Contradictions in Dōgen

Koji Tanaka* Department of Philosophy

University of Auckland The draft of 27 February 2012

k.tanaka@auckland.ac.nz Please don't quote or distribute

Abstract

In their article ‘The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism’, Deguchi, Garfield and

Priest argue that some (though not all) of the contradictions that appear in Buddhist texts should be

accepted. An examination of their argument depends on what sort(s) of negation is (are) used in the

texts. In order to see apparently contradictory statements as affirmations of true contradictions, we

must assume that ‘not' (or its variance) is used as a contradiction forming operator. In this paper, I

examine the conception of negation(s) that is (are) salient in the writings of Dōgen and argue that he

would not agree that his sentences are to be considered, and accepted, as contradictory.

1. Contradictions in Buddhism

There are a number of texts in the Buddhist traditions that contain apparently contradictory

statements. In their article ‘The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism’,

Deguchi, Garfield and Priest (DGP) argue that some (though not all) of the contradictions

that appear in Buddhist texts should be accepted. Armed with modern developments in paraconsistent logics,

1 they argue that one need not draw the conclusion that these

contradictions signify irrationalism. They contend that Buddhist thinkers themselves seem to

have developed machinery (such as the doctrine of the two truths) that, if employed to its

limit, entails contradictions.2

                                                        

* I would like to thank Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest for their rigorous comments

on the version of this paper I presented in the workshop held at Kyoto University. I would also like to

thank Yasuo Deguchi for organising the workshop. Many thanks also go to Teramae Jōin at Kōdaiji in

Kyoto for our long conversation on this very issue which we had a couple of days after the workshop

but also for all conversations we have had over the last few years. His agreement with my reading of

Dōgen certainly boosted my confidence. 1 For an introduction to paraconsistent logics, see, for example, Priest (2002) and Priest and Tanaka

(2009). 2 See also Garfield and Priest (2003). 

  2 

It seems, however, that it is one thing for us as contemporary commentators to think

through the implications of Buddhist discourses and another for the Buddhist thinkers

themselves to endorse these same conclusions as what they originally meant. Do or would

(historical or canonical) Buddhist thinkers, themselves, accept contradictions as true?

Answers to this question depend on what sort(s) of negation is (are) used in historical or canonical texts. In order to see apparently contradictory statements as affirmations of true

contradictions by the Buddhist thinkers themselves we must assume that ‘not’ (or its

variance) is used as a contradiction forming operator. But does this assumption hold any

water? Answering this question is a complex issue. We need to examine each apparent

contradictory statement to see whether or not ‘not’ is being used as a contradiction forming

operator. In this paper, I shall focus on Dōgen to whom DGP refer in making their case.

Instead of analysing each occurrence of ‘not’ in Dōgen’s writings, I will examine the

conception of negation(s) that is (are) salient in his writings. Dōgen doesn’t present any semantic reflection on his own writings. The account of negation(s) that I present is (are) a

result of rational reconstruction. Nonetheless, I will weave together the conceptual

machineries that Dōgen provides and present a coherent account of negation(s) that, I

contend, would be acceptable to him based on what he wrote. I do not deny that there maybe

some accidental contradictions contained in his writings. Yet, I shall argue that it is not clear that Dōgen would systematically think of his sentences as contradictory.

3

2. Shōji

Before analysing the negation(s) that Dōgen invokes, I shall consider the contradictions that

DGP claim to have been affirmed by Dōgen. There is one passage in particular that requires a

careful analysis. I shall demonstrate, however, that the apparently contradictory nature of the other passages considered by DGP is the result of the translation of Dōgen’s thought on

which DGP rely for their analysis.

In support for their claim that Dōgen takes some contradictions seriously, DGP quote

two passages from Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, one from the Shōji fascicle and another from the

Genjōkōan fascicle. Those passages appear in different contexts in Dōgen’s writings and thus

need to be examined separately. In this section, I consider the passage from Shōji where DGP claim that Dōgen asserts, and is committed to the truth of, a contradiction.

Just understand that birth-and-death is itself nirvana. There is nothing such as birth and

death to be avoided. There is nothing such as nirvana to be sought. Only when you

realise this are you free from birth and death. (Quoted in Deguchi, Garfield and Priest (2008) p. 396)

The last sentence implies that there is birth and death. But that contradicts the second

sentence, which denies their existence. Thus, so DGP claim, Dōgen asserts seriously that

there is and is not birth and death. If this were what Dōgen asserts, he would indeed have been committed to a

contradiction. Given that the notion of birth-and-death is integral to Dōgen’s philosophy, one

might think that this contradiction is important for Dōgen. However, the translation DGP use

                                                        3 This reverses my earlier view on the issue. For my previous view, see Tanaka (2000).

  3 

to establish their position on Dōgen is problematic. As I understand the passage, it can be

translated as follows:

Only when you regard [literally, have in mind] birth-and-death just as nirvāṇa and you

do not avoid it as birth-and-death and you don’t seek it as nirvāṇa, are you free from birth-and-death.

ただ生死すなわち涅槃とこころえて、生死としていとふべきもなく、涅槃とし

てねがふべきもなし。このときはじめて、生死をはなるる分あり。(Supp Vol,

p. 77) 4

Translated in this way, Dōgen doesn’t affirm nor deny the existence of birth and death.

Instead, he tells us what should be in our mind (こころえる) in order to be free from birth

and death. Dōgen tells us not to avoid birth-and-death, where this is understood in our mind

as nirvāṇa, as well as not to seek it as nirvāṇa. Rather than affirming and denying the

existence of birth and death, he instructs us not to be in a certain cognitive (or intentional)

state. There is no mention of the existence nor non-existence of birth-and-death. Thus, he

doesn’t assert any contradiction in this passage. Now, translating Dōgen’s writings is notoriously difficult. His writings are sometimes

ambiguous because of the poetic nature of his writings and sometimes difficult to understand

because of his frequent engagement in wordplay. However, this passage is relatively clear in

its sentence construction and its meaning. While one may challenge my translation, I think

that, given the relative clearness of this passage, the burden is on DGP to refute it and show that Dōgen does, in fact, assert a contradiction in this passage.

3. Genjōkōan

As another example of contradictions that Dōgen allegedly affirm, DGP quote a passage from Genjōkōan. This passage appears in a specific context (as we will see below) and thus must

be treated separately from the passage from Shōji. DGP quote the two opening sentences of

Genjōkōan:

As all things are Buddha-dharma, there is delusion and realisation, practice, birth and

death, and there are buddhas and sentient beings. As the myriad things are without an

abiding self, there is no delusion, no realisation, no Buddha, no sentient being, no birth and death.

5

This passage does lead us to think that Dōgen is committed to a contradiction. Unfortunately,

this translation is problematic for DGP’s purpose. In this translation, the first clause of each sentence is given as a reason for the second clause. This leads us to think that Dōgen is

saying:

Because A, B. Because C, ¬B.

                                                        

4 The version of Dōgen’s texts (and a contemporary Japanese translation by Ishii Kyōji) I consulted is

Dōgen (1996-98). Page numbers refer to this edition. 5 DGP cite Shōji as the source. That must be a typographical error.

  4 

If this were the case, he would be asserting B (on the basis of A) and ¬B (on the basis of C)

and, hence, asserting a contradiction.

At least two comments can be made about this passage. One concerns translation and

the other concerns the structure of Dōgen’s philosophy as expressed in his writings. Regarding translation, I believe that what Dōgen actually says is something quite different

from what DGP take him to say. Dōgen doesn’t offer the first clause of each sentence as a

reason for the second clause. Instead, what he says is:

When (jisetsu 時節) A, B. When (jisetsu 時節) C, ¬B.

The notion of time is important to Dōgen, not only in the context of this passage but also

more generally, as he explains in the Uji fascicle. If we simply think of these sentences as

conditional statements, however, it seems that he is saying (if we permit ourselves to use

modern logical notation to express the thought):

A → B and C → ¬B.

These two conditional statements are not contradictory. If this is right, then Dōgen doesn’t

assert the contradiction that ‘there is delusion and realisation, practice, birth and death’ and

‘there is no delusion, no realisation, no Buddha, no sentient being, no birth and death’.

One might think that if he asserts A → B and C → ¬B, then, given that they entail ¬A

and ¬C on a standard account of conditionals, Dōgen might be thought as asserting ¬A (all things are not Buddha-dharma) and ¬C (the myriad things are not without an abiding self).

But ¬A and ¬C seem to contradict his overall philosophy as well as Buddhist philosophy, in

general, since Dōgen arguably accepts that all things are Buddha-dharma and that the myriad

things are without an abiding self. One might use the apparent fact of Dōgen’s holding

contradictory commitments as evidence for the fact that he is committed to contradictions.6

In order to examine these alleged contradictory commitments we must analyse the negation(s) that Dōgen invokes in his writing. I will first consider ¬C (the myriad things are

not without an abiding self) followed by ¬A (all things are not Buddha-dharma) as how to

understand the negation involved in the first has an impact on how to understand the negation

involved in the second.

According to the translation DGP rely on, Dōgen asserts that ‘the myriad things are

without an abiding self’. If this were indeed what Dōgen says, then, following the reasoning above, he would be accepting ¬C (the myriad things are not without an abiding self) which

contradicts the claim that the myriad things are without an abiding self which Dōgen

arguably accepts. Again, however, this translation is problematic. I believe that what he

actually says is

When I (ware われ) am present together with myriad things, …7

万法ともにわれにあらざる時節、… (Vol. 1, p. 16)

                                                        6 Thanks go to Graham Priest for making this suggestion. 7 This sounds a bit awkward; however, this is a, more or less, a literal translation.

  5 

So he is not concerned with the lack of abiding self of myriad things. What he is concerned

with is the presence of I, my self, who is experiencing the myriad things. Dōgen is instructing

us not to let the self be part of our experience of myriad things. The absence of my self in

experiencing myriad things doesn’t contract anything that Dōgen does accept. In fact, that is

consistent with the no-self doctrine that Dōgen and most Buddhists accept.

Focusing on the problematic nature of the presence of the self helps us understand the rest of the passage from Genjōkōan that DGP quote. According to DGP, given the standard

analysis of conditional statements, he must be asserting that all things are not Buddha-dharma

while his overall position seems to be that all things are Buddha-dharma. In order to address

this issue, we need to consider the context in which this passage appears. In particular, it is

crucial to recognise that the two sentences that DGP quote constitute the first two sentences of a triplet. Instead of two truths, Dōgen often invoke three stages of awakening as the

structure of his writings. We need to understand the nature of negation or negations as part of

this structure.

In the Zazengi fascicle, Dōgen presents a set of instructions for doing zazen (sitting

meditation). Towards the end of Zazengi, he invokes three stages of awakening:

Sit diligently and then thinking (shiryō 思量) becomes not-thinking (fushiryō 不思量).

What is thinking that becomes not-thinking, this is non-thinking (hishiryō 非思量).

This is the art of zazen.8

兀々と坐定して思量箇不思量底なり。不思量底如何思量、これ非思量なり。こ

れすなわち坐禅の法術なり。 (Vol. 1, p. 283)

The idea of there being three kinds of thinking runs throughout Dōgen’s writings, although he

does not thematise them explicitly. In order to understand what he considers the problematic

nature of thinking and not-thinking and how it is overcome by non-thinking, we need to weave together some remarks that are scattered around in his writings.

In the end of the Sansuikyō fascicle, Dōgen writes:

An ancient Buddha said, “Mountains mountain, water waters”. These words don’t say

that “mountains” (やま) are mountains, they say that mountains (山) mountain. This

being the case, we should study (参究) “mountains” (やま). When we investigate (参

窮) mountains in this way, mountains mountain.9

                                                        

8 I note that the passage I translate here is, in fact, ambiguous. I have followed the contemporary

Japanese translation by Ishii. The passage that I have translated as “thinking becomes not-thinking”

(and “thinking that becomes not-thinking”) could be translated as “thinking of not-thinking” (See

Bielefdt (1990)), “thinking about not-thinking” (See Kasulis (1981)) or “thinking not-thinking” (See

Tanahashi (1985)). In these translations, not-thinking is the object of thinking. According to Brook

Ziporyn, not-thinking is clearly the object of thinking in the Chinese phrase that Dōgen makes use of.

However, it is not clear to me that that’s what Dōgen is suggesting. I acknowledge that I am taking a

stance on translating this passage in this way. 9 This passage is very difficult to translate. Dōgen seems to be playing with some Japanese words. In

fact, it is not clear that a literal translation which expresses the intended meaning is possible. I

acknowledge that I have a translation which is heavily interpreted based on my understanding of the

passage. 

  6 

古仏云、「山是山、水是水」。この道取は、やまこれやまといふにあらず、山

これやまといふなり。しかあれば、やまを参究すべし、山を参窮すれば山に功

夫なり。(Vol. 2, p. 329)

The difference between saying that mountains mountain and that mountains are mountains is

that the second expresses more than the first. In coming to be in contact with a mountain, we

may grasp it and identify it as “mountain” and attribute a property of “being a mountain” to

it. In such a case, it is because of our cognitive act that mountains are mountains in our thought. In saying “Mountains mountain”, however, we don’t express our cognitive act. It is

an expression about mountains and not about our cognitive identification. Dōgen seems to be

urging that we throw away the thinking that makes us the basis of the ‘truth’ of the utterance.

In hearing “Mountains mountain”, we may think that it is an expression of our grasping of a

thing, identifying it as “mountain” and attributing a property to it. But that is a mistake. Why this is a mistake is a question that can be answered only after a thorough

investigation of the entire corpus of Dōgen. I think the crux of the problem, however, is to do

with the subject-object duality that is often emphasised in Yogācāra tradition. That is, in

thinking, there is a distance between the grasper, the self, and the grasped, e.g., a mountain,

in one’s thought. The problem in there being such distance is that the grasper, the self, is part

of the content of thinking, since, otherwise, the mountain couldn’t be grasped as separate from us. It is the self represented and thus experienced in thinking that Dōgen criticises, for

example, in Genjōkōan and Uji.

The point seems to be that our ordinary thinking (shiryō) is problematic. The expression

that mountains are mountains is problematic because it is in subject-predicate form. Dōgen

thinks that such an expression expresses the fact that we identify a mountain as “m” and put it

together with the predicate M in order to come to think that Mm. Similarly, thinking that

mountains are not mountains, ¬Mm (or not-thinking (fushiryō) that mountains are

mountains), is problematic, since it is an expression of our act of identifying something as “m” but not attributing M to it. So it is not really that mountains are mountains or that

mountains are not mountains. Rather mountains mountain.

In order to make it more precise, consider a first-order model for the language M = ⟨D,

I⟩ where D is a set of things such as mountains and water and I is a function that assigns a

name or a predicate to a thing (a member of D) or a property (a sequence of some members

of D) respectively. (I assume, for the sake of simplicity, that our language consists only of

one-place predicates.) For each d ∈ D which is identified as a “mountain”, I(d) = m where m is the name “mountain”.

10 Then, each such d is subsumed under the predicate “is mountain”

M: I(M) = {d1, d2, …} where d1, d2, … ∈ D. Thinking that mountains are mountains can then be represented as

M ⊨ Mm.

This says, essentially, that it is true that mountains are mountains. Thinking that mountains

are not mountains, or not-thinking that mountains are mountains, can be represented as

M ⊨ ¬Mm.

                                                        10 This is an unorthodox way of defining the function I. Nonetheless, I believe that this unorthodox

definition captures Dōgen’s thought.

  7 

If we assume that M ⊨ ¬Mm iff M ⊭ Mm, then one contradicts the other. So “Mountains

are mountains” and “Mountains are not mountains” can be shown to be contradictory. In

other words, the negation invoked in the second stage of awakening, fu (不 ), is a

contradiction forming operator.

However, this negation is not carried through to the third stage of awakening. Instead of

fu, it is hi (非) that is operative in the third stage. This is a different kind of negation. In order

to see this, observe that the language of first-order logic used above to explicate Dōgen’s

thought on thinking (shiryō) and not-thinking (fushiryō) is designed to express highly

complex cognitive activities. Dōgen appears to think that, in the third stage of awakening,

some (and not all) of these cognitions should be ‘cast off’ (totsuraku 脱落). For Dōgen, these

predicative expressions, whether positive or negative, are problematic. They express our act of identifying a thing as “m” and putting or not putting it together with the predicate M in

order to come to think that Mm or that ¬Mm. In non-thinking (hishiryō), however, the self

(ware 我) (not a person (hito 人) with which Dōgen isn’t really concerned) is to be cast off. 11

The self is not represented in non-thinking and so does not get into the act. Non-thinking is

not an act that grasps a thing and identifies it as “mountain”, for example, and attributes a

property to it. The self who performs such an act is not represented in non-thinking. Analysed

in this way, the negation involved in non-thinking, hi (非), negates the presence of the self

(and hence the distance between the grasper and the grasped) in one’s thought. The self is not

represented in non-thinking whose point is the casting off of the mechanism that is operative

in thinking and not-thinking. Hi (非) is a negation of this kind.12

This means that, in the third stage of awakening, it is not just the self but also the

whole mechanism that necessitates the presence of the self that need to be cast off. Given that

it is this mechanism that assigns truth values to expressions such as “Mountains are mountains” and “Mountains are not mountains”, Dōgen’s point is that we shouldn’t be caught

in the activity of evaluating the truth values of such expressions. It is any attempt to engage

in such activity that Dōgen urges us to cast off.

4. Mountains Are Just Mountains

In order to be more specific about my disagreement with DGP, let us consider the alternative analysis of the three stages of awakening that Garfield and Priest attribute to Dōgen (and

Nāgārjuna) in their article ‘Mountains Are Just Mountains’. The notion of emptiness occurs,

they claim, in the stages of awakening as depicted in, for example, the ox-herding pictures. In

the first seven pictures, the process of the taming of an ox is depicted, representing the

taming of the mind. The eighth picture is blank, representing the realisation of emptiness. The last two pictures go back to the beginning, ‘but a beginning informed now with the realisation

of emptiness’ (pp. 74-76).

Garfield and Priest liken the ox-herding pictures to the aphorism that occurs frequently

in Chan/Zen literature:

                                                        11 See Zazenshin, Paragraph 3 (Vol. 1, p. 287). 12 For a discussion of Dōgen focusing on the importance of ‘forgetting the self’, see Davis (2011). 

  8 

Before I studied Zen, mountains were mountains, and water was water. After studying

Zen for some time, mountains were no longer mountains, and water was no longer

water. But now, after studying Zen longer, mountains are just mountains, and water is

just water. (Quoted in Garfield and Priest (2009) p. 71.)

According to Garfield and Priest, there are three stages in the process of understanding

mountains and water. The first stage is the understanding that mountains are mountains and

water is water. The second stage is the understanding that mountains are not mountains and

water is not water. But, the last stage is, again, the understanding that mountains are just mountains and water is just water. Hence, the understanding that mountains are mountains is

likened to the first seven ox-herding pictures; the understanding that mountains are not

mountains is likened to the eighth, blank picture, representing the realisation of emptiness;

and the understanding that mountains are (again) just mountains is likened to the last two

pictures representing the beginning with the realisation of emptiness. Garfield and Priest present a formal semantics for the negation involved in the three

stages of awakening. They take the negation to be expressed by 無 (mu).13

They assimilate

mu to emptiness as understood by Nāgārjuna (and his Mādhyamika followers). They take

cues from the catuṣkoṭi deployed by Nāgājuna, for example, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

(MMK) and consider four truth values: t (true only), f (false only), b (both true and false) and

n (either true nor false). They represent the catuṣkoṭi by the following lattice:

t

b n

f

An evaluation of the language, ν, is a function mapping each sentence of the language to one

of these values. So, for each sentence, A, ν(A) = t, ν(A) = f, ν(A) = b or ν(A) = f. ν(A ∧ B)

(conjunction) is the meet of ν(A) and ν(B) (the greatest value less than or equal to both) and

ν(A ∨ B) (disjunction) is the join of ν(A) and ν(B) (the least value greater than or equal to

both). ν(¬A) (negation) is the flop on the b-n axis. It can be characterised by the following

truth table:

                                                        13 There is, in fact, a difficulty of talking about mu in the context of Japanese Buddhism. The word mu

(無) has an ordinary usage in Japanese and doesn’t necessarily mean emptiness in the way that

Mādhyamikas would understand it. When Takuan Sōhō talked about mushin (無心), he gave the term

a connotation that is different from the Mādhyamika’s. It is, perhaps, for this reason that Japanese

Buddhists and Kyoto School philosophers generally use kū (空, literally meaning sky) to mean

emptiness. 

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ν(A) ν(¬A)

t f

f t

b b

n n

Garfield and Priest use the above lattice to explain the semantics underlying the ox-herding

pictures. In the first stage, each sentence is assigned one of the four values. At this stage,

there are four possible truth values that can be assigned to “mountains are mountains”. For the second stage, in addition to four values, Garfield and Priest introduce the fifth

value: e. This is the value that they use to represent mu. The fifth value, e, is an isolated point

in the sense that it is incompatible with the other four values. It is also a sink. So if ν(A) = e,

then ν(A ∧ B) = ν(A ∨ B) = ν(¬A) = e. In order to deal with the value e, Garfield and Priest

introduce a function µ that operates on the values on the lattice. It takes any value to e (i.e., µ

is a mu-operator). So, for any value, V, µ(V) = e. The sentence “Mountains are mountains” now takes the value e, indicating that it is no longer the case that mountains are mountains.

This second stage can be represented by the following lattice:14

t

↓

b → e ← n

↑

f

The third stage splits into two. In the first instance, by taking into account the fact that µ

operates on every value including e, µ(e) = e. This can be represented as:

t

↓

b

→

⤺ e

←

n

↑

f

However, since e itself is nullified (or ‘mu-ified’), there is nothing inside to be mapped onto. So the arrows representing µ fades out, giving rise to the following lattice:

                                                        14 Note that, as Garfield and Priest acknowledge, this is, strictly speaking, no longer a lattice since it is

a partial ordering. 

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t

b e n

f

Now, the original values return as they were in the beginning. They are no longer taken into e

by the mu-function, µ, even though the value e remains on the lattice. This represents the

returning to the beginning with the realisation of mu.

Garfield and Priest apply their analysis of the three stages of awakening to Dōgen (and Nāgārjuna) in the following way:

So, all things have a single nature, and that is emptiness, and that is no nature at all.

And that is why each thing can manifest exactly the conventional nature that it has. All of this might seem at first glance to be hopelessly incoherent. We grant its

inconsistency: Nāgārjuna and Dōgen are indeed committed to the identity of distinct

truths and to the assertion that the essence of all things is their essencelessness. They

are also committed to the claim that the objects of awakening and ignorance are both

distinct and identical. The fifth value, e, with its paradoxical status, is a way of

representing this. Nāgārjuna and Dōgen agree that ultimate reality escapes the standard four possibilities, and so acknowledge a fifth; and the fifth is self-dismantling. It is both

crucial and idle. (p. 81)15

The semantic analysis of mu provided by Garfield and Priest is ingenious. It is also valuable

for our understanding of the three stages of awakening that are often salient in East Asian Buddhism. However, Garfield and Priest have derived semantic resources from Nāgārjuna

(and Madhyamaka in general) and presented a Mādhyamika study of the notion of mu as

found in the Chan tradition. From a Mādhyamika perspective, the Chan/Zen tradition may

appear to follow Nāgārjuna: the Chan/Zen notion of mu may appear as the Mādhyamika

notion of emptiness.16

Yet, it is not clear that the Chan/Zen tradition itself understands the

negation(s) involved in the three stages of awakening in terms of the Mādhyamika notion of emptiness.

Whether or not the Chan/Zen tradition has historically adopted Madhyamaka, it seems

that the understanding of negation involved in the three stages of awakening in terms of mu

doesn’t properly capture what Dōgen says in his texts. We need to ‘negate’ something as part

of our training; yet what is negated is not the essence or inherent existence of mountains and water. As I have shown above, Dōgen instructs us to ‘negate’ the presence of the self. His

concern is not with the emptiness of mountains and water. What he is concerned with is the

problematic nature of the presence of the self which may be represented in one’s experience

of mountains and water. Even though Dōgen presumably would have had some influence of

                                                        15 It is, in fact, problematic to attribute the claim that “all things have a single nature” (italic added) to

Dōgen given that he would reject such an expression. See for example, Loy (1999). 16 See Garfield and Priest (2009) p. 81, where they claim that “the Chan/Zen tradition is merely

following Nāgārjuna closely”. Earlier in their article, however, they make a much more nuanced

claim: “it is illuminating to read Nāgārjuna through the lens of Zen insight.” (p. 74)  

  11 

Madhyamaka thought on certain issues, in this respect, it is Yogācāra thought that is

predominant in Dōgen’s writings and not Madhyamaka thought.

5. Was Dōgen a Dialetheist?

Does Dōgen assert contradictions systematically as DGP seem to suggest? The answer seems

to be no. According to the analysis of Garfield and Priest, contradictions are represented in the last stage in terms of the presence of the truth value b (both true and false). Reclaiming

this truth value in the third stage of awakening allows Dōgen to affirm in the end that

mountains are mountains and that mountains are not mountains. It is certainly the case that,

for Dōgen, mountains and water escape the standard possibilities: simple truth and falsity of

“mountains are mountains”. But to think of this escape in terms of assignment of another value is to be caught in thinking again. The contradictory truth value b must also be cast off

in the third stage of awakening for Dōgen.

For Dōgen, it is also problematic to say that the essence of all things is their

essencelessness. This is not because he would find the very notion of essence problematic

(though he does that too) but because he would find the attribution of essencelesness to all things to be problematic. Assigning the fifth value is just as problematic as assigning standard

truth values even if the fifth value is said to be ‘self-dismantling’. Hi (非) may negate the

presence of oneself but it also casts off the entire mechanism of assigning truth values. That

is, the difference between thinking (shiryō) and not-thinking (fushiryō) on the one hand and

non-thinking (hishiryō) on the other cannot be understood in terms of the absence and the

presence of mu; it has to be understood in terms of the presence of the mechanism of

assigning truth values and the absence of such a mechanism. Dōgen would find the very

presence of a lattice representing the semantics of the last stage of awakening to be problematic. It is not just that there is a difficulty of translating Dōgen’s writings as

containing contradictions; it would seem that, properly understood, there is no mechanism

that he appeals to which would allow him to affirm contradictions. For Dōgen, any such

mechanism needs to be dismantled. It is undeniable that there is an air of contradiction in Buddhist texts. Of all Buddhist

traditions, the Chan/Zen tradition would, perhaps, most evidently confirm the existence of

contradictions. I don’t argue that no Chan/Zen Buddhist would accept contradictions. Given

that their writings are filled with paradoxical statements, they might as well be committed to

contradictions. The ‘story’ contained in the ox-herding pictures may well imply a

contradiction. Yet, I have demonstrated that Dōgen would not be so committed. For Dōgen, contradictions are to be cast off together with the very mechanism which allows such

contradictions to arise. Dōgen was not a dialetheist.

References

Bielefeldt, Carl (1990) Dōgen’s Manual of Zen Meditation, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Davis, Bret W. ‘The Philosophy of Zen Master Dōgen” Egoless Perspectivism’, The Oxford

Handbook of World Philosophy, J. Garfield and W. Edelglass (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University

Press, pp. 348-360.

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Deguchi, Yasuo, Jay L. Garfield and Graham Priest (2008) ‘The Way of the Dialetheist:

Contradictions in Buddhism’, Philosophy East & West, Vol. 58, pp. 395-402.

Dōgen (1996-98) Shōbōgenzō (4 volumes and supplementary volume), Ishii Kyōji (trans.), Tokyo:

Kawade Shobō Shinsha.

Garfield, Jay L. and Graham Priest (2009) ‘Mountains Are Just Mountains’, Pointing at the Moon:

Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy, M. D’Amato, J. Garfield and T. Tillemans (eds.), Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Kasulis, T.P. (1981) Zen Action/Zen Person, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Loy, David R. (1999) ‘Language Against Its Own Mystifications: Deconstruction in Nāgārjuna and

Dōgen’, Philosophy East & West, Vol. 49, pp. 245-260.

Priest, Graham (2002) ‘Paraconsistent Logic’, Handbook of Philosophical Logic (Second Edition), D.

Gabbay and F. Huenthner (eds.), Dordrecht :Kluwer Academic Publishers, Vol. 6, pp. 287-393.

Priest, Graham and Koji Tanaka (2009) ‘Paraconsistent Logic’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

(Summer 2009 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford University.

Tanahashi, Kazuaki (trans.) (1985) Moon in a Dewdrop, New York: North Point Press.

Tanaka, Koji (2000) A Labyrinth of Trees and the Sound of Silence, PhD Thesis, University of

Queensland.