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Eitan Altman May, 2013. Competition over popularity in social networks. Cultural, Social, Artistic reasons can make a content a potential success We are interested in understanding how Information technology can contribute to the dissemination of content. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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COMPETITION OVER POPULARITY IN SOCIAL NETWORKS
Eitan AltmanMay, 2013
INTRODUCTION
WHAT MAKES A CONTENT POPULAR? Cultural, Social, Artistic reasons can
make a content a potential success We are interested in understanding how
Information technology can contribute to the dissemination of content
QUESTIONS WE WISH TO ANSWER Who are the actors related to dissemination of
content? What are the tools for dissemination of
content? How efficient are they? Can data analysis be used to understand why
a given content is successful? When and how much should we invest in
promoting content?
OUTLINE OF TALK The actors and their strategic choices Zoom: In what content to specialize Tools for accelerating dissemination Zoom: Analyzing the role of
recommendation lists Dissemination models Dynamic game models for competition over
popularity: tools for the solution, results Start with classification of models for
content dissemination
WHAT IS THERE IN COMMON BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING VIDEOS?
The most popular video with more than 1.5 billion viewers on youtube
A POPULAR MUSIC VIDEO
WHAT IS COMMON? WHAT IS DIFFERENT? Difference in potential interested
audience size Both exhibit viral behavior
DETERMINISTIC EPIDEMIC MODELS: Fraction of infected:
Solution:
Hence
Integrating, we get:
Finally.
EXAMPLES WITH X(0) = 0.0001, 0.01, 0.3 k=1 k=3
UNPOPULAR VIDEOWITH MANY VIEWS
President Barack Obama 2009 Inauguration and Address 3 years. Concave? Epidemic?
PROPAGATION MODELS WITHOUT VIRALITY, WITH MAX POPULATION SIZE
Consider the model: This models a constant rate M at which a non-infected node becomes infected. An infected node does not infect others. This gives
This is a negative exponential model that converges to a constant
CURVES WITH DIFFERENT X(0) Converge to 1
DECISION MAKING IN SOCIAL NETWORKS Involved decision makers: Social network
provider (SNP), content provider (CP), content creators (CCr) consumers of content (CoCo).
Goal of SNP, CP, CCr: maximize visibility of content.
Higher visibility (more views) allows SNP, CP and CCr to receive more advertisements money. The content itself can be an advertisement which the CCr wishes to be visible.
ACTORS AND ACTIONS: SNP: what type of services to offer.
CP: what type of content to specializes in
CCr: have actions available by the SNR (share, like, embed)
CoCo: can decide what to consume based on available information (recommendation lists)
A STATIC GAME PROBLEM R resources (eg content types), M players. Cost C(ji) for player i to associate with resource j The cost depends C(ji) depends on the number n(j) connected to j. Nondecreasing.Application: Each of M content providers has to decide in which type of content to specialize.
SOLUTION: MAP TO CROWDING GAMES
2. SPLITABLE CASE A CP can diversify its content MAPS to splittable routing games by
[ORS] The utility is a decreasing function in
the total amount of competing content.
Need to revise the whole routing game basic results.
YOUTUBE DATA FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
Each video has a recommendation list: set of recommended videos
Size of the list N: depends on the screen size.
Define a weighted recommendation graph.
Nodes: videos. Weight of a node: number of views, or
age etc. Direct link between A and B if B is in
the recommendation list of A.
MEASUREMENTS AND CURVE FITTING We take 1000 random videos Draw a curve where X=number of views of a video Y=average no. of views of its recommended list.
Not a good fit
THE LOG OF NUMBER OF VIEWS Horizontal axis: a function f of number of
views of a video Vertical axis: average of a function f of the
average no. of views of videos in its recommended list.
Good linear fit Average(Log(y))= a log(x) + b, a>1,
b>0 for N<5
MARKOV ANALYSIS Consider a random walk over the
recommendation graph. At time n+1 it visits at random (uniform probability) one of the videos recommended at time n.
State x(n )=number of views of a video at step n
Assume: x(n) is Markov.
STABILITY ANALYSIS: F can serve as a Lyapunov function
E[f(x(n+1)- x(n)|x(n))> (a-1)f(x(n))+b
For N<5 since a>1, the Markov chain is instable (not positive recurrent).
Therefore the expected time to return to a given video is infinite. Hence small screen means badPage rank.
DYNAMIC GAME MODELS FOR POPULARITY
Markov Decision Processes: We are given a1. State space2. Action space3. Transition probabilities4. Immediate costs/utilities5. We define information and strategies6. Cost criterion to minimize, or payoff to
maximize over a subset of policies V(x,t,u)7. x- is initial state, t is the horizon, u is the
policy
STATES The state at time T contain all the
information that determines the future evolution for given choices of control after T
Optimality principle: Let V(x,t) be the optimal value starting at time 0 at state x till some time t. Then
V(x,t) = Max E[V(x,s,u)+V(X(s),t-s)]This is Dynamic Programming PRINCIPLE
CRITERIA Total cost (reward): E [ T can be a stopping time. Running
reward ( r) and final reward (g). Other criterion: Risk sensitive cost Sample path criteria. E.G. sample path
total cost (without expectation). Denote by R(x,t).
DISCRETE TIME TOTAL PAYOFF CRITERION The optimality principle implies:
V(x,t+1)=Max_a [ r(x,a) +
Total cost: V(x,t) does not depend on t. Finite spaces: V is the unique solution
of the DP
RISK SENSITIVE COST Define J(x,t,u)=Eu [exp ( - a R(x,t) ]The standard optimality principle does not hold. Instead,V(x,t) = Max E[V(x,s,u) x V(X(s),t-s)]
We obtain a multiplicative dynamic programming.
Dynammic programming transforms optimization over strategies to one over actions. In games: NE over strategies transforms to a set of fixed point equations: NE over actions.
CONTINUOUS TIME CONTROL: MARKOV CASE
Assume one can go from state x to any state y in the set S(x). The time T(x,a,y) till a transition occurs to state y if an action a is used, is exponentially distributed with parameter L(x,a,y).
Then the next transition from state occurs at a time T that is the minimum over all y of T(x,a,y). It is exponentially distributed with parameter
The next transition is to state y w.p. L(x,a,y)/L(y)
UNIFORMIZATION We may view this as if there are different exponential
timers in different states.
We may wish to have a single one.
Idea: Assume we have rate L(1) at state 1 and rate L(2)>L(1) at state 2. Let p=L(1)/L(2). We shall now use the same rate of transition L(2) in both states, but at state 1 we shall also allow the possibility of transitions from state 1 to state 1 which occur with probability 1-p . These are called fictitious transitions. Only a fraction p of the transitions ae to othe states, which occur with rate L(2)p = L(1)
PROBLEM 3:COMPETING OVER POPULARITY OF CONTENT: Individuals who wish to disseminate content
through a social network. Goal: visibility, popularity
Social network provider (SNP) interested in maximizing the amount of downloads
Has tools to accelerate the dissemination of popular content. Example: Recommendation graph
The SNP can give priority in the recommendation graph to someone who pays
EXAMPLE: YOUTUBE
EXAMPLE: YOUTUBEAD 1
AD 3
AD 2
{}
EXAMPLE: YOUTUBEAD 1
AD 3
AD 2
{}
Recomgraph
A LIST CONTAINING OTHER AD EVENTS:SHARING AND EMBEDDING
SNOWBALL EPIDEMIC EFFECTS
Other accelerationFactors:
• Other publishersEmbed content• Comments andResponses increasevisibility
N content creators (seeds)– players M potential destination A destination m is interested in the first
content that it will be aware of. Information on content n arrives at a
destination after a time exponentially distributed with parameter λ(n).
The goal of a seed: maximize the number of destinations Xi(T) at time T (T large) that have its content (dissemination utility).
Model
Player n can accelerate its information process by a constant a at a cost c(a)
Uniformization: let = total utility for player i if at
time 0 the system is at state x, player j takes action aj and the utility to go for player i from the next transition onwards is v(y) if the state after the next transition is y.
Define dessimination utility of player i to be g(xi) and
ζi (xi) = g(xi+1) – g(xi)
We solve the DP Fixed Point Eq:
For linear dissemination utility, we can reduce the state space to the number of destinations that have some content. 1-dimensional!
Solution: formulate explicit M matrix games, the equilibrium at matrix m is the equilibrium of the original game at state m
If Ci(a)=Gi (a-1) (linear in a) then the equilibrium policy for player I is a threshold (Gi/λi)
STATE AGGREGATIONPossible to aggregate set of states S1, S2, … , Sr into states if states within Si are not distinguishable: Same transition probabilities from any
x in Si to any Sj Same immediate rewards/costs for any
x in Si Same available actions
This is a differential game with a compact state space.
The case of no information
Again state space collapce to dimension 1
Equilibrium at state m obtained as equilibrium of m-th matrix game. Now m is a real number
For linear acceleration cost – same threshold policies
Results
Semi-dynamic case (policies constant in time): explicit expressions for the state evolution and the utility.
Taking the sum, we get: dx/dt = C(M-x) Hence X(t) = M(1-exp(-Ct))
Results
Let Xi be lim Xi(t) as t-> infinity. Then starting at X(0)=0, we get
Xi = Ci/(C1+ … + Cn)
Where Ci = lambda(i) w(i)
Assume symmetry
The case of no information
KELLY PROBLEM: Player I chooses w(i)
Pays g w(i) Earns Ui ( M w(i)/( w(1) + … + w(n) )
There exists a unique equilibrium. Can be computed using a convex optimization problem.
Semi-dynamic case (policies constant in time): explicit expressions for the state evolution and the utility.
The state is proportional to
Results
GOOD FIT!
MOBILE SOCIAL NETWORKSInstead of M wireline destinations, consider relay destinations where A mobile relay stores at most one copy of
content. Mobile users get the content from the relays.
An end user is interested only in a single copy of the content (e.g. list of open restaurants)
Only the first content received in a relay is stored
The sources compete over (distributed) memory (relays) and on visibility space
POWER CONTROL MODEL The dissemination rate to mobile end
users depend on how many relays have the copy of a content.
To reach more relays each of N (mobile) sources has to transmit with larger power
The power determines the rate of contacts between a source and the relays
THE COST
EXPIRATION PROBABILITIES
OBBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS:
REFS AT WWW-SOP.INRIA.FR/MEMBERS/EITAN.ALTMAN/DODESCADEN.HTML