CONCLUSION

Farmers' movements in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharash­

tra and Punjab articulated the discontent of surplus produc­

ers in mid 1970's and 1980's. In these states the movement

started with issues specific to their own region. In the

course of the movement, region specific demands became sec­

ondary, giving way to general and populist demands. Rallies

and dharnas sponsored by leaders of the movements, got

massive response and were well-sustained. As the movement

spread, the class bias of the leaders and their demands was

exposed, thus cutting the support base of the movement.

The farmers' movement in western Uttar Pradesh, is a

part of the ongoing farmers' movements in other parts of the

country. The movement started against the hike in power

tariff. With every agitation more general economic demands

i.e. remunerative prices, subsidised inputs, loan waiver

etc. were included in the charter of demands. To broaden the

support base of the movement, social issues like abolition

of dowry, limiting marriage expenses, discouraging drinking,

taking action against husbands deserting or harassing wives

were raised. Like the farmers' movements in other parts of

the country, BKU adopted similar method of agitation, i.e.

229

sit in dharnas, panchayats (rallies), gherao, rasta roko

(road blockade), non-payment of agricultural loans and dues,

gaon bandi (blockade of villages) etc.

The Shamli agitation provided confidence to Takait and

BKU. They realised that their demands enjoyed broad accept-

ance from the farmers. The Meerut siege brought BKU and

Tikait to public attention. From then, Tikait emerged as a

charismatic leader. The week long dharna, at the Boat Club

lawns of Delhi transposed the agrarian politics of BKU from

state to the national level. It reflected the growing asser­

tiveness of rich and middle class/caste surplus producing

farmers. With these actions the BKU ensured that the farmers

charter of demands would occupy a place of pride in election

manifestoes of all political parties. The impending elec­

tions and a month_- long dharna organised by the BKU at

Bhopa, compelled UP Congress government to sign an agreement

with BKU.

The concessions obtained by the BKU, from the state

government were more rhetorical than real. Hence Tikait's

leadership came under criticism. As BKU at the village level

was dominated by Jats, the other cultivating castes did not

have a say in the decision making forums of the Union. They

230

gradually distanced themselves from the activities of the

movement. Parallel farmers organisations of Tyagis and

Gujjars emerged. They divided the surplus producers on

caste lines. Moreover Tikait's participation in the anti­

Mandal agitation, non-cooperation (non-tax payment) , and his

campaign against the police and administration created a law

and order problem in the region, which led to the decline of

the farmers participation in BKU's rallies and dharnas.

Corruption charges against Tikait, and his favouritism

towards his own Khap Balayan, divided the Jats. Jats of

other Khaps in the region turned against him, confining his

support base to parts of Muzaffarnagar and Meerut, particu­

larly west of Kali Nadi, where the Baliyan Khap is dominant.

The major achievement of the movement was at the psy­

chological level. It was able to instill confidence among

the rich and the middle class farmers. In the villages where

Jats dominate, the BKU is strong, there the farmers were no

longer afraid of corrupt police officials and bureaucrats.

The well-organised rallies and dharnas were able to arouse

consciousness among the farmers about their socio-economic

problems.

The farmers movement in western UP, like those of Tamil

231

Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Punjab was dominated by

rich and middle class farmers. They had a high stake in the

demands of higher prices and favourable terms of trade for

agriculture. They also possessed the resources to transport

farmers to the site of dharnas and rallies. Their contribu-

tion in the form of money, wheat etc. for the cause of the

movement was immense. Hence they played an active role in

mobilising marginal farmers and the landless. The small

farmers of western UP have adopted modern technology. They

not only use modern inputs in agriculture, but also produce

cash crops like sugarcane. As a result, demands like higher

prices for sugarcane and subsidies for agricultural inputs

attracted them to join the BKU. Their participation in the

rallies and dharnas of BKU provided a mass base for the

movement. Moreover, by joining the union, they received

attention and respect from the government officials. Mem-

bership of the BKU and its white-green cap was almost an

insurance against harassment by the police ande corrupt

officials.

The class interest of the rich, middle and small farm­

ers, in Upper Doab region was blurred by peasant proprietor­

ship. Districts like Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur,

232

Bulandsahar, Moradabad, parts of Bijnore, and Aligarh

(bastions of the BKU) , have an old tradition of the Bhaiya­

chara. In this system, particularly prevalent among the

cultivating castes of Jats, Gujjars, Tyagis and Jat Muslims

etc., the land was divided among Khap members forming a

bhaiyachara community. The absence of an intermediary be-

tween peasant proprietors (unlike the zamindari system in

east UP) and state, combined with a political system of

Khaps, in which rich and poor peasant proprietors are

equals, placed them in a dominating position in the rural

areas of these districts. It was this old political system

of Khaps, which was revived by Tikait. He himself is the

Chaudhary of one of the largest Khap Balyan. The Choud-

haries of other Khaps provided the BKU, an organisational

structure necessary to mobilise people and resources for

dharnas and rallies. Hence in the initial stages of the

movement, small and marginal farmers belonging to Jats,

Gujjar, Tyagis, and Jat Muslims rallied behind a cause which

would benefit their whole bhaiyachra community. But the

mobilisation based on khap system, limited BKU's geographi­

cal support base to the districts of Upper Doab region where

these castes are economically and numerically dominant.

The BKU failed to mobilise, the landless labourers and

233

rural poor, who in this region generally belong to the

scheduled caste and other lower castes. They were either

forced to participate in rallies and dharnas or joined the

movement on their own to enjoy free food and a free ride to

the towns, and cities, where the rallies or dharnas were

staged. In fact the most important among the issues, that

could have mobilised landless labourers and rural poor was

the demand of minimum wages. But no such demand was ever

included in the numerous charters of demands, presented by

BKU to the government.

The emergence of BKU, increased the political clout of

the rich and middle caste/class farmers. Their economic

dominance backed by a powerful organisation of BKU, in­

creased atrocities on the lower castes especially Jatav

labourers. The Bandhua Mukti Mazdoor Union, Dalit Sena, and

Bhartiya Mazdoor Union (Mitharia) failed to organise the

agriculture labourers, who were attracted towards the firy

speeches of Mayawati and Kanshi Ram. Thus the Bahujan Samaj

Party was able to form village units in the Upper Doab

region and challenged the dominance of BKU. In 1989 elec­

tions BSP emerged as a third party in the rural areas of

Upper Doab regiori, after Janata Dal and Congress.

234

Split in Lok Dal and increasing political clout of BKU

provided an opportunity to the Congress to woo the surplus

producers, who were generally opposed to the Congress. In

the initial stages of the movement, the Congress government

both at the state and centre, was lenient towards BKU be­

cause it wanted to divide the Jat and Gujjar votes of Janata

Dal (A) . The support base of the Janata Dal (A) and BKU was

same. Tikait's followers were not ready to support the Con­

gress. Hence, he supported Janata Dal which before 1989

elections had brought all anti-Congress forces on one plat­

form, and was likely to form the government. But Tikait's

indulgence in electoral politics, hobnobbing with Congress

politicians and Devilal, in order to side line Ajit Singh,

and to emerge as the Sole leader of the Jat farmers, demol-

ished the non-party image of the movement.

BKU activists on party lines.

It divided the

After the 1989 elections the political discourse in UP,

was dominated by Mandal-Mandir issue. The BJP propaganda on

Hindutva, polarised the farmers on communal grounds. The

BJP was able to penetrate the support base of BKU. Hence

Tikait had no choice but to follow his followers and support

BJP, in 1991 elections, which destroyed BKU's secular image.

235

It lost its support base of rich and middle class Muslims

causing further decline in the movement.

Tikait realised his mistake and denied his support to

BJP. To regain his Muslim support base he launched an

agitation against the BJP government. But BJP came down

heavily on BKU, and arrested Tikait many times. He was not

allowed to hold any major dharna or rally successfully in

UP. Tikait opposed BJP in 1993 elections and unsuccessfully

supported Congress. But could not negate the communal poli­

tics of RSS, BJP and VHP combine. Nor could it keep the

agrarian issues on the agenda of national politics. By this

time it was clear to all political parties that BKU had no

great influence over the surplus producers in the electoral

politics of Muzaffarnagar and Meerut. In fact the surplus

producers of Upper Doab region, used BKU only to get econom­

ic concessions from the government, and to increase their

power against the agricultural labouers. In electoral

politics they had their own individual preferences. They _

wanted BKU to remain neutral in elections and maintain its

non-party nature.

The farmers movement in western UP had a potential for

disciplining local bureaucracy, and for stimulating communi-

236

tarian support for more productive and equitable use of

common property resources, for co-operative marketing,

manufacturing of agricultural products, for bringing more

resources for rural development and for ensuring that they

are effectively used. But the movement was dominated by

rich, middle class/caste farmers, who overemphasised remu­

nerative prices, subsidy for inputs, waiver of loans and

electricity dues. They failed to espouse the cause of agri­

cultural labourers, marginal farmers, and social issues

related to women, in an effective way. Hence, there is no

evidence of progressive motivation in the farmers movement.

The farmers' movement, unlike peasant movements of 1950's

and 1960's, was not a struggle for restructuring the unequal

rural society, rather it was a struggle of the emerging

rural elite to further strengthen their economic and politi­

cal position in the existing power structure of India.

237

APPENDIX

Table I: Village Schedule

1. Survey Conducted in 1990

Village Tahsil District

1 Chandaudhi (Khas) Meerut Meerut 2 Mandi Muzaffarnagar Muzaffarnagar 3 Gunarsi Deoband Saharanpur 4 Atari Moradabad Moradabad 5 Salempur Bijnore Binore

2. Survey Conducted in 1993

1 Matheri Jansath Muzaffarnagar 2 Makhayli Muzaffarnagar Muzaffarnagar 3 Sonta Kairana Muzaffarnagar 4 Allawalpur (Maj ra) Budhana Muzaffarnagar 5 Pichaukra Sardhana Meerut 6 Mubarikpur Maw ana Meerut 7 Wazidpur Bagpat Meerut 8 Jani Meerut Meerut

238

District: ______________ _

Sl. Name/Caste

No.

Table II: Information on Socio-Bconomic Profile,

of Participation in BKU, and Blectoral Preferences, [Questionnaire Form]

Tahsil: ____________ __ Dev. Block: ____________ __ Village: ______________ _

Participation in Electoral Party Prefe Agricultural

Implements

ding to BKU

Luxury

Items BKU Participation renee accor-

AGB BDU. LAND OCC B IND TR BTB DP TH BC J/C M/S R TV AM/S N/M J/CA RAL 1989 1991 1993 N/A Yes

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

B.

9.

10.

EDU = Education, OCC = Occupation, B Bank Balance, IND = Indebtedness, TR = Tractor, ETB = Electric Tubewell, D

Diesel Pumpsets, TH =Threshers, BC Bogi Gari (Bullock Cart), J/C =Jeep and Car, M/S =Motorbike, Scooter,

Radio, TV = Television, AM/S = Active-Member/Sympathisers, N/M = Not Members, J/CA Jailed or Court Arrested, RA

Rallies

239

Table 2.1: Mean Distribution of Agricultural Classes and Size Groups in UP Regions,

1961 Census (in % of total cultivating households)

Regions

Kuma on

Agricultural Classes

Proprietors

64.07

Tenents Mixed Proprietors Tenants

16.48 19.46 Rohilkhand 92.47 2.40 5.21 Oudh 87.78 3.75 8.47 Eastern Districts 91.65 2.33 6.03 Lower Doab 90.50 2.18 7.32 Bundelkhand 87.63 3.65 8.69 Upper Doab 95.81 1.16 3.02 Uttar Pradesh 89.94 3.21 6.85

Source: Calculated from Government of India 1966, Table B­XI, Means are based on groups of Tahsils, cited in Paul Brass, "The Politicization of the Peasantry in a North Indian State", Journal of Peasant Studies, Jan-Sept 1980, p.406.

240

Table 2.2 Percentage Distribution of the Number of Holdings in various Economic Regions of Uttar Pradesh

Region Size Class in Hectares

Upto 1 1 - 2 2 - 4

Western 25.3 34.3 38.8

Central 18.5 20.9 18.3

Eastern 48.6 33.3 28.5

4 - 10

39.9

14.3

25.0

10 & above

27.5

10.3

26.9

Bundelkhand 3.1 7.3 10.3 17.1 31.2

Hill

Total

Source:

4.6 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.6

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Agricultural Census of Uttar Pradesh, 1976-77, Board of Revenue Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, 1980, p.44.

241

Land

Holdings

Acre

Landless

Marginal

0-2.5

Small

2.5-5

Middle

5-10

Large

10-15

Rich

15 & above

THH

2084

878

535

362

96

41

Table 4.1: Educational Qualification in 8 Villages of

Meerut and Muzaffarnagar

Illiterate Primary Middle Secondary Hr. Secon.

No. of Total Total

HHI

Total

HHI

Total

HHI

Total

HHI HHI HHI

418 214 51.19 106 25.35 55 13.15 26 6.22 12 2.87

176 85 48.29 45 25.56 20 11.36 15 8.56 8 4.54

106 38 35.85 30 28.30 16 15.09 9 8.49 8 7.54

73 1l 15.06 15 20.54 12 16.43 13 17.80 12 16.43

19 2 10.52 5 26.31 3 15.78 2 10.52 3 15.78

9 0 0 1 11.11 2 22.22 2 22.22

Graduate

Total

HHI

5

4

5

10

3

4

1.19

2.27

4. 71

13.69

15.78

44.44

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 3996 801. 350 43.69 201 25.09 107 13.35 67 8.36 45 5.61 31 3.87

THH Total no. of Households, HHI Households Interviewed.

242

Table 4.2: Religion/Caste and Level of Participation in 5 Villages each in Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur,

Bijnore and Moradabad

Sl. Religion/Caste No. of No. of No. HH HH in­

tervi­ewed

1. Gujars 34 3

AM

1

s NM p

1 3

J

1 2. Jats 547 56 44 10 2 47 16 3 . Muslims 450 45 9 7 31 15 1 4. Harijan 402 39 5 6 28 15 5. Saini 130 13 5 1 7 5 6 . Bhangi 101 11 3 8 4 7 . Brahmin 91 9 2 1 6 3 8 . Julaha 73 8 1 7 2 9 . Nai 46 5 5 1 10. Bania 38 4 4 11. Dhanak 35 4 1 3 1 12. Dhiwar 31 4 1 1 3 2 13. Gadaria 18 2 2 14. Kumhar 15 2 2 15. Badhai 8 2 2 ----------------------~-------------------------------------

2005 207 71 29 110 98

AM = Active members, S = Sympathisers, NM = Not members, P = Participation in various agitations of the BKU, J = Jailed.

243

18

Table 5.1: District-wise Percentage Votes polled by different Parties in Constituencies of

Western UP (1989)

District Congress

Saharanpur 37.33 Muzaffarnagar 36.76 Meerut 25.70 Ghaziabad 34.31 Bulandsahr 26.32 Aligarh 38.22 Mathura 31.44 Agra 31.74 Mainpuri 35.99 Etah 42.09 Bareily 32.14 Badaun 40.69 Shahjahanpur 50.02 Pilibhit 36.69 Bijnor 16.65 Moradabad 38.54 Rampur 39.46 Farrukhabad 37.29 Eta wah 42.37

BJP JD BSP CP

Bhartiya Janata Party = Janata Dal = Bahujan Samaj Party

Communist Party of India, Marxist

BJP JD BSP CP

0.00 50.91 11.76 0.00 0.00 60.77 2.46 0.00 0.22 69.00 5.09 0.00 8.27 46.65 10.77 0.00 7.90 57.69 7.72 0.37

14.19 37.79 9.81 0.00 9.35 49.83 9.38 0.00 0.00 62.89 5.37 0.00 7.09 50.51 2.89 3.53

21.83 32.01 4.14 0.00 13.62 49.06 5.18 0.00 24.70 32.42 2.20 0.00

7.16 37.96 4.86 0.00 15.77 45.79 1. 74 0.00

8.69 35.50 35.72 3.44 15.56 34.15 10.97 0.78 27.85 8.31 24.38 0.00 18.20 41.74 2.77 0.00 3.81 53.62 0.00 0.00

Communist Party of India-

Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.

244

Table 5.2: Region-wise Result of the 1991 Assembly Elections in UP

Region No.of BJP Cong JD SJP BSP CPI CPI(M) I&O ACS

Districts

Western 151 76 6 39

Hill 19 14 4 1

Central 113 49 22 23

Bundelkhand 21 11 4

Eastern 121 61 10 28

UP 425 211 46 91

ACS Assembly Constituencies Seat I&O Independent & Others

11

11 2

5 1

8 5 3

30 12 4

Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.

245

1

1

5

1 2

1 9

Table 5.3: Results of the 1991 State Assembly Elections of Western UP

Region

Districts

Saharanpur

No.of BJP Cong JD SJP BSP CPI CPI(M) I&O ACS

10 5 5 Muzaffarnagar 9 4 5 Meerut+ 16 3 1 6 Ghaziabad 6 v Bulandsahr 10 1 2

6 v Aligarh 10 6 4 Mathura 6 3 1 2 Agra 11 7 4

Etah 8 7 1 Bijnor 7 7

Moradabad 12 7 1 4 Rampur 4 3 1 Badaun 8 4 3 Bareily 9 6 2

1 v Pilibhit 4 4

Shahjahanpur 6 3 2 1 Etawah 7 2

5 v Farrukhabad 7 3 1 3 Mainpuri 7 3 1 3

Total 151 76 6 39 11

V = vacant or election not held.

Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.

246

Table 5.4: Results of the 1993 State Assembly

Blection of Western UP

Districts of No.of

Western UP AC

Saharanpur &

Hardwar

Muzaffarnagar

Meerut &

Ghaziabad

Bulandshahr

Aligarh

Mathura

Agra

Etah

Bijnor

Moradabad

Rampur

Badaun

Bareily

Pilibhit

Shahajahanpur

Eta wah

Farrukhabad

Mainpuri

Total

10

9

16

9

10

6

8

9

7

12

4

8

9

4

6

7

7

5

146

BJP

s 'k

8 34.9

7 40.4

8 37.3

7 40.3

6 36.3

3 31.9

6 40.6

5 34.6

4 35.3

8 36.6

2 30.1

4 31.0

2 35.7

3 35.0

3 26.5

28.6

5 37.2

1 28.8

80

AC Assembly Constituencies 1 S

JD

s 'k

28.1

2 23.8

5 31.0

1 20.0

1 14.7

2 24.3

16.1

1 11.6

1 19.9

2 20.9

1

13.4

15.4

3.0

9.5

1 13.1

0.2

8.5

4.8

17

Seats.

Cong

s %

2 24.5

14.1

2 15.1

13.8

1 17.4

1 17.5

1 15.8

14.4

6.5

8.3

11.1

17.1

12.3

9.1

3 24.6

20.9

14.1

18.6

10

Source: Election Commission of India, New Delhi.

s

SP

'k

5.5

6.5

1 10.5

1

2

7.3

9.4

9.1

1 17.9

3 26.4

4.4

1 22.8

2 23.8

4 30.1

7 39.1

10.1

2 23.0

7 39.4

2 30.2

4 40.4

37

247

s

BSP

'k

2.1

7.6

0.2

10.5

14.8

4.0

3.7

4.4

10.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

10.1

1.7

5.5

0.0

0.0

CPI

s 'k

o.o

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

o.o

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

s

1

1

CPM

'k

0.0

0.0

0.0

o.o

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

I&O

s 'k

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.5

4.6

2.2

0.0

2.6

1 10.0

3.8

10.0

1.8

0.0

1

19.1

2.8

0.0

3.2

2.9

G INTENSITY -E S H: CRQ!OP:_t:P~I N~-:-TAR PRAO Once)

RN UT More Than 81 WESTE .:___ d Area Sown 8-19 -MA P-2.:3 " ( •1• Of Cultivate 197 ·

1962-1965

~-\ .. ~-.·.~

. ·-~ . . . . . ......

r/h-v~~~ . . ·-::_.. ·::: ~~- • • :. :. :_(

·.·.·.·.·.·.·.j·:·:·:·) . . . ·. ;.: ...... .

1970-19 73

ETI low 120 Bt:ll . ~ . .

~ 120-140

~Above 140

ttAfl-2:1 WESTERN UTTAR PRADESH: AREA UNDER HYV CROPS

{ Percentag! Of HY V To Gross Cropped Ar~a Of i HYV Crops)

1970-1973

II HIGH{).SO)

§MEDIUM (30-GO)

[[]IIJ LOW(430)

1978- 1981