Consti Cases for Articles 6-17

8/13/2019 Consti Cases for Articles 6-17

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The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invokingexec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was citedin contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that hewould appear and give his testimony.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system?2. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order?

- YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government andinextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution.- The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by thePresident to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case.- In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on aspecific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject ofthe 3 questions asked.

- If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by thePresident on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that thesame be recognized.- YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked executive generates itsown abuses.- Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the executive to functioneffectively.- The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus prevent roving commissions.- The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature, must look into the internalrules of congress w/ regard to ensuring compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contemptorder must be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order was w/o

concurrence of the majority.

HELD:RESPONENTS COMMITTEES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 08APRIL2008IS HEREBY DENIED.

Powell v. McCormack

395 U.S. 486 (1969)

Powell was a Congressman who was caught in a political scandal. The House of Representativespassed a resolution to exclude him.

o The resolution wasn't phrased as an 'impeachment', or an 'expulsion', and was passedwith a simple majority vote.

Powell sued for an injunction, claiming that the resolution was invalid.o Powell argued that in order to expel him from Congress, the Constitution requires a

2/3rds vote. But the resolution to 'exclude' him didn't garner that many votes. (SeeArticle I, Section 2).

The Trial Court dismissed the case.o The Trial Court found that they did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and that the

case was notjudicable.


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The US Supreme Court reversed.o The US Supreme Court found that the case wasjudicable.

The Court didn't invoke the Political Question Doctrinebecause they found thatthe case did not constitute a political question that pit one branch ofgovernment against another. Rather, it required "no more than aninterpretation of the Constitution."

o The Court found that Congress being the sole judge of its members qualifications(Article I, Section 5, cl. 1) and the Speech and Debate Clause(Article I, Section 6) do notpreclude judicial review of Constitutional issues.

o The Court found that that Congress does not have the power to develop qualificationsother than those specified in Article I, Section 2, cl. 1-2.

This case settled a contradiction in the Constitution. Article I Section 5states that, "each Houseshall be the judge of the qualifications of its own members." But Article I, Section 2, says thatthe House can only expel a member with a vote of 2/3rds.

o The Court found that Section 2is controlling, and Congress can't change it, regardless ofwhat it says in Section 5.

Compare this case to Nixon v. United States(506 U.S. 224 (1993)), where, under a similar set of facts,the US Supreme Court found that they could not intervene because it was apolitical questionandtherefore notjudicable.

Vilando v. HRET (SECTION 17)

Citizenship; collateral attack prohibited. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that sheis a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization ofLimkaichongs father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the

citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a persons citizenship may only be done

through a direct action for its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles,G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23,

2011.

House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warrantopetitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of citizenship. The 1987Constitution vests the HRET with the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the

election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. This constitutionalpower is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. However, such power of the HRET, no matterhow complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of thejudgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate

as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. Renald F. Vilando vs.House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker ProsperoNograles,G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/192147.htm


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CASE BOOK CASES

Tobias vs. Abalos

G.R.No. L-114785 08 December 1994

PONENTE: BIDIN, J.

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong intoa Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged

to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not theyapproved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless,18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressedin the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinctfrom the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule

has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fiftymembers, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned

among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of theirrespective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as providedby law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral partiesor organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that thenumber of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment.Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make areapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.


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The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself whichdrafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Mariano Jr. V. COMELEC

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipalityof Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati onlyby special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed byCongress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislativedistrict in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, thepopulation of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charterof a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congressfrom increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This isexactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis

legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a generalapportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unitnationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress willbe denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations willdeprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord withSec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least onerepresentative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, itslegislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of

250,000.

Montejo vs. COMELEC

Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district ofLeyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regularprovince, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the new province. As a consequence, thecomposition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality inthe distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated ResolutionNo. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipalityof Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.


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Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities from one legislative districtto another legislative district

Held:The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of itspower of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based onthe deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power oflegislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empoweredthe COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of itspower to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authorityto transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about animbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issueinvolves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies with Congress.

Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Courtheld that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when itpromulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the

municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC

In 2006, RA 9371 was promulgated by Congress. It was entitled An Act Providing for the Apportionment

of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This was proposed by Rep. Jaraula fromCagayan de Oro. It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. In the next election,

Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their ownrepresentative to Congress as well as eight membersof the Sangguniang Panglungsod. On 13 March

2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371. Bagabuyofiled the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007 asking for the nullification of R.A. No.9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that 1.) Cagayan de OroCitys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,

abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;2.) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government

units involve a common denominatorthe material changein the politicaland economic rights of thelocal government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 3.) a voters sovereign powerto decide on who should be elected as the entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least

one halfbecause the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in thedistrict designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily deniedhis right to elect theCongressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 5.) governmentfunds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De OroCity.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan

de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit. Whether or not

it violates the equality of representation doctrine.


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HELD: Legislative apportionmentis defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of thenumberof representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.It is

the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district

lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.Reapportionment, on the otherhand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population andmandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does not have theeffect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories.Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhancevoter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in theSangguniang Panglunsod.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for itspopulation of approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with onecongressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 ofthe citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each one now servicesonly 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000. The fewer constituents represented translate to agreater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian. The City, for its part,

now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since thetotal number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, thepresence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative andproportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo furthercontends that RA 9371 violates the equality in representation doctrine as it appears that one district hasa higher number of voters as comparedto the other and that one is urbanized the other is rural. This isthe clarification; the law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of theinhabitantsof a city or a province, not the number of registered voterstherein

Gallego vs. Verra

Residence Qualification Case #1: GALLEGO vs. VERA

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI of Leyte,which declared illegal the petitioners election to the office ofthe municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte inthe election of Dec. 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification. Gallego is a

native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed as a schoolteacher in Catarman, Samar, aswell as in some municipalities in Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog, Leyte, but lost. InJune 1938, he worked in Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the Bureau of Forestry to make up forthe financial drawback caused by his loss in the previous election, and stayed there until he resigned inSept. 1940.Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in the election forassemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940,

He obtained and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in whichcertificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for 1.5 yrs. The CA declared thatGallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time he was elected mayor there on the grounds that:1.He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon2.He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen3.He obtained a residence cert from themunicipality of Malaybalay


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ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and acquired anew domicile inMalaybalay, Bukidnon.

HELD:

Yes. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as an employee, registeringas voter there and securing his residence certificate there for1940. The decision of the CA is reversed.

RATIO:

In the definition of residence in the election law under the 1935 Constitution, itstates that in order toacquire a domicile by choice, there must concur:1.Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality2.An intention to remain there3.An intention to abandon the old domicile

The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period of time. The court believedthat Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay indefinitely because:

1.When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned in Abuyog and even resigned whenhe ran for office in 19372.His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial drawback caused by his loss inthe election3.He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him4.He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in the plantation offered to him bythe government5.He visited his family no less than three times despite the great distance between Abuyog, Leyte andMalaybalay Bukidnon The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualificationis to:

excludea stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a

community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve thatcommunity.

And the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and was now elected with amajority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

FACTS:Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she

studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued hercollege degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 towork with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norteand was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they livedtogether in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, theylived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of theBatasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.


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Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leytefor the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyteand also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"withthe Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement forresidency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, whichshe sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate ofCandidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile orresidence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of theMunicipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running asrepresentative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of aconclusion supporting petitoners claim oflegal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte

despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operationoflaw when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fideintention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspondwith the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed tocontinue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law

does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, shekept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a newone only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicatedthat she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner evenobtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishingresidences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to runfor a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned

Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. RespondentCOMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as theduly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative forthe Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party,


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and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition todisqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate forcongressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 yearimmediately preceding the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressmanas mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District ofMakati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a residentof San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediatelypreceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of thesame district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What standsconsistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of hismost recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominiumunit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in

Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones

original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which

is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove anactual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place ofresidence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In theabsence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Domino v. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lonelegislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency wherehe seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancelthe certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in thecertificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Saranganiwhere he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Dominodisqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May

11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation ofhis certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24

Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediatelypreceding the May 11, 1998 elections

Held:The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective


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office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place

but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile

denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some otherreasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he

acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for theposition of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is nowclaiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a newdomicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new

one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removalor an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence andestablishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately

support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside inSarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones

original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of thecontract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to

abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residenceespecially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Co vs. House Electoral Tribunal

FACTS:

These are petitions for certiorari to review the decision of the House of Representatives ElectoralTribunal(HRET). Petitioners, Sixto Balinguit and Antonio Co, and the private respondent Jose Ong Jr. viedfor the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar in the May1987congressional election. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the saiddistrict. Petitioners filed election protests. Petitioners contend his qualification as a member of theHouse of Representatives on the basis of Article VI Sec. 6 of the present Constitution. The HRET declaredthat the respondent Jose Ong Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, NorthernSamar for voting purposes. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was however, denied.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

On the issue of jurisdiction

The Constitution explicitly provides that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be thesole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respective members,as stated in Article VI Sec. 17. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear, andcomplete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these tribunals. It


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has been argued that under Article VI Sec. 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as itexists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals.

On the issue of citizenship

The grandfather of private respondent, Ong Te arrived in the Philippines from China in 1895 and wasable to obtain a certificate of residence from then Spanish colonial administration. Ong Te brought theprivate respondents father, Jose Ong Chuan, to Samar from China. The respondents father, JoseOngChuan filed with Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization, and the same courtdeclared him to be a Filipino citizen. Respondent Ong was then 9 years old. The house of the respondentin Samar was burnt twice and they rebuilt it twice in the same district twice. Ong, after completing hiselementary education in Samar, went to Manila to acquire his secondary and college education. He tookand passed the CPA Board Examinations and since employment opportunities were better in Manila,Ong found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked thehardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his full brother, Emil Ong, was elected as a delegateto the 1971Constitutional Convention where his status as a natural-born citizen was challenged. Emilwas declared a natural born Filipino.

Respondent Ongs situation is argued to rest on Article IV Sec. 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution whichprovides that those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenshipupon reaching the age of the majority are citizens of the Philippines. Section 2 of the same article alsoreads in its last sentence: Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3

hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. There is no dispute that the respondents mother was a

natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Thus, the contention lies on whether or not therespondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. The aforementioned provision was enacted tocorrect the anomalous situation where, one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother wasautomatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and analien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution, they were both

considered as natural-born citizens with legislative intent to correct an unfair position whichdiscriminates against Filipino women.The petitioners also argue that the respondents father was not validly, a naturalized citizen becauseof his premature taking of oath of citizenship.

On the issue of residency

The petitioners argue that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot,therefore be a resident of the said place.

ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion in its decision on the grounds that

(1)respondent Ong is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and (2) respondent Ong is not aresidentof the second district of Northern Samar.

HELD:NO. Petition is dismissed. The questioned decision of the HRET is affirmed. Respondent Ong is declaredanatural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

RATIO:


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On the issue of jurisdiction

In the exercise of Article VIII Sec. 1 of the present Constitution, the Court is merely to check whetheror not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed graveabuse of discretion amounting to the lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise itscorrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET to decide. The degreeof judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRETbelong to this party or that party. The test remains the samemanifest grave abuse of discretion. In thecase at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of theHRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

On the issue of citizenship

In relation to Article IV Sections 1 and 2, to expect the respondent to have formally or in writing electedcitizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He

was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized.According to jurisprudence that defines election, the Court held that the exercise of the right of

suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippinecitizenship. The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He hasestablished his life here in the Philippines. There is no doubt in this case about respondent Ongs being

Filipino when he turned 21.The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateralapproach. This cannot be done. An attack on persons citizenship may only be done through a direct

action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to the respondentsfather as null and void would run against the principle of due process, as he has already been laid to restand that he has no opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural borncitizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of his father is

relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent chose to be a Filipino when he came ofage. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father of the respondent were Filipinos.Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship. The same issue on natural-borncitizenship has already been decided in the case of the full blood brother of the respondent Ong, whichis another reason why the Court cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse ofdiscretion.

On the issue of residencyThe petitioners argument on this issue is misplaced. It is not required that a person should have a housein order to establish his residence and domicile. The legislative intent is to adhere to the earlierdefinition of the word residence which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.Domicile denotesa fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one

intends to return. The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. It is characterized byanimus revertendi and that in the case at bar, the periodical journeys made by the respondent to hishome province, while studying and later on practicing his profession in Manila, reveal that he alwayshad the animus revertendi. In considering the residence of a person, It is enough that he should live inthe municipality or in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. The Constitution only requires thatthe candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required bythe Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified.


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Bengzon vs. Cruz

Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San

Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United StatesMarine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance tothe United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No.63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to oraccepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. OnMarch 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under

Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District ofPangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was thenrunning for reelection.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the

constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless heis a natural-born citizen.

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy processof naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concernedresides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored tohis prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-borncitizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born

Filipino.

Valles vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Respondent was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australiafollows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on the ground of dualcitizenship.

HELD: Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she hasdual citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. Filing a certificateof candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declareshimself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration

operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Dimaporo v. Mitra202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859October 15, 1991

FACTS:


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Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District ofLanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with theCOMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region inMuslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development bythe COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner'sname from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of theOmnibus Election Code which states:Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he isholding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker,expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress.He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P.Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore notapplicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House ofRepresentatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened,are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators,Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitutionshall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House ofRepresentatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise providedby law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the ruleexpressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to theseconstitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on aground not provided for in the Constitution.

Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressmanholds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is notequivalent to holding another office or employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVEACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBYPREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HISRIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned notbecause of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under ourConstitution, we have this chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987

constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:


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Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable tothe people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotismand justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve theirprincipal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cutshort the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P.Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging themfrom running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear thatshould they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant withthe constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not triflewith the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacyfor another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently beingheld, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and

permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the momentand act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothingsave a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make theforfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itselfas a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its applicationto present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, andthe Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment All other public officers and

employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such

constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of theConstitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expressionin the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude thelegislature from prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislativeenactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does notsuffice.

2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerialfunctions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor

of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House ofRepresentatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of MuslimMindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of analleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriouslyhinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to questionthe constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have notjudicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are


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creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for theinterest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations andconditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy maydictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member ofCongress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed bythe Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period duringwhich an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyondthe power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situationswill not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be

shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in thegovernment or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations or subsidiaries;b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an electioncontest; and,d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Codilla vs. de VeneciaG.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamationof the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity

Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidateFACTS:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4thlegislative district of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislativedistrict of Leyte. A petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the

Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and vehicles owned by the CityGovernment of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga andMatag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas

name remained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number ofvotes. However, his proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing ofhis disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered disqualified.


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Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representativeand subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with theComelec and also sought the annulment of Locsins proclamation.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected

Representative

RULING:

First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsiderationseasonably filed by the petitioner.

xxx

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Divisionsuspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of itsjurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the SecondDivision was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion forreconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in officeof the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in theinstant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been

resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution ofthe COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion forReconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made

and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contestinvolving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due tothe issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the

HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a divisionor en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

xxxA petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the


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Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor herloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run,and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected andproclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at thetime of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warrantoproceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation wasa patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district ofLeyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tellpetitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but neverthelessunproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition formandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, orstation, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which suchother is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for

mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer orperson, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act orduty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, inobedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgmentupon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and

gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary andnot ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exerciseof official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll ofMembers of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer amatter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute:petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondentLocsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Divisionand ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not beenchallenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has beenfinally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The ruleof law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the

rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC


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Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that the

senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired termof former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.

People vs. Jalosjos

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined atthe national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pendingappeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of aCongressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his havingbeen convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the

need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue:Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of Houseof Representatives

Held:Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of itsimportance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted bylaw.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arisesfrom a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. Theprovision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaningof its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend

sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman chargedwith a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it hasconstitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committeemeetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privilegesappurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status tothat of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang

Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of itsCommittee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication inseveral newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitiousAFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas,to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication

Held:The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purviewof the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression

refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as


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speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session,as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performedby Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official dischargeof their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform itsfunctions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to thePresident, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to bepublished in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be sopublished, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer ofany committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

ANTONINO V VALENCIAMAY 27, 1974

FACTS:

Lorenzo Sarmiento of the Liberal Party lost to Vicente Duterte of the Nacionalista Party in the electionfor governor in Davao.

Subsequently, Senator Antonino issued a statement that the loss was caused by the support given byValencia, the Secretary of Public Works, to the independent LP candidate Maglana which caused adivision in LP votes. Antonino was quoted in various newspapers that had Valencia not Sabotaged and

double-crossed them, the LP would have won.

Antonino then proceeded to file requests to have Valencia investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee on alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment.

Valencia retaliated by issuing a press release that he will also file charges with the Blue RibbonCommittee regarding anomalous acts of the Senator. This release was published in newspapers

Antonino filed this case of damages. Valencia filed a counter-claim. Lower court ruled in favor ofAntonino. Valencia appealed. Antonino died and was substituted by Senator Antonino (Wife)

ISSUES:1.W/N the Press Release was issued by Valencia2.W/N the Press Release is libelous

Held/Ruling:YES. The fact that Valencia caused the release and publication of the press release is seen in the

following facts:1.The newspapers reproduced the specific charges filed by Antonino.2.On the press release there was marked For release under the date.3.It was indicated on the press release the answers made by Valencia to the charges of Antonino in thesame numerical order.4.The press release indicated that it came from Valencia5.The press release quoted Valencia and he admitted making the statement in his office in the presenceof the press


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6.The first page of the press release consisted of quoted statements by Valencia and reports andinformation he received about Antonino7.The press release mentioned specific figures which only Valencia could know given the time constraint8.Valencia did not make any correction or denial of the published statement.

YES. The statements issued were defamatory and libelous in nature as they imputed upon him certaincorrupt practices. Also, because the statement was not issued privately or officially, malice is presumedand such presumption was not overcome asValencia did not prove the truth of his statements or that they were published with good intentions andwith a justifiable motive or that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on thecharacter, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.

The court said that had Valencia not been motivated with malice he would have filedcharges againstAntonino with the Senate seeing as Antonino was not a candidate forelection and that his term assenator was no yet to expire.

Also, Valencia cannot claim that his actions were justified in that Antonino was first in making libelous

statements. The anomalous transactions charge was duly filed with the Blue Ribbon.

Also, the statement on sabotage and double crossingcannot be considered libelous ascontemporarypolitics shows that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties.

Liban v. GordonG.R. 175352July 15, 2009

FACTS

Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners, petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon ashaving forfeited his seat in the Senate. The petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of theQuezon City Red Cross Chapter, while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross(PNRC) Board of Governors.

During Gordons incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman ofthe PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which thepetitioners alleged that by accepting the responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased to be a member of theSenate as provided in Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution:

Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or

employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeitinghis seat.

Respondent contested that the petitioners citation of a constitutional provision had no basis, since

PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VI ofthe Constitution did not apply to his case. Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a volunteer serviceto which is neither an office nor an employment.


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ISSUEBy accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his Senate Seat?

HELDNo. The Philippine National Red Cross is a private organization performing public functions. It does nothave government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRCis financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained throughsolicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. Apart from that, PNRC must not only be, butmust also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent to be able to conduct its activities inaccord to their fundamental principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntaryservice, unity, and universality. Hence, Article VI, Section 13 could not apply to Gordons case, in

accepting the position in the PNRC. The petition was deemed to have no merit.

Puyat vs. De Guzman

Facts:After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held,

one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioningthe election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, enteredhis appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected onConstitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body,and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance forrespondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero.Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in

the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SECgranted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandezownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC casewithout violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held:Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to beappearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining thecause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of hisownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez inthe SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of

directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduledhearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified hisintention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners.Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legalinterest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirectappearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a


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circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). Theintervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some othercapacity.

Avelino vs. Cuenco

GR L-2821, 4 March 1949

FACTS:Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the thenSenate President Jose Avelino and ordering the investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada coulddeliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner,motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers, leaving twelveother members who continued meeting and elected the respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as ActingPresident. Avelino thereupon filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latterhad not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorumthe majorityrequired of the 24-member Senate.

ISSUES:(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?

HELD:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a political question. Inview of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not interfere nor take over a political nature ofthe controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the minority of tensenators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that metwith their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approvedonly by ten or less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of theSenate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business ofthe Senate. Firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session therewere at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view ofthe absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority oftwenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitutea quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "theHouse". Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the

Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of theSenate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

Santiago vs. Guingona

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the dulyelected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreementof Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position ofminority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority,while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flaviermanifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a


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minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informedthe body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that theyhad elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formallyrecognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed apetition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding andexercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongedto Senator Tatad.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by theallegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefasserted. In light of the allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over thepetition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate orits officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of

their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, thelaws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when

referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than halfor more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of theSenate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it doesnot provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, whocould thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shallautomatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. Allthat the Charter says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as itmay deem necessary. The method of choosing who willbe such other officers is merely a derivative ofthe exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such methodmust be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.

Osmena vs. Pendatun

Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made

serious imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 memberswas created to investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against thePresident. Osmena refused to produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate suchimputations. For having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of 15 months for seriousdisorderly behavior.

Issue:Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech


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Held:Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate inCongress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in anyother place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in everylegislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom ofexpression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or anyother forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before thelegislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly orunbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes disorderly conduct forwhich Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge ofwhat constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction uponit, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows bestbut which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted

disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution neverintended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

Paredes Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan

On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case againstParedes (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), andHonrada (the clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignmentand of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever beenissued against him in a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from

the judge handlingthe case himself that the criminal case against him never reached the arraignmentstage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part maintained that there wasindeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaetonly changedhis side because of politicalrealignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsmanrecommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealedbut was eventually deniedby the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a memberof Congress, be suspended by order of theSandiganbayan.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the

Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives ofcongress. The SC ruled:

x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitutionwhich deals with thepower of each Houseof Congress inter alia to punish its Membersfor disorderly behavior, andsuspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification thatthe penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty daysis unavailing, as it appears tobe quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a


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preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed onpetitioner for misbehavior as a member of the House of Representatives.

CASCO Philippine Chemical v Gimenez

G.R. No. L-17931.February 28, 1963.

Facts: The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwiseknown as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1,1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon ResolutionNo. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separateimportation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of theseproducts, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin feetherefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said

amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the groundthat the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea andformaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No.2069.

Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaidmargin fee.

Held: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is

so ordered.

Ratio: It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of"urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed byCongress and approved by the President.

If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congressand approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle ofseparation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedyis by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Astorga vs. Villegas

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed onthird reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantialamendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by theSenate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear in thejournal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereaftersignified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by Senator Roxas and notthe Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies ofthe bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker


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of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. Then thePresident affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became RA 4065.Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by thePresident was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody theamendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the SenatePresident invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on H.B.9266.

Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to

Held:The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and independentdepartments, which requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed Congress, all billsauthenticated in the right manner.

Petitioners argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of abills due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of thegovernment, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be

invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill hehad signed had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of thedisclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the journal should beconsulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor andapproved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signedby him. The Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, MiguelCastillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of m