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Controlling Climate Change by Asia-Pacific Powers in APP
and MEM
By
Soomee Kim
A joint thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of the Collaborative Master of Arts Program in Asia-Pacific Studies
Graduate Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
© Copyright by Soomee Kim (2009)
ii
Controlling Climate Change by Asia-Pacific Powers in APP and
MEM
Soomee Kim
The Collaborative Master of Arts Program in Asia-Pacific Studies
Graduate Department of Political Science
University of Toronto
2009
Abstract
The problem of climate change is the major challenge to the world community. However, the full
world community still fails to find an adequate solution to this problem. In such a situation, the
mutual efforts of plurilateral institutions, such as the G8+5, MEM (now MEF), APEC and APP
are major drivers of the successful solution to the problem of climate change. This study
examines these informal plurilateral institutions’ role, their effectiveness in policy creation and
implementation, and their potential impact on global or regional climate governance to show that
the APP and MEF have been effective in inducing climate action by their members. This paper
applies an analytic framework of the six dimensions of global government developed by John J.
Kirton. The development of environmental initiatives of six Asia-Pacific countries(the U.S.,
Canada, Japan, China, Korea and Russia) have been accompanied by the introduction of energy
efficient technologies policies such as building and clean coal policies.
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Acknowledgements
I am deeply thankful to a Professor John J Kirton and the G8 Research Group for allowing me such a valuable opportunity to write this M.A. thesis. I am very appreciative to MAPS director Professor Hy Luong who always warmly encouraged me to have an Asia-Pacific perspective. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Matthew Hoffmann and Joseph Wong at the political science department for giving me excellent feedback. Since all professors have busy schedules, they all deeply engaged in my academic paper at considerate sacrifice. I am also thankful to all my friends who stay in the MAPS lab almost every day. Xu Ting and Jenilee Guebert always helped me find resources. Finally, I am very happy to have dear families who always support me and shared the warmest moments. I would particularly like to thank my parents who are very patient and could wait during my long writing. I love my sister and brother who suddenly became an “iron chef” at home.
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Table of Contents Chapter1: Introduction .................................................................................................................................1
A. Significance .........................................................................................................................................1
B. Competing Schools of Thought...........................................................................................................3
C. Puzzles..................................................................................................................................................8
D. Thesis...................................................................................................................................................8
E. Methodology and Issue Area Defined...............................................................................................11
Chapter2: An Overview of the Informal Institution's Climate Performance...............................................14
A. Overall Assessments...........................................................................................................................14
B. Domestic Political Management........................................................................................................15
C. Deliberation: Environmental Agenda...............................................................................................17
D. Direction-Setting: Environmental Principles and Norms................................................................22
E. Decision-Making: Environmental Commitments.............................................................................26
F. Delivery: Environmental Compliance ..............................................................................................30
G. Development of Global Environmental Governance.......................................................................32
Chapter3: Country Analysis- Clean Coal Technology and Green Building .....................................................................................................................................................................36
A. Green Building: APEC and APP .....................................................................................................37
B. Clean Coal Technology: APEC and APP ........................................................................................39
C. Asia Pacific Countries: Building and Coal Policies.........................................................................40
The U.S...............................................................................................................................................40
Canada...............................................................................................................................................42
China ..................................................................................................................................................43
Japan ..................................................................................................................................................45
Republic of Korea..............................................................................................................................46
Russia. ................................................................................................................................................47
Chapter4: Causes of Climate Performance..................................................................................................49
A. Equalized shock-activated vulnerability............................................................................................50
B. Institutionalized interaction intensity: Common Principles and Membership .................................................................................................................................................................52
C. The Weakness of the UNFCCC........................................................................................................56
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D. Rational Choice: Domestic Interests.................................................................................................52
Chapter5: Conclusion..................................................................................................................................56
References ...................................................................................................................................................58
APPENDIX A........................................................................................................................... 65 APPENDIX B........................................................................................................................... 66 APPENDIX C........................................................................................................................... 67 APPENDIX D........................................................................................................................... 68 APPENDIX E........................................................................................................................... 69 APPENDIX F........................................................................................................................... 73 APPENDIX G........................................................................................................................... 74
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Chapter 1: Introduction
A. Significance
Global governance of climate change has recently shifted from a large scale UN-driven effort
focused on top down targets and timetables to smaller, country-driven, informal, nonbinding
approaches focused on economic activity and technological cooperation. One of the reasons for
this shift is the failure of the Kyoto regime. The Kyoto regime is widely regarded as a failure
because it does not include as ratified carbon-controlling countries such major emitters as the
US, China and South Korea, while ratified countries such as Canada and Japan are not fulfilling
their carbon-controlling commitments. In addition, the negotiations for building effective post-
Kyoto framework are not producing any detailed progress, although countries have long been
expected to adopt a new agreement in the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen in December 2009.
What the next global climate change strategy will look like remains uncertain. However,
countries are competing to determine new climate change policies as world leaders at plurilateral
or regional conferences such as the Group of Eight (G8) plus Group of Five (G8+G5), the Major
Economic Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEM, now Major Economies
Forum), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Asia-Pacific Partnership
for Clean Development and Climate (APP). These four key smaller conferences cooperate and
compete with each other to respond to global climate change in the Asia-Pacific region. First,
there is the G8, which has reached out to China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa at the
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ministerial and official leader levels since 2003. Second, in association with the G8, the
American initiated MEF, a group of sixteen powers, adding Korea, Indonesia and Australia, to
the G8 plus G5 began in 2007. Third, APEC is a regional forum which has worked among the
U.S., China and 19 member economies through its Energy Working Group since 1992. Fourth,
the APP, the US-led plurilateral approach with Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea
and later Canada, emerged in 2005. The APP’s approach was endorsed by the G8 in 2006 and
APEC in 2007.
Against this backdrop, Asia-Pacific countries, especially the six major powers of the U.S.,
Canada, Japan, China, Korea and Russia, seek a more workable framework than the UN-led
Kyoto regime to foster strong initiatives at domestic, regional and global levels. At the global
and regional levels, the Asia-Pacific region, in cooperation with the US, is moving forward with
climate change initiatives through the G8+5, the MEF, APEC, and the APP. At the domestic
level, Japan has proposed in its “Cool Earth 50” plan that nations cut emissions by 50 percent by
2050, and more recently pledged to cut its owm by 25% by 2020. China has passed a
“Renewable Energy Law,” and the Chinese government also has set a target of having 15% of all
energy is to come from renewable sources by 2020 (Loh, 2007, Heggelund, 2007).
The Asia-Pacific countries are then creating, accepting and implementing climate commitments
through these institutions. These actions are critical because of the high and rising share of the
world’s population, energy consumption, and amount of greenhouse gas emissions from the
Asia-Pacific region. Yet due in part to their informality and short history, these institutions’
ability to contribute to global climate governance has yet to be theoretically and empirically
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analyzed in any systematic details by scholars, who remain overwhelmingly focused on the work
at the UN. Additionally, scholars have been focused more on Western countries’ initiatives in
climate change objectives rather than Asian countries’ growing role in setting the climate agenda
and guiding action.
Therefore, this study offers the first full scale systematic examination of these new bodies
creation, operation and their causes. It gives new insight into the informal plurilateral
institutions’ role, their effectiveness in policy creation and implementation, and their potential
impact on global or regional climate change governance in the Asia-Pacific region. This study
addresses two key questions: why are key Asia-Pacific powers pushing a climate change agenda
through US-led plurilateral initiatives beyond the formal multilateral UN? And how do these
approaches and the institutions’ performance affect regional or global climate governance?
B. Competing Schools of Thought
The G8+O5, MEM, APEC, and APP are considered soft or informal institutions. In general,
organizations are soft when states get together and create them outside of international law
(Sindico, 2006).1 From Kirton’s work on soft law, informal institution are defined as
translational and intergovernmental bodies, including those exclusively among governments,
which similarly rely on consent and consensus, rather than on codified and ratified legal charters
and intergovernmental bureaucracies with resources of their own (Kirton, 2004).
1 Quoted from J. Klabbers, “Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in International Law,” (2001) 70 (3) Nordic Journal of International Law
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The three classical international relations theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism explain
informal institutions and their cooperative activities on global climate change. The debate among
realism, liberalism and constructivism centers on differing emphasis on power, interests and
knowledge in the international political economy. Realists argue that international rule is
determined by major power states. Neorealists have developed the basic assumption of realists,
where cooperation come form hegemony. They discuss how the major powers reflects their
preferences in the final international agreement. In sum, realists and neorealists doubt whether
institutions can achieve common goals beyond those based on countries’ self-interests or that of
a “hegemon” within the international political system (Rowlands, 2001). Liberals and neoliberals
look at growing interdependence, institutional effectiveness and functional rationality. Their
view highlights the increased cooperation of countries to reduce transactions costs and
uncertainties for managing interdependence (Ruggie, 1983). As traditional theories, both the
realist and liberal approaches focus on the self-interested behavior and the rational choice of
states (Ravenhill, 2001). On the other hand, constructivists have more recently emphasized the
way in which individuals and groups shape strategic behavior, and how their behavior alters the
identities and social purpose of the actors (Ikenberry, 2001; Pempel, 2004). This study
accordingly assumes that groups shape strategic behavior, and their behavior alters the identities
and social purpose of the major Asia-Pacific states (Ikenberry, 2001; Pempel, 2004).
The realists, liberals and constructivists differ in their adherents’ analyses of the environmental
performance of the MEF and the APP. Four schools exist on the MEF. The first school, drawing
on neorealism, sees the MEF as a flexible and effective American alternative to Kyoto. This
school assumes that the U.S. is the major player on the climate change negotiation, and is likely
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to re-enter climate talks and take the lead in post-Kyoto negotiations, bringing about an
agreement on a long-term target at the MEF (Soledad, 2007). The MEF reflects the U.S.
preference which includes the flexibility of non-binding agreement and “aspirational” goals. In
addition, the U.S. shares a responsibility with developing countries in resolving global warming
(Lieberman and Schaeferm, 2007). Therefore, the MFF is a positive shift in the direction for the
US (Smith and Lennon, 2008).
The second school, largely drawing on some neoliberalism, believes that the MEF is a UN
supporter. Haas (2008) underlines the multilateral climate negotiation (MEF) is still weak
because of the thinness of the underlying social constructions, and tight financial resources on
climate change. To build an effective post-Kyoto agreement, a concerted push for national-level
research or a reasonable institutional venue such as the G8 plus O5 and MEF could be helpful.
Such an effort outside the UN should be coordinated closely with the Bali Roadmap in order to
maintain the legitimacy of the entire enterprise (Hass, 2008). Yet Diringer (2007) criticizes the
fact that the US has consistently resisted any consideration of new commitments within
UNFCCC and COPs, and emphasizes the necessity of binding commitments.
In the third school, other neoliberals see the MEF as a largely voluntary approach within the
G8. Mignon (2007) notes the MEF is effective due to its smaller size negotiation framework
which is easy to manage and achieve climate targets in. President Bush’s suggestion, bringing
developed and developing countries in, makes as much sense as any of the large group such as
UNFCCC or Conferences of the Parties (COPs). Yet, in comparison to other bodies, the MEF
seems weaker, as it has no domestic legislative support and concrete technology strategy. This
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slow progress might cause large gaps between UNFCCC and American climate policy. Thus the
“wait and see” attitude is likely to yield a failure in the MEF’s climate change policy.
A fourth, constructivist school see the MEF as a G8 instrument. Jim Caunnought (2008) argues
that strong leadership will be expected in initiating the major economies process and producing a
strong declaration which influences global climate change regime.The MEF is a new informal
institution which is at the stage of agenda setting for short and medium greenhouse gas reduction
goals. These goals of MEF are highly comparable with the G8’s plan, so that the MEF would
support the work of the G8 (Kirton, 2008).
Three schools dominate the APP studies. In the first, realists contend that the APP falls
fundamentally far short of the ideal. The absence of mandatory measures and especially the
small amount of funding are the reasons. In fact, there is only a total of AUD$100 million over
five years from Australia, and USD$ 52 million provided by the United States. According to the
IEA (2003), global energy sector investment needs are over USD$500 billion a year by 2030
(World Bank, 2007). The APP will thus probably not achieve serious results in stimulating
technology innovation. The APP has poor funding compared to the more than USD$ 30 billion
global carbon market in 2006 which comprised USD$ 25 billion in trade under the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme and USD 5 billion involving the Kyoto joint implementation and CDM
mechanism (World Bank, 2007). In short, the APP’s technology- focused climate policy is
ineffective because there is no cost-effective abatement action and government financial support
for technological innovation (Pezzey, Zotto, and Quiggin 2008).
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The second, more neoliberal school sees APP as a supplemental multilateral approach to the
Kyoto Protocol. The APP provides an attractive package, including funds and new form of
technology, to developing countries. In this way, the market-based approach fits participants’
common interests (Hoffman, 2008a). Thus, all members would play an active role in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions by creating technologies that can be implemented in the future (Sarah,
2007). In addition, the APP could add value to the Kyoto process by bringing some “missing”
players to the table and by adding flexibility in implementing actions (Zhang, 2007). According
to Hass, however, the non-legally binding nature of the APP means of needs to cooperate closely
with the Bali Roadmap to maintain the legitimacy of the entire enterprise. For these reasons,
APP is implemented as a supplement to the Kyoto Protocol, with the hope that together they may
prevent greenhouse gas emissions in multiple ways (Oxley, 2007).
The third, constructivist school believes the APP is an experimental institutional alternative
sub-group approach. This school argues that the APP represents a governance experiment,
which could pose a challenge to the Kyoto regime. Loh and Simon point out that Asia, despite its
diversity, has begun to transfer technology through the APP, and set regional goals through
APEC. The crucial target set by the APP, increasing energy efficiency some 25 percent for its
members, is an excellent first step. In addition, the APP crafts “side payments” to multinational
bargains and identifies “common but differentiated responsibilities (Barkenbus 2001).”
Consequently, Asia-Pacific countries form a trade and investment regime through technology
transfer and innovation.
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In short, these schools together suggest that the strength of the MEF and the APP are based on
four qualities: their incorporation of American leadership; their supplemental approaches to UN-
centred governance; their ability to work with other institutions; and their weak informal
cooperation with a modest budget and much diversity in economic, cultural and political
attributes. Scholars, in the limited literature available, tend to focus on member countries’
direction-setting and initiatives. Most schools clearly mention “breaking through initiatives” by
the US and “strong leadership” by both developed and developing nations. Also, technology-
based policy and clean development funds provide the future, long-term direction setting on
climate policy.
C. Puzzles
While all of these schools offer valuable insights, none takes a theoretical approach. All poorly
describe and explain how these institutions have developed and created cooperation, how well
member countries deliver in their domestic policy and why they implement these agreements.
Regarding the MEF, neorealists do not explain how the MEF enhances the G8’s institutional
development and these U.S. interests through sharing goals in the communiqué. Although
neoliberals see a balance between the MEF’s pros and cons, they do not include the cluster of
causes which drive the pattern of climate change negotiation. Constructivists fail to see the
political dynamics brought by the US into the climate negotiation.
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Scholars of the APP focus more on how US’s initiatives and a market-driven economy help
regional development. However, they have flaws similar to those of the scholars analyzing the
MEF: Realists neglect the fact that over 100 related projects, as well as 18 Flagship Projects, are
taking place in this region (APP Fact Sheet, 2009). Neoliberalists and constructivists schools fail
to examine how the APP plays a pivotal role as a regional institution and its pattern of global
climate policies.
D. Thesis
Although the schools of thought are not adequate in certain respects, this study takes useful tools
from previous scholarly work, supported by an analytic framework which traces causes and
patterns and causes of informal institutions’ performance. In order to enrich a constructivist view,
the paper systematically traces the climate-related consensus and commitments forged at the
global G8+5 with the MEF and at the regional APEC with the APP, the compliance of six key
Asia-Pacific powers with them, and the causes of the patterns of performance which arise. The
consensus, commitment and compliance on climate have varied considerably across these two
institutions, the G8+5 and APEC, and within each since 2005.
The following three questions are addressed to investigate the role and capability of the two
informal plurilateral forums, the MEF and the APP. First, how have new forums, importantly led
by the six leading Asia-pacific Powers of the U.S., Canada, Japan, China, Korea, and Russia,
created timely and appropriate consensus and commitments on climate change and on the
integrally related fields of energy efficiency and clean technology? Second, how well have they
10
induced these key member countries to comply with their commitments? Third, why have they
done so, in ways that may produce a better performance than that of the legalized, multilateral
UN process?
To answer these questions, this study advances three arguments. The first argument is that the
G8 + 5 and APEC have primarily increased their collective agreements on climate and clean
energy and that the MEF and the APP give support to and cooperate with the G8+5 and APEC.
Although these informal groups and forums are likely to show modest environmental
performance due to their diverse membership and short history, their cooperation plays an
important role in developing regional or global environmental governance in the Asia-Pacific
region. The second argument is based on neoliberal institutionalism. Domestic implementation
by Asia-Pacific powers is limited due to the divergent interests of countries in these non legally
binding regimes. In spite of the poor policy coordination history in the Asia-Pacific region, six
Asia-Pacific countries are recently seeking mutual benefit through international cooperation
under the uncertain post-Kyoto negotiations. The third argument is based on constructivism.
There is an increasingly dense network of cross-border cooperation, collaboration and
interdependence with regards to climate change. In particular, this informal network creates a
common and consensual knowledge, which creates a chain reaction on the part of actors that
develops into norms on climate change measures (Kanie, 2007).
In particular, the G8+5 succeeded in adjusting America to accept the scientific consensus and
take action on climate change, while the MEM summit induced the eight major emerging
emitters to signal for the first time that they would control their carbon as well. The G8+5’s
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performance on climate went from substantial in 2005, to a sustained rise to high levels by 2008.
The MEF made little progress in its initial official-level meetings in the autumn of 2007 but
made a meaningful difference at the summit in Japan in the summer of 2008.
In APEC, economies have announced energy and environment commitments since 1995.
Projects have been implemented by the Energy Working Group since 1992. Since 2005, the APP
has developed practical approaches and strategies to reduce emissions and facilitate energy
efficiency and environmentally sustainable growth. After that, APEC leaders put climate change
at the top of their agenda in 2007. They also shared some energy efficiency programs, such as a
standby power conference and a green building workshop, with the APP’s building and
appliances task force. The APP is likely to increase collaborative activities together with APEC,
governments, and the private sector, which weave a cross-national network across the Asia-
Pacific region (Pempel, 2004).
The G8+5 and APEC have similar causes to explain their pattern of climate change performance,
as both institutions largely share the same membership, time frame, and institutional function.
Appendix C shows that six countries have been actively involved in the G8+5, APEC, MEF, and
APP since 2005. Hypotheses based on these variables will be developed and tested both against
the commitments and compliance of these six states from 2005 to 2008.
E. Methodology and Issue Area Defined
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This study applies an analytic framework developed by John Kirton to explore the governance of
informal institutions in depth. Core governance functions of the G8 are explained as domestic
political management by leaders; deliberation to increase information and trust in order to avoid
accidental conflicts; direction setting through new principles and norms; creation of collective
commitments; delivering on these commitments through the national compliance of their
members; and the creation of new decision-making procedures by developing global governance
(Kirton, 2004).
This “6D” framework is applicable to the G8+5, MEF, APEC and APP, as they have annual
leaders’ summits which record members collective agreements in a series of official collective
documents. However, the diverse membership provides a division between the North and South,
which has made for less commitments and lower compliance score in the G8+5 and APEC
members as well as in the APP and MEF countries. The APP has been performance in domestic
political management, decision making and delivery, because it is based on projects rather than a
summit level meeting. There have been only two APP ministerial level meetings since 2005. The
MEF, with summits only in 2008 and 2009, has a similar weakness due to its short history. The
biggest problem to applying the “6D” framework to these four informal institutions is in
measuring compliance. Compliance is more difficult to assess when similar commitments have
been made by multiple organizations. Although a government allocates new resources and
changes legislation or regulation, it is difficult to identify what causes make countries implement
their commitment. For these reasons, this study partly introduces selective compliance data
which explains the G8 and G8+5’s effectiveness. In order to examine the APEC and APP’s
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effectiveness, it conducts two case studies of clean coal and building sectors, which the G8+5
and MEF has also worked on, and analyses how the six Asia-Pacific countries deliver these.
The issue area of climate change includes climate change itself, greenhouse gases, global
warming, the Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC, emissions, carbon dioxide, CO2, and other related
issues. It also includes energy in the forms of energy efficiency, renewable energy, and
alternative energy involving greenhouse gas reduction. It does not include energy security and
energy trade.
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Chapter 2: An Overview of the Informal Institution' s Climate
Performance
A. Overall Assessments
i. Bayne Grades
Nicolas Bayne offers the classic grading (from A to C) on the G7/8 summit’s performance. The
pattern of the G7/8’s climate change performance well reflects the informal institution’s nature.
He emphasises that strong leadership and the new dialogue process affect the G8’s agenda
setting. Their peak period on climate change is the 2005 Gleneagles summit with A- and 2007
Heilegendamm with B-. This matches the G8+5, MEM, APEC and APP’s performance
(Appendix A).
ii. The G8 Research Group Annual Performance Assessments
The G8 Research Group assesses the G8’s summit performance every year. Its environment
assessment suggests an overall pattern of rising performance, especially after the summit invites
and cooperates with other members and institutions since 2005. According to the assessment of
the six functions (6D), the G8’s climate governance has a six year cycle since 1979, with the
peak performance years being 1985, 1989, 1997 and 2005.
15
When APEC is analyzed by the 6D (except delivery), the results show that APEC has had much
the same cycle as the G8 since 1993 (Appendix A and C). The 6D are also adapted to the MEF
and APP in order to identify these new institutions’ role in deliberation, direction setting and the
development of global climate governance (Appendix E).
B. Domestic Political Management
i. Communiqué Complements
For the G8 and APEC, leaders have stressed climate change issues both in their informal
institutional documents and in their members’ national policy speeches, given in order to manage
their domestic policy and politics at home. Climate change complements of individual members
first appeared in the communiqué at the G8 (2005, 2007 and 2008) and at APEC leaders’
declaration in recent years (2008). In the G8, there have been three cases of “communiqué
complements.” Some leaders push their climate agenda at summits so their countries are noted in
the communiqué. Firstly, climate change complements came for developing countries such as
Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa since they were invited to the 2005 Gleneagles
summit, where they presented their common positions regarding major global issues with the G8.
For the 2007 Heiligendamm summit, the communiqué highlighted a joint declaration, including
climate change issues, by the G8 Presidency and five outreach countries. This joint declaration
described the road map of Heiligendamm process. The second complement was for Japan,
Canada, and the EU’s decision to halve global emissions by 2050, which was praised in the
16
Heiligendamm summit communiqué. Finally, the U.S. initiative, the MEF, was complemented at
the 2008 Hokkaido summit and the 2009 L’Aquila summit.
APEC communiqué has fewer complements. In 2008, the Chinese commitment to financially
support the Asia-Pacific Network for Energy Technology (APNet) was noted. It was also noted
Australia, the U.S., and Japan’s financial support for the Climate Investment Fund, which has
been managed by the World Bank since its creation on July 1, 2008.
The main reason for this pattern is that countries feel pressure from the great uncertainty about
the climate change regime, specifically the post-Kyoto negotiation. The key emerging economies
are involved in the summit preparation process in order to access more resources and information
from developed countries. The U.S. initiated a new informal institution, the MEF to reflect the
American preference for a voluntary greenhouse gas reduction target. Japan and Canada look
back to see whether they meet their Kyoto target and rethink their position in the Post-Kyoto
negotiation.
ii. National Policy Address
Beyond communiqué complements, some Asia-Pacific powers have managed their domestic
politics by increasingly mentioning climate change objectives along with their G8 performance
in their annual national policy addresses. The Japanese prime minister addressed climate change
issues and the G8 in General Policy Speeches twice in 2007 and once in 2008. The Canadian
prime minister mentioned the G8 and APEC once in a Speech from the Throne in 2007.
17
The pattern of little domestic political management is based on the uncertainty over the
international post-Kyoto negotiation. Overall, countries are likely to push their climate agenda at
international conferences rather than in their domestic policy. Under such uncertainty, climate
change remains a side issue for voters as well as candidates for the next election.
C. Deliberation: Environmental Agenda
As a deliberative forum, the leaders communicate with each other on an annual basis on their
core subjects for the leaders’ meeting. Agenda setting by leaders is a part of a deliberative role
that extends to creating new issues or policies, getting international attention and indentifying
best practices. Appendix A shows how many times G8+5 leaders have mentioned climate change
and clean technology in the leaders’ documents. The number of climate deliberations has
mounted in 1997, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.
Climate change had drawn only modest attention until 1997. In 1979, the G7 leaders expressed
the necessity of expanding alternative energy which might prevent pollution, such as carbon
dioxide and sulphur oxides, from entering the atmosphere. This was the first time that the leaders
recognized the link between energy and climate change. In 1985, 1987 and 1988, climate change
was again mentioned, but no specific details for an environmental plan were given. G7 leaders
gave more attention to climate change in 1989. This year saw more climate objectives, such as
deforestation, nuclear power and cooperation with international organizations, notably, the
18
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, World Meteorological Organization and United
Nations Environment Programme.
The leaders’ attention to climate change increased in 1997, while the 1992 Rio conference has
been consistently mentioned by the G7 after 1989. The G7 leaders added new climate objectives
such as legally-binding emissions targets under the UNFCCC and environmental education.
However, the variety of climate change objectives was less than in 1989. Furthermore, APEC
leaders, who started meeting in 1993, directly addressed climate change, UNFCCC, and
technology for sustainable development in 1997.
G8 leaders’ attention then declined until 2005. The G7/8 mainly expressed concern about the
Kyoto Protocol and technology for sustainable development. Climate change disappeared from
APEC leaders’ documents during this time. APEC continued to mention energy security (1998,
2000-2004), sustainable development (2001) and the environment (1998, 2000).
2005 came an explosive growth of G8 leaders’ attention to climate change. It was the first year
that the “Outreach Dialogue” was established by the 2005 host, the United Kingdom. As a result
of this dialogue, a joint declaration between the U.K. and the O5, which included climate change
as an issue, was released. In this document, developing countries emphasized their position on
climate change, which was aimed at poverty reduction, new financing frameworks and
technology transfer. In addition to the O5, other international organizations such as the IEA,
IMF, WTO and World Bank participated in the climate change discussion. Moreover, the
19
“Gleneagles Plan of Action” drew public attention by including more detailed climate objectives
for a long-term international policy framework, including carbon sinks.
For APEC leaders, 2005 summit was the second time that climate change was directly described.
It came in one paragraph that noted the need to address climate change and to support the
UNFCCC. 2005 was also a significant turning point for Asia-Pacific countries as the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate was announced on July 28, 2005 at an
ASEAN meeting, at which time a Vision Statement was released.
The 2006 St. Petersburg G8 summit highlighted the year for energy security. The position paper
by the O5 did not address climate change. Instead, it noted the need for alternative energy and
sustainable development. The G8 released the “St. Petersburg Plan of Action: Global Energy
Security,” which covered climate change and sustainable development. This action plan also
mentioned the APP. At APEC that year, human security was the central issue. It included energy
security and climate change.
The APP gave much more attention to climate than the G8+5 and APEC in 2006. Based on
discussions from the first ministerial meeting and two Policy and Implementation Committee
meetings, the APP produced a communiqué, a charter, a work plan and guidelines for the
Flagship Project. While all technology options for clean energy and business plans were on the
table, coal was the centre of attention. The six members heavily depended on coal for their
domestic energy and four members were among the world’s top five coal producers.
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In 2007 leaders’ attention to climate change climbed again in 2007. For the G8+5, climate
change was dealt with as seriously as in 2005. But the focus now was to establish a post-Kyoto
climate change framework, specifically by setting a binding greenhouse gas emission reduction
target which included all major emitters. Leaders felt pressure to make progress ahead of the
United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bali in December 2007. At the Heiligendamm
Summit in the summer, G8 leaders failed to agree to set a binding long-term goal for emission
cuts. However, they made progress with commitments from the European Union, Canada and
Japans “to at least halv[e] global emissions by 2050.” At the 2007 Heilingendam summit,
President Bush announced the launch of the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and
Climate Change (now MEF). There were two meetings of the MEM during 2007. Their biggest
focus was the target and timeline of the post-Kyoto climate change framework.
At the Australian-hosted Sydney APEC Summit in 2007, the number of climate change
deliberations reached their highest point ever. A separate climate change statement was released
for the first time. The “Declaration on Climate Change Energy Security and Clean Development”
highlighted the greenhouse gas reduction goals set to be reached by 2030, forest issues, and the
Asia-Pacific Network for Energy Technology (APNET).
On July 20 2007, the APP introduced an ongoing project status and the registration form at the
fourth Policy and Implementation Committee meeting. In addition, the APP added Canada as a
new member at its second Ministerial meeting on October 15, 2007 in New Delhi, India. The
Second Communiqué notes, “Canada is a key player in the region, shares the vision of the
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Partners, and has worked constructively with all Partners through the bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms that provide the foundation for our work.” At this conference, the launch of the
“Asia-Pacific Energy Technology Co-operation Centre,” which had been suggested at the last
ministers meeting, was officially announced.
In 2008, tackling climate change remained a critical issue. Progress was made on a number of
issues at the Japanese-hosted 2008 G8 Hokkaido summit. However, the G8 and G5 showed
significant differences in their positions on climate change. The G8 declaration expressed a long-
term goal of emission cuts that would cause “at least 50% reduction of global emissions by
2050” and sought a contribution from all major economies. In contrast, the G5 political
declaration stressed that the key to fighting climate change was further commitments by
developed countries. Without mentioning long-term emission cuts by 2050, the G5 countries
showed their interest in the area of adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and the
development of the carbon market. In this regard, the Major Economies Meeting at the Hokkaido
summit reached a deadlock among members. There was no long-term target in the MEM
declaration; however, the delegates did agree that major emission cuts were necessary. As short-
term and mid-term emission reduction goals, the MEM members agreed to promote technology
cooperation in energy efficiency and nuclear power and emphasised the importance of decreases
in land use and in the forestry sector.
Meanwhile, APEC had no new agreement for combating climate change. APEC leaders
supported “decisive and effective long term cooperation now, up to and beyond 2012, to address
climate change under the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), in
22
accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities.” Clean technology, enhancing carbon stocks in forests, and the UNFCCC were the
major issues in APEC’s climate change deliberations.
The overall pattern of deliberation shows approximately six-year phases (1975-1980, 1981-1986,
1987-1992, 1993-1998, 1999-2004 and 2005-now) which is same as Bayne’s (Bayne, 1997). In
such a way, all informal institutions offer a similar agenda and which one has begun to be much
more specific since 2005. While the G8 and APEC members urged members to pay attention to
protecting the environment before 1997(Bayne, 2004), the debate has moved forward certain
goals for enhancing technological cooperation after 2005. The cause of this development is the
birth of the new informal institutions in which the leading developing countries have more
opportunity to direct the climate change agenda. New institutions make international society
pays more attention to developing the climate change agenda and gives momentum to finding a
technological solution. Therefore, the O5, APP and MEM enhance the deliberative function with
their hope to identify the best solution.
D. Direction-Setting: Environmental Principles and Norms
The G8 and APEC have developed climate change principles, defined as beliefs of fact,
causation, and rectitude into annual leader’s documents (Krasner, 1983). These two institutions’
agendas include the defining principles of energy security in connection with the environment
and climate, sustainable development, and the legitimacy of the UN international climate change
regime and its negotiations.
23
For Asia-Pacific countries, the principle of energy security has been the greatest concern. These
countries have stressed consistently the connection between energy security and the
environment, including climate change. In 1979, 1989 and 1990, the G7 (now G8) emphasized
the importance of reducing greenhouse gases through energy efficiency, conservation,
technology, and nuclear energy. In 2000, the leaders pointed out that the increased use of
renewable energy sources will improve the quality of life, especially in developing countries.
The reasoning behind this principle is “the particular increase of carbon dioxide” and “sulphur
oxides in the atmosphere (1979)” and “energy-related environmental damage.”
As at the G7, APEC leaders noted in 1995 that the Asia-Pacific region faced “increase[d] the
demand for food and energy and the pressure on the environment” due to the Asia-Pacific
region’s expanding population and rapid economic growth. One of the indirect causes of this
Asia-Pacific focus on energy was rising oil prices and the risk for developing countries that
relied heavily on the condition of the oil market. In 2000, APEC leaders noted this oil price
volatility as a reason to support energy security and environmental protection.
The second principle is sustainable development, which is the central principle for developing
countries. Since 1989, the G7/G8 has brought sustainable development into its communiqué,
focusing on the necessity for scientific research into global climate change and for a partnership
on development and the environment through the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED). In 1999 and 2000, sustainable development appeared more clearly
than before. At Cologne in 1999, the leaders’ stated with urgency that climate change was “an
24
extremely serious threat to sustainable development,” and the members stressed the need to
support developing countries’ efforts through financial mechanisms, technology transfer, and
capacity building. In 2005, the G8 marked a great turning point for this principle by inviting
major emerging economies (O5). Developing countries sent a strong message to developed
countries through the joint declaration, underscoring the fact that developing countries urgently
needed financial mechanisms to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, with their first
priorities being economic development and poverty eradication. Also, they reiterated the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” from the UNFCCC and its Kyoto
Protocol. In response, the G8 issued a statement “The Gleneagles Plan of Action: Climate
Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development,” showing their commitment to reduce
poverty in developing countries.
In 1998, APEC also noted its members’ commitment in the area of energy and the environment,
especially given the economic and population growth of the APEC community. Also, APEC’s
attention toward the World Summit on Sustainable Development appeared twice in 2001 and
2002. However, poverty reduction for developing countries came out only once, at the APEC
meeting in 2008.
Overall, the issue of sustainable development was first established by the progress of
international climate conferences and negotiations, such as UNCED and UNFCCC, in the
context of international cooperation. The increased use of energy from fossil fuels and growing
energy demands from emerging economies pushed this principle further. In accordance with
these reasons, developing countries enhanced their presence at the international climate change
25
negotiations.
The third principle is leaders’ support for the UN, in the form of UNCED, UNEP, UNFCCC and
WMO, as the international climate negotiations under the UN have been receiving increased
attention. Some of the important conferences for determining the climate change regime held by
these UN bodies, such as the Rio Summit, the Johannesburg Summit, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, and the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention,
were mentioned continually by the G8 and APEC. From 1989 on, the leaders of the G8 and
APEC have worked in line with the progress of the UN climate change regime. The central calls
have been for increasing global participation in establishing targets to limit or reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (1998,1999), achieving the goals of the Kyoto Protocol (2000, 2003, 2005) and
achieving a post 2012-agreement (2006- 2008). Since 2005, the leaders have been paying much
more attention to the post-Kyoto negotiations, in accordance with Paragraph 9 of Article 3 in the
Kyoto Protocol, which says that states should start negotiation the next commitment phase from
2005. Following the international timeline, APEC leaders’ support for the post-Kyoto agreement
was the highest ever in 2007. For example, leaders pledged to support the host country, India, in
its role in the Conference in Bali in December 2007.
The APP and MEM share the same principles as the G8 and APEC, but focus more on clean
development which includes economic growth and technology transfer. In the first communiqué
of the APP in 2006, ministers mentioned their belief in “the urgent need to pursue development
and poverty eradication.” The APP’s partnership projects and activities are based on the principle
of cooperation between the public and private sectors. In short, the APP’s priority principle is
26
promoting economic growth and achieving practical results by involving the private sector. In
terms of the MEM, the first chairman’s summary states that, “Participants all placed a high
priority on action to address energy security and climate change,” and further posits that the
UNFCCC plays the central role in creating a long-term goal for greenhouse gas reduction. At the
next year’s declaration at the 2008 Hokkaido summit, the MEM leaders stressed “the need for
technology breakthrough[s]” in addressing climate change for developing countries. Also,
leaders paid particular attention to the IPCC scenario to share the scientific view on climate
change among all participants.
In sum, the G8+5, MEM, APEC and APP developed three principles and norms of climate
change. The most noticeable change is those developing countries’ beliefs of fact, causation and
rectitude has shifted toward scientific and political consensus. The cause is growing energy
demands and expanding population in the Asia-pacific region. Also, the tight timeline of post-
Kyoto negotiation in UN bodies is another factor.
E. Decision-Making: Environmental Commitments
The fourth function of informal institutions is decision-making. Leaders issue future-oriented
collective commitments in order to help carry out principles and norms. Over two decades, the
G8 has made a broad range of climate commitments. Appendix B indicates that the G8 has
consistently made climate commitments since 2004. The 1997 Denver summit marked the
highest number of commitments, including the Rio Earth Summit, the UNFCCC, greenhouse gas
reduction targets by 2010, and partnership with developing countries by implementing
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technological development and funding mechanisms. The number of climate commitments
gradually dropped after 1997, but suddenly picked up again in 2005 and reached its highest
number ever in 2007. During the three years from 2005-2007, the G8 made over half of its
overall climate commitments to that time. The core issues were technology (with 13
commitments) and the UNFCCC and greenhouse gas emissions (each with 10 commitments).
One of the critical commitments by the G8 was the long term greenhouse gas reduction goal of
“at least halving of global emissions by 2050” with the involvement of all major emitters, as
proposed by the EU, Canada and Japan in 2007. In 2008, leaders agreed to implement ambitious
economy-wide mid-term goals.
The G5 and MEM have begun to make more promises with new members since 2007. The O5
achieved scientific consensus on climate change for stabilizing green house gas concentrations in
2005. In addition, the O5 agreed to “advance the effective use of fossil fuels, such as clean coal
technology, and to increase the use of cleaner and renewable energy sources” in order to achieve
sustainable development. However, the G8+5 did not have specific new commitments due to the
different political positions between developing and developed countries. The same deadlock
arose in the MEM meetings, in which the core commitments were on the UNFCCC and
technology transfer (each with two commitments).
APEC has made agreements at the leaders meeting for a decade. The APP has made few
commitments because it only issued two communiqué at the ministerial meetings, in 2006 and
2007. These commitments included major technological commitments, flagship projects,
financing and the UNFCCC.
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Appendix B provides an overview of the pattern of the number of climate commitments that the
leaders agreed to at APEC summits from 1989 to as recently as 2007. Although this data
confirms that there were few commitments from 1998 to 2004, it captures two periods of surge
from 1995 to 1997 and 2005 to 2008.
Taking a closer look at the first period, from 1995 to 1997, there are five commitments regarding
energy and environment, especially climate change. APEC began releasing environmental
documents in 1994. An APEC Environment Vision Statement, announced at the APEC
Environment Ministers Meeting in Vancouver in March 1994, included the framework of nine
basic principles for environmental policies. Next year at the third APEC leaders’ summit in
Osaka, leaders confirmed that this region’s growth will “sharply increase the demand for food
and energy and the pressure on the environment.” The environment agenda reached its peak
popularity with three commitments in 1996 (Williams, 2000), while the second Environment
Ministers Meeting adopted the Action Program for Sustainable Development in July 1996 and
Energy Ministers addressed the environment as a central theme for discussion in August 1996. In
1997, however, APEC’s commitment suddenly declined. They only mentioned that, “The
enhancement of energy efficiency plays an important role in addressing climate change.” The
reason for this decline is considered to be the Asian currency and financial crises that hit many
economies in 1997, which weakened the collective emphasis and interest in environmental issues
(Williams, 2000). It also rationally reduced the demand for environment control, as economic
growth contracted.
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During the second period from 2005 to 2008, APEC made more specific commitments than in
any previous year. There were twenty five commitments regarding energy and climate change. In
2005, energy efficiency was discussed again, and three energy commitments appeared. The next
year, leaders were more concerned with the “cleaner use of fossil fuel” and launched a “biofuel
taskforce.”
In 2007, APEC leaders produced the highest number of commitments ever, sixteen. APEC
leaders’ Sydney Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development
reflected a new level of consensus in the region on climate change. The draft declaration
followed closely the proposals that former U.S. President George W. Bush had floated earlier in
2007. It called for a new world climate agreement that is “a more flexible and diverse framework
that promotes practical and co-operative action.” The most remarkable commitment is a long-
term aspirational global emissions reduction goal which will be a key component of the post-
2012 framework for climate negotiations. The draft agreement recognized that action was
required to “slow, stop and reverse” greenhouse gas emissions; that nations should vow to reduce
energy intensity by 25 percent by 2030 and to increase forest cover in the region by 50 million
acres by 2020 and that APEC nations would work with other nations to find a solution to climate
change. In 2008, there were five commitments, still a relatively high number, although most
commitments focused on reconfirmation of the Sydney Declaration.
The commitments have moved from general promises to specific ones in order to alter human
behaviour. Strong leadership and political will are the major causes of the increase number of
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commitments. For example, the U.K. and Japan showed leadership as the host country of the G8
summit in 2005 and in 2007. As a presidency of APEC, Canada and Australia were enthusiastic
to address climate change issue in 1997 and in 2007. In addition, the U.S.-led APP and MEM
provided new members such as China and Republic of Korea more opportunity to seek a way
into international cooperation and to urge what they needed the most for undertaking mitigation
and adaptation. Nevertheless, commitments are largely vague, as they have no obligation for
member countries. In fact, some countries such as the U.S. and China still resist setting an
absolute greenhouse gas emission reduction target. To set stronger commitments, all members’
concert effort will be needed beyond the North-South division and national interests.
F. Delivery: Environmental Compliance
The compliance measurement framework initially developed by George Von Furstenberg and
Joseph Daniels reveals the record of G7 members during 1975-1989. Following them, Ella
Kokotsis has conducted compliance assessments of the U.S. and Canada. 2 In addition, the
University of Toronto’s G8 Research Group has assessed the record of the members annually
since 1996. Member countries try to comply individually with their collective decisions. The G8
Research Group’s compliance scores examine the overall pattern of the G8’s climate change
commitments.3
2 The U.S. had only a +11% compliance rate, while Canada had +50%. 3 The compliance scale is +1, 0 and -1, which developed by George Von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels in “The Meaning and Reliability of Economic Summit Undertakings, 1975-1989.” The Three level measurement process is: 1: Full or nearly full compliance with a commitment is assigned a score of +1 2. A score of -1 indicates complete or nearly complete failure to implement a commitment. 3. An “inability to commit” or a “work in progress” is given a score of 0.
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Climate compliance rises during 1992-1998 and 2005-2007 among the Asia-Pacific countries
(Appendix C, Republic of Korea is excluded). There is a significant fall to an average of –0.75 in
limiting greenhouse gas emissions in 1997. In second period, there are lower scores on the
UNFCCC and Gleneagles Dialogue commitments (+0.25 in each) as the G8 introduced a new
dialogue with emerging economies. On the technology commitment, the Asia-Pacific Powers
successfully increased their score from 0 in 2006 to +0.75 in 2007.
Overall, the analysis concludes that G8 climate compliance has increased in recent years. Canada,
Japan and China have above-average scores of +0.46, whereas the U.S. and Russia remain below
the average. But both have improved their climate performance since 2006.
The cause of this rising good record is iteration, as liberal institutionalists suggest. The UNFCCC
and technology commitments have appeared several times and their compliance scores have
risen since 2005 (Appendix B). The average score on the UNFCCC was +0.25 in 2005, but +0.4
in 2006 and +1.00 in 2007. Similarly, technology had 0 in 2006 and +0.75 in 2007.
Although iteration may help enhance countries’ compliance, APEC and MEM have far less
iteration in their climate commitments. They also have a larger number of more members, same
of whom are emerging economies, so that their commitment and compliance are more difficult to
assess. Specifically, the APP has had only two ministerial level meetings with the private sector.
Thus it has increased its activities rather than its commitment, as recorded in its official
documents. For these reasons, the compliance of APEC and APP are assessed in the country
analysis section, in chapter four.
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G. Development of Global Environmental Governance
The function of developing global governance is measured by how the summit or forum creates
its own institutions at the leaders, ministerial or official levels and effectively works together
with other international institutions on climate change. In the G8, the Environment Ministers’
meeting was first held in 1992 and developed into an annual meeting in 1994. In 1997, the
Environment Ministers Meeting dealt for the first time with changes in the Earth’s climate which
has adverse impacts on the health or welfare of future generations, especially children. Ministers
quoted the IPCC’s words as scientific evidence.
The G20, G8+5 process and Major Economies process (now Major Economies Forum) are new
bodies that worked with the G8 on climate change. Official level bodies dealing with climate
change were created when the G8 expanded to include other countries. The new Group of
Twenty (G20) which is a forum of finance ministers and central bank governors, dealt with
climate change recently. In 2006 and 2007, the G20 first discussed the links between energy and
climate change policy, as well as the economic implications of climate change. The G8 plus Five
has strengthened their involvement both in the preparatory process and in G8 summit
participation. In 2005, five countries were invited to the Outreach Dialogue of the Gleneagles
Summit, Scotland. The leaders of the G8 launched the Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change,
Clean Energy and Sustainable Development. In 2006, Russian President Putin invited the O5 to
participate in preparatory ministerial meetings on energy with the aim of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. The next year’s G8 presidency, Germany, fostered more active involvement of the
O5 in the Heiligendamm summit. The O5 were involved in the meetings of the Finance,
33
Environment and Development Ministers prior to the Summit, a Special meeting on Climate
Change and Energy Efficiency for the Sherpas, an O5 Leaders Meeting in anticipation of the
Summit and a dialogue between both the G8 and O5, which ultimately resulted in the creation of
the “Heiligendamm Process.”
Following this, a new U.S. initiative, the MEM, was taken by President Bush in May 2007. The
MEM had three meetings before the G8 summit in Hokkaido 2008. The third meeting was
valuable, as here the U.S. announced its mid-term commitment of national greenhouse gas
emission reductions for the first time. At the 2008 Summit, the MEM publicly released a
document, the “Declaration of Leaders Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change,” which
noted developed nations’ mid-term goals and actions to achieve concrete emission reductions.
Also, this declaration stressed the APP approach of sectoral-based technology cooperation and
information exchange. The technology development section of the MEM declaration in particular
drew from the APP task force approach.
On the other hand, APEC has increased its number of ministerial meetings on climate change. At
a policy level, APEC holds leaders meetings, ministerial meetings, sectoral ministerial meetings
and meetings of the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC). Specifically, ministerial
meetings provide recommendations for the leaders meetings and also help shape APEC’s policy
direction. In addition, sectoral ministerial meetings are held regularly, covering areas such as
energy, environment, sustainable development, education, finance, human resource development,
regional science and technology cooperation, small and medium enterprises, telecommunications
and information industry, tourism, trade, transportation and women's affairs. Climate change has
34
been discussed mainly at the ministerial meetings and energy ministers meetings since 1996.
Except for 2002 and 2004, the energy ministerial meetings have dealt with climate change issues
in the context of improving energy efficiency. At the annual Ministers Meeting, climate change
was a critical issue from 1996 to 1997 and from 2005 to the present. Interestingly, other sectoral
ministerial meetings have seen a rapid increase in the climate change since 2007. The financial,
trade and transformation sectors began to discuss climate change in 2007. In 2008, the
telecommunications and information industry and tourism ministers meeting also addressed
climate issues.
The APP has developed quickly since it was first announced on July 28, 2005, immediately after
the G8’s Gleneagles summit. After two ministerial meetings in 2006 and 2007, the mechanisms
of the APP were comprised of the Policy and Implementation Committee (PIC) and Task Forces
and an Administrative Support Group.
The cause of their overall pattern of summit climate governance performance is based on
growing institutionalized interaction intensity at the ministerial level. Since 2005, the G8+5,
MEM, APEC and APP have held more preparatory ministerial meetings before the leaders’
annual meeting (Appendix A, C and E). These informal institutions have the same member
countries (Appendix F), share the same core principles and support the UN bodies. Because of
their increasing network, climate governance is spreading out to other related issue areas and
institutions such as energy, environment, sustainable development, regional science and
technology cooperation and others, if not health in a major way (Kirton and Guebert, 2009).
35
Although these four informal institutions are at an early stage, the development of multiple
institutions definitely has given the width and depth of discussion on climate change.
36
Chapter 3: Country Analysis-Clean Coal Technology and Green
Building
As the previous section suggest, measuring compliance is difficult in the case of APEC and the
APP. In order to examine the APEC and APP’s effectiveness, this chapter three conducts more
detailed case studies about how APEC and the APP have made appropriate projects on climate
change, in accordance with their commitments, in the building and clean coal sectors and how
well each of the six Asia-Pacific countries complied with these climate change commitments in
their domestic policy as a response.
The four informal institutions have made common climate commitments on clean technology
and energy efficiency since 2005. The Gleneagles Plan of Action: Climate Change, Clean
Energy and Sustainable development (by the G8+5) stressed the need for promoting energy
efficiency in buildings and demonstrating the potential of clean coal technology in 2005. But
G8+5 and MEM are still at the agenda setting stage here. In contrast, APEC and the APP have
worked on buildings and clean coal objectives through the APEC Energy Working Group
(EWG) and the APP Task Force. In this regard, Asia-Pacific Powers’ attention has focused on
increasing the efficiency of buildings and coal power plants, as these are critical short-term
solutions to manage the growth in greenhouse gas emissions.
The commercial building sector is strategically important because the use of modern
technologies allows cost saving on energy consumption, since buildings where energy efficient
technologies are applied need to consume less fossil fuels for heating and other technical needs
37
than buildings constructed on the basis of traditional technologies. In such a way, when energy
efficient technologies are applied on the mass scale, overall energy efficiency is at a very high
level.
As for coal policies, it is one of the major goals of the APP and APEC EWG and of projects
funded by countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The use of fossil fuels represents a serious threat
to the environment because fossil fuels are major sources of the greenhouse gas emissions which,
in their turn, are the major cause of the climate change. Through the minimization of fossil fuel
consumption and the introduction of new technologies, countries of the Asia-Pacific region
attempt to prevent the climate change. Remarkably, international cooperation is of the utmost
importance in this regard because greenhouse gas emissions affect the entire region and cannot
be limited by national borders. However, the domestic implementation effort is in sharp contrast
with mutual efforts of the informal institutions, due to different economic situation and national
interests among countries. Therefore, mutual efforts by the international community are needed
to overcome the problem of implementation.
A. Green Building- APEC and APP
The strategic goals of APEC EWG and APP were the development of international cooperation
and programs to decrease environmental pollution through reducing consumption of fossil fuels
and, therefore, lessening greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. The EWG focused on
energy efficiency in commercial buildings that could decrease the consumption of fossil fuels,
including coal consumption. The EWG defines energy efficient technologies, especially in
38
commercial buildings, but the strategic goal of the EWG as well as APP is the wide introduction
of energy efficient technologies throughout communities in the APEC region.
Through the introduction of energy efficient technologies, the APEC and APP attempt to
improve the environment, to reduce climate change and introduce environmentally friendly
technologies en masse. Countries of the Asia-Pacific region attempt to unite their efforts to meet
the goals of the APEC EWG and APP. However, some countries of the region are or, at least,
used to be unwilling to join the initiatives of the EWG and APP as well as other international
organizations and agreements aiming at the minimization of environmental pollution, the
introduction of energy efficient technologies and consistent technological changes in national
economies.
The major cause preventing countries of the Asia-Pacific region from joining the environmental
initiatives of APEC and the APP, was and still is the impact of such initiatives on national
economies. The introduction of environmentally friendly and energy efficient technologies
requires substantial financial resources and many countries of the Asia-Pacific region, especially
developing countries, cannot afford funding programs which imply consistent technological
changes. Even such countries as China, whose economy was rapidly growing and keeps growing
even in the time of global economic crisis, could confront numerous economic challenges while
introducing energy efficient and environmentally friendly technologies in commercial building
and other industries. The practical implementation of the APEC and APP initiatives would slow
down the economic development of countries of the Asia-Pacific region and they viewed such
initiatives as a threat to their national interests.
39
As a result, some countries, including the most significant from an economic and environmental
point of view, such as China and the US, did not fully implement initiatives of the APEC and
APP, preferring to conduct their own environmental policies. On the other hand, it is obvious to
them that the implementation of the environmental initiatives of the APEC and APP could have a
positive impact on the environment and slow down the negative effects of the climate change or,
even potentially prevent the further climate change.
B. Clean Coal Technology- APEC and APP
One of the main initiatives of the EWG is the development of environmental projects related to
clean coal technology. For this purpose, the EWG has created the Expert Group on Clean Fossil
Energy (EGCFE). It holds conferences and workshop as well as develops and maintains projects
on the introduction of clean coal technology. The EGCFE is quite productive in developing
environmental projects. Normally, the EGCFE approves two to five projects annually which are
supported by the countries of the APEC region, except Russia. These projects aim at the
introduction of energy efficient, environmentally friendly technologies that facilitate the
prevention of climate change and of the negative impact of human activities on the environment.
These projects tend to substitute technologies for these which are dangerous for the environment.
In this regard, the substitution of fossil fuels by alternative sources of energy and the introduction
of new technologies which use alternative sources of energy instead of fossil fuels are the main
priorities of the EGCFE. In this regard, the EGCFE is a good example of the successful
40
international cooperation in the field of environmental protection and the struggle of the
international community to combat climate change.
At the same time, the APP maintains environmental projects and introduces energy efficient,
environmentally friendly technologies. The scope of projects maintained by the APP is
consistently larger than that of the EGCFE. The APP via its Clean Fossil Energy Task Force and
Coal Mining Task Force, runs over 28 projects (Kimble, 2002). Being the largest countries and
leading economies of the region, the US and Japan are interested in the development of clean
coal technologies. What is more, they attempt to enter the market of such countries as China as
well as India. The environmental projects run by the APP task forces contribute not only to
environmental but also economic cooperation between countries. Yet well-developed countries,
such as the US, often turn out to be in an advantageous position due to their technological
advancements, while developing countries are either doomed to use old technologies, or license
technologies abroad in developed countries. Nevertheless, the cooperation between countries of
the Asia-Pacific region in the field of energy efficient technology and environmental protection
has proved effective under the APP task forces.
C. Asia-Pacific Countries: Building and Coal Policies
The US
The successful implementation of environmental projects and technologies in the Asia-Pacific
region implies a close cooperation among countries. However, some countries often tend to stay
aside of the introduction of energy efficient technologies, when they can affect their economic
41
development. In this regard, the U.S. is probably one of the most controversial countries. On the
one hand, the U.S. attempts to take an active part in international cooperation in environmental
policies.
The U.S. maintains international projects aimed at the prevention of the climate change and is
actively involved in the APP force tasks. But the U.S. views such participation as a tool to
penetrate new markets and expand its economic influence in the Asia-Pacific region, rather than
to improve the environmental situation in the region. On the other hand, the U.S. is reluctant to
introduce energy efficient and environmentally friendly technologies in its own domestic market.
The U.S. was not inclined to reduce consistently its green-house emissions. During the
presidency of G. Bush the U.S. never got actively involved in the practical implementation of
environmental projects at the domestic level. The U.S. refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, while
its participation in the APP and APEC environmental initiatives was at the international level
solely (Antes, 2006).
As a result, the U.S. did not take active steps toward the introduction of energy efficient
technologies in commercial buildings, while its implementation of clean coal technology was
mainly oriented on international projects in which American companies could participate. The
unwillingness of the US to reduce green-house gas emissions and introduce new, energy efficient
technologies was and still is justified by the unwillingness of the U.S. to slow down its economic
development because the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions would force American
companies to invest substantially in the reconstruction of their production and, what is more,
modernize the car manufacturing industry, which was traditionally oriented to the production of
42
cars paying little attention to their fuel-efficiency. Hence, the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions was not beneficial for the U.S. economy.
However, since the beginning of the 2008 economic recession in the U.S., its environmental
policies at the domestic level have started to change because energy efficiency has one of the
major priorities in the economic development of the country. In such a context, have arisen the
recent initiatives of Obama’s administration, which aim at the active participation of the US in
international environmental projects and the wider introduction of international norms and
agreements in the US to reduce green-house gas emissions.
In this respect, it is worth noting that the U.S. has started to implement environmental policies at
the domestic level. This is a very important advancement in the environmental protection and
solution of the problem of the climate change in the Asia-Pacific region and the entire world.
This is because the U.S. is one of the major countries provoking climate change for it has one of
the largest rate of greenhouse gas emissions in the world (Lohmann, 2006). Therefore, the
change in the American domestic policies is very important for the entire Asia-Pacific region.
Canada
Canada consistently influences the problem of the climate change and international policies in
the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, Canada, similarly to the U.S. and some other developed
countries of the region is one of the major sources of greenhouse gas emissions, representing 2%
of the global total. Canadian environmental policies were these similar to those of the US. Since
43
the 1990, its greenhouse gas emissions have growth steadily by 1.7% annually (Millard-Ball,
2008). Nevertheless, in 2008, the Canadian government adopted the plan of a consistent, about
20%, reduction of green-house gas emissions by 2020 (Millard-Ball, 2008). Obviously, this plan
aims at the minimization of the negative impact on the Canadian economy through the
introduction of energy efficient technologies.
The Canadian government has implemented a new series of initiatives in different sectors,
notably in the transportation and building sector in 2008 (National Energy Board, 2008). One of
the most significant programs launched in the building sector is eco-energy retrofit grants and
incentives for homes and businesses, serving to promote Canada's supply of clean energy,
develop clean-energy technologies and encourage Canadians to use energy more efficiently.
However, Canada is still a dismal 27th out of 29 OECD nations and ranked 10th in the world
(China being 96th) when greenhouse gas emissions are measured on a per capita basis. Canadian
government may need to commit to more significant reductions in GHG emissions during the
upcoming climate change negotiations in Copenhagen December 2009.
China
China is particularly dangerous in terms of environmental pollution and climate change because
the Chinese economy keeps growing rapidly regardless of economic crises. At the same time, the
economic growth of China is grounded on accelerated industrialization, which is accompanied
by the extensive exploitation of natural resources and dramatic pollution of the environment. In
44
this regard, China is now facing a big challenge in developing policies at the political, ministerial
and corporate levels to implement clean coal technology and green building projects.
The abundance of China’s coal reserves, the third largest in the world behind the U.S. and
Russia, and with China being the largest coal producer in the world, accounting for 45% of
global output, coal consumption in China will remain unchanged as the main source of energy
production for many years to come. In fact, China has built more than 370 coal-fired power
plants, accounting for two-thirds of coal-fired power units built in 26 nations, between 2002 and
2006, since coal remains China’s the cheapest, easiest and most secure energy resource.
Another industrial sector that the Chinese government has an interest in promoting is less
emission intensive consumption in the construction and building sector. Considering that 50% of
new buildings built around the globe each year are in China, and approximately one quarter of
China’s greenhouse gas emissions come from buildings due to energy inefficiency, establishing
China’s own national construction standard to support green building practices should be one of
the most pressing initiatives.
In short, the progress of Chinese economy is based on the aggravation of the environmental
situation in China. Gradually this country has become one of the major sources of green-house
gas emissions in the region. In such a situation, China has announced a supportive statement and
is implementing several programs such as increasing the proportion of renewable energy in the
primary energy supply, by 10% by 2010, introducing a renewable energy law, and increasing
45
financial support for research and technology. However, China is unwilling to limit consistently
its green-house gas emissions if such a decision can slow down its economic development.
Japan
The Japanese government has worked to strengthen the climate change agenda, in particular as a host
country at the 2008 G8 summit. Japan has proposed that nations cut emissions by 50 percent by
2050 in its “Cool Earth 50” plan which covers all climate and energy objectives. With a
willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation, Japan pushed a number of technology
innovations such as high-efficiency houses and buildings, housing/ building energy management
systems and low-carbon fossil fuel generation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2008).
In building sector, the Japanese Cabinet passed the Bill for the Revision of the Act Concerning
the Rational Use of Energy. It calls for saving of industrial and commercial building energy
consumption, and took effect on 1 April 2009 (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry).
Advancing coal-fired technology is one of the key issues for the Japanese government as Japan has
limited indigenous energy resources. Japanese coal power generation has increased almost eight
times since 1980, particularly in supercritical and ultra supercritical technologies boilers applied to
coal generation. It is the most noticeable shift compared with other Asia-Pacific countries
(APPENDIX G).
Japan is a technologically advanced country and its contribution to environmental pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions is significant. At the same time, Japan is a leader in the development
46
of environmental initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, adopting plans for the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions and steadily implementing these plans.
Republic of Korea
The Korean government considers that if the climate change issue is left untouched, climate
change could result in a substantial impact on the South Korean economy. South Korea is
currently experiencing the harmful consequences of climate change. For instance, South Korea’s
average annual temperature has risen 1.5 degrees Celsius during the last century which is double
the global average.
Although South Korea does not belong to the UN Parties which have agreed to cut carbon
dioxide emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 level between 2008 and 2012, a
voluntary CO2 target plan was announced on 4th of August, 2009. The government also unveiled
a “green growth” strategy, to increase clean and renewable energy while reducing reliance on
fossil fuels, Improve energy efficiency and promote conservation, establish a carbon market,
promote a voluntary agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and provide support for
research and development pertaining to green technologies.
Moreover, the government has green investment plans which already rank near the top in Asia.
The action plan is significant, as Korea is the first non-Annex 1 country to announce credible
mid-term targets for reducing carbon emissions and other commitments to combat climate
47
changes that might encourage much bigger emitters such as China and the U.S. to commit to
their own targets.
At the MEM held on July 2009, South Korea was selected as a leader in smart grid technology.
This provides the smartest way to manage and to supply electricity to consumers by making
network between different electricity resources. Korea is the first non G8 country to be chosen as
a leading country.4
In short, Korea has been recently involved in the international community in the prevention of
climate change and the minimization of the negative impact of human activities on the
environment. The government has also introduced and is implementing various domestic climate
policies.
Russia
Russia is another country, whose environmental policies consistently influence the
environmental situation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the Russian economy is energy
driven, while fossil fuels are strategically important for Russian economy because they comprise
the major part of Russian exports. At the same time, the Russian government plans to increase
coal production by 75% by 2020. Obviously, such a substantial increase in coal production has to
be accompanied by the introduction of modern technologies, including clean coal technology,
which will minimize the negative impact of the use of coal on the environment and greenhouse
gas emissions. 4 MEM changes its title to MEF since Obama administration launched.
48
Buildings in Russia are regarded as some of the most inefficient consumers of energy.
Understanding the issue, the draft law, suggesting governmental subsidies for business;
development companies and municipalities which implement energy efficiency technologies,
was submitted to the Russian Parliament on 17th of October, 2008. In addition, imposing fines on
inefficient energy building owners was also proposed.
To back up the introduction of energy efficient technologies, the Russian government supports
projects focusing on energy efficient buildings and the development of environmentally friendly
technologies. However, Russia has yet to set a proposed mid-term target for 2020. In addition,
Prime Minister Putin announced the “Climate Change Doctrine” which notes that Russia’s
position on climate change issue is likely to be as a developing country, like other emerging
economies.
49
Chapter 4: Causes of Climate Performance
The above analysis shows the improved performance both of the informal institutions and of
Asia-Pacific countries since 2005. This chapter explores how informal institutions’ approaches
affect regional or global governance and which school of thought is best able to explain the
pattern and causes of informal institutional performance as well as the implementation effort by
Asia-Pacific countries.
According to the “6D” analysis in chapter two, the informal institutions have a strong
performance the four strong functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making and
development of global environmental governance. On the other hand, performance on domestic
political management and delivery functions are largely weak. This difference from Kirton’s
concert equality model, which underlines performance on all six functions as strong. This model
explains that the G8 is effective as a climate governance institution due to its member’s equal
vulnerability, member’s political capital and control (equal capability), common principles such
as democratic values, failure of the UN bodies, and the G8’s constricted participation. The new
informal institutions are driven as the different causes of institutionalized interaction intensity
and member countries’ rational choice, as well as the similar causes of member’s equal
vulnerability and the failure of the UN bodies.
In this respect, a constructivist approach supports the four functions of informal institutional
performance and three causes, while the neoliberal approach explains two weaknesses in
performance and one cause. This mixed view shows that Asia-Pacific countries are inclined to
develop international projects but not many countries are ready to reduce greenhouse gas
50
emissions at the domestic level. As chapter 3 describes, some countries push to improve clean
coal technology through international cooperation but there are no changes in budget, legislation
or regulation at the domestic level. On the other hand, domestic activities in building projects
have begun to change national plans and laws to minimize the negative impact of human
activities on the environment. Therefore, new plurilateral institutions’ initiatives are milestone of
developing practical regional activities and achieving global level consensus among major CO2
emitters.
A. Equalized shock-activated vulnerability
Natural Disasters: Hurricane and Drought
Climate change increases the risk of natural disasters such as hurricanes, droughts, inundation
and other deadly shocks which affect the life of people. Under the impact of climate change
people have to change their traditional lifestyle and change traditional socioeconomic activities
in order to adapt to environmental changes. For instance, the agriculture of the Asia-Pacific
region is vulnerable to dramatic changes since natural disasters often destroy crops and put
millions of people on the edge of survival, to the extent that the threat of starvation becomes a
serious threat in many countries of the region. Other global warming related natural disasters
such as heat waves, forest fires and hurricane are also discussed among policy makers. After the
U.S. was attacked by Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita, all the media’s eyes were on the climate
change issue in 2005. The damage of the hurricane drew public attention, as it pushed the U.S.
government to agree to the scientific evidence on climate change after the 2005 G8 summit.
51
In this respect, the elimination of existing threats becomes one of the major challenges to
political leaders of countries of the Asia-Pacific region. At any rate, climate change is the major
threat to the economies and natural environment of countries located in the Asia-Pacific region
as well as in other regions of the world. This threat became particularly significant in the late 20th
century, when climate change and its negative effects became evident. The consistent
deterioration of the environment and climate change stimulated governments of Asia-Pacific
countries and governments of other countries of the world to start international action to prevent
the ongoing pollution of the environment and climate change. In response to climate change, the
G8+5, MEM, APEC and APP were developed, aimed at minimization of the environmental
pollution and consolidated actions of Asia-Pacific countries to stop climate change and minimize
its negative effects
Growing Energy Demands and Air Pollution
Managing regional energy consumption is a critical issue for all Asia-Pacific Powers as they are
all, some Canada and Russian, net energy importers. Since Asia countries recovered from the
financial crisis in 1997, significant economic growth has, especially in China, caused energy
shortages and air pollution.
China has become the largest individual contributor to CO2 emissions in the world, followed by
the United States of America. With approximately 8% higher emissions than those of the U.S.,
China now tops the list of CO2 emitting countries. In 2005, the CO2 emissions of China were still
2% below those of the USA. According to the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,
52
“China's need for energy is projected to increase by 150 percent by 2020. To sustain its growth,
China requires increasing amounts of oil. Its oil consumption grows by 7.5% per year, seven
times faster than the U.S.” As a result of the rapid growth and energy shortage, Asia-Pacific
countries face competition over resources (APEC, 2008). In addition, soaring oil prices in recent
years have made emerging economies seek cheaper energy, coal, which cause the major
pollution in the air.
Chinese energy dependant on coal power plants poses environmental threat. Also, Korean’s
industrialization has increased sulphur dioxide, so it caused almost seventy percent of acid rain
in capital city, Seoul. From the raising awareness of energy shortage and environmental threat,
Asia-Pacific powers are feeling pressure to agree a new global agreement on climate change.
B. Institutionalized interaction intensity: Common Principle and Membership
All informal institutions have increased the interaction intensity as they share a similar process
and commitments by common member countries. As Appendix F indicates, the U.S., Canada,
Japan, China and Korea joined the G8+5, APEC, APP and MEM, while only Russia is not a
member of the APP. As this study points out in the direction setting section, these informal
institutions have adopted the same principles of “common but differentiated responsibilities,”
sustainable development and energy-environment connection.
Based on common members and principles, voluntary, non-binding, and technology-centred
commitments come out of official level meetings. The official documents endorse other
53
institution’s initiatives so that members confirm they share the common goal of tackling the
adverse effect of climate change. For example, the 2006 St. Petersburg summit states, “Some or
all of us are participating in the following other initiatives to address these challenges: the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate.” Also, the 2007 APEC summit and 2008
Hokkaido summit mentioned the contribution of the MEM to the UNFCCC. These interactions
among informal institutions enhance nations’ chain reaction to build momentum for climate
negotiation, and further, develop norms on climate change negotiation (Kanie, 2007).
In addition, a number of regional and multinational organizations are working together to
improve the energy efficiency of buildings and coal fuel power plants. With the long history of
commitments and activities in Asia-Pacific, APEC and APP are cooperating with other
international institutions which include UNFCCC, UNEP, WMO, IEA, IMF and WTO. These
interactions among informal institutions enhance nations’ chain reaction to build momentum on
climate negotiation, and further, develop norms on climate change negotiation (Kanie, 2007).
In this regard, increased interaction makes countries work together to address climate change at
the same time, although adopting a climate agenda would not be a rational individual domestic
choice. In 2005, the U.S. accepted a climate change agenda and agreed to the scientific fact of
climate change, though there was a big divergence between the U.S. and other G8 countries.
Even the media predicted that the U.S. would drop or disagree with climate change objectives.
From the pressures within the G8 and from the O5 countries, the U.S. launched the APP in 2005
and MEM in 2007, which support and cooperate with, rather than compete with, the G8+5 and
APEC’s commitments.
54
In short, informal institutions’ dense interaction network helps to achieve a certain level of
consensus on climate change among the Asia-Pacific countries and gives momentum to setting
timelines and goals at the UNFCCC.
C. The Weakness of the UNFCCC
While the UNFCCC is a world-wide legitimated institution in setting a climate change control
framework, there are many promising initiatives and actions by the G8+5, MEM, APEC and
APP. As many scholars point out, the UN has too many members to codify and create
breakthrough initiatives to address climate change (Egenhofer, 2007). In addition, the critical
flaw of the Kyoto Protocol is that the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters such as the U.S.
and China are missing, while other ratified countries, Canada Japan and Russia do not achieve
their goal of cutting greenhouse gas. As a result, practical activities are implemented by new
informal institutions which consist of major emitters in relatively smaller membership bodies
with strong initiatives.
Moreover, countries feel pressure from the uncertainty and complexity of the climate change
regime, specifically the post-Kyoto negotiation. The leaders have a tight time line to decide the
post-Kyoto regime by December 2009. Therefore, leaders have been paying much more attention
to international cooperation in the informal institutions.
D. Rational Choice: Domestic Interests
55
Countries are likely to calculate their cost and benefit to introduce climate change policies, and
consequently they are reluctant to implement if climate plans cost too much. For example, as
great producers of coal, the U.S. and Russia have an interest in seeking a new market which their
products with advanced technology could sell to developing countries. As a technologically
advanced country, Japan attempts to transfer a limited level of clean coal technologies to the
developing. As mentions in chapter two and three, Asia-Pacific countries’ efforts are still
insufficient, as they prefer market-based activities or mutual-benefit-based international projects
and do not alter their social behaviour at home.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The G8+5, MEM, APEC and APP are all confronting the challenge of climate change. Basically,
numerous international agreements aim at the minimization of environment pollution. They
focus on the minimization of the green-house gas emissions through the decrease of fossil fuels
consumption and reduction of consumption of coal. In addition, international agreements focus
on the improvement of existing technologies and the wider introduction of environmentally
friendly technologies.
From the “6D” analysis, these new bodies creation and performance have suddenly arisen since
2005. The informal plurilateral institutions’ functions of deliberation, direction-setting, decision-
making and development of global environmental governance has developed quickly. However,
domestic political management and delivery functions have a poor record. Why do countries
push international cooperation but lay behind in implementing domestic climate change control?
The causes of this pattern are explained by member’s equal vulnerability, institutionalized
interaction intensity and the failure of the UN bodies by a constructivist approach; and countries’
rational choice by a neoliberal approach.
Countries of the Asia-Pacific region have started active policies aiming at the minimization of
greenhouse gas emissions. The work of the APEC and APP is particularly significant since they
make a consistent contribution to the development of clean coal sectors related to the climate
change. Unlike the UN’s failed approach, smaller multilateral forums such as the APP could
easily share knowledge to set an agenda and to promote quick and effective action on climate
policies because of the result of the strong network.
57
However, the economic interests of certain countries still remain prior to interests of the world
community. As a result, countries such as China and the US and some others, stand aside from
the plurilateral efforts of the world community to stop climate change.
In sum, the Asia-Pacific region is very concerned with climate change. The major way to build
effective regional and global climate governance is to have countries focus not only on
international but also domestic environmental policies and projects.
58
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National Energy Board, Canada, 2008<http://www.neb.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rnrgynfmtn/nrgyrprt/nrgdmnd/glblcndncntxt2008/glblcndncntxt-eng.html>(12 Aug, 2009). Barkenbus, Jack. “APEC and the Environment: Civil Society in an Age of Globalization.” Asia Pacific Issue Analysis from the East-West Center No. 51, March 2001 (East-West Center) <http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/api051.pdf>(12 June, 2009). Bayne, Nicholas (2004) et al. “Helping the Poor and the Planet.” Winter 2005 (LSE Magazine) <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/LSEMagazine/pdf/winter2005/G8_Spread.pdf >(10 April, 2009). Diringer, Eliot. “ Statement of Mr. Eliot Diringer, Director of International Strategies, Pew Center on Global Climate Change.” Kyoto Protocol: an update : hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, July 11, 2007. <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/36724.pdf\> (12 Aug, 2009). Ford, Melanie. et al “Energy security, clean technology development and climate change : addressing the future challenges in APEC.” Canberra, A.C.T.: ABARE Research Report, September 2007. <http://www.abare.gov.au/publications_html/climate/climate_07/apec_security.pdf>(12 Aug, 2009). Kirton, John J (2008a), "A Summit of Substantial Success: The Performance of the 2008 G8." Draft of August 17, 2008. <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton-performance-080817.pdf> (9 Aug, 2009). Lieberman, Ben and Brett D. Schaefer(2007). “The major economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change: A Badly Needed Alternative to the Kyoto Protocol.” Web Memo, 24 September, 2007 (The Heritage Foundation) <http://www.heritage.org/research/energyandenvironment/wm1636.cfm> (20 July, 2009). Ivanova, Antonina, “Trade and Environment Issues in APEC” (May 2002). International Trade and Finance Association Conference Papers. International Trade and Finance Association 15th International Conference. Working Paper 58. <http://services.bepress.com/itfa/15th/art58>(12 Aug, 2009).
64
Oxley, Alan. “Building a pro-development global strategy on climate change,” World Growth (Aug. 2007). <http://www.apec.org.au/docs/07_WGR.pdf> (10 Aug, 2009). Mignon, Bryan K (2007). “International Cooperation in a Post-Kyoto World.” November 2007(The Brookings Institution), <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/11_climate_mignone.aspx>(12 Aug, 2009). Williams, Leslie 2000, APEC environmental policies, research and programs, RIAP Briefing paper, Vol. 3, No. 1, January. <http://www.usyd.edu.au/riap/documents/publications/papers/APEC%20Environmental.pdf> (10 Aug, 2009). Zarsky, Lyuba. “ APEC, Globalization and the "Sustainable Development Agenda.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Fall 1998. <http://www.nautilus.org/archives/papers/enviro/zarsky_apec98.html>(12 April, 2009). The Christian Science Monitor “Global Boom in Coal Power .” March 22, 2007. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0322/p01s04-wogi.html>(9 Aug, 2009).
65
Appendix A
The G8 (+O5) Climate Change Performance, 1975–2008
Domestic Political Decision Delivery Year
Bayne score
G8RG score US Ja UK Ca
Delib Direct comit Compliance
Dev’l Global Gov
1975 A- NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0
1976 D NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1977 B- NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1978 A NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1979 B+ NA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 NA 0 1980 C+ NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1981 C NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1982 C NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1983 B NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1984 C- NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1985 E NA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 NA 0 1986 B+ NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA 0 1987 D NA 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 29(1) 0 1988 C- NA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 NA 0 1989 B+ NA 0 0 0 0 7 1 4 43(1) 0 1990 D NA 0 0 0 0 5 0 7 43(1) 0 1991 B- NA 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 41(2) 0 1992 D NA 0 0 0 0 4 0 7 71(3) 0 (2) 1993 C+ NA 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 57(2) 0 1994 C NA 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 72(2) 0 (1) 1995 B+ NA 0 0 0 0 3 0 7 29(1) 0 (1) 1996 B B+ 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 57(1) 0 (1) 1997 C- A- 0 0 0 0 5 0 9 42(2) 0 (1) 1998 B+ B+ 0 0 0 0 4 0 7 100(3) 0 (1) 1999 B+ C 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 NA 0 (1) 2000 B B (B) 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 NA 0 (1) 2001 B C 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 -4(3) 0 (1) 2002 B+ B 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 89(1) 0 (1) 2003 C+ B+ 0 0 0 0 2 3 4 88(2) 1(1) 2004 C+ B+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 89(2) 2 2005 A- NA 0 0 0 0 68 12 28 80(5) 0 (2) [2]
2006 D C+/B-
(C) 0 0 0 0 26 2
19 33 (9) 0 [1]
2007 B- B (B+) 0 3 0 1 47 12 44 61(2)* 1 (1) 2008 To/av C+/B- B (B-) 0 3 2 1 193 30 167 57(41) 4 (15) [3]
Resource: Kirton, John ”Compliance with Climate Change Commitments: The G8 Record, 1975–2007” July 2007, P7, <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/compliance-climate_080605.pdf Notes: Bayne Grade: Grades for 2006 and 2007 are unconfirmed grades and not permitted for citation or publication. Bold indicates year where environment was a significant contributor to the overall grade. G8RG Grade: Grade in parentheses represents grade for climate change only. Other scores represent overall grade for the summit for the year in question. Domestic Political Management: refers to mentions to the G8 and climate change in the national policy addresses for the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and Canada for the year in question. The unit of analysis is the sentence. Deliberative: refers to number of times climate change is referenced in the G8 leaders’ documents for the year in question. The unit is the paragraph. Environment data is in parentheses. Directional: refers to the number of times climate change is references in the chapeau or chair’s summary for the year in question. The unit of analysis is the sentence. Environment data is in parentheses. Decisional: refers to the number of commitments where climate change is the key issue. Delivery: refers the overall compliance score for climate change commitments measured for the year in question. Number in parentheses represents total number of commitments measured. All scores come from the G8RG. Development of Global Governance: refers to the number of official bodies created on climate change for the year in question. Number in parentheses represents the number of environment ministers meetings held for the year in question. Number in square brackets represents the number of G20 environment and energy meetings held for the year in question
66
Appendix B
Asia-Pacific Powers Climate Change performance, 1989-2007
Commitment Issue Av
e U.S. JAP C
HI CAD RUS Resource
1989-1 Limit GHG5 +0.33 -1 +1 N/A +1 N/A EK/AL 1991-1 Convention on
CC 0 -1 0 N/A +1 N/A EK/AL
1991-4 Limit GHG 0 -1 N/A N/A +1 N/A LD 1992-1 UNFCCC +1.00 +1 +1 N/A +1 N/A EK/AL 1992-6 CC Science +1.00 +1 +1 N/A +1 N/A EK/AL 1997-8 COP3 +0.50 0 +1 N/A 0 +1 G8RG-T 1997-9 Limit GHG -0.75 -1 0 N/A -1 -1 MJ 1998-34 Kyoto +1.00 +1 +1 N/A +1 +1 G8RG-T 2005-xx Climate
change +1 +1 +1 N/A +1 +1 G8RG-T
2005-1 UNFCCC +0.25 0 0 N/A 0 +1 KK 2005-9 Gleneagles
Dialogue +0.25 +1 0 N/A +1 -1 G8RG-T
2006-138 Technology 0 +1 +1 N/A -1 -1 G8RG-O 2006-162 UNFCCC/Ky
oto +0.4 +1 +1 0 0 0 G8RG-T
2007-8 UNFCCC/ Climate change
+1.00 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 G8RG-T, O
2007-36 Technology +0.75 +1 +1 N/A +1 0 G8RG-T
2007-2 Heiligendamm Process
+1.00 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 G8RG-T, O
Total +0.46 +0.38 +0.73 +0.67
+0.56 +0.27
Resource: Kirton, John . “Compliance with Climate Change Commitments: The G8 Record, 1975–2007” July 2007, P9, <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/compliance-climate_080605.pdf> Available See Reference. References selectively quoted by: LS=Laura Sunderland (2007), AL=Alex Lapin (2007), EK=Ella Kokotsis (1999), Melanie Martin (2000-1)Lindsay Doyle (2007), Heather Keachie (2007), G8RG-T=G8 Research Group Toronto, G8RG-O=G8 Research Group Oxford. Average score is calculated by author (selective member countries only).
5 Greenhouse gas emissions
67
Appendix C
The APEC’s Climate and Clean technology Performance, 1993–2008
Domestic Political Decision Year
Bayne score
G8RG score US Ja Ru Ca
Delib Direct comit
Dev’l Global Gov
1993 C+ NA 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1994 C NA 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1995 B+ NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1996 B B+ 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 2 1997 C- A- 0 0 0 0 3 7 1 3 1998 B+ B+ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1999 B+ C 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2000 B B (B) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2001 B C 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2002 B+ B 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 0 2003 C+ B+ 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2004 C+ B+ 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 2005 A- NA 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 2
2006 D C+/B-
(C) 0 0 0 0 1 3
2 1
2007 B- B (B+) 0 0 0 1 29 3 16 6 2008 6 17 5 6 To/av C+/B- B (B-) 0 0 0 1 53 43 31 24
Resource: Asia-Pacific Economics Cooperation, Leaders Declaration 1993-2008. < http://www.apec.org/>. Available See Reference. Delib: other official documents Direct: Leader’s declaration Dev’l Global Gov: Ministerial Meeting (Energy, Environment and ect.)
68
Appendix D
The APEC’s Climate Commitments
Year-Pharagraph
Number of Commitment
Issue Commitment
1995-17 1 Energy and environment
The Asia-Pacific region's fast-expanding population and rapid economic growth are forecast to sharply increase the demand for food and energy and the
pressures on the environment. We are agreed on the need to put these inter-related, wide-ranging issues
on our long-term agenda and consult further on ways to initiate joint action so as to ensure the region's
economic prosperity is sustainable. 1996-19 Energy and
environment We call on ministers to intensify work on sustainable growth and to report on their progress at our meeting
in Vancouver in 1997. 1996-19
2
Next year We agree to push for further progress on these important issues, in light of the various international
fora being convened next year to address these issues.
1997-18 1 Connection between energy
efficiency and climate change
We also agree that the enhancement of energy efficiency plays an important role in addressing
climate change.
1999-47 1 Clean production,
marine environment
We reiterate our commitment to advance sustainable development across the entire spectrum of our
workplan including cleaner production, protection of the marine environment and sustainable cities.
2002-13 1 21st Century Renewable
Energy Development
Initiative
We commended progress under the 21st Century Renewable Energy Development Initiative, and
noted the importance of oceans for food security and sustainable economic development.
2005-17 Energy supply (investment, technology)
We shared our concern on the impact of high oil prices and agreed to respond to it urgently by
addressing the supply and demand of the energy market simultaneously through: cooperative efforts to increase investment, to expand cross-border trade and to accelerate energy technology development,
thereby reducing the region's vulnerability and securing its energy supply;
2005-17
2
Energy efficiency
and promotion of energy efficiency and conservation and diversification measures, which would help to
reduce the demand of fossil fuels and lower speculative demand in the oil industry.
2006-18 2 Energy investment, renewable
energy
Noting the challenges of meeting rapidly growing energy demands while minimizing environmental
effects, we urged member economies to continue to work to facilitate energy investments and cross-
border energy trade, to develop new and renewable energy sources and technologies to ensure cleaner use of fossil fuels, to boost energy efficiency and
69
conservation, to enhance emergency preparedness and to better protect critical energy infrastructure.
2006-18 APEC biofuels
Taskforce
We commended the launch of the APEC Biofuels Task Force. We instructed Ministers to report to us
in 2007 on ways in which APEC might further contribute to responding to these challenges through pursuing policies and technologies that promote the development of cleaner energy and the improvement of energy efficiency, thereby enabling economies to
meet increasing energy needs with a lower environmental impact and to address climate change
objectives. 2007-6 UNFCCC We reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Based on UNFCCC principles, we
believe the following must underpin an equitable and effective post-2012 international climate change
arrangement: 2007-14 Stabilizing
greenhouse gas
concentrations
We are committed to the global objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. The world needs to slow, stop and then reverse the growth of global greenhouse gas emissions.
2007-15 Post-2012 arrangement,
Bali
We, therefore, call for a post-2012 international climate change arrangement, building on the above, that strengthens, broadens and deepens the current
arrangements and leads to reduced global emissions of greenhouse gases.
2007-17 Long-term aspirational
goal
We agree to work to achieve a common understanding on a long-term aspirational global emissions reduction goal to pave the way for an
effective post-2012 international arrangement. We appreciate the efforts of Japan and Canada in
proposing a long-term global goal. 2007-20 Clean
development We agree to work through bilateral, regional and
global partnerships to promote clean development, recognising that the UN climate process is the appropriate multilateral forum for international
negotiations on climate change. 2007-25-1 Energy
Efficiency: Mid-term
target
Improving energy efficiency is a cost-effective way to enhance energy security and address greenhouse
gas emissions while promoting economic growth and development. Without prejudice to commitments in
other fora, we therefore:agree to work towards achieving an APEC-wide regional aspirational goal of a reduction in energy intensity of at least 25 per
cent by 2030 (with 2005 as the base year).
2007-25-3 APEC Energy Peer Review Mechanism
agree to facilitate and review progress through the voluntary APEC Energy Peer Review Mechanism, as established by APEC Energy Ministers in May 2007,
with a report back to APEC Leaders in 2010 2007-26-1
16
Increasing forest cover
20milion hectars by
2020
Forests can play a critical role in the carbon cycle. Ongoing action is required to encourage afforestation and reforestation and to reduce deforestation, forest degradation and forest fires, including by promoting
sustainable forest management, combating illegal logging and addressing the underlying economic and
social drivers. We therefore:
agree to work to achieve a regional aspirational goal
70
of increasing forest cover in the APEC region by at least 20 million hectares of all types of forests by
2020. 2007-26-4 Asia-Pacific
Network for Sustainable
Forest Management
and Rehabilitation
agree to establish the Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation
to enhance capacity building and strengthen information sharing in the forestry sector.
Collaboration between all regional initiatives on forests, including the Asia Forest Partnership, will be
important.
2007-27-1 Asia-Pacific Network for
Energy Technology
Joint research, development, deployment and transfer of low and zero emission technologies will be crucial in our shared efforts to address climate
change. We therefore:
• agree to establish the Asia-Pacific Network for Energy Technology (APNet) to strengthen collaboration on energy
research in the region. Participation in the Network will be open to all research
bodies in the APEC region.
The aim of the Network will be to facilitate research linkages and co-operation in areas such as clean
fossil energy and renewable energy. APNet will be inaugurated at a major energy research conference in
2008.aim of the Network will be to facilitate research linkages and co-operation in areas such as clean fossil energy and renewable energy. APNet
will be inaugurated at a major energy research conference in 2008.
2007-28-1 Clean coal, CCS
Uses Enhanced uptake of low carbon energy uses will require coherent policy and regulatory settings.
We therefore:
agree to promote policies that advance the deployment of low and zero emission energy uses, in
particular in the field of clean coal use and carbon capture and storage, through co-operative work in
the APEC Energy Working Group. 2007-29 Energy
Supply We underline the importance to the region of
affordable and secure supplies of energy which are central to economic growth and sustainable
development, and we are committed to continuing efforts within APEC to address long-term energy
needs in the region. 2007-30-1
WTO, liberalization
of trade in environmental
goods
An open global trade and investment system is central to our clean development objectives and market opening in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would advance our climate and energy
security goals. We therefore:
agree to review and discuss at the 2008 APEC Leaders' meeting the progress achieved in the WTO
Doha Development Agenda negotiations on the liberalisation of trade in environmental goods and
services.
71
2007-31-1 ICAO(International Civil Aviation
Organization), Aviation emission
We see scope for co-operative action to address the issue of aviation emissions. We therefore:
agree that any future global action to address the climate-related impact of aviation emissions needs to reflect the interests of all economies, including the
views of all APEC economies while noting the leading role of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in developing a balanced approach to aviation emissions based on mutual
consent and relevant international legal instruments. 2007-31-3 Seminar for
Aviation Emissions
agree to convene a second public-private sector APEC Strategic Seminar on Measures to Address
Aviation Emissions in early 2008 to advance work in key areas such as air traffic management systems,
aircraft design and alternative fuels 2007-32-2
Policy analysis
capacities
Improved dialogue and policy and technical co-operation is valuable in underpinning our efforts. We
therefore:
agree to enhance co-operation between regional economicmodelling and related bodies to share
views and expertise on approaches to assessing the economic implications of climate change policies,
including measures aimed at adapting economies and societies to the impacts of climate change
2008-30 Domestic disaster
management
We agreed that greater focus is needed on disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness and building
domestic disaster management capabilities.
2008-32 UNFCCC As a global issue, climate change must be addressed in a comprehensive manner, through international cooperation under the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2009. 2008-32 Sydney APEC
Leader’s Declaration on Climate
change, energy
security and clean
development
We reaffirmed our commitment to the Sydney APEC Leaders' Declaration on Climate Change, Energy
Security and Clean Development.
2008-34 Sydney Declaration,
action agenda
We reaffirmed our commitment to the Action Agenda announced as part of the Sydney
Declaration.
2008-36
5
Mitigation and
adaptation, low emission technology
development
Recognizing that climate change could impede economies' abilities to achieve sustainable economic
growth and reduce poverty, we strongly support international cooperation and capacity building for mitigation and adaptation as objectives that should be equally pursued, including those that promote
low-emissions technology development and transfer to, and financial support for, developing economies.
Total 31 Resource: Asia-Pacific Economics Cooperation, Leaders Declaration 1993-2008. <http://www.apec.org/>
72
Appendix E
The O5, MEM and APP’s Climate Change Performance, 2005–2007
O5 MEM APP Delib Direct Decision Dev’l
Global Gov
Delib Direct Decision Dev’l Global Gov
Delib Direct Decision Dev’l Global Gov
2005
7
7 1
1
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0
7
0
0
2006
1 0
N/A
4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 36 3
3
2007
6
6
3
5
14 0 4 2 5 5
6
2
2008 11 0 0 5 2 13 7 3 N/A N/A N/A 2
Total 25 13 4 15 16 13 11 5 20 48 9 7
Resource: Asia-Pacific Economics Cooperation, Leaders Declaration 1993-2008. < http://www.apec.org/ > and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/general/cpyright.html>. Note: (1)O5 Delib: All official documents at the G8 summit such as Joint Declaration of the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (2005) Statement by the G8 and the Outreach leaders and the heads of international organizations(2006) Joint Statement by the German G8 Presidency and Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (2007) G5 Statement (2008) Direct: Joint Declaration of the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (2005) Joint Statement by the German G8 Presidency and Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (2007) Decision: Joint Declaration of the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (2005) Joint Statement by the German G8 Presidency and Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa (2007) Dev’l Global Gov: The number of ministerial meeting, Sherpa meeting, O5 meeting, G8+ O5 dialogues per year (2)MEM Delib: Final Chairman’s Summary: First Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (Sep. 2007) Final Chairman’s Summary: Second Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and ClimateChange (Jan. 2008) Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change (2008) Direct: Final Chairman’s Summary: First Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (Sep. 2007) Final Chairman’s Summary: Second Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and ClimateChange (Jan. 2008) Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change (2008) Decision: Final Chairman’s Summary: First Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (Sep. 2007) Final Chairman’s Summary: Second Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and ClimateChange (Jan. 2008) Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change (2008) Dev’l Global Gov: the number of official level meeting per year (3)APP Delib: Charter, Vision Statement, two Communiqué and ect. Direct: Inaugural Ministerial Meeting , Sydney Communiqué (2006) Second Ministerial Meeting, New Delhi Communiqué (2007) Decision: Inaugural Ministerial Meeting , Sydney Communiqué (2006) Second Ministerial Meeting, New Delhi Communiqué (2007) Dev’l Global Gov: the number of ministerial meeting and Policy and Implementation Committee meeting per year.
73
Appendix F Membership of the G8+O5, MEM, APEC, and APP
Member countries
G 20 G8+O5 MEM APEC APP
Argentina X Australia X X X X X
Brazil X X X Brunei Darussalam X
Canada X X X X X Chile X
People's Republic of China
X X X X X
France X X X German X X X
Hong Kong, China X India X X X X
Indonesia X X X Italy X X X Japan X X X X X
Republic of Korea X X X X Malaysia X Mexico X X X X
New Zealand X Papua New Guinea X
Peru X The Philippines X
Russia X X X Singapore X
Soudi Arabia X South Africa X X X
Chinese Taipei X Thailand X
The United Kingdom
X X
The United States X X X X X
Turkey X
Viet Nam X Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/apec/1995/general/cpyright.html>. Available See Reference.
74
Appendix G
Fuel Consumption Table for Power Generation Public Coal
Canada China Japan Republic of Korea
Russia United States of America
1980 14787 57141 5677 734 N/A 290071 1981 15895 57320 7077 728 N/A 301638 1982 17670 61150 8122 857 N/A 300637 1983 18704 64667 9905 1098 N/A 316237 1984 20665 72262 11501 2908 N/A 335330 1985 19712 73757 12875 3878 N/A 348402 1986 18007 81932 12693 4220 N/A 344985 1987 19848 93122 13818 3667 N/A 362743 1988 21661 102973 14647 4367 N/A 379535 1989 21900 110312 13977 4157 N/A 382572 1990 19947 119756 15566 3904 N/A 387030 1991 20862 153016 16651 3968 N/A 384710 1992 21663 171147 18312 4354 68119 403863 1993 19989 182327 19022 6107 65914 425499 1994 20469 210735 21643 8043 55744 424969 1995 20736 232655 23513 9277 51940 426451 1996 21234 255062 25295 12248 52019 449400 1997 22867 242526 26225 14482 46799 460453 1998 24627 242526 27215 16133 43703 470654 1999 24648 302527 29042 17466 42903 469023 2000 26881 326499 32629 20964 56443 490075 2001 26424 343336 35577 22178 44379 479791 2002 25975 373671 37051 24360 43240 429508 2003 25470 432027 42254 27928 44658 421266 2004 23647 466934 46040 29293 50711 420403 2005 23892 522570 48922 29226 52217 421928 2006 22790 601591 47318 32183 55112 431431
Resource:APEC Energy Database, Maintained by The Energy Data and Modelling Center, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan <http://www.ieej.or.jp/egeda/database/php/newfelectricity/felectricity.php>. Available See Reference. Note: Public Coal Unit: KTOE=1010 kcal
