Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio (1972) Ponente: JBL Reyes Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: September, 1934- Carmen Lapuz-Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio (ang pangit ng pangalan niya gad) got married in both civil and canonical rites. They lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943, when her husband abandoned her. March, 1949- Lapuz-Sy discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila. August 18, 1953- Carmen O. Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. In his answer to the petition, Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with Go Hiok. Before the trial could be completed, however, Lapuz-Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Issue: WoN the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abates the action. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? Ratio: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.

A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Under Art. 106 (effects of decree of legal separation), a claim to said rights is extinguished after a party dies, and under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, does not warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party (in this case, Macario Lapuz, Carmen’s father, actually substituted for her). A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

Held: Appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed (?)

Doctrine: NCC 102: “An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred.” Matubis vs Praxedes (1960) Ponente: Paredes Nature: Petition for review Facts: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement. In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to a child who was recorded as the child of said defendant. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community. April 24, 1956- Alleging abandonment and concubinage, filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a complaint for legal Separation and change of surname against her husband. After the trial, the court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation. It however, dismissed the complaint by citing Articles 102 (when action for legal sep. can be filed) and 100 (action for legal separation can only be claimed by innocent spouse, but in this case, the wife consented to her husband’s concubinage!) of the Civil Code. Issue: WoN it was error for the lower court to have considered that the period to bring the action has already elapsed and that there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.

Ratio: No error. The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for Art. 102. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this matter in her brief. The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part — that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. We do not share appellant's view. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Art. 100 specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

People vs Zapata (1951) Ponente: ? Nature: Criminal case for adultery Facts: In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint. Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. On September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint. On February 21 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be in double jeopardy. The trial court upheld the

contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948. Hence this appeal. Issue: WoN the second complaint constitutes double jeopardy. Held: No. Order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint of adultery, is reversed and set aside. Ratio: Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person – the offended husband, the same status – the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as they were carnally consummated, for as long as the status remains unchanged, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, the defense set up by him against the first charge (his defense was that he didn’t know the girl was married) upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this

defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

Doctrine: FC Art. 58: “An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.” (Art. 103 sa civil code). Luis Araneta vs Hon. Concepcion and Emma Araneta (1956) Ponente: Labrador Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus Facts: Petitioner filed for legal separation against his wife, one of the defendants, on the ground of adultery. After the issues were joined, Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport, to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. The petition is supported by her affidavit. Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the misconduct and allegations imputed to him. He also contended that Defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love, respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them. As to the claim for support, Plaintiff claims that there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to support because of her infidelity and that she was able to support herself. The Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition,

granting the custody of the children to Defendant and a

monthly allowance of P2,300 for support for her and

the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorney’s

fees. Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the

order, Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari

against said order and for mandamus to compel the

Respondent judge to require the parties to submit

evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.

Issue: The main reason given by the judge, for

refusing Plaintiff’s request that evidence be allowed to

be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition

contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads

as follows:

“ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no

case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since

the filing of the petition.”

Held:

The lower court’s order fixing the alimony and requiring

payment is reversed.

Ratio:

It may be noted that since more than six months have

elapsed since the filing of the petition the question

offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed

that the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction

should be given that the scope of the article cited may

be explained.

It is conceded that the period of six months fixed

therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as

a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation

between the spouses. The recital of their grievances

against each other in court may only fan their already

inflamed passions against one another, and the

lawmaker has imposed the period to give them

opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this

practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative

policy, does not have the effect of overriding other

provisions such as the determination of the custody of

the children and alimony and support pendente lite

according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil

Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be

determined by the court according to the

circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close

their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony

should be given effect and force provided it does not go

to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off

period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the

separation, like the actual custody of the children, the

means conducive to their welfare and convenience

during the pendency of the case, these should be

allowed that the court may determine which is best for

their custody.

The writ prayed for is hereby issued and

the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is

ordered to proceed on the question of custody and

support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion.

Collusion/ Mutual Consent

Ocampo v Florencaiano

Facts:

1938- Jose Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were

married.

July 5, 1955- petition for legal separation was filed on

the ground of Serafina’s adulterous acts performed in

March 1951 with Jose Arcalas and in June 1955 with

Nelson Orzame.

Serafina made no answer, she was defaulted by the

Court and the same asked the fiscal to investigate

whether or not collusion existed between the parties.

Fiscal then reported to the Court that there was no

coluusion.

Serafina was questioned by the fiscal. She admitted

having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame and

desired legal separation.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of the accused in a

legal separation case of having committed adulterous

acts and of desiring to be legally separated constitute

collusion?

Held: No.

Art. 101 of the NCC does not exclude as evidence, any

admission or confession made by the defendant

outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of

separation upon a confession of judgment.

Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that

the guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery,

desires divorce and makes no defense. In the case at

bar, the decree may and should be granted since it

would not be based on her confession, but upon

evidence presented by the plaintiff.

Collusion is when it can be shown that the parties have

suppressed evidence so as to allow legal separation

proceeding to prosper. It is also collusion when the

parties act as if an offense had been committed so as to

obtain legal separation. None of the two is present in

the case at bar. In the case at bar, adultery had already

been committed, therefore the admission of the

commission of the same crime cannot be counted as

collusion between the parties.

Lucy Samosa-Ramos vs Hon. Vamenta, Jr. and Clemen Ramos (1960) Ponente: Fernando Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: June 18, 1971- In the sala of respondent Judge, petitioner filed a case against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, alleging concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. July 3, 1971- There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. Respondent judge said that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. September 3, 1971- Petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. This is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Issue: WoN Article 103 ("An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition”) would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit. Ratio: No. Art 103 is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. The law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert

itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."

There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses… But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstance ... The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Doctrine: FC 58 “An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed

since the filing of the petition.” (formerly Art. 103 of Civil Code) Pacete vs Carriaga (1994) Ponente: Vitug Nature: Petition for certiorari Facts: April 30, 1938- Concepcion Alanis married Enrico Pacete before a justice in Cotabato, later had a child together. 1948- Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North Cotabato. August 1, 1979- The only time when Alanis found out about the second marriage. October 29 1979- Alanis filed with the court a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between herself and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. Alanis avers that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion. On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court partially granted the motion, but only for 20 days. The Order of the court was mailed to defendants' counsel on 11 January 1980. Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion (dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on

06 February 1980, the court denied this last motion, and later granted the plaintiff’s motion to declare the respondents in default and present her evidence. Issue: WoN the CFI (now RTC) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato City, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17 March 1980 which, among other things, decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis, and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion. Ratio: Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. Under Art. 58, an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. Held: Petition granted!

G.R. No. L-13982 July 31, 1920

DIEGO DE LA VIÑA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO VILLAREAL, as Auxiliary Judge of First Instance, and NARCISA GEOPANO, respondents.

Johnson, J.

FACTS: The purpose of the action is to obtain an order declaring: (a) That the respondent (Villareal) has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain action for divorce instituted by Narcisa Geopano against her husband; (b) That the said respondent judge has exceeded his power and authority in issuing a preliminary injunction against the said petitioner prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action; and (c) That all proceedings theretofore had in said court were null and void. Narcisa Gepano filed a complaint (dated Sept 17, 1917) against Dela Vina, they were married in the year 1888 in Negros Oriental, lived together, and had nine children. They had also acquired property, real and personal (P300,000) all of which are under the administration of Dela Vina. Since 1913 the defendant had been committing acts of adultery with an Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine. Because of this Dela Vina ejected Narcisa from their conjugal home. The Narcisa had no means of support and was living only at the expense of one of her daughters. She was praying for: (1) Decree of divorce; (2) Partition of the conjugal property; (3) Alimony pendent lite in the sum of P400 per month; and (4) That a preliminary injunction be issued against Dela Vina restraining and prohibiting from alienating or encumbering the property which belonged to their conjugal partnership. Dela Vina opposed the said motion—demurred the complaint upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause, nor over his person. The Trial Court overruled the his demurrer, and granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by the Narcissa. Dela Vina contents that the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction: he was a resident of Negros Oriental and Narcisa his must also be considered resident of the same province—the domicile of the husband is the domicile of wife (according to law); she could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before the marriage between her and the defendant was legally dissolved. He asserts that husband is the manager of the conjugal partnership—empowered to alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of wife—therefore no right of hers was violated. ISSUES:

1) May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the marriage?

2) In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband (in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for) may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of their conjugal property during the pendency of the action?

HELD: Petition is DENIED.

1) The general principle, is that the domicile of husband is domicile of wife (theoretic identity of person and of interest) but this is not an absolute rule though, just a presumption

a. The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is separation of the parties by agreement or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband’s domicile

b. The maxim that the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife cannot be applied to oust the court of its jurisdiction

c. When the tacit consent of the husband and other circumstances justify it, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should be considered as her domicile where her right may be exercised in accordance with art 63.

d. Furthermore, in this case there is no longer an identity of persons and of interest between the husband and the wife—therefore, the law allowed her to acquire a separate residence

2) Sec 164 of Act no 190: A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established that: a) Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded b) The commission or continuance of some

act complained of during the litigation

would probably work injustice to the plaintiff

c) Defendant is doing or threatens—some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights

The husband should not injure but promote the interest of the wife—when the harmonious relationship ceases, and the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to protect the interests of the wife that the husband’s power of administration be curtailed during the pendency of the action. In this case the right the plaintiff is seeking after is not the right to administer the conjugal property but the RIGHT TO SHARE in the conjugal partnership. The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventive and mandatory, is a logical and necessary incident of the general powers conferred upon the CFIs as courts of record of general and unlimited original jurisdiction both legal and equitable. In an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action. CFI judge had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce and he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing the preliminary injunction against the defendant.

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones

was assigned to different countries and as such, he left

the administration of their conjugal properties to his

wife Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones. In 1985 Sabalones

retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but did

not return to his family. In 1989, he filed judicial

authorization to sell their Greenhills property. He

alleged that he was 68 years old, very sick and living

alone with no income. Remedios opposed the

authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal

separation. She alleged that the Greenhills property

was occupied by her and their 6 children and they were

dependent on the rentals of their other properties.

She also informed the court that despite Sabalones’

retirement, he did not return to his legitimate family

and instead maintained a separate residence with

Thelma Cumareng and their 3 children. Remedios

prayed for a decree of legal separation and liquidation

of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her

husband’s share. Also prayed for preventing the

Sabalones from disturbing the tenants in the Forbes

Park property and disposing any of the conjugal

properties.

After trial, Judge Mariano Umali found that the

petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage

on October 5, 1981 with Thelma Cumareng. The court,

then, decreed the legal separation of Sabalones and

Remedios, forfeiture of his share in the conjugal

properties and non-entitlement to support. Pendente

lite, Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction preventing Sabalones from

interfering in the administration of their properties.

Petitioner opposed motion. On April 7, 1992 CA

granted the preliminary injunction. Petitioner argued

that the law provides of a joint administration of the

conjugal properties by the husband and wife, citing Art.

124 FC. Also the court failed to appoint an

administrator pursuant to Art. 61 FC

ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can enter into a

contract of lease of a conjugal property without the

consent of both spouses

HELD: While the law does indeed grant the spouses

joint administration over conjugal properties under Art.

124 FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be applied in the

instant case since the legal separation case filed by the

wife is still pending.

Pending the appointment of an administrator over the

conjugal assets, CA was justified in allowing the wife

to continue with her administration pursuant to Art.

61 FC. This provision states that after a petition for

legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in

the absence of a written agreement between the

couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third

person to act as the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge. The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.

G.R. No. L-996 October 13, 1902

LUIS R. YANGCO,Petitioner, vs. WILLIAM J. ROHDE, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,Respondent.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Luis Yangco filed writ of prohibition in

the Supreme Court, alleging that complaint had been

filed by Victorina Obin against the petitioner praying

that she be declared the lawful wife of the said Yangco,

and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for

alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of

the suit. Complaint was filed before Respondent Judge

Rohde, of the CFI of Manila, who then overruled the

demurrer filed by the petitioner, stating he is of the

opinion that petitioner’s marriage with Victorina is

valid. Petitioner denies this. Respondent then ordered

petitioner to pay the plaintiff, in advance, a monthly

allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after the

11th of March last past, and to pay on the 1st day of

August following all accrued allowances, in addition to

the allowance for the said month, amounting to the

sum of 1,500 pesos. Petitioner claims that he would be

unable to earn back the sum he’s being compelled to

imburse, and that he’s been deprived of right of appeal

or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. He prays to

reverse respondent’s judgement, and to prohibit

respondent from compelling him to pay Victorina the

said sum.

Respondent files a demurer on the following ground:

(1) That this court is without jurisdiction over the

subject-matter of the action; (2) that the petition does

not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

ISSUES:

1. WoN Respondent Judge was right to act on

the assumption that their marriage was valid

2. WoN Respondent Judge was right to compel

Petitioner to pay the sum

a. WoN Victorina Obin has the right to

obtain an allowance for alimony

3. WoN Respondent Judge’s decision really can’t

be appealed from

4. WoN Respondent Judge acted outside of his

jurisdiction

a. WoN writ of prohibition should be

granted

HELD:

1. No. He said himself that the status of validity

of the marriage was “not clear or free from

doubt”.

2. No. Art 143 of the Civil Code cited by the

respondent judge himself states the right to

support is granted: (1) to spouses inter se; (2)

to legitimate descendants and

ascendantsinter se; (3) to parents and certain

legitimated and acknowledged natural

children; (4) to other illegitimate children, and

(5) to brothers and sisters. Present in all these

cases is a civil status or a juridical relation

which is the basis of the action for support. In

the case at bar the civil status that should be

the basis of the action for support is marriage,

which must be duly proven in the manner

provided for by Art 53: Marriages celebrated

before the operation of the Code, must be

proven by the canonical certificate. Further,

under Art 1591 of the old Code any person

believing himself entitled to that provisional

alimony or support was required to file with

the complaint documents proving

conclusively the title by virtue of which the

same was sued for. The judge, under article

1592, could not admit the complaint unless

the documents referred to in the preceding

article were submitted. Thus, as the evidence

is lacking, a suit of alimony could not have

prospered based on Respondent Judge’s

opinion alone. [and Victorina has no right to

claim allowance for alimony]

3. No, BUT while it is true that an interlocutory

order such as that rendered by the

respondent judge in the present case is not

appealable during the course of the trial (but

only after a final judgment has been

rendered) it is also true that it cannot be the

intention of the law, when prohibiting an

appeal against interlocutory orders, to give

executory force to all kinds of other

interlocutory orders which the judge may see

fit to make in the course of a trial, and still less

when the effect would be to cause irreparable

damage, such as that alleged by the petitioner

in the present case.

4. Yes. The court below had jurisdiction to try

the divorce suit, but he was without

jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right

to claim alimony. The Code only grants the

rights to alimony to a wife. This status not

appearing by a final judgment, the court is

without jurisdiction to make any order in the

matter. [Mandamus and not prohibition is the

proper remedy for this; NOTE: there was a

long explanation for this but I guess it isn’t

important naman]

The motion and demurrer are overruled and the

defendant is authorized to answer the complaint within

twenty days from this date

G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972

LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMEN G. RAMOS, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

FACTS: The petitioner Lucy Samosa-Ramos filed in the sala of respondent judge for legal separation, on the grounds of concubinage. She additionally alleged that there was an attempt by respondent Celmen Ramos against her life. She likewise sought of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, which was then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. Opposition to this hearing invokes Art 103 of the CC, if motion is to be heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become dim. CFI ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other respondent husband, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner at the same time the suit for legal separation was instituted. ISSUE: WON art 103 of the CC prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy for such suit HELD: No. SC holds that Art 103 of the CC is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the 6-month period. A suit for legal separation is something else entirely—the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned—hence during the interposition of a 6-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried, the court should remain passive at this time (it is precluded from hearing the suit). After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each

other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court. There is recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during the 6-month period, therefore there is justification then for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction to prevent husband for continually managing her exclusive properties should not be ignored by the lower court. The period of 6 months is evidently intended as a cooling off period—but this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendent lite according to the circumstances. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. [Wherefore, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the order of the respondent court suspending the hearing on the petition for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is DIRECTED to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction]

G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974

TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION DIAZ, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.

FACTS: Teodoro Lerma and Concepcion Diaz married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. Then on Nov 18, 1969, respondent filed with the lower court a complaint against petitioner for legal separation and or separation of properties, custody of their children and support with an urgent petition for support pendent elite for her and their youngest son Gregory. The respondent’s complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds: (1) concubinage and (2) an attempt against her life. Petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent’s

application for support using the adultery charge he had filed against respondent as a defense (on this adultery charge: CFI of Rizal also decided the adultery case and found her guilty together with her co-accused, teodoro Ramirez, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment [there was also a second adultery case with Jose Gochangco]). The CFI granted the respondent’s application for support pendent elite amended: amount from 2,250 to 1,820. [TL;DR procedural stuff] Petitioner filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders alleging grave abuse of discretion. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders. Respondent court then set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence before the lower court (Oct 8). Respondent moved to reconsider decision on the ground that petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court. Respondent court then set aside the Oct 8 decision, and dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. Court resolved to issue a TRO effective immediately and until further orders from the Court- addressed to Judge Luciano and reps. Respondent filed opposition w/ a prayer for immediate lifting of the TRO issued ex parte: grounds of motion. An order granting support pendent elite, although interlocutory is immediately executory even if appealed unless enjoined. Dismissal of petition by CA rendered functus oficio the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously issued. Under Art 292 of the NCC: during the proceedings for legal sep or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property—such support is mandatory even if there be showing that the wife is guilty of adultery. ISSUE: Whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent’s claim for support pendente lite HELD: Yes, adultery is a good defense (Art 292). HOWEVER, it is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when support is taken from the conjugal partnership property. If during the pendency of the of the legal separation proceeding, support is taken from the conjugal partnership, it does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases. The said article contemplates the pendency of the court action

and inferentially at least a prima facie showing that action will prosper. ART 100 of CC: legal separation may be claimed only by innocent spouse, where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Probable failure of the respondent’s suit for legal sep can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the CFI. The right to separate support or maintenance even from the conjugal partnership property presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. Art 104 of the CC states that after the filing of petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. Under Art 303, the obligation to give support shall cease “when the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to his disinheritance”. Additionally, under Art 921, one act is when a spouse gave cause for legal separation, the loss of the substantive right to support in such situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite. Resolution of respondent CA (jan 21, 1971) and the

orders of the respondent court (JDRC) are all SET ASIDE

and their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to

such judgment as may be rendered in the pending

action for legal sep between the parties

Defense in Action for Legal Separation: Consent

People v Sensano and Ramos

Doctrine: In adultery, a party cannot institute a criminal

proceeding if he has given his consent, either expressly

or impliedly, to its commission.

Facts:

April 29, 1919- Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura

were married. Shortly after the marriage, Ventura left

her for three year. She cohabited with Mariano Ramos.

1924- Mariano Ventura came back, filed an adultery

charged against Sensano and Ramos. The two were

found guilty and was sentenced to serve the

punishment of arresto mayor.

She tried to make amends with Ventura, but the latter

refused to forgive the former and told her “(you) could

go where you wished, (I) have nothing more to do with

(you), and (you) could do as (you) pleased”. He left

again for Hawaii.

1931 (after 7 years)- Ventura again came back,

instituted another adultery proceeding against the two

for him to be able to obtain divorce.

Issue: Whether or not Sensano and Ramos can still be

prosecuted for adultery?

Held: No.

Art. 344 of the RPC states that the offended party

cannot institute criminal prosecution for adultery if he

“shall have consented or pardoned the offenders”.

The statement Ventura made, and his conduct warrant

the inference that he had consented to the adulterous

relations existing between the accused. That being the

case, he cannot institute another criminal proceeding

against his wife and its paramour.

People v Schneckenberger

Doctrine: Prior consent before the commission of the

crime is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the

offended party from prosecuting the offense.

Facts:

March 16, 1926- Rodolfo Schneckenberger married

Elena Cartagena. They agreed to live separately after 7

years and executed a document stating the same on

May 25, 1935.

June 15, 1935- Rodolfo secured divorce decree from

Mexico, he married Julia Medel on May 11, 1936.

As the divorce decree is not valid, people filed a case

against him for bigamy and concubinage. Rodolfo was

found guilty of bigamy. In the concubinage case, he

contended that it was double jeopardy, the Court

however did not give credence to his statement and

found him guilty of the said offense as charged.

Issue: Whether or not the case of concubinage must be

dismissed by reason of the prior consent given by Elena

to Rodolfo in the document they executed prior to the

commission of the crime?

Held: Double jeopardy is not present in the case at bar

as Rodolfo was not tried for the same offense.

Material to the case, the case of concubinage must be

dismissed because of the prior consent given by Elena

Cartagena in the document they executed on May

1935. Prior consent is as effective as subsequent

consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the

offense.

Condonation

Bugayong v Ginez

Facts:

July 1951- Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman to the US

Navy and Leonila Ginez were married.

He soon left for the US. He was informed by his sisters,

where his wife was residing of the same’s adulterous

acts.

August 1952- Benjamin Bugayong went home to

Pangasinan and looked for Ginez. He found her and

brought her to the house of Pedro Bugayon. They

stayed there and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as

husband and wife.

He confronted Ginez about her supposed adulterous

acts, she did not answer and just packed her things and

left. He filed for legal separation on Nov. 18, 1952.

Ginez denied the allegations and contented that

Benjamin cannot sue as he had already condoned her

deeds, assuming that it were true, by virtue of their

sexual intercourse in the house of Pedro Bugayong.

Issue: Whether or not sexual intercourse and living

together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day

amount to condonation?

Held: Yes. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital

offense constituting a ground for legal separation. It

deprives the offended spouse the action to file for legal

separation.

Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the

commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or

belief on the part of the injured party of its

commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of

condonation.

A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the

innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is

ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation. The

same necessary implies forgiveness on the part of the

offended spouse.

Recrimination

Brown v Yambao

Doctrine: Decree of legal separation may not be given

to plaintiff whose acts also constitute for the grounds

on which the complaint was based.

Facts:

July 14, 1955- William H. Brown filed a legal separation

suit against Juanita Yambao on the ground that the

latter had contracted extra-marital affairs while the

former was interred at the UST during WW2.

Juanita Yambao did not respond to the court despite

dure service of summons. The Court later on order the

State fiscal to determine whether there is collusion

between the parties.

Through cross examination, it has been established that

Brown is not an innocent party (he had lived martially

with another woman after his liberation) and that there

has been connivance and that his actions to sue had

already prescribed as stated under Article 102 of the

NCC since it was shown that he knew of his wife’s

actions in 1945 but only filed the proceeding in 1955.

Thus the petition was denied.

Issue: Whether or not legal separation may be given to

a plaintiff spouse whereby the same spouse also does

the ground where the complaint was based?

Held: No. Recrimination is where an accused party in a

case makes a similar accusation against the plaintiff.

(Simply put, it as a situation where the accused can say

“you too or eh ikaw din naman eh”)

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Juanita Yambao

had committed adulterous acts. Nevertheless, it must

be noted that Brown committed also the same acts.

Therefore, Brown cannot use the ground of

“committing adulterous acts” against Juanita Yambao

because that would constitute recrimination.

The evidence of misconduct of the plaintiff spouse and

failure or default of the other to set it up by way of

defense are proper subject of inqury and may justifiably

considered circumstancial evidence of collusion

between the parties.

Recrimination

William Ong v Lucita Ong

Facts:

July 13, 1975- Lucita and William Ong were married.

March 21, 1996- Lucita filed a complaint for legal

separation based on petitioner’s abusive conduct.

RTO ruled for the legal separation, the CA affirmed in

toto the same decision. Both courts found that there is

indeed abuse on the part of William Ong that warrants

the grant of the decree of legal separation.

William Ong filed a petition at the SC, the petitioner

raised for the first time that the legal separation decree

should not have been issued because it is the

respondent herself who has given ground for legal

separation by abandoning the family simply because of

a quarrel.

Issue: Whether or not petition for legal separation shall

be denied on the ground that it is the respondent who

left the conjugal dwelling and is thus who has given

ground for legal separation?

Held: No. Role of the Supreme Court is only to

determine whether there has been grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on

the part of the lower court. It is not a trier of facts.

The argument that since Lucita has abandoned the

family, a decree of legal separation should not be

granted, following Art. 56 par. 4 of the FC, which states

that legal separation shall be denied when both parties

have given ground for legal separation, is without

merit.

The abandonment referred to by the FC is

abandonment without justifiable cause for more than

one year. As shown by the evidence on record, Lucita

left William because of the latters abusive conduct.

Recrimination

Brown v Yambao

Doctrine: A decree for legal separation may not be

issued in cases where it can be shown that there exists

collusion or mutual consent between the parties. Failure

of one party to defend himself or herself by default may

be considered as circumstantial evidence that there is

collusion.

Facts:

July 14, 1955- William H. Brown filed a legal separation

suit against Juanita Yambao on the ground that the

latter had contracted extra-marital affairs while the

former was interred at the UST during WW2.

Juanita Yambao did not respond to the court despite

dure service of summons. The Court later on order the

State fiscal to determine whether there is collusion

between the parties.

Through cross examination, it has been established that

Brown is not an innocent party (he had lived martially

with another woman after his liberation) and that there

has been connivance and that his actions to sue had

already prescribed as stated under Article 102 of the

NCC since it was shown that he knew of his wife’s

actions in 1945 but only filed the proceeding in 1955.

Thus the petition was denied.

Issue: Whether or not failure or default of the accused

spouse can be considered as circumstancial evidence

for collusion between the parties?

Held: Yes. Collusion in matrimonial cases being the act

of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual

consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one

of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of

an agreement, to defend (divorce) proceedings.

The failure of the respondent wife to set up by way of

defense the evidence of misconduct of the plaintiff

spouse may justifiably considered circumstancial

evidence of collusion between the parties.

Collusion/ Mutual Consent

Ocampo v Florencaiano

Facts:

1938- Jose Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were

married.

July 5, 1955- petition for legal separation was filed on

the ground of Serafina’s adulterous acts performed in

March 1951 with Jose Arcalas and in June 1955 with

Nelson Orzame.

Serafina made no answer, she was defaulted by the

Court and the same asked the fiscal to investigate

whether or not collusion existed between the parties.

Fiscal then reported to the Court that there was no

coluusion.

Serafina was questioned by the fiscal. She admitted

having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame and

desired legal separation.

Issue: Whether or not the admission of the accused in a

legal separation case of having committed adulterous

acts and of desiring to be legally separated constitute

collusion?

Held: No. Art. 101 of the NCC does not exclude as

evidence, any admission or confession made by the

defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a

decree of separation upon a confession of judgment.

Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that

the guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery,

desires divorce and makes no defense. In the case at

bar, the decree may and should be granted since it

would not be based on her confession, but upon

evidence presented by the plaintiff.

Collusion is when it can be shown that the parties have

suppressed evidence so as to allow legal separation

proceeding to prosper. It is also collusion when the

parties act as if an offense had been committed so as to

obtain legal separation. None of the two is present in

the case at bar. In the case at bar, adultery had already

been committed, therefore the admission of the

commission of the same crime cannot be counted as

collusion between the parties.

Republic v CA and Quintos

Facts:

March 16, 1977- Eduardo and Catalina Quintos were

married.

April 6, 1998- Eduardo filed for petition for declaration

of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Catalina did not appear during the trial but submitted a

motion stating that she concedes to her psychological

incapacity but denies having relationships with multiple

men and states that she is not willing to forego her

share on their conjugal property.

RTC granted the petition. CA ruled the same. Hence,

the OSG filed a petition at the SC. OSG contends, inter

alia, that there had been collusion between the two

parties because Eduardo “paid” 50,000 to Catalina and

the latter after such payment stopped from attending

hearings in the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the money paid to the opposing

party as part of his or her share in the conjugal

property may amount to collusion?

Held: No. In the case at bar, it cannot be concluded

that the payment of Eduardo to Catalina of 50,000 as

part of her share in their conjugal property amounted

to collusion between the two parties.

At the very beginning, Catalina conceded to her

psychological incapacity but stated that she was

unwilling to give up her share in the conjugal property.

The money paid by Eduardo is not payment for Catalina

to stop from attending the hearings of their case,

rather the payment is for her share in their conjugal

property. This is clearly shown in the cross-examination

of Eduardo by the OSG.

-GEL’S CASES-

[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]

ILUSORIO VS BILDNER

FACTS:

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years old who possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos.

July 11, 1942 – they got married and lived together for 30 years. They had 6 children.

1972 – physical separation

December 30, 1997 – Potenciano returned from US and stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, which led to the deterioration of Potenciano’s health.

February 25, 1998 – Erlinda with RTC a petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.

May 31, 1998 - after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to the house of Erlinda

March 11, 1999 - Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband. She alleged that her children Sylvia and Lin refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

CA ruled: denial of writ of habeas corpus but granting visitation rights to Erlinda.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may grant the custody (through writ of habeas corpus) of Potenciano to Erlinda

HELD: No. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ.

(1) The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.

(2) The Court of Appeals also observed that Potenciano did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.

(3) As to Potenciano mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.

In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus.

G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991

ABELLA VS COMELEC

FACTS:

The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers

on who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte

(1) petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who obtained

the highest number of votes and was

proclaimed as the duly elected governor but

who was later declared by COMELEC

disqualified as Governor;

(2) petitioner Benjamin Abella who obtained the

second highest number of votes for the

position of governor but was not allowed by

the COMELEC to be proclaimed as governor

after the disqualification of Larrazabal; or

(3) Leopoldo E. Petilla, the vice-governor of the

province of Leyte.

Adelina is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the

original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban

who was disqualified by COMELEC for lack of residence.

Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City,

filed a petition to disqualify her for alleged false

statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her

residence. It was alleged that she was a resident of

Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier

disqualified from running for the same office.

COMELEC ruled in favor of Petilla (the vice-governor).

ISSUES: Whether or not COMELEC was correct in

disqualifying Larrazabal on the ground that she is not a

resident of Kananga, Leyte.

HELD: Yes. The petitioner did not present evidence to

show that she and her husband maintain separate

residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at

Ormoc City. For the purpose of running for public

office, the residence requirement should be read as

legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party

may have properties and may visit from time to time.

The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil

rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the

domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual

residence.

Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also

provide as follows:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to

live together, observe mutual love, respect

and fidelity, and render mutual help and

support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the

family domicile. In case of disagreement, the

court shall decide. The court may exempt one

spouse from living with the other if the latter

should live abroad or there are other valid and

compelling reasons for the exemption.

However, such exemption shall not apply if

the same is not compatible with the solidarity

of the family.

Husband and wife as a matter of principle live

together in one legal residence which is their

usual place of abode.

In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that

the petitioner temporarily left her residence in

Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling,

profession or business. What is clear is that she

established her residence in Ormoc City with her

husband and considers herself a resident therein. The

intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her

residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is not present.

The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte

through the years does not signify an intention to

continue her residence therein.

In sum, SC does not find any reason to reverse and set

aside the questioned decision and resolution of the

COMELEC.

G.R. No. 164790 August 29, 2008

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS

DOCTRINE: AN ESTRANGED wife who was not

dependent upon her deceased husband for support is

not qualified to be his beneficiary.

FACTS:

April 29, 1964 – marriage of Antonio and Gloria

February 1965 – Gloria left Antonio and contracted

another marriage

1969 – Gloria went back to Antonio and lived with him

until 1983. They had three children.

1983 – Gloria left Antonio and went to the United

States (US). On May 21, 1983, she executed a

document waiving all her rights to their conjugal

properties and other matters.

May 8, 1986 - Gloria filed for divorce against Antonio in

California, granted on November 5, 1986.

May 23, 1987 – Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in

Camalig, Albay. Their union produced one child, May-

Ann. On her part, Gloria contracted a third marriage

with Larry Thomas Constant, an American citizen, on

July 11, 1987, in the US.

May 15, 1989 – Antonio amended his records at the

Social Security System (SSS). He changed his

beneficiaries from Mrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila

de los Santos; from Gloria de los Santos to May-Ann de

los Santos; and from Erlinda de los Santos to Armine de

los Santos.

Upon his death, Cirila applied for and began receiving

his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999. On

December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s

death benefits with the SSS Cubao Branch. Her claim

was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary

of Antonio.

ISSUES:

The controversy revolves on who between respondent

Gloria, the first wife who divorced Antonio in the US, or

Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary

entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS.

HELD:

As found by both the SSC and the CA, the divorce

obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio

was not binding in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine

law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided

they are valid according to their national law.15 The

divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she

was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy

against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage

ties with Antonio.

However, although respondent was the legal spouse of

the deceased, she is still disqualified to be his primary

beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the

requirement of dependency upon her deceased

husband Antonio.

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal

abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two

different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year

after their marriage, when she contracted a second

marriage to Domingo Talens. The second time she left

Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US,

obtained a divorce, and later married an American

citizen. In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her

from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her

deceased husband.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Social Security

Commission is REINSTATED (Gloria is not a beneficiary.

Marriage of Antonio with Cirila is void, thus she is also

not a beneficiary. Daughter Mary Anne is an illegitimate

child, hence, will receive one half of the benefits)

G.R. No. 170195 March 28, 2011

SSS VS FAVILA

DOCTRINE: A spouse who claims entitlement to death

benefits as a primary beneficiary under the Social

Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to

wit: (1) that he/she is the legitimate spouse; and (2)

that he/she is dependent upon the member for

support.

FACTS:

Teresa was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on

January 17, 1970, and the latter designated her as the

sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before

petitioner Social Security System (SSS). When they

begot their children Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her

husband likewise designated each one of them as

beneficiaries. Believing that as the surviving legal wife

she is likewise entitled to receive Florante’s pension

benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said

benefits before the SSS. The SSS, however, denied the

claim.

SSS alleged that Estelita Ramos, sister of Florante,

wrote a letter9stating that her brother had long been

separated from Teresa. She alleged therein that the

couple lived together for only ten years and then

decided to go their separate ways because Teresa had

an affair with a married man with whom, as Teresa

herself allegedly admitted, she slept with four times a

week. SSS also averred that an interview conducted in

Teresa’s neighborhood in Tondo, Manila on September

18, 1998 revealed that although she did not cohabit

with another man after her separation with Florante,

there were rumors that she had an affair with a police

officer.

ISSUE: Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation

of the Social Security Law as to be entitled to death

benefits accruing from the death of Florante?

HELD:

There is no question that Teresa was Florante’s legal

wife. What is at point, however, is whether Teresa is

dependent upon Florante for support in order for her

to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under

Section 8(k) of RA 1161.

SC agrees with Teresa that her alleged affair with

another man was not sufficiently established. The

Memorandum of SSS Senior Analysts reveals that it was

Florante who was in fact living with a common law

wife, Susan Favila (Susan) and their three minor

children at the time of his death. Susan even filed her

own claim for death benefits with the SSS but same

was, however, denied.

It is not hard to see that Estelita’s (sister’s) claim of

Teresa’s cohabitation with a married man is a mere

allegation without proof. Likewise, the interviews

conducted by SSS revealed rumors only that Teresa had

an affair with a certain police officer. Notably, not one

from those interviewed confirmed that such an affair

indeed existed.

This notwithstanding, SC still finds untenable Teresa’s

assertion that being the legal wife, she is presumed

dependent upon Florante for support. Teresa has not

presented sufficient evidence to discharge her burden

of proving that she was dependent upon her husband

for support at the time of his death. What is clear is

that she and Florante had already been separated for

about 17 years prior to the latter’s death as Florante

was in fact, living with his common law wife when he

died. Suffice it to say that "[w]hoever claims

entitlement to the benefits provided by law should

establish his or her right thereto by substantial

evidence."31Hence, for Teresa’s failure to show that

despite their separation she was dependent upon

Florante for support at the time of his death, Teresa

cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Hence, she is

not entitled to the death benefits accruing on account

of Florante’s death.

Respondent Teresa G. Favila is declared to be not a

dependent spouse within the contemplation of

Republic Act No. 1161 and is therefore not entitled to

death benefits accruing from the death of Florante

Favila.

G.R. No. 185595

CALDERON VS ROXAS

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private

respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on

December 4, 1985 and their union produced four

children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed a

complaint for the declaration of nullity of their

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

While the action was pending, the trial court granted

Calderon’s request for support pendent lite (while the

action for nullity is pending).

On May 16, 2005, the trial court rendered its decision

declaring the marriage null and void, awarding custody

of the children to the mother and ordering Roxas to

provide support to the children. Several actions were

raised in court, with Roxas asking for a decrease of the

monthly support while Calderon asking for an increase

in the amount and Roxas’ payment on his arrears for

support.

ISSUE: This petition is raised by Calderon not to assail

the nullity of their marriage but, rather, is premised on

whether or not the matter of support pendent lite is

already interlocutory and final

HELD:

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that

the interlocutory aspect of the assailed orders pertains

only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support

which was granted, and to her own motion to increase

support, which was denied. Petitioner points out that

the ruling on support in arrears which have remained

unpaid, as well as her prayer for

reimbursement/payment were in the nature of final

orders assailable by ordinary appeal. SC disagrees.

An interlocutory order merely resolves incidental

matters and leaves something more to be done to

resolve the merits of the case. In contrast, a judgment

or order is considered final if the order disposes of the

action or proceeding completely, or terminates a

particular stage of the same action. Clearly, whether an

order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not

dependent on compliance or noncompliance by a party

to its directive, as what petitioner suggests.

Moreover, private respondent’s obligation to give

monthly support in the amount fixed by the RTC in the

assailed orders may be enforced by the court itself, as

what transpired in the early stage of the proceedings

when the court cited the private respondent in

contempt of court and ordered him arrested for his

refusal/failure to comply with the order granting

support pendente lite. A few years later, private

respondent filed a motion to reduce support while

petitioner filed her own motion to increase the same,

and in addition sought spousal support and support in

arrears. This fact underscores the provisional character

of the order granting support pendente lite.

Petitioner’s theory that the assailed orders have ceased

to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by

private respondent is therefore untenable.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject

of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under

Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is

rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong

remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders

of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed

by the CA.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC VS MOLINA

FACTS:

Roridel O. Molina filed for declaration of nullity of her

marriage to Reynaldo Molina. After a year of marriage,

Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and

irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he

preferred to spend more time with his peers and

friends on whom he squandered his money; that he

depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and

was never honest with his wife in regard to their

finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.

Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of

his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the

sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986

the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of

which their relationship was estranged; that in March

1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went

to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks

later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had

since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus

shown that he was psychologically incapable of

complying with essential marital obligations and was a

highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual

who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that

it would be to the couple's best interest to have their

marriage declared null and void in order to free them

from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage

from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo

admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live

together as husband and wife, but contended that their

misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to

(1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on

maintaining her group of friends even after their

marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her

marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's

failure to run the household and handle their finances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage may be annulled on the

ground of psychological incapacity

HELD:

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that

the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It

appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright

"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some

marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable

differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise

constitutes psychological incapacity.

8-point guideline:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity

must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)

alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by

experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at

"the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about

the disability of the party to assume the essential

obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family

Code as regards the husband and wife as well as

Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in

regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the

Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,

should be given great respect by our courts

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting

attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to

appear as counsel for the state.

The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina

subsists and remains valid.

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

HATIMA C. YASIN vs. SHARIA COURT

FACTS:

On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a

District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume

the use of maiden name". She was formerly married to

a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in

accordance with Muslim rites and customs. They were

granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic

Center Foundation, Inc.

Petition was denied by the respondent on the ground

that the it is substantially for change of name and that

compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of

Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is

to be granted as it would result in the resumption of

the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden

name and surname is also a petition for change of

name

HELD:

No. The true and real name of a person is that given to

him and entered in the civil register. While it is true

that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can

change his name or surname without judicial authority,

nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the

true and official name recorded in the Civil Register.

Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In

the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change

her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that

she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name

in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris

Yasin.

We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name

filed by petitioner before the respondent court a

superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law

requires her to do so as her former husband is already

married to another woman after obtaining a decree of

divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is authorized to resume her

maiden name and surname.

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN G.R. No. 168852 Petitioner, Present: YNARES-

SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, - versus - AUSTRIA-

MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Promulgated: Respondents.* September 30,

2008

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner)

and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married On April 18,

1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan

(Steven) were married. On January 12, 2005, barely six years

into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the

Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO)[6] against

Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and

Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that

Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,

psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of

Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of RA No.

9262, otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women

and Their Children Act of 2004.”

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice[9]

granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO. However on

March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution[12]

dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground

that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they

were not included/covered as respondents under R.A.

No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law “expressio

unius est exclusio alterius” (“the expression of one

thing is the exclusion of another”). The RTC reasoned

that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A.

No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the

provisions of the law.

ISSUE: WoN respondents-spouses may be included in

the petition for the issuance of a protective order

HELD: Yes, they may be included. As petitioner

contends, respondents may be included because R.A.

No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the

provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which

explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the

Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the

provision on “conspiracy” under Article 8 of the RPC

can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262.

While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the

offender be related or connected to the victim by

marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating

relationship, it does not preclude the application of

the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Legal

principles developed from the Penal Code may be

applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished

under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262 as per Article

10 of the RPC: “Offenses not subject to the provisions

of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may

be punishable under special laws are not subject to the

provisions of this Code. This Code shall be

supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should

specially provide the contrary”.

The express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the

intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will

best ensure the attainment of the object of the law

according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the

protection and safety of victims of violence against

women and children.

However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which

should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the

merits and cannot be determined in the present

petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.[26] It is

thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary

matters since this controversy is centered only on the

determination of whether respondents may be

included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The

presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed

upon after a trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11,

2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon

City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY

REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the

petition against respondents is concerned.

San Diego vs RTC

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section

5(a) of RA 9262. He charged in the RTC of using

personal violence on his girlfriend by pulling her hair,

punching her back, shoulder and left eye, thereby

demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic

worth and dignity as a human being. After examining

the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause

and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against

petitioner on November 19, 2009.

Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged

incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating

relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262

was inapplicable. In her affidavit, private respondent

admitted that her relationship with petitioner had

ended prior to the subject incident. She had gone to

him to ask for payment for money she loaned him and

also asked him if he was responsible for spreading

rumors about her. After he admitted to the latter she

slapped him which led to him incurring the mentioned

physical abuses.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9262 should be construed in a

manner that will favor the accused

HELD: No. RA 9262 is broad in scope but specifies two

limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be

considered as a crime of violence against women

through physical harm, namely: (1) it is committed

against a woman or her child and the woman is the

offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or

had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has

a common child; and (2) it results in or is likely to result

in physical harm or suffering. The elements of the crime

of violence against women through harassment (Ang vs

CA):

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating

relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another,

commits an act or series of acts of harassment

against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial

emotional or psychological distress to her

It is not, however, indispensable that the act of

violence be a consequence of such relationships

mentioned in #1. Nowhere in the law can such

limitation be inferred.

The Information having sufficiently alleged the

necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating

relationship between the petitioner and the private

respondent; the act of violence committed by the

petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private

respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which

falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petition is DISMISSED.