CASE # 1Maosca vs. CA, 252 SCRA 412 (1997)

Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied. Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes public use.Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.

CASE # 2City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila GR14355, 31 October 1919FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?

HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.

CASE # 3Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. GR L-18841, 27 January 1969

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications Inc., an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCAs domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its own Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service.

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same; thus, prompting the plaintiff to file a case before the CFI praying for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau for the use of the facilities of PLDTs telephone system, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant to restrain the severance of the existing trunk lines and restore those severed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant PLDT can be compelled to enter into a contract with the plaintiff.

HELD:

x x x while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.CASE # 4Comm. Of Public Highways vs Burgos 96 SCRA 831Facts:On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-right-of-way purpose. Then Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines). Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover the value of said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of the government was invoked. In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775. The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees.Issue: Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken.Held: No, it is not applicable. Article 1250 of the New Civil Code seems to be the only provision in our statutes which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount different from what has been agreed upon by the parties because of the supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation. Thus, the Article provides:ART. 1250. In case extra-ordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.It is clear that the foregoing provision applies only to cases where a contract or agreement is involved. It does not apply where the obligation to pay arises from law, independent of contract. The taking of private property by the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. Moreover, the law as quoted, clearly provides that the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment which, in cases of expropriation, would be the value of the peso at the time of the taking of the property when the obligation of the Government to pay arises.It is only when there is an "agreement to the contrary" that the extraordinary inflation will make the value of the currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment of the obligation, the basis for payment. In other words, an agreement is needed for the effects of an extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation which, as a rule, is always the determinative element, to be varied by agreement that would find reason only in the supervention of extraordinary inflation or deflation. Under the law, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, even assuming that there has been an extraordinary inflation within the meaning of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code, a fact We decline to declare categorically, the value of the peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation, which in the instant case is when the property was taken possession of by the Government, must be considered for the purpose of determining just compensation. Obviously, there can be no "agreement to the contrary" to speak of because the obligation of the Government sought to be enforced in the present action does not originate from contract, but from law which, generally is not subject to the will of the parties. And there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that just compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof in expropriation by the Government, the value of the property as it is when the Government took possession of the land in question, not the increased value resulting from the passage of time which invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true value to be paid as just compensation for the property taken.CASE # 5City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta GR L-34915 June 24, 1983Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

CASE # 6Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay GR L-59603, 29 April 1987Facts: The President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, 4 parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the San Antonio Development Corporation. The EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the corporation in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (PD) 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. EPZA filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the corporation, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to PD 66. The judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing. The respondent judge also issued a second order appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in Presidential Decree 1533 is valid and constitutional, and whether the lower values given by provincial assessors be the value of just compensation.Held: Presidential Decree 76 provides that "For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 464 provides that "In determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Section 92 of PD 794, on the other hand, provides that "In determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." Lastly, Section 1 of PD 1533 provides that "In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." The provisions of the Decrees on just compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just compensation under the said decrees constitute impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the Supreme Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. Further, various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Thus, tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.CASE # 7PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF SORSOGON vs.VDA. DE VILLAROYA G.R. No. L-64037 August 27, 1987Facts: The subject matter of Civil Case No. 50 was a 16,500 square meter lot occupied by the Gubat High School and developed as its athletic ground. The lower court promulgated a decision in the recovery of real property case in favor of the plaintiffs and intervenors. The decision became final and executory. Shortly afterwards, the petitioner manifested its willingness to pay to the private respondents the value of the subject parcels of land as mandated in the court's decisionhe lower court through then Presiding Judge Aquilino Bonto ordered the private respondents to comply with the requirements set up by the COA. The lower court stated that the requirements were made purely in consonance with auditing rules and regulations and were not a whim or caprice designed to cause a protracted delay in the actual payment. Moreover, the lower court stated that the requirements were not beyond compliance considering that some of the required documents were available in the records of the case. When the petitioner tried to disturb the respondents' possession of the land they had re-entered, the latter, filed a "MOTION TO RESTRAIN INTERFERENCE BY DEFENDANTS WITH POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFFS" before the lower court. In their Comment to the Motion, the private respondents-intervenors manifested that the status quo in this case should be observed, namely, that the parcel of land remains in the possession of the petitioner but conditioned on the payment by the petitioner of the value of the land; provided however, that in the event that the petitioner fails to pay, the definite shares in the property of each heir should first be determined before the possession is delivered to the plaintiffs and intervenors.Issue: Whether or not the additional requirement charging the private respondents with the duty to have the corresponding title issued in the name of the municipality free from all liens and encumbrances as a condition before the release of the payment for the value of the land is reasonableHeld: No. The dispositive portion of the decision explicitly states that in case the petitioner favors payment of the value of the land, the private respondents are ordered toexecute a conveyancein favor of the petitioner. The respondents have complied with all the requirements originally imposed by COA. The petitioner cannot, therefore, deny payment to the private respondents.This case is a classic example of a common problem besetting hapless citizens in varying degrees. Because of insistent but distorted application of administrative rules and regulations, persons dealing with government are often placed in unfair predicaments which require needless expenditure of their time, money, and patience. The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. Under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. In cases where land is taken for public use, public interest however, must, be considered. The children of Gubat, Sorsogon have been using the disputed land as their high school athletic grounds for thirty years. In the execution of this decision, the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any further delays be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any of the patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount necessary to implement this decision.

CASE # 8COSCULLUELA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 77765 August 15, 1988Facts: The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project. In this instant petition, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court as being violative of his right to just compensation and due process of law. He maintains that these constitutional guarantees transcend all administrative and procedural laws and jurisprudence for as between these said laws and the constitutional rights of private citizens, the latter must prevail. As admitted by the respondent Republic, the NIA took possession of the expropriated property in 1975 and for around ten (10) years already, it has been servicing the farmers on both sides of the Barotac Viejo Irrigation Project in Iloilo Province and has been collecting fees therefor by way of taxes at the expense of the petitioner. On the other hand, the petitioner, who is already more than eighty years old and sickly, is undergoing frequent hospitalization, and is made to suffer further by the unconscionable delay in the payment of just compensation based on a final and executory judgment. The respondent Republic, on the other hand, argues that while it has no intention of keeping the land and dishonoring the judgment, the manner by which the same will have to be satisfied must not be inconsistent with prevailing jurisprudence, and that is, that public funds such as those of the respondent NIA cannot be disbursed without the proper appropriation.Issue: Whether or not the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking is a correct determination for just compensation Held: Yes. Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause. (Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects forrentorsaleto private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems andsellswater rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominwq.,y for the agencies to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of just compensation to the former owners.CASE # 9MERALCO v. Pineda206 SCRA 196

FACTS: MERALCO filed a complaint for expropriation of the lots of the private respondents. While the case was going on and before the appointment of the Board of Commissioners to value the land, the private respondents filed a motion to withdraw a portion of the deposit of MERALCO. This was granted by Judge Pineda; MERALCO objected, contending that this cannot be done since the Board of Commissioners was not yet constituted, and allowing such is a deprivation of its property without due process of law. Judge Pineda maintained that he can dispense with the Board and adopt the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or he could exercise himself the right to decide the just compensation to be paid to the owners of the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court can disperse, with the assistance of Board of Commissioners, in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation

HELD: : In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. Hence, the judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MERALCO's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

CASE # 10Province of Camarines Sur vs CAMay 17, 1993

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Resolution No. 129 authorizing the provincial governor to purchase/expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No 129 is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domainHELD: Yes, the expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would ensure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the province. Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fisherman and craftsman would be enhanced. The housing project, on the other hand, satisfies the requirement of public purpose of the constitution.CASE # 11PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

FACTS: Respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free COMELEC space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The COMELEC space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The COMELEC space shall also be used by the Commissionfor dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent COMELEC, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the COMELEC over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

ISSUE: Whether or not compelling the petitioner to donate COMELEC space amount to taking of private property for public use

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate COMELEC space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent COMELEC, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

CASE # 12Landbank vs CA249 SCRA 149 (1995)

FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose holdings were acquired by DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under RA 6657. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses by DAR and LBP with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed a petition questioning the validity of DAR AO Nos. 6 and 9. They sought to compel DAR to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively, carmarked, reserved and deposited in trust accounts for private respondents and allow them to withdraw the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9

HELD: Yes, DAR overstepped the limits of its power when it issue AO No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowners as compensation for his property because Sec 16 (c) of RA 6657 is specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular No 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. The respondent court there, did not commit ay error in striking down AO No. 9 for being null and void.

CASE # 13Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998

FACTS: Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didnt accept. The trial court issued an Order authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES: Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action

HELD: Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority on the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

CASE # 14ESLABAN VS. ONORIO G.R. NO. 146062, 28 JUN 2001

FACTS: Clarita Vda. De Onorio is the owner of the land in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). Mr. Santiago Eslaban Jr. is the project manager of NIA. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the government will pay for the area that has been taken. A right-of-way agreement was entered into by the parties in which respondent was paid the amount of P4, 180.00 as right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees which waives her rights for the damage to the crops due to construction of the right of way. After which, respondent demands that petitioner pay P111, 299.55 for taking her property but the petitioner refused. Petitioner states that the government had not consented to be sued and that the respondent is not entitled for compensation by virtue of the homestead patent under CA no. 141. The RTC held that the NIA should pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq meters that have been used for the construction of the canal. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the value of the just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or from the time of the finality of the decision

HELD: The only servitude which a private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the contested property was built only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."

CASE # 15Republic vs Ker & Co GR NO 136.171, July 2, 2002

FACTS: the petitioner filed before RTC a petition for expropriation of portions of two parcels of land owned by the respondent for road widening. The provisional value of the properties was fixed at 1,000 per sq meter but the private respondent claimed that it was more than 4,000 per sq m. When estimate for just compensation was given, the petitioner argued that it is unreasonable as the tax declaration of the property indicated that its assessed value is only at P425 per sq m., while the market value was only P849 per sq m.

ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation can be measured by the assessment value of the property as stated in its tax declaration and schedule of market values

HELD: As declared in Manotok v NHA, the statements made in tax documents made by the assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered but they cannot exclude or prevail over the court determination after expert commissioners have examined the property an all the pertinent circumstances are taken into account and after all the parties have had the opportunity to fully leas their case before a competent and unbiased tribunal.

CASE # 16CIR vs Central Luzon Drug Corp456 SCRA 414 (2005)

FACTS: Respondent Central Luzon Drug Corp (Central) is a retailer of medicines and pharmaceutical products. Its operates franchises under the name Mercury Drug.In 1995, Central granted a 20% discount on the sale of medicines to qualified senior citizens, in conformity with RA No. 7432. The discount amounted to P219,779. CIR issued a revenue regulation which implemented RA 7432. It states that the discount given to the senior citizens shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales. So, Central deducted the amount P219,778 from its gross income for the taxable year 1995.Central reported a NET LOSS in its income tax return so as a consequence, Central did not pay income tax for 1995. Thereafter, respondent filed a claim for tax refund in te amount of P904, 769.00 allegedly arising from the 20% sales discount granted by the respondent to qualified senior citizens in compliance with RA 7432.

ISSUE: whether or not the respondents claim will prosperWhether or not respondent is entitled to just compensation

HELD: The plain wording of the law discounts given under R.A. No. 7432 should be treated as tax credits, not deductions from income. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment concerned. Sec. 229 of the Tax Code does not apply to the case because such section governs only those kinds of refund and credit of taxes that were erroneously or illegally imposed and collected. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and collected. As earlier mentioned, the tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments concerned. The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or benefit.

CASE # 17De La Paz Masikip vs. The City of Pasig, et. al.,GR. No. 136349, Jan. 23, 2006

FACTS:Petitioner, Masikip, is the registered owner of a parcel of land Pasig City. In January 1994, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan pursuant to Ordinance No. 42 enacted by the thenSangguniang Bayanof Pasig. In March 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."In May 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.In December 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."In February 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. Respondent prayed that the trial court issue an order for the condemnation of the property.In April 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent failed to show a genuine necessity for the taking of the property. Subsequently, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the petition. ISSUE:Whether or not the power of eminent domain was properly exercised.RULING:No. The respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. InCity of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, it was held thatthe very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Further, upon scrutiny of the records, it showed that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

CASE # 18Heirs of Pidacan, et. al. vs. ATOGR No 162779 June 15, 2007FACTS:Mateo Pidacan and Romana Eigo had acquired parcel of land about 22 hectares in San Jose Mindoro Occidental with original title certificate and issuance of land TCT No. 2204, patent No. 3383.The ATO (Air Transportation Office) used a portion of land and constructed an air base new terminal building property upon the death of the Pidacan spouses.The heirs of the late Pidacan spouses as represented by Pacita Pidacan de Zubiri filed a petition for issuance of owners duplicate because the old copy (original) was lost and later executed a judicial settlement for them, unfortunately it was cancelled and TCT was issued in favor of heirs.The heirs presented the death certificate of their parents to the ATO but the latter still refuses to pay; the former allege that the respondents must pay the rentals plus the value of property to them. However, ATO insisted that the title was still under their parents name and it was formerly sold to its predecessor, although they failed to claim the property because it was just for taxation purposes.The heirs filed a subsequent complaint for payment of rentals and property to the respondent on the other hand respondents filed a complaint for expropriation.The trial court dismissed the respondents petition and promulgated a decision that respondents should pay the amount of 6, 249, 645.40 php per month with 12 % interest per annum until same is fully paid, and 10 % amount must need for expenses of attorneys fees and litigation.The heirs moved for reconsideration and were denied; afterwards the former filed an instant petition alleging the honorable Court of Appeals grave error and abuse of discretion, disregarding the law in reversing the trial courts decision.ISSUE:WON the heirs shall successfully claim the said payment of rentals and property value from the assailed respondents ATO.RULING:The CA set aside or reversed the trial courts decision knowing that there was no contract of lease to allege competent evidence among both parties.Director of Department of transportation and Communication had a letter that endorse a person named Parales for immediate payment rentals but it was a considered a hearsay and still doesnt have any proof of lease of contract between each parties negotiation.The petition was GRANTED, the assailed decision was set aside. However, the RTCs decision was AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with regards to the actual area of occupation by the respondent to the heir petitioner that reckons 304.39 php per square meter of area expropriated plus the appropriate interest rate of 6% per annum from this total of 65, 668, 183. 43 until fully paid.The court decision was deemed pursuant to Article VIII of Sec. 13 of the constitution.

CASE # 19Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Trinidad S. vda. De ArietaGR No. 161834 Aug. 11, 2010FACTS:Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an approximate area of 37.1010 hectares 14.999 hectares of which was covered by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Private respondent offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the price of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said portion of the land covered by CARP.Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP as just compensation for said 14.999 hectares the amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The offer was rejected by private respondent.In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as provisional compensation for the acquisition of the property.Thereafter, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the Regional Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary administrative proceedings to fix the just compensation.On June 26, 2002, the DARAB rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.

Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on September 4, 2002.

Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), Regional Trial Court, which is the subject of this petition.

Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court, to which petitioner LBP filed its answer and moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial Valuation praying that petitioner LBP be ordered to deposit the DARAB determined amount of P10,294,721.00 Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the deposit should only be the initial valuation of the DAR/LBP in the amount of P1,145,806.06 and not P10,294,721.00 as determined by the DARAB.On December 12, 2002, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution ordering petitioner LBP to deposit for release to the private respondent the DARAB determined just compensation of P10,294,721.00.On December 13, 2002, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order to deposit.On December 17, 2002, private respondent filed a motion to cite, for contempt for failure to comply with the order to deposit.Public respondent rendered the assailed resolution dated February 17, 2003, denying petitioner LBPs motion for reconsideration.ISSUE:Whether or not the SAC order to deposit had no legal basis, considering that the requirement for the prompt payment of just compensation was satisfied buy the deposit of the provisional compensation of P1, 145,806.06 required under Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657.RULING:Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.[12] Once an expropriation proceeding or the acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. EO No. 405, provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP can disagree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as SAC for final determination of just compensation.

The objective of the procedures on land valuation provided by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) as amplified by the issuances of the DAR/DARAB is to enforce the constitutional guarantee of just compensation for the taking of private agricultural lands placed under the CARP. It must be stressed that the DARs authority to determine just compensation is merely preliminary. On the other hand, under Section 1 of EO No. 405, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the just compensation to be paid for their taking.

In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBPs valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations.

As the Court had previously declared, the LBP is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the CA or to this Court, if appropriate.

CASE # 20Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. PARC, et. Al., GR no. 171101, (2011)FACTS:On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUE:Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

RULING:NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it wasnot raised at the earliest opportunityand that the resolution thereof isnot the lis motaof the case. Moreover, the issue has been renderedmoot and academicsince SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.CASE # 21MORFE vs. MUTUC22 SCRA 424 (1968)

FACTS:The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission within the month of January of every other year thereafter of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clauseISSUE:Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is an oppressive exercise of police power.FACTS:NO. Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty.The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming officeThere was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

CASE # 22Vda. De Genuino vs. Court of Agrarian Relations22 SCRA 792 (1968)

FACTS: Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino is the judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased Jacinto Genuino, Jr., part of which were lands in Mandili and Mapaniqui, Candaba, Pampanga, all devoted to rice production. On May 25, 1964, the share tenants of said lands filed the following complaints against Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino before the Court of Agrarian Relations of Angeles City, Pampanga: The purpose of these complaints was the conversion of the tenancy relationship from share tenancy to leasehold tenancy pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act 3844,1in relation to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199,2as amended. The nominal average produce for the past three agricultural years, less expenses, was alleged in the complaints. Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino, in separate answers, on September 22, 1964, denied the alleged normal average produce and as an affirmative defense, questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of Republic Act 3844. On January 23, 1965, after the parties had filed their memoranda, the Court of Agrarian Relations denied defendant's prayer for dismissal on the ground that the issue of constitutionality of Sections 4 and 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) will not directly affect the tenants' rights in the case because even if said sections were declared unconstitutional, Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, providing also for change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy, which was already held constitutional by the Supreme Court, would still apply. As to the limitation in Section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code of the maximum rental, it ruled that the limitation was not really burdensome, for the decrease of 5% of the owner's share,4is offset by the advantages he gets under the law. A reconsideration was denied the defendant and the Court of Agrarian Relations subsequently, on August 31, 1965, promulgated its decision granting and authorizing the leasehold system starting from agricultural year 1965-1966 on the ground that the issue had become moot since the Supreme Court had upheld the legality of the change from sharehold to leasehold tenancy at the tenant's option pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, as amended. And hence, this petition for review.ISSUE:Whether or not the exercise of POLICE POWER was valid.RULING: YES. The abolition of the share tenancy and the compulsion on the landowner and/or tenant to enter into the leasehold system is questioned as unconstitutional on the ground that the freedom of contract is violated and that it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. Said legislation is justified by the right of the state to exercise its police powers. Here, individual rights to contract and to property, had to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. In the case at bar, the exercise of such a power was the result of the intention of Congress to do away with the share tenancy completely. And besides, as the Court of Agrarian Relations correctly held then that even if the challenged provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code be declared unconstitutional, the effect would be the same for the Code provides that while the National Land Reform Council has not declared the Code operative in the region, the provisions of Republic Act 1199, as amended, would apply. Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, which grants this option to choose the leasehold relationship to the tenant and binding to the landowner, is as earlier pointed out, constitutional. Consequently, regardless of the Land Reform Code, petitioner Eduarda S. Vda. de Genuino must give in to the desired change of system.CASE # 23Alalayan vs. National Power Corp.,24 SCRA 172 (1968)FACTS:This declaratory relief proceeding was started in the lower court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Power and Development Company, both franchise holders of electric plants in Laguna, to test the validity of a section of an amendatory act, empowering respondent National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Respondent, under such provision, could likewise "renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of the Act could be given effect. This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, as well as the due process guarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners being infringed upon. The lower court sustained its validity.ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of the subject act, which further amends Commonwealth Act No. 121 infringes the right to due process and impairs contracts. HELD:This argument has the ring of futility. Precisely, this Court in an opinion by the present Chief Justice upheld such a figure as against the contention that it was rather too generous to the public utility. To speak of it as confiscatory then is to employ the language by hyperbole. Moreover, in the absence any evidence to demonstrate the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there would be no basis for its nullification, in view of the well-known presumption of validity that every statute has in its favor.In the light of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yielding assent to the claim of petitioner that the legislation assailed contravenes the due process clause.Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already, existence established and in operation.

CASE # 24Agustin vs. Edu,88 SCRA 195 (1979)

FACTS:Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.ISSUE: Whether or not the said is Letter of Instruction is valid exercise of POLICE POWER.RULING:YES. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines ------ adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. Our countrys word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 . The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of international morality.In Santiago vs Far Eatern Broadcasting Company , it was held that the constitutionality of the law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon and adequately argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.Petition is DISMISSED and the restraining order is lifted. CASE # 25CASE # 25Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)

FACTSThe petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila which prohibits any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person. The petitioners argued that said ordinance violates their right to property and due process of law. The lower court dismissed their petition, hence this appeal.

ISSUEWhether or not Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, violating the petitioners right to property in their means of livelihood without due process of law

HELDThere is no showing of the unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila. The enactment of said ordinance is a valid exercise of the municipalitys police power mainly for the purpose of imposing payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, and in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers. The delegation of police power in municipality has been given wide application by municipal authorities and the Court has been liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.

CASE # 26 Melchor, Jr. vs. Moya, 121 SCRA 1 (1983)

FACTSRespondent, retired Judge Jose Moya declared Republic Act 6359, the Rent Control Law as unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid police power measure, that there was lack of substantive due process and a violation of equal protection safeguard. Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 20 as part of the law of the land based on the Article on the Transitory Provisions of the present Constitution which states that : Presidential Decrees promulgated or issued, or acts done by President Ferdinand E. Marcos "shall be part of the law of the land [to] remain valid, legal, binding, and effective" except when "modified, revoked, or suspended" by him as "incumbent President or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the [now Batasang Pambansa]. PD 20 amended RA No. 6359. The petitioner, Alejandro Melchor, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary filed a petition for certiorari and pleaded for the reversal of the decision of the Respondent Judge.

ISSUEWhether or not Republic Act 6359 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is not a valid police power measure, there was lack of substantive due process and a violation of the equal protection safeguard

HELDNo, Republic Act 6359 is constitutional. RA 6359 was enacted to promote public interest and general welfare. RA 6359 cannot be considered as oppressive and arbitrary because it was specifically designed to ease economic distress due to housing shortage, as shelter is one of the basic social and economic rights. Enacted by Congress, there was a clear manifestation that RA 6359 have been thoroughly discussed with all aspects of the question accorded due consideration. All questions relating to the determination of the matters of the facts are for the legislature and are not subject for judicial review. Presidential Decree No. 20 have the force and effect of the law of the land as stated in the Article on Transitory Provisions of the present Constitution and as ruled in Aquino, Jr. vs Commission on Elections. Therefore, Presidential Decree 20 as an amendment of RA 6359, it is extremely illogical if an amendatory act is given full force and effect and yet the statute it sought to amend would be declared as being tainted by an unconstitutional infirmity. That clearly is an affront to reason. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision declaring unconstitutional Republic Act No. 6359 is reversed

CASE # 27 Philippine Ports Authority vs. Mendoza, 138 SCRA 496 (1985)

FACTS

Prior to the declaration of martial law in the Philippines, the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in the country's various domestic ports was in great disarray. The "cabo system" of exploiting labor and the lack of rationality in the handling of cargoes prevailed in the port. The Bureau of Customs issued a policy for the integration of all existing cargo handling contractors, in two stages, first into ten corporations, then to one. Only eleven corporations were authorized to do business in the port of Cebu City. Neither respondent Pernito Arrastre Services nor any of the other respondents in this case were issued permits by the Bureau of Customs to operate arrastre services. Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created thru PD 857 amending PD 505 to carry out all duties and functions of the Bureau of Customs. PPA adopted Bureau of Customs integration policy. The eleven port service contractors formed the United South Dockhandlers Inc (USDI) and was authorized to handle exclusively the cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a management contract. Private respondents Pernito, et al. (numbering 18 in all) instituted an action for declaratory relief and mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages against petitioner PPA and USDI. The respondents alleged that the interest of the small contractors were not protected in the integration policy where the big contractors refuse to assimilate them. Respondents further alleged that the controlling interests in USDI reneged on their commitments to the small stockholders; that as a result, respondent Pernito, et al., left USDI and applied with PPA for separate permits to operate their services, but their (Pernito, et al.) applications were denied. Respondent judge issued an injunction order enjoining PPA from enforcing its policy of integration in the port of Cebu City and directing it to allow respondent Pernito, et al., to operate individually and independently as arrastre and stevedoring contractors. Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUEWhether or not PPAs policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and void for being violative of legal provisions on monopolies

HELDNo, PPAs policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provisions on monopolies.The operations of arrastre and stevedoring affected the maritime transportation in the port of Cebu which is the principal port in the South. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-island and international trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbued with public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the public good and welfare. The discretion in choosing the stevedoring contractor for the South Harbor, Port of Manila belongs by law to PPA. As long as standards are set in determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related for the purpose for which they are used, the courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPA's choice. The policy of integration does not promote monopoly because USDI is comprised of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge and ultimately constituted. Whether the monopoly has been created, the overriding and more significant consideration is public interest, therefore PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision on monopolies.

CASE # 28Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)

FACTS

A petition to quash the charges against the petitioners for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) was filed before the Court on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense because BP 22 is unconstitutional. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case, hence this petition for relief.

ISSUEWhether or not BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State

HELDYes, BP 22 is constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check , creates not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

CASE # 29Pernito Arratre Services, Inc. vs. Mendoza, 146 SCRA 431 (1986)

FACTS

The Bureau of Customs due to the proliferation of the oppressive "cabo system" and the increase in the incidence of violence and thefts in the ports, issued a policy for the integration of all existing cargo handling contractors, requiring the merger of the thirty-six (36) existing labor contractors into four corporations, and then to just one. Presidential Decree No. 857 transferred and vested the powers, duties, and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs with regard to arrastre and stevedoring operations to the respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). Pursuant to said decree, respondent PPA imposed a ten percent (10%) charge on the monthly gross earnings of the operators of arrastre and stevedoring services.PPA adopted the existing integration policy to the port of Tacloban where the four authorized arrastre/stevedoring operators, agreed to merge and form one of the petitioners herein, the Leyte Integrated Port Services, Inc. (LIPSI).PPA issued Special Order No. 114-79 creating the Philippine Ports Authority-Tacloban Arrastre Ports Services (PPA-TAPS) within its worn Tacloban port unit and ordering a take-over by PPA-TAPS of the entire arrastre and stevedoring services in the Port of Tacloban. Petitioner LIPSI, as well all port users were duly informed of the take-over by PPA-TAPS PPA-TAPS took over the actual management and operations of arrastre and stevedoring services in the port of Tacloban. According to PPA, the take-over protected the rights of the dockworkers. Several petitions from the various operators were filed, so the Court consolidated these petitions which seek to permanently restrain the Philippine Ports Authority from taking over the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte. The petitioners invoke the constitutional right to due process of law and to non-impairment of contract.

ISSUE Whether or not the respondent PPA's take-over through PPA-TAPS of arrastre operations in the port of Tacloban, Leyte is a valid exercise of police power and does not violate the constitutional right of the petitioners to non-impairment of contracts

HELDYes, PPAs take-over is a valid exercise of police power. The State in the exercise of its police power through its agency, the PPA, has the power to revoke the temporary permits of petitioners, assuming the existence of valid temporary permits, and take over the operations of the port of Tacloban whenever the need to promote the public interest and welfare of both stevedoring industry and the workers therein justifies such take over. Rights of the petitioners from the temporary permits as well as their right to non-impairment of contract must yield to the valid exercise of police power of the State. The take-over of PPA-TAPS absorbed the entire labor force that existed at the time of the cancellation of LIPSI's permit, composed of all the labor contractors and the workers under them which have been integrated to develop and improve the planning, growth, financing, construction, maintenance and operation of ports throughout the country and make them responsive to the needs of their individual localities.

CASE # 30Philippine Asssociation of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drillon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)

FACTS

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a recruitment firm for Filipino Workers for overseas placement filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". The petitioner contends that the Department Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the State for the validity of Department Order No. 1, s.1998.

ISSUEWhether or not Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid in the constitution

HELDYes, Department Order No. 1 of DOLE is valid in the constitution. It is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, which imposes restraint on liberty and property to foster the common good. Official acts such as Department Order No.1, is presumed to be valid and there is no clear showing why it should be nullified. Applying only to female workers, it does not discriminate sexes" and equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class, where the classification in this case rests on substantial distinctions. The said DO is part of the Governments efforts to protect victims of exploitation which is more rampant in female workers than male workers. The Court agrees that due to the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.The deployment ban does not impair the right to travel as this right is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law. Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, of its basic policy to "afford protection to labor. "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. The Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority, in fact , it removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

CASE # 31Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157 (1992)

FACTSResidents of Sta. Elena, Virac , Catanduanes filed a complaint regarding the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine in the warehouse of the petitioner Celestino Tatel. The appointed committee of the municipal council in its investigation found that the inflammable materials stored in the warehouse pose a danger to the crowded neighborhood. Thus, the committee passed Resolution No. 29 declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance under Article 694 of the New Civil Code and directed the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2) months from receipt of the said resolution. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Municipal Council of Virac, hence he instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on the co. Respondents contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, which requires warehouses to maintain a distance of 200 meters from block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUES1. Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. HELD

1. No, Ordinance No. 13 is within the scope of the Constitution as an exercise of the Municipal Councils police power to provide for health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. Said ordinance was also validly enacted and is in consonance with the basic principles of a substantive nature which requires that municipal ordinance : (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.

CASE # 32People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 727 (1992)

FACTS

Private respondent Lim issued a check payable to Sasaki which was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds and still failed to make arrangements for the payment of the full amount in the check after receipt of the notice of dishonor, thus was charged of violation of BP 22 or Bouncing Check Law. Respondent moved to quash the information alleging that BP 22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check in the nature of a promissory note. Supreme Court in previous cases ruled that BP 22 is constitutional. Hence, the respondents remaining contention is that the memorandum check that he issued is not covered by BP 22, being only a memorandum of indebtedness and should be sued upon only in civil action.

ISSUEWhether or not