Considerations for planning future wild bird avian ... · debated as conflicting information on the impacts of HPAI on bird survival and migratory abilities remain unresolved (Olsen

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CREATING A WORLDTHAT IS SAFE AND SUSTAINABLE

FOR WILDLIFE AND SOCIETY

Considerations for planning future wild bird avian influenza surveillance in CanadaAn Opinion Paper Prepared by the Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative

PREPARED BY

Craig Stephen DVM PhDPatrick Zimmer BSc JDErin Moffatt BSC MSc

Jane Parmley DVM PhD

May 14, 2015

http://www.cwhc-rcsf.ca


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Context for the report 3

Overview of wild bird avian influenza 4

Structure of the Canadian Interagency Program 6 What are the intended outcomes of wild bird AI surveys or surveillance? 11 Summary 11 Obligations 11 Goalsandobjectives–internationalexamples 13 Earlywarningasagoal 13 Doesearlywarningwork? 16 Diseaseecologicalresearchasagoal 17

Section 2: Assessment of success on reaching goals 18 Summary 18 Programevaluationorreview 18

Wild Bird AI surveillance in 2015 and beyond 24 Summary 24 Programevaluation 24 Timelinessandforecasting 25 Vulnerabilitysurveillance 26 ANationalWildBirdAIStrategyandPlan 28 Whataboutthewildbirdsthemselves? 29

References 30

Appendix 1. Overview of international wild bird influenza surveillance efforts 33

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Context for the report

Thisreportisa‘think-piece‘;apieceofwritingmeanttobethought-provokingthatconsistschieflyofbackgroundmaterialandpersonalopinionandanalysis.TheCanadianWildlifeHealthCooperative(CWHC)undertookthisexerciseaftertheoutbreakofhighlypathogenicavianinfluenza(HPAI)inBritishColumbiaandduringtheincursionofHPAIintoOntario.Itwasinresponsetothelackofadistinctnationalstrategywithwhichtoguidethefuturedirection,designanduseofdatabasedonsurveillance,surveysorinvestigationofavianinfluenza(AI)inwildbirdsinCanadaorelsewhere.AfteradecadeofCanada’sInteragencyWildBirdInfluenzaSurvey,wefeltitanappropriatetimetoreflectonpastexperienceandprovokediscussionaboutthenextdecadeofawildbirdAIprogram.Thereport’scontentsaretheopinionoftheauthorsandarenotmeanttorepresenttheopinionsofotheragenciesorindividualsinvolvedinwildbirdAIsurveillanceinCanadaorelsewhere.

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Overview of wild bird avian influenza

Summary

Wildbirds,particularlywaterfowl,playanimportantroleininfluenzaecology.Theycanharbourandshedbothlowpathogenicityavianinfluenza(LPAI)andhighpathogenicityavianinfluenza(HPAI);however,thereisagapinunderstandingtheexposurepathwaysthatlinkwildbirdsandpoultry.Betterunderstandingofwildbirdecologyandpathogentrafficatthewildlife-agricultureinterfacemayhelpdirectfuturesurveillanceandbiosecurityplanning.

Wild birds as sources of AI

InfluenzaAviruseshavebeenisolatedfrommanyspecies,includingpeople,domesticmammals(e.g.pigs,horses,mink,felids),wildmammals(e.g.marinemammals),avarietyofdomesticbirdsandover100speciesofwildbirds(Olsenetal,2006).IthasnowbeenwellestablishedthatwildbirdscarryawiderangeofLPAIsubtypesandthattheyperpetuateLPAI(Hoyeetal,2010).IsolationratesforLPAIvirusesaverageabout11%forducksandgeeseandaround2%forotherspecies(Alexander,2007),butvaryaroundtheseaverageswithcountry,species,ageandseason.LPAIisusuallyisolatedfromapparentlyhealthywildbirdsduringsurveillanceprograms,butHPAIhasoccasionallybeendetectedaftermortalityincidents.Ducks,geese,andswans(Anseriformes)andgulls,terns,andwaders(Charadriiformes)constitutethemajornaturalLPAIvirusreservoirs(Olsenetal,2006)andthespeciesinwhichthegreatestvarietyofvirussubtypeshasbeendetected(Olsonetal,2014).ExtensivesurveillancestudiesofwildduckshaverevealedLPAIvirusprevalencepeaksintheNorthernHemisphereinearlyfall,particularlyinjuvenilebirdsonsouthwardmigrations.InNorthAmerica,theprevalencefallsfromashighas∼60%induckssampledclosetothebreedingareasinearlyfall,to0.4to2%atthewinteringgroundsinthesouthernU.S.A.,and∼0.25%onreturntothebreedinggroundsinspring(Olsenetal,2006).ExperiencewiththeCanadianwildbirdprogramsuggeststhatdetectionofAIisgreaterinliveducks(∼30%testedpositive)comparedwithotherspeciesofbirds(∼5%testedpositive)(note:alllivebirdsamplingoccurredinthelatesummerandfall;however,whenbirdsfounddeadweretested,LPAIwasonlydetectedin3%)(Parmleyetal,2009).Thismayreflectthedifferentseasonsofsamplecollectionaswellasthespeciesofbirdstestedratherthanatruedifferenceinabilitytodetectviruses.

HPAI,althoughmuchlessfrequentlyfoundinwildbirds,hasoccasionallybeenassociatedwithwildbirdmortality(Anseriformesandraptors)inAsia,EuropeandNorthAmerica.Ithasalsobeenfoundinbirdsdyingofothercauses(ex.aspergillosisinwaterfowlinWashingtonin2014)andinasymptomaticbirds.WhereasitisbelievedthatwildbirdmigrationsplayaroleindistributingLPAIsub-types,theroleofavianmigrationinmovingHPAIremainsdebatedasconflictinginformationontheimpactsofHPAIonbirdsurvivalandmigratoryabilitiesremainunresolved(Olsenetal,2006).Kraussetal(2007),ononehand,concludedthat“theavailableevidencedoesnotsupporttheperpetuationof{HPAI}H5N1influenzainmigratorybirdsandsuggeststhattheintroductionof{HPAI}AsianH5N1totheAmericasbymigratorybirdsislikelytobearareevent”.Keawcharoenetal(2008),ontheotherhand,concludedthat“somewildduckspecies,particularlymallards,canpotentiallybelong-distancevectorsofhighlypathogenicavianinfluenzavirus(H5N1).”TheH5virusesdetectedinNorthAmericain2014-15seemtobehavedifferentlythatAsian

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andEuropeanH5,emphasizingtheneedtobecautiouswhenextrapolatingfindingsinAIvirusesacrosslocationsandwildbirdspeciesaswellastheimportanceoffurtherunderstandingtheinfluenceofvirusgenetics/subtypesontheirspreadandimpacts.

BehaviourandecologyarethoughttobedeterminantsoftheprevalenceandpersistenceofLPAIinwildbirdsand,thus,caninformwhichspeciestotargetinsurveillanceprograms.Forexample,dabblingducksmayhavegreaterexposuretothevirusintheaquaticenvironment(thoughtcriticalinwaterfowltransmission).Longtermdata(approx.20years)fromNorthAmericasuggestthatshorebirdshadahigherfrequencyofinfluenzaAvirusisolationduringtheirnorthernmigration,whileduckshadhighervirusisolationfrequenciesduringtheirsouthernmigrationandshorebirdsyieldedabroaderrangeofsubtypesbutlessfrequentlywerepositivecomparedtoducks(Kraussetal,2004).Birdsthataggregateduringmigrationsorbreedingmayhavegreateropportunitiesforexposurethroughconcentrationoffecalcontaminationwhichmaypresentampleamountsofvirusintheirenvironment.Thereisevidencethatinfluenzaremainsviableinsurfacewaterandaquaticsedimentsforextendedperiods,allowingshorelinestobeimportantavenuesforvirustraffic(Wilkingetal,2009),andmakingdabblingducksmorelikelytobeexposedthandivingducks.Birdsthatfeedorliveinandaroundagriculturesettingsmaybeimportantinbridgingwildanddomesticpopulations.

Wild birds as mechanisms of spread of AI to poultry

Aswasseeninthe2014-15NorthAmericanHPAIoutbreak,whenthemechanismofspreadisnotfirmlyestablished,evidenceofsharedvirallineageinwildanddomesticbirdsisusuallyusedtosupportclaimsthatwildbirdsarespreadingthevirus.TherehavebeensomecaseswhereHPAIwasseenfirstinacountryinwildbirdsbeforebeingdetectedindomesticpoultry,buttherearealsomanycaseswherethereverseistrue.Thecontributionofpoultryand/orwildbirdmovementinthespreadofHPAIremainscontroversial,inpartduetochallengesinquantifyingandtracingthesemovements(Wilkingetal,2009).Asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow,biasescreatedthroughopportunisticsamplingthathasnotbeenstrategicallyselectedtoreflecthighriskpoultryareasfurthercomplicatestheabilitytolinktemporalandgeographicpatternsofwildbirdAIwithpatternsofcasesinpoultry.

TheriskofAIoutbreaksinpoultryispartiallydependentontheprobabilityofcontactbetweendomesticpoultryandviralcontaminatedwildbirdfeces;however,surveillanceprogramsoftendonottargetthisinterface.Burnsetal(2012)noted:“BecausedetectionofAIV,particularlyH5andH7strains,inwildbirdsonornearpoultryfarmscouldresultinimplementationofdiseasecontrolactionsonpoultryfarms,surveillanceofwildbirdsinCanadaisfunctionallyrestrictedtoareasthataredistantfromcommercialpoultryfarms.Theseareashavedifferenthabitatandhumanactivitypatternsthancommercialpoultryfarms;therefore,samplingofwildbirdsoff-farmmaynotreflectthespeciesdistributiononpoultryfarmsandspeciesthataremostlikelytohavecontactwithpoultrymightbeinsufficientlyrepresentedtoestimatetheirpotentialtotransmitAIV.”ThefocusofmostwildbirdAIsurveillanceprogramsonAnseriformesandCharadriiformeslimitstheextentofdataavailableabouttheoccurrenceofAIinotherbirdspecies.ThisgapmaybeimportantgiventhatBurnsetal(2012)foundapproximately68speciesofbirdsaroundcommercialpoultryfarmsinBritishColumbiaandOntario.UnderstandingtheexposureormixingofthesespecieswithwaterfowlandtheirAIinfectionstatusmaybeanextstepinAIecologicalresearch.Inordertobeabletodothis

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work,cooperationandtrustwithmanypartnerswillberequiredasitisstillunclearwhattherepercussionswillbeifawildbirdtestspositiveforHPAIonapoultryfarm.

Thedisconnectbetweenunderstandingwildbirdecology,behaviouranddiseasehasresultedindebateabouthowAIinfectionsmightaffecttheabilityofawildbirdtocontinueonitsmigration,oritspotentialtostrayfromitsmigratorypathorshedvirus.Feare(2010)forexample,notedthatallH5N1outbreaksinwildbirdsintheearly2000’soccurredinthesummerwhenbirdsweremoultingandonlytravellinglocallyratherthanoverlongdistances.Afterreviewingseveralinternationaloutbreaks,Feare(2010)concludedthatwildbirdHPAIoutbreakswerelinkedtoperiodsofphysiologicalstress(moulting,coldweather)andperiodsofbirdaggregation;however,giventhedemandsofmigration,ifanHPAIwascausingillness,itisplausiblethataffectedbirdsdieenrouteandarenotfoundbygeographicallyandtemporallylimitedsurveillanceprograms.ItisdifficulttotesttheassumptionthatbirdswillcarryandshedHPAIontheirmigrationwithouttheabilitytofollowthecourseofinfectioninindividualbirdsastheymigrateandbecauseofthebiasesinsamplecollectioninmostwildbirdsurveys.

Theroleofwildbirdswillundoubtedlyvarywithepidemiologicalcircumstances.Forexample,poultrymovementshaveclearlybeenlinkedtothespreadofHPAIH5N1inSoutheastAsia(Feare,2010).Differencesinvirulence,effectsoninfectedhosts,housingandbiosecuritypractices,andenvironmentalconditionswillcausecomplexitiesthatmayresultindifferentroutesoftransmissionatdifferenttimesandlocations.Kilpatricketal(2006)integrateddataonphylogeneticrelationshipsofvirusisolates,migratorybirdmovements,andtradeinpoultryandwildbirdstodescribepossiblepathwaysfor52individualintroductionevents.Theiranalysissuggestedthat9of21ofH5N1introductionstocountriesinAsiaweremostlikelythroughpoultry,and3of21weremostlikelythroughmigratingbirds;but20/23countriesinEuropeweremorelikelyexposedthroughmigratorybirds,while3/8introductionsinAfricacouldpartlybelinkedtowildbirdmovement.ThevalidityofthisanalysishasnotbeenconfirmedbuttheydoemphasizethatcircumstancesmayaffecttheroleofwildbirdsassourcesandspreadersofHPAI.Theepidemiological,climatologicalandagriculturaldifferencesbetweentropicalversustemperateclimates,northernversussoutherncountries,andextensiveversusintensiveagricultureregionscanlimitconfidenceinextrapolationsoffindingsfromoneareatoanother.

Structure of the Canadian Interagency Program

Summary

AnationalprogramoftestingdeadbirdsforAIcurrentlyexistsacrossCanadaandissupplementedwithlimitedlivebirdtesting.TheCWHChelpstocoordinateanddelivertheprogram,includingreportingandarchivingresults.KnownastheInteragencyWildBirdInfluenzaSurvey,itistheonlyongoingwildbirdsurveillanceprogramthatoperatesacrossCanadaandinvolvesallprovincesandterritories.Thegoalsandobjectiveshaveevolvedovertimewithchangingknowledgeandchangingepidemiologicalsituations.

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Structure, Roles and Responsibilities of the Program

TheInteragencyWildBirdInfluenzaSurveyisundertakenbythegovernmentsofCanadaandofCanada’sprovincesandterritories,andiscoordinatedonbehalfofgovernmentagenciesbytheCWHC.ItispartofnationalandglobaleffortstodetectAIvirusesthatcouldthreatentheagriculturalsectorandhumanhealth.

Nationally,theCWHCworkswiththeCanadianFoodInspectionAgency(CFIA),thePublicHealthAgencyofCanada(PHAC)andCanadianWildlifeService(CWS)ofEnvironmentCanada(EC)todevelopanddeliveraharmonizedCanadianprogram.PrimaryfundingisderivedfromtheCFIAandPHACwiththeformeralsoprovidingconfirmatorytestingandhavingoverallprogramobligations.EachofthefederalpartnersassistsinAIVandsurveycommunications.Significantin-kindsupportisprovidedbyCWS,primarilyintheformofsamplecollection,inparticularlimitedlive-birdsamplingandresearchanddeadbirdcollectioninBritishColumbia.AtthenationalleveltheCWHCprovidesprogramdevelopment,informationmanagement,communicationsandreportingaswellasexpertadvice.

ProvincialandTerritorialgovernmentstakeprimaryresponsibilityfororganizingthedetectionofdeadwildbirdsandtheirconveyancetoparticipatingveterinarydiagnosticlaboratories.Eachwilldowhatcanbedonewithinitsprogramtoobtaindeadducks,otherwater-associatedbirds,raptorsorclustersofdeadbirdsfortheSurvey.Birdsare screenedforavianinfluenzavirusbyrealtimereversetranscriptasePCRfortheM1gene.Allmatrixproteingene-positivesamplesaretestedbyPCRforH5andH7virusesandanysamplespositivebythesetestsaresenttotheNationalCentreforForeignAnimalDiseases(NCFAD)forfurthercharacterisation.

TheextenttowhichtheactivitiesoftheSurveyaredeferredtoaCWHCregionalcentrefordiagnostictestingvariesbyjurisdiction(SeeFig.1).Proceduresandthescaleofactivitydiffersamongprovincesandterritories,asdoestheinvolvementofCWHCdiagnosticcentresintestingbirds,thedetectionofdeadwildbirdsandtheirconveyancetoparticipatingveterinarydiagnosticlaboratories.Insomejurisdictions,notably,BC,AB,MBandNL,labexaminationandtestingisconductedbytheprovincialagriculturaldepartment/ministry,withtheCWHCprovidingasupportingrole.Intheremainingprovincial/territorialjurisdictionstheCWHChasaleadroleincoordinatingamongprovincialpartners,performinglabexaminationsandobtainingsamples.Allinitialtestingisdoneataprovincial/universitydiagnosticlaboratory.TheCWHCcollectsdataandreportsfindingstotheCFIAandpublicassoonasresultsareavailableand,whendealingwithHPAI,afterconfirmationandreportingbytheCFIA.

Fundingsupportdiffersamongprovincesandterritories.Generallythosedepartmentsresponsibleforwildlifeprovidein-kindsupportinthecollectionandsubmissionofdeadbirds.Provincialagriculturaldepartmentsmayprovidein-kindtestingsupportandinsomecases,forinstanceinSaskatchewanandOntario,directsupporttotheCWHCregionalcentreinsupportoftheprogram.

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Figure 1 – Summary of wild bird avian influenza surveillance partners and activities by jurisdiction.

ThescaleoftheSurveyhassignificantlychangedinthe10yearssinceitsinception.Thepeakoftheprogramwasinthecalendaryears2006and2007,whengreaterthan6,000deadbirdswereexaminedandthenumberofsamplescollectedfromlivebirdsexceeded17,000.Thetotalbudgetinthatperiodwasapproximately$3.5M.Interestandavailableresourceshavewanedsubsequenttothistimewithanannualbudget(includingin-kind)ofapproximately$600Kforthelastseveralyearsandanalmostexclusivefocusondeadbirdsurveillance.In2014,1,545deadbirdswereexaminedaspartofthesurveyand1,324livebirdsweretestedviaindependentresearchprogramsandcollaborations.Appendix1putsthissamplingeffortincontextwithothercountries.

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CWHC performs testing

Provincial lab performs testing

CWHC lead, regional coordination, necropsy and sample collection. Provnicincial or University veterinary laboratory conducts testing, provnical environment/wildlife carcass collection and submission, communications.

Provincial Ag lead and conduct necropsies/testing, CWHC sample collection, data management, advisory and support role. Provinical wildlife carcass collection and submission, in BC this includes CWSNo program








Evolving goals and objectivesCanada’sInteragencyWildBirdInfluenzaSurveywasinitiatedinthespringof2005,partlyinresponsetothe

outbreakofHPAI(H7N3)inthepoultryinsouthwesternBritishColumbiain2004.Theoriginalsurveywastofocusonthecollectionofsamplesfromlivewildbirdswiththefollowingobjectives:

• Makinganinventory/archiveofinfluenzaAvirusesthatoccurinwildbirds,inCanada

• CharacterisingthesevirusessufficientlytodetermineifwildbirdswereatransmissionrouteforinfluenzaAvirusesthatarepathogenicforpeopleordomesticanimals

• MonitoringwildbirdpopulationsforthepresenceofinfluenzaAvirusesofnationalorinternationalconcern

• Establishingfield,laboratoryandcoordinativecapacityneededinCanadatocarryoutinfluenzaAvirussurveillanceinwildbirds

• ComplimentingsurveillanceeffortsbeingconductedbytheUnitedStates

Thescopeandobjectivesoftheprogramwereexpandedinlate2005inresponsetotherangeexpansionofhighlypathogenicH5N1fromSoutheastAsiaintoEuropeandAfricaandconcernthatthisvirusmaybetransportedbywildbirdstoNorthAmerica.AstheEuropeanexperiencehadshownthathighlypathogenicvirusesweremorelikelytobefoundindeadbirds,thesurveywasexpandedtoincludedeadbirdsurveillanceasameansofearlydetectionforthisparticularvirus.

Since2005thefocusofthesurveyhasshiftedfromtheoriginalemphasisonlivebirdsurveillancetoafocusondeadbirdsurveillance.Concurrentlivebirdanddeadbirdsurveillancewasconductedforthefirst6yearsoftheprogramwithlivebirdstudiesbecomingalmostexclusivelyreliantonthesupportoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofAgriculture(USDA)andUSGeologicalSurvey(USGS).Thisaspectoftheprogramwasdiscontinuedin2012duetolackofresources.Aninformalandsmall-scalelivebirdprogramhasbeencontinuedsincethattimeduetothein-kindcontributionsofCWS,CFIA(testing)andtheCWHC.

A2009publicationlistedCanada’sinteragencywildbirdinfluenzasurvey’spurposesasfollows(Parmleyetal,2009):

Live bird surveys:

1. DevelopaninventoryofinfluenzaAvirusesoccurringinwildbirdsinCanadaandmeasuretheyear-to-yearvariationinvirusdetectionandstrains

2. CharacteriseinfluenzaAvirusesisolatedfromCanadianwildbirds3. SurveyCanadianwildbirdpopulationsforthepresenceofparticularinfluenzaAvirusesthatareofnational

andinternationalconcern(e.g.H5andH7subtypes)4. EstablishanarchiveofinfluenzaAvirusesfromwildbirdsinCanada5. Usethesurveytoenhancenetworksestablishedfordiseasemanagement

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6. DetermineifforeignstrainsofavianinfluenzaarecarriedtotheAmericasbytrans-Atlanticmigrantwildbirds7. ComplementandextendavianinfluenzasurveillancecarriedoutbytheUSAandMexico

Dead bird surveys:1. DeadbirdsurveillancesharedthegoalsabovebutincludedenhancingdetectionofHPAIstrainsinCanada.

The2013-14operationalplanforCanada’sInteragencySurveystatedthatthepurposeofthesurveywas:“primarilytobevigilantforhighly-pathogenicstrainsofinfluenzaAvirusesthatmaycausemortalityinwildbirdsandtoalesserextenttoprovideinformationontheformsofinfluenzaAincirculationamongwildbirdseachsummer,includingH5andH7variantsofpotentialimportancetopoultry”.TheCFIApressreleaseforthe2013-14planstated:“Ifthesurveyweretodetectavirusofconcerninwildbirdsinalocationclosetoapoultryflock,theCFIAwouldalertproducersintheareaandconductheightenedsurveillanceindomesticpoultry”.Thus,thewildbirdsurveyseemedtobeintendedtoprovidebothanearlywarningaswellasresearchrole.

The2014-15wildbirdavianinfluenzasurveyhadfourmainobjectives:

1. ToprovidevigilanceforhighlypathogenicAIvirusstrains

2. ToassesswhetherornotAIviruseshadcausedthedeathofthebirds

3. Tomonitoryear-to-yearvariationinAIvirusespresentinwildbirds

4. Tosupportprovincialoutbreakresponse

TheobjectivesoftheenhancedactivitiesinresponsetotheoutbreakinBritishColumbiawereasfollows:

1. Todetermineifthesamestrainofvirusfoundincommercialbirdswaspresentinwildbirds

2. Todetermineifhighlypathogenicstrainswerepresentinwildbirdsortheirenvironmentsaftertheoutbreakinthecommercialpoultry

3. ToenhancepreparednessforsurveillanceintheSpring2015migration

Thediversity,extentandvariationingoalsandobjectivesreflectedchangingknowledgeandfundingbuthasresultedinvariationsinexpectationsoftheprogramwithinandbetweenSurveypartnersandstakeholders.

Plansaccompanyingtheseobjectivesoriginallyaimedfortesting3000birdsperyear.Lateroperationalplansrecognizedthattheavailableresourcesdidnotallowthistargettobemet.Theseplansoutlinedthegeneralgoals,providedguidanceonviralsamplecollectionandsubmission,andgeneraltestingproceduresbuttheydidnotspecifytargetspecies,locationsorsamplesizesrequiredtomeettheintendedgoalsorpurpose.Thislackofdetailreflectedtherelianceonopportunisticsampleandin-kindsupporttodelivertheSurvey.

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WhileotherAIsurveillanceeffortsexistinCanada,suchastheCanadianNotifiableAvianInfluenzaSurveillanceSystem(agovernment,industry,farmerprogram)ortheFluWatch(whichmonitorsforhumancasesofinfluenza),thereisnootherorganizedprogramforwildbirdAIsurveillanceinCanadaotherthantheInteragencyWildBirdInfluenzaSurvey.

What are the intended outcomes of wild bird AI surveys or surveillance?

Summary

Itcanbearguedthatthereare3generalcategoriesofoutcomesthathaveinformedthedesignandimplementationofAIsurveillancearoundtheworld:

1. Meetingobligationsbasedonstatutesandinternationalagreements

2. ProvidingearlywarningoftheincursionofHPAI

3. ImprovingthescientificunderstandingofAIecology

Acommonmotivationforearlywarningisrapidandearlydetectionofanagro-economicandtoalesserextentpublichealthriskinordertoinspireactionsthatwouldpreventexposureorspreadofahighlypathogenicstrainindomesticpoultryand/orpeople.Theeffectivenessofthisearlywarningfunctionhasnotbeenevaluated.Lowsamplesizes,challengesinobtainingrepresentativesamplesanduntargetedsamplingresultsinalowprobabilityofdetectionAIinwildbirds.Littleworkhasbeendonetoundertakesurveillancethatcanforecastriskinareliablemannerinadvanceoffindingavirusortoclassifychangingvulnerabilityofspecificgeographiclocations.

Obligations

Canadafacesmanybindingandnon-bindingobligationsandresponsibilitieswithrespecttowildlifehealth.TheseincludeinternationalobligationssuchasthosefoundpursuanttotheWorldOrganizationforAnimalHealth’s(OIE)Terrestrial Animal Health Code aswellasdomesticresponsibilitiesincludingthosederivingfromtheHealth of Animals Act.TogetherwithobligationsoriginatingfrominternationaltreatiessuchastheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)andtheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA)theseresponsibilitiesincludemeasurestosupporteconomicopportunitiesandtradewhileensuringasafeandsecureCanada.

Safety and Security

Canadaisobligatedtoreportdiseasescausingsignificantmorbidityormortalityindomesticandwildanimals.InCanadathisincludesHPAIandLPAIH5andH7viruses,whichareconsideredareportablediseaseundertheHealth

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of Animals ActaswellastheOIETerrestrial Animal Code.Theseresponsibilitiesaredesignedtoprevent,contain,anderadicatereportablediseasesofsignificancetopublichealthand/orCanadianwell-being.Surveillanceforwildlifediseases,suchasAI,isanessentialcomponentforreportinganimaldiseasethreatsaccuratelyandisexpectedbyOIEmembers,tradepartners,industry,andtheCanadianpublic.

Chapter10.4oftheOIETerrestrialCodestates:“InfectionwithinfluenzaAvirusesofhighpathogenicityinbirdsotherthanpoultry,includingwildbirds,shouldbenotifiedaccordingtoArticle1.1.3.However,aMemberCountryshouldnotimposebansonthetradeinpoultrycommoditiesinresponsetosuchanotification,orotherinformationonthepresenceofanyinfluenzaAvirusinbirdsotherthanpoultry,includingwildbirds”.TheCodenotesthat“noMemberCountrycandeclareitselffreefrominfluenzaAinwildbirds”.TheCodedoesrecommendtargetingpoultryatspecificrisk,recognizingthatcontactwithwildbirdsisadeterminantofrisk.Understandingcontactbetweenwildbirdsandpoultry,therefore,seemsanimportantpartofnationalAIsurveillance.TomeetOIErequirementslaidoutintheTerrestrialCode,wildbirdprogramsshouldbeabletodetectHPAIinwildbirdsaswellasinformdomesticpoultryriskassessmentbasedonwild-domesticbirdinteractions.

Due diligence and supporting economic activities

InvestmentinAIsurveillancehelpstoestablishthatanentityhasactedreasonablyintheirdecision-making,thereforeavoidingorminimizingliabilitywhileprovidingcontextfortheimpactsoftheirdecisions.InvestmentinwildbirdAIsurveillancecanhelptoensurethatimpactstotradeandtheeconomyareminimized.Forinstance,ongoingsurveillancecanserveasadefenseagainsttraderestrictions,includingthoseunderNAFTA,andbeusedtominimizetheimpactofadoptedsanitaryandphytosanitarymeasuresunderWHOInternationalHealthRegulationsandWTOregulations.

AdditionalinternationalresponsibilitiesexistundertheSecurityandProsperityPartnershipofNorthAmerica(NorthAmericanPlanforavianandpandemicinfluenza),whichincludeswildbirdsurveillancetoprovideearlywarningforpotentialorrealthreatsthatmayexistinthewildbirdpopulation.Thepartnershipsuggeststhatwildbirdsurveillanceshouldbeconductedatleastannuallyandshouldincludeactiveandpassivemethodologiesaswellasliveanddeadbirdsampling.TheCFIAplaysakeypartinupholdingalloftheseobligations,asreflectedintheirmission/mandateof:

• ProtectingCanada’slivestockresources;

• Mitigatingrisksassociatedwithanimaldiseases;and

• SupportingthehealthofCanada’sanimalresourcesandpreservingconfidenceinthesafetyofsaidanimalsandanimalproducts

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Goals and objectives – international examples

Hoyeetal’s2010reviewof191publishedreportsfound4mainfociforwildbirdsurveillance:(1)earlydetectionofHPAI;(2)detailingtheecologyandepidemiologyofLPAI;(3)studyingviralevolutionwithinwildbirds;and(4)multi-pathogenstudiesinwildbirds.EarlywarningwasaubiquitousmotivatorforwildbirdAIsurveillance

acrossnationsandprograms. Themajorityofprogramsusedwildbirdsasearlywarningsentinelsofrisktodomesticpoultryandindirectlytopeople

TheUSDAsystem,forexample,aimstodetectanyHPAIvirusesinmigratorybirdsregardlessofthesource.TheirsystemalsoseekstoincreaseknowledgeregardingLPAIvirusesandthegeneralhealthofwildbirds(Delibertoetal,2009).TheprimaryobjectiveoftheUSGS2009PlanwastoprovidefortheearlydetectionofH5N1HPAIifitwasintroducedbymigratorybirdstotheUnitedStatesorU.S.TerritoriesandFreely-AssociatedStates,asstatedintheinitialchargeoftheirInteragencyStrategicPlan.AsecondaryobjectivewasthedetectionofH5andH7subtypesofavianinfluenzavirusesinwildbirds.DetectingwildbirdinfectionbyanyofthecirculatingLPAIviruseswasatertiaryobjective.Outputsfromtheirprogramwereintendedtoprovideinformationforscientificstudythatcanprovideinsightintothemodesandmechanismsofthespreadofinfluenzavirusesingeneral,whichmayhaveapplicationinunderstandingthepotentialroleofwildbirdsinthespreadofHPAIviruses.

TheAIprogramintheUnitedKingdomhasaimedtoensuretheearlydetectionofH5N1HPAIandtoidentifytheriskofintroductionofHPAIandLPAIintodomesticpoultry.ThisgoalwassharedinEurope.Forexample,inDenmarkandGreenland,surveillanceisaimedatdetectingvirusesofbothHPAIsubtypesH5andH7aswellasLPAIviruses(Hjulsageretal,2012).

Early warning as a goal

TheNorthAmericanplanforanimalandpandemicinfluenza1states:”Effectivewildbirdsurveillanceprovidesanearlywarningsystemforpotentialorrealthreatsthatmayexistinthewildbirdpopulation….Advancewarningwouldenablethepoultrysectortoadoptenhancedbiosecuritymeasuresandallowpoultrysurveillanceprogramstobetargetedtothosepopulationsorcompartmentsatincreasedrisk”.

Earlywarningsystemsaretimelysurveillancesystemsthatcollectinformationonepidemic-pronediseasesinordertotriggerpromptinterventions.Whereasmostsurveillancesystemsareintendedtodetectandmeasurediseaseoutbreaksastheyoccur,earlywarningsystemsaimtoalerttherelevantauthoritiesinadvancetoimplementeffectivemeasurestoreduceadversehealthoutcomesduringandaftertheevent(EbiandSchmier,2005).Attheirverybasic,earlywarningsystemsareinformationsystemsdesignedtofacilitatedecisionmakingtoenableactionstomitigatetheimpactsofanimpendinghazard.

1 http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/napapi.pdf

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Thereare5keyrequirementforeffectiveearlywarning:(1)thewarningsystemmustbeabletodetecttherisksignalearlierthanbymonitoringthepopulationofconcernfortheadverseeffectsthataretobeavoidedormitigate;(2)theremustbetimelycommunicationofearlywarningsignalstoinspireactionsoonenoughtoavoidormitigatenegativeimpacts;(3)theremustbecapacitytoverifythesignalstoavoidunnecessaryresponse,(4)theremustbecapacitytoassesstheriskassociatedwiththeearlywarningsignal(WHO,2014),and(5)theremustbeadequateinfrastructure,includingthepoliticalwill,toundertakethedesign,implementationandsustainabilityofthesystem.

Earlywarningrequiresallpartsofthesystemtowork.Commonareasoffailureincludethefollowing:(i)therisksignalisinaccurate;(ii)theremaybeafailuretocommunicatewarninginformationinsufficienttimeorinaunderstandableorinterpretablefashion;(iii)theresponsetothesignalmaynotbeappropriateduetomissingancillaryinformationorproblemsinincorporatingorapplyingtheinformationintodecisionmaking(NAS,2001);and/or(iv)thelinkagebetweentheearlywarningsignalandtherisktothepopulationofconcernorneedforactionisnotwellestablished.

Sentinelspeciesareoftenusedforearlywarning.Sentinelwildlifeareagroupofwildanimalsunderobservationthatprovidesignalsofrisktoothermembersofthegroup,othergroupsand/orotherspecies.InthecaseofAI,wildbirdsproviderisksignalsfordomesticpoultryand,indirectly,forpublichealth.Sentinelscangiveearlyinsightsintothecapacityofahazard,suchasAIvirus,tobeathreat.Forexample,earlywarningsontheemergenceofanHPAIsub-typeinwildbirdsurveillancegiveswarningofasub-typecapableofcausingsignificantmorbidityand/ormortality.Sentinelscanalsogiveanindicationonthethreataccessibility.Inthecaseofaninfectiousagent,thismayinvolveinformationthatindicatesthatpopulationsofconcernarepotentiallyexposedtoacirculatingthreat.ChallengesexistforwildbirdAIinthatthescaleandlocationofsamplingcanbetoofarremovedfromdomesticpopulationsofconcerntoprovideprecisedescriptionsofthelocationsandtimingofviralpresence.

Sentinelscangiveanindicationofsystemssusceptibility.Forexample,situatingasentinelspecieswithintheenvironmentofspeciesofconcernmaygiveinsightsintobiosecurity.Theuseofimmunocompromisedmiceinrodentresearchfacilitiestodetectincursionsofapathogenisanexample.ThelatterfunctioncannotbepartofwildbirdAIsurveillanceasmixingwildanddomesticbirdsonpurposeisnotrecommendednorisitknownifthewildbirdswouldmanifestsignsofinfectionbeforedomesticbirdsduetovariationinpathogenicitywithhostspeciesandviralsubtype.

Littleevidenceexiststoevaluatethevalueofanimalsentinelsortospecifythestandardcriteriaforselectionofasentinelspecies,however,generalfeaturesofapotentialsentinelspeciesareknown.Table1listsgenericfeaturesofsentinelanimalsandrelatesthemtowildbirdAIsurveillance.ThistablesuggeststherearelimitstothevalueofwildbirdsassentinelsforAIrisktodomesticpoultryorpublichealth;however,aswildbirdsarethereservoirforthisvirus,therecontinuestobeinterestintrackingthevariety,abundanceanddistributionofAIvirusinthesespecies.

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Table 1. Generic features of sentinel animals and reflections on those features as they relate to avian influenza surveillance of wild birds in Canada. General sentinel attribute Attribute in wild birds in CanadaThepopulationneedstobeunderobservation. Populationsarenotsystematicallyorintensively

sampledforAI.Eitheropportunisticcollectionofdeadbirdsortimeandspacelimitedsurveysofsub-populationsarethebackboneofwildbirdAIsurveillance.Neitherprovidesforrepresentativeorrepeatablepopulationsurveys,buttheongoingsurveillancedoesallowforregularobservation.

Thesentinelsshouldbeinthesameenvironmentasthepopulationofconcerntoestablishthatthepresenceofthehazardinthesentinelanimalsisasignalofexposureriskforthepopulationofconcern.

Strategicallocationofsamplingefforthasnotemphasizedlocationswherewildbirdsintersectwithdomesticbirdsonasmallscale,requiringex-trapolationofrisksignalsderivedfromalocationdistanttothepopulationsofconcern.

Thesentinelsneedtoproduceameasureableandmeaningfulsignal.

Anumberofwell-establishedtestsareavailableforAIvirusdetectionandcharacterisation.Theresultsaregenerallyacceptedwithinthescientificcommunity(especiallyPCR)althoughnotalltestsarevalidatedforwildlife.Therearegreaterchal-lengesinusingthosediagnosticsignalstopredictpopulationeffectsorrisks.

Thesentinelsshouldrevealawarningbeforeim-pactsarerealizedinthepopulationofconcern.

WhilethereisevidencethatwildbirdscanbereservoirsofvariousAIvirustypesandthatthesetypescansometimesbedetectedinwildbirdsbeforeindomesticbirds,delaysintesting,variationinclinicalpresentation,therelianceonopportunisticsamplingandtheinadequacyofwildbirdisolatesalonetoinspiremanagementactionsreducesthewillingnessandabilitytoquicklyre-spondtotheearlywarningsignal.

Theirsignalsshouldcreateawarning. Thresholdsforwildbirdfindingsthatinspirespe-cificactionsthatwouldreduceon-farmriskhavenotbeenidentified.SpecificactionshavenotbeendefinedfordetectionofAIinwildbirdsinCanada.

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Thesentinelpopulationsshouldbeabletocopewiththesamplingplan.

BirdstargetedforAIsurveillanceareabundantandarenotthoughttobeharmedbythepro-gram.

Does early warning work?

WhenexaminingtheroleofwildbirdsurveillanceforAsianH5N1,Feare(2010)concludedthatsurveillanceofapparentlyhealthywildbirdshadnotprovidedearlywarningtothepoultryindustrybutsearchingandexaminingdeadbirdswasabletodemonstratetheenvironmentalpresenceofthevirus,althoughnotitssource.WhenHallidayetal(2007)appliedtheirframeworkforselectingasentinelspecies,wildbirdsdidnotfarewellintheirexampleofdevelopingaHPAIH5N1surveillanceprogram.Positiveattributesofwildbirdsincludedthefollowing:(i)theycanserveasasourceforthevirus;(ii)theyhaveameasureableresponsewheninfected;and(iii),therearehighlyspecificdiagnostictests.Negativeattributeswereasfollows:(i)theresponsetoH5N1canbevariable.Thiscombinedwithalowprevalencelimitsthesensitivityofwildbirdsassentinels;(ii)wildbirdsarelessaccessiblethandomesticsentinelsandtheassociatedcostofcaptureoraccessingsamplespluslogisticchallengeslimitsthesamplesize;and(iii)theymayliveremotefromthepopulationsofconcern.ThesecommentsreflectexperiencewithH5N1Eurasianstrain.TheymaynotbeequallyapplicabletootherstrainscirculatinginNorthAmericaorelsewhere.

SomeauthorshaveconcludedthatactivesurveillanceofliveorhunterkilledbirdshavefailedtoshowearlywarningforcertainHPAI(mostlyH5N1)butthesesampleshavegreatlyexpandedourunderstandingofthegeographic,temporalandhostvariablesrelatedtovariationinLPAIstrains(Feare2010,Wilkingetal,2009).Feare(2010)concludedthatdeadbirdsurveillancehasbeenabletoindicatetheenvironmentalpresenceofHPAIinareaswhereitisbothendemicandnewtopoultryproductionregions.However,thereareexceptionstothesegeneralizations.Forexample,HPAIH5N1hasbeenfoundinlive,apparentlyhealthybirdsorbirdsdyingforsomethingotherthaninfluenzaandtherearemanyinstanceswhereHPAIwasfoundinpoultrybeforewildbirds,suchastherecentoutbreakinBritishColumbia.

Oneofthechallengesofanearlywarningsystemistofindthediseasesoonafteritemergesandisstillatlowprevalence.Wilkingetal(2009)reviewedGermanexperiencewithwildbirdsurveillanceforH5N1HPAIandconcludedthat,undertheircircumstances,318birdswouldneedtobetesteddailyinordertofindH5N1HPAIatorabovea1%prevalence.Thisrepresenteda4-foldincreaseintheexistingsamplingeffortinGermanyin2007;asamplesizeofover116,000birds/year.ThesamplingeffortsachievedforHPAIinGermanyintheearly2000’swereunabletoeitherruleinorruleoutthepresenceofHAPIinwildbirds(Wilkingetal,2009).Theseauthorsrecommendedrisk-basedsamplingthatmadeuseofgeographic,ornithologicalandveterinaryinformationtoselectlocations,speciesandtimestotargetspecificanimalsforsamplingasameanstoreducesamplesizeandincreasetheprobabilityofdetectionHPAIinwildbirds.

Theliteratureontheeffectivenessofearlywarningtochangepeople’sbehaviourinthefaceofaninfectiousdiseaseriskissparse.ImplicitinearlywarningforAIistheassumptionthatfarmerswillaltertheirbiosecurity

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practicestoreduceriskoftransmissiontodomesticbirdsfromwildlifebasedonknowledgeaboutwhichsub-typesofAIarecirculatinginwildlife.WeareunawareofanystudiesthatvalidatedthisassumptionandshowedthateffectivebiosecuritychangesaccompanywildbirdAIfindings.

Thereisevidencethatsocietallearningcanaffectthefinalsizeofdiseaseoutbreaks,justifyinginvestmentinearlywarningsystems(Drakeetal,2006;Rubineetal,2009).However,studiesofthedriversofbiosecuritypracticesonfarmsarefewandsometimessurprising.Forexample,asurveyofcattlefarmersintheUnitedKingdom(UK)post-bovinespongiformencephalopathyandpost-footandmouthdiseaseoutbreaksfoundthat“despitetheheavytollanimaldiseasehastakenontheagriculturaleconomy,moststudyparticipantsweredismissiveofthemanymeasuresassociatedwithbio-security,”oftenblamingexternalfactorsfordiseaseproblems(Heffernanaetal,2008).Conversely,Dutchswinefarmers“valuedbiosecuritymeasuresasamoreeffectivestrategythananimalhealthprograms”(Valeevaetal,2011).UKpoultryfarmers,showedaninverserelationshipbetweentheirwillingnesstoadoptabiosecuritymeasureagainstzoonoticinfectionsthatdidnotlimitproductionanditsestimatedcost(Fraseretal,2010).AQuebecstudyfoundthattheeffectsofinterventionsthatimprovedbiosecurity(inthiscasevideomonitoringofstaff)couldbeshortlived(Racicotetal,2012).FollowinganH5N1outbreakintheUK,onestudyfoundthatfarmerclaimsaboutthebestwaystoprotectflocksagainstdiseasewereinfluencedbythestructureoftheindustryandfarmerknowledgeandbeliefsystemsaboutpurityanddirt,healthandhygiene(Nerlichetal,2009).

Disease ecological research as a goal

ThepastdecadeofsurveillancehasgreatlyexpandedourunderstandingofAIecologyandepidemiology.Laboratory-basedresearchhasprovidedkeyinsightsintohost-orstrain-specificpathogenesis,thetimescalesofinfection,andtheroutesofvirusshedding.Experimentalworkandexaminationofcarcasseshaverevealedsignificantinformationonthecourseofinfection,theextentofviralsheddingandtherelativeimportanceofcloacalversusoropharyngealshedding(Feare,2010).MajorgapsstillexistinourknowledgeontheecologyandepidemiologyofLPAIandHPAIinwildbirds.“Althoughwildbirdsaretherecognizedsourceandreservoirforallsubtypesofavianinfluenzaviruses(AIV),thecomplexinteractionamongthesediversehostandviruspopulationshasnotreceivedadequateattention”(StallknechtandBrown,2007).Feweffortshavebeendirectedtolinkingornithologicalinformationandexposurepathwayanalysistoallowreadytranslationofthelaboratoryevidencetomanagementoutcomes(Yasuéetal,2006).Notenoughresearchhasfocusedonunderstandingexposureandtransmissionsystemsatthewildbird-domesticbirdinterface,makingitdifficulttotargetspecificsettings,speciesorcircumstancesforfocusedsamplingandsurveillance(Bevinsetal,2014)ortoattributesourcesofspreadorexposure.Thislimitationwasevidentinthe2014-15NorthAmericanHPAIoutbreakswhereinseveralagenciesassumedwaterfowlweremovingHPAIthroughmigratoryflywaysacrossandwithinNorthAmerica.GeneticevidenceindicatedthatthesomeHPAIsub-typescontainedamixtureofEurasianandNorthAmericanwildbirdviruslineages,suggestingthattheywerelikelytheproductofviralmixinginwildbirds,probablyinthewesternArcticduringthesummermonths.ThefallsouthwardmigrationofwaterfowlcouldhavebroughtthesenewviralvariantsintosouthernBritishColumbiaandthenorthwesternUSA.InearlyMarch,H5N2viruswasidentifiedinaturkeyflockinMinnesotaandsincethen,therehavebeensubsequentidentificationsindomesticpoultryinotherstatesandprovincesincludingMissouri,

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Arkansas,Kansas,Iowa,NorthandSouthDakota,WisconsinandOntario.VariousagencystatementsandnewsreportshighlightedthefactthatthesewerethefirstidentificationsofthesevirusesintheMississippiFlyway.Theuseoftheflywayasageographicidentifierputtheblame,byimplication,onwildbirdsasthesourceofthevirusandmanycommentatorsmadethisconnection.ItisreasonabletobelievethatthesestrainsofHPAIarrivedinthePacificNorthwestandintheMidwestafterbeingtransportedsouthwithmigratingwaterfowlinthefall.However,waterfowltypicallydonotstopandoverwinterintheareasintheMidwestwheretheviruswasinitiallyfoundinturkeys.Theycontinuetheirsouthwardmigrationtotheiroverwinteringgrounds.Furthermore,whilethereissomestrayingbetweenflyways,connectionstendtooccurwhenbirdsaggregateinthenorthernnestingareasorwhereflywaysintersectattheirsouthernterminus;notmid-continent(althoughstrayingdoesoccur).Prematurelyconcludingthatwaterfowlwerethemechanismsofcontinentaltransportofthevirusandintroductionintodomesticpopulationscouldlimitinvestigationofalternativeanthropogenicsources.

TheimplicationofwaterfowlastheprimarysourceofintroductionofnovelstrainsindomesticpoultryhasgoodsupportinAsiawherereducingexposuretowildbirdshasbeenacriticalfactorinpreventingspilloverintopoultry(Panditetal,2013).Giventhattheproductionsettings,wildspeciesandenvironmentalconditionsaresignificantlydifferentbetweenAsiaandNorthAmericaandwithinNorthAmerica,generalizationofthisconclusion,whileprecautionaryinnature,shouldnotprecludeinvestigationoftransmissionpathwaysinCanada.

Section 2: Assessment of success on reaching goals

Summary

Systematicevaluationsoftheimpact,reliability,representativeness,cost:benefit,orutilityofwildbirdavianinfluenzasurveillancecouldnotbefoundinthepeerreviewedliterature.KeyinformantsinCanadaandtheUSAnotedthatpastsurveyshavegreatlyincreasedourknowledgeofthevirusandincreasedawarenessoftheneedtoincorporatewildbirdinformationwhenplanningbiosecurityorsurveillance.

Program evaluation or review

Published reviews

Ourrapidliteraturereviewfoundnopublishedreportsofsystematicandcomprehensiveevaluationsforwildbirdavianinfluenzaprograms.ThisfindingisconsistentwithVrbovaetal(2010)whosesystematicliteraturereviewfoundnocomprehensiveevaluationofemergingzoonoticdiseasesurveillancesystemsandonly4assessmentsoftheusefulnessofsuchprograms.PublishedassessmentsofaviandiseasesurveillanceprogramsfocusmainlyonexperienceswithWestNilevirussurveillance.Paperswefoundthatincludedthewords“assessment”or“evaluation”and“avianinfluenza”tendedtofocusonevaluationsoftestingprotocolsordiagnosticmethods.Thereis,therefore,noabilitytomakeevidence-basedrecommendationsbasedonpublishedliterature.

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Qualitative assessment done for this report

Inrecognitionoftheabsenceofsystematicevaluations,theCWHCundertookinterviewsofkeyinformantswithinwhohavehadaroleinavianinfluenzasurveillance,researchandcontrolaswellassurveyeddirectorsofeachoftheCWHCregionalcentresandparticipatingprovincialdiagnosticlaboratories.WealsosurveyedopinionsofcriticalpersonnelinvolvedinthewildbirdenhancedprogramthatwaslaunchedinsouthwesternBCinthewinterof2014.Thegoalwastoidentifymainthemesorinsightsontheimpacts,opportunitiesandchallengesfacingwildbirdAIsurveysorsurveillance.

Comments from key informants

Theme 1: Much has been learned about AI ecology but knowledge gaps remainKeyinformantsinCanadanotedthatwehavelearnedalotaboutAIecologyandtheroleofwildbirdsduetopastsurveysandresearch.IntervieweesnotedthatthelackoftraderestrictionsuponthedetectionofEA/AMH5N8andH5N2inwildbirdslikelyreflecteddesensitizationofpoultrytradingpartnersoffindingsinwildbirds,becausetheyhavebeenconsistentlystudyingandreportingfindingsinwildbirdsfor9years. They recognizedtheneedformoreresearchonhowwildbirds,domesticpoultryandpeoplegetinfectedandonthedriversofviralreassortment.

Theme 2: Inability to point to specific impacts on AI risk or policy, but there was recognition that there have been some effects on programs and practices

PersonnelinterviewedattheEnvironmentCanada,theWildlifeConservationSociety,USDAandUSGSwereunawareofanypolicychangesresultingdirectlyfromofAIsurveillanceinwildbirds.Theywereunable,likemanyexperts,toanswerthequestionaboutwhatdatawouldtriggeractionorproposeawaythismighthappen.

CanadianintervieweesnotedthattheInteragencySurveyhelpedtodevelopandsupportanetworkoflaboratoriesacrossCanada.Recentshiftsawayfromlivebirdsurveysmayhaveerodedsomeofthenetworkswithotheragenciesandfieldpersonnel,butengagementwithlabsandthepoultryindustryremainsgood.Inaddition,experiencewithAIhasformedimportantbridgeswiththewildlifediseasescommunityandhasresultedinmoreregularandsystematicconsiderationofwildlifeinthenationalanimalhealthprogram.Giventhatthereareavarietyofimportantwildlife-agricultureissues(e.g.Tuberculosis,Brucellosis,ChronicWastingDisease),howmuchofthischangewecanattributetoAIisspeculative.Duringourinterviews,welearnedthattheUSDAmodifiedbiosecurityrecommendationsonfarmstoeliminateuseofuntreatedsurfacewaterforpoultry,tomakepoultryhousesbirdproof,andtodiscouragewaterfowlfrombecomingresidentonpropertyponds.TheUSDABiosecurityfortheBirdsCampaignnowincludesinformationonwildbirdsurveillanceandprovidesinformationonhowhuntersandfarmerscanprotectthemselvesfromexposuretoinfectedwildbirds.USDAkeyinformantsfurthernotedthatthereisgrowingrecognitionbytheUSpoultryindustrythatwildbirdsurveillancecouldserveasanearlywarning

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systemforpoultry.Forexample,manyindustryveterinariansrequestedin2014thattheUSDAdevelopaplantoconductsurveillanceforH5N8anditsreassortmentsinallflyways.GiventhatthebiosecurityinEuropeanandNorthAmericanpoultryfarmsishighalready,understandingtheimpactsandbenefitsofincrementalchangesbasedonknowledgeofwildbirdAIstatusseemswarranted.TheUSDAsuggestedthattheirpreviouseffortsarenowbeingusedtodesignwildbirdsurveillancefortherecentHPAIintroduction;andthatworkonenvironmentaldeterminantsofAI(Farnsworthetal.2012)andwildbirdsurveillance(Bevinsetal.2014)wereusedtodesigntheirenhancedPacificFlywaysurveillanceeffortaswellastheonesbeingdevelopedfortheotherflyways.

Forallofthechangesdiscussedabove,itwasnotpossibletodeterminewhatproportionofthechangeswereduetotheoutputsofnationalwildbirdsurveillanceactivitiesper seorthecombinedgrowinginternationalknowledgederivedfromresearchandsurveysfromaroundtheworld.

Comments from diagnostic centres in Canada

Theme 1: Reliance on opportunistic samplingThefocusonopportunisticsamplinghaslimitedtheabilityofdiagnosticcentrestodesignregionalprogramswithspecificsamplesizes,locationsorspeciestotarget.Capacitytoexpandtheprogramtoincreasethenumber,locationsordiversityofdeadbirds(throughactivesolicitationandfieldcollection)ortoincludelivebirdshasbeenlimitedbyavailableresources.Insomeregions,thelackofresourcesorwillingpartnerstotransportdeadbirdstothelabreducesthescopeofannualsamplingefforts.Theseissuescreatedelaysindetectingdeadbirdsandcanaffecttimelinessoftheprogram.Someregionsareabletomakeextraeffortstoovercomethegeographicbiasassociatedwithdeadanimalsurveillance.Forexample,inOntarioandSaskatchewan,provincialministriesarealreadyprovidingfundsorareindiscussionswithlocalCWHCregionstodevelopthisadditionalcapacity.TheCFIAwasabletosupplementcapacityinBritishColumbiaduringthe2014-15outbreakthatincreasedacquisitionofdeadbirdsamples.SucheffortsrelyonsupportoutsideannualinvestmentintheInteragencySurveyandarenotbeinguniformlydevelopedacrossjurisdictions.

Theme 2: Delays in testingTherearepragmaticimpedimentstotimelywildbirdsurveillancerelatedtothelogisticsofcollectingsamplesandthechallengesofmaintainingthepathogenasapriorityininter-epidemicperiods.Samplecollectionisaffectedbybirdmovements,accessibilityandavailabilityofsamplingcrewsorsubmissionstothelab.Therehasbeenvariationacrossthecountrybetweenlabsontheperceivedimportanceoftestingbetweenoutbreaks.Insomeregionsriskperceptionsandresourceconstraintscombinetoaffecttestingpractices.Forexample,insomejurisdictions,laboratories“batch”samplestoreducecosts,creatingdelaysintesting.Resourcelimitationsandthedesiretoestablishcauseofdeathinbirdscanalsocausefurtherdelaysinexaminingandtestingbirds.Respondentssuggestedwaystostreamlinethesurveysuchascreatingsharedinclusioncriteriafordeadbird

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surveillancethatcouldhelptriageandprioritizetesting.Anexamplegivenwastheeliminationoftestingwildbirdsthathadbeenheldincaptivityforprolongedtimes.Understandinggeographicvulnerabilitycouldalsoassistintriageandprioritizationoftesting.Livebirdsurveillance,especiallyinregionswithsignificantpoultryoperations,couldbeimplementedwithfocusonidentifyingviraltrafficinhighriskareas.

Theme 3: CommunicationsCommunicationsrequireongoingeffort,andinsomeareasawarenessabouttheimportanceofthesurveyandtheneedtoretainvigilanceindeadbirdcollection,timelysubmissionandprompttestinghasbeendiminished.ThecommunicationofprogramobjectivesanddevelopmenthasbeenachallengeashasthereportingofconfirmatoryresultsfromtheCFIAbacktoregionallabsand/orCWHCregionaloffices.Arenewedfocusoncommunicationisnecessarytoensurevigilanceandimprovetimelinessofreporting.

Theme 3: Value for investmentOveralltheprogramwasthoughttoworkwellandatarelativelylowcost.Samplenumbersofbirdsfounddeadandtestedhaveremainedstableinrecentyearsandacauseofdeathhasbeendeterminedforeachdeadbirdsubmitted.DataentrystandardsandinformationmanagementissuespresentatthebeginningoftheSurveywerelargelyresolved7-8yearsago.

Review of experience obtained in wild bird surveillance in the British Columbia 2014-15 outbreak

InearlyMay2015,membersoftheBCInteragencyWildBirdMortalityteam,theBCAnimalHealthCentreandtheCWHCmettodiscussandreflectontheabilitytorespondto,enhanceactivityandmanagewildbirdsurveillanceinresponsetotheHPAIintheFraserValley.ThepurposewastoidentifystrengthsandchallengesintryingtoensureareliableunderstandingofthewildbirdAIsituationduringandaftertheoutbreak.

MembersoftheInteragencyWildBirdMortalityteamcomefromtheMinistryofAgriculture(BCAnimalHealthCentre),MinistryofForests,LandsandNaturalResourcesOperations(FLNRO)andtheCanadianWildlifeService.Thispre-existingteamhasjurisdictiontocollect,handleandtestwildbirdsintheprovince.Theformerprovidesdiagnosticservices,thelatterprovideslogisticalsupportincollectingdeadbirdsandmaintainsadatabaseofcollectionsandresults,andtheFLNROrepresentativeprovidesliaisonwiththeprovincialwildlifecommunityandcontextforassessingdiagnosticresults.TheProgramisintendedtoaddresssurveillanceneedsforAI,WestNilevirusandotherwildbirdmortalityevents.ProgramoutputsaresharedwiththeCWHCwhoalsoprovidescoordination,liaisonandcommunicationsupporttothegroup.TheInteragencyteamdevelopsanannualplanandinvestigativeprotocol.Anexamplecanbefoundat:http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/wld/documents/wldhealth/AI_1pager2014.pdf

Theme 1: Communication• Strengths

o TheInteragencyWildBirdMortalityteamhasbeeninexistenceforseveralyears,overwhichtimeteammembershavebuilttrustandsharedunderstandingthatfacilitatesongoingcommunications

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andshareddecisionmaking.Thepre-establishedrelationshipandprotocolsreduceconfusiononprioritiesandactivitiesandensurescoordinationinmessagingandcommunications.TheCWHC’spre-existingworkingrelationswiththisteamassistedininformationflowandcoordinationofcommunications.

o AlocalemergencylaboratorydatabaseassistedintimelyentryoflaboratoryresultsandcommunicationwithintheBCAnimalHealthCentreandtotheCFIA,butdidlimitdatasharingwithotherpartnersincludingtheCWSandCWHC.

• Challenges

o Thelackofapre-establishedcommunicationsplanresultedingapsinpublicmessagingthatdelayedrequestsforpublicvigilanceandreportingofdeadbirdsandoutreachtothehuntercommunitytobolstersubmissionsofbirdsfortesting.

o Thelackofanagreedcommunicationplanandcontingenciesforunavailablepersonnelcauseddelaysandsomemisunderstandingsofactivitiesandoutcomes.

o Reportingandsharingofdatabackfromnationalpartnerswasseenasasignificantimpedimenttoensuringallpartnershadanequitableandsharedunderstandingofthesituationduringtheoutbreak.

o TrueearlywarninginBCislikelytocomefromfindingsfromWashingtonStateandAlaska,butnoregularorformalmechanismsforcollaborationandinformationsharingexistedpriortotheoutbreak.Thisgapremainspost-outbreak.

o Lackofcapacityforwildlifesurveillance,diagnosticsandepidemiologywithintheCFIAwasfelttocreatesomechallengesincommunicatingprioritiesonactivitiesandneedsforinformation/samplesharing.

Theme 2: Pre-planning• Strengths

o Existingprotocolsandahistoryoflocalcollaborationsallowedrapiddeploymentofanenhancedwildbirdprogram,createdmechanismsforpublicreportingthatwereimmediatelyavailableaswellasestablishedlocaldecisionmakingroles.

o Thecross-agencycharacteristicoftheInteragencyWildBirdMortalityteamcreatedasocialnetworkthatallowedforquickaccesstosuitablytrainedsurgecapacityaswellastoconnectwithadiversityofgroupstoallowforcommunicationwithstakeholderswhocouldreportdeadbirds.Italsoallowedlocalpartnersandteammembertotakeadvantageofcapacitytoexploittheoutbreaktodevelopandassessnovelmeansforsurveillance.

• Challenges

o Thisdiseasecrossesmanyjurisdictions,yettherewasalackofclarityanddirectiononroles,

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responsibilitiesandactionsonanoperationalandtacticallevelforeachoftheprogrampartnerorindividuals.WhilethereisaForeignAnimalDiseaseEmergencySupport(FADES)planforavianinfluenzainBritishColumbia,wildlifedoesnotfeatureprominentlyandthedetailsareinsufficientforoperationalortacticalplanning.Thisgapcreatedconfusiononrolesandresponsibilitiesforthewildbirdportionsoftheresponse,includingissuesofcommunication,informationandsamplecontrol,andmanagementandresourceuse.

o Thereareno“hardtargets”forwildbirdsurveillance.ThiscanleadtoinconsistenciesinexpectationsforgoalsforwildbirdAIactivitiesandlackofclarityonwhatcanbeandneedstobeaccomplishedwithinfinancialconstraints,andhowthoseneedsvaryinthepre-,inter-andpost-outbreakperiods.Thelackofapre-existingoperationalplanthatspecifiesdetailedrolesandresponsibilitiesresultedinchallengesinmakingdecisionsonsurveydesignsandallocationofresources.Thelackofguidanceonoptimumtools,targetsandstrategiesforwildbirdsurveillanceoronhowtobestshare,assessandusedataexistsacrossCanada,creatingtheopportunityforvariationintheoperationalgoalsandprioritizationofactivities,speciesandlocationsforsurveillanceacrossCanadaandbetweenjurisdictions.

Theme 3: Capacity• Strengths

o ThecombinationofCFIAcontributionsandpre-existingprofessionalsocialnetworksallowedforrapidaccesstosurgecapacityneededtosupplementtheInteragencyWildBirdMortalityteam’sabilitytocollectsamples.

o Theteamcouldcompensateforthelackofapre-existingsurgecapacityplanorbudgetbecauseoftheirpre-existingrelationshipsandpersonalcontacts.ThisallowedforrecruitmentofanexternalcontractorconcurrentwithCFIAactivitiestosecurefunds.

• Challenges

o WhilethelocalexpertsbelievedtheiractivitiesresultedinarepresentativeviewofHPAIintheFraserValley,lackofcapacitytocollectmanydeadwildbirdsbeyondthisgeographicregionortotestmorehunterkilledandlivebirdsthatweretravellingintooroutofthisarealimitedconfidenceintheabilitytowildbirdrolesintheHPAIoutbreakbeyondtheFraserValley.

o Despiteeffortstoencouragemorereportingofdeadbirdsandtoactivelysearchforhunterkilledbirdsordeadbirdsstoredatotherfacilities,thesamplesizeofbirdsavailableforexaminationseemedtoreachacap.Whetherthisreflectedthelackofsufficientpublicprofileoftheteamandits1-800reportinglineorreflectedthebiologicalrealityofrelyingofpassivesurveillanceisunknown.

o Lackofresourcesrequiredpre-outbreaksurveillancetobedoneinbatches.ThisinpartreflectedthegoalofestablishingcauseofdeathbutalsoreflectedlackofcapacityinpartneringagenciessuchastheCanadianWildlifeServicewhichreceivedsignificantcutstoitsoperatingbudget-restrictingtime

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forcollection,submissionandmanagementofdeadbirdrecovery.

Wild Bird AI surveillance in 2015 and beyond

Summary

OuroverviewofexistingopinionandexperiencesuggesttherearefourkeyareasforconsiderationwhenexaminingfutureprogramactivitiesforwildbirdAIsurveillance,surveysorresearch:

1. Thereisaneedforprogramevaluation.Understandingiftheinformationbeinggeneratedishavingthedesiredeffectsonhumanbehavioursthatcaninfluencepoultryexposureprobabilitiesoraffectthevulnerabilityofpoultryoperationsiscriticalforevidencebasedprogramdevelopment.

2. ThereisadesiretoimprovethetimelinessandforecastingabilityofinformationgeneratedbyanAIprogramsothatpoultryoperationscanbebetterpreparedinadvanceofanoutbreak.Giveninherentdelaysinacquiring,testingandconfirmingtheAIstatusofawildbird,itmaybetimetoincludemonitoringvariablesthatcouldaffectthevulnerability(susceptibilityandexposure)ofpoultryoperationstocontaminatedwildbirdfeces.

3. TosupportvulnerabilityassessmentandtomaximizetheefficientuseoflimitedresourcestocoveravastnumberofwildbirdsoverallofCanada,risk-basedsurveillancethattargetsvulnerableandhigherrisklocationsshouldbeexplored.

4. Anup-to-dateandexplicitstrategythatoutlinesroles,responsibilities,andexpectationsforthegovernance,objectivesandconductofnationalwildbirdAIprogramsisneeded.

Program evaluation

Thelackofprogramevaluationpreventsevidence-basedprogramplanningandassessment.Programevaluationisasystematicwaytoimproveandaccountforactionsbyinvolvingproceduresthatareuseful,feasible,andaccurate(Milsteinetal,1999).Evaluationincludesaneedsassessmentthatreviewsandestablishesthegoalsoftheprogramtoassistinplanning;aprocessevaluationtoseehowtheprogramisoperating;andanoutcomeevaluationtodetermineiftheprogramhashaditsdesiredeffect.

Wewerestruckinthisreviewbythechallengeofdeterminingthelinkbetweenprogramgoals,outputsandoutcomes.Historically,itappearsthatincreasingknowledgeofAIecologyinwildbirdswasamajoroutcomebutthedesiredgoalwasearlywarning.Aneedsassessmentwithindustryanddecisionmakersmayhelptodeterminewhichoutcomesaredesiredinthefutureandtheoutputsrequiredtomeettheseexpectations.Understandinghowtheseexpectationswillvaryininter-,pre-andpost-outbreakscenariosisimportantnotonlytoensureaconsistentcross-

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Canadaapproachbutalsotomaintaininterestandactivitybetweenoutbreaks.Earlywarningsurveillancerequiresconsistentinter-epidemicactivitythatdoesnotwaneininterestorcapacitybetweenepidemicevents.Outcomeevaluationmayrequireresearchtoestablishif/howprogramoutputsaffectbiosecurityplanningandpracticesandtodeterminewhichoutputswouldinfluenceriskreductionbehaviours.Timeliness and forecasting

Anumberofauthorsadvocateforrisk-basedwildbirdsurveillanceasawaytoincreasetheforecastingvalueofwildbirdinformation(e.g.Hoyeetal,2010;Wilkingetal,2009;Snowetal,2007).Recommendationsonhowbesttoidentifyriskvariedacrosspublicationswithsomeauthorsemphasizinghighrisktimesandplaceswherewildbirdsaggregateandaremorelikelytobeshedding;othersemphasizinggeographicproximitytodomesticbirdsandstillothersfocusingonlandscapefeaturessuchaswaterbodiesinthevicinityofpoultryagricultureasmeanstoselectsamplinglocations,timesandspeciesmorelikelytoprovidereliableriskforecasting.

Wagneretal(2001)nominatedfourmainwaystoimprovethetimelinessofearlywarningsurveillance,threeofwhicharerelevanttoAI.First,morecompletesamplingcanbeundertakentoimprovethequalityofthewarningsignal.Inthiscase,expandingthesamplesize,speciesdiversityandgeographicdistributionofwildbirdssamplesmayhelpinthedetectionofarelativelyrareeventsuchasanewAIsub-type.Unfortunately,theopportunisticnatureoftheInteragencySurveyandlimitsoftypicalbudgetsandinfrastructurereducecapacitytoincreasesamplingeffortorgeographicdistribution.SamplesizesneededtodetecttargetprevalencewillvarywithseasonalchangesinexpectedtrueprevalenceandwhetherthedesireistodescribecommonLPAIordetectraresub-types.Asinglesamplesizecouldnotbespreadacrossspecies,seasonorlocationbecauseprevalencecanbeexpectedtovarywitheachofthesevariables.

Analternativestrategytosimplyincreasingsamplesizeistorefinethesearchareaandprioritizespeciesbasedontheirknownproximitytoandinteractionswithpoultryfarms,aswellasandtheirknownhistoryassourcesofAIsub-types.Burnsetal(2012)attemptedtoidentifyhighpriorityspeciesforBCandOntariousingsuchcriteria.SuchanapproachwouldreducegeographicrepresentativenessandconstrainafullviewofAIecology,butcouldallowforfocusedeffortsaroundhighriskcircumstances.Planningsuchaprogramwouldneedtobalancethefrequencyofcontactbetweenwildbirds(ortheirfeces)andthelikelihoodofthetargetedspeciesbeinginfected.GubertiandNewman(2007)recommendeddailytoweeklysamplinginimportantbirdhabitatstoincreasethelikelihoodofearlydetectionofHPAIH5N1.Furthermore,theyrecommendrestrictingsamplestodeadorsickbirds,giventheexperienceinfindingHPAIinassociationwithmortality/morbidityevents.Forlivebirdsurveillance,theyrecommendedrestrictingsamplingtoareasnearpoultryfarms,andfocusingonwaterfowlaggregationsofmorethan1,200birds.ItisimportanttonotethatGubertiandNewman’s(2007)recommendationshavenotbeenvalidatedasmethodstomorecompletelycharacterisetheAIriskorfacilitatemoretimelydetectioninaNorthAmericansettingorwithothersub-types.Beforeadoptingarisk-basedapproach,adetailedconsiderationoftheimplicationsandactionsassociatedwithfindingAIonornearapoultryoperationinwildbirdsortheirenvironmentmustbeundertaken.

Thesecondstrategyistoaddadditionalsignalstotheearlywarningsystem.CurrentCanadianeffortsfocus

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almostexclusivelyondeadbirdsurveillancewithonegeographicallyandtemporallyconstrainedlivebirdsamplecollectionperyear.Additionalsignalsofviralpresenceinbirdswouldrequireexpandingthesystemasdescribedabove.Alternativemeanstodeterminethepresenceofthevirusinenvironmentsofconcerncouldfocusontestingotherenvironmentalmediafrequentedbywaterfowl.Feces-contaminatedwaterisawell-establishedrouteofinfectionforwildbirds.AIhasbeenisolatedfromfeces,lakesandponds.FreshfecalsampleshavebeenusedasthebasisofnationalAIsurveillancesystemsandsurveyselsewhere(eg.Kangetal,2010;Ofulaetal,2013).Fecalsamplingmayprovidelessinformationonthehostsinvolved(unlesssupplementedwithDNAtestingtoidentifythehost)andmayyieldlowerprevalenceestimates,butitisconsideredbysometobeanefficientapproachtoidentifyingcirculatingvirusesandeliminatestheneedtocapturebirds,reducesstafftrainingneedsandeasesneedsforpermitsforsamplingwildlife(Stallknechtetal,2012).OtherstudieshaveshownthecapacitytodetectAIvirusinwater,evenunderwarmconditionswithlowdensitiesofwaterfowl(Henauxetal,2012;Burnsetal,2012).Theinclusionofornithologicaldata,particularlyonanimalmovementsandwildbirdinteractionswithpoultry,mayhelpidentifyareaswithincreasedriskofspilloverofvirusintothedomesticbirdpopulation(Yasuéetal,2006).Remotesensingtechnologyhasbeennominatedasmeanstoidentifywaterbodies,includingfloodedareas,thatmightbesuitablehabitatforwildducksand/orplaceswhereenvironmentalcontaminationwithAIvirusmaybegreater.VirussurvivaloutsideofabirdisaffectedbyenvironmentalcharacteristicsandpersistenceofAIvirusinaquaticecosystemsisakeyinwildbirdinfectiondynamics.Remotely-sensedinformationonthepresenceandsuitabilityofwaterforwaterfowlandAIvirusmayallowformorerapiddetectionofhighriskareasanddeploymentofsurveyresourcestoareasmorelikelytoharbourinfectedbirds(Tranetal,2010).WhileallofthesedatasourcescouldyieldadditionaldatatoincreasethetimelinessofresponsetoanAIthreat,theirsuitabilityforforecastingriskandinspiringactionawaitsvalidation.

Thechallengewithaddinginnewdatasourcesisthat,whiletheymaydetectrisksignalsearly,thecertaintypeoplehaveintheirpredictivepowerislower.Wecanstatethatanepidemicinpoultryoreventhefindingofanindexfarm/caseisnotearlywarning,butitwouldinspireimmediateaction.Conversely,remotesensingdata,orenvironmentalsamplingwouldgivemuchearlierwarning,butitslikelihoodofinspiringimmediateactionintheabsenceofeffectsinpoultrywouldlikelybelow.Wefoundnopapersdescribingtheresultingactionsbasedonenvironmentorremotesensingsignals.Whileeconomicconstraintsmayforceriskmanagerstofocusonasmallernumberofsourcesofriskinformation,amulti-stageapproachwouldallowresourcestobegraduallyrampedupwithmorepreciseselectionofhighriskareasasforecastcertaintyincreases.

Thethirdstrategytoimprovethetimelinessofearlywarningistooptimizedetectionthresholds.Forsome

AItests,suchasmRT-PCR,sensitivitycanbechangedbyalteringpositivedetectionthresholds.ShiftingtosyndromicsurveillanceisunlikelytobeusefulforLPAI(andsomeHPAI)duetothelackofclinicalsymptomsininfectedbirds,andmayyieldtoomanyfalsepositivesifusedaloneforHPAI.

Vulnerability surveillance

Therearetwomainwaystoimprovetheriskforecastingvalueofwildbirddatawithintherealityofresourceandlogisticconstraints.OneistoincreasethelikelihoodofearlydetectionofHPAIinwildbirds.Thesecondapproach

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istofocusonpoultryoperationsandidentifyfactorsthatmakethemmorevulnerabletoexposureanddisease.ThepoultryindustrywantsadvancedwarningofanincursionofaHPAIstrainintimeenoughtoact.GlobalexperiencesuggeststhatthereisnotaconsistentpatternofwhetherornotHPAIwillbedetectedinwildbirdsbeforedomesticpoultryorthatthewildbirdsthatdotestpositivearethesourceofadomesticoutbreak(asopposedtobeingspill-backhostsorsharinganexposuresourcewithdomesticbirds).Wildbirdsurveillancealoneisinadequatetorevealwhichlocationsaremostvulnerabletoexposure.

Vulnerabilityiscomposedofthelikelihoodofexposuretoahazardandthesusceptibilitytoharmfromthatexposure.Thereisagrowingbodyofworkemergingfromconcernsoverbioterrorism,emergencyresponse,climatechangeandemerginginfectionsthataddressesquestionsofhowtodeterminewhichpopulationsaremostvulnerabletoanepidemicspreadingthroughanetwork,andwhichcarrythehighestriskofcausingamajoroutbreakiftheyarethesourceoftheinfection.Becker(2003)recognizedthelackofvulnerabilityassessmentworkinveterinarymedicineandrecommendedincreasedattentionbeplacedbytheveterinaryprofessiononvulnerabilityassessmenttobetterprotectagricultureandpublichealth.

Asillustratedabove,therehasnotbesufficientworkconductedonthemechanismsofintroductionofHPAIintopoultrybarnsnorontheuseofepidemicintelligencetocharacterisetherisk/vulnerabilitysettingofaregion/farminordertomotivatechangesinbiosecuritypracticesinadvanceofdetectinganinfectedwildordomesticbird.Forecastingarisk(asopposedtodetectingitearly)requiresanintelligenceapproachthatprovidesawarenessofthechangingepidemiologicalsituationbytrackingnotjustdiseaseoutcomesbutalsovulnerabilitiesofpopulationsofconcern.Sawfordetal(2011)proposedanintelligencesystemfordetectionofemergingzoonosesunderlowresourcesettings.Inthatpaper,theyoutlinedthefeaturesofasystemthatcouldallowforongoingsituationalawareness.Theirworkhighlightstheneedtoexpandsurveillancefromonlytrackingdiseaseoutcomestoalsotrackingthepopulationofconcern,aswellastheneedforcontextualinformationaffectingsusceptibilityorexposurealongwiththecapacityforongoingtrendsassessment.FurtherworkwouldberequiredbeforeanAIepidemicintelligenceprogramcouldbelaunched.Table2proposes,fordiscussion,possibleelementsofawildbirdAIintelligenceprogram.Thethresholdsforaction(e.g.whatremotelysensedchangesinwatersystemswouldtriggerdeploymentofresourcestosearchforviruses)andthebalancebetweenthedesireforearlywarningandimplicationsoffindingcertainAIsub-typeswouldneedtobediscussedandbalanced.However,withgrowinginterestintheuseoftechniquesotherthandirectbirdsampling,regulatoryagenciesareadvisedtoproactivelyconsiderhowalternativeearlywarningorenvironmentalsamplingtechniquescanbeused,interpretedandcommunicated.

RegardlessofwhetherornotanAIepidemicintelligencesystemisdesired,thereseemsanobligationtobetterunderstandthewildbird-domesticbirdinterface.Forexample,tomeetOIErequirementslaidoutintheTerrestrialCode,wildbirdprogramsshouldbeabletodetectHPAIinwildbirdsaswellasinformdomesticpoultrysurveillancebasedonwild-domesticbirdinteractions.Thenatureoftherequireddescriptionisunclear.The2015NorthAmericansituation,particularlytheappearanceoftheHPAIinMinnesotaatatimewherewildwaterfowlwouldbesparseinthewinterenvironment,suggestsweneedabetterunderstandingofhowanAIviruscanmovefromawildbird,intotheenvironmentandintoabarninordertorefinebiosecurityplans.

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Table 2: Hypothetical elements of a wild bird avian influenza (AI) intelligence system SPECTRUMOFWILDBIRDAIINTELLIGENCE

SAMPLETARGETS

CONDUCIVEENVIRON-MENT

VIRUSINDETECTION EXPOSUREPOTENTIAL DISEASEDETECTION

DATA/SAMPLESOURC-ES

1.Remotesensingofwaterconditions2.Wildbirdmove-ments3.Distributionofpoultry

1.Waterorsediments2.Wildbirdfeces3.Deadwildbirds4.Livewildbirds

1.Wildbirdmovementoraggregationnearpoultry2.Wildbirdmortalityonornearfarms3.Wildbirdfecesonfarm 4.On-farmdomesticbirdsurveillance

1.Deadormoribundwildbirds2.Deadormoribunddomesticbirds3.Outbreaksofclini-callycompatibleillness

ACTIONS DEPLOYsamplingre-sourcesstrategicallytoareasconducivetoAIpresenceandtrans-mission.MakepeopleAWAREsothereisenhancedvigilance.DeterminepotentiallyVULNERABLElocations

UndertakeRISKANALY-SISforlocalconditions.IssueALERTStopromoteenhancedbi-osecurityatvulnerablelocations

IssueALERTStopro-motediseasecon-tainmentandcontrolandmountEARLYRESPONSEtorestrictspreadandeliminaterisktovulnerablepop-ulations

MountRECOVERYandareaCONTAINMENTactions

A National Wild Bird AI Strategy and Plan

Astrategyoutlinesthedesiredgoalsandoutcomes.Withoutit,itisnotpossibletoidentifythebesttacticstoachievethoseoutcomes.TherehaveroutinelybeenoperationalplansdevelopedannuallytoguideparticipatingorganizationsonthegoalsandmethodsoftheInteragencyWildBirdSurvey;however,variationintacticaldecisionsonhowtotriageandtargetsamplingeffortssuggestthatthereisnotasharedunderstandingoragreementonthegoalsortargetsforsurveillanceandhowthosemaydifferforinter-epidemicversusepidemicperiods.Inaddition,therehasbeenalackofguidanceandcommunicationamongparticipantsinplanningimplementationoftheprogramincludinginformationflow,performanceexpectations,orhowtoadapttochangingcircumstancesforcommunicationsoroperationswhenkeypersonneldepart.TheselimitationsarenotuniquetoCanadaandtheyreflecttheresponsiveandevolvingnatureofwildbirdAIsurveillanceactivitiesinthepast.Inmanyways,itseemsthattheoperationalplansofmanycountrieshavebeendevelopedinresponsetofiscalandresourceconstraintsratherthandesignedtoachievespecificmeasurabletargets.Reductionininterestandinvestmentinmodifyingandassessingplansinbetweenurgenteventsoroutbreaksmayhaveimpededthedevelopmentandsharingofaplanthatisusefultoguidesurveillance

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operationsunderallepidemiologicalsituationsandensureasharedvisionofthedesiredoutcomesinamannerthatwouldallowlocalparticipantstoadapttheirresourcestobestaddressthespecificprogramgoals.

Resourcelimitationscontinuetoinspireasearchforwaystomoreefficientlyconductpathogensurveys.Hoyeetal(2010)forexample,recommendedstandardized,hypothesisdrivenlocalsurveysthatarestrategicallycompiledoverawidergeographicareainordertomaximizebenefitsofwildbirdAIsurveillance.Someofthemethodsdiscussedaboveforimprovementsintimelinessfocusonthegoalofimprovedearlydetection.However,caremustbetakenthatsuchefficienciesdonotcompromiseothergoals,particularlythoserelatedtoestablishingtheecologyandepidemiologyofAIassuchbiasedsamplingapproacheswillnotberepresentativeofthetruepopulationinfectionstatus.Forexample,samplingbirdsfurthernorthmayincreasetheprobabilityofvirusdetection,butitwouldrestrictsamplingtoonetimeinthebirdslifecyclewhentheirstressors,age,proximitytoagricultureandothervariablesthatmayaffectviralprevalence,impactsandsheddingwillbedifferentthanatothertimesintheirlifecourse.Asharedandstandardizedplanandstrategymayreduceyear-to-yearandbetween-jurisdictionvariations,aswellassetoutclearguidanceonperformanceexpectationsforsampling,testingandcommunications.

What about the wild birds themselves?

Thefocusofthisreporthasbeenontheuseofdataassociatedwithwildbirdsaspartofasurveillanceprogramtoprotectagricultureandpublichealth.ExperiencetodatesuggeststhatAIhasnotbeenasignificantcauseofmortalityinwildbirds(withlimitedexamplesofdie-offsinHPAI-infectedwildbirds).Giventhat(i)ecologicaleffectsofinfectioninwildlifeareoftennotrealizedthroughmorbidityormortalitybutratherthroughsub-clinicalimpactsonreproduction,predatoravoidance,foragingsuccess,orotherpopulationhealthdeterminants,(ii)avianinfluenzaisrecognizedasaglobaldiseasesthatisregularlyandpossiblyincreasinglyseeninsusceptiblewildanddomestichosts;and(iii)surveillancebiaseshaveprecludedarobustassessmentoftheimpactsofAIonwildbirdsundernaturalconditions,itseemsreasonabletoreflectonhowwildbirdAIsurveillanceandcontrolmayhelpprotectwildbirdsaswell.

Investmentinunderstandingviraltrafficmayhelpbetterunderstandwhatproportionofwildbirdinfectionsarespill-overorspill-backcasesandbetterprotecteitherwildordomesticbirdsfromexposuretonovelsub-types.Understandingtherolebetweenwildbirdstressors(especiallythoseassociatedwithhumanactivitysuchaslanduse)mayhelpidentifypolicydecisionsthatareprotectiveofwildbirdswhilealsoreducingdomesticbirdrisk.EngagingthewildlifehealthcommunityandagenciesindevelopingacomprehensivenationalwildbirdAIstrategyandoperationalplaniswarrantedasisdevelopingplansthatwillallowresultinginformationtogenerateevidencethatprotectswildlife,agricultureandpublichealth.

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Appendix 1. Overview of international wild bird influenza surveillance efforts Thefollowingnumberswerereportedinresearchpapersandarenotnecessarilyrepresentativeofsurveillanceeffortsacrosstheentirecountryorgeographicregion.

Page33

Country/Region Sample Size Sample Type Sampling Period Surveillance Type Species Positives % Positive

Australia 21858 Cloacal, fecal 2005-2008 Active – live sampling

Waterfowl, shorebirds, other

300 1.4

Bavaria 5864 Cloacal, tracheal, fecal, organs

Jul 2007-Dec 2008 12 orders 217 3.7

Caribbean region 324 Cloacal, Tracheal

2006-2009 Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

Waders, ducks, doves

0 0

Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia)

2604 Cloacal 2003-2009 Active – harvest, live capture

14 orders; mostly Anseriformes, Charadriiformes, Passeriformes

17 0.07

Denmark 11055 Oropharyngeal, cloacal, fecal

2007-2010 Passive – found dead; Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

11 orders – high percentage Anseriformes

536 4.8

Greenland 3555 Fecal 2007-2010 Active - fecal 6 orders 0 0

Egypt 7894 Cloacal Sep 2003-Feb 2007 Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

Green-winged Teal, Northern Shoveler, Northern Pintail, 92 other species

745 9.4

Europe 24516 Cloacal 1998-2005 612 2.5

Georgia 5220 Tracheal, cloacal, fecal

2009-2011 Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

Anatidae, Charadriiformes, total 11 Orders

84 1.6








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Country/Region Sample Size Sample Type Sampling Period Surveillance Type Species Positives % Positive

Germany, Austria, Switzerland

778 Tracheal, cloacal

2006-2007 (Sep-Aug)

Passive – found dead, bycatch; Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

Swans, diving ducks, grebes, mergansers, other

Great Britain 9960 2007-2009 Passive – found dead; Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

Kenya 2630 Fecal 2008 12 (of 516 pooled samples

Mexico 1262 Cloacal, oropharyngeal

2007-2009 Active – hunter harvest

20 aquatic species

46 3.6

Mongolia 5831 Fecal Jul 2009-Oct 2012 (May-Oct)

Anatidae, Laridae

80

Norway 2417 Cloacal, tracheal

2005-2010 (Aug-Dec)

Active – hunter harvest

Dabbling ducks, gulls

15.5

Poland 366 Cloacal, oropharyngeal

2008-2010 Active – live sampling

Anseriformes, Charadriiformes, Gruiformes

14 3.8

Portugal 5691 Cloacal, oropharyngeal

2005-2009 Active – live sampling

13 orders 93 1.6

Russia (Asian region)

5678 Cloacal, fecal 2008 Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

18 orders 41 0.72

Slovakia 650 Cloacal, oropharyngeal

2008 (Apr, Jun, Jul) Active – live sampling

Passeriformes, Falconiformes

13.6/17.5 (spring/fall)

South Korea 28214 Fecal 2003-2008 Active – fecal sampling

Anseriformes 225 0.8

Sweden 18645 Cloacal 2008-2009 (Mar-Dec)

2463 13.2

Switzerland 2106 Pharyngeal, cloacal

Sep 2006-Dec 2008 Active – live sampling, hunter harvest

13 orders 84 4

Taiwan 44786 Fecal 1998-2011 Active - fecal Anatidae, shorebirds, Laridae, Ardeidae, other

1.1 (Anatidae)

Active - fecal








Sources of information for Appendix 1. Baumeretal.2010:http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1637/9119-110209-Reg.1Borovskaetal.2011:http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/biolog.2011.66.issue-2/s11756-011-0016-3/s11756-011-0016-3.xmlBreedetal.2012:http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/10166-040912-Reg.1Chengetal.2010:http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1637/8960-061709-Reg.1Hansbroetal.2010:http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/16/12/10-0776_articleHenriquesetal.2011:http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03079457.2011.618943Hjulsageretal.2012:http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/10190-041012-ResNote.1Kangetal.2009:http://www.jwildlifedis.org/doi/abs/10.7589/0090-3558-46.3.878Knight-Jonesetal.2010:http://www.vetres.org/articles/vetres/pdf/2010/04/v09603.pdfLefrancoisetal.2010:http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/8787-040109-ResNote.1Lewisetal.2013:http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0058534Machalabaetal.2015:http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/21/4/14-1415_articleMarchenkoetal.2012:http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/9834-061611-ResNote.1Montalvo-Corraletal.2010:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1865-1682.2010.01182.x/epdfOfulaetal.2013:http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/vbz.2011.0926Olsonetal.2014:http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0090826Rabletal.2009:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19999383?dopt=AbstractSivayetal.2012:http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/9868-080111-Reg.1Smientankaetal.2012:http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/pjvs.2012.15.issue-2/v10181-011-0150-4/v10181-011-0150-4.xmlSolimanetal.2012:http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22740532Tonnessenetal.2013:http://www.virologyj.com/content/10/1/112

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http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1637/9119-110209-Reg.1

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/biolog.2011.66.issue-2/s11756-011-0016-3/s11756-011-0016-3.xml

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/biolog.2011.66.issue-2/s11756-011-0016-3/s11756-011-0016-3.xml

http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/10166-040912-Reg.1

http://www.bioone.org/doi/abs/10.1637/8960-061709-Reg.1

http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/16/12/10-0776_article

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03079457.2011.618943

http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/10190-041012-ResNote.1

http://www.jwildlifedis.org/doi/abs/10.7589/0090-3558-46.3.878

http://www.vetres.org/articles/vetres/pdf/2010/04/v09603.pdf


http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0058534

http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/21/4/14-1415_article


http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1865-1682.2010.01182.x/epdf

http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/vbz.2011.0926

http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0090826

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19999383?dopt=Abstract

http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1637/9868-080111-Reg.1

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/pjvs.2012.15.issue-2/v10181-011-0150-4/v10181-011-0150-4.xml

http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/pjvs.2012.15.issue-2/v10181-011-0150-4/v10181-011-0150-4.xml

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22740532

http://www.virologyj.com/content/10/1/112


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