Evidence Cases [Rulings]

Bacalso vs. Padigos ; G.R. No. 173192 ; April 14, 2008

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character. The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

Concepcion Chua Gaw vs. Suy Ben Chua & Felisa Chua; GR 160855; 4/16/08

1. The delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.

o That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be bound by the former’s testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence of his bad character. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not vouch for the witness’ veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.

o A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latter’s testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.

o In the present case, petitioner, by her own testimony, failed to discredit respondent’s testimony on how Hagonoy lumber became his sole property. The petitioner admitted having signed the Deed of Partition but she insisted that the transfer of the property to Sioc Huan was only temporary. On cross examination, she confessed that no other document

was executed to indicate that the transfer of the business to Sioc Huan was a temporary arrangement. She declared that after their mother died in 1993, she did not initiate any action concerning the Hagonoy Lumber, and it was only in their counterclaim in the instant, for the first time, she raised a claim over the business.

o Due process requires that in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented. All the parties to the case, therefore, are considered bound by the favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence. In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. In this light, the more vital consideration is not whether a piece of evidence was properly attributed to one party, but whether it was accorded the apposite probative weight by the court. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or contradict his testimony.

2. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public document, and makes it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. It is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notarized document carries evidentiary weight as to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such a document must be given full force and effect absent a strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects recognized by law. A public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is, generally, evidence of the facts therein express in clear unequivocal manner.

3. The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,47 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

o An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. The parties’ intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third parties who are strangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

BPI vs. JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES; G.R. No. 157177; February 11, 2008

1. The [Supreme] Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. Such rule however is not absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when the

inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [We hold that this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.]

2. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other.

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:

SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.

3. Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. We [SC] have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.

GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA; G.R. No. 159240; February 4, 2008

1. Well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel. The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.

2. In People v. Hernandez, [SC] held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court.

The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[…] an attorney who is employed to manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit […] has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, […] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such admissions are made […] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, […] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.

3. Judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.

ERNESTO L. SALAS vs. STA. MESA MARKET CORPORATION and the HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO; G.R. No. 157766; July 12, 2007

1. The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as general rule, private documents . However, once financial statements are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

2. Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly authenticated.

3. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

4. Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their admissibility in evidence.

5. During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation's monthly market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a representative of SMMC's external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements were never authenticated.

SPS FLORES vs SPS. PINEDA; G.R. No. 158996; November 14, 2008

1. Elements of a Medical Negligence Case

A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient.

There are four elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely: i. duty,

ii. breach, iii. injury, and iv. proximate causation.

Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on one's conduct.The standard in turn refers to the amount of competence associated with the proper discharge of the profession. A physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use under the same circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach, the physician is answerable for negligence.

2. As in any civil action, the burden to prove the existence of the necessary elements rests with the plaintiff. To successfully pursue a claim, the plaintiff must prove by preponderance of evidence that,

a. the physician either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and

b. the failure or action caused injury to the patient.3. Expert testimony is therefore essential since the factual issue of whether a physician or surgeon

has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is generally a matter of expert opinion.

4. Injury and Causation

As previously mentioned, the critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff's injuries; the plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he had been injured and defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendant's fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA vs. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON; G.R. No. 177407; February 9, 2011

(It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.)1. rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the

BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

2. Admissibility of evidence vs. Probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence.

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

3. As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

x x x x

(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

………The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.

4. …. the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

5. ….contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

6. Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

STAR TWO (SPV-AMC), INC vs. HOWARD KO, MIN MIN SEE KO, JIMMY ONG, and GRACE NG ONG; G.R. No. 185454; March 23, 2011

1. courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered because parties are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their respective exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made. Without a formal offer of evidence, courts are constrained to take no notice of the evidence even if it has been marked and identified.21

This rule, however, admits of an exception, provided that the evidence has been identified by testimony duly recorded and that it has been incorporated in the records of the case.

In this case, the subject pieces of evidence were presented in support of respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to dismiss. A hearing was set for the reception of their evidence, but petitioner failed to attend the same. The pieces of evidence were thus identified, marked in evidence, and incorporated in the records of the case. Clearly, the trial court correctly admitted and considered the evidence of respondents warranting the dismissal of their case.

NANCY T. LORZANO vs. JUAN TABAYAG, JR.; G.R. No. 189647; February 6, 2012

1. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact

2. the signature of Tabayag in the May 25, 1992 deed of sale was a forgery is a conclusion derived by the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon this Court as it involves the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, which is a matter not for this Court to resolve. Where a petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the CA regarding the existence of forgery is a question of fact

3. …the CA aptly ruled that a handwriting expert is not indispensable to prove that the signature of Tabayag in the questioned deed of sale was indeed a forgery. It is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies

of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO; G. R. No. 171701; 2-8-12

1. It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in what manner must be clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.

The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative; therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner’s allegations. Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court such documents as secondary evidence absent the affiant’s testimony.

2. The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d), when ‘the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,’ the original thereof need not be presented. However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document but what the plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.

3. In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original.

None of the abovementioned requirements were complied by the plaintiff. Exhibits ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’, ‘S’, and ‘T’ were all photocopies. ‘P’, ‘R’, and ‘T’ were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit ‘S’ is a letter, which is clearly a private document.

It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned. Hence, Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence. (Paredes: affidavits are public documents but considered as hearsay evidence UNLESS affiant is presented before the court)

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE; G. R. No. 183622 February8, 2012

1. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

2. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

3. Burden of Proving Foreign Law

The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

4. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

Dr. EMMANUEL JARCIA, Jr. and Dr. MARILOU BASTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. No. 187926; February 15, 2012

1. As to the Application of The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."

The Black's Law Dictionary defines the said doctrine.

Thus: The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened provided the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.

Under this doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.

2. As to negligence

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.

The elements of simple negligence are: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.

ARNEL SISON y ESCUADRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; G.R. No. 187229; February 22, 2012

1. P.D. 1866, as amended by RA 8294, the law governing Illegal Possession of Firearms provides:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. − The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high-powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter, such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser-calibered firearms but considered powerful, such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use, unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

2. In People v. Ladjaalam,36 we laid down the correct interpretation of the law and ruled:

x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.

3. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The prosecution was able to sufficiently allege in the Information, and establish during trial, that a gun was used in the commission of rape. Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was established in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.38 Thus, we affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted by the courts below.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO; G.R. No. 173476; February 22, 2012

1. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

2. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

3. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

4. The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO vs THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., ; G.R. No. 185527 ; July 18, 2012

1. The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

2. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

3. The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

4. Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. Nowhere in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.

…. to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.

5. While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.

6. It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

7. The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses

Constitution provides as follows:

Section 14. (1) x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

8. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo, the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus:

"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x"22 (Underscoring supplied)1âwphi1

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris that the constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility."

As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination,"it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v. Washington,the US Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement, thus:

Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's right to confront witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.

9. The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case

The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb that the taking of an unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery procedure the use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.

But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not similar. The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five

defense witnesses before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the United States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense.

In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED; G.R. No. 170491 ; April 4, 2007

1. "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.

2. The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

3. A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

4. Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: "SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of

a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:

a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;

d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law;

e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole."

HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG vs. Sps. LORENZO and FLORENTINA PAROCHA, PRISCILLA P. ABELLERA, and MARIA VILORIA PASAG; G.R. No. 155483; April 27, 2007

1. The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case, any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

2. Waiver of the Offer of Evidence

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility . Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.

Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice. Under the Rule on guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and case of deposition and discovery measures, it is provided that: On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he is required to make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his last witness and the opposing party is required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter the judge shall make the ruling on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of evidence in writing in conformity with Section 35, Rule 132[.]

On the other hand, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence." It requires that "such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the Court to be done in writing."

The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the very day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may consider the party’s documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court may allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object evidence or documents are large in number––say from 100 and above, and only where there is unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.

No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party’s evidence-in-chief other than those that had been identified below and pre-marked during the pre-trial. Any other evidence not indicated or listed below shall be considered waived by the parties.

However, the Court, in its discretion, may allow introduction of additional evidence in the following cases: (a) those to be used on cross-examination or re-cross-examination for impeachment purposes; (b) those presented on re-direct examination to explain or supplement the answers of a witness during the cross-examination; (c) those to be utilized for rebuttal or sur-rebuttal purposes; and (d) those not available during the pre-trial proceedings despite due diligence on the part of the party offering the same.

It is apparent from the foregoing provision that both parties should obtain, gather, collate, and list all their respective pieces of evidence–– whether testimonial, documentary, or object––even prior to the preliminary conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictly adhere to the principle of "laying one’s cards on the table." In the light of these issuances and in order to obviate interminable delay in case processing, the parties and lawyers should closely conform to the requirement that the offer of evidence must be done orally on the day scheduled for the presentation of the last witness.

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the party rests its case.19 The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean

that it has already been offered as part of the evidence.20 It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.21

3. Dismissal of the Complaint on a Demurrer to Evidence

A demurrer to evidence is an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action; thus, abbreviating judicial proceedings. It is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue." The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI vs. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAÑA and ROSALITA CARDAÑA; G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006

1. whether petitioner was negligent or not is a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for review, and when this determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding on this Court. However, there is an exception, that is, when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the lower court. In our view, the exception finds application in the present case.

2. The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely informed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was an absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that required by the attendant circumstances. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaña. The appellate court ruled that the dead caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it.

3. A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.

4. The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was

unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position.

5. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13

6. The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

7. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

8. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.

9. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the school’s premises. The fact that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by her position.

PROCOPIO TAPUROC, HEIRS OF ANTONIA EBE (Deceased); HEIRS OF CELEDONIA PUTONG; HEIRS OF EUFEMIO PUTONG; HEIRS OF GREGORIO PUTONG; HEIRS OF MARIANO PUTONG and SOFRONIA PATROLLA, ALL REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, AUREA P. MERCIDOR vs. CARMELITA LOQUELLANO VDA. DE MENDE and the HEIRS OF EVANS MENDE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF TAGBILARAN; G.R. No. 152007; January 22, 2007

1. As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their burden.

2. The trial court correctly ruled that the parties themselves dictate the course and flow of the presentation of evidence, as well as the witnesses for each side. Considering that the case before it is civil, not criminal, the lower court certainly cannot, on its own, issue an order requiring a handwriting expert to appear before it and compare the documents presented by the parties. It behooves upon the parties themselves to call forth their own set of witnesses and present their own evidence to bolster their respective claims. If the petitioners failed to present an expert witness, only themselves ought to be blamed.

3. Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison of handwritings.

4. In the present case, all that the petitioners had to offer by way of evidence on the issue of forgery was their bare denial that their predecessors-in-interest signed the subject Deed of Sale. Such denial will not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity of notarized documents, to overthrow which, the countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.

5. At the other end of the spectrum, the respondents presented sufficient proof of their claim of ownership over the property in dispute. The respondent Mendes maintain that they had been in continuous, peaceful and open possession of the property since 1967, the year of the alleged sale, or for more than thirty (30) years now. No less than the petitioners themselves acknowledged this in their pleadings20 before this Court. And beginning the year 1968, the respondents have been religiously paying the realty taxes due on the same property. Likewise, when TCT No. 3444 was lost, respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende filed a petition for judicial reconstitution to secure a second owner’s copy of the lost title. Said petition went through the proper procedure and thereafter Carmelita was issued a second owner’s copy of TCT No. 3444 which was later changed to TCT No. (8585) T-4767.

6. Not to be overlooked is the fact that the petitioners filed their complaint of declaration of nullity only after twenty-nine (29) years from the execution of the alleged forged deed of sale. In the meanwhile, title to the property had already been in the name of respondent Mendes since 1967. The Mendes had been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject land, and had been religiously paying the realty taxes due thereon. These are hard facts that ought not to be disregarded. The Court, in a long line of cases, has uniformly held in favor of the registered owner who had been in possession of a disputed property for a considerable period of time. With the Mendes’ possession in this case having been in the concept of an owner and the land itself registered in their names for more than thirty (30) years now, their title thereto had become indefeasible and their possession could no longer be disturbed. The petitioners’ failure to take the necessary steps to assert their alleged right for at least twenty-nine (29) years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action on the ground of laches.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERDINAND PASCUAL y BAUTISTA; G.R. No. 173309; January 23, 2007

1. positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime, as for instance when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., vs. MODESTO CALAUNAN, G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007

1. For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case

2. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.

3. Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

G.R. No. 159585 April 22, 2008 AMANDO A. PONTAOE and DR. ALEJANDRO G. PONTAOE, vs. TEODORA A. PONTAOE and EDUARDO A. PONTAOE ; G.R. No. 165318 April 22, 2008 TEODORA A. PONTAOE and EDUARDO A. PONTAOE vs. AMANDO A. PONTAOE and DR. ALEJANDRO G. PONTAOE

As to the argument that handwriting experts should have been employed, handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them, but resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwritings.

A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

The opinions of handwriting experts are not binding upon courts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court likewise explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting

"with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge."

G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005 CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

1. It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form where a proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:

(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;

(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;

(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;

(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;

(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;

(6) identification of the speakers; and

(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.

2. In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings. Likewise, a witness’ declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of authentication.28 The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of the conversation recorded.

These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering

3. In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recording and that he had to instruct his adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts

G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005 MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ

1. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."

The reasons given for the rule are:

a. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

b. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

c. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

d. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

2. But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

3. The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"

4. CA in this case held: "The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which

the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."

5. It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

6. At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity."