COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR REMEDIAL LAW (2014-2015)

8/9/2019 COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR REMEDIAL LAW (2014-2015)

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COMPIL TION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

(MARCH 2014-MARCH 2015)

Prepared by : ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA, RNAteneo de Davao University

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REMEDIAL LAW

• G.R. No. 196894. March 3, 2014 Jesus G.Crisologo and Nanette B. Crisoslogo Vs.JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation

•

The crux of this controversy iswhether the CA correctly ruled thatRTC-Br. 14 acted without graveabuse of discretion in failing torecognize Spouses Crisologo asindispensable parties in thecase for cancellation of lien.

• In this respect, the Court agreeswith Spouses Crisologo.

• In an action for the cancellation ofmemorandum annotated at theback of a certificate of title, the

persons considered asindispensable include those whoseliens appear as annotationspursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No.1529,

• In Southwestern University v.Laurente, the Court held that thecancellation of the annotation of anencumbrance cannot be orderedwithout giving notice to the partiesannotated in the certificate of titleitself. It would, thus, be an errorfor a judge to contend that no

notice is required to be given to allthe persons whose liens wereannotated at the back of acertificate of title.

• Here, undisputed is the fact thatSpouses Crisologo’s liens wereindeed annotated at the back ofTCT Nos. 325675 and 325676.Thus, as persons with their liensannotated, they stand to bebenefited or injured by any orderrelative to the cancellation ofannotations in the pertinent TCTs.In other words, they are asindispensable as JEWM itself in thefinal disposition of the case forcancellation, being one of the manylien holders.

• As indispensable parties, SpousesCrisologo should have been joinedas defendants in the case pursuantto Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of

Court, SEC. 7. Compulsory joinderof indispensable parties. – Partiesin interest without whom no finadetermination can be had of anaction shall be joined either as

plaintiffs or defendants.• The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties isthe complete determination of alpossible issues, not only betweenthe parties themselves but also asregards other persons who may beaffected by the judgment.

The rule is that a petition for certiorarunder Rule 65 is proper only if there is noappeal, or any plain speedy, and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, no adequate recourse, at thattime, was available to Spouses Crisologo,except resorting to Rule 65.

Although Intervention under Rule 19 couldhave been availed of, failing to use thisremedy should not prejudice SpousesCrisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14,following the rule on joinder ofindispensable parties, to simply recognizethem, with or without any motion to

intervene. Through a cursory reading ofthe titles, the Court would have noticedthe adverse rights of Spouses Crisologoover the cancellation of any annotations inthe subject TCTs.

Neither will appeal prove adequate as aremedy since only the original parties toan action can appeal. Here, SpousesCrisologo were never impleaded. Hence,they could not have utilized appeal asthey never possessed the required legastanding in the first place.

And even if the Court assumes theexistence of the legal standing to appeal,it must be remembered that thequestioned orders were interlocutory incharacter and, as such, Spouses Crisologowould have to wait, for the review byappeal, until the rendition of the judgmenton the merits, which at that time may not

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be coming as speedy as practicable. Whilewaiting, Spouses Crisologo would have toendure the denial of their right, asindispensable parties, to participate in aproceeding in which their indispensability

was obvious. Indeed, appeal cannotconstitute an adequate, speedy and plainremedy.

The same is also true if recourse toAnnulment of Judgment under Rule 47 ismade since this remedy presupposes afinal judgment already rendered by a trialcourt.

At any rate , the remedy against aninterlocutory order, not subject of anappeal, is an appropriate special civilaction under Rule 65, provided that theinterlocutory order is rendered without orin excess of jurisdiction or with graveabuse of discretion. Only then is certiorariunder Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

• G.R. No. 208660. March 5, 2014 Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. Vs. SugarRegulatory Administration

• The primordial issue for the Court’sresolution is whether or notPENSUMIL committed forum-shopping in filing the case a quo.

•

At this point, the Court deems itworthy to note that on November4, 2013, and during the pendencyof the instant petition, the SRA hasissued Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014,

which revoked the Assailed Sugar Orders.As a result thereof, all mill companieswere directed to cease from collecting thelien of ₱2.00 per LKG-Bag from all sugarproduction, effective immediately.

The case at bar should be dismissed forhaving become moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot andacademic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue ofsupervening events, so that anadjudication of the case or a declarationon the issue would be of no practical value

or use. In such instance, there is no actuasubstantial relief which a petitioner wouldbe entitled to, and which would benegated by the dismissal of the petitionCourts generally decline jurisdiction over

such case or dismiss it on the ground ofmootness. This is because the judgmentwill not serve any useful purpose or haveany practical legal effect because, in thenature of things, it cannot be enforced.

In this case, the supervening issuance ofSugar Order No. 5, s. 2013- 2014 whichrevoked the effectivity ofthe AssailedSugar Orders has mooted the main issuein the case a quo - that is the validity ofthe Assailed Sugar Orders. Thus, in viewofthis circumstance, resolving the

procedural issue on forum-shopping asherein raised would not afford the partiesany substantial relief or have any practicalegal effect on the case.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Courtfinds it appropriate to abstain frompassing upon the merits of this casewhere legal relief is no longer needed norcalled for.

• G.R. No. 195374. March 10, 2014 PedroLukang Vs. Pagbilao Development

Corporation and Eduardo T. Rodriguez• Synthesized, the issues boil down

to the question of whether or notthe RTC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion when it issued the May13, 2008 Order granting the writ ofpreliminary injunction.

A writ of preliminary injunction is aprovisional remedy which is adjunct to amain suit, as well as a preservativeremedy issued to maintain the status quoof the things subject of the action or therelations between the parties during thependency of the suit. The purpose ofinjunction is to prevent threatened orcontinuous irremediable injury to theparties before their claims can bethoroughly studied and educated. Its soleaim is to preserve the status quo until themerits of the case are fully heard.

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Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction maybe issued upon the concurrence of thefollowing essential requisites, to wit: (a)the invasion of right sought to beprotected is material and substantial; (b)

the right of the complainant is clear andunmistakable; and (c) there is an urgentand paramount necessity for the writ toprevent serious damage. While a clearshowing of the right is necessary, itsexistence need not be conclusivelyestablished. Hence, to be entitled to thewrit, it is sufficient that the complainantshows that he has an ostensible right tothe final relief prayed for in his complaint.

In the present case, the Court finds theRTC grant of injunction to be in order. The

pertinent parts of its order read:

It is to be emphasized that the deeds ofsale between the vendors of the sixparcels of land and the PagbilaoDevelopment Corporation were executedon June 1, 1993. The Affidavit ofAdverse Claim of Leoncia Martinez Vda.De Lukang and the Notice of LisPendens of Pedro Lukang over the sixproperties were all inscribed onFebruary 3, 1989.

There is no question, therefore, that whenthe Pagbilao Development Corporationbought the properties from the vendors, ithad full knowledge that there werequestions involving ownership of theparcels of land it bought.

Likewise there is no question thatPagbilao Development Corporationdid not take any step to have theannotation or encumbrance in eachtitle cancelled.

Here, it must be noted that theannotations of adverse claim and lis pendens have been inscribed in thecertificates of titles on the following datesFebruary 3, 1989, November 6, 1989 andOctober 1, 1990, more than three (3)years before PDC bought the subjectproperties in 1993. It would have been

different if the adverse claims and lis pendens were not annotated in the titlesWith PDC having been officially aware ofthem, there can be no grave abuse ofdiscretion that can be attributed to the

RTC for issuing the writ of preliminaryinjunction. There is no question that whenPDC purchased the property, thepetitioner and other intervenors were inactual possession of the property andtheir claims adverse to its predecessors-in- interest were annotated in the verytitles of the properties. In fact, theseannotations were carried over to PDC’stitle. PDC cannot invoke its being theregistered owner to dispossess thepresent possessors for, precisely,when it brought the properties, it was

charged with the knowledge that theownership and sale of the subjectproperties by its predecessors-in-interest have been questioned bytheir co-heirs. Inevitably, PDC is deemedto have obtained the properties subject tothe outcome of the litigation among theheirs of Arsenio.

During the hearing, Pedro and the otherheirs were able to convince the RTC thatthey had a right over the properties which

should be protected while being litigatedConvinced, the RTC made a preliminarydetermination that their right should beprotected by a writ of preliminaryinjunction. Their claimed ownership andactual possession were then being violatedby PDC which had started entering thepremises and preparing the property forthe construction of a power plant forliquefied natural gas. Unless legallystopped, such act would indeed causeirreparable damage to the petitioner andother claimants. As claimed co-owners

the petitioner and the other heirs have theright to remain in possession of thesubject properties pendente lite. The legaor practical remedy of PDC, who gambled

With regard to the issue of the injunctivebond, the Court has time and again ruledthat the posting of the bond is a conditionsine qua non before a writ of preliminaryinjunction may issue


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enjoined against any damage that he maysustain in case the court should finallydecide that the applicant was not entitledthereto.mean, however, that the injunction maybe

disregarded since it becomes effectiveonly after the bond is actually filed incourt.

In fine, it is erroneous for the CA to rulethat the RTC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion simply because it failed to fixthe amount of the bond. This error caused"no substantial prejudice" that wouldwarrant the quashal of the writ ofinjunction. ( As a matter of fact, Pedroposted a bond

in the amount of One Million Pesos (Pl,000,000.00), the sufficiency orinsufficiency of which was neverquestioned by PDC before the RTC. Hence,the Court will not discuss the sufficiency ofthe bond not only because the issue wasnot raised before the RTC but also itinvolves a question of fact.

• G.R. No. 208232. March 10, 2014 SurvivingHeirs of Alfredo R. Bautista, namely:Epifania G. Bautista and Zoey G. BautistaVs. Francisco Lindo and Welhilmina Lindo,

et al.3. the issue for the Court’s resolution

is: whether or not the RTC erred ingranting the motion for thedismissal of the case on the groundof lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter.

The core issue is whether the action filedby petitioners is one

involving title to or possession of real

property or any interest therein or oneincapable of pecuniary estimation.

The course of action embodied in thecomplaint by the present

petitioners’ predecessor, Alfredo R.Bautista, is to enforce his right torepurchase the lots he formerly ownedpursuant to the right of a free-patent

holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or thePublic Land Act .

The Court rules that the complaint toredeem a land subject of a free patent

is a civil action incapable of pecuniaryestimation.

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction ofthe court is determined by the allegationsin the complaint and the character of therelief sought. In this regard, the Court,in Russell v. Vestil , wrote that “indetermining whether an action is one thesubject matter of which is not capable ofpecuniary estimation this Court hasadopted the criterion of firstascertaining the nature of theprincipal action or remedy sought. If itis primarily for the recovery of a sum ofmoney, the claim is considered capable ofpecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or inthe RTCs would depend on the amount ofthe claim.” But where the basic issue issomething other than the right to recovera sum of money, where the money claimis purely incidental to, or a consequenceof, the principal relief sought, this Courthas considered such actions as cases

where the subject of the litigation may notbe estimated in terms of money, and,hence, are incapable of pecuniaryestimation. These cases are cognizableexclusively by RTCs.

Settled jurisprudence considers some civiactions as incapable of pecuniaryestimation, viz:

4. Actions for specific performance;5. Actions for support which wil

require the determination of the

civil status;

6. The right to support of the plaintiff;7. Those for the annulment of

decisions of lower courts;8. Those for the rescission or

reformation of contracts;9. Interpretation of a contractua



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stipulation.10.

The Court finds that the instant cause ofaction to redeem the land is one for

specific performance.

The facts are clear that Bautista sold torespondents his lots which were coveredby a free patent. While the deeds of saledo not explicitly contain the stipulationthat the sale is subject to repurchase bythe applicant within a period of five (5)years from the date of conveyancepursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, suchlegal provision is deemed integrated andmade part of the deed of sale asprescribed by law. It is basic that the lawis deemed written into every contract.

Although a contract is the law between theparties, the provisions of positive lawwhich regulate contracts are deemedwritten therein and shall limit and governthe relations between the parties. Thus, itis a binding prestation in favor of Bautistawhich he may seek to enforce. That isprecisely what he did. He filed a complaintto enforce his right granted by law torecover the lot subject of free patent.

Ergo, it is clear that his action is forspecific performance, or if not strictly suchaction, then it is akin or analogous to oneof specific performance. Such being thecase, his action for specific performance isincapable of pecuniary estimation andcognizable by the RTC.

At first blush, it appears that the actionfiled by Bautista involves title to orpossession of the lots he sold torespondents. Since the total selling priceis less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, notthe RTC, has jurisdiction over the case.This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista orherein successors-in-interests, the presentpetitioners, is but incidental to and anoffshoot of the exercise of the right by thelatter to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec.119 of CA 141. The reconveyance of thetitle to petitioners is solely dependent on

the exercise of such right to repurchasethe lots in question and is not the principaor main relief or remedy sought. Thus, theaction of petitioners is, in reality,incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the

reconveyance of the lot is merely theoutcome of the performance of theobligation to return the propertyconformably to the express provision ofCA 141.

• G.R. No. 188191. March 12, 2014 EnriqueAlmero y Alcantara Vs. People of thePhilippines, et al.

• ISSUE: PERSONALITY OF APRIVATE PERSON TO TO FILE APETITION FOR PROHIBITION IFTHE CASE AROSE FROM ACRIMINAL PROCEEDING

•

Anent the first issue, petitionerargues that in criminal cases, theoffended party is the State, andthat private complainants’ interestis limited to the civil liability arisingtherefrom. Petitioner's applicationfor probation purportedly did notinvolve the civil aspect of the case.

While the present petition originated froma criminal proceeding, what petitioner filedwith the RTC was a special civil action, in

which he himself impleaded privaterespondents. He cannot now belatedlychange his stance to the prejudice ofprivate respondents, who would otherwisebe deprived of recourse in a civil actionthey did not initiate. In any case, thisCourt has consistently ruled that privateparties may be clothed with sufficientpersonality if the facts show that the endsof substantial justice would be betterserved, and if the issues in the actioncould be determined in a more just,speedy and inexpensive manner.

While the rule is, as held by the Court ofAppeals, only the Solicitor General maybring or defend actions on behalf of theRepublic of the Philippines, or representthe People or the State in criminaproceeding pending in this Court and theCourt of Appeals, the ends of substantia justice would be better served, and the

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issues in this action could be determinedin a more just, speedy and inexpensivemanner, by entertaining the petition atbar. As an offended party in a criminalcase, private petitioner has sufficient

personality and a valid grievance againstJudge Adao’s order granting bail to thealleged murderers of his (privatepetitioner’s) father.

Furthermore, as offended parties in thepending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid thatrespondents have sufficient interest andpersonality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ bypetitioner judge’s ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civilaction under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65.

Recently in line with the underlying spiritof a liberal construction of the Rules ofCourt in order to promote their object, asagainst the literal application of Rule 110,section 2, we held, overruling theimplication of an earlier case, that awidow possesses the right as an offendedparty to file a criminal complaint for themurder of her deceased husband.

Petitioner’s second and third argumentsare brought by an erroneous

understanding of the nature of probationand shall be discussed jointly.

Probation is not a right but a mereprivilege, an act of grace and clemencyconferred by the State, and may begranted by the court to a deservingdefendant. Accordingly, the grant ofprobation rests solely upon the discretionof the court. It is to be exercised primarilyfor the benefit of organized society, andonly incidentally for the benefit of theaccused.

Aside from the goals of accordingexpediency and liberality to the accused,the rationale for the treatment of appealand probation as mutually exclusiveremedies is that they rest on diametricallyopposed legal positions. An accusedapplying for probation is deemed to haveaccepted the judgment. The application

for probation is an admission of guilt onthe part of an accused for the crime whichled to the judgment of conviction. Thiswas the reason why the Probation Lawwas amended: precisely to put a stop to

the practice of appealing from judgmentsof conviction – even if the sentence isprobationable – for the purpose ofsecuring an acquittal and applying for theprobation only if the accused fails in hisbid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitionercannot make up his mind whether toquestion the judgment, or apply forprobation, which is necessarily deemed awaiver of his right to appeal. While he didnot file an appeal before applying for

probation, he assailed the validity of theconviction in the guise of a petitionsupposedly assailing the denial ofprobation. In so doing, he attempted tocircumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended byP.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeaand probation mutually exclusiveremedies.

The assignment of errors in the Petitionbefore us reflects the diametricallyopposed positions taken by accused

petitioner. On the one hand, he bewailsthe defects committed by the trial courtduring the promulgation of the judgment,thus casting doubt on the judgment itselfYet in the same breath, he persists in hisapplication for probation, despite thewaiver and admission of guilt implicit inany procedure for probation – preciselythe unhealthy wager the law seeks toprevent.

• G.R. No. 183034. March 12, 2014 SpsFernando and Ma. Elena Santos Vs. LolitaAlcazar, rep. by her Attorney-in-Fact

Delfin Chua• The rule that the genuineness and

due execution ofthe instrumentshall be deemed admitted, unlessthe adverse party specificallydenies them under oath, appliesonly to parties to such instrument.

More to the point is the fact that



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petitioners failed to deny specifically underoath the genuineness and due executionof the Acknowledgment in their Answer.The effect of this is that the genuinenessand due execution of the Acknowledgment

is deemed admitted. “By the admission ofthe genuineness and due execution [ofsuch document] is meant that the partywhose signature it bears admits that hesigned it or that it was signed by anotherfor him with his authority; that at the timeit was signed it was in words and figuresexactly as set out in the pleading of theparty relying upon it; that the documentwas delivered; and that any formalrequisites required by law, such as a seal,an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence,

such defenses as that the signature is aforgery x x x; or that it was unauthorizedx x x; or that the party charged signed theinstrument in some other capacity thanthat alleged in the pleading setting it out xx x; or that it was never delivered x x x,are cut off by the admission of itsgenuineness and due execution.”

“There is no need for proof of executionand authenticity with respect todocuments the genuineness and due

execution of which are admitted by theadverse party.” With the consequentadmission engendered by petitioners’failure to properly deny theAcknowledgment in their Answer, coupledwith its proper authentication,identification and offer by the respondent,not to mention petitioners’ admissions inparagraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer thatthey are indeed indebted to respondent,the Court believes that judgment may behad solely on the document, and there isno need to present receipts and other

documents to prove the claimedindebtedness. The Acknowledgment, justas an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is

“valid and binding between the partieswho executed it, as a documentevidencing the loan agreement they hadentered into.”

The absence of rebutting evidenceoccasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their

right to present evidence renders theAcknowledgment as the best evidence ofthe transactions between the parties andthe consequential indebtedness incurredndeed, the effect of the admission is such

that “a prima facie case is made for theplaintiff which dispenses with thenecessity of evidence on his part andentitles him to a judgment on thepleadings unless a special defense of newmatter, such as payment, is interposed bythe defendant.”

However, as correctly argued bypetitioners, only Fernando may be heldliable for the judgment amount ofP1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not asignatory to the Acknowledgment. She

may be held liable only to the extent ofP600,000.00, as admitted by her andFernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer;no case against her may be proved overand beyond such amount, in the absenceof her signature and an acknowledgmentof liability in the Acknowledgment. Therule that the genuineness and dueexecution of the instrument shall bedeemed admitted, unless the adverseparty specifically denies them under oath,applies only to parties to the document.

•

G.R. No. 201601. March 12, 2014

MarylouCabrera Vs. Felix Ng• The sole issue to be resolved by

the Court is whether the CA erredin affirming the RTC Order datedDecember 19, 2007, which deniedthe motion for reconsideration filedby the spouses Cabrera.

The general rule is that the three-daynotice requirement in motions underSections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court ismandatory. It is an integral component of

procedural due process. “The purpose ofthe three-day notice requirement, whichwas established not for the benefit of themovant but rather for the adverse partyis to avoid surprises upon the latter and togrant it sufficient time to study the motionand to enable it to meet the argumentsinterposed therein.”



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“A motion that does not comply with therequirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule15 of the Rules of Court is a worthlesspiece of paper which the clerk of court hasno right to receive and which the court

has no authority to act upon.” “Being afatal defect, in cases of motions toreconsider a decision, the running of theperiod to appeal is not tolled by their filingor pendency.”

Nevertheless, the three-day noticerequirement is not a hard and fast rule.When the adverse party had beenafforded the opportunity to be heard, andhas been indeed heard through thepleadings filed in opposition to the motion,the purpose behind the three-day notice

requirement is deemed realized. In suchcase, the requirements of procedural dueprocess are substantially complied with.

It 1s undisputed that the hearing on themotion for reconsideration filed by thespouses Cabrera was reset by the RTCtwice with due notice to the parties; it wasonly on October 26, 2007 that the motionwas actually heard by the RTC. At thattime, more than two months had passedsince the respondent received a copy of

the said motion for reconsideration onAugust 21, 2007. The respondent wasthus given sufficient time to study themotion and to enable him to meet thearguments interposed therein. Indeed, therespondent was able to file his oppositionthereto on September 20, 2007.

Notwithstanding that the respondentreceived a copy of the said motion forreconsideration four days after the dateset by the spouses Cabrera for the hearingthereof, his right to due process was notimpinged as he was afforded the chanceto argue his position. Thus, the RTC erredin denying the spouses Cabrera's motionfor reconsideration based merely on theirfailure to comply with the three- daynotice requirement.

• G.R. No. 193494. March 12, 2014 LuiEnterprises, Inc. Vs. Zuellig PharmaCorporation and the Philippine Bank of

Communications• There should be no inexplicable

delay in the filing of a motion to setaside order of default. Even when amotion is filed within the required

period, excusable negligence mustbe properly alleged and proven.

Lui Enterprises failed to show that its

failure to answer the complaint within

the required period was due toexcusable negligence

When a defendant is served withsummons and a copy of the complaint, heor she is required to answer within 15days from the day he or she was servedwith summons. The defendant may also

move to dismiss the complaint “[w]ithinthe time for but before filing the answer.”

ifteen days is sufficient time for adefendant to answer with good defensesagainst the plaintiff’s allegations in thecomplaint. Thus, a defendant who fails toanswer within 15 days from service ofsummons either presents no defensesagainst the plaintiff’s allegations in thecomplaint or was prevented from filing hisor her answer within the required period

due to fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable negligence.

In either case, the court may declare thedefendant in default on plaintiff’s motionand notice to defendant. The court shalthen try the case until judgment withoutdefendant’s participation and grant theplaintiff such relief as his or her complaintmay warrant.

A defendant declared in default loses his

or her standing in court. He or she is “deprived of the right to take part in thetrial and forfeits his [or her] rights as aparty litigant,” has no right “to presentevidence [supporting his or her]allegations,” and has no right to “controthe proceedings [or] cross-examinewitnesses.” Moreover, he or she “has noright to expect that [the court] would[act] upon [his or her pleadings]” or that



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he or she “may [oppose] motions filedagainst him [or her].”

However, the defendant declared indefault “does not [waive] all of [his or

her] rights.” He or she still has the right to “receive notice of subsequentproceedings.” Also, the plaintiff must stillpresent evidence supporting his or herallegations “despite the default of [thedefendant].”

Default, therefore, is not meant to punishthe defendant but to enforce the promptfiling of the answer to the complaint. For adefendant without good defenses, defaultsaves him or her “the embarrassment ofopenly appearing to defend the

indefensible.”

On the other hand, for a defendant withgood defenses, “it would be unnatural forhim [or her] not to set x x x up [his or herdefenses] properly and timely.” Thus, “itmust be presumed that some insuperablecause prevented him [or her] from[answering the complaint].” In whichcase, his or her proper remedy dependson when he or she discovered the defaultand whether the default judgment was

already rendered by the trial court.

After notice of the declaration of defaultbut before the court renders the default judgment, the defendant may file, underoath, a motion to set aside order ofdefault. The defendant must properlyshow that his or her failure to answer wasdue to fraud, accident, mistake orexcusable negligence. The defendant mustalso have a meritorious defense.

If the defendant discovers his or herdefault after judgment but prior to the judgment becoming final and executory,he or she may file a motion for new trialunder Rule 37, Section 1, paragraph (a) ofthe 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. If he orshe discovers his or her default after the judgment has become final and executory,a petition for relief from judgment underRule 38, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure may be filed.

Appeal is also available to the defendantdeclared in default. He or she may appeathe judgment for being contrary to the

evidence or to the law under Rule 41,Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of CiviProcedure. He or she may do so even if heor she did not file a petition to set asideorder of default. A petition for certiorarmay also be filed if the trial court declaredthe defendant in default with grave abuseof discretion.

The remedies of the motion to set asideorder of default, motion for new trial, andpetition for relief from judgment aremutually exclusive, not alternative orcumulative. This is to compel defendantsto remedy their default at the earliestpossible opportunity. Depending on whenthe default was discovered and whether adefault judgment was already rendered, adefendant declared in default may avail ofonly one of the three remedies.

Thus, if a defendant discovers his or herdefault before the trial court renders judgment, he or she shall file a motion toset aside order of default. If this motion to

set aside order of default is denied, thedefendant declared in default cannot awaitthe rendition of judgment, and he or shecannot file a motion for new trial beforethe judgment becomes final andexecutory, or a petition for relief from judgment after the judgment becomesfinal and executory.

Also, the remedies against default becomenarrower and narrower as the trial nears judgment. The defendant enjoys the mostliberality from this court with a motion toset aside order of default, as he or shehas no default judgment to contend with,and he or she has the whole period before judgment to remedy his or her default.

With a motion for new trial, the defendantmust file the motion within the period fortaking an appeal or within 15 days fromnotice of the default judgment. Although a


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default judgment has already beenrendered, the filing of the motion for newtrial tolls the reglementary period ofappeal, and the default judgment cannotbe executed against the defendant.

A petition for relief from judgment is filedafter the default judgment has becomefinal and executory. Thus, the filing of thepetition for relief from judgment does notstay the execution of the default judgmentunless a writ of preliminary injunction isissued pending the petition’s resolution.

Upon the grant of a motion to set asideorder of default, motion for new trial, or apetition for relief from judgment, thedefendant is given the chance to presenthis or her evidence against that ofplaintiff’s. With an appeal, however, thedefendant has no right to presentevidence on his or her behalf and can onlyappeal the judgment for being contrary toplaintiff’s evidence or the law.

Similar to an appeal, a petition forcertiorari does not allow the defendant topresent evidence on his or her behalf. Thedefendant can only argue that the trialcourt committed grave abuse of discretion

in declaring him or her in default.

Thus, should a defendant prefer to presentevidence on his or her behalf, he or shemust file either a motion to set asideorder of default, motion for new trial, or apetition for relief from judgment.

In this case, Lui Enterprises haddiscovered its default before the RegionalTrial Court of Makati rendered judgment.Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside

order of default, raising the ground ofexcusable negligence.

Excusable negligence is “one whichordinary diligence and prudence could nothave guarded against.” The circumstancesshould be properly alleged and proved. Inthis case, we find that Lui Enterprises’failure to answer within the required

period is inexcusable.

Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion todismiss four days late. It did notimmediately take steps to remedy its

default and took one year from discoveryof default to file a motion to set asideorder of default. In its motion to set asideorder of default, Lui Enterprises only

“conveniently blamed its x x x counsel [forthe late filing of the answer]” withoutoffering any excuse for the late filing. Thisis not excusable negligence under Rule 9,Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, theRegional Trial Court of Makati did not errin refusing to set aside the order ofdefault.

Lui Enterprises argued that the RegionaTrial Court of Makati should have beenliberal in setting aside its order of default.After it had been declared in default, LuEnterprises filed several manifestationsinforming the Makati trial court of theearlier filed nullification of deed of dationin payment case which barred the filing ofthe interpleader case. Lui Enterprisespresident, Eli L. Lui, and counsel even flewin from Davao to Makati to “formally

[manifest that] a [similar] action between[Lui Enterprises] and [the Philippine Bankof Communications]” was already pendingin the Regional Trial Court of DavaoHowever, the trial court did not recognizeLui Enterprises’ standing in court.

However, the basic requirements of Rule9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure must first becomplied with. The defendant’s motion toset aside order of default must satisfythree conditions. First is the time elementThe defendant must challenge the defaultorder before judgment. Second, thedefendant must have been preventedfrom filing his answer due to fraud,accident, mistake or excusable negligenceThird, he must have a meritoriousdefense.

As discussed, Lui Enterprises never


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explained why its counsel failed to file themotion to dismiss on time. It just arguedthat courts should be liberal in settingaside orders of default. Even assumingthat it had a meritorious defense and that

its representative and counsel had to fly infrom Davao to Makati to personally appearand manifest in court its meritoriousdefense, Lui Enterprises must first showthat its failure to answer was due to fraud,accident, mistake or excusable negligence.This Lui Enterprises did not do.Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharmafiled the interpleader case to compel LuiEnterprises and the Philippine Bank ofCommunications to litigate their claims.Thus, “[d]eclaring the other claimant indefault would ironically defeat the very

purpose of the suit.”

An interpleader complaint may be filed bya lessee against those who haveconflicting claims over the rent due for theproperty leased. This remedy is for thelessee to protect him or her from “doublevexation in respect of one liability.” He orshe may file the interpleader case toextinguish his or her obligation to payrent, remove him or her from the adverseclaimants’ dispute, and compel the parties

with conflicting claims to litigate amongthemselves.

In this case, Zuellig Pharma filed theinterpleader case to extinguish itsobligation to pay rent. Its purpose in filingthe interpleader case “was not defeated”when the Makati trial court declared LuiEnterprises in default.

At any rate, an adverse claimant in aninterpleader case may be declared indefault. Under Rule 62, Section 5 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimantwho fails to answer within the requiredperiod may, on motion, be declared indefault. The consequence of the default isthat the court may “render judgmentbarring [the defaulted claimant] from anyclaim in respect to the subject matter.”The Rules would not have allowedclaimants in interpleader cases to be

declared in default if it would “ironicallydefeat the very purpose of the suit.”

The Regional Trial Court of Makatdeclared Lui Enterprises in default when it

failed to answer the complaint within therequired period. Lui Enterprises filed amotion to set aside order of defaultwithout an acceptable excuse why itscounsel failed to answer the complaint. Itfailed to prove the excusable negligenceThus, the Makati trial court did not err inrefusing to set aside the order of default.

The nullification of deed in dation in

payment case did not bar the filing of

the interpleader case. Litis pendentiais not present in this case.

Lui Enterprises allegedly filed fornullification of deed of dation in paymentwith the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Itsought to nullify the deed of dation inpayment through which the PhilippineBank of Communications acquired titleover the leased property. Lui Enterprisesargued that this pending nullification casebarred the Regional Trial Court of Makatfrom hearing the interpleader case. Sincethe interpleader case was filed

subsequently to the nullification case, theinterpleader case should be dismissed.

Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e)of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amotion to dismiss may be filed on theground of litis pendentia:

In this case, there is no litis pendentiasince there is no identity of parties in thenullification of deed of dation in paymentcase and the interpleader case. Zuellig

Pharma is not a party to the nullificationcase filed in the Davao trial court.

There is also no identity of rights assertedand reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filedthe first case to nullify the deed of dationin payment it executed in favor of thePhilippine Bank of CommunicationsZuellig Pharma subsequently filed theinterpleader case to consign in court the


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rental payments and extinguish itsobligation as lessee. The interpleader casewas necessary and was not instituted toharass either Lui Enterprises or thePhilippine Bank of Communications.

Thus, the pending nullification case didnot bar the filing of the interpleader case.

In this case, the nullification of deed ofdation in payment case was filed by LuiEnterprises against the Philippine Bank ofCommunications. The interpleader casewas filed by Zuellig Pharma against LuiEnterprises and the Philippine Bank ofCommunications. A different plaintiff filedthe interpleader case against LuiEnterprises and the Philippine Bank ofCommunications. Thus, there is noidentity of parties, and the first requisiteof litis pendentia is absent.

As discussed, Lui Enterprises filed thenullification of deed of dation in paymentto recover ownership of the leasedpremises. Zuellig Pharma filed theinterpleader case to extinguish itsobligation to pay rent. There is no identityof reliefs prayed for, and the secondrequisite of litis pendentia is absent.

Since two requisites of litis pendentia areabsent, the nullification of deed of dationin payment case did not bar the filing ofthe interpleader case.

• G.R. No. 187944. March 12, 2014 Carmencita Suarez Vs. Mr. and Mrs. FelixE. Emboy, Jr. and Marilou P. Emboy-Delantar

• Carmencita had not amplyalleged and proven that all therequisites for unlawful detainerare present in

• the case at bar.

•

“Without a doubt, the registeredowner of real property is entitled toits possession. However, the ownercannot simply wrest possessionthereof from whoever is in actuaoccupation of the property. Torecover possession, he must resortto the proper judicial remedy andonce he chooses what action tofile, he is required to satisfy theconditions necessary for such

• action to prosper.”

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, thefollowing key jurisdictional

facts must be alleged and sufficientlyestablished:

(1) initially, possession of property by thedefendant was by contract with or bytolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventuallysuch possession became illegal uponnotice by plaintiff to defendant of thetermination of the latter’s right of

possession; (3) thereafter, the defendantremained in possession of the propertyand deprived the plaintiff of theenjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demandon defendant to vacate the property, theplaintiff instituted the complaint forejectment.

In the case at bar, the first requisitementioned above is markedly absentCarmencita failed to clearly allege and

prove how and when the respondentsentered the subject lot and constructed ahouse upon it. Carmencita was likewiseconspicuously silent about the details onwho specifically permitted the respondentsto occupy the lot, and how and when suchtolerance came about. InsteadCarmencita cavalierly formulated a legaconclusion, sans factual substantiationthat (a) the respondents’ initial occupat ion



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of the subject lot was lawful by virtue oftolerance by the registered owners, and(b) the respondents became deforciantsunlawfully withholding the subject lot’spossession after Carmencita, as purchaser

and new registered owner, had demandedfor the former to vacate the property.

It is worth noting that the absence of thefirst requisite assumes even moreimportance in the light of the respondents’claim that for decades, they have beenoccupying the subject lot as ownersthereof.

Again, this Court stresses that to give thecourt jurisdiction to effect the ejectmentof an occupant or deforciant on the land, itis necessary that the complaint mustsufficiently show such a statement of factsas to bring the party clearly within theclass of cases for which the statutesprovide a remedy, without resort to paroltestimony, as these proceedings aresummary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on theface of the complaint. When the complaintfails to aver facts constitutive of forcibleentry or unlawful detainer, as where itdoes not state how entry was effected or

how and when dispossession started, theremedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

As an exception to the general rule,the respondents’ petition fornullification of the partition of Lot No.1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suitfor unlawful detainer.

Carmencita’s complaint for unlawfuldetainer is anchored upon the propositionthat the respondents have been inpossession of the subject lot by meretolerance of the owners. The respondents,on the other hand, raise the defense ofownership of the subject lot and point tothe pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of thepartition of Lot No. 1907-A, in whichCarmencita and the Heirs of Vicente wereimpleaded as parties. Further, should

Carmencita’s complaint be granted, therespondents’ house, which has beenstanding in the subject lot for decadeswould be subject to demolition. Theforegoing circumstances, thus, justify the

exclusion of the instant petition from thepurview of the general rule.

All told, we find no reversible errorcommitted by the CA in dismissingCarmencita's complaint for unlawfudetainer. As discussed above, the jurisdictional requirement of possession bymere tolerance of the owners had notbeen amply alleged and proven. Moreover,circumstances exist which justify theabatement of the ejectment proceedingsCarmencita can ventilate her ownership

claims in an action more suited for thepurpose. The respondents, on other hand,need not be exposed to the risk of havingtheir house demolished pending theresolution of their petition for nullificationof the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, whereownership over the subject lot is likewisepresented as an issue.

• G.R. No. 201234. March 17, 2014 Heirs oAmada A. Zaulda, namely: Eleseo AZaulda and Rodolfo A. Zaulda Vs. Isaac ZZaulda

•

Petition for review from the RTC tothe CA is governed by Rule 42 ofthe Rules of Court,

In this case, the petitioners complied withthe requirements laid down in the abovequoted provision.

Records show that on March 10, 2010petitioners timely filed a motion forreconsideration and/or new trial of theRTC decision (dated January 20, 2010,received by petitioners on February 25,2010), but the same was denied in theRTC Order, dated August 4, 2010, copy ofwhich was received by petitioners onAugust 10, 2010. Thus, they had untiAugust 25, 2010 within which to file apetition for review pursuant to saidSection 1, Rule 42.

On August 24, 2010, petitioners filed



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their Motion for Extension of Time to FilePetition for Review before the CA, payingthe docket and other lawful fees anddeposit for costs and prayed for anadditional period of fifteen (15) days from

August 25, 2010 or until September 9,2010, within which to file the saidpetition.

On September 9, 2010, they filed thePetition for Review.

The Court notes that the petition forreview before the CA was filed within theadditional fifteen (15) day period prayedfor in their motion for extension of time tofile it, which was filed on time byregistered mail. To repeat, the petitionwas filed on September 9, 2010, withinthe fifteen (15) day period requested intheir motion for extension of time to filethe petition.

As earlier stated, the Motion For ExtensionOf Time To File Petition For Review, whichwas filed through registered mail onAugust 24, 2010, was filed on time. It wasphysically in the appellate court’spossession long before the CA issued itsResolution on February 11, 2011,

dismissing the petition for review for beingfiled out of time. The record shows that 1]the CA received the motion for extensionof time to file petition for review onSeptember 13, 2010; 2] the CADivision received the motion onSeptember 14, 2010; and 3] the ponente’s office received it on January 5,2011.

Indeed, there was a delay, but it was adelay that cannot be attributed at all tothe petitioners. The almost four (4)months that lapsed before the recordsreached the ponente’s office was causedby the gross incompetence andinefficiency of the division personnel atthe CA. It was the height of injustice forthe CA to dismiss a petition just becausethe motion for extension reached the ponente’s office beyond the last dateprayed for. Clearly, the petitioners were

unreasonably deprived of their right to beheard on the merits because of the CA’sunreasonable obsession to reduce its loadIn allowing the petitioners to be fatallyprejudiced by the delay in the transmitta

attributable to its inept or irresponsiblepersonnel, the CA committed anunfortunate injustice.

The petitioners could not also be faultedthat the motion for extension of time wasreceived by the CA on September 13,2010. The rules allow parties to file apleading by registered mail. They are notrequired to ensure that it would bereceived by the court on or before the lastday of the extended period prayed forThough no party can assume that its

motion for extension would be granted,any denial thereof should be reasonable.

Granting that the petition was filed late,substantial justice begs that it be allowedand be given due course. Indeed, themerits of petitioners’ cause deserve to bepassed upon considering that the findingsof the RTC were in complete contrast tothe findings of the MCTC which declaredpetitioners as the lawful owners entitled topossession of the lots in question.

As regards the competent identity of theaffiant in the Verification and Certification,records show that he proved his identitybefore the notary public through thepresentation of his Office of the SeniorCitizen (OSCA) identification card. Rule II,Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on NotariaPractice requires a party to the instrumentto present competent evidence of identity.

It is clear from the foregoing provisionsthat a senior citizen card is one of thecompetent identification cards recognizedin the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Forsaid reason, there was compliance withthe requirement. Contrary to theperception of the CA, attachment of aphotocopy of the identification card in thedocument is not required by the 2004Rules on Notarial Practice. Even A.M. No02-8-13-SC, amending Section 12 thereof


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is silent on it. Thus, the CA’s dismissal ofthe petition for lack of competent evidenceon the affiant’s identity on the attachedverification and certification against forumshopping was without clear basis.

•

G.R. No. 176055. March 17, 2014

SpousesEdmundo Dela Cruz and Amelia Concio-Dela Cruz Vs. Spouses Rufino R. Capcoand Marty C. Capco

• This case involves two spousesbattling for the material possessionof a piece ofland.

Contrary to the CA’s pronouncement, the

Complaint sufficiently makes out a casefor unlawful detainer.

The timeliness of the filing of theComplaint for unlawful detainer is not anissue in this case. Hence, the failure of theComplaint to allege when and how thespouses Capco came into possession ofthe property does not mean that the MeTCdid not acquire jurisdiction over it. “Togive the court jurisdiction to effect theejectment of an occupant or deforciant onthe land, it is necessary that the complaintshould embody such a statement of factsas brings the party clearly within the classof cases for which the statutes provide a

remedy, as these proceedings aresummary in nature. The complaint mustshow enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to paroltestimony.

Here, the Complaint alleged that thespouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-in-interest, Teodora, is the registered ownerof the property per TCT No. 31873 andthat she tolerated the spouses Capco’soccupation of the lot. The spouses DelaCruz subsequently acquired the propertythrough conveyance and they extendedthe same tolerance to the spouses Capco.The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for thespouses Capco to vacate the property butto no avail; hence, they sent the latter aformal demand letter which, per theattached copy to the Complaint, is datedSeptember 1, 2003. The Complaint wasfiled on October 6, 2003 or within one

year from the time the formal demand tovacate was made. Clearly, the Complaintsufficiently established a case for unlawfudetainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdictionover it.

The lot occupied by the spouses Capcoand the lot over which the spouses DelaCruz claim to have a better right to possess pertain to the same property.

The CA opined that there is a need todetermine if the lot occupied by thespouses Capco really forms part of theproperty over which the spouses DelaCruz claim to have a better right topossess.

The Court, however, thinks otherwise.

One of the three issues defined during thepreliminary conference is “whether or notthe [spouses Capco] are occupying thesubject property by mere tolerance of theplaintiffs”. It is therefore safe to concludethat there is no dispute with respect to theidentity of the property. What was clearlyup for resolution before the MeTC wasonly the question of whether the spousesCapco are occupying the property by mere

tolerance of the spouses Dela Cruz.

Moreover, the evidence submitted in thiscase establishes that the lot subject of thisComplaint for ejectment is the same lotbeing occupied by the spouses Capco. Asmentioned, the spouses Capco submittedtax declarations covering their house anda camarin as well as the correspondingreceipts evidencing their payments of reaproperty taxes. Notably, the declaredowner of the lot on which these properties

stand, as written in the receipts for theyears 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998, isJuan. Yet, the receipts for the years 2000,2001, 2002, and 2003 no longer reflectJuan as the owner but Teodora. Thischange tends to support the conclusionthat the lot occupied by the spousesCapco, which was previously owned byJuan, is the portion adjudicated in favor ofthe spouses Dela Cruz’ predecessor-in-



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interest, Teodora.

The spouses Dela Cruz are able toestablish by preponderance of evidencethat they are the rightful possessors of the

property.

“The only issue in an ejectment case is thephysical possession of real property ‒possession de facto and not possession de jure.” But “[w]here the parties to anejectment case raise the issue ofownership, the courts may pass upon thatissue to determine who between theparties has the better right to possess theproperty.” Here, both parties anchor theirright to possess based on ownership, i.e.,the spouses Dela Cruz by their ownownership while the spouses Capco by theownership of Rufino as one of the heirs ofthe alleged true owner of the property.Thus, the MeTC and the RTC correctlypassed upon the issue of ownership in thiscase to determine the issue of possession.However, it must be emphasized that

“[t]he adjudication of the issue ofownership is only provisional, and not abar to an action between the same partiesinvolving title to the property.”

• G.R. No. 189176. March 19, 2014 Barry

Lanier and Perlita Lanier Vs. People of thePhilippines

• While the determination ofprobable cause is primarily anexecutive function, the Court wouldnot hesitate to interfere if there isa clear showing that Secretary ofJustice gravely abused hisdiscretion amounting to lack orexcess· of jurisdiction in making hisdetermination and in arriving at theconclusion he reached.

It is well-settled that courts of law areprecluded from disturbing the findings ofpublic prosecutors and the DOJ on theexistence or non-existence of probablecause for the purpose of filing criminalinformations, unless such findings aretainted with grave abuse of discretion,amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the

general rule rests on the principle ofseparation of powers, dictating that thedetermination of probable cause for thepurpose of indicting a suspect is properlyan executive function; while the exception

hinges on the limiting principle of checksand balances, whereby the judiciarythrough a special civil action of certiorari has been tasked by the presentConstitution to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdictionon the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the Government.

Judicial review of the resolution of theSecretary of Justice is limited to adetermination of whether there has been

a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction consideringthat full discretionary authority has beendelegated to the executive branch in thedetermination of probable cause during apreliminary investigation. Courts are notempowered to substitute their judgmentfor that of the executive branch; it may,however, look into the question ofwhether such exercise has been made ingrave abuse of discretion.

When the Secretary of Justice concludedthat there was planting of evidence basedon the lone fact that the raiding teamarrived ahead of the search team, he, ineffect went into the merits of the defenseWhen he made a determination based onhis own appreciation of the pieces ofevidence for and against the accused, heeffectively assumed the function of a tria judge in the evaluation of the pieces ofevidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.

When confronted with a motion towithdraw an Information on the ground oflack of probable cause based on aresolution of the Secretary of Justice, thebounden duty of the trial court is to makean independent assessment of the meritsof such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court isnot bound by such resolution but is



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required to evaluate it before proceedingfarther with the trial. While the Secretary'sruling is persuasive, it is not binding oncourts. When the trial court’s Order restsentirely on the assessment of the DOJ

without doing its own independentevaluation, the trial court effectivelyabdicates its judicial power and refuses toperform a positive duty enjoined by law.

The RTC clearly deferred to the finding ofprobable cause by the Secretary of Justicewithout doing its own independentevaluation. The trial court even expressedits apprehension that no prosecutor wouldbe willing to prosecute the case should themotion to withdraw be denied. The onlymatter discussed by the trial court was its

concurrence with the DOJ relative to theservice and conduct of the search forillegal drugs. The trial court declared thatthe evidence is inadmissible in view of themanner the search warrant was served.Settled is the rule that the presence orabsence of the elements of the crime isevidentiary in nature and is a matter ofdefense, the truth of which can be bestpassed upon after a full-blown trial on themerits.

In the case at bar, the grounds reliedupon by petitioners should be fullyexplained and threshed out not in apreliminary investigation but during trialas the same are matters of defenseinvolving factual issues.

At the risk of sounding repetitive, we mustemphasize that the trial court, havingacquired jurisdiction over the case, is notbound by such resolution but is requiredto evaluate it before proceeding furtherwith the trial. While the Secretary's rulingis persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

• G.R. No. 158916. March 19, 2014 Heirs ofCornelio Miguel Vs. Heirs of Angel Miguel

• ISSUE: complaint for thenullification of deeds of donationand reconveyance of property.

• While blood may be thicker thanwater, land has caused numerousfamily disputes which are

oftentimes bitter and protractedThis case is another example.

The petition fails. Res judicata in theconcept of conclusiveness of judgment

precludes the complaint in Civil Case No2735.

A better understanding of thefundamentals of res judicata andconclusiveness of judgment will explainand clarify the Court’s ruling.

The following are the elements of res judicata:

1. (1) the judgment sought to bar

the new action must be final;2. (2) the decision must have beenrendered by a court having

jurisdiction over the subject matterand the parties;

3. (3) the disposition of the casemust be a judgment on the merits;

and

4.

(4) there must be as between thefirst and second action, identity of

parties, subject matter, and causesof action.

Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) barby prior judgment as enunciated inSection 47(b) of the aid Rule and (2)conclusiveness of judgment as explainedin Section 47(c) of the same Rule. Shouldidentity of parties, subject matter, andcauses of action be shown in the twocases, then res judicata in its aspect as a

“bar by prior judgment” would apply. If asbetween the two cases, only identity ofparties can be shown, but not identicacauses of action, then res judicata as

“conclusiveness of judgment” applies.

The petitioners do not question the ruling



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of the Court of Appeals that there isidentity of parties in Civil Case No. 1185and Civil Case No. 2735. What thepetitioners principally contend is that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 cannot

bar Civil Case No. 2735 as the two casesinvolve different causes of action anddifferent subject matters.

However, for res judicata in the concept ofconclusiveness of judgment to apply,identity of cause of action is not requiredbut merely identity of issue.

The claim of the petitioners that Civil CaseNo. 1185 was dismissed not because theyhave no cause of action but because theyfailed to state such a cause of action iswrong. The dispositive portion of theOrder dated January 31, 1986 is clear: theamended complaint was “ordereddismissed for lack of cause of action.”

The Order dated January 31, 1986 in CivilCase No. 1185 ruled that Cornelio and thepetitioners had no cause of action inconnection with the reformation of thedeed of donation executed by the spousesCornelio and Nieves in favor of Angelbecause the said deed of donation is a

simple donation and therefore not aproper subject of an action forreformation. As there can be noreformation of the deed of donationpursuant to Article 1366 of the Civil Code,the necessary implication andconsequence of the Order dated January31, 1986 in Civil Case No. 1185 is that thedeed of donation stands and the identityof the property subject of the donation isthat parcel of land which corresponds tothe technical description in the deed ofdonation. In other words, the propertydonated under the deed of donation isthat which matches the property whosemetes and bounds is particularly describedin the deed of donation. This is becausethe technical description of the land isproof of its identity. Such technicaldescription embodies the identity of theland. In this case, the technicaldescription in the deed of donation

pertains to Lot J of Psd. 146880. That iswhy the trial court in Spl. Civil Action No1950 ordered the issuance in Angel’sname of TCT No. 11349 over Lot J of Psd.146880. Thus, in Civil Case No. 1185 and

Spl. Civil Action No. 1950, Lot J of Psd.146880 is the property donated to Angeand registered in his name as TCT No11349 and, subsequently, to Angel’s fourchildren as TCT Nos. 20094, 2009520096, and 20097.

For purposes of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means thatthe right, fact, or matter in issue haspreviously been either “directlyadjudicated or necessarily involved in thedetermination of an action” by acompetent court. In this case, the issue ofthe transfer pursuant to the deed ofdonation to Angel of Lot J of Psd. 146880and, corollarily, his right over the saidproperty has been necessarily involved inCivil Case No. 1185.

The petitioners engage in hair-splitting inarguing that none of the issues involved inCivil Case No. 1185 is also involved in CiviCase No. 2735. The primary issue in CiviCase No. 1185 is whether the true

intention of the spouses Cornelio andNieves as donors was to donate to Angethe property described in the deed ofdonation, that is, Lot J of Psd. 146880.The issue in Civil Case No. 1185 istherefore the identity of one of theproperties donated by the spousesCornelio and Nieves for which Cornelioand the petitioners sought reformation ofthe deed of donation. As stated above, theorder of dismissal of the complaint in CiviCase No. 1185 necessarily implied that, asthe deed of donation is not subject to

reformation, the identity of the propertysubject of the donation is the propertycorresponding to the technical description,Lot J of Psd. 146880. On the other hand,the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2735is the recovery of Lot J of Psd. 146880 onthe petitioners’ claim that a clerical errorprevented the deed of donation fromconforming to the true intention of thespouses Cornelio and Nieves as to the


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identity of the property they intended todonate to Angel. This boils down to theissue of the true identity of the property,which has been, as earlier stated,necessarily adjudicated in Civil Case No.

1185. Thus, the judgment in Civil CaseNo. 1185 on the issue of the identity ofthe land donated by Cornelio and Nievesto Angel is conclusive in Civil Case No.2735, there being a similarity of parties inthe said cases.

The petitioners also question the validityof the deed of donation executed by thespouses Cornelio and Nieves in favor ofAngel. Indeed, that is the foundation oftheir claim. However, that issue had beensettled with finality in Civil Case No. 1185.

The petitioners who were parties againstAngel in Civil Case No. 1185 cannotresurrect that issue against the privies orsuccessors-in-interest of Angel in CivilCase No. 2735 without violating theprinciple of res judicata. In other words,Civil Case No. 2735 is barred by theconclusiveness of the judgment in CivilCase No. 1185.

As the issues of whether Lot J of Psd.146880 is one of the properties donated

by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves toAngel and whether such donation wasvalid have been necessarily settled in CivilCase No. 1185, they can no longer berelitigated again in Civil Case No. 2735.The Order dated January 31, 1986effectively held that the said property hadbeen donated to Angel. It follows that hehad properly sought its registration in hisname under TCT No. 11349 and he hadvalidly partitioned and donated it to hisfour children who acquired TCT Nos.20094, 20095, 20096, and 20097 in their

respective names.• G.R. No. 193516. March 24, 2014 Vilma

Macedenio Vs. Catalina Ramo, et al.• In resolving whether to dismiss a

case for violation of the rulescovering certifications againstforum-shopping, the courts shouldbe mindful of the facts and meritsofthe case, the extant evidence,

the principles ofjustice, and therules offairplayTheyshouldnotgiveintorigidity,indifference,indolence,orlackof depth.

The trial court in Civil Case No. 5703-Rcommitted grave abuse of discretion interminating or dismissing the case forfailure ofthe parties to submit acompromise agreement. In GoldloopProperties, Inc. v. Court o f Appeals, theCourt held that dismissing the actionwithout allowing the parties to presentevidence and after ordering them tocompromise is tantamount to deprivationof due process, and the "dismissal of anaction for failure to submit a compromiseagreement, which is not even required by

any rule, is definitely a harsh action.

The Court likewise held therein that ''thefact that negotiations for a compromise

agreement persisted even up to the timeof the dismissal of the case strongly

demonstrates their earnest efforts toabide by the trial court's order to settletheir

dispute amicably"; thus, "dismissing anaction on account of the failure of the

parties to compromise, would be to rendernugatory the pronounced policy ofthe

law to encourage compromises, and thusopen the floodgates to parties refusing to

agree upon an amicable settlement bysimply railroading their opposing parties'

position, or even defeating the latter'sclaim by the expedient of an outrightDISMISSAL.

For the same reasons, the Court finds thatthe dismissal of Civil Case No7150-R was unwarranted. It is true thatwhile it was incumbent for petitioner tohave informed the trial court of Civil Case



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contempt, and is one which, if the party isacting in good faith, is within his rights,the presence or absence of acontumacious intent is, in some instances,held to be determinative of its character.

A person should not be condemned forcontempt where he contends for what hebelieves to be right and in good faithinstitutes proceedings for the purpose,however erroneous may be his conclusionas to his rights. To constitute contempt,the act must be done wilfully and for anillegitimate or improper purpose.

The supposed inaction of the SLU and itsofficials when the Olairez group visited theschool on July 17, 2003 to demand theircompliance with the decision was not

borne out of a contumacious conducttending, directly or indirectly, to hinderthe implementation of a judgment. Aconduct, to be contumacious, implieswillfulness, bad faith or with deliberateintent to cause injustice, which is clearlynot the case here. On the contrary, SLUwas well within its rights to appeal thedecision and not immediately heed thedemand of the Olairez group.

• G.R. No. 162063. March 31, 2014 Leonora

A. Pascual, represented by Florebhee N.

Agcaoili, Attorney-In-Fact Vs. Josefino L.Daquioag, et al.• The writ of execution issued upon a

final judgment adjudicating theownership of land to a party mayauthorize putting her in possessionalthough the judgment does notspecifically direct such act.

As a general rule, a writ of executionshould strictly conform to every particularof the judgment to be executed, and notvary the terms of the judgment it seeks toenforce, nor may it go beyond the termsof the judgment sought to be executed;the execution is void if it is in excess ofand beyond the original judgment oraward.

Admittedly, the phrase “placing thewinning party, Catalina Almazan Villamorin the premises of the land in question”

was not expressly stated in the dispositiveportion of the decision of the RegionaExecutive Director of the DENR. But theabsence of that phrase did not render thedirective to enforce invalid because the

directive was in full consonance with thedecision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to what appearson the face of the decision, for itembraces whatever is necessarily includedtherein or necessary thereto.

Upon the final finding of the ownership inthe judgment in favor of AlmazanVillamor, the delivery of the possession ofthe property was deemed included in thedecision, considering that the claim itselfof Pascual to the possession had been

based also on ownership. In Nazareno vCourt of Appeals, the Court affirmed thewrit of execution awarding possession ofland, notwithstanding that the decisionsought to be executed did not direct thedelivery of the possession of the land tothe winning parties.

• G.R. No. 199595. April 2, 2014 PhilippineWoman's Christian Temperance UnionInc. Vs. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rdGeneration Heirs Foundation, Inc.ISSUE: IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT;

Exceptions

On its face, it is immediately apparentthat the petition merits outright dismissain view of the doctrine of immutabilityattached to the Court’s final and executoryResolutions dated July 21, 2010 andSeptember 15, 2010 in G.R. No. 190193.

The doctrine postulates that a decisionthat has acquired finality becomesimmutable and unalterable, and may nolonger be modified in any respect, even ifthe modification is meant to correcterroneous conclusions of fact and law, andwhether it is made by the court thatrendered it or by the Highest Court of theland. Any act which violates this principlemust immediately be struck down.

While firmly ingrained as a basic

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procedural tenet in Philippine jurisprudence, immutability of final judgments was never meant to be aninflexible tool to excuse and overlookprejudicial circumstances. The doctrine

must yield to practicality, logic, fairnessand substantial justice. Hence, it’sapplication admits the followingexceptions: (1) the correction of clericalerrors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to anyparty; (3) void judgments; and (4)whenever circumstances transpire afterthe finality of the decision rendering itsexecution unjust and inequitable.

Here, the third exception is attendant. Thenullity of the RTC judgment and all

subsequent rulings affirming the same,render inoperative the doctrine ofimmutability of judgment, andconsequently justify the propriety ofgiving due course to the present petition.

To expound, the RTC judgment in LRCCase No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedingstaken in relation thereto were voidbecause the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the fundamental subjectmatter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the

issuance of a title which was in reality, acomplaint for revocation of donation, anordinary civil action outside the ambit ofSection 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

The petition filed by TRY Foundationwas a disguised complaint forrevocation of donation.

TRY Foundation is actually seeking torecover the possession and ownership ofthe subject property from PWCTUI and notmerely the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCTNo. 20970 T-22702. The propriety ofpronouncing TRY Foundation as theabsolute owner of the subject propertyrests on the resolution of whether or notthe donation made to PWCTUI has beeneffectively revoked when its corporateterm expired in 1979. Stated otherwise,no judgment proclaiming TRY Foundationas the absolute owner of the property can

be arrived at without declaring the deed ofdonation revoked.

An action which seeks the recovery ofproperty is outside the ambit of

Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.

Whether the donation merits revocationand consequently effect reversion of thedonated property to the donor and/or hisheirs cannot be settled by filing a merepetition for cancellation of title underSection 108 of P.D. No. 1529

The petition of TRY Foundation had theeffect of reopening the decree ofregistration in the earlier LRC Case No20970 which granted PWCTUI’sapplication for the issuance of a newowner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970As such, it breached the caveat in Section108 that “this section shall not beconstrued to give the court authority toreopen the judgment or decree ofregistration.” The petition of TRYFoundation also violated that portion inSection 108 stating that “all petitions ormotions filed under this section as well asany other provision of this decree afteroriginal registration shall be filed and

entitled in the original case in which thedecree of registration was entered.” Thepetition of TRY Foundation in LRC CaseNo. Q-18126(04) was clearly not a merecontinuation of LRC Case No. 20970.

Further, the petition filed by TRYFoundation is not within the province ofSection 108 because the relief thereundercan only be granted if there is unanimityamong the parties, or that there is noadverse claim or serious objection on thepart of any party in interest.

Records show that in its opposition to thepetition, PWCTUI maintained that it

“remains and continues to be the true andsole owner in fee simple of the property”and that TRY Foundation “has no iota ofright” thereto.

More so, the enumerated instances for


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amendment or alteration of a certificate oftitle under Section 108 are non-controversial in nature. They are limited toissues so patently insubstantial as not tobe genuine issues. The proceedings

thereunder are summary in nature,contemplating insertions of mistakeswhich are only clerical, but certainly notcontroversial issues.

Undoubtedly, revocation of donationentails litigious and controversial mattersespecially in this case where the conditionsupposedly violated by PWCTUI is notexpressly stated in the deed of donation.Thus, it is imperative to conduct anexhaustive examination of the factual andlegal bases of the parties’ respectivepositions for a complete determination ofthe donor’s desires. Certainly, suchobjective cannot be accomplished by thecourt through the abbreviated proceedingsof Section 108.

In fact, even if it were specifically imposedas a ground for the revocation of thedonation that will set off the automaticreversion of the donated property to thedonor and/or his heirs, court interventionis still indispensable.

As ruled in Vda. de Delgado v. CA, “[a]lthough automatic reversionimmediately happens upon a violation ofthe condition and therefore no judicialaction is necessary for such purpose, still judicial intervention must be sought bythe aggrieved party if only for the purposeof determining the propriety of therescission made.” In addition, where thedonee denies the rescission of thedonation or challenges the proprietythereof, only the final award of the courtcan conclusively settle whether theresolution is proper or not. Here, PWCTUIunmistakably refuted the allegation thatthe expiration of its corporate term in1979 rescinded the donation.

Lastly, the issues embroiled in revocationof donation are litigable in an ordinary civilproceeding which demands stricter

jurisdictional requirements than thatimposed in a land registration case.

Foremost of which is the requirement onthe service of summons for the court to

acquire jurisdiction over the persons ofthe defendants. Without a valid service ofsummons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless thedefendant voluntarily submits to itService of summons is a guarantee ofone’s right to due process in that he isproperly apprised of a pending actionagainst him and assured of theopportunity to present his defenses to thesuit.

In contrast, jurisdiction in a landregistration cases being a proceeding inrem, is acquired by constructive seizure ofthe land through publication, mailing andposting of the notice of hearing. Personsnamed in the application are notsummoned but merely notified of the dateof initial hearing on the petition.

The payment of docket fees is another jurisdictional requirement for an action for

revocation which was absent in the suitfiled by TRY Foundation. On the otherhand, Section 111 of P.D. No. 1529merely requires the payment of filing feesand not docket fees.

The absence of the above jurisdictionarequirements for ordinary civil actionsthus prevented the RTC, acting as a landregistration court, from acquiring thepower to hear and decide the underlyingissue of revocation of donation in LRC

Case No. Q-18126(04). Any determinationmade involving such issue had no forceand effect; it

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COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR REMEDIAL LAW (2014-2015)