Concept Framework€¦ · Web viewdesired operational capabilities (DOC). This paper concludes with thoughts on an . experimentation strategy. 2.0. Operational Context. 2.1. The

White Paper Version 0.5Concept Framework

AConcept Framework

For

RAPID DECISIVEOPERATIONS

22 October 1999

USJFCOM J9Concepts Division (J92)

1


2

Preface

This publication is Version 0.5 of U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM) Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) White Paper. RDO is an “integrating” concept that provides context and focus for the “functional” concepts described in USJFCOM’s Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000 (CPLAN 00).

The RDO White Paper responds to the April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance. This paper continues to expand our understanding of key constructs first described in Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) and amplified in the Concept for Future Joint Operations. RDO encompasses many of JV 2010’s 21st Century Challenges and incorporates a number of JV 2010’s Desired Operational Capabilities. This paper also helps fulfill concept development requirements described in the December 1998 CJCSI 3010.02 (Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan) and additional guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The RDO concept focuses on the joint force at the operational level. It will describe how a joint force commander (JFC) can determine and employ the right balance of air, land, sea, space, and information-based capabilities in an intense, focused, non-linear campaign to defeat an adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity.

RDO Version 0.5 expands on CPLAN 00’s RDO concept summary. It provides a framework of several constructs that will be examined in a series of FY 00 joint experimentation events. For example, an RDO seminar, follow-on workshop, and March 2000 Wargame will explore different conceptual alternatives to accomplishing RDO requirements. An associated USJFCOM experiment (Unified Vision 2000) will focus on the construct “shaping the battlespace” introduced in this version. The results of these events will lead to publication of a Version 1.0 White Paper by summer 2000.

Points of Contact

Questions or comments related to RDO experimentation should be directed to CDR Dave Prothero, Integrated Concept Team (ICT) Chairman, J98, (757-836-2846, DSN 836-2846), [email protected]. Questions or comments related to the content of this paper should be directed to Mr. Ron Bullard, J92, (757-836-2255, DSN 836-2255; [email protected]) or to Mr. Bob Fawcett, J92, (757-836-2252, DSN 836-2252; [email protected]).

/s/DAVID J. OZOLEKColonel, US ArmyDirector, Joint Battle Lab

Joint Experimentation EEExperimentationExperimentation

mailto:[email protected]


A Concept Framework for Rapid Decisive Operations

in the 21st Century

1.0. Purpose. Version 0.5 of the RDO White Paper is a product of the “concept definition” phase of concept development. Its purpose is to establish an initial concept framework composed of key constructs, such as “shaping the battlespace”, that are essential to rapid decisive operations. This framework will help focus discussion and examination of these constructs in a series of FY 00 events that include seminars, workshops, wargames, and a joint M&S-supported experiment. USJFCOM will work closely with Services, combatant commands, and DoD agencies to understand and incorporate near-term enhancements and lessons learned from recent operations into concept development and experimentation efforts. J-9 will publish Version 1.0 of this White Paper based on the results of these efforts.

3

Rapid Decisive Operations

Joint or combined military operations characterized by rapid, intense, focused attack of an adversary’s strategic and operational vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and decisive points anywhere in the battlespace to force the adversary to do our will without a protracted campaign.


This “framework” version first discusses briefly the operational context for RDO. A concept section then describes RDO’s primary elements, followed by a brief recap of potential desired operational capabilities (DOC). This paper concludes with thoughts on an experimentation strategy.

2.0. Operational Context.

2.1. The April 1999 Defense Planning Guidance established a requirement for USJFCOM to develop new joint warfighting concepts to address a variety of challenging and important future operational missions. One of these relates to forcing an adversary to undertake certain actions or denying an adversary the ability to threaten or attack others. The Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) joint integrating concept1

described in this paper intends to investigate how a joint force commander (JFC) can accomplish this in a rapid, decisive joint operation that forces the adversary to do our will as quickly as possible. In this arrangement of joint operations, the JFC quickly employs all available capabilities in the right balance to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

2.2. This RDO concept is founded in the key constructs of JV 2010 as amplified by the May 1997 Capstone Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO). It also incorporates recent work from the draft Joint Contingency Force Operations concept that began as part of USJFCOM’s Campaign Plan 1999 (CPLAN 99). RDO considers several of JV 2010’s 21st Century Challenges such as “Battlespace Awareness”, “Rapid Joint Force Projection”, and “Generating Precision Effects.” These and other challenges are addressed at appropriate points throughout the paper. This concept also uses JV 2010 DOCs as a point of departure for developing a wider set of RDO DOCs. Finally, it provides context for USJFCOM’s current work on the following functional concepts—Attack Operations against Critical Mobile Targets; Joint Interactive Planning; Common Relevant Operational Picture; Adaptive Joint Command and Control; and Focused Logistics: Enabling Early Decisive Operations. The concept will also influence early work related to strategic deployment, information operations, and forcible entry operations.

2.3. Recent campaigns, including those against Iraq (December 1998) and Serbia (March-June 1999) have demonstrated that accomplishing our strategic

1 USJFCOM currently develops two types of operational concepts. An “integrating” concept describes how the JFC integrates supporting “functional” concepts and capabilities in a specific operation. RDO is the only CPLAN 00 integrating concept. A “functional” concept amplifies a specific function (such as joint command and control) or describes how to employ a system or conduct a task. Functional concepts rely on integrating concepts for operational context.

4


objectives in the early 21st century may require quicker, more concentrated employment of a wider range of capabilities in a time-constrained environment. The convergence of potent new concepts and capabilities envisioned by JV 2010 will allow the JFC to rapidly apply force in a discriminate manner to achieve decisive effects across a broad range of 21st century missions.

2.4. In a generic sense, “rapid” and “decisive” are desirable characteristics for any mission across the range of military operations. While future operational environments may be relatively focused and routine, others will be complex, differ from mission to mission, and often will combine both combat and noncombat operations. The JFC will seek decisive operations rapidly in any of these specific missions. This paper will focus RDO on applying joint combat power, principally at the operational level, to achieve objectives in a regional contingency environment such as recent operations in Serbia. Future applications of the RDO integrating concept will address large-scale combat operations typically associated with major theater warfare. Finally, RDO will be examined at the lower end of the range of military operations in an MOOTW environment. Although many principles described in this paper also apply to larger-scale operations, the RDO concept is not intended as a preliminary phase of a protracted campaign.

2.5. Power projection and forward presence will likely remain the fundamental national strategic concepts for military operations well into the early 21st century. Power projection will enable the timely response critical to our deterrent and warfighting capabilities. Forward presence facilitates power projection and sends a clear signal of US commitment and resolve. RDO builds on these concepts by calling for an agile, lean, and lethal joint force that can deploy and respond rapidly worldwide, achieve decisive results, and redeploy for subsequent operations. RDO will also look at leveraging leading-edge technology enhancements to increase our capabilities. Further, it will investigate concept options that could require new joint doctrine, organizations, training and education, materiel, leadership, and people (DOTMLP). In an attempt to “think outside the box”, the concept is not constrained by current budget, strategy, or policy.

3.0. The Concept.

3.1. When diplomacy and other options fail, our military capabilities currently provide several ways to compel an adversary to do our will. For example, precision engagement by aerial and naval fires can destroy a wide range of capabilities, including critical infrastructure, military projection platforms, and economic targets. Air, sea, and land exclusion zones can deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force and can also adversely affect their economy. Even the credible threat of military operations through the quick deployment of military forces to the region can potentially deter an adversary. In other cases, a full-scale deployment and attack by coalition forces might be required to forcibly eject an enemy from the territory of a neighboring state. Possible strategic objectives could be to preclude or halt an adversary’s military

5


operations against a neighbor, to cause him to cease development of weapons of mass effects, or to protect basic human rights. Whatever the goal, the basic precepts typically will be quick decisive operations, minimal loss of life, and limited collateral damage.

3.2. As applied in this paper, the RDO concept focuses on how a highly deployable, lethal, agile, survivable, and supportable joint force can rapidly defeat an adversary’s operational and strategic centers of gravity in order to force the adversary to do our will. The essence of the concept emphasizes situational understanding, immediate response capability, speed, and massing of effects rather than forces.

3.3. A limited, focused example of such operations might be a single precision strike from a great distance that accomplishes the strategic objective, such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986 in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin. The RDO concept, however, will consider a broader scope of operations, one that enables a JFC to determine and employ the right balance of air, land, sea, space, and information-based capabilities in an intense, focused, brief campaign to defeat or neutralize an adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity. Distinguished from traditional operations, this approach usually will not focus on seizing and occupying territory in the battlespace except for a limited purpose, such as to generate an otherwise unobtainable opportunity for precision engagement, to secure a key decisive point, or to protect the civilian populace. Forces inserted for these purposes would have the capability to be quickly withdrawn and

6


employed elsewhere. An RDO campaign typically will be characterized by immediate, continuous, and overwhelming operations to shock and paralyze the adversary, destroy their ability to coordinate offensive and defensive operations, fragment their capabilities, and foreclose their most dangerous options.

3.4. The “quad” chart above summarizes key elements of the concept. The hypothesis quadrant reflects the primary goal—to compel the adversary to concede without a protracted campaign. The “desired capabilities” quadrant lists examples of the many potential DOCs that enable RDO. The following sections discuss some of the key components that comprise the RDO concept. These include precision engagement, battlespace awareness, rapid joint force projection, the construct of shaping the battlespace, and joint command and control.

Precision Engagement

3.5. Combat operations in the 2010 timeframe will typically consist of the application of JV 2010’s dominant maneuver and precision engagement capabilities, enabled by focused logistics and full-dimensional protection. Successful RDO, as this white paper describes, relies heavily on precision engagement (PE).

3.5.1. Although its roots are embedded in its predecessor precision strike, PE encompasses more than just attacking targets with advanced weapons systems and high-tech munitions; it also uses a wider range of capabilities. Inherently, it includes actions to detect, identify and track operational targets, determine the desired effect, select and combine the right forces, engage the operational objective, assess results, and reengage as required. PE focuses primarily on operational effects, not on the means by which effects are achieved. The JFC, for example, could employ forces, an array of weapons and munitions (including non-kinetic means), a range of information operations, or a combination of those means at decisive points and times to accomplish RDO objectives.

3.5.2. Precision engagement contains a variety of means that are also used in many ways to accomplish objectives associated with dominant maneuver (DM) and full dimensional protection (FDP). Ground-based indirect fire systems (including surface-to-surface missiles) are PE systems organic to maneuver units. Likewise, both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft provide platforms for precision weapons that typically support DM objectives. A variety of air-, land-, and sea-based PE systems can interdict adversary capabilities before they can engage friendly forces. Similarly, aircraft carrying precision weapons conduct offensive counterair operations while a variety of platforms and weapons round out the air and missile defense component of FDP.

3.5.3. The improving range, accuracy, and reliability of a broad range of precision weapons, platforms, and other systems increase the probability that some missions can be accomplished primarily by employing PE capabilities. If RDO requires destruction of enemy forces and facilities, our first choice in 2010

7


could be to do so from well outside of direct-fire range if possible. PE, however, is broader than just improved ways and means for target destruction. At the core of PE is the focus on achieving effects that range well beyond killing people and destroying things, supplementing attrition-based, hard-kill techniques with a broader range of effects that will help break an adversary’s will. Precision engagements can be conducted to achieve very specific limited objectives and can leverage non-kinetic options (such as information operations to disrupt, deny, or exploit enemy systems) that limit collateral damage and preserve population and infrastructure.

3.5.4. The Precision Engagement Joint Warfare Coordinating Authority2 fielded two 21st Century challenges to focus JV 2010 capability development efforts. The first of these, Integrating Precision Effects, is concerned with the information superiority aspect of precision engagementthe need to develop a fused C4ISR system that enables the optimum application of precision effects. Generating Precision Effects, is concerned with the JFC having the tools to precisely apply a full range of effects (kinetic to non-kinetic) against adversaries.

3.5.5. Information operations (IO) provide a variety of non-kinetic precision engagement options to the JFC. Defensive IOto protect friendly systems and capabilities essential to information superioritywill begin early in any operation and continue throughout. Likewise, the JFC can use offensive IO very early in the operationeven before the joint force deploysto influence, disrupt, deny, exploit, destroy, or otherwise affect an adversary’s information environment, thereby increasing the information differential in the JFC’s favor. As the JFC and his staff weigh potential courses of action, they could determine that a full range of integrated offensive IO, supplemented by selective precision engagement with kinetic means, might accomplish operational and strategic objectives with minimal commitment of conventional forces. Information operations can be a significant combat

2 In late 1997, the Director, Joint Staff designated several Joint Staff Directorates as “Coordinating Authorities”, responsible for the oversight of JV 2010’s key constructs. They are as follows: J-7, Full Spectrum Dominance; J-8, Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, and Full-dimensional Protection; J-4, Focused Logistics; J-6, Information Superiority (with the J-2 focused on Relevant Information and the J-3 on Information Operations); J-3, Joint Command and Control.

8

21st CENTURY CHALLENGESGenerating and Integrating Precision Effects

Throughout the range of military operations, the JFC should be able to rapidly select the best

mix of forces, weapons, and platforms tooverwhelm the enemy through the precise and

unrelenting application of required effects while minimizing collateral damage.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGEInformation Operations

The JFC should be able to mitigate the effects of adversary information operations (IO) and

protect our networks from unauthorized infiltration while influencing, disrupting,

denying, exploiting, or destroying the adversary’s information capabilities.


multiplier, essential to the success of any campaign.

Battlespace Awareness

3.6. Information processing capabilities ensure that key joint and component command and control systems such as Global Command and Control System (GCCS), Maneuver Control System (MCS), Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), and Advanced Tomahawk Weapons Control System (ATWCS) are fully interoperable. In other words, they all share and promote battlespace awarenessa real-time, common, relevant picture of the battlespace. Battlespace awareness will not eliminate the fog of war, but will yield a much-improved visualization of the battlespace in space, time, and effect, regardless of terrain, weather, or time of day. The total picture results from a combination of strategic and operational actions and capabilities and an unimpeded flow of relevant information among all levels. The USJFCOM CPLAN 00 functional concept, Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP)3, contains a detailed discussion of the ways and means to address this JV 2010 challenge.

Rapid Joint Force Projection

3.7. The NCA’s ability to respond to a requirement for rapid decisive operations will be greatly facilitated by the realization of 21st

Century challenges associated with rapid joint force projection. The challenge described in the accompanying text box focuses on moving forces rapidly to positions of strategic and operational advantage. This will be enabled by enhanced global situational awareness resulting from a common relevant operational picture (see the CROP concept, mentioned earlier). There is a related focused logistics challenge (Joint Deployment and Rapid Distribution) that concentrates on peacetime initiatives associated with enhancing transportation infrastructure to facilitate rapid deployment prior to and throughout a crisis. Forward presence forces, prepositioned assets, and innovative basing options should greatly increase force projection agility and responsiveness. The organic lift capability of forces, such as that afforded the Marines by the V-22 Osprey, will allow the JFC to set the timing and tempo of operations, with precision engagement where and when the JFC chooses. The mobility and agility thus afforded joint forces should enable the JFC to extend his operational reach and allow him to strike simultaneously with multiple systems throughout the battlespace.

3 The USJFCOM J-9 approved the CROP concept White Paper, Version 1.0, on 3 Sep 99.

9

21st CENTURY CHALLENGEBattlespace Awareness

The JFC should be able to use a common relevant operational picture to achieve

battlespace awareness of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, improve the art of decision

making, and provide for more efficient decisive operations.

21st CENTURYCHALLENGERapid Joint Force Projection

The JFC should be able to execute rapid deployment worldwide, quickly occupy and

influence the battle space, and reduce time to build combat power in order to seize momentum and gain multi-dimensional positional advantage.

21st CENTURY CHALLENGEDecisive Combat Operations

With increased battlespace awareness, rapid joint force projection, and multi-dimensional

superiority, the JFC should be able to simultaneously employ tailored force packages

in high-tempo, intense joint operations to achieve decisive results.


Shaping the Battlespace

3.8. Even the necessity for quick, decisive action will not allow the JFC to disregard the preconditions for mission success. A broad range of preliminary actions must occur to establish conditions for decisive operations. These include: developing a complete and accurate picture of the battlespace; achieving dimensional superiority (air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic spectrum); isolating the adversary and denying him freedom of action; building and positioning combat power; and coordinating the efforts of other organizations to achieve unified action. The objectives of this stage—however brief it may be—are to seize and exploit the initiative, posture the force, and set the conditions for decisive operations.

In the 1990-91 Persian Gulf Conflict, Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991 when allied air and naval forces began the destruction of key Iraqi strategic, operational, and tactical targets. By the end of the second day, the coalition air component had achieved air superiority and by 21 January the Iraqi air force was incapable of air operations. Activities that built sufficient combat power, achieved air superiority, suppressed Iraqi air defense, and degraded command and control capabilities established the important conditions that enabled subsequent decisive operations.

3.8.1. In combat, the friendly force should have achieved information superiority over the enemy before beginning decisive operations. The friendly force must also be in a position to bring sufficient combat power to bear against the enemy force at the right time and place to accomplish the mission efficiently and effectively. This will typically require deployment of forces to attain operational reach combined with maneuver to achieve positional advantage. Full-dimensional protection of friendly forces is essential. The additional complexity of operations with our allies requires C2 arrangements that must be established before decisive operations can occur in a coalition environment.

3.8.2. Since the actual period in which decisive operations occur may be very short, the conditions that enable them may not be required to exist continuously throughout the campaign. For example, it will not be necessary to maintain positional advantage throughout an entire operation as long as the force can achieve positional advantage for the specific period required for decisive operations. Nor is it necessary to maintain air superiority over the entire battlespace as long as air superiority can be achieved relative to decisive operations and full-dimensional protection requirements.

10

21st CENTURY CHALLENGEBattlespace Control

If the JFC can control the battlespace by achieving dimensional superiority protecting

his force, and maintaining friendly access, then he will to set the conditions for rapid decisive

operations


3.8.3. Table 1 lists several of the conditions that enable decisive operations and can be grouped within a construct called “shaping the battlespace.”4 The ability of the joint force to achieve dimensional superiority is the central component of this construct. These conditions are closely linked, with changes in one potentially affecting the others. This construct helps the JFC and joint force staff as they consider the interaction of a variety of operations that will create an environment conducive to freedom of action for friendly forces.

Achieve Dimensional Superiority. This is the central component of

shaping the battlespace. Control of the air and sea has historically been essential to successful combat operations on land. Air and sea superiority contribute greatly to the JFC’s ability to maintain friendly access and deny enemy access to the battlespace and to move our forces within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity. This concept applies not only to the CINC and subordinate JFCs, but to commands at lower levels as well. For example, ground force commanders typically will require local air and indirect fire superiority in addition to favorable maneuver unit combat-power ratios. In 2010, superiority in space and throughout the electromagnetic spectrum will be essential as well, particularly for the purpose of achieving information superiority. Moreover, information operations should contribute significantly as a combat power multiplier. Dimensional superiorityeven if localized in time and spaceis required in order to maintain friendly access to the battlespace.

Maintain Friendly Access. Access to the battlespace in all dimensions by US and allied forces contributes to the JFC’s freedom of action. This does not necessarily mean the battlespace is accessible from all directions, but that sufficient air and sea lines of communication for movement of forces and sustainment packages exist and can be protected successfully from interdiction. Access from space and through the electromagnetic spectrum is equally essential.

Protect the Force. Full-dimensional protection (FDP) is one of the

4 The construct of shaping the battlespace will provide the focus for the USJFCOM-sponsored FY 00 joint experiment J0019, “Unified Vision 00”.

11

Table 1 – Essential Conditions for Decisive Operations Achieve Dimensional Superiority

Protect the Force Maintain Friendly Access Isolate the Enemy Attain Operational Reach

Shape the Battlespace a core construct

21st CENTURY CHALLENGECountering Air and Missile Threats

With an integrated family of interoperable systems and a common relevant operational

picture, the JFC should be able to gain control of the battlespace and provide multi-level, in-depth

defense against missile and other air threats


essential conditions for decisive operations. Protection requirements are at the heart of operations to achieve dimensional superiority, attain operational reach, and maintain friendly access to the battlespace. FDP actions exemplify the close interaction among the components that enable the JFC to control the battlespace. FDP includes both offensive and defensive elements (such as offensive counterair and antisubmarine warfare respectively). Countering air and missile threats, a JV 2010 21st Century Challenge, will be an essential aspect of establishing full-dimensional protection.

Isolate the Enemy. It is important to deny the enemy outside sources of support and access to friendly decisive points and centers of gravity. It can be particularly difficult to limit outside support if rules of engagement preclude the JFC from conventional attack against countries or factions that support the enemy with forces, supplies, or sanctuary. Information operations offer great potential to inhibit outside sources of support by ways and means that exhibit no apparent destructive effects. Denying the enemy access to our key capabilities can be accomplished by offensive and defensive protective measures, including locating these capabilities outside the enemy’s operational reach.

Attain Operational Reach. Operational reach is, “. . . the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. 5” The 2010 JFC’s operational reach will increase due to many factors, such as longer-range weapons and systems, more efficient logistics, and smaller but more lethal combat units. Innovative basing options that allow “split-basing” of functions and capabilities such as logistics, intelligence support, and C2 will also decrease our footprint and increase operational reach. Enhanced protection capabilities as well as the CROP will help the JFC achieve positional advantage more quickly.

Joint Command and Control

3.9. The CROP and advanced information systems will provide the capability to conduct military planning in an entirely new way. The JFC and his staff will be able to centralize their planning efforts while becoming less centralized in location. The ability to rapidly exchange information around the globe and throughout the battlespace will force the sequential, linear planning of the past to give way to simultaneous, interactive planning which will greatly affect the tempo of execution.

5 Joint Pub 3-0, p. III-16.

12

21st CENTURY CHALLENGEJoint Command and Control

The JFC should be able to combine increased battlespace awareness, advanced planning

capabilities, and assured communications to apply the proper balance of JV 2010’s new operational concepts to achieve decisive

operations.


Likewise, in the execution of future joint operations, our advanced systems will allow leaders at all levels to leverage more fully the capabilities of the force and achieve a tempo of operations that will overwhelm any opponent. An unprecedented level of battlespace awareness will permit leaders to operate more effectively within the commander’s intent without requiring direct control. However, the same capabilities will enable commanders to monitor and directly control the actions of their forces at lower echelons, thus allowing a greater degree of centralized control when required. The JFC should be able to vary the degree of control based on the situation. In spite of the potential to centralize control, appropriate decentralization and self-synchronization will more fully exploit the capabilities of agile organizations and the initiative of leaders at every level.

4.0. Desired Operational Capabilities

4.1. Joint operations in the 2010 timeframe will depend on fielding a wide range of capabilities to enable dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and other JV 2010 constructs. The established list of DOCs developed by the JV 2010 Coordinating Authorities provide a foundation for developing a comprehensive set of desired operational capabilities tailored to RDO requirements.

4.2. Version 1.0 of the RDO White Paper will discuss DOCs in more detail. The following DOCs (or DOC categories) are among the most important to the rapid response and time-constrained requirements of rapid decisive operations:

Provide Real-time Battlespace Awareness This provides real-time or near real-time battlespace awareness to the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staffs at all levels. It includes DOCs necessary to achieve the CROP and those associated with defensive information operations.

Achieve Unity of Effort The JFC will regulate forces and functions to focus, integrate, and synchronize actions throughout the battlespace. It includes DOCs related to organizing the joint force headquarters and task organizing the joint force.

Achieve and Preserve Battlespace Control This is required in order to ensure freedom of friendly action. Paragraph 3.7.3 discusses specific requirements of the construct “shaping the battlespace.” It includes DOCs that relate to achieving air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic superiority.

Generate Overmatching Lethal and Non-lethal Effects This is the capability to provide a decisive advantage in range, probability of hit and kill, efficiency of effects, and relative combat power. It includes DOCs associated with precision engagement, combat identification, and offensive information operations.

13


Synchronize Employment of Forces to Achieve Desired Effects The capability to synchronize joint operations of widely dispersed forces against multiple centers of gravity (simultaneously if necessary).

Conduct Short-notice Global Maneuver and Attack The capability to rapidly deploy, maneuver, and attack with forces sufficient to accomplish the mission. It includes focused logistics DOCs that relate to strategic deployment as well as inter- and intra-theater mobility.

Protect Forces, Facilities, and Capabilities This is a relatively broad category that includes specific full-dimensional protection DOCs related to early detection and engagement of those threats that are most dangerous to mission accomplishment (such as air and missile threats that are WME capable). It also includes DOCs related to precision engagement, defensive information operations, and combat identification.

Affect Adversary Ability to Observe the Battlespace This increases the information differential in the JFC’s favor, thus contributing to information superiority and creating confusion for the adversary.

Affect Adversary Ability to Command and Control Forces This disrupts, destroys, or otherwise affects the adversary’s C2 systems, thus greatly weakening his planning and execution processes.

5.0. Experimentation Strategy Overview

5.1. The RDO experimentation strategy begins with a series of investigation venues (and corresponding concept refinement) and culminates in a USJFCOM major joint integrating event (MJIE) or package of events in 2004. Initial focus areas and corresponding groupings of DOCs and Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) task sets have been identified for investigation. Given that many facets of RDO remain only loosely defined, the experimentation strategy in 2000 is directed toward alternative identification and exposure, discovery, and concept refinement. The strategy centers on two objectives:

USJFCOM will generate a forum by which new and potentially revolutionary alternatives to achieve RDO can be examined.

USJFCOM will capitalize on investigation and discovery

opportunities presented in the near-term experimentation processes of the Services and other organizations.

14


5.2. The first objective will be achieved through a USJFCOM-sponsored RDO seminar - work shop - war game - experiment sequence. The seminar will provide the initial forum for exposure of three broad RDO alternatives that will be used as the preliminary vehicles for investigating RDO throughout spiral one of the iterative development process. These alternatives include a baseline comprised of programmed Service forces employed in accordance with current joint doctrine and two concept options that project new capabilities, organizations, and employment methods. The RDO Workshop will investigate force structure and deployability implications of each alternative. The RDO Wargame and follow-on experiment; UNIFIED VISION 00, will examine the alternatives and variations against a Kosovo-based, 2010-2015 campaign scenario.

5.3. The second objective will be achieved by leveraging the discovery opportunities that reside in currently scheduled FY 00 experimentation venues. Two active experimentation areas that are of particular interest are the DARPA-sponsored “Command Post of the Future” series of limited objective experiments (LOE) and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate-sponsored series of wargames that will investigate the utility of non-kinetic weapons. USJFCOM will also conduct its own LOE to examine the implications of non-kinetic weapon availability during the target selection and approval process. USJFCOM’s routine participation in Service-sponsored wargames and other venues will also provide opportunities for discovery and investigation of specific issues.

5.4. During 4th Quarter, FY 00 USJFCOM will participate in a major leveraged experiment, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 00, that will combine the opportunities associated with the four independent Service experiments. These are the Army’s Joint Contingency Force-Advanced Warfighting Experiment (JCF-AWE), the Air Force’s Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX), the Navy’s Fleet Battle Experiment-Hotel (FBE-H), and the Marine Corps’ Urban Warrior MOUT ACTD. By providing the joint force headquarters, USJFCOM will leverage a significant opportunity to investigate emerging architectures associated with the Joint Interactive Planning and Common Relevant Operational Picture concepts.

5.5. Beyond 2000, we will refine experimentation using the results of the findings and insights gained during the first year. The strategy will again focus on a USJFCOM-generated investigation series complemented by increased efforts to leverage high pay-off experimentation venues in the JE community at large.

5.6. Following are initial experimentation questions for the RDO concept:

What is the size, composition and capability of the joint force? How could we organize the joint force?

How will the joint force deploy to a theater? What is the deployment sequence? How long does it take the joint force to arrive in a combat position?

15


What is the best way to protect the deployment of the joint forces?

What is the best organization for the joint force and Service components’ command and control?

What are the information requirements and information generating assets available to the JFC? How is information for the joint force managed, coordinated, and distributed?

What are the “new” warfighting capabilities of this force?

How mobile is the force? How does it achieve operational and tactical mobility?

How much firepower does the joint force need and how does the force receive timely and effective fires?

How can the JFC leverage non-kinetic capabilities to expand precision engagement options?

What is the best construct for shaping the battlespace?

How could the adversary counter the capabilities of the joint force at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war?

How does the joint force protect itself?

What is the sustainable operational reach of the RDO force?

What are the human implications of RDO? How do humans make appropriate decisions rapidly enough to take full advantage of advanced information capabilities? How do they analyze and mitigate the risks involved in these operations?

What are the effects on leadership, morale, and sustainability of deep operational force projection?

How do advanced information systems such as CROP and inter-active combat ID increase operational understanding of the battle space and allow the joint force to accept risk that previously would have been unacceptable?

5.7. USJFCOM will modify the RDO concept as appropriate after each experiment spiral and will use the results of these experiments to build a USJFCOM

16Employ the full range of joint capabilities to rapidly control, deny, degrade, or destroy an adversary’s strategic and operational centers of gravity without a large-scale invasion of enemy territory to compel the adversary to undertake certain actions or to deny the adversary the ability to launch a successful attack.


major joint integrating experiment in 2004. This large joint field event will stress the following objective:

As the concept matures, USJFCOM will conduct MJIE every two years. USJFCOM will refocus and refine experimentation objectives and strategy in less-intensive field experimentation events starting in 2007 and every 12-14 months thereafter.

17

Documents

Concept Framework€¦ · Web viewdesired operational capabilities (DOC). This paper concludes with thoughts on an . experimentation strategy. 2.0. Operational Context. 2.1. The