articulated

by social mo vem ents, missing the meanings and v alues intrinsic to popularpolitical action (Escobar and Alvarez 1992, Shefner 1995).

The identity-oriented paradigm, which has been influenced by post-

modernist and post-structuralist thought, examines social movements as

collective identities and has facilitatory ramifications for progressive

political action and transformation in two fundamental ways:

...[firstly], the widening of 'sociopolitical citizenship', linked topeople's struggles for social recognition of their existence and for

political spaces of expression, and secondly, the transformation orappropriation by the actors of the cultural field through their search for

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a collective identity and the affirmation of their difference and theirspecificity. (Jelin in Escobar and Alvarez 1992:4)

Furtherm ore, social action is unde rstood as the product of complex social

processes in which structure and agency interact in manifold ways and inwhich actors produce meanings, negotiate and make decisions. Generallyspeaking, social movements are seen to be engaged in a significant'political struggle in terms of access to the mechanism s of power b ut also[a] culturalfstruggle] in the search for different iden tities' (Jelin in E scobarand Alvarez 1992:4). Significantly, the identity paradigm denotes a shiftaway from pedantic class analysis and functionalist Marxism (Shefner1995, Slater 1997).

W hile this pape r adheres to the identity-oriented approach, we believethat the BBR situation is uniqu e in many ways and demands a theoreticalresponse which is novel and adequately addresses the contingencies of adispute in the post-apa rtheid era. The dispute in Bushbuckridge concernsthe struggle of a comm unity to access resources, to have their basic needssatisfied while at the same time waging a battle to determine their owngeograp hy, in terms of attaching meanings to lines which exist on a map.The meaning s they attach to these lines are all the more significant becau seof the historical situation. Sou th Africa is in a new dem ocratic dispensation

and it is important to the laity that decisions which are perceived to im pactdirectly on their lives be infused w ith dem ocratic content. It is here that theidentity paradigm can make a contribution.

The Geography of Apartheid: the case of Bushbuckridge

BBR is made up of the Mhala d istrict of the former Gazankulu bantu stanand the M apulaneng district of the former L ebowa bantustan. P rior to theestablishmen t of the self-governing Lebowa and Gazankulu bantustan s on

October 20 , 1972 and February 1, 1973 respectively, BB R was located inthe Eastern Transvaal sub-province and was administered by the Graskoplocal authority. When the bantustans were proclaimed, demarcation wasdetermined on the basis of ethnicity and language. Those who wereSepulani speakers were combined with the Pedis. They were thenadministered by the Lebowa bantustan, whose seat of government waslocated at Lebow akgom o. The Shangaan component, who spoke the Tsongalanguage, were classified as citizens of the Gazankulu bantustan andadministered from the bantustan capital at Giyani.

The grand apartheid schema, hatched by the National Party (NP) in the1950s, impac ted on the demograph ics of Bu shbuck ridge. From the 1960s,

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it was reported that members of the Shangaan ethnic group were dumpedin this area from wh ite farms an d plantations as w ell as from areas such asW hite River and Sabie, which had been proclaimed as white towns un der

the Group Are as Act of 1950 (Surplus Peoples Project 1983:17 7). BBR w astherefore a resettleme nt area — the dumping ground of the ' surplus p eo ple 'who were removed from so-called black spots:

People [were] moved to create nature reserves such as the Blyde RiverCanyon reserve; they have been moved for strategic reasons such asthe community opposite Bourkes Luck Potholes where there is an armybase; yet others have been moved in the deproclamation of townshipssuch as Graskop which was deproclaimed in 1978 - 2000 people weremoved from Graskop. (Surplus Peoples Project 1983:177)

With the proclamation of the bantustans in the early 1970s, the regimeintroduced the parameter of ethnic nationalism which had never existedbefore. Such politically-engineered spatial units destroyed communitiesand rende red indigenous po pulations as aliens in their places of birth. T heapartheid state created and sharpened the ethnic and linguistic cleavages by

spatial inscription. This new geography of apartheid was not accepted

passively by the oppressed. They voiced their displeasure against the

state's unilateral geographical strategy. However, attempts at persuading

the state to overturn its decision were met with brutality by the NationalParty government.

With the failure of the displaced people to convince the regime toabandon its grand apartheid strategy, and the opportunism of apartheidsurrogates in the form of the bantustan governments, artificial ethnicnationalism s cam e to the fore. The example of BB R is a case in poin t. Prior

to the proclamation of Lebowa and Gazankulu, ethnicity played a veryminor role in the social life of the resettled people of BB R. How ever, afterthe proclam ation of these bantu stans, BBR becam e the centre of a spate ofborder conflicts betw een the two bantustans, with Lebow a claiming land inBBR w hich fell under the control of Gazankulu (W altl9 82 ). As the S urplusPeo ple's P roject Report noted, 'B BR has been integrally mixed for years.People have intermarried, settled, been moved together, and are now

having to sort out ethnic differences' (1983:177).

In addition to being the object of a tug o'w ar betw een the two ba ntustan s,

there was also a groundsw ell of discontent regarding m aterial conditions inBB R. In the 1980s, the Surplus Peoples Project (1983:1 80) reported that in

BBR 'there w ere no taps, and people had to walk more than a kilometre toget water. Few peo ple had latrines... Cholera is endemic in the rainy seaso n.

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Furthermore, boreholes are a common supply of wate r'. BBR w as, underapartheid, a bantustan enclave in the midst of a region in which tourism,commercial farming and game reserves were flourishing (Addison 1997:99).

In the late 1990s, the material conditions in BBR remain unchanged.BBR has a population of about one million people w hich is increasing by2.5 per cent annually. Forty-four per cent of the population is under 15years old. The area is densely populated, w ith between 186 to 225 peo pleper square kilometre (Baumann 1998:325). Its economic role remainsprimarily that of 'an apartheid-era labour reservoir' (Baumann 1998:325).

The unemp loymen t rate in the area stands between 50-60 per cen t, withmost being in the 25-34 age group . Average household income per mo nth

is R6 30, way below the mean living level (MLL ) of R970. The m ain sourceof incom e is from m igrant w orkers, w ith 70 per cen t of econom ically activemales working outside the area, largely in Mpumalanga province. Such

workers, therefore, contribute in effect to the economic upliftment ofMpumalanga rather than the Northern Province. The people of BBR alsospend their money at the major consum er centre inNe lspruit, in M pum alangaprovinc e, rather than in Pietersburg, in the Northern Province. Nelspru it is,in terms of geography and accessibility, closer than Pietersburg.

Fu rther evidence of the material conditions in BBR is highlighted b y the

fact that in 1996 there were 335 schools, catering for a student populationof 196,727, with a pupil-classroom ratio of 54:1 in the Mhala d istrict and58:1 in the Mapulaneng district. The BBR area is also extremely under-resourced in terms of other basic services. There is no hospital (the ne aresthospital is 85km aw ay), only one clinic which is open from 8am to 4pm , andtwo police stations which cater for a population of approximately one

million people . The area lacks electricity, has an inadequate wa ter su pply,and its roads are poor. The Northern Province adm inistration h as provided

no additional facilities and little or no upg rading has taken plac e in the BBRarea.

Residents of BBR believe that the Northern Province is too poor toprovide for their development. T he Northern Province is the poo rest regionin the coun try, with an average per capita income of R 725. Forty eight percent of the population w ere unem ployed in 1996, while forty p er c ent ofhouseholds had no source of regular income. The infant mortality rate inthe province , 57 per 1000 births, is extremely high. The province also has

the lowest literacy rate and the fastest population growth rate in the country

(Levin 1996:362).

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BBR residents maintain that the developm ent needs of the area would be

better addressed if it were to become part of Mpumalanga. Its economicgrowth rate over the past decade has been 4.4 per cent, compared to the

nation al av erage of 1 per cent. It is the fourth-richest pro vinc e in Sou thAfrica with an average per capita income of R5 932 (Newham 1996:21-2).

W hen dem ocratic governance becam e a fait accompli in 1994, BBR did

not appear on either the development agenda of the Northern Province or

M pum alanga. This was because the No rthern Province had expected BBR

to be transferred to Mpum alanga, while the latter was reluctant to include

the area in its develop ment plans before a formal transfer was effected. Th ismeant that services in the area came to a virtual standstill. This state of

affairs existed until 19 97, with the BBR not be ing included in the bud gets

of either pro vinc e. It is little wond er therefore th at the peo ple hav e been so

vociferous at their marginalisation.

W hile the people of BBR languish in a spiral of underdevelopm ent, thewhite component of the area, Hoedspruit, continues to reap the fruits of ademo cratic dispensation in the form of increased tourism and developmen t.For exa mp le, the number of game lodges in the area has increased from 25to more than 80 within the past two years (Ad dison 1997). Significantly,Hoe dspruit is not lobbying to be included in Mp um alanga and is content to

be part of the Northern Prov ince. The town co ntinues to prosp er in a post-apartheid dispensation. Vast sums of corporate capital are being p um pedinto the area to take advantage of the huge dem and for the 'African-sa fari'experience and more land is being enclosed by electric fences andcommunities are being shut out. It is a case of history repeating itself:

The capitalisation of land continues a process begun many years ago.When white miners and farmers moved into the area over a centuryback, indigenous people were impelled into wage labour and becamehabitual migrants working in mines and cities far away. Thedevelopment of the Kruger Park accelerated this process, then camethe forced resettlement of blacks into overcrowded hom elands. Todaythe poor of this area are seeing more land enclosed once again foranimals. (Addison 1997:106)

The irony is that tourism, which is the lifeblood of the economy here, has

suffered directly as a result of the border dispute. Hotels in the nearby

Hazyview area have reported minimal occupancy rates (Beeld June 30,

1997), reducing potential employment opportunities for the unemployed.

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Post-apartheid Regional D ecimation

In the early 1990s, with the demise of the apartheid state, the unbann ing ofthe liberation movem ent and the dawning of a new era, the people of BB R

were optimistic that they would finally be able to determine their owngeog raphy. During the drafting of the Interim Constitution, a Com missionfor the Delimitation/Demarcation of Regions (CDDR) was appointed toaddress the issue of bantustan boun daries and the reconfiguring of regionsin South Africa. Submissions were invited from all interested parties. Thepeople of Bushbuckridge argued for inclusion in the Eastern Transvaalprovince (now called Mpumalanga).

The CDDR proposed a nine-region dispensation to replace the four

provinces and the myriad of bantustans. When the CDDR demarcated theborders of Northern Province and Mp umalanga, it separated BBR from th ewhite commercial farming and game ranching areas of Mpumalanga. Theborder looped southward, following the old homeland borders (Addison1997:101). This spatial inscription left the chasm between rich and poorunadjusted. It could not, however, reach consensus on all boun daries andreferred certain disputed areas to the Negotiating Council for a finaldecision. These includ ed BBR w hich w as included in a list of affected areaswhich formed p art of Schedule 1 of the Interim Constitution.

In terms of the Interim Constitution, a referendum could be held todetermine the views of the residents in a disputed area. To that end itstipulated th at a petition had to be lodged w ith the Secretary of Parliamentand that within three months of this the referendum had to be held. It alsostipulated that any such petition h ad to be lodged w ithin six months of thecommencement of the Interim Constitution. In May 1994, a ReferendumFacilitation C omm ittee (RFC) was formed in BBR. It was expected that th ereferendum would be conducted under the auspices of the Independent

Electoral Commission (IEC). However, when the necessary proceduresregarding the referendum w ere implem ented, the people of BB R were onceagain me t with resistance. The premiers of the Northern and Mpum alangaprovinces came to Bushbuckridge and came out against a referendum onthe grounds that it was a purely po litical issue and thus could be solved viapolitical mechanisms, would cause instability and be too costly.

In an attempt to resolve the dispute, meetings were conducted withrepresentatives of the people of BBR and the premiers of both provinces

accompanied by their Executive Committee members (MECs). It was atone such meeting that it was agreed that no referendum wo uld be held. It

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was also agreed that ANC structures in BBR would be consulted to decideon the border issue. These subsequently met and ratified the commonconsensus of including Bushbuckridge in Mpumalanga (Bushbuckridge

Border Crisis Com mittee 1997). This decision was accompanied by eloquentenunciations of the right of the people to determine their own destiny. Adocum ent to that effect was adopted and signed by the provinc ial authorities

, at the M apulaneng College of Education. This, however, was not the endof the saga.

In 1997 when President M andela signed the Final Con stitution Act 108of 1996, no provision was made for border changes. The absence ofenabling legislation to facilitate b oun dary changes mean t that the claims of

the peop le of BBR had no co nstitutional basis. A new era of struggle th us/ beg an for the people of BBR.

The Role of the Bushbuckridge Border Crisis Com mittee

On 20 April 1997, when it became apparent that their demands were noibeing addressed constructively, the residents formed the BushbuckridgeBorder Crisis Committee (BBCC) to engage the state. It was formed as aproactive bo dy to engage the state in purposeful dialogue with the primaryobjective of excising BBR from Northern Province and incorporating it

; into Mpumalanga. Its membership consists of local blue-collar workers,teachers and businessmen . Its leadership is largely m iddle-class. A ccordingto Prince N dlov u, a teache r and spokesperson for the BB CC , the objectivesof the organisation are:

: To primarily facilitate the incorporation of Bushbuckridge intoMpumalanga; to unite the people of Bushbuckridge; and to be the solemouthpiece of the people on the border issue. Furthermore, the BBCCintended to enter into agreement and form alliances with other interested

, parties to galvanise support for its cause. (Interview, December 1997)

•' Altho ugh there have bee n such calls from some quarters, the BBC C is notmo tivating for a separate regional entity. Recently, however, after the lossof its court battle w ith the state, there w ere isolated calls for the declarationof a 'People's Republic of Bushbuckridge'.

The BBC C is concep tualised by its mem bers as providing an alternativeto the geographical identity imposed by the state, one couched in a

• com mu nal construction/d etermina tion of the region of which the peop le ofBBR want to be a part. In so doing, the people of BBR - through the

; surrogate of the BBCC - are attempting to impose their meanings ofterritoriality. In such a way the map engineered by a panel of experts is

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being infused with local democratic content. The apartheid state neverallowed black peop le to engineer space in this way.

The key question, however, is wh at are the meanings of territoriality tha t

the peop le of BBR wan t the state to acknowledge? Und er the ban tustanadm inistration, Lebow a was viewed as efficient in the provision of services

in the area while Gazankulu was seen as corrupt and inefficient. Theinability of the Northern Province to provide services reflects the apartheidexperience and thus the desire to be part of a region that provides efficientservices. Escobar (1992:69) has emphasized that social movements mustbe seen equally and inseparably as struggles over meanings as well as

material conditions, that is, as cultural struggles. The discontent of the

people of BBR has a ma terial basis . The perceived failure of the N orthernProvince adm inistration to address the m aterial conditions of the peop le ofBBR has led to them to seek an alternative means of addressing their need s- incorporation into M pum alanga province . There is thus amongst the BBRa perception that not only will their material conditions be addressed, bu t

also that the community will prosper under the growth regime ofMpumalanga.

Mpumalanga has enormous growth potential with the MaputoDevelopment Corridor running through the province. Mpumalanga province

will be a primary beneficiary of this project. The inclusion of BBR in theprovince will ensure that some of the cor ridor 's developmen t benefits w illaccrue to the area. Hence, an implicit objective of the BBCC is that

Bushbuckridge be included in the accumulation regime of Mpumalangaprovince.

The claim of the BBC C is also based on ethics; they were prom ised bythe premiers of the No rthern and M pumalanga prov inces that their w isheswould be hon oured. Fu rthermore, it is viewed as m orally ju st to honour the

wishes of a comm unity who were brutalised under an apartheid geograph y.Indeed, it is the promises which were made to the people of BBR thatformed the basis of a court battle between the BBCC and the state. TheBBCC h ad been threatening since 1997 to take the state to court. H owev er,this did not materialise until Octobe r 1998, wh en the case came before theHigh C ourt in Pretoria. The decision to resort to the courts was p romp tedby two factors. One was the lack of progress tow ards an acceptable solution

to the dispute while the second related to questions being raised by thecomm unity concerning the effectiveness of the BBCC and its leadership tomanage funds which were collected from the community for the expresspurpose of taking the state to court.

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The BBC C embodies the comm unity of BBR. The defeat of the BBCC ,

therefore, meant that the community of BBR had suffered a setback inhav ing their spatial identity acknow ledged by the state. One of the prob lems

arising out o f this conflation of the identities of the BBR and the BBCC h asbeen that those who are members of the BBCC as well as the African

Nationa l Congress (ANC ) were instructed in 1998by the AN C to step downfrom representing the interests of the Crisis Com mittee (City Press, April

26 ,1 99 8) . This is primarily because in identifying and leading the struggleof the people of BBR for incorporation in Mpumalanga, the BBCC has

identified the AN C-led governm ent - in its nation al and regiona l forms -as its adversary. According to Tourain e, such reconstitutions w ithin social

mo veme nts are not uncom mon. R ather, he argues that:...social movements are always defined by a social conflict, that is, byclearly defined opponents. Actors often live their own actions first ofall as a rupture with predominant cultural values or institutional roles.(1985:772)

Historically, the ANC w hich has a virtual monopoly on power in the region,has never favoured a regional dispensation. The policy inclination of theAN C has been that of a unitary state. How ever, changing political dynam icsat the local level demanded that the ANC espouse a regional or pseudo-

regional policy in the run-up to the first democratic elections of SouthAfrica in 19 94. The AN C governm ent, therefore, has reluctantly espo useda regional policy and it is unde rstandable that their response to the revisionof regional boundaries has been gua rded. The ANC-led governm ent has,how ever, been caugh t betw een its own ideology and the realities of existinglegislation and agreem ents, as well as the political contestation between itsown officials.

State Responses to the BBCCOn Augu st 3 1 , 1995, the provincial legislature of the Northern Province

passed a motion that BBR be included in Mpumalanga and secondly, thatGroblersdal be included in Northern Province. On May 18, 1995, the

provincial legislature of Mpumalanga resolved that BBR be included in

M pum alanga. T wo days later it approved the transfer of Groblersdal to theNorthern Province. The legislatures of the two provinces were thus in

agreem ent, which w as one of the requirem ents of the Interim Co nstitution.It was therefore possible to proceed with the next step in the process,

nam ely, to effect an amendm ent to the Interim Constitution. In July 1996,the then Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development,

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Valli Moosa, submitted an enabling Bill to Cabinet. It read:

To amend the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, soas to effect certain amendments to the boundaries of the Northern

Province and of the Province of Mpumalanga; and to provide formatters connected therewith. (Republic of South Africa 1996b:l)

The Bill was approved by C abinet and then tabled in parliam ent. It was not,how ever, debated in the parliamen tary portfolio com mittee, and was heldover to be debated in the first session of parliamen t in 1997. Meanw hile, theinterim constitution had been succeeded by the final con stitution that madeno provision for boundaries to be changed. It subsequently emerged thatthe Minister did not push the Bill through the parliamentary portfolio

comm ittee because he w as sure that he wou ld not be ab le to rally the two-thirds support needed to facilitate the transfer, even though the NationalParty and the Pan Africanist C ongress supported the inclusion of BBR intoMpumalanga.

There was also conflict within the ANC caucus itself, specificallybetween representatives of the Northern Province and Mpumalanga. Theconflict was highlighted by what many subsequently saw as a last-ditchattempt by M pumalanga P remier M atthews Phosa to get the Senate to ruleon the issue. In his address to the Senate, Phosa argued that:

...the issue of the finalisation of border disputes, and specifically theareas in question on the border of Mpumalanga and the NorthernProvince, needs to be addressed. We can no longer starve thesecommunities of good governance and services, (cited in HansardAugust 22, 1996:2807)

The failure to resolve the border conflict can be traced to the politicalmanoeuvring which took place between the provincial legislatures ofNorthern Province and Mpumalanga. The attempt at a political solution,removed from the ambit of civil society, complicated what should have

been a straightforward transfer of BBR from the No rthern to M pum alangaprov ince. After an agreement had been signed to effect the transfer in 1995,nego tiations took place behind closed d oors, where it was decided that thetransfer o f BBR be linked to a transfer of Groblersdal an d Marble Ha ll fromMpum alanga province to the Northern Province.

When the comm unity of G roblersdal became aware of such a move, theydismissed the decision, arguing that they were content to remain in

M pum alanga. According to the Report of the Select Com mittee on L iaison

with Provinces (SCOLP), the biggest meeting that it attended in M pumalangawas at Groblersdal, where the community were adamant that they wanted

48




to remain part of Mpumalanga, and submitted six memoranda to thecommittee to support their position. Furthermore, the community at

Groblersdal formed the Eastern Transvaal Joint Forum Alliance, which

motivated aggressively against inclusion into the Northern Province.

Groblersdal, which under the apartheid regime was designated as awh ite tow n, was controlled by the Na tional Party, which was oppo sed to its

excision from Mpumalanga. The Northern Province, however, lobbiedsupport and even tually persuaded the legislature of M pumalanga to pass a

resolution classifying Groblersdal as part of No rthern Prov ince (The Star,

May 8, 1997).

The intransigence on the part of the two ANC-controlled provinces

eventually led to the issue being referred to the National W orking Com mittee(NWC) of the organisation. In May 1997, the ANC's NWC decided thatBBR w ould remain in the No rthern Province. This did not settle the dispute .

The BBCC met with President Nelson Mandela on June 10, 1997 andunsuccessfully appealed to him to reverse the decision of the NW C (Beeld,

June 11, 1997). As the issue remained unresolved, a task team consistingof all role play ers w as constituted to revisit the issue.

The events outlined above reveal that there were two different agend as

relating to the incorporation of BBR into Mpumalanga. The agenda of thepeople of BBR was simp ly for the material conditions of their existence tobe uplifted. However, at the regional governmental level, it was thepoliticking between the Northern Province and Mpumalanga which wasthe prim ary reason for the lack of progress on the issue with some mem bersof both legislatures fearing they would lose their positions if the transferwent throu gh. As a means of entrenching their positions, some m em bers ofthe legislatures opposed the BBCC .

The national government has sought to retain the present dispensationprimarily in the cause of party unity. It has tried to quell the political

infighting b ut, in so doing , has ignored the claims of the BBR com mu nity.

In an attempt to preven t fractures within the party in the regio n, it has alsogiven an ultimatum to ANC mem bers serving on the BBCC to step down

from it or leave the party. Finding itself in a catch 22 situation, gove rnmenthas basically resorted to a constitutional position, namely that the bounda ries

as agreed upon prior to the Final Constitution remain extant. In so doing,it has also tried to ensure that other communities in the region do not

motivate for border changes.

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Although the government may have been caught in a no-w in situation,it does not detract from its incomplete understanding of the role ofboundaries, nor its disregard for the oppression that people experienced

under apartheid. The right of local people to jettison the baggage ofapartheid and to fashion for themselves their ow n spacial destiny ha s beendenied. The government has discounted the role of identity formation and

social difference, and most importantly, the geog raphical basis of identityformation. Instead the government has, for its own advan tage, en sured thatregional political relations remained uncom promised, b ut by disregardingthe claims of the people of Bushbuckridge.

In October 1998, the BBCC took the state to the High Court. It had

decided to petition the courts to instruct parliament to support a m otion toinclude BBR in Mpumalanga. The reason for this move was that the onlyway to change provincial boundaries was by a two-thirds majorityparliamentary vo te in favour of such a chan ge. The move failed when thejudge ruled it could not dictate what is essentially the prerogative of theparliament. Furtherm ore, becau se the political promise had not translatedinto an administrative decision, the court could not rule in favour of the

BBCC.

What does the story of the BBC C tell us about localised social movem ents?It wou ld seem that the success of localised movem ents is highly dependen ton the nature of th e devolution of statepow er. While provincial governmentsin South Africa are awarded certain pow ers, they are ultimately subject tonational legislation and decision making. Consequently, localised socialmovem ents are perhaps mo st successful w hen state power itself is localised.Such movements, as the case of the BBCC illustrates, may also bedisadvantaged through limited access to financial and other resources.

Does this mean that the BBCC has no real import? W e would a rgue that

the BBC C is an important social movement organ isation given its capacityto represent local needs, which perhap s, given adequate financial resourcesand greater networking capacity, could achieve its stated goals. In No vem ber1998 at a report-back m eeting to the residents of Bushbuckridge, the B BC Cwas given a renewed m andate to explore other avenues to get the state tochange the boundaries; indeed, the comm unity called for an intensification

of the struggle. The legitimacy of the movement therefore, has not beenopen to question and it continues as an advocate of the co mm unity on the

issue of the bound ary change.

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ConclusionBoundary disputes are neither unique to, nor a consequence of, the new

democratic South African dispensation. The apartheid state's paranoid

pursu it of race purity and spatial regim entation of South Africa resulted inpeople of colour being brutally uprooted and their land unceremoniouslyappropriated. The creation of these artificial spatial entities resulted in the

formation of new townships and the redefinition of magisterial districts.The magisterial districts were the spatial premise of the apartheid state'sfour provinces and the nine 'developm ent reg ion s' of the 1980s. W hen the

new nine region dispensation for South Africa wa s proposed, some observerswarned that hastily planned regions could well be a recipe for disastrous

and violen t fissipation along ethn ic, racial or party political lines.The BBR saga illustrates that the struggle for political liberation is not

cong ruent w ith the strjiggle fo r' spa tial liber ation ', particularly at the loc alor regiona l level. The refusal of the state to revisit the issue of bo undaries

is a clear indic ation of its intention to freeze spatia l m eanings and to imposeits own conception of space. In the process, it has marginalised and

repressed voices at variance with its national view . In effect, the struggleof the people of BBR has been a struggle to have their meanings of

territoriality and boundaries accomm odated by the state. These struggles,how ever, are always subject to m ore centralised state intentions, as well as

existing legislation and institutional power struggles.

The process of region demarcation has erased the 'grand apartheid'schema of bantustanbalkanisation. However, the spatial inscription whichpres cribe s the separation of areas of abject poverty from areas of affluencepersists. It has been the contention of this paper that the struggle of thepeople of BBR is rooted in the material conditions of their existence. It isapparent tha t service provision in the area is highly inefficient and in m any

ways not different from their experience under apartheid. The materialbasis of pove rty thus remains uncom prom ised. The prom ise of the AN Chad created a sense of expectancy which was misplaced by the subsequentmarginalisation of the community of BBR. The struggle of the people ofBBR is to re-define provincial borders so that their material conditionscould be addressed.

The BBC C has been the conduit through w hich the demands of the BBRcom mu nity for developm ent and the upliftmen t of m aterial conditions hav e

been expressed. The community construe the alteration of boundaries ascentral to these issu es. The BB CC has engaged the state at the national and

51




regional levels in order to hav e the bou nda ry change effected. In effect, itis an attempt to devolve democratic decision mak ing to the regional or locallevel, ie it is a call for the restructuring of relations between the national

state, the regional and the local levels. W hile the BBCC has largely failedin its primary objective, it has w on some significant concessions from thestate. Perhaps the most significant is the proposed provision of servicesacross regional boundaries.

The BBCC also called for constitutional reform. At present, theconstitution makes no provision for the change of boundaries. There is a

need for legislation to be introduced which will enable communities,particularly those brutalised under apartheid, to determine their own

geography. There is also a need for a body to be set up to address thegrievances of communities regarding border disputes, rather than the ad

hoc commissions of enquiry at present. This would have the effect ofbroadening the scope of democratic participation.

In the struggle for 'spatial ju sti ce ', the action of the people of BB R is achallenge to the authority of the state. A challenge to the authority of thestate is at the same time a challenge to the w ay space is produced. A s P ileand Keith assert:

...authority produces space through, for example, cutting it up,differentiating between parcels of space, the use and abuse of bordersand markers, the production of scales (from the body, through theregion and the nation, to the globe), the control of movement withinand across different boundaries. (1997:3)

In challenging the authority of the state as the sole determinant of spatial

production, the people of Bushbuckridge have posed important questionsabout the process itself. In effect, the entire process of regio nal dem arcation

has been brought into question. The initial process of regional dem arcationhas been shown to be a product of political expediency rather than

dem ocrat ic consultat ion. C omm unal dissent is a pro duc t of themarginalisation of the polity and indicative of the artificiality of the

proce ss. It is imperative that the state take cognisance of the discontent atthe grassroots, revisit regional demarcation and institute constitutionalreform.

The apartheid experience was defined by authority, patronage andexclusion. The aim of the post-apartheid state should be 'the creation of

bases for the construction of a new civil society, in which the majority,

through its own autonomous social and political organization, is able to

52




exercise decisive influence over the state' (Slater 1986:165). However, this

reality has not been extended to the people of BBR.

Social movements have been indispensable to the democratic project in

South Africa. In the post-apartheid era, social movements such as the

BBCC are of vital import in the democratization of the state, the broadening

and deepening of civil society and the creation of institutions which

facilitate and enhance democratic participation.

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Documents

Borders of Dissent