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Public Organization Review: A Global Journal 1: 465486 (2001)# 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in The Netherlands.

Dissecting Public Sector Corruption in Bangladesh:Issues and Problems of ControlHABIB ZAFARULLAH [email protected]

School of Social Science, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia

NOORE ALAM SIDDIQUEEDepartment of Political Science, International Islamic University, Malaysia, 53100 Kuala Lumpur,

Malaysia

Key words: corruption, accountability, public sector, Bangladesh

Abstract

The public sector in Bangladesh is ridden with corruption of various dimensions and shades. Apart from

bribery, rent-seeking and misappropriation of funds, the performance of public organizations is

adversely affected by a host of other factors like excessive lobbying, delays in service provision,

pilferage and larceny, irresponsible conduct of officials, bureaucratic intemperance, patronage and

clientelism. The several institutional mechanisms to combat administrative malfeasance are rendered

ineffective by a non-committed political leadership, a blased bureaucracy, weak accountabilitystructures, and unproductive legislative labors. The public body for controlling corruption is itself

associated with all sorts of malpractices and conducts its affair most unprofessionally. Despite several

attempts, the constitutionally authorized ombudsman is yet to find its place in the governance

framework.

The worldwide concern for public sector corruption is phenomenal. Internationalorganizations, donor agencies, civil society activists and, in particular, academicshave been unrelenting in their crusade for making public representatives appreci-ate the damaging effects of corruption and urging them to take concrete andrealistic measures to reduce its incidence in the public domain. Yet, very few

governments, especially those in developing countries, appear to be totallycommitted in initiating strategic moves to make public organizations and theirpersonnel corruption-free and unquestionably accountable for their conduct.

The present concern with corruption can be attributed to a number of factors.First, there is a widespread perception that corruption is not only ubiquitous buthas recently assumed dangerous proportions in some cases. Secondly, there iscurrently a greater awareness of the devastating effects of corruption on nationallife. Thirdly, corruption in administration is seen as a serious restraint on the abilityof a government to accomplish some of its vital tasks and functions.


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The World Bank recognizes the harmful effects of corruption. It argues that thepractice

weakens public service delivery, misdirects public resources, and holds backthe growth that is necessary to pull people out of poverty . . . [Corruption]undermines the driving forces behind reform . . . Vital resources are siphonedoff shore. Foreign investors turn away in frustration . . . [It] reduces publicrevenue, undermines public trust, and weakens the credibility of the state(World Bank 2000a, p. xiv).

It is common knowledge now that corruption retards economic growth, distorts thepolitical system, debilitates administration and undermines the interests andwelfare of the community. Corruption is a great impediment to development asit adversely impacts upon resource allocation and project design, selection andimplementation. Public sector management is destabilized and rendered ineffec-tive because of corrupt practices like kickbacks, patronage, and inconsistentapplication of rules and abuse of official information (ADB, 1998, p. 23). Thephenomenon leads to the forfeiture of public trust at the altar of private gain.Furthermore, any constructive initiatives toward political and economic liberal-ization are thwarted by both systemic and personal malfeasance in the publicsector.

Bangladesh presents a typical case where corruption has found a remarkably

fertile ground, despite the existence of several mechanisms, albeit ineffective, fortackling it. Presently, corruption in Bangladesh is so pervasive that it has evokedwidespread condemnation from within the country as well as from outside.Externally, it has already caused a national embarrassment as the country hasbeen branded as the most corrupt nation in the world (Daily Star, 28 June, 2001).Internally, reports and evaluations prepared and commissioned by local thinktanks have already painted an ominous picture of public sector integrity. Themedia and civil society groups are vociferous in denouncing the present level ofcorruption in administration.

The gravity of the problem is conceivable, as public figures, including thecountrys President and the Prime Minister, have spoken of corruption reachingendemic proportions (Daily Star, 2 August 1999; 10 July and 14 September 2000).International agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and

the European Commission are concerned with the extent and intensity of corrup-tion in the countrys public sector. The World Bank, in particular, has pointed tobribery, kickbacks and similar under-the-table payments on investment levels andmisallocated resources as causes for denigrating the countrys developmentalpotential (Reported in the Holiday, 7 April 2000). According to TransparencyInternational, Business International, Political Risk Services and the WorldEconomic Forum, Bangladesh has ranked for several years now among themost corrupt nations in the world (Temple, 1999). All this reflects the extent anddepth of corruption in Bangladesh and the urgency of the need to control and

466 H. ZAFARULLAH AND N.A. SIDDIQUEE


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combat the menace if the objectives of economic growth and social justice are tobe realized.

In this paper we view corruption in government not simply as misappropriation offunds, bribery or rent-seeking but also as a phenomenon that encompasses otheraspects of administrative ethics. Any action that distorts normal administrativebehavior is tantamount to corruption. Thus, a public official who deviates from theprescribed norm, discriminately administers a law or adopts a subjective orpartisan approach in dealing with clients is perceived to be morally irresponsible.

The main objective of this paper, however, is not to conceptualize corruption butto present an overview of the malady in Bangladesh and examine the institutional

mechanisms available to combat it. More specifically, it seeks to critically examineand analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the public sector. Thepaper argues that the existing mechanisms are grossly inadequate or futile and,therefore, there is a need for initiating a serious anti-corruption drive in conjunctionwith more definitive measures to reform public institutions and strengthengovernance.

1. The nature and incidence of corruption

Public sector corruption is not a new routine in Bangladesh. It has been an integralart of bureaucratic culture since pre-colonial times,1 but its incidence has intensi-

fied following the nations independence in 1971. Over the past few decades, ithas assumed many forms2 and has engulfed the entire social fabric. While, in thepast, only a few departments were known for corrupt officials and practices, thevice has now spread throughout the governmental structure and no public agencyis spared of its influence. A survey3 has revealed that corruption is now endemic,chronic and all pervasive. The police department is the most corrupt department,followed by customs, taxation and the national secretariat (Ahmad, 1997). Suchfindings, by and large, have been supported by other subsequent studies/surveysconducted by Transparency International, Bangladesh (TIB) and other agencies.The conclusion that one may draw from the available evidence is that most of theservices offered by the public sector are in the clasp of unfettered corruption.

1.1 Corruption large and small and the magic of Tadbir

There is a common allegation that the bureaucracy in Bangladesh is corrupt to theextent that even the simplest things like obtaining birth and death certificates fromrelevant authorities, filing a complaint with the police, obtaining a passport, gettinga driving license, registering a vehicle, getting admission into public hospitals,acquiring a statement on bank and housing loans require some lubrication ormonetary inducements. Other complex matters like getting utility connections,getting a contract or lease, obtaining approval for a building plan, obtaining jobs in

DISSECTING PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION IN BANGLADESH 467


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government departments and/or managing transfers to preferable locations invari-ably require strong lobbying, often accompanied by sizeable bribery. Thisculture usually known as tadbir (promoting ones case) has immobilized theadministration as virtually nothing happens without the application of this device.Files wait for tadbir and in its absence they have a strange tendency of gettingmisplaced or even lost forever (Anisuzzaman, 1985, p. 21).

At times, delays in providing service, lack of easy access to service providersand procedural complications force many clients to use tadbir. It has a magicalpower of facilitating action and making possible what is apparently improbable.4

This has created a group of professional brokers and middleman in every

government agency. A citizen in need of a service at any public agency (landoffice, police or magistracy at the field level or passport, electricity, water supplyand telephone departments, municipal bodies or education boards) is sure to beintercepted by these agents/brokers who offer their service for a fee. While theclients use brokers for their skills in getting things done rapidly, many officials,particularly those who are corrupt also prefer their clients to come through theagents/brokers. The awkward work of negotiating bribes is dealt with by thesebrokers. Since the administration is deliberately inflexible or inaccessible, thebrokers and the accompanying bribes serve as a lubricant to overcome the accessencounter, bureaucratic inflexibility or indolence. This is how the public service ismanaged by the common people, especially those without any political clout orstrong connections at higher levels.

As elsewhere, corruption in Bangladesh takes many forms and public servantsof all types and levels are engaged in corrupt practices. Bribery is, perhaps, themost ubiquitous and damaging form of corruption in the public sector in Bangla-desh. Practically nothing can be done without bribing the concerned officials. In asense, it has become a standard practice in most departments. A businessmancannot expect to obtain a license without commission or a contractor cannot lookforward to getting a work order or payment of his bill without satisfying theconcerned officials. Payments are also required simply to obtain an applicationform or a signature, to secure a copy of an approved sanction, to ensure properservices and billing from telephone, gas and water departments (Kochanek, 1993;see also Zafarullah, 1987). Bribes related to agricultural loans are said to rangebetween 10 to 20 percent of the loan amount. In some departments it is as high as50 percent. The TIB survey revealed that contractors in the Roads and Highways

Department (RHD) are required to pay 4052 percent of the contract value in orderto secure a job.

A recent TIB study has uncovered how bribes are extorted from students andinstitutions in the education sector, from patients in the health sector, from redress-seekers in the judicial system and police administration, from clients in land-administration and from subscribers and users in utility departments (see, TIB,1997). Though departments like customs and taxation and banking and financialinstitutions were always known for indulging in corrupt practices, this routine hasnow been firmly established in the Bangladesh public sector as a whole.



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With corruption becoming a way of life and almost unavoidable, some peopleargue in favor of legalizing it to ensure proper delivery of services. However,others strongly oppose the idea, as it would mean a complete surrender toillegality and immorality. While it is true that bribery expedites the delivery ofservices and facilitates action, the problem is that in the process civil servants getinto the habit of delaying decisions until payment is made. Secondly, it means thatit is the quantity of bribe and not the merit of the case that matters most.

1.2 Pilferage and larceny

Another most familiar expression of corruption in Bangladesh is waste andpilferage in the public sector. Many of the public sector agencies are in totalshambles mainly because of excessive depletion and organized larceny sustainedover the years. The much discussed system loss in the power sector is anexample of larceny and deliberate dereliction of official responsibility. Despite somuch talk about system loss, it has remained as high as 35 percent (TIB, 2000).A rough estimate suggests that a mere 10 percent reduction in system loss wouldyield Tk5 3 billion savings annually. While part of the loss can be considered to betechnical, the bulk is due to massive irregularities committed by those involved atdifferent levels. Apart from meter readers, supervisors, ledger keepers and othersconnected with billing and consumer accounting, many lower level engineers and

some high level officers are believed to be involved in this process. On theconsumer side, some people are involved in dishonest practice of stealingelectricity, often in connivance with the officials (TIB, 2000, p. 4). Arguably, thishas compounded the problem thereby rendering the Bangladesh Power Develop-ment Board (BPDB) incapable both in terms of reducing system loss and meetingthe growing demands for electricity.

This, however, is not unique to the BPDB; other utility agencies (water, gas,telephone) are equally known for the system loss syndrome. Pilferage andlarceny are also widespread in the rural works program (RWP)6 and the construc-tion departments like RHD and Public Works. Due to pilferage and larceny,between 40 and 60 percent of the development budget is lost every year. Thisis confirmed by official statistics, which shows that between 1972 and 1993 thepublic sector, due to misappropriation, lost a total of almost Tk 180 billion (Alam,

1996). All this indicates the gravity of the problem, which is compounded further bythe recurring losses in the state-owned enterprises (Muhith, 1999).

1.3 Responsibility lapses

Negligence of official duties is another familiar expression of corruption inBangladesh. Coming to office late and leaving early, absence or unauthorizedleave are rampant in government offices. Often officials who do report for work are



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hard to be found or accessed for services. This is simply because they either takeextended hours for tea and lunch breaks, prayers and meetings (mainly mean-ingless) of various types (Khan et al., 1995) or employ their time/energy elsewhereto advance their personal interests. The spirit of public service does not inspirethem. Since there are no measurable performance standards, a tendency amongofficials to dupe the system is not uncommon. Thus, doctors in governmenthospitals are engaged in private practice to the utter neglect of their officialduties. While some of the specialists are always on their toes expecting summonsfor a surgery from private clinics, others remove kidneys in place of ovariescausing death of innocent patients. Agricultural extension workers hardly visit

farmers, health and family welfare assistants bother little to keep contact with localpeople and police personnel remain reluctant to take any action against criminalsunless some incentives are on offer or pressure originates from above. This isindicative of the status of work ethics in Bangladesh.

Though it is difficult to quantify the impact of such willful dereliction andfraudulent practice, it is indisputable that such behavior causes untold publicmisery. It also defrauds the government financially for many employees are paidfor work they do not perform. The total person-hours lost in this process every yearwould be huge by any estimate.

1.4 Bureaucratic intemperance

Administrative excesses, arbitrary behavior and harassment add to the suffering ofthe people. The people have developed fear and wariness about the policebecause of the excesses they perpetrate on them and the way they abusepower. Reports of atrocities committed by law enforcing agencies are routineand frequent mysterious deaths in police custody indicate the extent of powerabuse in the police department (USDS, 2001). Thus the overall quality ofadministration has deteriorated. Not surprisingly, public officials are increasinglyseen as unresponsive to public needs and bereft of any moral and ethical values.

1.5 Raging patronage

Yet another dominant mode of corruption in Bangladesh is the patronage system,a feature of Bangladeshi society. This often explains why the process of awardingmajor contracts bypasses competitive norms, and instead, is governed by thecriterion of personal linkages with key decision makers in government depart-ments. It is not surprising that the lowest bidder for the lease of a market place or aferry ghat (quay) or the highest bidder for a construction project wins the contractat the intervention of a patron at the policy level (Khan et al., 1995). Civil servants,however, are not to be blamed alone. At times, the political factor becomes crucialas politicians get involved in the process.7 More often than not, pressure from



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politicians to carry out their unfair orders and the fear of retribution in the form oftransfer to a less important position or even threats of removal force officials tosacrifice professional ethics and the public interest. Even honest officials knownfor their courage and integrity, may feel utterly helpless and succumb to suchpressures. Some, of course, find it convenient to collude with politicians and sharethe booty generated from the abuse of power.

1.6 Impact of corruption

The price that society pays for all unethical practices in the public sector isconsiderable in terms of cost and inconvenience. The impact is clearly visible insocial, political and economic spheres. Though billions of dollars have beeninjected by major international aid agencies as development assistance over theyears and nearly half a dozen five-year plans have been implemented, Bangla-desh has remained one of the poorest countries measured by most socio-economic indicators. Apart from public inconvenience and hassle, bureaucraticcorruption and inefficiency are taking a heavy toll on the countrys economycausing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of loss in terms of unrealizedinvestment and income (Financial Express, 31 July 1997). An estimate showsthat during the first six months of 2000 alone, a total of Tk 115.3 billion has gonemissing in the public sector due to 1,345 corruption incidents in various agencies

(Daily Star, 26 September 2000). According to a very conservative estimate, theper-capita income in corruption-free Bangladesh would have been double of thecurrent figure (World Bank, 2000b). It is obvious, therefore, that corruption hasbeen grinding down the economy and hindering the process of growth anddevelopment. Corruption has social costs as well; it tends to hit the basics ofsociety destroying moral and ethical values.

2. Combating corruption: institutional mechanisms, policiesand performance

Recent years have witnessed a heightened awareness about the venality and

scale of corruption. Yet, attempts at combating the vice are by no means new. Aselsewhere, successive governments in Bangladesh have expressed their commit-ment to wipeout corruption from every sphere of administration and proclaimedexecutive orders, introduced rules and regulations, enacted anti-corruption legis-lation and installed institutional mechanisms. A plethora of rules and regulationsframed from time to time in order to deter public officials from undesirable behaviorand action is now extant. The Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979,Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1986 are among the rulesthat allow disciplinary actions8 against errant civil servants for inefficiency,



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misconduct, desertion, corruption, deviance from expected behavior and subver-sive activities.

The most significant measure to counter corruption in Bangladesh, however, isthe Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Act, 1974 which provides for the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAC). This Act (modified over the years), along with the Prevention ofCorruption Act, also enacted in 1974, provides detailed framework for dealing withand controlling bribery and other forms of corruption in the public service. Also,there is a range of other mechanisms (e.g. Comptroller and Auditor General orCAG, legislative committees) designed to stamp out corruption in administration.Nonetheless, despite the prevalence of all these measures, corruption seems to

have outpaced fairness in the disposal of business in the public sector.

2.1 Bureau of anti-corruption

BAC is the most important mechanism responsible for combating corruption.Headed by a Director General, the Bureau operates through a network of officesat the district and field levels. It has eight Regional Offices and 66 district and fieldoffices. Being authorized to investigate into and prosecute cases of corruption,BAC was expected to play a significant role in curbing malfeasance and abuse ofpower in government administration. However, the performance of the agency has

been far from satisfactory. Despite several decades of its existence and changes

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brought about in its status and structure, BAC has failed to emerge as an effectivebody in controlling and combating administrative corruption. Currently, it stands asa toothless organization lacking adequate authority to effectively discharge itsresponsibilities. BAC is also ridden with a host of other deficiencies and problems.It has been rendered ineffective in undertaking investigation and initiating casesagainst many individuals and agencies. An estimate shows that, given theabundance of corruption cases, the Bureau has failed to investigate and filesufficient numbers of cases annually.

Table 1 shows that the annual average during the period was 1,023 (casesinvestigated), 777 (charge-sheets filed) and 252 (number convicted). Otherestimates suggest an equally depressing record in terms of the number ofcases filed by BAC per year (see Rahman et al., 1993). This is partly because

of inadequate personnel and poor logistics and partly because of lengthy and rigidbureaucratic procedures BAC is required to follow. The system of obtainingsanction for instituting an inquiry, filing an ejahar (first information report) and acharge sheet is highly bureaucratic and thus time-consuming. Often BAC holdsother agencies responsible for delays but the small number of convictions that it isable to carry out demeans the quality of BAC investigations and the filing of cases.In most instances, the accused are acquitted by the court because of poor framingof cases, lack of clear evidence and absence of seriousness on the part of publicprosecutors (GOB, 2000).



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What is more significant to note is that BAC seems to be pre-occupied withsnaring small fries and processing cases of petty corruption while leaving the bigplayers uninterrupted and matters of grand corruption unexplored. Though sensa-tional news of blatant corruption (the Alcatel telephone system deal, the Japaneseinvestment or KAFCO debacle, purchase of aircraft for the national airline, theMIG-29 bungling, among others) often makes headlines in the print media, veryfew such cases are investigated by BAC. This failure or inability of the agencyraises a host of questions about its sincerity and that of the government incombating corruption. Indeed, BACs authority to investigate allegations againsthigh government officials has been greatly circumscribed, as it cannot proceed

without the green signal from the higher political echelons. The institutionallocation of BAC under the Prime Ministers office and its subservience to politicalcaprice with regard to filing cases or indictment against senior officials andimportant individuals in political circles, is seen as a major deterrent to its task.

Even though it is necessary to insulate BAC from ruling party pressures and toaccord it a very high status within the administrative structure (Siddiqui, 1996), theagency is fraught with the danger of politicization. The fear that it may be used as atool for intimidating and punishing dissenting people in politics and bureaucracyhas been corroborated by recent evidence. Indeed, there are instances of politicalconsiderations swaying the decisions of the government to enable BAC to initiateaction against corrupt officials. There are many corrupt officials and politicians whohave managed not only to escape conviction but also to obtain important positionsby aligning themselves with the ruling party (Alam, 1996; Siddiquee, 1999). Thus,

instead of helping curb malfeasance and abuse of power, BAC serves as apolitical tool in the hands of the government. This statutory public body amplycomplements the bureaucrat-politician nexus in corruption.

Apart from its institutional weaknesses and the lack of independence, BAC hasa very poor image in society. Despite half a century of its existence, it has failed toestablish any reputation as an effective organization and to generate confidenceamong the people. There is a common allegation that BAC inspectors and otherofficials use their positions mainly to advance their personal gain. Often theyharass the people including public officials, extort money from them and threaten

Table 1. Corruption cases handled by BAC, 19721998.

Period No. of cases investigated No. of charge-sheets filed No. of convictions

19721975 2,857 1,957 938

19761981 6,791 4,369 735

19821990 11,102 7,176 3,349

19911994 4,746 4,403 989

19951998 2,126 3,062 806

Total 27,622 20,967 6,817

Source: Adapted from (Alam, 1996), World Bank (2000b).



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them of roping in corruption cases against them. Indeed, it is so intensely riddenwith corruption, irregularities and venalities that at times it is seen as the mostcorrupt wing of the government (New Nation, 21 June 2000). In such circum-stances, BAC cannot serve its purposes well.

2.2 Fiscal and administrative mechanisms

The collection and utilization of public funds are among the most importantresponsibilities of public servants. However, they tend to be vulnerable to financial

irregularities and indiscipline. Apart from formulating a set of rules and regulations,the government has devised an elaborate institutional framework in order tomaintain financial discipline and to control the misappropriation of public moneyby government officials. The system of audit and accounts is at the center of fiscalaccountability and control. As elsewhere in the British Commonwealth, the officeof the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) is responsible for keeping theaccounts of the government and for detecting irregularities in terms of complianceof relevant rules and regulations and/or fraud and embezzlement in publicexpenditure. In many respects CAG is the financial ombudsman and is empow-ered to audit the accounts of all government departments, state owned enterprises(SOEs) and development projects. The Comptroller General or any other personauthorized by him has access to all records, books, vouchers, documents, cash,

securities and other government property in the possession of any person in theservice of the republic. Audit officials are expected to detect cases of financialirregularities, malpractice, deviation from fiscal rules, waste and extravagance andreflect this in CAGs annual reports submitted to the government.

However, there is a wide discrepancy between CAGs stipulated functions andits actual operation. Evidence suggests that the audit and accounts system isfaulty and there is a series of problems that render the whole exercise ineffective.Like BAC, CAG does not enjoy the independence and operational autonomyrequired for the proper discharge of its functions although the Auditor General andhis office have been accorded constitutional status. This status has been subse-quently downgraded by making it subservient to the executive (Zafarullah, 1994).Currently, CAG is seen more as an appendage to the Ministry of Finance ratherthan as an autonomous body to enforce fiscal discipline in public departments and

scrutinize their financial activities. Furthermore, inadequate resources includingskilled and professionally competent personnel and logistics severely limit itscapacity to undertake systematic and comprehensive auditing of governmentaccounts.10 In the absence of professionally accredited chartered accountants(World Bank, 1996), CAG mostly relies on under-trained clerks who are neitherefficient nor committed to their jobs. They are generally noted for being eitherhighly fastidious at one extreme, and for being highly amenable at the other,depending on how they are treated by the organisations and officials beingaudited (Siddiqui, 1996, p. 158).



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The effectiveness of audit as a tool for controlling financial mismanagementdepends, among other things, on the quality of reports prepared, the thoroughnessof probes and enquiries and the sincerity of the legislature in getting the reportimplemented.

The Controller General of Accounts (CGA) is expected to exercise accountingcontrol in respect of government receipt and expenditure at different levels.However, the impact of accounts control in general and the pre-audit in particularappears to be very limited, if not non-existent. The well-known study undertakenby an inter-ministerial Committee on Reforms in Budgeting and ExpenditureControl observes a plethora of weaknesses of this approach:

CAOs have an ineffective accounting control; and PAOs/Secretaries are moreconcerned with administrative management than financial propriety and finan-cial accountability. The creation of DAOs and UZAOs within a short space oftime have expanded the accounts administration outfit which have been filledup by persons without adequate training and experience (GOB, 1993, p. 43).

Departmental accounting system, introduced in the early 1980s as a step forseparating accounts from audit is yet to take an institutional shape. Seriousanomalies like the power of the Secretary to overrule the CAO have not onlyrendered the latter powerless but also virtually abolished effective accounting andinternal audit within the government. On the other hand, there are many who argue

that rather than helping reduce corruption the so-called pre-audit system hasexpanded opportunities for rent seeking.The internal control system is designed to minimize corruption in terms of

administrative behavior and expenditure. But for various reasons, this is eitherweak or non-functional in the Bangladesh public sector. The numerous rules andregulations have hardly altered bureaucratic culture and work ethics. In manycases, willingness of senior officials to enforce these rules seems to be lacking.Higher officials often tend to protect themselves and their subordinates as spoils ofcorruption are shared. As such, flouting of regulations and violation of rules andprocedures are commonplace in administration. Whistle blowing from within thebureaucracy itself is limited, if not missing altogether. There are examples thatindicate that whistle blowing is indeed a risky occupation and whistle blowers haveto suffer as a result of sounding the alarm. All these weaknesses facilitate fraud of

various kinds, colossal levels of waste and misuse of resources in the publicsector.

2.3 Legislative mechanisms

Legislative accountability is the bedrock of good governance. Parliamentarydebates, questions and motions are among the devices that are available tomembers of Parliament (MPs) to scrutinize the activities of various ministers and



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those of senior bureaucrats within these ministries. The purpose of question houris to enable MPs to ventilate public grievances and to draw the attention of thepeople toward the failure of the government and its administration. Also there canbe unscheduled debates on any specific issue. However, the Bangladesh experi-ence shows that the impact of debates and questions has been minimal. Rarely, ifever, parliamentary debates and question hours focus on administrative lapses,cases of corruption and other malpractices. Indeed, the Parliament in Bangladeshis yet to establish itself as a scrutineer of administrative actions and bureaucraticexcesses and corruption (Ahmed and Khan, 1995; Siddiquee, 1999).

The effectiveness of legislative committees is greatly reduced by a number of

factors (Ahmed, 1998). The important committees like the Public AccountsCommittee rely on CAG reports. However, as already noted, financial andmanagement control within the government being generally weak and the publicaccounts and audit reports being inadequate, unrealistic and almost alwaysbehind schedule, these have an incapacitating effect on the Committees opera-tions. Until recently, parliamentary committees were ineffective entities as theywere headed by relevant ministers who had a propensity to influence theirdeliberations. These committees also suffered from the lack of requisite authorityand resources. Even after some reorganization, they continue with restrictedpower and various ministries are unwilling to act upon their directives in termsof checking financial irregularities (World Bank, 2000b). Thus legislative oversight,in general, and the committee system, in particular, has failed to play any notable

role in checking bureaucratic corruption and venality.

2.4 Media and civil society

Since the transition to democracy began in the early 1990s, emerging civil societyorganizations are increasingly becoming active in building public opinion againstthe violation of human rights, breaches of law and discipline, administrativecorruption and mal-governance, among other things. The Bangladesh chapter ofTransparency International (TIB), Civic Watch, Association of DevelopmentAgencies in Bangladesh, Ain-O-Salish Kendro are among the prominent civilsociety organizations, which, apart from keeping the public informed about thepervasiveness of waste and corruption in the state sector, have come up with

concrete ideas to confront governmental maladies. TIBs Survey of Corruption inBangladesh and subsequent workshops, discussions and roundtables havegenerated a considerable interest in different circles and prompted the govern-ment to initiate some changes, albeit minor, in regulatory and administrativeprocedures to reduce administrative discretion and the scope for corruption.

The electronic media has always been state property and continually abused byall ruling parties. The print media, on the other hand, has shown much fortitudeand buoyancy in investigating and exposing both political and administrativecorruption. The latter has been playing a noteworthy role in highlighting public



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grievances and mal-administration. Some newspapers are active and well-timed inpublishing reports on bureaucratic irregularities, highhandedness, abuse of power,mismanagement, inefficiency and corruption. To some extent, this acts as adeterrent for public servants as they constantly remain cautious while dischargingtheir official responsibilities (Siddiquee, 1999). However, the impact of suchexercises is bound to be limited. Having no executive authority, the media andcivil society cannot go beyond exposing cases of corruption except in arousingpublic opinion against the vice. Instances of remedial measures initiated by thegovernment following reports by the print media are few and far between.

3. Combating corruption in Bangladesh: issues and experiences

The preceding discussion leads one to the conclusion that corruption has beenrampant and deep-rooted in every sphere of administration in Bangladesh. It alsoshows that the performance of existing instruments for controlling and uprootingcorruption has fallen far short of expectations and intended objectives. As a matterof fact, there are some formidable barriers that render the institutional mechan-isms weak and virtually ineffective. Neither BAC nor CAG, the two most importantagencies, is endowed with adequate power and authority to discharge its respon-sibilities effectively. This means that neither is in a position to handle the oneroustask of auditing all transactions made by public authorities and investigating an

ever-increasing number of cases. An estimate shows that BAC takes an averageof three years to investigate cases, of which only 15 percent actually get to thecourts and the rest are disposed off at lower levels. Only four percent of the casessent to the courts end up in some kind of sentence (TIB, 2000). Even moredisconcerting is the number of cases pending in the courts of law.11 What thisreflects is the fundamental flaw in the institutional capacity of BAC and the lawcourts to deal promptly with corruption cases.

The Bangladesh experience also shows that the merit of an investigating bodyrelies, among other things, on its institutional capacity, operational freedom andthe sincerity of the political leadership. A weak and vulnerable anti-corruption outfitis not effective in combating corruption. Lack of qualified and trained manpowerhave made it difficult for BAC to make any headway in investigating officials knownfor massive corruption in various departments.12 On the other hand, successive

governments failed to display their commitment for a strong and effectivesurveillance regime. Instead of permitting BAC to operate independently, theymerely used it as a tool for intimidating political opponents. The government alsoremained oblivious to allegations of massive corruption within BAC itself, which isnot only a further source of corruption but has expanded the web of corruption topreviously untainted areas.

The fiscal measures have not met with much success in controlling the situation.On the one hand, CAG has remained crippled and unable to undertake a detailedand comprehensive audit of government expenditure, on the other, departmental



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control is virtually non-existent.13 Thus, the overall impact of audit and other fiscaltools is limited. For many, combining accounts and the audit function into one andthe lack of institutional separation in this regard is a serious anomaly that explainspoor performance in government. Performance audit is almost unknown inBangladesh as audit is rarely geared to examine whether a particular expenditurewas made in the public interest and in the most efficient manner, or whetherpolicy goals were at all achieved (GOB, 1993). There are allegations that ratherthan helping reduce corruption, the so-called pre-audit policy has contributedtoward its aggravation.

The effectiveness of legislative mechanisms in containing corruption, bureau-

cratic lapses and excesses has been greatly eroded by a number of factors. TheBangladesh parliament failed to serve as an effective watchdog for much of theperiod since independence as it remained either suspended or crippled under thepresidential system. The reintroduction of the parliamentary system in 1991 andthe subsequent policy changes have certainly invigorated the legislative arena byallowing it to play an important role in controlling the behavior of the executive ingeneral and the bureaucracy in particular. But majoritarian rule and enduringboycott of parliamentary sessions by the mainstream opposition parties seriouslyundermined that prospect. Even when the Parliament has been vibrant with theopposition, questions and debates are usually less effective in addressinggovernment failures and in exacting bureaucratic responsiveness andaccountability.

The Bangladesh experience also points to the ineffectiveness of ministerialcontrol compared to that in other parliamentary democracies. Though ministers,as heads of executive departments, are assumed to exercise control over themembers of the bureaucracy, they are unable to do so mainly for their lack ofnecessary knowledge, education and experience in running the administration.Consequently, they have to depend, at times heavily, on senior bureaucrats foradvice and support. The superiority of senior bureaucrats in terms of education,training and experience and their monopoly in technical knowledge enable them tohave considerable influence on ministers and also at times to be cynical ofministerial control. This is complicated further by bureaucratic discretion permis-sible by rules and the absence of performance standards in the public service.This practically means that ministers have to turn a blind eye to the many failuresand deviations of civil servants and seek explanations for only the most obvious

and appalling lapses. Thus, the barriers of holding bureaucracy accountable areso formidable that the formal theory of accountability is clearly at odds with thereality (see Rosenbloom, 1998).

This largely explains why the internal control mechanisms remain so weakdespite the prevalence of so many regulations. In the prevailing administrativeculture, officials often tend to protect each other, thus making hierarchical controlirrelevant. Besides, superiors do not find enough incentives to engage in fruitfuland rigorous oversight on a regular basis. They prefer to avoid getting involved inthe cumbersome and difficult process of staff discipline and instead allow



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deviations from administrative rules and cases of petty corruptions go unpunished.Further, there are serious defects in administrative measures for dealing withcorrupt acts. In a few cases where disciplinary action is taken, punishment is toolight and the person is rehabilitated too quickly either because of political connec-tions or pressures from employee/trade unions. Long-term imprisonment, heavyfines and confiscation of assets of the corrupt officials are rare. Though the BPDB,in particular, is well known for perennial corruption of various types, a recent studyobserves:

There have been no significant anti corruption drives within the BPDB nor any

court actions against corrupt employees. On occasions, mid level officers havebeen suspended from duty on suspicion of moral turpitude and financialirregularities. But most were reinstated for lack of evidence. Instances ofdepartmental enquiries or disciplinary actions against lower grade employeesare even rarer due to the supposed or real fear of retaliation by trade unions(TIB, 2000, p. 5).

BPDB typifies other public sector departments where corruption continuesunabated. One of the toughest barriers in the wrestle against corruption is notthe absence of laws/rules but the lack of their enforcement.

Though laws require stern action against those public servants who (or theirdependents) are in possession of money or property disproportionate to their

known source of income or enjoy a lifestyle beyond their actual means, hardlyanything is done to hold offenders accountable. Despite public pronouncementsmade by successive governments to root out corruption from the body politic of thecountry no single public official has so far been imprisoned or had his propertyacquired through dubious means confiscated. This reflects a wide gap betweenrhetoric and reality, and policy and practice. Special anti-corruption drivesmounted by the military rulers ended in fiasco as they or their supportersthemselves resorted to massive corruption subsequently. This has emboldenedgovernment officials to indulge in systematic corruption.

The political-bureaucratic nexus in corruption has its roots deep in the politicalhistory of the country. Ever since independence, democracy and democraticculture were hardly allowed to flourish. The country witnessed monolithic one-party rule, prolonged military rule and overt and covert manipulation for super-

imposing one-party hegemony. Democratic practices like accountability andtransparency in government business were overturned and press freedom wasrestricted. Military administrators not only failed to arrest the steady decline in thestandard and quality of services, but in many ways also contributed to makingcorruption rampant and freewheeling in all tiers of administration. The military andquasi-democratic rulers often made use of public funds in the most arbitrary andnon-transparent manner thus creating opportunities for themselves and theirproteges to channel state resources for personal gain. As a result, numerousadministrative irregularities, mismanagement and corruption were effectively kept



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out of the public eye. Military rulers needed funds to launch their own politicalparties and organize elections when pressures to civilianize their regimesmounted. Indeed, corruption during military rule was converted from a crime toa habit (Puchkov, 1989, p. 133; see also Kochanek, 1993, pp. 25862).

Even under democratic rule, the nexus between corrupt officials and politiciansis still pervasive in the administrative hierarchy. Politicians in Bangladesh arebelieved to have a direct hand in sustaining corruption in administration. Theyhave lucrative shares in all state deals, they receive commissions from terroristsand smugglers and they patronise corrupt officials for personal gains. Sometimes,it is extremely difficult for someone to honestly discharge his/her responsibilities

because of pressures from above. Most often pressures from political elites tocarry out their illegal orders force bureaucrats to sacrifice professional ethics andpublic interests. All this shows why the system of political control is weak andineffective. This also explicates why superiors in political circles have lost themoral courage to question the officials under them for proven malfeasance andcorrupt practices.

There is no avenue for citizens to redress their grievances or lodge a complaintagainst any action of corruption or irregularity committed by public officials.Actually, they are demotivated to do so because the head of the agency againstwhom the complaint will be lodged would be the judge, the jury and the defendant.If a person is aggrieved at the action of any public official such as the chiefexecutive of a district or the chief officer of a police station, it will be hazardous to

lodge a complaint against him. Of course, one can go to court but it is not onlycostly and time consuming but there is little chance for him to win the case againstthe mighty state officials.

The higher courts have played a significant role in delivering their verdictsagainst corruption mainly involving those who have held offices of trust andresponsibility. Even presidents and ministers were not spared. The higher judiciarythus continues to command the respect of the majority. However, there is aperception among the people that fair judgment in a lower court is hard to come bywithout money and/or influence. Hence, the ordinary people accept bureaucraticmalfeasance as fait accompli and rarely bother to seek any redress. The linkbetween the executive and the judiciary, a legacy of colonial rule, has alwaysserved as an impediment to the independence of the courts, especially those atthe lower levels.

Unable to challenge government failures or administrative corruption at anystage, the people, especially the poor majority in rural areas, have opted to exitstate services and have increasingly been using alternative channels to accesscredit, health and education (Hulme and Siddiquee, 1999). The phenomenalgrowth of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the quality and growingpopularity of the services offered by them and their widespread use by citizensreflect their disillusionment with the public sector and the governments inability toadequately serve them. The NGOs have gradually become integral to the processof poverty alleviation and service delivery in rural Bangladesh. They are not only



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known for their huge size, coverage and innovations, but also for the internationalacclaim they have earned for their successes in different areas. Some of theseNGOs (like Grameen Bank, BRAC and PROSIKA) have focused on povertyalleviation through the provision of micro-credit (Lovell, 1992), training and supportservices, as well as formal and non-formal education, environmental conservation,disaster management, human rights, policy advocacy and legal aid supportservices. The NGO strategy for empowerment has contributed to making therural poor increasingly vocal and assertive in their demands for improved servicesfrom government agencies (Kramsjo and Wood, 1992). Some NGO groups andnetworks have achieved some degree of success in making the administration

more responsive to the needs of the poor, but they are yet to have any lastingimpact as far as bureaucratic corruption is concerned. In many cases, the NGOsand their groups face a range of problems in their quest for ensuring anaccountable and transparent administration (Hoque and Siddiquee, 1998).

3.1 Recreating accountability structures

The entreaties for reforming the public integrity system in Bangladesh haveemanated from both within and outside the country. One of the most pressingdemands has been the appointment of the Ombudsman. In 1972, the originalBangladesh constitution provided for the ombudsman with the power to investigate

public complaints against a ministry, an official or a statutory public authority(GOB, 1972, Article 77). The ombudsman had the potential to become a viabletool to keep the public bureaucracy under constant surveillance as it was expectedto be clothed with the authority to look into such administrative matters as seriousdelays in taking action, discriminatory behavior, insolence, harassment or failure torender services to the public. It also could serve as a useful device in fosteringbureaucratic responsiveness and minimizing corrupt tendencies among officials.While other countries in the region forged ahead with this concept, successivegovernments in Bangladesh failed to establish an ombudsman even after adecade of the countrys transition to democracy and the professed commitmentof major political parties and leaders in this regard. The strong plea made by allmajor administrative reform commissions/committees went unheeded and there islittle indication that ombudsman will be put in place in the near future (PARC,

2000). There appears to be a deep-seated resistance from the bureaucracy toestablish the ombudsman and political leaders are nervous of the role it is likely totake on in addressing the issue of corruption in the high political offices.

The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other international organiza-tions have also provided their suggestions for creating the structures to combatcorruption and enforcing accountability in the public sector. Some specific ideasadvanced include: the creation of an independent agency against corruption,simplifying governmental rules and regulations, constituting legislative committeeson corruption; exposing corrupt officials, monitoring the accounts of politicians and



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civil servants, making mandatory the submission of asset reports of publicorganizations and performance reviews of agencies and projects, separating the

judiciary from the executive, creating awareness among the citizens about theirrights and ways of accessing government resources, involving grassroots levelorganizations in fighting the corruption menace and so on (PARC, 2000; WorldBank, 1996; ADAB, 2000).

4. Concluding observations

Corruption in the public sector in Bangladesh does not work in isolation; it isfostered by corrupt acts of political leaders in power. Politicians of the country arebelieved to be involved in large-scale corruption. As such, administrative corrup-tion is an appendage of political corruption. Often pressures from politicians tocarry out their illegal orders, the fear of punitive transfers and perceived or realthreats of removal force bureaucrats to sacrifice professional ethics and the publicinterest. Since most officials do not want to risk losing their jobs/positions, theyprefer to collude with their political masters and share the booty generated fromthe abuse of official positions. It is now an open secret that there is a comfortablenexus between malevolent politicians and corrupt bureaucrats and that they havelucrative shares in most deals and undertakings made on behalf of the state. Sucha nexus can be found throughout the administrative hierarchy. This is a mutually

convenient arrangement in which private gains of both sides are protected.Needless to say that this renders the system of control weak and ineffective asthe superiors, be they in officialdom or in political circles, lose moral fortitude toquestion their subordinates for negligent behavior and/or proven malpractice. TheBangladesh experience also shows that bureaucrats who establish god-fatherlyrelationships with political leaders are largely immune from external control as thelatter come to their rescue in the event of any trouble. In this process, someofficials become sacred cows and roam scot-free as hardly any authority has thecourage to attack them even when they are clearly at fault.

The culture of ministerial responsibility, as is seen in mature democracies, iseither missing or weak in Bangladesh. Despite massive corruption, unusual delaysin decision making, huge wastage and misappropriation of resources that char-acterize every department causing untold public inconvenience, rarely a minister

chooses to accept responsibility for such lapses in his ministry and offer his/herresignation (Siddiquee, forthcoming). Instead, ministers have tended to defendthemselves and their personnel.

The public sector in Bangladesh has failed to perform to acceptable standards.The quality of service is poor and the level of client satisfaction is low. Apart fromsystemic defects the offshoot of outmoded structures and procedures, thebureaucracy is still entrenched in an administrative culture, which is influencedby notions of clientelism and an attitude of paternalism toward the people. Publicorganizations lack a sense of mission, do not optimize their performance, are too



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protective of their organizational interests, are reluctant to expose themselves toaccountability and control measures and are captives of parochial and group-centered politics (Zafarullah and Khan 2001, p. 994) The ordinary citizens are thevictims of poor governance, exemplified by mal-administration, bureaucraticdisdain, wayward enforcement of rules and regulations, raging misdemeanorand slapdash implementation of public policies and programs. They are deprivedof the wherewithal and the wisdom to make a claim to what is due to them by thestate apparatus.

The transition to democracy that began in 1991 is yet to be completed.Democratic consolidation requires more than periodic free elections and the

meeting of legislators to approve executive choices. Among the several keycomponents of consolidation is a sound national integrity system that willmanage the accountability structures, monitor bureaucratic performance, correctadministrative delinquency, keep a close watch on governmental operations, andfacilitate public access to grievance mechanisms. Corruption can be rooted out ofthe administrative system by the combined efforts of an independent anti-corrup-tion agency, the Parliament, civil society organizations, a responsible media andan informed public. This has not been happening in Bangladesh.

Pervasive corruption, which has assumed immense proportions in recent years,has further added to the woes of the public. Although its prevalence is widelyacknowledged in political, civil society and business circles, successive demo-cratic governments have been lukewarm in making any concerted effort to combat

corruption. The ruling political leadership ignores the continued overtures of theinternational donor community to address the issue and its failure to reform thepublic integrity system has resulted in policy failures, colossal economic waste,abortive projects, social degeneration and hence public suffering.

Notes

1. Bureaucratic corruption and embezzlement had been a part of the political and administrativesystem during the Mughal, British and Pakistan periods. It became so widespread duringAyub Khans military rule in Pakistan that hundreds of civil servants were dismissed fromtheir services while close to another 900 were offered compulsory retirement in 195960 onvarious charges of corruption.

2. Bribery, nepotism and favoritism, misuse of power, neglect of official duties, fraud, misap-propriation of funds, false and inflated invoicing are some common forms of corruption in thepublic sector. Other types of corruption like terrorism, extortion, defaulting of bank loans,black marketing, trafficking of children and women, adulteration of food and medicine andeven contract killings are now common in Bangladesh society.

3. Conducted in 1997 on a sample of 2,197 individuals chosen proportionately from thecountrys rural as well as urban population.

4. Tadbiris very effective in that it helps one to avoid the long delay and the hassles of being onthe queue. For instance, the average waiting period for gas and water connection is 34months but with speed-money of Tk 20,00030,000 one can get connections in a week. Untilrecently (before the cell/mobile telephone was introduced), the average waiting time for a



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telephone connection was 1012 years, but one could obtain telephone connection instantlyby paying an extra Tk 30,00070,000 under the table (see Muhith, 1999).

5. Tk is the abbreviation of Taka, the currency of Bangladesh. One US dollar is roughlyequivalent to Tk 53.

6. While estimates vary, it has been found that up to 70 percent of the resources earmarked forRWP schemes get lost at different stages and both government officials and peoplesrepresentatives are involved in the process (Siddiquee, 1999).

7. Politicians, while in power, use or abuse their positions by distributing patronage of variouskinds. In fact, using positions to grant undue favor and benefit to ones relatives, friends andkey supporters is one of the hallmarks of Bangladesh politics.

8. Penalties include censure, withholding promotion for specific period of time and reduction inpay, (minor) demotion and dismissal from the service (major).

9. Established in the early 1950s, BAC witnessed a series of changes in its structure andinstitutional affiliation. In the later part of the 1980s, the Bureau was transferred from theCabinet Division to the Presidents Secretariat. Following the countrys transition to theWestminster type of government, BAC has been brought under the Prime Ministers Office.

10. This is precisely the reason that the idea has been mooted in a recent conference that theCAG be totally separated from the executive branch and placed directly under the Parliamentwith independent budget and staff (see Daily Star, 16 September 2000).

11. An estimate shows that thousands of cases are now pending in different courts of law.12. Though the Customs Department is one of the most corrupt departments, BACs impotency

there is clear as not a single prosecution has resulted in successful conviction in recent years(TIB, 2000).

13. In its 1998 annual report, CAG observes that for all practical purposes no internal controlsystem exists in government ministries.

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Habib Zafarullah Habib Zafarullah teaches political science, public policy and Asian studies atthe University of New England, Australia. His research interests are in Third World politics,comparative bureaucracy, policy analysis and development management with focus on SouthAsia. He has published several books and book chapters and numerous articles in internationalrefereed journals.

Noore Alam Siddiquee Noore Alam Siddiquee is Head of the Department of Political Science,International Islamic University, Malaysia. He has a PhD from the University of Manchester. Hehas published extensively on local government, decentralization, NGOs and development, publicsector management and bureaucratic accountability.


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