Consti Commissions Cases

7/28/2019 Consti Commissions Cases

1/47


2/47

EN BANC

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

- versus -

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

AND MANAGEMENT,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 158791

Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PUNO,PANGANIBAN,QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,andGARCIA,JJ.

Promulgated:

July 22, 2005_______________________

x - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:


3/47

The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for

mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management

(respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the

same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the

constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was

appropriated for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act

(GAA) of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources

of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44.[1] It complains,

however, that the total fund releases by respondent to its Central Office

during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an

unreleased balance ofP5,807,392.30.

To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent

on the basis of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations for

agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned

in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478

on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds,[2]which documents are:

1. Annual Cash Program (ACP)

2. Requests for the Release of Special Allotment Release Order

(SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA)

3. Summary List of Checks Issued and Cancelled

4. Statement of Allotment, Obligations and Balances

5. Monthly Statement of Charges to Accounts Payable

6. Quarterly Report of Actual Income

7. Quarterly Financial Report of Operations

8. Quarterly Physical Report of Operations

9. FY 2001 Preliminary and Final Trial Balance

10. Statement of Accounts Payable
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn1


4/47

Petitioner contends that the application of the no report, no release

policy upon independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a

violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds.

It contends that first, petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies as it

could have sought clarification from respondents Secretary regarding the

extent of fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second, even

assuming that administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no

exceptional and compelling reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition

with this Court instead of the trial court, thus violating the hierarchy of

courts.

On the merits, respondent, glossing over the issue raised by petitioner

on the constitutionality of enforcing the no report, no release policy,

denies having strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with fiscal

autonomy, it claiming that it has applied by extension to these offices

the Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional

Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy) issued on June 3, 1993, [3]

particularly one of the guiding principles established therein governing the

budget of the Judiciary, to wit:

5. The Supreme Court may submit to the Department ofBudget and Management reports of operation and income, current

plantilla of personnel, work and financial plans and similar

reports only for recording purposes. The submission thereof

concerning funds previously released shallnot be a condition

precedent for subsequent fund releases. (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn3


5/47

Respondent proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance

of petitioners budget was not on account of any failure on petitioners part

to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues.[4]

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by

respondent applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring

such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court.[5]

As petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from the

Secretary of Budget and Management prior to filing the present action, its

failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.

As for the rule on hierarchy of courts, it is not absolute. A direct

invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there

are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in

the petition.[6] Petitioner justifies its direct filing of the petition with this

Court as the matter involves the concept of fiscal autonomy granted to [it]

as well as other constitutional bodies, a legal question not heretofore

determined and which only the Honorable Supreme Court can decide with

authority and finality.[7]To this Court, such justification suffices for

allowing the petition.

Now on the substantive issues.

That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced

against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such

policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn4


6/47

without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which

provides:

Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and

regularly released.

InProvince of Batangas v. Romulo,[8]this Court, in construing the

phrase automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

reading:

Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share,

as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be

automatically released to them,

held:

Websters Third New International Dictionary defines

automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a major extent sothat any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature;

without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton.

Further, the word automatically is defined as in an automatic

manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being

automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous

and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform

any actto receive the just share accruing to them from the

national coffers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[9]

By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual

appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested

with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to

fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn8


7/47

above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution of this Court which effectively

prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the

Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the

Constitution.[10]

Respecting respondents justification for the withholding of funds

from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In

the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second

place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not

justify non-compliance with the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A),

Section 5 of the Constitution.

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs teaches that

[a]n interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or

provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,

destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,

meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.[11]

If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate

to automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be

suspended every year, or even every month[12]that there is a shortfall in

revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering

insignificant altogether, such mandate.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy

only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is

one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to

withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn10


8/47

to that extent, place petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal

autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same

autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the

Constitution.

The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy

should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations

over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

Significantly, the Year 2002 GAA itself distinguished between two

types of public institutions in the matter of fund releases. With respect to

government agencies in general, the pertinent General Provisions of the

GAA read as follows:

Sec. 62. Prohibition Against Impoundment ofAppropriations.No appropriations authorized in this Act shall be

impounded through deduction or retention, unless in accordance

with the guidelines for the imposition and release of reservesand the rules and regulations for deduction, retention ordeferral of releases shall have been issued by the DBM in

coordination with the House Committee on Appropriations and

the Senate Committee on Finance.

Accordingly, all the funds appropriated for the purposes,

programs, projects and activities authorized in this Act, except

those covered by Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed

Fund shall be regularly andautomatically released in

accordance with the established allotment period and system by

the DBM without any deduction, retention or imposition of

reserves. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government BudgetDeficit. Retention or reduction of appropriations authorized in this

Act shall be effected only in cases where there

is unmanageable national government budget deficit.


9/47

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used

in this Section shall be construed to mean that the actual national

government budget deficit has exceededthe quarterly budget

deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit of P130.0billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of Expenditures and

Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress

pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution or there are

clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of such

condition, as determined by the Development Budget

Coordinating Committee and approved by the President.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002

GAA, which specifically applied to offices vested with fiscal autonomy,

stated:

Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with FiscalAutonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for theJudiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on Human

Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service

Commission, the Commission on Audit and the Commission on

Elections shall be automatically and regularly released.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an

office is generally allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit,

the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from

such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus,

even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it


10/47

could not withhold full release of petitioners funds without violating not

only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the

Year 2002 GAA.

This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution

also states as a guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the

Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy that:

4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the

Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to

availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)

This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however,

contradict the present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal

autonomy should be automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in

revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is

a situation where total revenue collections are so low that they are not

sufficient to cover the total appropriations forall entities vested with fiscal

autonomy. In such event, it would be practically impossible to fully release

the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal

autonomy for that matter, without violating the right of such other entities to

an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under that situation

that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularlyrelease appropriations is allowed.

Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is

only a small portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme


11/47

circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the requirements

of such agencies. To illustrate, in the Year 2002 GAA the budget for

agencies vested with fiscal autonomy amounted only to P14,548,620,000.00,

which is 2.53% of the total appropriations in the amount

ofP575,123,728,000.00.[13] In Year 2003 GAA, which was re-enacted in

2004, the budget for the same agencies was P13,807,932,000.00, which is

2.27% of the total appropriations amounting to P609,614,730,000.00.[14]

And in the Year 2005, the budget for the same agencies was

onlyP13,601,124,000.00, which is 2.28% of the total appropriations

amounting to P597,663,400,000.00.[15]

Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by

Congress lower than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the

Judiciary, must be rejected.

For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the

Constitution explicitly provides:

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal

autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced

by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the

previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and

regularly released.[16](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy

to Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction

of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent.

Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jul2005/158791.htm#_ftn13


12/47

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and

regularly released.

The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing

such reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that

Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of

Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the

previous year.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing

discussions, GRANTED. Respondents act of withholding the subject

funds from petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby

declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount

of Five Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand, Three hundred Ninety Two

Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P5,807,392.30) representing the unreleased

balance of petitioners appropriation for its Central Office by the General

Appropriations Act for FY 2002.


13/47

EN BANC

[G. R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000]THELMA P. GAMINDE, peti t ioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES

and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents.D E C I S I O N

PARDO, J.:The Case

The case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set asidetwo decisions of the Commission on Audit ruling that petitioners term of officeas Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed onJune 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointmentpaper.

The FactsOn June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner

Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. Sheassumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippinesconfirmed the appointment. We quote verbatim her appointment paper:

11 June 1993Madam:

Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are herebyappointed, ad interim, COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2, 1999.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the

performance of the duties of the office, furnishing this Office and theCivil Service Commission with copies of your oath of office.[1]However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office

of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to herrequest, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07,1998[2]opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000,not on February 02, 1999.

Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote theCommission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not CommissionerThelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries

notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued

an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02,1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.[3]

Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipeissued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit thesalaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff,effective February 02, 1999.[4]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn1


14/47

On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission onAudit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No.99-090 dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed thepropriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of officemay be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which

set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereftof power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the impliedacquiescence of the Office of the President.[5]

In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999,the Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129.[6]

Hence, this petition.[7]The Issue

The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P.Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she wasappointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in theappointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.

The Courts RulingThe term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil ServiceCommission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:

Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall beappointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on

Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Ofthose first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, aCommissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years,without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only forthe unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member beappointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.[8]

The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation orcycle in the membership of the Civil Service Commission. The provision on the1973 Constitution reads:

x x x The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by thePrime Minister for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of theCommissioners first appointed, one shall hold office for seven years,another for five years, and the third for three years. Appointment to anyvacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of thepredecessor.[9]

Actually, this was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended

1935 Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman andmembers of the Commission on Elections. The Constitutional amendmentcreating an independent Commission on Elections provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Electionscomposed of a Chairman and two other Members to be appointed bythe President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn5


15/47

reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, oneshall hold office for nine years, another for six years, and the third forthree years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commissionon Elections may be removed from office only by impeachment in themanner provided in this Constitution."[10]

In Republic vs. Imperial,[11]we said that the operation of the rotational planrequires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the termsof the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) thatany vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of theterm should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.[12]

Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of theConstitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a commondate, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualificationsof the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five andthree years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year intervalbetween the expiration of the terms.[13]

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that theappropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to theConstitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belatedappointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and theactual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. [14]

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term andtenure. [T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of theincumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to holdoffice as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shallsucceed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the

incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond thepower of the incumbent.[15]

In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the termsof office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1(2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members ofthe Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the firstappointees terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In nocase shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of officeas this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon itsratification (on February 02, 1987).

On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987 Constitutionprovides:

SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission,the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn10


16/47

continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution,unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated todischarge the duties of their office or appointed to a new termthereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than sevenyears including service before the ratification of this Constitution.[16]

What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is tenure notterm of the incumbent Chairmen and Members ofthe Civil Service Commission,the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who shall continuein office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they aresooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties oftheir office or appointed to a new term thereunder. The term unless imports anexception to the general rule.[17]Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that theincumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in officefor one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existingappointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short theirtenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming

incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to anew term thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the oneyear period after the effectivity of the Constitution.

However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed inArticle IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the firstappointees under this Constitution.

At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the incumbent Chairmanand members of the Civil Service Commission were the following: (1)Chairperson Celerina G. Gotladera. She was initially appointed as OICChairman on March 19, 1986, and appointed chairman on December 24, 1986,which she assumed on March 13, 1987. (2) Atty. Cirilo G. Montejo. On June 25,

1986, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, without anyterm. He assumed office on July 9, 1986, and served until March 31, 1987, whenhe filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Congressman, 2nd District,Leyte, thereby vacating his position as Commissioner. His tenure wasautomatically cut-off by the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (3) Atty. Mario D.Yango. On January 22, 1985, President Ferdinand E. Marcos appointed himCommissioner for a term expiring January 25, 1990. He served until February 2,1988, when his term ended in virtue of the transitory provisions referred to. OnMay 30, 1988, President Aquino re-appointed him to a new three-year term andserved until May 31, 1991, exceeding his lawful term, but not exceeding themaximum of seven years, including service before the ratification of the 1987

Constitution. Under this factual milieu, it was only Commissioner Yango whowas extended a new term under the 1987 Constitution. The period consumedbetween the start of the term on February 02, 1987, and his actual assumptionon May 30, 1988, due to his belated appointment, must be counted against him.

Given the foregoing common starting point, we compute the terms of the firstappointees and their successors to the Civil Service Commission under the 1987Constitution by their respective lines, as follows:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn17http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn16


17/47

First line : Chairman seven-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 01,1994. On January 30, 1988, the President nominated Ms. Patricia A. Sto. TomasChairman, Civil Service Commission. On March 02, 1988, the Commission on

Appointments confirmed the nomination. She assumed office on March 04,1988. Her term ended on February 02, 1994. She served as de facto Chairman

until March 04, 1995. On March 05, 1995, the President appointed then SocialWelfare Secretary Corazon Alma G. de Leon, Chairman, Civil ServiceCommission, to a regular seven-year term. This term must be deemed to starton February 02, 1994, immediately succeeding her predecessor, whose termstarted on the common date of the terms of office of the first appointees underthe 1987 Constitution. She assumed office on March 22, 1995, for a termexpiring February 02, 2001.

This is shown in her appointment paper, quoted verbatim as follows:

March 5, 1995Madam:

Pursuant to the provisions of Article VII, Section 16, paragraph

2, of the Constitution, you are hereby appointed, ad interim,CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for a term expiringFebruary 2, 2001.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon theperformance of the duties of the office, furnishing this Office and theCivil Service Commission with copies of your oath of office.

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOSSecond line : Commissioner Five-year term. February 02, 1987 to

February 02, 1992. On January 30, 1988, the President nominated Atty. SamiloN. Barlongay Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On February 17, 1988,

the Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines, confirmed thenomination. He assumed office on March 04, 1988. His term ended on February02, 1992. He served as de facto Commissioner until March 04, 1993.

On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. GamindeCommissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02,1999.[18]This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. Sheaccepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is boundby the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In thisconnection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive SecretaryRenato C. Corona[19]clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000,

was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was anomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of hersuccessor[20]must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire onFebruary 02, 2006.

Third line : Commissioner Three-year term. February 02, 1987 toFebruary 02, 1990. Atty. Mario D. Yango was incumbent commissioner at thetime of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. His extended tenure ended onFebruary 02, 1988. In May, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn18http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn20http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn19http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn18


18/47

Commissioner, Civil Service Commission to a new three-year termthereunder. He assumed office on May 30, 1988. His term ended on February02, 1990, but served as de facto Commissioner until May 31, 1991. OnNovember 26, 1991, the President nominated Atty. Ramon P. Ereeta asCommissioner, Civil Service Commission. On December 04, 1991, the

Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. He assumed office onDecember 12, 1991, for a term expiring February 02, 1997.[21]Commendably, he voluntarily retired on February 02, 1997. On February 03,

1997, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Jose F. Erestain, Jr.Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02,2004. He assumed office on February 11, 1997.

Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely,February 02, 1994, for the first Chairman,[22]February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner,[23]and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year termCommissioner.[24]Their successors must also maintain the two year interval,namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman;[25]February 02, 1999, for

Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for CommissionerRamon P. Ereeta, Jr.The third batch of appointees would then be having terms of office as follows: First line : Chairman, February 02, 2001 to February 02, 2008;

Second line: Commissioner, February 02, 1999 to February 02, 2006;[26]and,Third line: Commissioner, February 02, 1997 to February 02, 2004,[27]therebyconsistently maintaining the two-year interval.

The line of succession, terms of office and tenure of the Chairman andmembers of the Civil Service Commission may be outlined as follows:[28]

Chairman TermTenure(7-year original)Sto. Tomas 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to Mar. 04, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1994 March 08, 1995De Leon 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994 to March 22, 1995 to(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2001 Feb. 02,2001

_______ - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 toFeb. 02, 2008

2nd Member Term Tenure(5-year original)Barlongay 1

st

appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to March 04, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1992 March 04, 1993Gaminde 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992 to June 11, 1993 to

Feb. 02, 1999 Feb. 02, 2000Valmores 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999 to Sept. 08, 2000 to(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2006 Feb. 02,20063rd Member Term Tenure
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn27http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn26http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn25http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/dec2000/140335.htm#_edn21


19/47

(3-year original)Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to May 30, 1988 to

Feb. 02, 1990 May 31, 1991Ereeta 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990 to Dec. 12, 1991 to

Feb. 02, 1997 Feb. 02, 1997Erestain, Jr. 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb. 11, 1997 to(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2004 Feb. 02,2004

The FalloWHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde

as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended toher by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02,1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02,2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actualservice rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing inaudit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission on Auditinsofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner ThelmaP. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer fromFebruary 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000.

This decision shall be effective immediately.


20/47

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 160465 April 28, 2004ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. COMMISSIONER RALPH C.LANTION and ROLANDO F. SALVADOR,respondents.

RESOLUTIONCARPIO MORALES, J.:Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 seeking toset aside and nullify the November 5, 2003Status Quo

Ante Order1 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En

Bancin EAC No. A-10-2002, "Romeo F. Estrella v. Rolando F.Salvador."Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent)were mayoralty candidates in Baliuag, Bulacan during the May 14,2001 Elections.The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent aswinner. Petitioner thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Bulacan an election protest, docketed as EPC No. 10-M-2001, which was raffled to Branch 10 thereof.2

By Decision of April 10, 2002, the RTC annulled respondentsproclamation and declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor ofBaliuag.3Respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC where itwas docketed as EAC No. A-10-2002, and raffled to the secondDivision thereof, while petitioner filed before the RTC a motion forexecution of the decision pending appeal.4The RTC, by Order of April 16, 2002, granted petitioners motion forexecution pending appeal and accordingly issued a writ of execution. 5Respondent thus assailed the April 16, 2002 Order of the RTC via

petition for certiorari filed on April 24, 2002 before the COMELECwhere it was docketed as SPR No. 21-2002, and raffled also to theSecond Division thereof.6Petitioner later moved for the inhibition7 of Commissioner Ralph C.Lantion, a member of the COMELEC Second Division.On May 30, 2002, the COMELEC Second Division issued a StatusQuo Ante Order,8


21/47

By Order of July 9, 2002, the motion for inhibition of CommissionerLantion was denied by the COMELEC Second Division.On July 11, 2002, petitioner filed before this Court a petition forcertiorari questioning the COMELEC Second Division May 20, 2002Status Quo Ante Order, which petition was supplemented on July 30,2002. The petition was docketed by this Court as G.R. No. 154041.

As no temporary restraining order was issued by this Court, the May30, 2002 Status Quo Ante Order of the COMELEC Second Divisionwas implemented on or about July 17, 2003, resulting in the ouster ofpetitioner from the mayoral post.In the meantime, during the July 23, 2002 hearing ofSPR No. 21-2002, COMELEC Commissioner Lantion inhibitedhimself.9 Commissioner Ressureccion Z. Borra was, by Order of

August 25, 2002,10 thus designated in place of Commissioner

Lantion.During the pendency of G.R. No. 154041 before this Court, theCOMELEC Second Division, by Order of January 16, 2003, nullifiedin SPR No. 21-2002 the writ of execution11 issued by the RTC.Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Orderwhich motion was duly certified to the COMELEC En Banc.On September 16, 2003, this Court, by Resolution on evendate, dismissed G.R. No. 154041 on the grounds that 1) the case hadbecome moot and academic because of the COMELEC Second

Divisions resolution on the merits of SPR No. 21-2002, and (2) thisCourt has no jurisdiction over Division orders or rulings of theCOMELEC.On October 15, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division, issued in EACNo. A-10-2002 an Order12 adopting the order of substitution in SPRNo. 21-2002 dated August 25, 2002 designating Commissioner Borraas substitute member thereof.On October 20, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division issued in EACNo. A-10-2002 a Resolution13 affirming with modifications the RTCdecision and declaring petitioner as the duly elected mayor. On even

date, respondent moved to reconsider14 the said October 20, 2003Order.Petitioner, in the meantime, filed on October 22, 2003 a motion forimmediate execution15 of the COMELEC Second Division October 20,2003 Resolution, which was set for hearing on October 28, 2003 butreset to November 4, 2003.


22/47

On October 29, 2003, respondent filed before the COMELEC SecondDivision a "very urgent motion to consider the instant case certified tothe Commission en banc."16Respondent later filed on November 3, 2003 a "very urgentmanifestation and motion to suspend proceedings."17Hearing of the incidents in EAC No. A-10-2002 was conducted onNovember 4, 2003. The following day or on November 5, 2003, theCOMELEC Second Division issued an Order18denying respondentsplea for suspension of proceedings and granting petitioners motionfor execution pending appeal and accordingly directing the issuanceof a writ of execution. On even date, the COMELEC En Bancissuedthe questioned November 5, 2003Status Quo Ante Order. Five (5)members including CommissionerLantion participated in thisNovember 5, 2003 Order wherein Commissioner Lantion stated that

"his previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not inthe EAC" and "as further agreed in the Second Division, [he] will notparticipate in the Division deliberations but will vote when the case iselevated [to the] en banc." Of the five Commissioners, CommissionerBorra dissented.Hence, the present petition, alleging as follows:I. THE NOV. 5 STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER IS NULL AND VOIDFOR WANT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITYOF THE COMELEC TO ISSUE SUCH AND ORDER.

II. THE COMELEC EN BANC PALPABLY ACTED WITHOUTJURISDICTION AND IN FLAGRANT BREACH OF INTER-COLLEGIAL COMITY WHEN IT ISSUED THE NOV. 5 ORDERCONSIDERING THAT EAC NO. A-10-2002 IS STILL UNDER THEPRIMARY AND CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIALSECOND DIVISION WHICH HAS YET TO FULLY DISPOSE OFESTRELLAS TIMELY FILED MOTION FOR IMMEDIATEEXECUTION.III. DUE TO HIS PREVIOUS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION IN ARELATED CASE, SPR NO. 21-2002 AND AT THE DIVISION LEVEL

IN THE SAME CASE, EAC NO. A-10-2002, COMMISSIONERLANTIONS VOTE IN THE ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD BEDISREGARDED AND CANCELLED. THE EN BANCS NOV. 5ORDER IS THUS INVALID FOR FURTHER REASON THAT IT ISNOT SUPPORTED BY THE REQUIRED MAJORITY VOTE.IV. THE COMELEC EN BANC ALSO ACTED ARBITRARILY AND INMANIFEST GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO


23/47

LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN ITPREVENTED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DIVISIONS ORDEROF EXECUTION THE ISSUANCE OF WHICH IS LEGALLYJUSTIFIED UNDER THE APPLICABLE CASE PRECEDENTS ANDWARRANTED UNDER THE SPECIFIC FACTS ANDCIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.V. THE COMELEC EN BANC GROSSLY VIOLATED ESTRELLASRIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND EQUAL ORFAIR TREATMENT WHEN IT IGNORED ITS OWN CASEPRECEDENTS AND PRACTICE. IN STARK CONTRAST TO WHATIT DID IN THIS CASE, THE EN BANC HAD PREVIOUSLY

ALLOWED THE FIRST DIVISION, IN AT LEAST TWO RECENTCASES (EPC NO. 2001-19 AND EAC NO. A-4-20030 TO RESOLVETIMELY FILED MOTION FOR EXECUTION PENDING

RECONSIDERATION AND GAVE SAID DIVISION A FREE HANDAT FULLY DISPOSING OF SAID INCIDENTS.Petitioner argues that Commissioner Lantions vote in the assailedorder should be disregarded because of his previous inhibition in asimilar case and in the same case in the Division level, thus makingsaid assailed order null and void as it was not concurred by therequired majority.Petitioners argument is meritorious.Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be

countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow aCommissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him toparticipate in the En Bancproceedings when he previously inhibitedhimself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only

judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd.Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in theissuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) membersconcurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of themembers of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed tocomply with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of

a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting enbanc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute aquorum for the purpose of transacting business. Theconcurrence of a majority of the Members of the


24/47

Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement ofa decision, resolution, order or ruling.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status QuoAnte Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC EnBancis hereby NULLIFIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELYEXECUTORY.


25/47

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 142527 March 1, 2001ARSENIO ALVAREZ, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LA RAINNE ABAD-SARMIENTO, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O NQUISUMBING, J.:This petition for certiorari assails the Resolution of the Commissionon Elections En Banc, denying the Motion for Reconsideration ofherein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division

of the COMELEC that modified the decision dated December 4, 1997of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 40, of Quezon City in ElectionCase No. 97-684. Said decision declared herein private respondentLa Rainne Abad-Sarmiento the duly elected Punong Barangay ofBarangay Doa Aurora, Quezon City during the May 12, 1997elections; directed the herein petitioner to vacate and turnover theoffice of Punong Barangay to private respondent upon the finality ofthe resolution; and directed the Clerk of the COMELEC to notify theappropriate authorities of the resolution upon final disposition of this

case, in consonance with the provisions of Section 260 of B.P. Blg.881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended.1The facts of the case are as follows:On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected PunongBarangay of Doa Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes whilehis opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claimingirregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by theBoard of Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and theissues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial Court ordered the

reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. Itsubsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won theelection. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes afterthe recount.2On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that privaterespondent won over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, fileda Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed.


26/47


27/47

electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters innumerous cases.Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed totreat the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision inSection 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the"preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts7and notthose before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section willreadily show.Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of theCOMELEC for the first time. As private respondent pointed out,petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the casewas pending before it. In fact, private respondent points out that itwas she who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when itwas before the COMELEC. The active participation of a party coupled

with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicialbody where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation ofthat jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of thecase and will bar said party from later impugning the court or thebody's jurisdiction.8 On the matter of the assailed resolution,therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this score by theCOMELEC.Second, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC En Banc granted theMotion for Execution pending appeal of private respondents on April

2, 2000 when the appeal was no longer pending. He claims that themotion had become obsolete and unenforceable and the appealshould have been allowed to take its normal course of "finality andexecution" after the 30-day period. Additionally, he avers it did notgive one good reason to allow the execution pending appeal.We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed,petitioner had a motion for reconsideration before the SecondDivision. This pending motion for reconsideration suspended theexecution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then,the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when

the Second Division resolved both petitioner's motion forreconsideration and private respondent's motion for executionpending appeal, it did so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate

jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant of execution pending appealare: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice tothe adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for the executionpending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special


28/47

order.9 In our view, these three requisites were present. In its motionfor execution, private respondent cites that their case had beenpending for almost three years and the remaining portion of thecontested term was just two more years. In a number of similar casesand for the same good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decisionto grant execution pending appeal in the best interest of theelectorate.10Correspondingly, we do not find that the COMELECabused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal.Third, petitioner contends that the COMELEC misinterpreted Section2 (2), second paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Heinsists that factual findings of the COMELEC in election casesinvolving municipal and barangay officials may still be appealed. Hecites jurisprudence stating that such decisions, final orders or rulingsdo not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil

action for certiorari,11 when grave abuse of discretion has marredsuch factual determination,12 and when there is arbitrariness in thefactual findings.13We agree with petitioner that election cases pertaining to barangayelections may be appealed by way of a special civil action forcertiorari. But this recourse is available only when the COMELEC'sfactual determinations are marred by grave abuse of discretion. Wefind no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and therecords, we observed that the lower court and the COMELEC

meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience,the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate,appreciate and decide on factual questions before it. Here, we find nobasis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrarinessmarred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously held,factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments andduly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so inthe absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, orerror of law in the questioned resolutions.14 Unless any of these

causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will not interfere with theCOMELEC's findings of fact.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the En BancResolution of the Commission on Election is AFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioner.


29/47

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129132. July 8, 1998]

ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, pet i t ioner, vs. HONORABLE COURTOF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO DE LA

FUENTE, respondents.D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a sequel to our decision [1]of 5 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428,entitled Isabelita Vital-Gozon v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., whichheld that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, in a special civil actionformandamus against a public officer (docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No.16438 and entitled Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente v. Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etal.), to take cognizance of the claim for damages against respondent publicofficer.

Specifically, the instant petition seeks to reverse the Resolution of 7 May

1997[2]of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 awarding topetitioner below, now private respondent, moral and exemplary damages andattorneys fees after hearing the evidence thereon sometime after this Courtsdecision in G.R. No. 101428 became final.

The factual antecedents then, as found by us in G.R. No. 101428, must berestated, thus:

In the early months of 1987 -- and pursuant to Executive OrderNo. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C.

Aquino -- reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry ofHealth commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers of

personnel effected.

At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuentewas the Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital,having been appointed to that position on December 20, 1978.Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, aposition to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving asMedical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years (since1971).On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from theDepartment of Health that he would be re-appointed Medical

Specialist II. Considering this to be a demotion by no less thantwo ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente fileda protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protestwas ignored, he brought his case to the Civil ServiceCommission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4. In themeantime the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn1


30/47

position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowedto be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr.Dr. de la Fuentes case was decided by the Civil ServiceCommission in a Resolution dated August 9, 1988. In thatResolution, the Commission made the following conclusion and

disposition, to wit:xxx (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer ofappellant dela Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to MedicalSpecialist II as null and void: hence, illegal. Consideringfurther that since the National Children's Hospital was notabolished and the positions therein remained intactalthough the title or the position of Chief of Clinics waschanged to 'Chief of Medical Professional Staff' withsubstantially the same functions and responsibilities, theCommission hereby orders that:

1. Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or consideredas never having relinquished his position of Chief ofClinics (now Chief of Medical Professional Staff)without loss of seniority rights; and

2. He be paid back salaries, transportation,representation and housing allowances and suchother benefits withheld from him from the date of hisillegal demotion/transfer.

No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever

submitted nor appeal therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court,within the thirty-day period prescribed therefor by theConstitution. Consequently, the resolution became final, onSeptember 21, 1988.De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon,the Medical Center Chief of the National Childrens Hospital,demanding implementation of the Commission's decision. Dr.Vital-Gozon referred de la Fuentes claims to the Department ofHealth Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriateadvice and/or action xxx (She did this allegedly because,

according to the Solicitor General, she was) unaware when andhow a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory, whethersuch Resolution had in fact become final and executory andwhether the DOH Legal Department would officially assail thementioned Resolution. But she did not answer Dr. de laFuentes letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof tothe Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await legal


31/47

guidance from the DOH Legal Department. On the other hand,no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. dela Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advisecompliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the CivilService Commission. In fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-

Gozon had actually threatened to stop paying xxx (his) salaryand allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved'appointment even as Medical Specialist II x x x.Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever thatthe CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, andapprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries andallowances otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund,Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission andasked it to enforce its judgment. He was however toldto file incourt a petition for mandamus because of the belief that theCommission had no coercive powers -- unlike a court -- toenforceits final decisions/resolutions.So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988an action of mandamus and damages with preliminaryinjunction to compel Vital-Gozon, and the AdministrativeOfficer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply withthe final and executory resolution of the Civil ServiceCommission. He prayed for the following specific reliefs:

(1) (That) xxx a temporary restraining order be issuedimmediately, ordering the principal and other respondents torevert the funds of the NCH corresponding to the amountsnecessary to implement the final resolution of the CSC inCSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein petitioner, Dr. AlejandroS. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums which haveaccrued and due and payable as of the date of said order;

(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, thatthe restraining order be converted to a writ of preliminaryinjunction; and that a writ of preliminary mandatory

injunction be issued ordering principal respondent and theother respondents to implement in full the said finalresolution; and

(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, thatjudgment be rendered seeking (sic) permanent writs issuedand that principal respondent be ordered and commandedto comply with and implement the said final resolution


32/47

without further delay; and, furthermore, that the principalrespondent be ordered to pay to the petitioner the sumsof P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplarydamages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses andattorney's fees.

x x x

The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. Italso issued a temporary restraining order as prayed for, andrequired the respondents to show cause why it should not beconverted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record showsthat the respondents prayed for and were granted an extensionof fifteen (15) days to file their answer through counsel, who,as the Court of Appeals was later to point out, did not bother toindicate his address, thus notice was sent to him through theindividual respondents xxx (However, no) answer was filed;neither was there any show cause [sic] against a writ ofpreliminary injunction. It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia whoappeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf.

About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the sameCourt a Supplemental/Amended Petition dated February 2,1989. The second petition described as one for quo warrantoaside from mandamus, added three respondents including Dr.Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia that he (de la Fuente)had clear title to the position in question [by] virtue of the finaland executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission; thateven after the Commission's judgment had become final andexecutory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latterallowed Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as OIC Professional Service tofurther usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and exercise thepublic office/position of petitioner (under a duly approvedpermanent appointment as Chief of Clinics since 1978). De laFuente thus prayed, additionally, for judgment:

(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D.Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled to the office of Chief

of Clinics (now retitled/known as Chief ofMedicalProfessional Staff, NCH), ousting him therefrom andordering said respondent to immediately cease and desistfrom further performing as OIC Professional Service anyand all duties and responsibilities of the said office; (and)(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. dela Fuente, Jr., is the lawful orde jure Chief of Clinics (now


33/47

known as Chief of the Medical Professional Staff andplacing him in the possession of said office/position,without the need of reappointment ornewappointment asheld by the Civil Service Commission in its resolution of

August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.xxx."

Copy of the Supplemental/Amended Petition was sent to Atty.Jose A. Favia, Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. IsabelitaVital-Gozon, etc., National Children's Hospital, E. Rodriguez

Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated ormentioned in his motion for Extension of Time).

Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents.Again, none was filed. The petitions were consequentlyresolved on the basis of their allegations and the annexes. The

Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. Itheld that --

The question of whether petitioner may be divested ofhis position as Chief of Clinics by the expedient of havinghim appointed to another, lower position is no longer anissue. It ceased to be such when the resolution in CSCCase No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicitin its mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de

jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical ProfessionalStaff) of the National Childrens Hospital, and by thistoken, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legallyentitled to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr.Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or choice on thematter; the resolution had to be complied with. It was ill-advised of principal respondent, and violative of the ruleof law, that the resolution has not been obeyed orimplemented.

and accordingly orderedxxx respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon,xxx to forthwith comply with, obey and implement the

resolution in CSC Case No. 4 (and) xxx Dr. Jose D.Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, xx toimmediately cease and desist from further performing andacting as OIC Professional Service.

But de la Fuente's prayer for damages -- founded essentially onthe refusal of Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory

judgment of the Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled


34/47

him to litigate anew in a different forum -- was denied by theCourt of Appeals on the ground that the petitions(formandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum forxxx (said) claim of damages.Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the

Appellate Tribunal's Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15,1989. Respondent de la Fuente acknowledged receipt of hisown copy on June 15, 1989. Neither Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, orattempted to appeal the decision.It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment,by motion filed through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. Heinsisted that the Appellate Court had competence to awarddamages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such aclaim for damages might not have been proper ina mandamusproceeding in the Appellate Court before theenactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals hadauthority to issue such writs only in aid of its appellate

jurisdiction, the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtueof which three levels of courts -- the Supreme Court, theRegional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals -- were conferredconcurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Courtof Appeals was given power to conduct hearings and receiveevidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to separately

litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead to thatmultiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuentesought to enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June9, 1989 -- directing his reinstatement pursuant to the CivilService Commissions Resolution of August 9, 1988,supra. Hefiled on July 4, 1989 a Motion for Execution, alleging that the

judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final and executory forfailure of Gozon, et al. -- served with notice thereof on June 16,1989 -- to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to

the Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court ofAppeals in a Resolution dated July 7, 1989, reading as follows:

The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final andexecutory, as prayed for, let the writ of execution issueforthwith.

The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, onthe invoked authority of Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the


35/47

dispositive portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989, including, asthe Solicitor Generals Office points out, the second paragraphto the effect that the petitions are not the vehicle nor is theCourt the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayertherefor is denied.The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June9, 1989 judgment was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuentefiled, on July 20, 1989, an UrgentEx Parte Manifestation withPrayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt, complaining thatalthough Gozon and her co-parties had been served with thewrit of execution on July 14, they had not compliedtherewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Courtrequired Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3,1989 to answer the charge and show cause why they shouldnot be adjudged in contempt for disobeying and/or resisting the

judgment.At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presentedthemselves, accompanied by their individual private lawyers --one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla (BernardoS. Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared intheir behalf, from the Health Department, Artemio Manalo, whostated that he was there in behalf of Jose A. Fabia. Theyexplained that they had no intention to defy the Court, they hadsimply referred the matter to their superiors in good faith; and

they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment,undertaking to do so even in the afternoon of that same day.The Court consequently ordered them "to comply with theirundertaking xxx without any further delay, and report the actiontaken towards this end, within five (5) days.On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as Medical Center Chief, sent aletter to Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that underHospital Special Order No. 31 dated August 3, 1989, de laFuente had been directed to assume the position of Chief of theMedical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment

of his allowances had been prepared and was being processed.More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27,1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated another Resolution, thistime resolving de la Fuente's motion for reconsideration of June29, 1989. It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a)deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim ofdamages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it as


36/47

a PARTIAL DECISION, and (c) scheduling furtherproceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (ofdamages), since said question cannot be resolved by merereference to the pleadings. This was done in reliance onSection 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la

Fuente, which reads as follows:SEC. 3. Mandamus. -- When any tribunal, corporation,board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance ofan act which the law specifically enjoins as a dutyresulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfullyexcludes another from the use and enjoyment of a rightor office to which such other is entitled, and there is noother plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinarycourse of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file averified petition in the proper court alleging the facts withcertainty and praying that judgment be renderedcommanding the defendant, immediately or at some otherspecified time, to do the act required to be done to protectthe rights of the petitioner, and topay the damagessustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful actsof the defendant.

At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinezentered his appearance for Isabelita Gozon. At his instance, theCourt gave him an opportunity to xxx file a motion for

reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. Thatmotion he filed by registered mail on November 10, 1989. Hisbasic contentions were (a) that the decision of June 9, 1989could no longer be altered, having become final and executoryand having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129,the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question ofdamages in a mandamus action.The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance inGozon's behalf at this juncture, saying that the case had beenreferred to it only on November 14, 1989. It, too, sought

reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filedon November 16, 1989 an Omnibus Motion: I. ForReconsideration of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; andII. To defer hearing on petitioner's claims for damages.Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a

Resolution dated January 11, 1991. In that Resolution, theCourt


37/47

1) declared that the amended decision had alreadybecome final and could no longer be re-opened because,although a copy of the amendatory resolution wasreceived by counsel who was representing Gozon onOctober 3, 1989, the first motion for reconsideration was

not mailed until November 10, 1989 and the SolicitorGenerals Omnibus Motion was not filed until November16, 1989; and2) prohibited the Solicitor General fromrepresenting Gozon in connection with xx (de la Fuentes)claim for damages, on the authority of this Courts rulingpromulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R. No. 87977(Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Cov. Regional Trial Court of Pasig).

Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on theSolicitor Generals Office on January 18, 1991. Again theSolicitor General sought reconsideration, by motion datedJanuary 25, 1991 and filed on January 30, 1991. Again it wasrebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991, served onthe Solicitor Generals Office on August 20, 1991, the Court of

Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the question of theauthority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel forrespondent Gozon xxx (had already) been extensivelydiscussed, and that its jurisdiction xxx to hear and determine

issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129as amended.In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of

Appeals -- and obtain the ultimate and corollary relief ofdismissing respondent de la Fuentes claim for damages - theSolicitor Generals Office has instituted the special civil actionofcertiorariat bar. It contends that the Court of Appeals is notlegally competent to take cognizance of and decide the questionof damages in a mandamus suit. xxx[3]On 5 May 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution [4]which noted that

our decision in G.R. No. 101428 had become final and left the option to reopenthe case to de la Fuente.In its resolution of 26 October 1995,[5]the Court of Appeals, inter alia, set the

hearing for reception of evidence on the matter of damages on 7 December1995.

After de la Fuente presented his evidence, the Court of Appeals set receptionof Vital-Gozons evidence on 16 and 17 January 1996.[6]
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jul1998/129132.htm#_edn4


38/47

At the scheduled hearing on 16 January 1996, Conrado M. Dela Fuentesought to block the presentation of Vital-Gozons evidence on the ground that theformer had not filed an answer, which the latter refuted. The hearing was thenreset to other dates for the parties to prove their respective claims. Vital-Gozonsubmitted, on 18 January 1996, copies of a Manifestation and Motion dated 10

September 1992 to which was attached an Answer likewise dated 10 September1992. It was claimed in the Manifestation that the answer to the claim fordamages could not have been filed earlier as the jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals over de la Fuentes claim for damages had been questioned before theSupreme Court. Vital-Gozon likewise claimed that copies of the Manifestationand Motion were received by the Court of Appeals on 18 September 1992 at 3:40p.m. and sent by registered mail to counsel for dela Fuente.[7]The filing of theManifestation and Motion with the Court of Appeals was confirmed by RemigioM. Escalada, Jr., Division Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division of the Court of

Appeals in an undated Report.[8]He further disclosed that the pleading wastransmitted to the Archives Section on 19 September 1992.

The Court of Appeals then ordered the parties to submit their respectivememoranda,[9]after which, the Court of Appeals promulgated, on 20 March 1997,a resolution denying petitioners motion to admit her Answer to the petition andsupplemental/amended petition formandamus with damages, on the ground thatthe period to file the answer had long prescribed, thus:

It was too late that the answer was filed in this Court onSeptember 18, 1992, after promulgation on August 5, 1992, ofthe decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 101428. Theprescribed period to file such answer as well as the extendedperiod had long expired on January

Documents

Consti Commissions Cases