Comparative Politics Essentials

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ESSENTIALS OFCOMPARATIVE POLITICS T H I R D E D I T I O N

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W. W. Norton & Company has been independent since its founding in 1923, whenWilliam Warder Norton and Mary D. Herter Norton rst published lectures deliveredat the Peoples Institute, the adult education division of New York Citys Cooper Union.The rm soon expanded its program beyond the Institute, publishing books by cele-brated academics from America and abroad. By mid-century, the two major pillars ofNortons publishing programtrade books and college textswere rmly established.In the 1950s, the Norton family transferred control of the company to its employees,and todaywith a sta of four hundred and a comparable number of trade, college,and professional titles published each yearW. W. Norton & Company stands as thelargest and oldest publishing house owned wholly by its employees.

Copyright 2010, 2007, 2004 by W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

All rights reserved.Printed in the United States of America.

Editor: Aaron JavsicasAssistant Editor: Carly FraserProject Editor: Kate FeigheryDesign director: Rubina YehProduction manager, College: Eric Pier-HockingE-media editor: Dan JostAncillary editor: Rachel ComerfordComposition: Matrix Publishing Services, Inc.Manufacturing: Quebecor WorldFaireld division

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataONeil, Patrick H., 1966

Essentials of comparative politics / Patrick H. ONeil3rd ed.p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN: 978-0-393-93376-5 (pbk.)

1. Comparative government. 2. State, The. 3. Capitalism. 4. Democracy. 5. Post-communism. I. Title.

JF51.O54 2009320.3dc22 2009015082

ISBN: 978-0-393-93376-5 (pbk.)

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT

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P A T R I C K H . O N E I LUniversity of Puget Sound

BW . W . N O R T O N & C O M P A N Y

New York London

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CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS xi

ABOUT THE AUTHOR xiii

PREFACE xv

1 INTRODUCTION 1What Is Comparative Politics? 2

The Comparative Method 3

Can We Make a Science of Comparative Politics? 7

A Guiding Concept: Political Institutions 13

A Guiding Ideal: Reconciling Freedom and Equality 16

In Sum: Looking Ahead and Thinking Carefully 18

2 STATES 21Defining the State 22

The Origins of Political Organization 26

The Rise of the Modern State 30

Comparing State Power 35

Legitimacy 35

Centralization or Decentralization 39

Power, Autonomy, and Capacity 39

In Sum: Studying States 43

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3 NATIONS AND SOCIETY 47Ethnic Identity 48

National Identity 50

Citizenship and Patriotism 52

Ethnic Identity, National Identity, and Citizenship: Origins and Persistence 53

Ethnic and National Conflict 55

Political Attitudes and Political Ideology 58

Political Attitudes 59

Political Ideology 63

Religion, Fundamentalism, and the Crisis of Ideology 66

Political Culture 71

In Sum: Society and Politics 75

4 POLITICAL ECONOMY 77The Components of Political Economy 78

Markets and Property 78

Public Goods 80

Social Expenditures: Who Benefits? 81

Taxation 82

Money, Inflation, and Unemployment 82

Regulation 85

Trade 86

Political-Economic Systems 87

Liberalism 88

Social Democracy 89

Communism 92

Mercantilism 94

Political-Economic Systems and the State: Comparing Outcomes 96

Measuring Wealth 96

Measuring Inequality and Poverty 99

Human Development Index (HDI) 100

Happiness 101

The Rise and Fall of Liberalism? 104

In Sum: The End of Economic History? 106

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5 DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 109Defining Democracy 110

Origins and Sources of Democracy 111

Contemporary Democratization 113

Modernization and Democratization 115

Elites and Democratization 115

Society and Democratization 116

International Relations and Democratization 117

Culture and Democratization 117

Institutions of the Democratic State 118

Executives: Head of State and Head of Government 119

Legislatures: Unicameral and Bicameral 120

Judiciary: Concrete and Abstract Review 121

Models of Democracy: Parliamentary, Presidential, andSemipresidential Systems 122

Parliamentary Systems 122

Presidential Systems 124

Semipresidential Systems 125

Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semipresidential Systems: Benefits and Drawbacks 126

Political Parties 128

Electoral Systems 129

Referendum and Initiative 137

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 137

In Sum: Future Challenges to Democracy 139

6 NONDEMOCRATIC REGIMES 141Defining Nondemocratic Rule 142

Totalitarianism and Nondemocratic Rule 143

Origins and Sources of Nondemocratic Rule 145

Modernization and Nondemocratic Rule 145

Elites and Nondemocratic Rule 146

Society and Nondemocratic Rule 147

International Relations and Nondemocratic Rule 148

Culture and Nondemocratic Rule 149

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viii C O N T E N T S

Nondemocratic Regimes and Political Control 151

Coercion and Surveillance 152

Co-optation: Corporatism and Clientelism 153

Personality Cults 155

Models of Nondemocratic Rule 157

Personal and Monarchical Rule 157

Military Rule 158

One-Party Rule 160

Theocracy 161

Illiberal/Hybrid Regimes 162

In Sum: Retreat or Retrenchment for Nondemocratic Regimes? 164

7 ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES 167Defining Advanced Democracy 168

Freedom and Equality in Advanced Democracies 172

Advanced Democracies Today 176

Political Institutions: Sovereignty Transformed? 177

The European Union: Integration, Expansion, and Resistance 177

Devolution and Democracy 184

Societal Institutions: New Identities in Formation? 186

Postmodern Values and Organization 186

Diversity, Identity, and the Challenge to Postmodern Values 188

Economic Institutions: A New Market? 190

Postindustrialism 191

Maintaining the Welfare State 192

In Sum: The Advanced Democracies in Transition 195

8 COMMUNISM AND POSTCOMMUNISM 197Communism, Equality, and the Nature of Human Relations 198

Revolution and the Triumph of Communism 201

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Putting Communism into Practice 203

Communist Political Economy 207

Societal Institutions under Communism 208

The Collapse of Communism 210

The Transformation of Political Institutions 214

Reorganizing the State and Constructing a Democratic Regime 214

Evaluating Political Transitions 216

The Transformation of Economic Institutions 219

Privatization and Marketization 219

Evaluating Economic Transitions 221

The Transformation of Societal Institutions 223

Re-creating Identities 223

Evaluating Societal Transitions 224

In Sum: The Legacy of Communism 227

9 LESS-DEVELOPED AND NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 230Freedom and Equality in the Newly Industrializing and Less-Developed Countries 231

Imperialism and Colonialism 234

Institutions of Imperialism 236

Exporting the State 236

Social Identities 237

Dependent Development 239

The Challenges of Postimperialism 241

Building State Capacity and Autonomy 242

Forging Social Identities 245

Generating Economic Growth 247

Puzzles and Prospects for Democracy and Development 253

Forging States 254

Building Society 256

Promoting Economic Prosperity 257

In Sum: The Challenges of Development 259

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10 POLITICAL VIOLENCE 261What Is Political Violence? 263

Why Political Violence? 263

Institutional Explanations 264

Ideational Explanations 264

Individual Explanations 265

Forms of Political Violence 267

Revolution 267

Terrorism 273

Terrorism and Revolution: Means and Ends 279

Political Violence in Context: Faith, Terrorism, and Revolution 281

Countering Political Violence 285

In Sum: Meeting the Challenge of Political Violence 288

11 GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 291What Is Globalization? 292

Institutions and Globalization 294

Political Globalization 297

Economic Globalization 300

Societal Globalization 304

Taking Stock of Globalization 308

Is Globalization New? 308

Is Globalization Exaggerated? 310

Is Globalization Inevitable? 313

In Sum: Freedom and Equality in a Globalized World 315

GLOSSARY 318

CREDITS 326

INDEX 327

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LIST OF MAPS

Africa xx

Asia xxi

Europe xxii

Central and South America xxiii

North America xxiv

Europe in the Twelfth Century 30

Levels of Ethnic Fragmentation 58

European Union Membership, 2009 181

The Decolonization of Africa 242

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patrick H. ONeil is professor of politics and government at the University ofPuget Sound in Tacoma, Washington. Professor ONeils teaching and researchinterests are in the areas of democratization, conflict and political violence.His publications include the books Revolution from Within: The HungarianSocialist Workers Party Reform Circles and the Collapse of Communism andCommunicating Democracy: The Media and Political Transitions (editor). Hiscurrent research focuses on Iran. He is coeditor with Ron Rogowski of Essen-tial Readings in Comparative Politics, Third Edition, and coauthor with KarlFields and Don Share of Cases in Comparative Politics, Third Editon, bothpublished by W. W. Norton & Company.

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PREFACE

The past twenty years has seen the dramatic transformation of comparativepolitics: the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, thespread of democracy around the world, the rise of new economic powers inAsia, and the deepening of globalization. For a time, many looked upon thesechanges as unmitigated progress that would bring about a decline in globalconflict and produce widespread prosperity. Recently, however, there has beengrowing doubt, as the uncertainties of the future seem to portend more riskthan reward, more conflict than peace. It is increasingly difficult to sustain thenotion that a nation can function without a good understanding of the billionsof people who live outside of its borders. We ignore the world at our peril.

This textbook is meant to contribute to our understanding of comparativepolitics (the study of domestic politics around the world) by investigating thecentral ideas and questions that make up this field. It begins with the mostbasic struggle in politicsthe battle between freedom and equality and the taskof reconciling or balancing these ideals. How this struggle has unfolded acrossplace and time represents the core of comparative politics. The text continuesby emphasizing the importance of institutions. Human action is fundamen-tally guided by the institutions that people construct, such as culture, consti-tutions, and property rights. Once established, these institutions are both influ-ential and persistentnot easily overcome, changed, or removed. How theseinstitutions emerge, and how they affect politics, is central to this work.

With these ideas in place, we tackle the basic institutions of powerstates,markets, societies, democracies, and nondemocratic regimes. What are states,how do they emerge, and how can we measure their capacity, autonomy, andefficacy? How do markets function, and what kinds of relationships existbetween states and markets? How do societal components like nationalism,ethnicity, and ideology shape political values? And what are the main differ-ences between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, and what explainswhy one or the other predominates in various parts of the world? These area few of the questions we will attempt to answer.

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xvi P R E F A C E

Once these concepts and questions have been explored, subsequent chap-ters will apply them directly to various political systemsadvanced democ-racies, communist and post-communist countries, and newly industrializingand less-developed countries. In each of these, the basic institutions of thestate, market, society, democratic or nondemocratic regimes all shape the rela-tionship between freedom and equality. What basic characteristics lead us togroup these countries together? How do they compare to one another, and what are their prospects for economic, social, and democratic develop-ment? Finally, we will conclude with discussions of political violencelooking at terrorism and revolution in particularand globalization, linkingwhat we have studied to two of the most central areas of concern today.

There are several changes to the Third Edition of this book. One majorchange has been in the order of the chapters on democratic and nondemo-cratic regimes, moving the former before the latter. The rationale for thischange was to use the democratic regimes chapter as a template to show theorigins and structures of these systems, which will then allow for a morefocused comparison with nondemocratic regimes. This allows for the twochapters to be more explicitly comparative, rather than viewing nondemo-cratic systems as a residual category of idiosyncratic institutions. In addi-tion, the chapter on globalization has been moved to the end of the text, imme-diately following the discussion of political violence. This allows for the dis-cussion of globalization to benefit from the earlier investigation of politicalviolence and also lets us look at how the two might be related. In addition,the globalization chapter considers to a greater extent the ways in which com-parative politics as a field of study might be affected by the blurring betweendomestic and international politics. Finally, throughout the book, supportingexamples and evidence have been updated, and recent influential work in com-parative politics is noted and discussed.

The format of this text is rather different from that of most textbooks inthis field. Traditionally, books have been built around a set of country stud-ies, with introductory chapters for the advanced, post-communist, and less-developed world. While such a textbook can provide a great deal of informa-tion on a wide range of cases, the trade-off is often a less thoroughconsideration of the basic grammar of comparative politics. We might knowwho the prime minister of Japan is but have less of an understanding of polit-ical culture, mercantilism, or state autonomy, all ideas that can help us makesense of politics across time and place. This text strives to fill this gap andcan be used alongside traditional case studies to help draw out broader ques-tions and issues. By grasping these concepts, arguments, and questions, stu-dents will better understand the political dynamics of the wider world.

This thematic approach to the essential tools and ideas of comparativepolitics is supported by a strong pedagogy that clarifies and reinforces the

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most important concepts. Key concepts lists and In Focus boxes in everychapter highlight important material that students will want to review. Numer-ous figures and tables illustrate important concepts and provide real worlddata related to the topic at hand. Timelines and thematic maps show impor-tant political developments over time and around the globe. The importanceof institutions is emphasized by Institutions in Action boxes.

Essentials of Comparative Politics is designed to offer instructors flexibil-ity in creating the course that they want to teach. In addition to the core text-book, a corresponding casebook and a reader are also available. Cases in Com-parative Politics, coauthored by Karl Fields, Donald Share, and myself, appliesthe concepts from Essentials of Comparative Politics to thirteen country stud-ies. In Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, my coeditor RonaldRogowski and I have selected key readings to accompany each chapter in thetextbook. Norton also offers the textbook and casebook in e-book format. Sup-port materials for instructors, including a Test Bank and PowerPoint lectureoutlines, are also available.

Many people have contributed to this work. The text itself is inspired byKaren Mingsts Essentials of International Relations. When Norton releasedMingsts book in 1999, I was struck by its concision and came to the conclu-sion that comparative politics would benefit from a similar kind of text. AtNorton, Peter Lesser first encouraged me to submit a proposal for this text-book, and Roby Harrington encouraged me to develop the initial chapters,supported its publication, and provided important feedback at many stages.As editor, Ann Shin held me to a high standard of writing argumentation inthe First Edition. For the Second Edition, Peter Lesser took over editorialduties, helping to further improve the work. In this Third Edition, Aaron Javsi-cas guided me through a number of complicated revisions. I am grateful toall three of them for their investment in this work. Thanks, too, to ElizabethKaster for her research assistance.

In addition to the people at Norton, many academics have helped improvethis work. Most important have been my colleagues at the University of PugetSound, in particular Don Share and Karl Fields. Over the past few years Don,Karl, and I have team-taught introductory comparative politics, and it wasmy work with these two outstanding teachers and scholars that helped gen-erate many of the ideas in this book. Don and Karl were also kind enough touse draft chapters of this text in their courses and provided a great deal offeedback and numerous suggestions. I am fortunate to have such colleagues.Another important source of input has come from those reviewers who pro-vided input in advance of the Third Edition: Emily Acevedo (California StateUniversity, Los Angeles), James Allan (Wittenberg University), JosephineAndrews (University of California, Davis), Alex Avila (Mesa Community Col-lege), William Heller (Binghamton University), Robert Jackson (University of

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Redlands), Ricardo Larmont (Binghamton University), Eric Leonard(Shenandoah University), Mary Malone (University of New Hampshire),Pamela Martin (Coastal Carolina University), Philip Mauceri (University ofNorthern Iowa), Mark Milewicz (Gordon College), John Occhipinti (CanisiusCollege), Anthony ORegan (Los Angeles Valley College), Paul Rousseau (Uni-versity of Windsor), Emmanuel Teitelbaum (George Washington University),and Jos Vadi (Cal Poly, Pomona).

Finally, I would like to thank the students of the University of Puget Soundfor their questions and insights, the administration of the university for itssupport of this project, and my family for their patience.

Patrick H. ONeilTacoma, Washington

June 2009

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Africa

A L G E R I A L I B Y A

M A L I N I G E R

MAURITANIA

WESTERNSAHARA

MOROCCOTUNISIA

E G Y P T S A U D IA R A B I A

YEMEN

LEBANON

TURKEY

I R A NI R A Q

KUWAITISRAEL

CYPRUS

U.A.E.OMAN

SYRIA

JORDAN

ERITREA

S U D A N

ETHIOPIA

C H A D

CENTRALAFRICAN REP .

DEMOCRATICREP . OF THE

CONGO KENYA

TANZANIA

SENEGAL

GUINEA

LIBERIA

SIERRA LEONE

GAMBIA

IVORYCOAST

CAME

ROON

CABINDA(Angola)

ANGOLA

C ON

GO

GABONEQUATORIAL

GUINEA

N I G E R I A

GUINEA-BISSAU

TOGO

BENIN

GHAN

A

S O U T HA F R I C A

LESOTHO

ZIMBABWE

BOTSWANA MAD

AGAS

CAR

NAMIBIA

ZAMBIA

MALAWI

SWAZILAND

BURUNDIRWANDA

UGANDA

BURKINAFASO

MO

ZAMB

IQUEA t l a n t i c

O c e a n

SOM

ALIA

xx M A P S

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Asia

Celebes

C H I N A

M O N G O L I A

TAIWAN

JAPAN

N.KOREA

S.KOREA

PHILIPPINES

BRUNEI

Borneo

Sumatra

EAST TIMOR

I N D O N E SI A

SRI LANKA

I N D I A

BANGLADESH

BHUTAN

NEPALPAKISTAN

I R A NAFGHANISTAN

UZBEKISTA NTURKM EN ISTAN

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

K A Z A K H S T A N

R U S S I A

LAOS

VIETNAM

BURMA(MYANMAR)

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

A r a b i a nS e a

I n d i a n

O c e a n

P a c i f i c

O c e a n

S o u t hC h i n a

S e a

P h i l i p p i n eS e a

PAPUANEW GUINEA

M A L A Y S I A

Java

SINGAPORE

Maps xxi

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Europe

S P A I N

UNITEDKINGDOM

IRELANDP O L A N D

G E R M A N Y

LATVIA

LITHUANIA

ESTONIA

NORWAYF I N L A N D

SWEDEN

MOLDOVA

U K R A I N E

R U S S I A

ARMENIA

B E L A R U S

SWITZ.F R A N C E

ITALY

GREECE T U R K E Y

GEORGIA

AZER-BAIJAN

BELGIUM

LUX.CZECH REP.

AUSTRIA

SLOVAKIA

HUNGARYROMANIA

BOSNIAHERZE-GOVINA BULGARIA

MACEDONIAALBANIA

SLOVENIA CROATIA

DENMARK

NETHER-LANDS

PORTUGAL

A t l a n t i c

O c e a n

SERBIAMONTENEGRO

ICELAND

xxii M A P S

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Central and South America

FRENCHGUIANA

SURINAMEGUYANA

CHILE

ECUADOR

PARAGUAY

URUGUAY

A R G E N T I N A

B O L I V I A

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

PERU

B R A Z I L

Falkland Islands(U.K.)

MEXICOBAHAMAS

CUBA

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALA

BELIZE

HONDURAS

COSTA RICA

JAMAICAHAITI

DOM. REP. BARBUDA

DOMINICAST. LUCIA

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINESGRENADA

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

PUERTO RICO(U.S.)

GUADELOUPE (FR.)

MARTINIQUE (FR.)NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

(NETH.)

G u l f o fM e x i c o

A t l a n t i c

O c e a n

P a c i f i c

O c e a n

A t l a n t i c

O c e a n

VIRGIN IS. (U.K./U.S.)

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

Maps xxiii

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North America

A r c t i c O c e a n

N o r t hA t l a n t i c O c e a n

N o r t h P a c i f i c O c e a n

B a f f i n B a y

G u l f o f A l a s k a

L a b r a d o r S e a

G u l f o f M e x i c o

H u d s o n B a y

G r e e n l a n d S e a

B e a u f o r t S e a

B e r i n g S e a

GREENLAND (Denmark)

ICELAND

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

C A N A D A

U . S . A .

Alaska(U.S.A.)

MEXICO

GUYANA

BRAZIL

BAHAMAS

CUBA

EL SALVADOR

GUATEMALABELIZE

HONDURAS

COSTA RICA

JAMAICAHAITI

DOM. REP.

PUERTO RICO(U.S.)

VIRGIN IS.(U.K./U.S.)

NICARAGUA

PANAMA

xxiv M A P S

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1INTRODUCTION

KEY CONCEPTS

Comparative politics relies on a comparative method in order to constructand test hypotheses.

There are long-running debates over whether we can make comparative pol-itics more scientificbetter at explaining or predicting politics.

One concept to guide our study is political institutions: self-perpetuating pat-terns of activity valued for their own sake.

One ideal to guide our study is the relationship between freedom and equal-ity, and how politics reconciles the two across countries.

During the past two decades, the world has seen an astonishing numberof changes: the rise of new economic powers in Asia, the retreat of com-munism and the advance of capitalism and democracy, the return of religionto politics, the spread of the Internet and wireless technologies, the deepen-ing of globalization. As a result, many of the traditional assumptions andbeliefs held by scholars, policy makers, and citizens are open to question. Newcenters of wealth may reduce poverty, increase inequality, or both. Democracymay be an inexorable force, or it may founder on the obstacles of nationalism,economic instability, or culture. New forms of electronic communication maybind people across societies, creating shared identities, or fragment communi-ties, generating a backlash.

Debates over ethnic conflict illustrate these issues. Why does this form ofpolitical violence occur? Is it a response to economic or political inequalityor bad government? A function of cultural differences, a clash of civiliza-tions? Is it abetted by globalization? Perhaps the explanation lies somewhereelse entirely, beyond our purview or comprehension. How can we know whatis correct? How do we scrutinize a range of explanations and evaluate their

1

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2 C H . 1 I N T RODUC T I ON

merits? Competing assumptions and explanations are at the heart of politicaldebates and policy decisions, yet we are often asked to choose in the absenceof reliable evidence or a good understanding of cause and effect. To be bet-ter citizens, we should be better students of political science and compara-tive politicsthe study and comparison of domestic politics across countries.

This chapter will lay out some of the most basic vocabulary and structuresof political science and comparative politics. These will fall under three basiccategories: analytical concepts (assumptions and theories that guide ourresearch), methods (ways to study and test those theories), and ideals (valuesand beliefs about preferred outcomes). Analytical concepts help ask questionsabout cause and effect; methods provide tools to seek out explanations; idealsprovide a way to compare what we find in political life to what we would pre-fer. Concepts and methods can help us reach our ideals by revealing what wedont know and when our assumptions are wrong.

Our survey will consider some of the most basic questions: What is poli-tics? How does one compare different political systems around the world? Wewill spend some time on the methods of comparative politics and how schol-ars have approached its study. As we shall see, over the past century, politi-cal scientists have struggled not just with the challenges of analyzing politicsbut also with whether this can actually be considered a science. Exploringthese issues will give us a better sense of the limitations and possibilities inthe study of comparative politics. From here we will consider comparativepolitics through the concept of institutionsorganizations or activities thatare self-perpetuating and valued for their own sake. Institutions play an impor-tant role in defining and shaping what is possible and probable in politicallife by laying out the rules, norms, and structures through which we operate.Finally, in addition to looking at institutions, we will take up the ideals offreedom and equality. If institutions shape how the game of politics is played,then the objective of the game itself is the optimal mix of freedom and equal-ity. Must one come at the expense of the other? If so, which is more impor-tant? Can both freedom and equality be achieved? Or is perhaps neitherdesirable in place of some other ideal? With the knowledge gained by explor-ing these questions, we will be ready to take on the complexity of politicsaround the world.

What Is Comparative Politics?

Before we go any further, we must identify what comparative politics is. Politics is often defined as the struggle in any group for power that will giveone or more persons the ability to make decisions for the larger group. Thisgroup may range from a small organization up to an entire country or even


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What Is Comparative Politics? 3

the entire global population. Politics can be found everywhere there is organ-ization and power; for example, we may speak of office politics when weare talking about relations and power within a business. Political scientists inparticular concentrate on the struggle for leadership and power for the largercommunity. Politics is the struggle for the authority to make decisions thatwill affect the public as a whole. It is therefore hard to separate the idea ofpolitics from the idea of power, which is often defined as the ability to influ-ence or impose ones will on others. Politics is thus about the competition forpublic power, and power is about the ability to extend ones will.

Within political science, comparative politics is a subfield that comparesthis struggle for power across countries. The method of comparing countries,it is believed, can better test our assumptions and theories than simply look-ing at our own country or by making arguments about cause and effect with-out any comprehensive evidence drawn over space and time. For example,one important puzzle we will return to frequently is why some countries aredemocratic while others are not. Why have politics in some countries resultedin power being more dispersed among the people while in other societiespower is concentrated in the hands of a few? Or to be more specific, howcome South Korea is democratic while North Korea is not? Looking at NorthKorea alone wont necessarily help us understand why South Korea went downa different path or vice versa. A comparison of the two, perhaps alongsidesimilar cases in Asia, may better yield explanations. As should be clear, theseare not simply academic questions. Democratic countries actively support thespread of like-minded regimes around the world, whether through diplomacy,aid, or war, but if it is unclear how or why it comes about, democracy becomesdifficult or even dangerous to promote and perhaps foolhardy to take asinevitable. It is important to separate ideals from our concepts and methodsand not let the former obscure the latter. Yet even as comparative politics canhelp inform and even challenge our ideals, it can provide new ways of think-ing by highlighting alternatives to what we see and know, questioning ourcommon assumption that there is one (right) way to organize political life.

The Comparative Method

If comparison is an important way to test our assumptions and shape ourideals, how we make those comparisons between cases is important. If thereis no criterion or guide by which we gather information or draw conclusions,then our studies become little more than a collection of random details.Researchers thus often seek out puzzlesquestions about politics with noclear answeras a way to guide their research. From there, they rely on somecomparative methoda way to make comparisons across cases and drawconclusions. By comparing countries or subsets within them, scholars hope


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to draw conclusions and make some generalizations that could be valid inother cases.

To return to our earlier question, let us say that we are interested in whydemocracy has failed to develop in some countriesa big puzzle if ever therewas one. This argument was central to debates over going to war with Iraqand remains a contentious issue with different groups marshaling their ownevidence or beliefs to make their case. We might begin our answer to this puz-zle by looking at North Korea. Why has communism persisted in North Korea,even after it has declined almost everywhere else?

A convincing answer to this puzzle could tell scholars and policy makersa great deal, even guide our tense relations with this country in the future.But this kind of research also has its limitations. The study of one countryalone can generate interesting hypotheses, but it alone is not enough to testthose hypotheses. We call the single-case approach inductive reasoningthemeans by which we go from studying a case to generating a hypothesis. Thus,we might study North Korea and perhaps conclude that the use of national-ism by those in power has been central to the persistence of authoritarian(nondemocratic) rule. In so concluding, we might suggest that future studieslook at this relationship between nationalism and authoritarianism in othercountries around the world. Inductive reasoning can therefore be a buildingblock to greater theories in comparative politics.

From the other direction, comparative politics can also rely on deductivereasoningstarting with a puzzle and from there generating some hypothe-sis about cause and effect which will then be tested against a number of cases.Whereas inductive reasoning starts with the evidence as a way to undercovera hypothesis, deductive reasoning starts with the hypothesis and then seeksout the evidence. To contrast, whereas in our example of inductive reasoningwe started with a case study of North Korea and ended with some general-ization about nationalism to test across other cases, in deductive reasoningwe would start with our hypothesis about nationalism and then test thathypothesis by looking at a number of countries. By carrying out such stud-ies, we may find a correlation, or apparent association, between certain fac-tors or variables.1

Neither inductive nor deductive reasoning is particularly easy. First, polit-ical scientists are unable to control the variables in the cases they study. Inother words, in our search for cause-and-effect relationships, we are unableto make true comparisons because each of our cases is quite different. By wayof illustration, suppose a researcher wants to determine whether increasedexercise by college students leads to higher grades. In studying the studentswho are her subjects, the researcher can control for a number of variablesthat might also affect grades, such as the students diet, the amount of sleepthey get, or any factor other than exercise that might influence the results. By


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controlling for these differences and making certain that many of these vari-ables are the same across the subjects with the exception of exercise, theresearcher can carry out her study with greater confidence.

But political science offers very few opportunities to control the variablesbecause the variables are a function of real-world politics. Countries are amaz-ingly diverse in terms of economics, culture, geography, resources, and polit-ical structures, and it is difficult to control for these differences. Even in asingle-case study, variables change over time. At best, we can control as muchas possible for variables that might otherwise distort our conclusions. If, forexample, we want to understand why gun possession laws are so much lessrestrictive in the United States than in most other industrialized countries,we would be well served to compare the United States with those that havesimilar historical, economic, political, and social experiences, such as Canadaand Australia, rather than Japan or South Africa. This allows us to more effec-tively control our variables, but it still leaves many variables uncontrolled andunaccounted for.

This leads us to a second problem. Political scientists are often hamperedby a limited number of cases. In the natural sciences, research is often con-ducted with a huge number of caseshundreds of stars or thousands of indi-viduals. This breadth allows researchers to select their cases in such a way asto control their variables, and the large number of cases also prevents any sin-gle unusual case from distorting the findings. But in comparative politics, weare limited by the number of countries in the worldfewer than 200 at pres-ent, most of which did not exist a few centuries ago. If we attempt to controlfor differences by trying to find a number of cases that are similar (for exam-ple, industrialized democracies), our total body of cases will be relatively small.

A third problem in comparative politics concerns how we access the caseswe do have. Even with the limited number of countries available to study,research is further hindered by the barriers that make countries unique. Theinformation that political scientists seek is often not easy to acquire, necessi-tating work in the field, conducting interviews or studying governmentarchives in other countries. International travel requires time and money, andresearchers may spend months or even years in the field. Interviewees maybe unwilling to speak on sensitive issues or may distort information inten-tionally or unintentionally. Libraries and archives may be incomplete, oraccess to them restricted. As you might imagine, doing such research in morethan one country is extremely challenging. A researcher may be able to readRussian and travel to Russia frequently, but if he wants to compare commu-nism between the Soviet Union and China, it would be ideal to be able to readChinese and conduct research in China as well. Few comparativists have thelanguage skills, time, or resources to conduct field research in a number ofcountries. Almost none, for example, speak both Russian and Chinese. As a


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result, comparativists often master knowledge of a single country or lan-guage and rely on deductive reasoning. This limits the kinds of comparisonsthey can make. The specialization of comparativists also tends to congre-gate around those regions that can be easily studied at home and abroad.There are many comparativists who study Europenot so many who studyIndonesia, even though it is the fourth most populous country in the world.This also means that comparative politics is slow to shift its focus when newchallenges and questions arise; just as intelligence agencies lack Arabicspeakers, so too political science has few practitioners with necessary lan-guage skills.

Finally, the problems of variables and case selection are further muddiedby issues of bias. By this we dont mean political bias, though sometimes thatcan be a problem as well. Rather, it is the question of how we select our cases.In the natural sciences, case selection is randomized to as great an extent aspossible so that those cases under observation have not been chosen inadvance to support one hypothesis or another. But for the reasons we men-tioned above, such randomization is not possible in political science. Single-case studies are already influenced by the fact that comparativists study acountry because they know its language or would prefer to travel there. Yeteven if we rely instead on deductive reasoningbeginning with a hypothesisand then seeking out our caseswe can easily fall into the trap of selec-tion bias.

For example, say we want to understand revolutions and we hypothesizethat the main cause is a rapid growth in inequality. How should we select ourcases? Most of us would respond by saying that we should find as many casesof revolution as possible and then look for whether they were preceded bysuch a change in inequality. But by looking only at cases of revolution, wemiss all those cases where inequality may have grown but revolution did nottake place. Indeed, there may be many more cases of inequality without rev-olution than those where revolution has taken place, disproving our hypoth-esis. So, better that we concentrate on what we think is our cause (growth ininequality) rather than what we think is our effect. While this may now seemobvious, it is a frequent mistake among scholars, who are often drawn to par-ticular outcomes first and then work their way backward. To sum up, thestudy of comparative politics is limited by the direction in which we do ourresearch (inductive versus deductive) and the range, quality, and selection ofcases we have to do that research.

These are significant obstacles but they are not necessarily impossible toovercome. Though variables cant be perfectly controlled, certainly similarcountries can be studied; secondary sources or other data can be used wherelanguage skills are lacking; and careful construction of our research can makecertain we dont fall into the trap of selection bias. This done, we may draw


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some interesting conclusions, but we must be modest in what we may claim.Say, for example, that careful research finds that countries with a low rate offemale literacy are less likely to be democracies than countries where femaleliteracy is high. Why this would be the case is still not clear; our correlation,even if strong, still does not mean causality. For example, female literacy andauthoritarianism may both be driven by some other variables, like poverty orinequality or ethnic diversity.

Even if we are confident enough to claim that in fact there is a causal rela-tionship between female illiteracy and authoritarianisma bold statementindeedanother problem looms. Which one is cause and which is effect? Isit perhaps that low rates of female literacy limit public participation such thatdemocracy finds a limited audience, or perhaps that authoritarian leaders (byand large men) take little interest in promoting gender equality? This prob-lem of cause and effect, known as endogeneity, is a major obstacle in anycomparative research. Even if we are confident that we have found cause andeffect, we cant easily ascertain which one is cause and which one is effect.Upon reflection, this is to be expected; one political scientist has called endo-geneity the motor of history, as causes and effects tend to evolve together,each transforming the other over time. Thus, early forms of democracy, lit-eracy, and womens rights may well have gone hand in hand, each reinforc-ing and changing the others. This makes an elegant claim about cause andeffect problematic, to say the least.2

Can We Make a Science of Comparative Politics?

We have so far elaborated all the ways in which comparative politicsand much of political science in generalmakes for difficult study. In fact,you may well have concluded at this point that the notion of anything like ascience of politics is hopeless. But it is precisely these kinds of concerns thathave driven political science, and comparative politics within it, toward a morescientific approach. Whether this has or will yield significant benefits, and atwhat cost, is something we will consider next.

Political science and comparative politics have a long pedigree. In almostevery major society there are masterworks of politics, prescribing rules or,less often, analyzing political behavior. In the West, the work of the philoso-pher Aristotle (384322 B.C.E.) departed from the traditional emphasis on polit-ical ideals to conduct comparative research on existing political systems,eventually gathering and analyzing the constitutions of 158 Greek city-states.Aristotles objective was less to determine the ideal political system than tounderstand the different forms of politics that actually existed and their rel-ative strengths and weaknesses. With this approach, Aristotle conceived of anempirical (that is, observable and verifiable) science of politics with a practi-


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cal purpose: statecraft, or how to govern. Aristotle was perhaps the first West-erner to separate the study of politics from that of philosophy.3

Unfortunately, Aristotles early approach did not immediately lead to anyreal science of politics. For the next 1,800 years, discussions of politicsremained embedded in the realm of philosophy, with the emphasis placed onhow politics should be rather than on how politics was actually conducted.Ideals, rather than conclusions drawn from evidence, were the norm. Onlywith the works of the Italian Niccol Machiavelli (14691527) did a compar-ative approach to politics truly emerge. Like Aristotle, he sought to analyzedifferent political systemsthose that existed around him as well as thosethat had preceded him in history, such as the Roman Empireand even triedto make generalizations about success and failure. These findings, he believed,could then be applied by statesmen to avoid their predecessors mistakes.Machiavellis work reflects this pragmatism, dealing with the mechanics ofgovernment, diplomacy, military strategy, and power.4

Because of his emphasis on statecraft and empirical knowledge, Machi-avelli is often cited as the first modern political scientist, paving the way forother scholars. His writings came at a time when the medieval order was giv-ing way to the Renaissance, with its emphasis on science, rationalism, secu-larism, and real-world knowledge over abstract ideals. The resulting work overthe next four centuries reinforced the idea that politics, like any other area ofknowledge, could be developed as a logical, rigorous, and predictable science.

During those centuries, a number of major thinkers took up the compar-ative approach to the study of politics, which slowly retreated from moral,philosophical, or religious foundations. In the late sixteenth and early seven-teenth centuries, authors such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke followedin Machiavellis footsteps, advocating particular political systems but on thebasis of empirical observation and analysis. They were followed in the eigh-teenth century by such scholars as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Baron de Montesquieu, whose studies of the separation of power and civil libertieswould directly influence the writing of the American Constitution and othersto follow. The work of Karl Marx and Max Weber in the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries would further add to political science with analyses of thenature of political and economic organization and power. All these develop-ments reflected widespread changes in scholarly inquiry and were often ablend of political ideals with analytical concepts and some attempt at a sys-tematic method of study.

Thus, by the turn of the twentieth century, political science formallyexisted as a field of study, but it still looked much different from the way itdoes now. The study of comparative politics, while less focused on ideals orphilosophy, resembled a kind of political journalism: largely descriptive, athe-oretical, and concentrated on Europe, which still dominated world politics


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through its empires. There was little in this work that resembled a compara-tive method.

The two world wars and the rise of the Cold War would mark a turningpoint in political science and comparative politics. There were several rea-sons for this. First, among universities there was a growing move towardapplying more rigorous methods to studying human behavior, whether insociology, economics, or politics. Second, the world wars raised seriousquestions about the ability of scholars to meaningfully contribute to anunderstanding of world affairs. The creation of new countries, the rise offascism, and the failure of democracy throughout much of interwar Europewere vital concerns, but political scholarship did not seem to shed enoughlight on these issues and what they meant for international stability. Third,the Cold War with a rival Soviet Union, armed with nuclear weapons andrevolutionary ideology, made understanding comparative politics a matterof survival. Finally, the postwar period saw a wave of technological inno-vation, such as early computers, that generated a widespread belief thatthrough technological innovation many social problems could be recast astechnical concerns, finally to be resolved through science. The fear ofanother war was thus married with a belief that science was an unmitigatedgood that had the answers to almost all problems. The question was simplymaking the science work.

Although these changes dramatically transformed the study of politics, thefield itself remained a largely conservative discipline, taking capitalism anddemocracy as the ideal. In comparative politics these views were codified inwhat was known as modernization theory, which held that as societies devel-oped, they would become capitalist democracies, converging around a sharedset of values and characteristics. The United States and other Western coun-tries were furthest ahead on this path, and the theory assumed that all coun-tries would eventually catch up unless diverted by alternative systems suchas communism (as fascism had done in past).

During the 1950s and 1960s, comparativists influenced by modernizationtheory expanded their research to include a wider number of cases. Fieldresearch, supported by government and private grants, became the normalmeans by which political scientists gathered data. New computer technolo-gies combined with statistical methods were also applied to this expandingwealth of data. Finally, the subject of investigation shifted away from politi-cal institutions (such as legislatures and constitutions) and toward individualpolitical behavior. This trend came to be known as the behavioral revolu-tion. Behavioralism hoped to generate theories and generalizations that couldhelp explain and even predict political activity. Ideally, this work would even-tually lead to a grand theory of political behavior and modernization thatwould be valid across countries.


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Behavioralism and modernization theory were two different thingsmodernization theory a set of hypotheses about how countries develop, andbehavioralism a set of methods with which to approach politics. However, thetwo were clearly linked by a sense of approaching politics in a more scien-tific manner to achieve certain policy outcomes.5 Behavioralism also pro-moted deductive, large-scale research over the single-case study common in

Major Thinkers in Comparative Politics

Aristotle (384322 B.C.E.) First separated the study of politics from that of philosophy; used comparative method tostudy Greek city-states; in The Politics, con-ceived of an empirical study of politics with apractical purpose.

Niccol Machiavelli Often cited as first modern political scientist (14691527) because of his emphasis on statecraft and

empirical knowledge; analyzed different politicalsystems, believing the findings could beapplied by statesmen; discussed his theories inThe Prince.

Thomas Hobbes Developed the notion of a social contract, (15881679) whereby people surrender certain liberties in

favor of order; advocated a powerful state inLeviathan.

John Locke (16321704) Argued that private property is essential to individual freedom and prosperity; advocated aweak state in his Two Treatises of Government.

Charles Louis de Secondat, Studied government systems; advocated the Baron de Montesquieu separation of powers within government in (16891755) The Spirit of Laws.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau Argued that citizens rights are inalienable and (17121778) cannot be taken away by the state; influenced

the development of civil rights; discussed theseideas in The Social Contract.

Karl Marx (18181883) Elaborated a theory of economic development and inequality in his book Das Kapital; pre-dicted the eventual collapse of capitalism anddemocracy.

Max Weber (18641920) Wrote widely on such topics as bureaucracy,forms of authority, and the impact of culture oneconomic and political development; developedmany of these themes in Economy and Society.


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inductive reasoning. It seemed clear to many that political science, and com-parative politics within it, would soon be a real science.

By the late 1970s, however, this enthusiasm began to meet resistance andsignificant obstacles. New theories and sophisticated methods of analysisincreased scholars knowledge about politics around the world, but this knowl-edge in itself did not lead to the expected breakthroughs. Those theories thathad been developed, such as modernization theory, increasingly failed tomatch politics on the ground; rather than becoming more capitalist and moredemocratic, many newly independent countries collapsed in the face of vio-lent conflict and revolution, to be replaced by authoritarianism that in no wayreflected Western expectations or ideals. What had gone wrong?

Some critics charged that the behavioral revolutions obsession withappearing scientific had led the discipline astray by emphasizing methodol-ogy over knowledge and technical jargon over clarity. Others criticized thefield for its ideological bias, arguing that comparativists were interested notin understanding the world but in prescribing the Western model of mod-ernization. At worst, their work could be viewed as simply serving the foreignpolicy of the developed world. Since then, comparative politics, like all ofpolitical science, has grown increasingly fragmented. While few still embracethe old descriptive approach that dominated the earlier part of the century,there is no consensus about where scholarship is going and what research

Trends in Comparat ive Pol i t ics

Traditional approach Emphasis on describing political systems and their various

institutions.

Behavioral revolution The shift from a descriptive study of politics to one that

emphasizes causality, explanation, and prediction; places

greater emphasis on the political behavior of individuals

as opposed to larger political structures and on quantita-

tive over qualitative methodology; modernization theory

predominant.

Postbehavioralism Rejection of a grand theory of politics; criticism of

modernization theory as biased and inaccurate; diversity

of methods and political approaches, emphasizing such

issues as gender, culture, environment, and globalization.

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methods or analytical concepts are most fruitful. This lack of consensus hasled to several main lines of conflict.

Methodological debates turn on how best to gather and analyze data. Tra-ditional area studies scholars continue to emphasize the importance of deep,long-term investigations of particular countries or regions, relying on what isknown as qualitative evidence and methodology. In their view, the behav-ioral revolution in many ways led the discipline astray by attempting to over-simplify a complex and culturally diverse world. In contrast, others reject thequalitative approach as failing to contribute to the accumulation of knowl-edge and being little better than the description that dominated the field acentury ago. These advocates of a quantitative approach favor a greater useof statistical analysis as well as mathematical models often drawn from eco-nomics. For this group, the failing of the behavioral revolution is that this rev-olution is not yet complete.

A second related debate concerns rationality. Are human beings rational,in the sense that their behavior conforms to some generally understandablebehavior? Some say yes. These advocates rely on what is known as rationalchoice or game theory to study the rules and games by which politics isplayed and how we seek to realize our preferences (like voting, choosing aparty, or supporting a revolution). Such formal models can, ideally, lead notonly to explanation, but even to predictiona basic element of science. Nat-urally, many qualitative political scientists are skeptical of this view. Theyargue that human beings are essentially unpredictable and that the emphasison individual rationality discounts the importance of historical complexity oridiosyncratic behavior.

As these debates have continued, the world around us has changed. TheCold War came to an end, something neither qualitative nor quantitative schol-ars anticipated (or really even took under consideration). Religion reemerged

Quant i tat ive Method vs. Qual i tat ive Method

Quantitative method Gathering of statistical data across a large number of coun-

tries in order to look for correlations and test hypotheses

about cause and effect.

Emphasis on breadth over depth.

Qualitative method Mastery of a limited number of cases through the detailed

study of their history, language, and culture.

Emphasis on depth over breadth.

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as an important component in politics around the globeagain, a force thatmodernization theory (and research focused on Europe) told us was on thewane. New economic powers emerged in Asia, coinciding with democracy insome cases but not others. Terrorism resurfaced with spectacular results. It seemed that political scientists, whatever their persuasion, had little to contribute to many of these issues and were unable to prepare us for theirimplications.

Where does this leave us now? Does political science or comparative pol-itics matter, or is it simply time to chuck this book in the trash? In recentyears there have been some signs of progress. Quantitative scholars recognizethat careful scholarship is possible with qualitative approaches, recognizingthat simply expressing information in the form of numbers does not make itscientific, nor does purely qualitative information necessarily lack rigor.Similarly, traditional area scholars are making more use of statistics and morecareful methodology to ensure that their research is more than simply descrip-tion that cannot be built upon by others. New models, like those from gametheory, can be employed with both quantative and qualitative material. Somescholars speak optimistically of an integration of statistics, narrative (casestudies), and formal models, each contributing to the other.6 Finally, all sideshave recognized that the discipline has sometimes lost touch with real-worldconcerns, become inaccessible to laypersons, and failed to speak to those whomake decisions about policywhether voters or elected leaders. In the pastfew years there has been an increasing emphasis on reconnecting political sci-ence to central policy questions and also reengaging political ideals, some-thing largely discarded in the behavioral revolution as unscientific.

This new emphasis is not a call for comparativists research to be biasedin favor of some ideal (though some raise this concern); rather, comparativepolitics should not be simply about what we can study or what we want tostudy but also how our research can reach people and help them be bettercitizens and leaders. After decades of asserting that political science shouldhave an objective and scientifically neutral approach, this call for greater rel-evance and contribution to the ideals of civic life represents a dramatic changefor many scholars, but relevance and rigor are not at odds. They are in factcentral to a meaningful political science and comparative politics.

A Guiding Concept: Political Institutions

A goal of this textbook is to provide a way to compare and analyze politicsaround the world in the aftermath of recent changes and uncertainties. Giventhe long-standing debates within comparative politics, how can we organizeour ideas and information? One way is through a guiding concept, a way of


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looking at the world that highlights some important features while deem-phasizing others. There is certainly no one right way of doing this; any guide,like a lens, will sharpen some features while distorting others. With that said,our guiding concept is institutions, which were defined at the beginning ofthis chapter as organizations or patterns of activity that are self-perpetuatingand valued for their own sake. In other words, an institution is something soembedded in peoples lives as a norm or value that it is not easily dislodgedor changed. People see an institution as central to their lives, and as a result,the institution commands and generates legitimacy. Institutions serve as therules, norms, and values that give meaning to human activity.

Consider an example from outside politics. We often hear in the UnitedStates that baseball is an American institution. What exactly does this mean?In short, baseball is viewed by Americans not simply as a game but as some-thing valued for its own sake, a game that helps define society. Yet fewAmericans would say that soccer is a national institution. The reason is prob-ably clear: soccer lacks the kind of public perception of its indispensabilitythat baseball has. Whereas soccer is simply a game, baseball is part of whatdefines America and Americans. Even Americans who dont like baseballwould probably say that America wouldnt be the same without it. Indeed,even at the local level, teams command such legitimacy that the mere threatof their moving to another city raises a hue and cry. The Brooklyn Dodgersmoved to Los Angeles in 1958, yet many in New York still consider themtheir team half a century later. For many Canadians, while baseball isimportant, it is clearly hockey that is viewed as a national institution,thought of as Canadas Game and an inextricable part of Canadian iden-tity and history. In Europe and much of the world, soccer reigns as a pre-mier social institution, with teams provoking such fervent loyalty that fanviolence is quite common. As a result of this legitimacy and seeming indis-pensability, institutions command authority and can influence humanbehavior; we accept and conform to institutions and support, rather thanchallenge, them. Woe to the American, Canadian, or European who deridesthe national sport!

Another example is directly connected to politics. In many countries,democracy is an institution: it is not merely a means to compete over politi-cal power but a vital element in peoples lives, bound up in the very way inwhich they define themselves. Democracy is part and parcel of collective iden-tity, and some democratic countries and their people would not be the samewithout it. Even if cynical about democracy in practice, its citizens will defendthe institution when it is under threat and even die for it. In many other coun-tries, this is not the case: democracy is absent and unknown or weakly insti-tutionalized and unstable. People in such countries do not define themselvesby democracys presence or absence, and so democracys future there is inse-


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cure. However, these same people might owe a similar allegiance to a differ-ent set of institutions, such as their ethnic group or religion. Clearly, there isno single, uniform set of institutions that holds power over people all aroundthe world, and understanding the differences is central to the study of com-parative politics.

What about a physical object or place? Can that, too, be an institution?Many would argue that the World Trade Center was an American institutionnot just a set of office buildings, but structures representing American values.The same thing can be said about the Pentagon. When terrorists attackedthese buildings on September 11, 2001, they did so not simply to cause a greatloss of life but also to clearly indicate that their hostility was directed againstAmerica itselfits institutions as they shape and represent the American wayof life and the U.S. relationship to the outside world. Israelis and Palestini-ans similarly struggle over the future of Jerusalem, which Palestinians andIsraelis both claim as their capital. The historical, political, and religious sig-nificance of the city is what is keyfor both groups, the city is an institutionthat is central to their identity and ideals.

In general, however, institutions are not physical structures. Because theyare embedded in each of us, in how we see the world and what we think isvaluable and important, it is difficult to change or eliminate institutions. When institutions are threatened, people will rush to their defense and evenre-create them when they are shattered. This bond is the glue of society. How-ever, one problem that institutions pose is this very stickiness, in that peo-ple may come to resist even necessary change because they have difficultyaccepting the idea that certain institutions have outlived their value. Thus,while institutions certainly can and do change, their very nature is one ofgreat perseverance.

Politics is full of institutions. The basic political structures of any coun-try are composed of institutions: the army, the police, the legislature, and thecourts, to name a few. We obey them not only because we think it is in ourself-interest to do so but because we see them as legitimate ways to conductpolitics. Taxation is a good example. In many Western democracies, incometaxes are an institution; we may not like them, but we pay them nonetheless.Is this because we are afraid of going to jail if we fail to do so? Perhaps. Butresearch indicates that a major source of tax compliance is peoples belief thattaxation is a legitimate way to fund the programs that society needs. We pay,in other words, when we believe that it is the right thing to do, a norm. Incontrast, in societies where taxes are not institutionalized, tax evasion tendsto be rampant; people view taxes as illegitimate and those who pay as suck-ers. Similarly, where electoral politics is weakly institutionalized, people sup-port elections only when their preferred candidate wins, and they cry foul orriot when the opposition gains power.


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Institutions are a useful wayto approach the study of poli-tics because they set the stagefor political behavior. Becauseinstitutions generate normsand values, they favor andallow certain kinds of politicalactivity and not others. As aresult, political institutions arecritical because they influencepolitics, and how political insti-tutions are constructed willhave a profound effect on howpolitics is conducted.

In many ways, our institu-tional approach takes us back to the study of comparative politics as it existedbefore the 1950s. Prior to the behavioral revolution, political scientists spentmuch of their time documenting the institutions of politics, often without ask-ing how those institutions actually shaped politics. The behavioral revolutionthat followed emphasized cause and effect but turned its attention towardpolitical actors and their calculations, resources, or strategies. The actual insti-tutions were seen as largely unimportant. The recent return to the study ofinstitutions in many ways combines these two traditions. From behavioral-ism, institutional approaches take their emphasis on cause-and-effect rela-tionships, something that will be prevalent throughout this book. However,institutions are not simply the product of individual political behavior; theycan and do have a powerful effect on how politics functions. In other words,institutions are not merely the result of politics; they can also be an impor-tant cause.

As recent events have shown us, there is still a tremendous amount ofinstitutional variation around the world that needs to be recognized andunderstood. This textbook will map some of the basic institutional differencesbetween countries, acknowledging their diversity while pointing to some basicfeatures that allow us to compare and evaluate them. By studying politicalinstitutions, we can hope to gain a better sense of the political landscape acrosscountries.

A Guiding Ideal: Reconciling Freedom and Equality

At the start of this chapter, we spoke about analytical concepts (such as insti-tutions), methods (such as inductive or deductive, quantitative or qualitative),

Inst i tut ions . . .

Are any organization or pattern of activity that is self-perpetuating and valued for its own sake.

Embody norms or values considered central to peopleslives and thus are not easily dislodged or changed.

Set the stage for political behavior by influencing howpolitics is conducted.

Vary from country to country. Are exemplified by the army, taxation, elections, and the

state.

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A Guiding Ideal: Reconciling Freedom and Equality 17

and ideals about politics. Politics was defined as the struggle for power inorder to make decisions for society. The concept of institutions gives us a wayto organize our study by investigating the different ways that struggle can beshaped. Yet this begs an important question: People may struggle for politi-cal power, but what are they fighting for? What is it they seek to achieve oncethey have gained power? This is where ideals come in, and we will concen-trate on one core debate that lies at the heart of all politics: the strugglebetween freedom and equality. This struggle has existed as long as humanbeings have lived in organized communities, and it may be that these are val-ues that are more than ideals, that are part of our evolutionary makeup.

Politics is bound up in the struggle between individual freedom and col-lective equality and how these ideals are to be reconciled. Of course, thesetwo terms can mean very different things to different people, and so it isimportant to define each of them. When we speak of freedom, we are talk-ing about the ability of an individual to act independently, without fear ofrestriction or punishment by the state or other individuals or groups in soci-ety. It encompasses such concepts as free speech, free assembly, freedom ofreligion, and other civil liberties. Equality refers to a shared material stan-dard of individuals within a community, society, or country. The relation-ship between equality and freedom is typically viewed in terms of justice orinjusticea measurement of whether our ideals have been met.

Freedom and equality are tightly interconnected, and the relationshipbetween the two shapes politics, power, and debates over justice. What isunclear, however, is whether one must come at the expense of the other.Greater personal freedom, for example, may imply a smaller role for thestate and limits on its powers to do such things as redistribute incomethrough welfare and taxes. As a result, inequality may increase as individ-ual freedom trumps the desire for greater collective equality. This growinginequality can in turn undermine freedom if too many people feel as thoughthe political system no longer cares about their material needs. Even if thisdiscontent is not a danger, there remains the question of whether society asa whole has an obligation to help the pooran issue of justice. The UnitedStates, as we shall see, has one of the highest degrees of both personal free-dom and economic inequality in the world. Should this be a cause of con-cern? Is it right?

At the other end, a primary focus on equality may erode freedom. Demandsfor greater material equality may lead a government to take greater controlof private property and personal wealth, all in the name of redistribution forthe greater good. Yet when economic and political powers are concentratedin one place, individual freedom may be threatened since people control fewerprivate resources of their own. In the Soviet Union under communism, forexample, all economic power was held by the state, giving it the ability to con-


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trol peoples liveswhere they lived, the education they received, the jobs theyheld, the money they earned.

Are freedom and equality by nature zero-sum, where the gain of one rep-resents the loss of the other? Not necessarily. Some would assert that free-dom and equality can also serve to reinforce each other, with material securityhelping to secure certain political rights, and vice versa. In addition, while ahigh degree of state power may weaken individual freedom, the state may alsoact as the very guarantor of these rights. Finally, the meaning of freedom andequality may change over time, as the definition of each shifts through changesin the material world and in the fabric of our values. For some, managingfreedom and/or equality necessitates some, or perhaps a great deal of, cen-tralized political power. Others view such power as the very impediment tofreedom and/or equality. We will consider these debates to a greater extentwhen we consider political ideologies in subsequent chapters.

In short, politics is driven by the ideal of reconciling individual freedom andcollective equality. This inevitably leads to questions of powerinfluencing oth-ers or imposing ones willand the role of the people in political life. Whoshould be empowered to make decisions about freedom and equality? Shouldpower be centralized or decentralized, public or private? When does powerbecome a danger to others, and how can this be prevented? Each political sys-tem must address these questions and in so doing determine where politicalpower shall reside, and how much. And each political system creates a uniqueset of institutions to structure political power, shaping the role that the peo-ple play in politics, and their debates about justice.

In Sum: Looking Ahead and Thinking Carefully

Politics is the struggle for power in any organization, and comparative poli-tics is the study of this struggle around the world. Over the past centuries, thestudy of politics has evolved from philosophy to a field that emphasizes empir-ical research and the quest to explain and even predict politics. This approachhas limitations: in spite of the earlier desire to emulate the natural sciences,comparative politics, like political science as a whole, has not been able to generate any grand theory of political behavior. Yet the need to study pol-itics remains as important as ever; dramatic changes over the past twentyyears have called on comparativists to shed light on these developments andconcerns.

Political institutions can help us organize this task. Institutions generatenorms and values, and different configurations of institutions lead to differ-ent forms of political activity. Institutions can help us map the landscape of


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In Sum: Looking Ahead and Thinking Carefully 19

politics. If institutions serve as a map to political activity, then the goal of thatactivity is to reconcile the competing values of individual freedom and col-lective equality. All political groups, including countries, must reconcile thesetwo forces, determining where power should reside and in whose hands. Inthe chapters to come, we will return to this question of freedom and equal-ity and to the way in which these values influence, and are influenced by,institutions.

A final thought before we conclude on how to use all this information.Much of our discussion in this chapter has been about the controversies inhow best to study politicswhat method? What concepts? What role forideals? In all of this it may seem that we have gained little understandingof how to do political science well. If scholars cant agree about the bestway to analyze politics, what hope do we have of making sense of the world?Recently, the work by the political scientist Philip Tetlock provided someinsight. Thinking about the goal of predictability in the social sciences, Tet-lock conducted a long-term survey of a number of scholars and policy mak-ers, asking them to forecast the likelihood of specific world events (such asa revolution in particular country or a war between rivals). He also con-ducted psychological surveys of those same individuals, hypothesizing thatcertain personal characteristics, rather than ideological or methodologicaldifferences, would be most strongly correlated with the ability to predictpolitics well. The result? Tetlock divided his subjects into two basic cate-gories, borrowed from the late philosopher Isaiah Berlin: hedgehogs andfoxes. Hedgehogs know one big thing; they tend to look for a single over-arching explanation that can explain many different political events and aremore likely to reject information that runs counter to their beliefs. Foxesare less confident in their views, with many small ideas that are cobbledtogether and subject to frequent revision. As you might suspect, hedgehogsare much worse predictors of world events and are more interested into try-ing to fit the world into their preconceptions than revise their beliefs on thebasis of new information.7

We would do well to consider these findings. The most fruitful approachto comparative politics is to be skeptical not simply of othersthats the easypartbut of what we believe and take for granted as well. We should be readyto reconsider our beliefs in the face of new evidence and arguments and toremember that every explanation in this book is a conjecture and subject torevision if we can find better evidence. With this approach, by the end of thiscourse you will be able to draw your own conclusions about the contours ofpolitics and what combination of values might construct a better politicalorder.

So, drop your assumptions about how the world works, and lets begin.


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NO T E S

1. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

2. Adam Przeworski, Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible? in Oxford Hand-book of Comparative Politics, Charles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds. (Oxford; NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2007).

3. Aristotle, The Politics, T. A. Sinclair, trans. (New York: Viking, 1992).4. Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince, W. K. Marriott, trans. (New York: Knopf, 1992).5. For more on the behavioral revolution, see Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach

in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, AmericanPolitical Science Review, 55, no. 4 (December 1961), pp. 763772.

6. David Laitin, Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdiscipline in Political Sci-ence: The State of the Discipline, Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds. (New York:Norton, 2002).

7. Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,2005).


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2 STATES

KEY CONCEPTS

The state is a central institution in comparative politics, as the centralizationof violence over a territory.

Regimes guide states by serving as the fundamental rules and norms of politics.

Government is the leadership or elite in charge of running the state.

Political legitimacy can take several forms: charismatic, traditional, andrational-legal.

States can vary in autonomy and capacity, and this can shape their power athome and abroad.

We begin our study of the basic institutions of politics by looking atthe state. This discussion is often difficult for North Americans, whoare not used to thinking about politics in terms of centralized political power.Indeed, when Americans in particular think of the word state, they typicallyconjure up the idea of local, not centralized, politics.1 But for most peoplearound the world, the state refers to centralized authority, the locus ofpower. In this chapter, we will break down the basic institutions that makeup states and discuss how states manage freedom and equality and distributepower toward achieving that authority. The chapter will define what statesare and what they comprise, distinguishing a state from a government or aregime. We will also consider the origins of states themselves. For most ofhuman history, politics was built on organizations other than states, and myr-iad forms of authority existed around the world. Yet now only states remain.Why? In other words, we can consider states as an effectwhat caused themto come into existence?

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22 C H . 2 S TA T E S

Once we have discussed the nature and origins of the state, we will lookat some different ways in which states can be compared. This discussion willinclude an analysis of different forms of legitimacy that give a state powerand the actual levels of power itself. Can we speak of states as weak or strong?And if so, how would we measure that strength or weakness? To answer thisquestion, we will make a distinction between state capacity and state auton-omy, and how this might differ across cases and policy areas. Here, we con-sider states as a cause, in how they can shape other institutions. With theseideas more clearly in hand, we will return to our theme of individual freedomand collective equality and consider the future of the state itself.

Defining the State

What exactly do we mean by the term state? Political scientists, drawing onthe work of the German scholar Max Weber, typically define the state in itsmost basic terms as the organization that maintains a monopoly of violenceover a territory.2 At first glance, this may seem to be a rather severe defini-tion of what a state is or does, but a bit of explanation should help flesh outthis concept. One of the most important elements of a state is what we callsovereignty, or the ability to carry out actions or policies within a territoryindependently from external actors or internal rivals. In other words, a stateneeds to be able to act as the primary authority over its territory and the peo-ple who live there, setting forth laws and rights, resolving disputes betweenpeople and organizations, and generating domestic security.

To achieve this, a state needs power, typically (but not only) physical power.If a state cannot defend its territory from outside actors such as other states,then it runs the risk that those rivals will interfere, inflicting damage, taking itsterritory, or destroying the state outright. Similarly, if the state faces powerfulopponents within its own territory, such as organized crime or rebel movements,it runs the risk that its rules and policies will be undermined. Thus, to securecontrol, a state must be armed. To protect against international rivals, statesneed armies. And in response to domestic rivals, states need a police force. Infact, the very word police comes from the old French word meaning to govern.

A state is thus a set of institutions that seeks to wield the majority of forcewithin a territory, establishing order and deterring challengers from insideand out. In so doing, it provides security for its subjects by limiting the dan-ger of external attack and internal crime and disorderboth of which are seenas threats to the state and its citizens. In some ways, a state (especially a non-democratic one) is a kind of protection racketdemanding money in returnfor security and order, staking out turf, defending its clients from rivals, set-tling internal disputes, and punishing those who do not pay.3


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But most states are far more complex than simply being an entity thatapplies force. Unlike criminal rackets, the state is made up of a large numberof institutions that are engaged in the process of turning political ideas intopolicy. Laws and regulations, property rights, health and labor, environmentand transportation are but a few things that typically fall under the respon-sibility of the state. Moreover, the state is a set of institutions (ministries,departments, offices, army, police) that society deems necessary to achievebasic goals regarding freedom and equality. When there is a lack of agree-ment on these goals, the state must attempt to reconcile different views andseek (or impose) consensus. And unlike a criminal racket, which people obeyout of fear or pure self-interest, the state is typically valued for its own sake.The public views the state as legitimate, vital, and appropriate: Who can imag-ine politics without it? States are thus strongly institutionalized and not eas-ily changed. Leaders and policies may come and go, but the state remains,even in the face of crisis, turmoil, or revolution. Although destruction throughwar or civil conflict can eliminate states altogether, even this outcome isunusual and states are soon re-created. Thus, the state is defined as a monop-oly of force over a given territory, but it is also the set of political institutionsthat create standards through which conflicts related to freedom and equal-ity can be resolved. It is, if you will, the machinery of politics, establishingorder and turning politics into policy. Thus many social scientists argue thatthe state, as a bundle of institutions, is an important causal variable in suchthings as variations in economic development or the rise of democracy.

A few other terms that are often used with regard to political organiza-tion need to be defined here. Although often used interchangeably with theconcept of the state, they are in fact separate institutions that help define anddirect the state. First, we should make a distinction between the state and aregime, which is defined as the fundamental rules and norms of politics. Morespecifically, a regime embodies long-term goals regarding individual freedomand collective equality, wherepower should reside and how itshould be used. At the mostbasic level, we can speak of ademocratic regime or a nonde-mocratic one. In a democraticregime, the rules and norms ofpolitics emphasize a large rolefor the public in governance, aswell as certain individual rightsor liberties. A nondemocraticregime, in contrast, will limitpublic participation in favor of

Defining the State 23

The State

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