Community in Conservation and Management:

A Study of .Joint Forest Management in Orissa

A Thesis Submitted to the University of Mysore, Mysore, for

Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

By

Satyapriya Rout

Research Supervision by

G. K. Karanth Professor and Head, Sociology Unit

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE NAGARABHAVI, BANGALORE-5600n, INDIA

October 2005

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the present thesis titled 'Community in

Conservation and Management: A Study of Joint Forest

Management in Orissa', is a result of the original research undertaken

and carried out by me with the guidance of Prof. G. K. Karanth, of

Sociology Unit of Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC),

Bangalore.

I have properly acknowledged the sources from which I may have

borrowed ideas. I declare that the material of the thesis has not formed, in

any manner, the basis for awarding of any Degree or Diploma previously

of University of Mysore or any other University.

Place: Bangalore

Date:

~rt~r~ Satyapriya Rout

(Ph. D. Fellow)

FAX: 91-80-23217008 Phones: Direct - 23212907 (Office)

Residence - 23212675 Mobile: 9845731403

e-mail: karanths@vsnl.com gkkaranth@isec.ac.in

INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE Professor V.K.R.V. Rao Avenue, Nagarabhavi PO: BANGALORE-560 072

Dr. G. K. Karanth Professor and Head, Sociology Unit

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I have guided and supervised the preparation and writing of

the thesis titled 'Community in Conservation and Management: A Study of

Joint Forest Management in Orissa', by Mr. Satyapriya Rout.

I also certify that the thesis has not previously formed the basis for the award of

any Degree or Diploma of the University of Mysore or any Other University.

Place: Bangalore Date: Professor of Sociology and

Research Guide

ACKNOWLEDGEM ENT

It gives me great pleasure to place on record my sincere thanks and gratitude to several persons who have helped me in my research and writing the thesis.

I am grateful to my supervisor Professor G. K. Karanth, Head, Sociology Unit, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, without whose guidance and cooperation, the thesis would not have been possible. His encouragement and enriching ideas on the subject made this work more valuable. lowe him to a great deal for the support in professional as well as the personal aspect of my life. I would also like to thank Ms. Rajalaxmi Karanth for her hospitality and encouragement.

Many thanks are due to Professor Gopal Kadekodi, Director, Institute for Social and Economic Change, and Prof. M. Govinda Rao, former Director, ISEC, for giving me an opportunity to carry out my research work at the institute. I am also thankful to the facuity, student community and administrative staff for their abundant support during the cntire period of my stay at ISEC.

It was a privilege to have had Dr. Sharad Lele as my panel member in all my seminars at the institute. His constant criticisms, comments and suggestions were extremely helpful. I thank Prof. K. V. Raju, Prof, D. Rajasekhar, Prof. Sangita and Dr. M. D. Ushadevi for their suggestions and comments on the topic. Sincere thanks are due to Dr. Anand Inbanathan, Dr. K. G. Gayathri Devi, Dr. Manohar Yadav, and Dr. V. Ramaswami of Sociology Unit for their support and encouragement to finish the work.

I sincerely thank Mr. K. S. Narayana of Ph.D. section, Mr. Krishna Chandran and Satish Kamat of Computer Section, and the Library staff of the Institute for their kind support and cooperation extended to me.

It's a time to recall some of my teachers at the University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, who laid the foundation of Sociology in me and endear research as the profession in my life. Many thanks are due to Professor C. S. Bhatt, Professor E. Haribabu, Dr. S. S. Jodhka, Dr. Apama Rayporulu and Dr. K. Laxminarayan. I am also thankful to Dr. Sasheej of University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, who taught me the basics of research and whose initial guidance helped in choosing my area ofresearch.

I would like to place in record my gratitude to some of my colleagues at the Department of Sociology at Banaras Hindu University (BHU), Varanasi. Many thanks are due to Dr. Ashok Kaul for his constant encouragement to finish the writing of the thesis.

To the people of Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur, who shared with me their views, ideas and experiences and supported me throughout the period of my stay in the villages during my fieldwork, lowe a huge debt. Mr. Ananta Charan Mohanty, President and headman of Nagiapasi village committee introduced me to the villagers and paved the way for a useful stay in the village. I can offer nothing, but my sincere thanks to Mr. Dillip Kumar Mohanty and his family of Nagiapasi village, who accommodated me and my wife in their family during my fieldwork days.

I thank many of my student friends at the Institute for their constant help, motivation and support. It is not possible on my part to name each and everyone. However, I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Kashi Vai, Milu Apa, Gagan, Prabir, Pratap, Rajib Vai, Amit, Pravakar, Bhanumurthy, Amal, Mini, Dipthi, Dukhi, Ashish, Kshama, Kannan, Nazrul, Anand Vadivelu and Hurshi, whose company I enjoyed during my stay at the institute. Special thanks are due Badri, Bikas, Sachi and Geetanjay who extended great help during the days of my thesis submission.

I thank my parents, father-in-law and mother-in-law for their support, constant encouragement and motivation to complete the work.

Last but not the least, I will not be doing justice with myself if I fail to acknowledge the contributions of my wife Pratyusna Patnaik, who has been the friend, philosopher and guide in my life. Without her support and encouragement, it would have been really difficult on my part to complete the work. I do hope she will keep up the good work.

Bangalore

October, 2005

Acknowledgement

List of Tables

Preface

CONTENTS

Chapter I: Common Property and Collective Action

1.1 Property Rights and Resource Management Regimes 1.2 Defining Common Pool Resources I .3 Types of Resource Management Regimes 1.4 Problems in Commons Management 1.5 Problems of Collective Action: Theoretical Approaches 1.6 Problems of Collection Action: Empirical Solutions

Chapter II: Dissecting the Community: Search for Impeccable

Characteristics for Collective Action

2.1 Community in Conservation and Management 2.2 Community Characteristics and Sustainable Collective Action 2.3 Images of the Community 2.4 Gaps in the Literature and the Research Question 2.5 Objectives 2.6 Methodology

Chapter III: Contexualising the Research Sites

3.1 The Orissa State 3.2 The Dhenkanal District 3.3 The Study Villages

Chapter IV: The Forestry Debate: Evolution and Functioning of

Joint Forest Management

4.1 Approaching the Forestry Debate in India 4.2 The history of Forest Management in Orissa and the Evolution of JFM

1

8

51

86

97

Chapter V: Heterogeneity and the Capability of Local Communities

for Collective Action: Some Empirical Findings 140

5.1 Conceptual ising Heterogeneity 5.2 Contextualising Heterogeneity in the Field Settings 5.3 When, How and Why Heterogeneity Matters 5.4 Heterogeneity, Resource Dependency, Collective Action and Management

Outcomes: Finding a Linkage

Chapter VI: Collective Action Despite Heterogeneity: Revisiting the

Pre-Condition Debate

6.1 From Common Pool to Common Property: Establishing Institutional Arrangements in Forests

183

6.2 Managing the Common Property: Community Institution and Collective Action in the Forest

6.3 Heterogeneity Did Not Matter: Explaining the Reasons

Chapter VII: Summary and Conclusion

7.1 Recapitulating the Contexual Background 7.2 Summary of the Findings 7.3 Discussion of the Findings 7.4 Concluding Remarks

References

217

230

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Contrasting Common Pool with Private Goods and Pure Public Goods

Table 2.1: A Quick Survey Report on the 10 Villages

Table 4.1: Legal Status of Forests in Orissa in 1959

Table 4.2: Physical Area of the Forest in Orissa after Independence

Table 4.3: Deforestation in Orissa from 1947 to 1985

Table 4.4: Land Degradation in the Peripheries of Reservoirs of Multipurpose River Valley Projects in Orissa between 1972 and 1982

Table 4.5: Quality of the Forest Cover in Orissa, 1981 - 83 and 1993 - 95

Table 4.6: Formation and Working of Van a Ssmrakshyana Samiti in Orissa

Table 5.1: Caste and Tribes in the Study Villages

Table 5.2: Landholding Pattern in the Study Villages

Table 5.3: Housing Pattern in the Study Villages

Table 5.4: Occupation structure in the Study Villages

Table 5.5: Castes and land distribution: Nagiapasi

Table 5.6: Castes and Land Distribution: K. K. Pu{

Table 5.7: Castes and Occupation: Nagiapasi

Table 5.8: Castes and Occupation: K.K. Pur

Table 5.9: Dependency upon Forest for Fuelwood in the two Villages

Table 5.10: Dependency upon Forest for Fodder in the two Villages

Table 5.11: Castes and Dependency on forest for Fue1wood in Nagiapasi

Table 5.12: Castes and Dependency on forest for FUe1wood in K. K. Pur

Table 5.13: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in Nagiapasi

Table 5.14: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in K. K. Pur

Table 6.1: Categorisation of Rules

Preface

Contextual Background

The disappointing results of natural resource conservation policies in developing

countries and the subsequent depletion of forest and other natural resources over the

past few decades, have forced scholars, development practitioners, and bureaucrats to

shift their focus away from state-centred policies of conservation towards solutions at

the local level. The resource degradation in the last few decades has not only altered

the world ecology and environmental scenario at the global level, but has challenged

the livelihood security of thousands of indigenous population at the local level too.

The intrinsic relationship that the communities share with their local resources and

their inherent dependency upon those resources not undermining, it has been argued

that policies regarding sustainability of the resource cannot be designed without

integrating these communities in the management strategy.

The shift in the policy approaches towards resource management has always

been accompanied with renewed interest in the academia in studying local

communities as potential resource managers, and in tum, bringing the community to

the centre stage in development and resource management policies. Besides, the

state's failure in achieving desirable resource management outcomes, there are many

other reasons that are frequently cited for the worldwide shift to community-based

approach as an alternative strategy for resource management. Indigenous knowledge,

centuries old intrinsic relation and peaceful coexistence with natural environment,

dependence for livelihood, local customs and traditions favouring conservation,

efforts by civil society groups for greater autonomy and democratization are some

among several other justifications for such a paradigm shift.

The state's efforts for inclusion oflocal communities in the gambit of resource

management in India have coexisted with successful histories of community

initiatives in resource conservation and management. Recognition of people's efforts

for resource management by the state, and their further involvement in such activities

have taken various shapes depending upon the nature of the resource and the

management regIme. The present research poses questions relating to the forestry

sector and analyses such community initiatives in local forest resource management.

Community involvement in forest resource management have taken several forms,

ranging from complete control and management by the local communities to

partnerships with state and/or at times with other community-based local civil society

organisations. In the last one and half decade, the institutional arrangements to

involve communities as partners in forest management along with state have been

structured by the Joint Forest Management Programme of the Government of India,

where the state not only attempts for the inclusion of community in resource

management, but also acknowledges community's stake in such resources. Such state­

community partnership through the national level Joint Forest Management

Programme forms the contextual background for the present study, from where the

research tries to go beyond the partnership and focuses much upon the community

characteristics and other underplaying factors, which contribute to the success or the

failure of the community in its efforts for such resource control and management. The

research has been carried out by taking two village communities from Orissa as cases

in point.

Statement of the Problem

Most of the natural resources, including forest resources, sutfer from problems like

over use, free-riding and degradation, because of their' common pool' characteristics

on the onc hand, and absence of institutional arrangements for strict adherence of

property rights on the other. Despite the state's exclusive claim of property rights over

all forest resources of the country, it faces challenges in restricting the resource from

being over accessed. The de jure state property, i.e., the forests, therefore, becomes

open access resources in de facto. Such free-riding and over use results in degradation

and denudation of forests, generating mattcrs of great concern. At such a juncture,

intervention of local communities is much desired towards establishing efficient

institutional arrangements, which reduces the incidents of free-riding and over use.

Recognition of the significance of community III conservation and

management activities of natural resources leaves us with a further question: do all

communities are equally capable of sustainable resource management? If returning

2

back to the community is the preferred solution to the problems of over-use, free­

riding and degradation of natural common pool resources, then why do communities

vary with respect to their capability in ensuring sustainability of the resource. The

popular response in the academia - by the scholars working on common property

and resource management - to several such questions, in the recent decades, has

been to point out towards social composition and size of the communities involved in

resource management. As a result, small and homogeneous communities have been

considered as ideal for resource management and 'homogeneity' has been accepted as

a pre-condition for achieving success in collective action for local resource

management. Challenging such straight forward responses and much accepted

hypothesis, the present research aims to analyse the ways and means of giving shape

to local level collective action initiatives in sharply heterogeneous communities.

Taking two heterogeneous communities - one successful and other a failure in

their endeavours in collective action - this research attempts to explain the contested

role of group heterogeneity in local level collective action for resource management.

The thesis examines the role of heterogeneity upon resource dependency and

management outcomes. The purposive selection of two heterogeneous villages (one

successful and the other a failure) paves the way for a contestation and comparison

between them, and gives an a priori understanding that heterogeneity is not always

negatively associated with collective action outcomes. The research, therefore, tries to

explain the factors and processes that mobilise di fferential interests, overcome

problems of heterogeneity and sustain collective action in a heterogeneous

community. Joint Forest Management in Orissa being the context for the research, it

becomes, therefore, essential to understand the historical background to various

approaches and policies of forest management of India, in general and Orissa, in

particular. Towards this end, the thesis attempts to historically analyse the process of

people's participation in forest management finally culminating in Joint Forest

Management in Orissa.

3

Rationale of the Study

This piece of research has a great significance particularly in the context of global

paradigm shift in the approaches towards development, democratization and resource

managemcnt. The findings of the study reaffirm the capabilities of local communities

in playing a positive role in local resource management, and thereby, in paving a way

for their own empowerment and development. Besides being a crucial addition to the

existing theoretical and empirical knowledge on the subject, the research puts forth

several noteworthy arguments of both thcoretical and policy relevance. The findings

of the study call for additional attention to be paid to building up of institutional

arrangements at local levels, and developing the capacities of rural communities and

their leadership groups for sustainable resource management, rather than relying on

the framework that any given, small and homogeneous community will be suitable for

inclusion in resource management practices. The research, therefore, is of added

significance to both academia and policy makers.

Chapter Scheme

The dissertation is structured into seven chapters, excluding this preface. Setting up

the foundation for the research, Chapter I attempts to conceptually clarify the basic

concepts involved in resource management and community-based conservation. It

begins with a brief discussion of community-based resource management, and then

proceeds further in explaining the property rights structures and different resource

management regimes. The chapter attempts to clarify the key concept for the research,

i.e., 'common pool resources', by explaining its characteristic features, on the one

hand, and by juxtaposing it with other two kinds of goods, namely, pure public goods

and private goods. An effort is made here to distinguish 'common pool resources'

from 'common property' by drawing insights from property rights debate, and by

contextualising 'common property' in other resource management regimes, such as

'state property regime', 'private property regime' and 'open access regime'.

Proceeding further, the chapter analyses the basic problems related to commons

management, and tries to find out the ways and means to overcome such problems

both theoretically as well as empirically. The theoretical arguments are drawn from

'game theoretic approach', 'logic of collective action' and 'critical mass theory'.

4

Empirical observations of successful resource management and the preconditions for

such success also find a place at the end of the chapter. Discussions made in this

chapter seem justified not only because they provide the context and lay the

foundation for the research, but also because they provide an insight into the larger

issues of resource degradation and point out the potentials of rural communities in

halting such degradation of natural resource base.

Chapter II provides a thorough review of relevant literature pertaining to

community-based resource management, common property, institutional aspects in

resourcc management, etc. Tracing the revivalist history of community in resource

management and development, and the reasons for such resurgence, the chapter then

moves forward and carries out a detailed review of the role of community

characteristics in successful collective action for local resource management. In the

process, the 'homogeneity and heterogeneity debate' in deciding the success or failure

of the collective action endeavours also finds its due place. Deconstructing the

structural-functionalist approach towards community as a 'shared understanding', the

chapter highlights the internal differentiations and heterogeneous aspects of the

community and their inherent potential to affect the collective action efforts at the

local level. Such elaborate discussions and reviews pave the way for finding out

several research gaps, and thus, towards the end, the chapter poses certain research

questions and statcs thc objectives of the study. The chapter ends with describing the

methodology adopted in selecting the two study villages from a quick survey of ten

villages concerned with forest protection and management. The tools and techniques

used for collection of data also find a place in this section.

Chapter III contextualises the research sites by sketching the position of the

two study villages in the Block (Taluka), district and finally in the state of Orissa.

This chapter presents a brief narration of the socio-economic and geographical

background to the study areas. It begins with a description of specific features of the

state of Orissa, and then proceeds further by highlighting such features of the district

to which both the villages fall. It concludes with a description of the location and

other basic information of the two study villages. Such narration of socio-economic,

geographical and other features seems justified not only because they give an idea of

5

the research sites, but also because they help in conceptualising the present study by

linking the study villages into a wider context.

Dealing with the first objective of the dissertation, Chapter IV attempts to

analyse the historical background to the forest management practices in Orissa, and

sketches the evolution of community's inclusion in such practices finally culminating

in the State Joint Forest Management (JFM) Programme. Such an analysis, however,

will remain incomplete without looking back to the history of forest management in

India since pre-colonial period, and how the forestry debate has been shaped in our

country over the years. The chapter, therefore, is divided into two parts. The first part

deals with the historical development of 'scientific forestry' in the country starting

from the colonial period, and the second part deals with the specific data pertaining to

the state of Orissa for narrating the historical background, evolution and functioning

of the JFM in Orissa. For analytical purpose, the chapter draws insights from several

secondary sources such as government policies, enactments, reports and several other

published works on community's involvement in forestry activities.

In its efforts to assess the contested role of heterogeneity, which forms the key

question of the research, Chapter V tries to give an understanding of how

heterogeneity affects the capabilities of communities in use and management of their

local resources. To begin with, the chapter conceptualises 'heterogeneity' by

identifying several types such as 'socio-cultural heterogeneity', 'resource

heterogeneity', 'interest heterogeneity' and 'political heterogeneity'; and then tries to

contextualise them in the field setting. A theoretical discussion also finds a place in

the chapter to have a clear understanding of how, when and why heterogeneity

matters in collective action. Finally, drawing insights from the empirical data, the

chapter explores the role of heterogeneity in affecting a) the resource dependency, b)

collective action initiatives, and c) the resource management outcomes in the two

studied villages.

In order to understand the local common pool resource management in the

study villages, Chapter VI attempts to examine the process of collective action that

the community members had exhibited for successful management of their forest

resources. The first part of the chapter is devoted towards elucidating the process of

6

collective action in the first village (Nagiapasi), where collective action has been

successful in ensuring sustainable resource management. The second part engages

itself with the main thrust of the dissertation, i.e. 'the issue of heterogeneity and

collective action'; and discusses the causative factors for success in the first village

(Nagiapasi) as well as failure in the second village (K. K. Pur) in their efforts towards

collective action for local resource management, given the situation that both are

heterogeneous communities. Towards the end, the chapter re-considers some of the

'pre-conditions of collective action' as frequently occur in the literature, by

highlighting upon leadership issues, institutional aspects and other non-economic

(incentives) aspects of collective action.

Finally, in Chapter VII, I present the summary of the findings of the study and

put forth several generalizations derived out of empirical observation. The chapter

recapitulates the background and research questions with which the research had

started. It then discusses the findings in the backdrop of theoretical and empirical

literature, and thereby highlights those areas of understanding, which the hitherto

existing literature on common property and resource management seems to have

neglected. In the conclusion, the chapter calls attention to the practical relevance of

the research, discussing the findings in the context of broader policy perspective.

7

Chapter I

Common Property and Collective Action

The increasing depletion of India's forest resources over the last few decades has

made certain things amply clear. While on the one hand, it has brought into sharp

focus the inherent inadequacy of the conventional state-run system of forest

management, the inherent potential of traditional local communities to protect and

manage the forests effectively has emerged as a dominant paradigm on the other. The

poor outcomes of state-controlled resource management strategies and planned

development have compelled policy makers and scholars to seek fresh solutions to the

problem of conservation. One solution has been to reconsider the role of community

in it. It has been affirmed that forest conservation priorities cannot be determined by

isolating local communities, which depend so much on it for their day-to-day

livelihood.

In recent years, countries around the world have started giving greater rights,

responsibilities and powers to the local communities to sustainably manage their

immediate environment. In a departure from previous work on development and

resource management, which considered communities as hindrance to progress, social

change and resource conservation (e.g., Hardin, 1968), local communities have been

the center of attraction in most of the current writings; and their role in bringing about

decentralized and meaningful participation for sustainable use and management of

natural resources has been much discussed (c. f. Etzioni, 1996; Gadgil and lyer, 1991;

Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988; Bromley et aI., 1992). Previous policies on conservation

and the scholarly writings as well, consider local communities as an obstacle to

sustainable use of natural resource; and their capabilities in organising themselves for

resource protection were highly undermined. The rationale behind such an assumption

was that the interests of local communities in natural resource and their livelihood

requirements always clashed with the goals of conservation. Thus, conservation of

natural resources like forests, wildlife, pastures, fisheries and water resources required

protection from members of local communities, who depended upon these resources

for their livelihood and thus exploited them without restraint. Such justifications

R

paved the way for conservation policies that supported either nationalisation or

privatisation of natural resources by excluding local communities from the scope of

its management (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).

Notwithstanding the persistence of such ideas among policy makers in certain

cases, most of the current ideas about community's role in natural resource

management have changed radically. Communities have now become the major thrust

of conservationist thinking and scholarly writings about natural resource management.

The limitations of the state to coerce its citizens to unpopular development and

conservation practices have been widely acknowledged, and national governments,

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and international donor agencies are now

extending both financial and institutional supports towards community based

conservation. Further, with the spread of the idea of democratic decentralisation and

renewed interest in the concept of popular participation, unrepresentative

development and resource management practices with top-down approaches have

become unpopular and out of fashion. Resource management priorities now demand

participatory and democratic institutions at the community level, which can ensure

popular participation. sustainable use of the resource and equitable distribution of the

benefits that accrue from the resource.

Scholars supporting community based natural resource management argue that

local communities depend upon their immediate resource base near which they live

for their livelihood requirements and, thus, have a long term need for such resources.

The increasing resource scarcity due to deforestation and degradation of local forests

is not only a matter of concern for national government, but also a great threat to the

subsistence of local communities. Poffenberger ef at .. (1996: 45) observe that in

response to such resource scarcity and subsequent livelihood insecurity, 'many

communities in India have developed localised protection and management systems',

promoting community based natural resource management. Further, the traditional

and indigenous knowledge of local communities about these resources is also citcd as

a reason making them the best managers of their resources than potential actors from

elsewhere (Lynch and Talbot, 1995). Instances of resource degradation by local

communities themselves are also found when they are not involved in active resource

management and are kept outside the purvIew of conservation (Guha, 1989: 58;

9

Western and Wright, 1994). The implicit assumption behind such arguments is that

'communities have incentives to use resources unsustainably when they are not

involved in resource management, and if they are involved in conservation, the

benetits they receive will create positive incentives for them to become good stewards

ofresourccs' (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 633).

One of the important points to note here is that such a community control of

India's forest resources implicitly involves a change in property rights and resource

management regimes. The shift of management responsibilities to the local

communities also involves a shift in property rights over the forestland. Forests,

which were state property under the state-controlled system of management, are now

managed as 'common property' under the community control. Thus, a detail

discussion of the concepts such as 'property rights' and 'resource management

regimes' are required to better understand the process of community's involvement in

forest management and the local level collective action required for such efforts.

1.1. Property Rights and Resource Management Regimes

In the literature on natural resource management and the policy formulations intended

to involve local community in its ambit, nothing is as misunderstood as the concept

'common property rcsource'. Partly, the confusion arises from the failure to

distinguish between two separate but indeed inter-related concepts, i.e. 'property' and

'resource'. While the nature of the resource is an inherent physical characteristic,

property refers to a social institution or a special kind of human intervention in the

resource.

'Resources' are mere physical phenomena, which are put to use to derive

benefits out of it, and may be either natural or man-made. Natural resources are often

defined as 'those components of an ecosystem which provides goods and services

useful to mankind' (Gibbs and Bromley, 1991: 22). While most of the earth's

resources, such as forests, water, land, fisheries, minerals etc., are used as raw

materials to produce several goods of human satisfaction, a majority of the world's

poor also directly use them as a source of their livelihood. Viewed in this sense,

10

natural resources are regarded as useful only to the extent that they provide some

goods and services for human satisfaction. The usefulness of a resource in this sense

depends upon the market forces and the market determines the value of the resources.

However, such a narrow perspective of natural resource often undermines the

ecological value of the resource (see Grima and Berkes, 1991). Emphasising the

ecological value of natural resource, Grima and Berkes (1991: 35) cite the example of

a wetland with continuous water logging, which has little market value. However,

such resources serve extremely important ecological functions as 'water flow

regulation, flood control, etc'. In the past two to three decades, with the increasing

awareness about environment, there has been a radical rethinking concerning natural

resource, acknowledging its ecological importance.

Natural resources further are divided into non-renewable and renewable

resources. Non-renewable resources such as coals and minerals are also known as

'stock' resources, and physical amount available for such resources are more or less

fixed. In such resources, the physical quantity of resources used to day reduces the

amount available for future use. On the other hand, in the case of renewable

resources, the total physical amount of the resource changes over time and what is

used today may not necessarily reduce the amount that will be available tomorrow.

For example, in the case of complete renewable resources such as solar energy and

winds, the pattern of present use does not reduce the amount available for future use.

However, some renewable resources have a 'critical zone' beyond which any further

present depletion reduces the amount available for future use (Gibbs and Bromley,

1991: 24). Forests, pasture lands, inland water bodies, fisheries, etc. are examples of

renewable resources having a critical zone. A majority of the population of the

developing countries of the world also depend upon these resources directly for their

livelihood requirements. Such resources, if consumed rcstrictively with proper

management, can be expected to yield benefits sustainably.

'Property', on the other hand, refers to an institutional arrangement in the

resource or a special kind of human intervention, which defines individuals'

relationship with resources. The institution of property is the 'result of a secure claim

to a resource or the services that resources provide' (Gibbs and Bromley, 1991: 24).

Bromley (1992: 2) defines property as 'a benefit or income stream', and property

II

rights as 'a claim to a benefit stream that some higher body - usually the state -

will agree to protect through the assignment of duties to others, who may somehow

interfere with the benefit stream'. Thus, property is not the resource itself, rather a

social relation that defines the rights of the property holder to the resource in relation

to others who have a corresponding duty to respect that right. Viewed in this sense

one's right over a property also includes other's duty to respect that right. Thus,

property is a 'triadic social relation involving benefit stream, right holders and the

duty bearers' (Hallowell, 1943 cited in Bromley, 1992: 2).

1.2. Defining Common Pool Resources

Before going further in describing the property management regimes and common

property arrangements, it is essential to conceptually clarify the concept of common

pool resources. The basic distinction between resource and property makes the job of

defining common pool resources easy. One needs to distinguish several types of

goods to understand the position of common pool resources. Common pool resources

are those natural or man-made resources, from which it is difficult to exclude other

potential users from using the resource and such joint use by more than one user

involves subtractability (Berkes and Farvar, 1991; Ostrom, 1986a). Common pool

goods are distinguished from two other types of goods, i.e., pure public goods and

private goods. Such classification of goods is based on changes along two analytical

dimensions: exclusion of others from the resource and jointness of use.

In the case of pure public goods, such as TV broadcast, street light, light

house, etc., it becomes not only difficult but also sometimes impossible to cxclude the

resource from other co-users, but such joint use in the case of pure public goods does

not involve subtraction of the resource. For example while it is difficult to exclude

somebody from using the services provided by a street light, at the same time one's

use of such service does not necessarily affect other's use of the same service. On the

other hand, private goods can be easily excluded from outsiders, but if joint use of the

good begins then the resource starts to deplete. Thus, common pool resources exist in

between the pure public goods and private goods, and share the characteristics of

subtractability with the private good on the one hand, and the characteristics of non-

12

excludability with the pure public good, on the other (McKean, 2000) (see Table -

1.1 ).

The twin characteristics of 'subtractability' and 'non-excludability' make the

common pool resources a special kind of resources, in which it becomes difficult to

protect the resource from depletion if some mechanism to exclude the non­

contributing users is not devised. Thus proper maintenance of common pool resources

requires some kind of institutional arrangements of property rights or resource

management regimes to exclude the non-members or non-contributors from availing

benefits from the resource. In the absence of such institutional mechanisms to address

the problems of exclusion and joint use, common pool resources become de facto

'open access resources' accessible to anyone.

Table 1.1: Contrasting Common Pool with Private Goods and Pure Public Goods

Exclusion Easy Exclusion Difficult

Subtractable (rivalrous in Private goods (all kinds of Common pool goods

consumption) pri vate property) (forest, pasture lands,

fisheries, inland water

bodies, etc)

Non-subtractable (non- Club or toll goods Pure public goods

rivalrous in consumption) (defence, TV broadcasting,

lighthouse, etc)

Source: MeKean, (2000: 29)

1.3. Types of Resource Management Regimes

Resource management regimes may be understood as a specific kind of institutional

arrangements of property right in the resource, which defines who will have rights to

access the resource and who will not. A resource management regime derives its

sib'Tlificance from 'the structure of rights and duties that characterise the relationship

of individuals to one another and to the objects of value or the particular resource in

question' (Bromley and Cemea, 1989: 5, Bromley, 1999: 86). The resource

management regime structures the relationships between two or more individuals (or

13

groups) in the sense that while, on the one hand, it ensures the interests of one party

over the resource by assigning 'rights' over that particular resource, it makes

obligatory on the part of the other party to respect that right by means of 'duties'

towards that secured claim or 'rights' on the other. In other words, resource

management regimes make one's claims over a property secure by establishing

'property rights arrangements', which is respected by those who are outside such

arrangement and also is protected by state or some higher authority oflaw.

One of the important things to point out m the context of resource

management regimes is to distinguish between the two concepts of 'resource' and

'regime'. The distinction between the resource and the regime under which it is held

or managed is important because a particular resource may be held (or managed)

under more than one regime. In many rural communities, certain resource may be

under the control of a particular household or group of households at particular

seasons in a year, while at other seasons the same resource becomes available for all

the members of the community to use. Take the case of a village common land or

pasture land; while the same piece of land is used by all members of the community

for grazing their cattle throughout the year, during the harvesting period particular

households use that as threshing floor. In other worlds, the access to such land

becomes restricted and certain households share among themselves the right to access

during the harvesting period, while in other seasons the access to the land is open for

all the members of the village. Even the private agricultural lands (mainly paddy

fields), in many rural communities, become open for every body to graze their cattle

after the harvest. However, such access ceases to operate once the next agricultural

reasons starts. Such explanations reveal the fact that while resource is a fixed

phenomenon, management regime is a dynamic concept, which changes depending

upon the relationship of individuals to one another and to the resource itself, and a

particular resource may be used under various regimes at different periods of time.

In general, four different types of management regimes are commonly

identified in common property literature (see Bromley, 1992, 1999; Bromley and

Cemea, 1989). They are:

I. State Property Regimes

2. Private Property Regimes

14

3. Common Property Regimes

4. Open Access Regimes (non-property regimes)

1.3.1. State Property Regimes

In a state property regime, ownership of the resource remains with the state, which

controls it by its agencies like government. However, private individuals or groups

may make use of the resource. but only with permission from the state. Examples of

resources under state property regimes include: state forests, national parks, and other

resources that are held under public domain over the which state has direct control.

The state has the discretion either to directly manage the state-owned natural

resources (say forests) through government agencies or to lease them to individuals or

groups to avail the usufruct rights over such resource for a specified period of time.

As it was pointed out earlier. shi ft of a resource from state property regimes to other

regimes and vice versa is quite possible. For example. the nationalisation of village

forest by the Nepalese government in 1957 converted a common property regime at

the village level into a state property regime. Likewise. the recent Joint Forest

Management efforts in India aim to establish common property regimes in state forest

resources. However. in such cases the communities are only given the usufruct rights

over thc torest produce. while the title to the land still remains in the hands of the

state.

One of the Imporlant characteristics of state properly regimes is the separation

of ownership and management from actual use of the resource. In many cases the

ownership resides with the population at large (or the state) and the management

resides at the hand of the agencies of the state or with a class of bureaucrats, while

common people arc the main users of the resource (Bromley, 1992: 10).

1.3.2. Private Property Regimes

The resources undcr private property regImes are owned, managed and used by

private individuals. However, in the case of corporate properties, which also come

under private property regimes (Bromley, 1999: 87), while the ownership rights

remain with the group or corporate members, the management responsibility rests

with certain core individuals, usually trained professionals, who take decisions on

15

behalf of the corporate members. All the private lands belonging to households and

private possessions are used and managed under private property regimes.

Private property regimes are considered to be more stable and supposed to be

well managed because 'they have the social and legal sanction to exclude other non­

owner and resist unwanted intrusion, often through the power of the state' (Bromley

and Cernea, 1989: 13). In other words, in the case of private property, the owner can

easily exclude others from accessing the resource. The owners, in such cases, as they

enjoy exclusive property right over the resource, are completely free to do whatever

they wish to do with the resource. It should be pointed out here that such exclusive

property right over the resource in the case of private property is always accompanied

by a sensible 'duty' of others to respect that right and not to invade private property.

1.3.3. Common Property Regimes

In common property regimes the property rights over the resource is vested in a group

of individuals or members of a community who can be significantly distinguished

from the outside non-members. In this case the group or the community holds

property in common and share rights and duties towards the resource. The community

having rights ovcr common property may differ in size, nature or internal

organisation, but it is considered to be a social unit having common interests,

common social norms, internal authority structure, and definite membership and

boundaries.

Common property shares one important characteristic with private property -

exclusion of non-members or outsiders from accessing the resource. In this sense,

common property implies shared private property of the group or community, since

the community enjoys rights over the resource and hence, is expected to exclude all

outsiders of the community from accessing such resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup and

Bishop, 1975). Unlike Common Pool Resources, where exclusion of non-members is

very difficult, common property can be kept away from outsiders easily since the

group or community enjoys property rights over the resource. A small forest patch or

an irrigation system managed by a community serves as the best example of resources

managed under common property regimes. Here, there is a well-defined community

whose membership is more or less fixed, a resource to be managed (physical area of

16

the forest or irrigation system), a continuous benefit stream from the resource (notion

of property) and a requirement for group or community management (having

restrictions on the use of the resource and regular maintenance) to ensure the

sustained flow of benefits. Such community shares common norms (rules and

regulations towards the use and management of the resource) and interests, and is in a

position to restrict members of other communities from accessing the benefits from

the resource.

Crucial to any management regime is the 'authority structure', which ensures

the expectations of the right holders, in terms of first, establishing exclusive rights of

the members over the resource, and second, protecting the resource from possible

intrusion by other non-members (Bromley, 1992: 12). Private property is considered

to be durable and well-managed because of a strong authority system which can

exclude potential outsiders from invading the resource. Such authority system in the

case of private property is also given equal and often strong back up by the state.

Similar conditions apply to common property also. So far as the authority system in

the case of common property regime is strong and efficient enough to exclude non­

members from sharing the benefits out of the resource, we can call it as a common

property regime. Once such authority system breaks down the common property

regime degenerates into open access and resource degradation becomes an obvious

phenomenon. Thus, Bromley (1992: 12) rightly points out 'it is not the property

regime that explains compliance and wise natural resource use. It is, instead, the

authority system that ensures that the particular regime is adhered to'.

Quite unmindful to the notion of property rights arrangement, the concept

common property seems to have entered social science literature not to refer to any

form of property at all, but rather to its absence (Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955; Demsetz,

1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1973 cited in McKean, 2000: 30). Common property in

social science has always been confused with open access; and what Hardin (1968)

had in his mind while analysing 'tragedy of the commons' was, in fact, open access

instead of common property. Contrary to common property arrangements, open

access is a situation where no property right arrangements exist over the resource and

in the absence of authority structure or property right arrangements to exclude non­

members every one is free to access the resource. Thus, common property is not a

17

situation of access open to all, but access limited to a specified group or community

having a well-defined boundary, which holds its rights in common over the resource

(McKean, 2000; Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Bromley, 1992, 1999; Bromley et

a1.1992; Runge, 1981, 1984, 1992).

There may be two inherent problems in common property regimes (see

Bromley, 1992: 12; Bromley and Cernea, 1989: 18 - 9). First, since common property

is controlled and managed by a group or collectivity, it becomes difficult to prevent

the breakdown in compliance by co-owners towards the resource. Changes in other

sphere of economy resulting in limited livelihood opportunities may have

considerable impacts upon the compliance of community members towards the rules

and norms of co-management, making resource overuse and degradation an obvious

phenomenon. Second, if the state fails in its duty to provide legal backup to the

community holding resource under common property regimes in protecting the

resource from external threat, then common property has the very chance of

degenerating into open access situation. Unlike private property, which has received

maximum state protection, most of the common property in developing countries has

recci ved lesser attention by the state and the larger population depending upon

common property is always perceived as a politically marginal category.

1.3.4. Open Access Regime

Open access is a situation where property rights arrangement does not exist and

hence, none (neither individualls nor community) can claim exclusive right over the

resource. In the absence of such property rights arrangements, it is illogical to say -

as is popularly said - that 'everybody's property is nobody's property'. Rather, it can

be only said as 'everybody's access is nobody's property' (Bromley, 1992: 13;

Bromley and Cernea, 1989: 19). Resources under open access regimes - whether

forests, fishing or grazing lands - always belong to the persons who first exercise

control over them. As it was pointed out in the previous section, open access

situations arise mainly because of the breakdown of the authority system, which can

design rules for proper management of the resource and which can prohibit outsiders

from entering into the resource.

18

The distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' is very much crucial for

understanding open access regimes (see, Bromley, 1978, 1989, 1999). A right of an

individual over a property is always accompanied by duty of all others to respect that

right. Thus, when one has a right over a property, slhe will have the expectation that

herlhis claim will be protected in the form of duties by the rest of the community. In

other words, one's right over a property is always accompanied by 'others' duty not to

invade in herlhis rights and see to it that slhe enjoys that right. On the other hand, in

situations of 'privileges' the notion of duty does not arise since none has any right.

One's privilege to use a resource is not accompanied by other's duty not to invade

upon the resource. In conditions of privilege, everyone is free to do as slhe wishes,

since neither party has any right over the resource.

The distinction between common property and open access regimes seems to

become clear when we look into the difference between rights and privileges. In

common property regimes, the co-users or co-owners of the resource enjoy collective

rights over the resource, and hence, as a matter of practice can keep others away from

invading the resource. In such situations, some have the right to use the resource and

others have the duty to keep them away from the resource. Contrarily, in situations of

open access, since none enjoys such exclusive rights over the resource, but all, at the

same time, have the privileges to use the resource, excluding anybody from accessing

the resource becomes difficult. Thus, unlike common property regimes, an open

access situation is 'one of mutual privileges and no rights' (Bromley, 1999: 86).

1.4. Problems in Commons Management

A substantial majority of world's population, especially the members of rural

communities, depends to a greater extent on common pool natural resources, like

grazing and fallow land, forest, water, fisheries, etc., for their survival. The basic

necessities of rural population like food, fuel wood, fodder and shelter are met out of

common pool resources. As per an estimation, nearly 80 per cent of world's

population depend upon commons for their existence (Bromley, 1986: I). Such being

the importance of common pool resources, it is essential to point out that common

19

pool resources face two important problems: the problem of overuse or degradation

and the problem of free-riding (Dietz et aI., 2002: 18).

The common pool resources face these two above-mentioned problems

because of its two inherent characteristics, such as subtractability and difficulty in

exclusion. The subtractable nature of common pool implies that one person's use of

the resource curtails the amount of the resource available for the rest of the

community to use. For example, one person's use of water, fish or forest produce

reduces from the total amount left for others to use. Such subtractability nature of

common pool creates an incentive for overuse of the resource, ultimately leading to its

degradation or what Hardin (1968) termed as 'tragedy of the commons'. The

excludability problem in common pool refers that once the good is provided, it is

difficult to protect it from outside non-members. Such a characteristic leads to free­

rider problem where members start to overuse the resource without paying the cost of

its production. Since exclusion is difIicult in such a context free-rider problem

becomes inherent in common pools and this, in the long run, also leads to overuse and

degradation of the resource.

It is pertinent to point out that the problems of overuse and free-riding arise

because of 'lack of coordination' among the resource users, and thus, as Oakerson

points out, 'the key problem in commons is how to coordinate the action of individual

users in order to obtain an optimal rate of production or consumption (1992: 41).

Successful management of common pool resources requires proper coordination

among the resource users and collective action to come together and share the costs of

producing the resource. Thus, coordination problem or collective action problem is

very much crucial to common pool resources, which results in overuse and free­

riding.

The success of community management of commons, therefore, involves the

problem of collective action, in which it becomes difficult on the part of self-seeking

rational individuals to come together for production of a collective good (the

resource). In a situation of collective action, each resource user tries to maximise

his/her individual gain, which, in tum, affects the total resource stock and also the

share of other resource users, resulting in what Hardin had called 'tragedy of the

20

commons' (Hardin, 1968). As the total amount of resource is always limited, resource

appropriation by anyone user to maximise hislher own gain seriously affects the

amount remaining for other appropriators. This 'free riding' obviously happens due to

lack of communication and binding agreement, which can determine how much

resource unit each user can appropriate from a resource system, keeping in view the

interest of all resource users and the resource system itself. For example, in the case

of irrigation, if the head-end farmers consume more water, the tail-end farmers may

end up without water for their fields or less water than the head-end farmers. Further,

nobody will be willing to contribute to the maintenance of the canal or tank as each

prefers to free ride at the cost of others. Whether a farmer contributes for maintenance

of the water resource or not, he can still use water from it since it is difficult to

exclude him from using the resource. However, if an agreement can be made between

them through some institutional arrangements all the farmers can have access to

water.

Before going further in discussing the problems of common pool resources

and the problems that resource users face in coordinating for their successful

management, we should look at the question as to why common pool resources

require collective action at all? The very nature of common pool resource, i.e.,

. subtract ability' and 'non-excludability' makes it necessary on the part of the resource

to be managed through collective action. To put it precisely, the management of CPRs

requires collective action at the community level owing to three factors. First, the

good is jointly produced, or else it would not require collective action at all. Common

property is such that they cannot be produced in isolation, by any single individual's

effort. Second, CPR confers benefits on all members of the group, making it

impossible or impracticable to exclude members who fail to contribute for the

production of CPR. Third, production of benefits in CPR involves cost, which should

come from all members of the community (Heckathorn, 1993: 331).

Having acknowledged the inherent problem of common pool resources and the

necessity of the process of collective action in the production of Common Property, I

now move forward to discuss the challenges that resource users face in such

processes. In any CPR situation, the resource users face two problems: provision

problem and appropriation problem (Ostrom, 1990, 200 I). Provision problem in CPR

21

focuses on investment for production and maintenance of the resource itself.

Production of benefits from CPRs often requires long-term investments for

construction of the resource and/or its proper maintenance, as in the case of village

woodlots, tanks or canals. Provision problem involves determining the type and level

of regular maintenance that will sustain the resource system over timet.

In regard to appropriation problem in CPR environment, the key focus is on

how to allocate a fixed amount of resource among resource users so as to avoid

conflicts over the assignment of rights2. In the absence of firm rule on who can

appropriate how much in a CPR environment, the situation becomes like a Prisoner's

Dilemma game and free-riding becomes inherent. In such cases none will have any

incentive to leave any portion of the resource for other user, which ultimately result in

degradation of the resource system as discussed above. However, if the access to the

CPR is limited and a well-defined !,'TOUp of users rely on the resource jointly, the

incentive of the users to appropriate will depend upon rules governing the nature of

appropriation, and its enforcement and monitoring.

Equitable distribution or allocation of benetits forms an important

appropriation problem in most CPR environments. The problem of equitable

distribution or appropriation of resources arises mostly because of the uncertain and

heterogeneous characteristics of the resource itself For example, in the case of water

resource, farmers extracting water from head"end of the irrigation system always have

the freedom to obtain more water than the farmers who are located at the tail-end.

This uncertain geo!,'Taphical characteristic of the resource often makes the

maintenance of the resource difficult. In such cases well-enforced rules to allocate

time, location and quantity of resource units to specitic user can reduce the risk of

I It should be pointed out here that in CPR investments are usually of long-term duration, where costs are incurred in present while the benefit. out of it are acquired in future, making it difticult for taking any decision for investment. When this difficult long-term problem is combined with free-riding of other resource users, maintenance of a resource system becomes a challenging task.

2 Resource appropriation in CPR means withdrawal of resource units by resource users from the whole resource system. Resource users may appropriate resource units for self consumption, for using it as an input for production process, e.g., water for agricultural development; or for the market (Ostrom, 200 I: 142)

22

inequitable distribution and enhance the chance of production and sustainability of the

resource.

To put it precisely, all the problems in common pool resource finally revolves

around the central problem of 'collective action,}, i.e., why and how people would

come together (coordinate) to manage their local common pool resources. Despite the

fact that free-riding and lack of coordination poses a serious threat to collective action

and results in over use or degradation of the resource, several scholars have pointed

out, from their theoretical as well as empirical research, the condition required for

successful collective action at the community level for effective management of

ePRs. The following sections make a review of such theoretical and empirical

arguments stressing the preconditions for successful collective action for managing

common property.

1.5. Problems of Collective Action: Theoretical Approaches

At a theoretical level. scholars have tried to answer the question as to why and how

people come together for a common cause and exhibit cooperative behaviour. For

analytical purposes such theoretical arguments are categorised into two separate

sections, though both deal with the same question of collective action.

1.5.1. A Game Theoretic Approach

In recent years, game theory is being used as an analytical tool for approaching the

collective action problem in common property. The theory provides an important

theoretical construct to analyse collective action. It has been widely used by various

scholars (Wagner, 1983; Axelrod, 1981 and Snidal, 1985 in the context of

International Relations and Runge, 1992; Seabright, 1993 and Rasmussen and

) The tenn 'collective action' in social science literature has been widely used by different scholars to understand different situations. However, the element, which is common to all, is 'mutual interest and the possibIlity of benefit from coordinated action'. Situations requiring collective action take several fonns, one of which is the management of common property resources like fisheries, forests and irrigation. Although sociological literature on the subject is relatively small and new (e.g. Heckathorn, I9RR, 19R9, 1990, 1991, 1992; Oliver, 19RO; Marwell and Oliver, 1984, 1993; Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira, 19R5), research on the subject by economists (e.g. Samuelson, 1954; Bator, 1958; Head, 1974, Olson, 1965), political scientists (e.g. Chamberlin, 1974; Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1970; Hardin, 1971) and psychologists (Kelley and Grzelak, 1972; Bonacich el aI., 1976; Dawes, McTarish and Shaklee, 1977) is much too large and old.

23

Meinzen-Dick, 1995 in the context of Common Property Resources) to address the

question whether or not people are capable of cooperative behaviour and choose

chose to cooperate and organise voluntarily.

Many common pool problems have been formulated and analysed as

Prisoners' Dilemma (PO) Game. The core argument of PD model revolves round a

situation where two suspects are being interrogated separately for a jointly committed

crime. Cooperation or defection are the two dominant choices open to them. If both

cooperate with each other and do not confess, they will receive a minor punishment; if

one defects and confesses, he will be set free while the other will receive a heavy

prison sentence; ifboth defect and confess, each will be prosecuted. Such a situation

can be better understood in the following payoff matrix (see figure 1.1). Suppose

there are two players, A and B in the game, each having the choice either to cooperate

or defect. If both A and B cooperate with each other, they will receive 3 points each.

But if A chooses to defect (and B still cooperates) then he will gain a higher benefit

from what he had got last time when he had cooperated with B, because now he is not

paying the cost of collective action and enjoying free riding. In such a situation A will

receive 4 points and B, only 1 point. This payoff will similarly change when B

chooses defection strategy and A, cooperation. Both the players are gaining more,

individually, when they are choosing the defection choice. In such a situation,

defection is the dominant strategy and each has an incentive to defect, unmindful of

the other's move, to secure one's own interest and self-protection. Hence, the rational

decision of each player will individually make them worse off (Runge, 1992: 23) and

both wi 11 end up in having 2 points each.

Figure - 1.1

Player B

C n

Player A C 3, 3 1, 4

0 4, 1 2, 2

24

Thus, Prisoners' Dilemma analysis as applied to Common Property

management poses a situation, where there are a number of individual actors having

the choice either to cooperate for better management or defect for personal gain.

Available evidences suggest that the choice of defection will predominate in case of

the management of CPRs. The rational choice of each individual will instigate

himlher to take free-ride at the cost of others, finally leading to what Hardins has

summed up as 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968). According to Hardin, 'in the

case of community owned resources, each individual has the incentive to over-use the

resource, regardless of what others' do, thereby leading to destruction of those

resources (Hardin, 1968; cited in Nugent, 1993: 624). And the alternatives, which are

put forwarded to avoid such a situation are to have certain external coercive

regulations, either by nationalising the resources or by pri vatising it. This is based on

the argument that the original payoff structure in the Prisoner's Dilemma game can be

changed by the state in such a way that cooperation becomes a dominant strategy. It is

believed that regulations and penalties can create a new payoff structure that would

encourage people to cooperate (Ostrom, 1990: 8 - ll). Such a policy of nationalising

natural resource, such as, grazing land, fisheries, forests, etc., and bringing them into

centralised control and regulation, has been followed extensively, particularly in the

third world countries since colonial rule. This, however, assumes that the state has

proper motivation, sufficient knowledge and enforcement ability to provide optimal

resource management. It, thus, ignores the need for extensive local information for

monitoring and enforcing regulations, in which the state has no competitive advantage

(Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995: 19).

The structure and payoff of Prisoner's Dilemma game is often criticised as

highly artificial, and may not always represent the real life situation faced by

individuals in most natural resource management situations. Thus, a number of

alternative games have also been put forwarded by scholars who believe that the costs

and benefits of collective action on natural resources are often a kind which is more

favourable to the possibility of cooperation than what the original Prisoner's Dilemma

game predicts (Bardhan, 1993a: 634 - 35; Nugent, 1993: 624 - 26; Rasmussen and

Meinzen-Dick, 1995). Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game, these games take into

account the interactions between individual members of the community managing the

natural resources. Scholars such as Axelrod (1981, 1984), Runge (1992), Nugent

25

(1993), and Taylor (1988) have argued that if certain conditions are present, the

players will face a payoff structure, which makes voluntary cooperation a possibility.

Taylor's (1988) chicken game provides a situation III which cooperation

becomes a favourable strategy. It describes a one-shot situation in which at least one

of the player will cooperate simply because both players want to avoid a dominant

strategy of defection, which is a least favourable strategy in terms of comparison of

costs and benefits (Taylor, 1988; cited in Bardhan, 1993a: 634). Suppose, in a

situation where two neighbouring families are pondering on the issue, who will

participate in fencing and maintenance work of a forest patch managed by the group.

Either of them can participate in the activity, but each can also prefer to 'free-ride' on

the work of others. But in the case of such vital common pool resources the

consequence of defection on the part of both agents may be so bad that either of them

rather prefer to do the work himselflherself if the other does not do so. The following

figure makes the situation clearer.

Player A c

D

Figure - 1.2 Player B

c D

3, 3 2,4

4,2 I, I.

As the figure (Figure 1.2) shows, if both A and B cooperate with each other

they get three points each. If one of them defects (whether A or B) while the other

cooperates, the one who defects gets four points and who cooperates gets two points.

However, ifboth the players defect, they end up in having only one point each, which

is the worst outcome. Here, as the figure shows defection - defection is not the

dominant strategy. Because, if one player assumes that the other is going to defect and

he also takes a defection strategy accordingly, he gets only I point; but, if he chooses

to cooperate even though the other prefers to defect, he gets 2 points, which is at least

better than the previous outcome.

Further, if we analyse the non-cooperative Prisoners' Dilemma Game, we can

find that non-cooperation or defection arises because of lack of coordination or

26

infonnation asymmetry among the players. The action of a player may change if slhe

could know in advance the action that the other player would take. Similarly, in a

common pool situation, if somebody knows that her/his neighbour would cooperate in

management of the resource, slhe may also undertake cooperative action instead of

free-riding. Therefore, the reasoning of Prisoner's Dilemma that each player is

individually better off if slhe takes a defection strategy unmindful of what the other

player does, may not apply in a continuous and recurrent situation, and where players

interact with each other for an indefinite number of times. If the players know that the

game will be repeatedly played, there is a possibility that the chances of cooperation

will emerge (Axelrod, 1981: 307). Once cooperation gets started, it will be

reciprocated (Nugent, 1993: 625), as each player plays whatever the previous player

had played or according to a strategy which Axelrod states as 'Tit for Tat' strategy (cf.

Axelrod, 1981: 311).

Here, the argument is that each player accumulates expenence of the

behaviour of his opponent since slhe meets herlhim personally at each round of the

game and is able to recall herlhis past moves (Baland and Platteau, 1996). And most

importantly, the players get time to rationally observe the behaviour of others and

adopt a choice of conditional cooperation, i.e., to cooperate first and only defect if

others do so. This is an 'assurance game', which captures a widely observed

phenomenon in the field studies: no body wants to be 'suckered', but one tends to be

cooperatives when others or at least a critical mass of others in a multi-persons' game

do so (Burdhan, 1993a: 634). According to Tit-for-Tat strategy, an organisation can

emerge and can be maintained if the group is small and stable; and there should be a

willingness to give cooperation a trial and a continuous interaction for a longer period

of time between the same members (Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995: 22).

The other ways to overcome the problem posed by Prisoner's Dilemma model

are 'interdependency', 'mutual expectation' and 'degree of trust' of the actors involved

(Runge, 1984; Baland and Platteau, 1996). Here, the dominant strategy of defection

does not exist, and the individual decision to cooperate or not are not independent of

one another, but are outcomes of individual assessment of mutual expectations and

interests. Under these circumstances, the degree of communication between players

27

plays a crucial role in detennining the possibility of cooperation and organisation

(Runge, 1992).

The situation observed in prisoner's dilemma game can be analogous to many

situations that may be found in reality in the context of common pool resources. There

may be groups with divergent, and even conflicting opinions and interests in common

property. One group might not be in favour grazing in the forests, while the other

might be favouring it. Some might be in favour of cutting trees while others opposed

to it.

1.5.2. The Logic of Collective Action and The Critical Mass

Much theoretical and empirical work in the field of community management of

natural resources can be traced back to one theoretical framework, namely, the Logic

of Collective Action (Olson, 1965). The publication of Olson's (1965) 'The Logic of

Collective Action' challenged a much commonly held view that groups would tend to

fonn and take collective action whenever members jointly benefited from a resource.

Instead, Olson offered the negative assertion that rational, self-interested individuals

will not act to achieve their common group interests, unless the number of individuals

in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to

make individuals to act in their common interest.

Olson's (1965) 'The Logic of Collective Action' may be considered as a

starting point of collective action theorisation. Olson mainly focuses on the 'size of

the group' as a relevant theoretical construct to analyse collective action. Based upon

size, Olson distinguishes between small and large groups and analyses their capacity

to get collective action done. Olson holds the view that small groups can provide

themselves with collective goods without relying on coercion or any other positive

inducements apart from the collective good itself (1965: 33). This is because in a

small group the members find that personal benefits or gains which they achieve from

the collective action are more than the total costs which they have made to get the

collective action done; and secondly, each individual member is better off as a result

of the collective action, even slhe has to pay a substantial amount for it. The small

groups, Olson adds, are twice blessed for collective action, in the sense that, they have

not only economic incentives, but also perhaps social incentives, that lead their

28

members to work towards the achievement of collective goods (1965: 63). Generally,

social pressure and social incentives operate only in small groups, where people have

face-to-face contact with one another. Social incentives in the form of prestige,

respect, status and social acknowledgement often induce members of a group to act

towards group- oriented action.

Olson (1965) further distinguishes between 'exclusive groups' and 'inclusive

groups'. Where the benefits from collective goods are fixed on supply, there is a

tendency on the part of the group to reduce the size of their group, because any further

addition of members in their groups lessens the personal gain of each member. This

type of collective goods are called 'exclusive collective goods' and the group which

wants to reduce its size so that individual members gain more out of the collective

good is called the 'exclusive group'. On the contrary, in case of 'inclusive collective

goods' the supply of collective good automatically expands when the group expands.

By this distinction Olson tries to prove that in the case of 'exclusive collective goods'

(as in the case of most ePRs, where the physical amounts and the benefits from the

resources are always fixed), the smaller the size of the group, the better the chance of

collective action.

Analysing the capacity of the large groups for collective action, Olson (1965)

states that there are three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups from

furthering their own interests. First, in large groups, each member receives a very

small fraction of the total group benefits. Second, as each member gets a small

fraction of the total group benefits, the incentives to act towards any group-oriented

action are very low. Third, larger the number of members in a group, greater is the

organisation costs, and thus, higher the hurdle that must be jumped before any of the

collective good that can be obtained. For these reasons, Olson concludes that, 'larger

the group, farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply of collective goods,

and very large groups normally will not, in the absence of any coercion, or separate

and outside incentives, provide themselves with even minimal amounts of collective

goods' (1965: 48).

Having considered the size of the groups, Olson develops a classification of

groups based upon their capacity to achieve collective goods. In the small size range,

29

he further distinguishes between 'privileged groups' and 'intennediate groups'. In a

privileged group, each member has an incentive to see that the collective good IS

provided, even if slhe has to bear the full burden of providing it himseltihersclf. In

such a group, there is the presumption that collective good will be provided even

without any group organisation or coordination. In contrast to 'privileged l:,'TOUps·.

'intermediate group' is a group in which no single member gets a share of the benctit

sufficient to give him an incentive to work for obtaining collective good. But as the

size of such groups are small, the action of members, i.e. whether they are working

towards group-oriented action or not, is noticed by other members clearly. Thus,

Olson states that 'in such a group collective goods may, or equally well, may not be

obtained' (196S: SO). To obtain collective goods in such a group, what is required is

some group organisation or coordination. The third type of group developed by Olson

is the 'latent group', which is generally big in size. In a 'latent group' the action of

anyone member, i.e., either to help provide the collective good or not, does not

significantly affect other members of the group; and thus, none has any reason to

react. Thus an individual in a 'latent group' cannot make a noticeable contribution to

any group effort; and since hislher non-contribution does not affect any other

members, slhe has no incentive to contribute. However, collective good in such a

group can be provided, Olson (196S) mentions, only through a 'separate' and

'selective incentive' (196S: SI). A separate and selective incentive will stimulate a

rational individual in a 'latent group' to act in a group-oriented way. The incentives

must be selective in a way that those who do not join the organisation working for the

group's interest can be treated differently from those who do. These incentives can

either be positive, in the form of inducements offered to those who act in group

interest, or negative in the form of coercion to those who fail to bear an allocated

share of the costs of the group action. Such 'latent groups', which act in the collective

interest of the group, either through positive rewards or through coercion, Olson terms

as 'mobilised latent group' (196S: SI). Olson terms large groups as 'latent', because

they have a latent power or capacity for collective action, but such potential power

should be 'mobilised' only with the help of 'selective incentives'.

Although Olson is pessimistic about the success of collective action among

rational and self-interested individuals, yet he visualises apparent instances of

collective action whenever a 'separate and selective' outside incentive is present to

30

reward those who participate In it (1965: 51). Such an incentive will normally

stimulate rational individuals to act in a group oriented way. Moving beyond Olson in

collective action theorisation, we find that the dynamics of 'positive and negative

selective incentives' have been dealt much rigorously by Pamela Oliver (1980). She

identifies two extreme cases of payoff where the dynamics of selective incentives

become much apparent. In the first extreme, cooperation by a few people yields a high

payoff to every one and additional cooperation adds little. In the second extreme,

nearly everyone must cooperate for group members to achieve high payotfs, and any

one person's cooperation adds little to the payoff unless others too cooperate. Oliver

points out that while positive incentives are highly efficient in the case of former,

negative incentives yield better results in the latter (1980: 1364).

Positive incentives in the form of rewards and prestige induce individuals to

cooperate to get the collective action done. When the incentives have joint-ness of

supply, it is useless to limit the number of people who are rewarded. But if the cost of

using the incentives rises with the numbers who receive it, the incentive provider then

does want to limit the number ofrecipients. If the size of the contributions varies, it is

more efficient to induce a few 'large' contributors to cooperate than to induce many

'small' contributors to do so (Oliver, 1980: 1366). Thus, in a collective action

situation those few who take the initiative for collective action and give leadership are

more rewarded in terms of social prestige, honour and often also economic rewards

than the others.

Unlike positive incentives, negative selective incentives are cheaper to use

when they are more successful at inducing cooperation. When nearly unanimous

cooperation is required for collective action and if some positive resource is available

as positive selective incentives, its use is effectively the same as that of a negative

incentive. This is because, a person who defects in collective action and is denied an

expected reward feels punished. In this case rewards for cooperation enjoyed by

nearly everyone in a group are frequently taken as key requisites of group

membership, and their withdrawal is likely to be viewed as punishment. Thus, in such

cases, negative incentive does not require any extra cost except prohibiting those from

positive incentive who fail to cooperate (Oliver, 1980: 1368).

31

Theorisation in collective action has been further enhanced by scholars like

Oliver et at. (1985), Oliver (1980), Marwell et al. (1988), Heckathorn (1993). Unlike

Olson, these scholars analyse the possibility of collective action in big and

heterogeneous social groups. Oliver et at. (1985) analyse the role of production

function and conclude that in a heterogeneous social group, collective action usually

depends upon the development of a 'critical mass' - that behaves differently from

typical group members. For them a 'critical mass' means 'a small segment of

population that chooses to make big contribution to collective action, while the

majority do little or nothing' (1985: 524).

Based on the nature of collective action, Oliver et at. (1985) distinguish

between decelerating and accelerating production functions and analyse the potential

of collective action in both. In the case of decelerating production function, the first

few units of resource contribution have the biggest effects on collective action and

subsequent contributions yield progressively reducing results. The marginal gains

from contributions in such cases are decreasing and thus, each additional unit of

contribution produces a smaller amount of collective goods (see also Heckathorn,

1993: 330). On the contrary, in case of accelerating production function, successive

contributions generate progressively larger payoffs; thus, each contribution makes the

next one more likely. In such cases, initial contribution of resources have only

negligible effects on the collective action, and only after long start up costs have been

made, subsequent contributions do start to make a big difference in the collective

action.

Discussing the social composition of the group involved, Oliver et al.

distinguish between two types of heterogeneity that have significant effects on the

level of collective action expected from a given group. The first is heterogeneity in

terms of interest in the collective goods and the second, heterogeneity in terms of

alternative resource available to group members. One may recall here that the first

type of heterogeneity finds a place, though less prominently, in the works of Olson

(1965). Olson mentions about 'exploitation of the great by the small' (1965: 29), by

which he means the existence of two categories of people; first, those who have a

larger interest in the collective good; and second, those whose interest, though

positive, is relatively small. Since the former are so interested, Olson argues, they will

32

provide the good themselves, regardless of the actions of the less interested parties.

The later exploits the 'great' by not contributing at all, as they know that they will get

the good anyway provided by the great. However, heterogeneity of resources has

received less attention by scholars in collective action theorisation.

Focusing on the fonns of distribution in their analysis of heterogeneity, Oliver

et al. deduce that 'if an interest group is heterogeneous, there may be some highly

interested individuals or highly resourceful people available for a 'critical mass', even

when the mean interest or resource level is low (1985: 529). This 'critical mass'

initiates collective action, gives leadership to the group and sustains it by their

contribution, even in those periods of collective action when contributions from other

members are relatively low or non-existent. Interest heterogeneity, in particular, is

significant in both the types of production function, i.e., decelerating and accelerating,

as the critical mass born out of it contributes in the later and initial parts of the two

types of production functions respectively. However, resource heterogeneity is much

more significant when production function is accelerating.

Accelerating production function is marked by two of its important features:

on the negative side, the feasibility of collective action is a central problem because

collective action starts at a period of low returns as the initial contributions do not

yield the expected results. Therefore, collective action rarely begins in such situations.

On the positive side, each contribution makes the subsequent contribution more

likely, as the results become visible gradually with each subsequent contribution.

Thus, if somehow contributions begin, collective action tends to snowball, involving

more and more contributions until the good is provided. In such situations the

resolution of collective action dilemma become highly problematic, and it solely

depends on the rare circumstances of there being a critical mass of persons whose

combination of resource and interest should be high enough to overcome the

feasibility problem (Oliver et al., 1985: 542). Resource and interest heterogeneity,

they further add, are essential to resolve a collective action dilemma, for a

homogeneous group cannot contain a critical mass. It becomes obvious that a positive

correlation between interests and resources are highly favourable for collective action;

as it increases the probability of there being a 'critical mass' - a pool of highly

interested and highly resourceful individuals willing and able to contribute in the

33

initial regions of low return and provide the collective action for the everyone. This

subset of people or - critical mass - is needed to begin collective action, give shape

to it and sustain it for longer times in any given group.

The conceptualisation of 'critical mass' referred to by Oliver et at. (\985)

needs some further discussion. Despite the fact that Oliver et al.'s (1985) conclusion

that only heterogeneous groups can provide critical mass is highly questionable, the

critical mass definitely plays a crucial role in any collective action situation. If critical

mass is to be meant a small group of individualls within a community, which initiates

collective action, gives leadership to the community and sustains it, by their

comparatively larger contribution, then homogeneous groups may too have the chance

of possessing a critical mass. Whatever may be the size and/or composition of the

group, one fact is very much clear that critical mass plays a very important role in

getting the process of collective action initiated and giving it a sustainability.

One of the important facts that Oliver et at. (1985) seems to have missed is the

possible negative side of a critical mass. It is not necessary that a critical mass or a

leadership group would always playa positive role in collective action. It may quite

equally possible that a leadership group may act towards disrupting any efforts

towards collective action. Therefore, the role of critical mass in ensuring collective

action can be seen to varying - sometimes conducive and sometimes constraining

collective action - in actual field setting. Particularly in the Indian context, where the

society is tradition bound and hierarchical in nature, the appearance of critical mass

becomes more pertinent and often problematic also. The local leaders of the village

communities, whether traditional or otherwise, playa vital role in initiating collective

action and pursuing it at the village leveL While the majority of the members of the

community remain skeptical about the future of collective action, it is the

contributions of these leaders that become crucial for it. However, it is not appropriate

to accept the theorisation on the role of 'critical mass' in its totality in the Indian

context. Though the theory explains one possible way to solve the collective action

dilemma, yet it can be criticised in several respects.

First, as we go along understanding the crucial role played by the critical mass

in collective action, it becomes apparent that the true meaning of 'collective action' is

34

lost. If the collective good can be provided by a single individual or by a few

individuals of the whole group, then how can one call the action of these individuals

and the resultant goods as collective? Even though the critical mass is acting for the

benefit of the whole group, can we call the action of this small group as 'collective',

unmindful of the actions of the whole community. An action to be called as collective

should not only involve the collective efforts of the people, but also collective time

and energy of the members of the community. But, in this analysis, the rest of the

group members remain at the receiving end, who depend upon the critical mass to get

the collective action done for them, and thus, their action remains obscured and

unexplained.

Second, as collective action depends upon a single or a few individuals, there

is always a possibility that the results of collective action may become unstable or

unsustainable. What will happen if a critical mass itself becomes less interested in

collective action? Here, one needs to analyse the source of incentives of the critical

mass. As long as the incentives for the critical mass is drawn from the benefits of the

collective action, it may be rational on their part to be interested in it. But if they have

alternative sources of incentives, i.e., if they can get the same incentives from other

sources, their interest in collective action may become highly doubtful. For example,

if the critical mass enjoys the position of leadership and the benefits, which are

accrued from it by contributing to collective action, then they can be expected to stop

their contribution at any time if they can get the same benefits without contributing

for it. Equitable returns resulting from collective action through the role of critical

mass also becomes suspect, for the critical mass may even comer the benefits.

Third, from the analysis of Oliver et al. (1985), it is not clear how the rest of

the group members react or respond to the actions of critical mass. Even though it is

expected that the critical mass will act for the benefit of the group, but there is every

possibility that the critical mass may become ideologically Fascist in their dealings

with the rest of the community in the production of collective action. If the critical

mass enjoys maximum benefit out of collective action, it may just force the rest of the

community to join with them unmindful of the fact whether they are also gaining or

not from the collective action. To put it more precisely, it is not clear from the

analysis whether the rest of the community obeys and pays respect to critical mass

35

I SEC LIBRARY, BANGALORE Ace. No ..... J.1:t ... ~Q ...

because of its authoritarian attitude or because of its beneficial action for the whole

group.

To summanse, the analysis makes a successful attempt in explaining how

collective action will be possible in a heterogeneous community and why critical mass

will emerge in such a community only. But how such critical mass becomes

successful in mobilising people, how they overcome several sources of dif1erences

and sevcral conflicting interests inside the community, how they institutionalise their

leadership over the community remains unexplored in this analysis.

1.6. Problems of Collective Action: Empirical Solutions

Notwithstanding the pessImIsm of scholarly writings on commons (e.g., Hardin,

1968) and the persistent problems of free-riding and resource degradation as a result

of overuse and congestion, there has been no dearth of instances of collective action

by local communities to manage their immediate common pool resources successfully

(see, NRC, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1991; Bromley et aI., 1992). The case

studies depicting success stories of resource management by local communities have

challenged the notion that state control and privatisation are necessarily the only

preferred solutions to avoid the situation of tragedy, which is so intrinsic to common

pool resources. Consequently, community management of common pool resources

has been acknowledged as a third solution to commons' problems by scholars ranging

from various disciplines. Based upon their study of various common pool resources,

like forests, fisheries, grazing lands and irrigation systems scholars have attempted to

generalise the conditions required for successful collective action at the community

level for local resource management.

Elinor Ostrom (1990) terms these preconditions for successful collective

action as 'design principle', by which she means' an essential element or condition

that helps to account for the success of institutions in sustaining the common pool

resources and gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators

to the rules in use' (1990: 90). Ostrom, however, emphasises that these principles are

not necessary conditions for successful resource management regimes. Yet, they

36

facilitate conditions favourable for people to come together and behave in a particular

way, which is conducive towards local management practices. As she mentions,

'these principles can affect incentives in such a way that appropriators will be willing

to commit themselves to conform to operational rules devised in systems, to monitor

each other's conformance, and to replicate the institutions across generational

boundaries' (1990: 91 ).

Most of the literatures on common poll resources engage themselves with the

factors behind the emergence of community action and its endurance in the

management of commons. A recent summary of literature by Arun Agrawal (2002)

mentions three major book-length works of Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), and Baland

and Platteau (1996). Based upon the survey of literature, Agrawal (2002) identifies

four categories of factors that playa crucial role in the emergence of local institutions

for common poll resource management: characteristics of the resource, characteristics

of the users of commons, particular institutional regimes through which resources are

managed, and the nature of relationship between users groups and external forces and

authorities. In the following paragraphs, Agrawal's (2002) categorisation is followed

to discuss the factors essential behind community action for successful commons'

management.

1.6.1. Resource Characteristics

The physical aspects of the resource concerned often make it vulnerable for

community management. Two major resource characteristics are identified that help

community to organise for resource management. They are small size of the resource

(Wade, 1988) and more elearly defined boundaries (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988).

Clearly defined boundary of a resource is the first and foremost requirement for any

kind of collective use and management of the resource. In the absence of such

boundaries the resource turns into an open access situation where every one will

prefer to maximize herlhis own benefit. Further, prohibition of other non-contributors

from accessing the benefits from the resource also becomes difficult without clearly

defined boundary. Small size of the resource is emphasised, because, for larger size of

resources it becomes difficult to set the boundaries to prohibit access of others and

avoid a 'tragedy' situation.

37

Besides the twin characteristics of small size and clearly defined boundaries,

other resource characteristics like perceived benefits from the resource to be protected

and the perceived threat to livelihood in the scarcity of the resource are also important

factors to generate collective action for common pool resource management.

Livelihood insecurity and substantial risks of crop loss due to lack or irregular supply

of water, fodder unavailability in the absence of grazing land, and fuel wood scarcity

due to degradation of the local forest often provide incentives to community members

to sustain their local natural resource. To organise people into collectives to manage

local resources becomes easier 'when they feel their interests threatened than when

they wish to further interests they do not have' (Wade, 1988: 192). Resource scarcity

and high risk have been pointed out by scholars like Wade (1988) and Thomson et al.

(1992) as the roots for organised action in the villages for sustaining local resource.

Contrary to this, Varughese and Ostrom (200 I) from their study of 18 villages in

middle hills of Nepal find that the level of collective activity is strongly associated

with good resource conditions. In their studied locations, high level of collective

activity related to forest management is seen in a majority of the cases (83 %) where

forests are in an improving condition and subsequently, in majority of the cases (86

%) where forests are found to be deteriorating, the local community undertook little or

no collective activity (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001: 756).

From his study of several dry and wet villages of South India, Wade (1988)

concludes that delibcrately concerted action for resources management arises, first,

'when the net material benefits to be provided to all or most cultivators are high -

when without it all or most cultivators would face continual collision and substantial

risk of crop loss'; and second, 'that such unificd action is very likely when these risks

are high' (1988: 186). Varughese and Ostrom also mention that 'until modest levels of

scarcity are apparent to the users, little efforts will be invested in trying to change

local institutions' (2001: 748).

Kartar Singh (1994), from his study of a water cooperative society (Mohini

Water Cooperative Society) in Gujarat, emphasises on factors like, high private

benefits from the resource, which should be timely and assured, equitable distribution

of the benefits from the resource, for generating collective action for water resource

management. 'Water users' cooperatives can be organised and sustained', Singh

38

(1994: 201) states, 'only when each of the water users perceives his private benefits

from membership of the society to be substantially higher than his perceived private

costs of membership'. A predictable benefit from the resource to be conserved and a

clear understanding of such benefit often helps in collective action. 'A resource flow

that is highly predictable is much easier to understand and manage than one that is

erratic' (Ostrom, 1999: 5).

Blomquist et al. (l994) emphasise on two physical features of the resource,

I.e., 'stationarity' and . storage' , which have significant impact on its local

management. Stationarity refers to whether a resource is mobile and storage is related

to the extent to which it is possible to 'collect and hold the resources' (1994: 309). For

many common pool resource, such as fisheries, wildlife, water resource, etc., which

share these two characteristics, greater mobility and difficulties in storage often make

it more difficult for users to design institutions for their local management. Mobility

of the resource and difficulties in storage poses problems like 'their reliability and

high costs of information', which comes in the way of institutional solutions needed

for their collective management (Agrawal, 2002: 56).

1.6.2. Characteristics of the Community

Like the physical characteristics of the resource, small size of the user group with

clearly defined boundary have been much emphasised by scholars for promoting

collective action for local resource management. Much of the scholars on common

pool resources have supported the claim that collective action is more successful in

small user groups and have identified small size and homogeneous group composition

as the preconditions for collective action - a theme which was very much central to

Olson's (1965) seminal work 'The Logic of Collective Action'. Olson (1965: 33)

mentions that smaller groups are better endowed to provide themselves with

collective goods than bigger groups. Such a conclusion has been supported by works

of Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996). Smaller groups with homogeneous

members are considered to be more favourable for collective action since they share

face-to-face relation and have a better chance of organising themselves.

Joshi et al. (1997) from their survey of various literature (e.g. Douglas, 1976;

Doherty and Jodha, 1979; Esman and Uphoff, 1984) state that local organisations

39

need to be small in size for greater effectiveness. They favour smallness of local

organisation because of factors like lesser domination of any particular indi\Idual/s.

lesser conflicts, more satisfaction with proportion of benefits, b'TOUP cohesion etc.

However, Rimjhim Aggarwal (2000), from her study of group managed small

wells in two villages of Mahbubnagar District in Andhra Pradesh, comes out with

differential findings concerning smallness of the group involved in collective action.

Aggarwal makes a distinction between different group activities in collective action

for irrigation management and then finds out the potentials of small groups in

fulfilling these activities. She comes out with the finding that even a small group may

not succeed in all activities of collective action. To quote Aggarwal (2000: 1494),

'there are certain activities in which mechanisms of informal cooperation work well

and others where they do not, even when the group size is small and members are

family-related'. Even members of a small and homogeneous group are likely to work

better for those activities, 'which are of a repeated nature, require low contribution,

entail low risk and require close monitoring' (Aggarwal, 2000: 1494).

Along with smallness in size, if the boundary of the community IS well

defined, then it becomes easy for the community to distinguish itself from members of

other communities and thus, protect the resource from the latter. A clearly defined

community having exclusive possession of a clearly defined resource is often

regarded as a necessary condition to establish a 'common property regime' in a

resource and to avoid an open access situation (see, Ciciacy - Wantrup and Bishop,

1975).

Baland and Platteau (1996) have much emphasised on sociological features of

a community like past experience in collective action, shared norms, presence of

strong social capital, and a strong authority structure or leadership group as

facilitating conditions for successful collective action. Wade has also supported the

conditions of past experience and strong authority structure for successful collective

action. Shared norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness are very much crucial for

collective action to begin with, since collective action 'evolves from drawing upon

such norms' (Ostrom, 2000: 149).

40

Successful past experience in collective action tends to breed further success

in collective action since 'it helps establish a reputation for cooperation that has the

effect of making other cooperative ventures easier to undertake and to sustain'

(Baland and Platteau, 1996: 325). In such a context cooperation spreads from one

domain of social life to another. Seabright (1997: 305) also puts forward similar claim

when he concludes that 'cooperation is indeed habit-forming to a degree'. Further,

'success or failure of cooperative action in the past can be expected to have a

signitlcant effect on the prospects for cooperative action in the future, by affecting the

degree of contldence or trust that individuals have in the likelihood that others will

play their part in a cooperative agreement' (1997: 304).

A good, strong and stable leadership is very much crucial for collective action.

Good leaders perform several critical functions in a collective action situation, such as

making people aware of the real challenge confronting them, convincing the members

of community about the expected benefits from collective action, mobilising people

for necessary collective efforts, ensuring impartiality and fairness in the designing and

enforcing rules for collective management, etc (Baland and Platteau, 1996: 345). In

any community action towards collective management of common pool resources,

traditional leaders do have a crucial role to play. Bardhan (1993a) mentions that

cooperative action in many rural communities have been sustained and enforced over

the years by traditional authority structure. 'While there may be ethics of sharing a

resource and its benetlt, the predominant social norm is that of an unequal patron­

client system. In such a system the powerful tend to enjoy disproportionate benetlts

from the process of cooperation enforced by the rules of the game. For this very

reason they give effective support to 'solidaristic' efforts (I 993a: 638).

The importance of leadership in successful co-management has been observed

also by Jewitt (1998) from his study of Joint Forest Management in the Jharkhand

region of Bihar. In the two villages studied, forest conservation by local people was a

success in one owing to the leadership role played by the village elite. The absence of

such traditional leadership in another has resulted in deforestation by contractors and

by local people themselves.

41

Wade's pioneering study of fanners' managed irrigation systems in Andhra

Pradesh also suggests that a strong and traditional leadership is very much crucial for

successful collective action at the community level. Wade has examined the factor

commonly associated with successful collective action and effective co-management

of natural resources, which is the leadership role played by village elites, He

identi tied the higher economic benefit from a coordinated action as the primary

incentive for the leaders to generate and sustain collective action, Since the benefits of

co-management of irrigation systems are positively related to land area, the elites

have a disproportionately greater interest in effective regulation of water resources.

This greater benefits in proportion to their landholdings motivates the elites to take

the role ofleadership, which in tum, ensures successful collective action (1988: 190).

Besides economic incentives, the personality of village elites and the general

social atmosphere prevailing in the society also affects the management outcomes in a

heterogeneous social setting. Chand (1994) in his study of two hill irrigation systems

in Himachal Pradesh describes how the leadership role played by village elite has

ensured orderly and equitable distribution of water in one irrigation system in spite of

group heterogeneity. Of the two villages he studied, he found in one no specific rules

existing for inter and intra-village distribution of water which led to a state of quasi

anarchy and frequent disputes. However, in 1960, the local 'numberdar' (village

revenue gatherer) who was also one of the local landowners, mobilised the fanners to

frame a set of nonns for water distribution. The agreement reached among the

beneficiaries was recorded as a document which contained detailed infonnation on

days and timings of water supply to each of the six villages served by the tank in the

village. On the other hand, the absence of such leadership in another village resulted

in disproportionate allocation of water. The high caste fanners had greater and

frequent access to water even though a majority of them have their fields at the tail

end of the system. The opposite is also true of the lower caste members who did not

get frequent water despite their fields being located nearer to the channels.

The nature of leadership, traditional or otherwise, has been the main focus to

examine its role in successful co-management of natural resources. However, when it

comes to emphasising 'traditional' background of leadership, some scholars tend to

exaggerate its role, often underplaying the role of self-interest. For instance,

42

Jayraman's study of fanners' managed irrigation systems in two Gujrat villages show

how co-management was possible through etlective leadership by traditional

authorities. The leadership came from traditionally land owning and self-cultivating

class of Pate/so The past record of service to the village in the traditional caste

structure naturally helped the leaders to assume stewardship in irrigation

infrastructure maintenance. The villagers too seemed to have relied upon them. It is,

thus argued, the leadership in local resource management led by the traditional

leadership (made up of upper strata of community) was interested in the natural

resource not merely because they were rich, but also due to their traditionally held

leadership positions (Jayraman, 1981: A-97). Such an assertion makes one to believe

that the rich and upper strata of the community had no other incentive than merely a

traditional obligation or commitment to manage the local resource. Their economic

stakes thus got underplayed in the analysis. One may recall here Baland and Platteau

who observe that "the elites from the upper strata behave like good patrons and ensure

a situation in which a relatively egalitarian access to resources is guarantied to

everyone in the village, especially so if they are essential for survival of the lower

strata" (1996: 310).

Despite the fact that traditional leadership structure may offer considerable

advantages for collective action since they carry high social prestige and an authority

over the rest of the community, Baland and Platteau state that they (traditional

leaders) did not always possess all the required qualities to face the changing

circumstances of present day resource management regimes. Instead they propose,

'collective action is probably more satisfactory when it is led by relatively young,

literate persons who have been exposed to the outside world and who can find some

way of collaborating with traditional structures of authority and leadership (1996:

325).

1.6.3, Interaction Between Resource and Community Characteristics

The characteristics of the resource in combination with the characteristics of

community often generate certain conditions, which have significant potentials to

affect collective action. The much accepted resource characteristics of smallness in

size and well-defined boundaries may become problematic when the benefits out of

the resource as well as the community depending upon it are fluctuating and unstable.

43

In such a situation the size of the resource and its boundary must be flexible enough to

accommodate the increasing demands from the group and variations in benefits out of

the resource (Agrawal, 2002, McCarthey et al., 1999). Thus, instead of accepting

small resource systems with clearly defined boundaries as preconditions for collective

action, Agrawal (2002: 64) proposes that 'size and boundary of the resource system

should vary with group size and flow of benefits respective(v, and for larger resources,

authority relations within a group should be organised in a nested fashion (emphasis

added).

Based on the location of the community and the resource concerned both

Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996) argue that 'greater the overlap between

location of the common pool resource and the residence of the users, greater is the

chance of success in collective action. With residential proximity, it becomes easy for

resource users to notice any sort of free-riding and to monitor the violation of

designed rules. Chhetri and Pande (1992) from their study of forest user groups in

western Nepal state that people who live in a distance from the forest show less

interest in involving themselves in protection and management (cited in Varughese

and Ostrom, 2001: 753). However, Varughese and Ostrom (2001) from their study of

18 forest users villages in middle hills of Nepal come out with the conclusion that

locational differentials did not have any positive relation with organisation of

collective action. User groups staying at a distance from the resource had also shown

greater degree of collective behaviour for protection and management of forests in

Nepal (2001: 757).

Wade (1988: 215) has pointed out that if the users have a greater demand for

the resource and if the resource is vital for th" survival for the users then there is a

greater chance of collective action for resource management. However, Baland and

Platteau (1996: 344) have stressed that 'if the users are hard pressed by their survival

constraints and if the rehabilitation of the common pool resource entails a long

gestation period, then the immediate economic gains may come in way of protecting

the resource'. Agrawal (2002) also opines in favour of low levels of user demand for

successful collective action and sustainable resource management.

44

1.6.4. Institutional Arrangements

Before discussing further on what kind of institutional arrangements are favourable

for community action for local resource management, it is apt to have a clear

understanding of what institution means in the context of common pool resource and

how it has been conceptualised by scholars.

A study of institutions, in the context of CPR, focuses on the laws and

conventions of community that either directly allocate resources, or establish

processes and constraints for its members to make allocative decisions.

Notwithstanding the casual use of the term "institution' in our day-to-day life, it is

mostly used in reference to rules, regulation, and prescriptions to behave in a certain

way. It is often defined as rules about behaviour, 'especially about making decisions'

(Rinker, 1982: 4) and about 'individual expression and choice' (Pllott, 1979: 156).

However, focusing only on the term 'rules' does not serve the purpose of defining

institutions properly. In her attempt to define 'institutions', Ostrom distinguishes rules

from physical and behavioural laws and discusses the prescriptive nature of rules,

which refers to 'actions that are required, prohibited or permitted; and are commonly

known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent

relationships' (l986b: 5). The prescriptive nature of rules becomes visible from the

fact that people who foHow certain rules always know and internalise that if they

violate rules, other individuals will hold them accountable for that.

There has been considerable disagreement by scholars over the nature of rules.

Scholars like Ganz (1971) and Shimanoff (1980) limit the scope of prescriptive rules

to only 'obligation' and 'prohibition'; while on the contrary, V. Ostrom (1980) and

Commons (:957) include "permission' in their conception of rules (cited in Ostrom,

1986b). Such limitation of the scope of rules by these scholars, whether 'prohibition

or permission', arises from their very way of defining rules as prescribing a particular

action to be done. Instead, Ostrom considers rules as providing a set of outcomes or

actions, which they do in three ways: first, by forbidding certain action; second, by

permitting certain actions or outcomes; and third, by requiring a particular action or

outcome. The third type of rules expects individuals to perform a particular action and

is less used in everyday Iiie.

45

Ostrom defines institutions as 'a set of working rules that are used to

determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed

or constrained, what aggregation of rules will be used, what procedure must be

followed, what information must or must not be provided, what payoff will be

assigned to individuals dependent on their actions' (Ostrom, 1990: 51). For Ostrom,

working rules may not necessarily represent, be a part of, or be backed by formal laws

that are designed by legislative regulations. However, this should not lead one to

conclude that working rules are always formed beyond the purview of formal laws.

Formal laws are important sources of working rules among several others4. When

formal laws are known to all the participants; actively enforced and its violations are

monitored, coercing those who violate them, they become working rules (Ostrom,

2001: 167 - 8). Thus, common knowledge, enforcement and monitoring are three

important features of working rules or institutions5.

North (1991) defines institutions as humanly devised systems that structure the

interaction of its members in social, economic and political arenas. As an organised

and well-detlned system, it constraints some behaviours and favours or facilitates

others. It enforces sanctions negatively in the form of punishments when, its

prescribed set of rules is violated, and positively in the form of rewards when such

rules are complied. Institutions exist both as formal entities through constitutions,

laws and well-detlned property rights; and as informal agents through customs,

traditions, norms, codes of conduct, social taboos etc.

Bromley (1989: 42) detlnes institutions in terns of 'conventions' and

'entitlements'. For Bromley, conventions are regularities in human behaviour, which

everyone prefers to comply on the expectation that all others will also GO the same.

Thus, conventions are structured set of expectations about behaviour, and of actual

behaviour, which evolve out of shared and dominant preferences for the ultimate

4 On certain occasions differences between formal laws and working rules arise. In such situations, working rules may provide de /aclo rights over a resource that are contrary to de jure rights provided by formal laws. The whole discourse of legal pluralism addresses these issues (see, Pradhan e/ al .. , 1997; Bruns and Menzen-Dick, 2000; Merry, 1988). However, Ostrom concentrates only on de/aclo rights that are actually used in CPR settings.

5 In fact, prior to Ostrom, Commons (1957) used the term 'rules in use' or 'working rules', which are those actually used, monitored and enforced when individuals make choices of taking certain actions.

4()

outcome'. Entitlements are 'socially recognised and sanctioned set of expectations for

everyone in society, which define the choice sets of individuals with respect to the

choice sets of others'. While driving motor vehicles on a particular side of the road

may be cited as an example of conventions, the concept of ownership of an object for

that of entitlement (see Challen, 2000: 14).

Institutions, thus, toml the basis for human interaction and relationship among

indiyiduals a within society, consisting of both formal and infonnal entities. They

provide a set of rules tor cooperation and competition and thereby adjust conflicting

claims of ditTerent members of community and of groups tor scarce resources.

For sustainable management of local common pool resources the rules for

access and use of the resource should be locally devised and should be simple and

easy to be understood by the community members (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Wade,

1988; Ostrom. 1990). [n locally devised rules, it becomes easier to accommodate the

changing circumstances and varying demands from the community. Besides,

participation of all the appropriators in designing and modifying the rules that would

affect their status of resource use is also important for sustainable resource

management.

Mere presence of good rules to regulate access and use of the resource,

however, does not entail sustainability of the resource system. The rules must be

complied by all the appropriators and there should be effective monitoring system to

regulate rule violation and free-riding. Ostrom (1990: 94) mentions that the monitors

who audit the appropriators' behaviour and resource systems to avoid free-riding

'should either be appropriators themselves or should be accountable to the

appropriators'. [n case of any deviant behaviour in complying the rules, there should

be 'graduated sanctions' to punish those who violate the rules (Wade, 1988 and

Ostrom, 1990). 'Loss of reputation' also functions as a t,'Taduated sanction in case of

monitoring any rule violation (Wade, 1988: 193).

Wade (1988:2 I 6) points out that easy 'noticeability' of the rule-breaking as a

facilitating condition for successful collective action. [f the violation of rules is easily

noticed by the appropriators or monitors of common pool resources, the chances of

47

success tn collective action for sustainable resource management is higher. Easy

noticeabilty is related to other variables like size of a resource system, locational

distance of the community from the resource to be protected and size of the

community. Larger size of the resource, greater distance from the resource to be

protected and bigger size of the community often makes the job of noticing rule

violation difficult.

Resolution of conflicts that arise in the process of resource management is

very much central to commons management. Ostrom (1990: 100) mentions that

appropriators of a resource system should have access to 'low cost adjudication

mechanisms to resolve the conflicts among the appropriators or between appropriators

and officials'.

1.6.5. External Factors

Despite the fact that community based collective action is very much central to

sustainable management of common property, external factors often influence the

collective action significantly. Both Ostrom (1990) and Wade (1988) strongly argue

in favour of minimal intervention from State in community's efforts towards self­

governance of common pool resources. In most commons situations, the appropriators

design locally devised rules and form local organisations, which are very much

informal in nature and lack the backup of any legal sanctions. In such a situation, if

the state starts challenging or undermining the rights and authorities of the

appropriators to organise themselves for the management of the resource - which the

state considers of its own - then it becomes difficult on the part of the local resource

users to sustain the common for a longer period.

However, Baland and Platteau (1996) argue in favour of a strong and positive

role of the state in terms of financial aid, external assistance, subsidy, etc. Since

rehabilitation of some of the common pool resources are long term affairs,

conservation of these resources may come in the way of livelihood of the rural poor.

In such circumstances, external assistance or subsidies play a crucial role. 10dha

(1992: 46 - 8) mentions that in the absence of special economic incentives to the rural

poor from the state, 'they tend to adopt measures manifesting a high degree of

desperation, i.e., premature harvesting of commons products, increased frequency and

48

un seasonal lopping of tress, overcrowding of the commons, and the use of inferior

products that are possibly health-damaging' (cited in Baland and Platteau, 1996: 293).

Baland and Platteau conclude that even the rural populace are aware of the recent

conditions of resource depletion and degradation, they may not likely to participate in

conservation efforts 'if they do not receive external assistance to tide over the critical

period during which they must build up their resources to a steady-state level where it

can be optimally maintained (1996: 295).

From a study of 104 peasant cooperative institutions in Paraguay, Molinas

(1998: 421 - 2) concludes that external assistance often attempt to enhance the

prospects for successful cooperation by providing economic incentives to cooperation,

assisting in detection of defectors, educating local agents about their mutual

dependencies and providing organisational training'. However, Molinas (1998) also

warns of external assistance by highlighting some of its negative impacts arrived at by

other scholars. External intervention in community activities in the form of assistance,

Molinas mentions, 'may affect the local level cooperation since it can: a) exacerbate

asymmetries of interest and endowments among community members increasing the

levels of conflicts among them (Lam, 1994), b) crowd out informal networks (Evans,

1996), and c) destroy the conditions for associational autonomy that might help

organisational development' (Heller, 1996) (cited in Molinas, 1998: 416).

Agrawal (2002) emphasises 'articulation with market' as an important factor

affecting the chances of success of local level collective action for commons

management. A higher degree of market integration into the lives of local people

often makes the chances of organisation for collective outcomes at the local level

difficult. With better access to markets, which, in tum, brings with it cash exchanges,

the subsistence users tend to overuse and increase their rate of harvest from the

common pool resource in order to get higher profits from the market (Carrier, 1987;

Colchester, 1994 and Stocks, 1987 cited in Agrawal, 2002: 56 - 7). Such a process

makes the subsistence users as well as their use of the common pool resource market­

oriented and thus, increases their demand, which the resource system may not be able

to provide.

49

Besides a higher economic return, market integration also affects local lc\cl

collective action by 'introducing new ways for resolving the risks that common

property institutions are designed to address' (Agrawal, 2002: 57). Common pool

resources are highly valued by local people since it addresses to a b'Teater extent the

problems like scarcity and risk in rural communities. However, with markct

penetration into rural communities such problems of scarcity and risk are taken carc

by the market with its mechanism of 'surplus exchange'. Since different people of thc

same community gain differently from market exchange, the existing incentivc

structure of the community members towards protecting common pool resources also

faces a change. The process of market integration also affects the local level collective

action by affecting the local power relations in the changing circumstances

(Fernandes el al., 1988; Jessup and Peluso, 1986; Peluso, 1992 cited in Agrawal,

2002: 57).

50

CHAPTER II

Dissecting the Community:

Search for Impeccable Characteristics for Collective Action

2.1. Community in Conservation and Management

The tenn 'community', in the last couple of decades, has emerged as a panacea to the

problems of under-development and natural resource degradation in the third world

countries; and has, thus, occupied the centre stage in policies promoting

'development', 'democratisation' and 'conservation'. A complete array of factors

have joined together to make community attractive to the policy makers, and bestow

on it the status that it enjoys today in the policy arena. A strong disillusionment with

the perfonnances of the state in delivering the fruits of development to the people,

coupled with market imperfections in distributing rewards equitably, are a few among

several other reasons that have resulted in looking forward to the communities for

solutions. Therefore, academicians, policy makers and development practitioners are

now of the opinion that resorting back to communities along with an increased

emphasis on popular local participation can help achieving broader goals, which,

otherwise, would have been difficult to achieve. However, a historical perspective on

the role of community in the policy arena may suggest otherwise. Traditionally,

communities have been out of place in developmental debate and did not enjoy the

kind of attention that now they seem to enjoy. The marginalisation of community in

almost all spheres of policy activities notwithstanding, in the following paragraphs, I

concentrate on the ore-emergence of community' in conservation and management of

local natural resources. Before that, it is apt to engage in a general understanding of

the history of the community in Indian developmental experience

2.1.1. Back to the Community

I have used the word ore-emergence' of communities, keeping in mind that

'panchayats', 'village republics' or governing councils of village elders have been in

existence, in some fonn or the other, since ancient times. These councils, sometimes

in the fonn of caste panchayats, have been responsible for managing the overall

51

affairs of the village communities. During the period prior to the British Conquest,

there have been instances of forests being owned and managed by self-sufficient

village communities with traditional practices and indigenous knowledge, though de

jure ownership of the forests were in the hands of the king, which resulted in the

effective conservation of Indian forests through religious sanctions and social

regulations (see, Guha, 1983; 1989). Many traditional Indian scriptures, including

Manusmriti. Kautilya's Arthasashtra. and the two great epics of Ramayalla and

Mahabharata. speak of the existence of such village level organisations to cater to the

needs of rural communities. The reliability of such traditional and religious scriptures

has been debated and has been modified by contemporary historians (see, Stein, 1980;

Thapar, 1984).

Perhaps the first modem attempt to note down the characteristics of village

communities was by Sir Charles Metcalfe, a nineteenth century British official, who

wrote about the village communities as 'little republics having nearly everything they

want within themselves and almost independent of foreign relations. They seem to

last where nothing else lasts' (Metcalfe, 1830: 331 - 32; cited in Vasavada et al.,

1999: 153). Despite the impression sounding to be extreme, it no doubt proves the

existence of independent community organisations at the village level during the pre­

colonial period. Nehru's (1946) masterpiece, The Discovery of India. also makes a

reference to such independent village panchayats in the traditional India. The

existence of such village level organisations notwithstanding, scholars have opined

that 'they have been progressively undermined by the introduction of British legal

system, by British method of revenue collection and, outside the northern and parts of

central India, by the introduction ofzamindari and ryotwari land tenure systems' (see,

Vasavadaetal., 1999: 154).

During the time of independence, when the importance of communities had

already been relegated to a comer, India had two alternative models of development

and reconstruction: the Gandhian model of reviving the village economy as the basis

of development, and the Nehruvian model of development through rapid

industrialisation. While Gandhi visualised the village community to be the core of

developmental programmes and a platform from where to begin the process of

development of the nation, it was lawaharlal Nehru who envisioned a modem India

52

with rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. On 5th October 1945, Gandhi wrote a

letter to Nehru in which he outlined his dream of free India:

I believe that, if India is to attain tnle freedom, and through India the world as well, then sooner or later we will have to live in villages - in huts, not in palaces. A few billion people can never live happily and peacefully in cities and palaces ... my village exists today in my imagination ... Men and women in this imagined village will live freely, he prepared to face the world. The village will not know cholera, plague or smallpox. After all this, I can think of many things, which will have to be produced on large scale. May be there will be railways, so also post and telegraph. What it will have and what it will not, I do not know. Nor do I care. If I can maintain the essence. the rest will mean free facility to come and settle. And if / leave the essence, I leave everything ... (cited in Baviskar, 1995: 20).

Despite Gandhi's emphasis on returning back to communities as the centre

stage of development and progress, his ideas were discarded in independent India,

mostly by the ideas of nationalist leaders, such as Nehru, Patel and others. Nehru's

extraordinary reliance on industrial progress and new scienticism - partly influenced

by the West and above all by his exposure to a wider worldview - did not take into

consideration Gandhi's idea of self-reliance village communities. Responding to

Gandhi's letter he wrote:

It is many years since I read Hind Swarai and I have only a vague picture in my mind ... A village, normally speaking, is backward intellectually, culturally and no progress can be made from a bacbvard environment ... (cited in Baviskar, 1995. 21).

The then nationalist leaders and development planners believed that through

rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, and through creation of a strong nation state,

India could catch up with the West. It was believed that developmental outcomes

achieved through rapid industrialisation would trickle down to village communities,

and economic growth would automatically bring about socio-political development of

the Indian masses. In the process, the 'community' was further sidelined and the idea

of nationalism and national interest swayed over the interests of the community. The

reflection to it was visible in almost all sectors of development, more prominent being

in the natural resources, with nationalisation of forests, creation of reserved and

protected areas undermining the needs and requirements of the communities.

Communities were kept out of planning and management of natural resources, and

remained at the receiving end of government policies, which were so much state­

centric in nature.

53

The relegation of the notion of community was further supported with the

advancement of new sociological theories of social change and development. The

sociologists of 19th and early 20lh century, such as Sir Henry Maine, Auguste Comte,

Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tonnies, Karl Marx and Max Weber

tried to capture the ongoing changes that were happening during their period as

disappearance of communities and its replacement by a new form of social

organisation, which was more individualistic, impersonal and heterogeneous in

nature.6

These theorists described that members of the society of their time came to

relate each other in completely different terms than that of past. In this newer form of

interaction and society, 'status, tradition and religion gave way to equality, modernity

and a scientific temper' (Agrawal, 1999). The differential treatment to the processes

of change in the writings of these scholars notwithstanding, a factor, which was

common to all, was that the modem society was fundamentally different from

anything that had come before, and in this modem society there has been a decline in

the local forms of social organisation, namely, the community.

The modernisation theorists of mid 20lh century out-rightly rejected the notion

of the community and pitted it against marketisation, industrialisation and economic

growth. J The modernisation theorists visualised particularistic affiliation to religion,

traditions, and ethnicity as impediments to modernisation and economic development

and openly argued against community, which clung to such factors. Most importantly,

they saw the cultural, institutional and organisational features of poorer countries,

which revolved around community feelings, as roadblocks in their attempts to develop

and democratise (Roberts and Hite, 2000: 8 -9). Community was visualised as a

potential obstacle to modernity, growth and development, which were considered as

very much desirable. The effective way to modernise, grow and develop was,

therefore, visualised through eroding and/or doing away with the feelings and ties that

community encouraged.

6 For a detailed understanding of these theories see Aron, 1970; Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Roberts and Hite, 2000; Giddens, 1992. To understand the shifting position of the community in these theories of change and evolution, see, Agrawal, 1999, and Agrawal and Gibson, 1999.

7 See Huntington, 1971; Inkeles, 1969; Lerner, 1958; Rostow, 1971; McClelland, 1961 and Hoselitz, 1964 for a better understanding of the modernisation theory.

54

Drawing insights from some of these theories and OWIng to our own

developmental experience of first few years of independence, the concept

'community' became out of fashion from the lexicon of development and

conservation. With the adoption of Nehruvian economy of rapid economic growth

with large-scale industrialisation, people-based development lost its focus and

significance, and development became a state prerogative. Although the nced for

development of rural communities was acknowledged, it became the responsibility of

the state to deliver the fruits of development to the rural communities through top­

down models of development. Thus, the engines to rural development such as

Panchayati Raj, Community Development Programmes, etc., all came under the direct

control of the state mechanism.

However, the situation began to change in the 1970s, when criticisms started

pouring against the dominant paradigms of mainstream development. 8 Disillusioned

by the developmental experience of previous two to two and half decades,

academicians and development practitioners became critical towards GNP-focused,

growth-centred development. The dismal results of state-centred development

coupled with the increasing cost to deliver development, forced the policy makers to

move towards a new approach to development, an approach, which visualiscd

people's participation, equity and sustainability to be the centre-stage of development

process. With such a changing approach to development, the community again

reemerged as the core of development and began taking the responsibility of

conservIng natural resources in its vicinity and empowering its members through

greater decentralisation.

Having gained a perspective on the historical reemergence of community, in

general, I now move forward to discuss how the community has been perceived in the

conservation and management of natural resources.

8 Fore a critique of mainstream development and the search for an alternative paradigm, see, Dube, 1988; Haq, 1976. The underdevelopment theories also pose a structural critique to modernised approach to development. For details, see, Santos, 1969; Baran, 1962; Frank, 1971.

55

2.1.2. Community in Conservation

The history of community in conservation, like in development, is also a revivalist

one. Prior to independence, it was the responsibility of the village communities to

look after their village tanks for irrigation and drinking water, forests for food, fodder

and fuel wood, village pasture land for common grazing, etc. The village communities

had autonomous institutions in this regard. However, with the passage of time such

institutions became defunct and as a result, the resources started degrading.

With the coming up of British Raj in India, the colonial administration tried to

consolidate the state power, and as a repercussion monopolised the natural resources

of the country.9 The colonial attitude to monopolise the natural resources was more

visible in the forestry sector. With the introduction of scientific forestry and

reservation of forest blocks, the communities became outsiders to resource

management, which became the sole responsibility of the colonial state. The

marginalised status of community could not see a positive attitude even after

independence. The policy of centralisation and monopolization of natural resources,

which was in vogue during the British Raj, was reinforced, intensified and extended

even after independence. The legal successor to the colonial state - the political and

economic elites of modem independent India - continued to rely on earlier colonial

legal usurpation of India's natural resources and reinforced the rights of the state to

exclusive control over such resources.

At the policy level also the scholarly writings concemmg conservation of

natural resources perceived communities as a threat to protection of precious natural

resources (see Hardin, 1968; Eckholm, 1976). It was perceived that conservation of

natural resources require their protection from human interference, whereas members

of local communities depend upon them for their daily livelihood and thus exploit

them without any restraint (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 631). Further, Hardin's (1968)

seminal work, The Tragedy oj' the Commons, theoretically proved that human

interference into natural resources would ultimately result in degradation of the

resource. Hardin's thesis concluded that co-users of a common pool natural resource

are trapped in a situation in which, in the absence of any regulated access to the

9 For an understanding of the ecological history of Indian and the colonial treatment to India's forests, see, Guha, 1989; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Grove, 1998.

56

resource, each rational user is motivated to consume/use more and more units of the

resource system till the resource is completely degraded. Thus, collective and

unregulated use of the resource would finally lead to its overuse and degradation, and

individual rationality of each user would not favour any coordinated action to regulate

the use of the resource. Such being the inherent problem, the solution, which was put

forth by Hardin and many other scholars, (Demsetz, 1967; Smith, 1981; Ophuls,

1973; Hardin, 1978) was either to nationalise or privatise the resource, wherever

feasible.

In either of the solutions to the problems of natural resources, the community

couldn't find a place for itself in the conservation activities of natural resources. It

should be pointed out, however, that while designing such solutions to the problems

of overuse and degradation of natural resources, the scholars had only in mind the

physical sustainability of the resource, undermining the needs and requirements of the

local population, who depended upon such resources for substantial part of their

livelihood. The scholars and policy makers arguing for nationalisation and/or

privatisation of natural resources failed to perceive the sheer presence of human

population inside the natural resources arena and the intrinsic relation between rural

communities and their immediate resource base. However, an one-sided approach to

the problem of natural resources couldn't succeed in conserving the natural resources.

Later studies on the effect of nationalisation of resource base made it clear that

nationalisation converted the common pool resource to a de jure state property, while

in reality degenerating it into de facto open access regime (Arnold, 1998; Arnold and

Stewart, 1991). The heavy hand of the state in monopolising and centralising the

natural resources in India, say forests, always coexisted, paradoxically, with

degradation of India's forest resources. Even though, the problem of deforestation has

been controlled to some extent, the real problem in India's forests has always

remained with 'degradation' of the quality of forests (Kumar et al., 1999).

The persistent degradation of India's natural resources despite strong policies

of centralisation and state control, in the last couple of decades, has questioned the

very premise of state's policies towards natural resource conservation. The

disillusionment with regard to the state-centred development, it is being perceived

now has also included in it dismal results of state-centred natural resource ,

57

management. The failure of the state-centric approach has proved that very few

alternatives other than community-based approach exist (see, Wells and Brandon,

1992; Gibson and Marks, 1995).

Besides the state-failure in conserving natural resources, despite strong

policies of centralisation, there are various other factors, which have contributed to

the reemergence of the community in conservation activities. Broadly speaking four

factors may be identified, that have compelled the policy makers to look upon the

community as the starting point of conservation.

First, failures of the prevIOus two and half developmental decades (1950s,

1960s and up to mid 1970s) have already made it clear in the early 1980s the

limitations of the state. It has been affirmed that the state is not the only agency for

development of the local people, and debates about the potentials of the community

have already begun. This, coupled with limitations of state in conserving natural

resources alone, again strengthened the positions of the community as potential

partners in the process of development and conservation.

Secondly, with the spread of popular democracy and decentralisation, and

above all with increasing demand on people's participation, the unrepresentative

policies of conservation came into criticism (see Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). The

reflections of policy changes at the larger level for deepening democracy, widening

development up to the grass-root level and empowering the indigenous population

also became visible in the natural resource sector. Empowering the local people and

accelerating their development process and allowing them a greater say in the policies

that affected their livelihood were perceived only through uplifting 'communities' and

giving them a share in natural resource conservation.

Thirdly, evolution of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) as an

intermediary in development, which relied more on community than state, also

contributed to the changing status of the community in the conservation debate today.

The efforts of the NGOs to amplify the voices of the local indigcnous population, and

build their capacity for collective action at the local level for their own development

have also helped the community in regaining its strength and being able to conserve

58

and manage its local natural resources. Further, the flow of heavy tinancial aids from

external donor agencies, who emphasise on local knowledge and people's

participation, boosted the communities to take the lead role in conservation activities

with the help oflocal NGOs.

Finally, the scholarly writings about the ecological histories,

environmentalism and success stories of communities managing their local resources

sustainably also strengthened the position of community. Historical ecologists

emphasised the 'anthropogenic' nature of forest and the inalienable history of

environments and human population (see Denevan, 1992; Anderson and Posey,

1989). Agrawal and Gibson (I 999: 632) summarising the works of ecological

historians state that, 'new revisionist ecological research began to question the two

main planks of coercive conservation. First was that pristine environments untouched

by human hands existed until the very recent past. The second was the belief that

indigenous and other local communities had been relati vel y isolated in the past, and

therefore, used their resources sustainably'. In the tropical areas the growing presence

of human population in the forested areas made creation of wildlife areas and

conservation parks without human interference a difficult proposition. Even the

Indian environmental historians (see, Gadgil and Guha, 1995; Guha and Martinez­

Alier, 1997; Guha, 2000) have also pointed out that the peculiarity of southern

environmentalism, and Indian environmentalism in particular, lay in its inseparability

from human population. Unlike northern America, where a clear distinction between

natural landscape and human landscape exists, the Indian natural landscape has

always coexisted with human population. Under such conditions, it became clear that

any policy aiming at excluding local communities from conservation activities is

bound to be failed.

Adding to these historical writings, the current advancement of research In

common property has also glorified the capabilities of local communities In

sustainable management of its local natural resources (See Berkes, 1991; Bromley et

al., 1992; McKean, 1992; NRC, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). These works have

pointed towards community as a suitable alternative to nationalisation and

privatisation, highlighting the importance of local knowledge and local institutional

arrangements. The case studies depicting success stories of resource management by

59

local communities have challenged the notion that state control and privatisation are

necessarily the only preferred solutions to problems of natural resource management.

Consequently, community management of common pool natural resources has been

acknowledged as a third solution to commons problems by scholars from vanous

disciplines.

Recognition of the significance of community III conservation and

management activities of natural resources leaves us with a further question: do all

communities are equally capable of sustainable resource management? If returning

back to the community is the preferred solution to the problems of over-use, free­

riding and degradation of natural common pool resources, then why do some

communities succeed in collective action for sustainable management of local natural

resources and some fail in this attempt? Or, as indeed the question, what are the

characteristic features of the community that support community-based conservation?

There are several characteristics of the community, which favour collective action

like, smallness in size, strong and effective leadership, successful past record of

collective action, shared norms and reciprocity, etc., which I have already discussed in

the previous chapter. In the following section, I therefore, make an attempt to review

various scholarly works pertaining to the nature of the community - in tenns of

homogeneity and heterogeneity -and its potential for collective action at the local

level for sustainable resource management.

2.2. Community Characteristics and Sustainable Collective Action

Notwithstanding the tact that scholars on community-based common pool resource

management seem to agree on facilitating or favourable conditions for successful

collective action at the community level to sustainably manage the local commonslO

,

there still persists ambiguity regarding the relationship between the nature of the

community and successful collective action. The twin issue of 'group size' and 'social

composition' of the group in terms of homogeneity or heterogeneity form an

10 For an understanding of these factors see, Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990 and Wade, 1988. An attempt has been made in the previous chapter t to summarise these pre-conditions for successful collective action.

60

important and ambiguous explanation among several others for answenng the

question as to what are the conducive factors for successful collective action.

Scholars, while attempting to answer such questions, vary from each other, both

theoretically and otherwise, in their explanation of the role played by the nature of the

community - in terms of homogeneity and heterogeneity - in achieving success in

any attempt for collective action. Broadly speaking, there seems to be at least two

schools of thought concerning the nature of community (heterogeneous vs.

homogeneous) and its potential for collective action for sustainable management of

natural resources. The first believes that homogeneous or small communities are more

capable or even a pre-condition for collective action or co-management. The other

argues that homogeneity of the community is not a precondition, and instead

heterogeneity can even be an instrument of collective action.

2.2.1. Explaining Heterogeneity

Before going further to discuss the positive or negative role played by heterogeneity

in local level collective action, it is appropriate to conceptualise the term

heterogeneity and mention what are the different types of heterogeneity that carry the

potential to affect collective action. Baland and Platteau (1996: 303 - 12) identify

three sources of heterogeneity, which may affect the capability or the motivation of

resource users to participate in collective action:

First, heterogeneity resulting from cultural divisions such as caste, race and ethnic

identity.

Second, heterogeneity originating from inter-village variations in critical endowments

such as skills, wealth, etc.

Finally, heterogeneity arising from differential interests of users in the resource and

for collective action.

The cultural heterogeneity, arising out of caste and ethnic differentiations, may

lead to differential interpretation of norms and often prohibit any effort based on

shared norms. The second source of heterogeneity arising out of variations of critical

endowments mainly pertains to 'economic inequality' of the resource users in a

community. Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson identify several variants of economic

heterogeneity, such as a) inequality in wealth or income among the members of a

resource-user group, b) inequality in the sacrifices (contributions) community

61

members make in cooperating with commons-management regimes, c) inequalities in

the benefits they derive from such regimes, and d) inequalities In outside earning

opportunities, which increase the 'exit options' (2002: 88).

The differential interests of uses primarily arise because of their differential

use of the same resource system. Further, differential use of the resource may also

arise owing to factors like ones occupation, position in the caste hierarchy, gender etc.

Differential interests in common pool resource pose a problem to successful collective

action since it pits different users of the resource against each other. For example, the

interests of shepherds, who primarily depend upon forest for !,'Tazing their cattle, may

come in the way of the interest of the rest of the community, which advocates closure

of grazing for regeneration of the forest. In the case of water resource, Meinzen-Dick

and Jackson (1996) argue that differential use of the resource based upon gender

differentials often pitted the interests of women who needed water for cleaning and

cooking against the interests of men whose primary interest in water lay in irrigating

cash crops for increasing income.

To these sources of heterogeneity, Vedeld (2000) adds another type of

heterogeneity, i.e., 'political heterogeneity', which plays a significant role in deciding

the possibility of collective action for commons management. Political heterogeneity,

Vedeld argues, may significantly affect local efforts since it creates opportunities for

conflict among leadership groups leading ultimately to intra group rivalries.

Having discussed various types of heterogeneity, let me now tum to focus the

impact (whether positive or negative) of heterogeneity on commons management

outcomes from a review of works done by various scholars on different types of

commons.

2.2.2. Heterogeneity as a Favourable Condition

It has been pointed out earlier that scholars tend to divide into two camps in their

efforts to analyse the role of heterogeneity in collective action. The scholars who

favour heterogeneity to gain collective outcomes mostly derive their argument from

the theoretical work of Mancur Olson (1965), who stated that small groups with

62

considerable inequality have more chance of achieving collective goods. Olson (1965:

34) has explained that:

'in small groups marked by considerable degree of inequality, there is greatest likelihood that collective good will be provided, for the greater the interest ill collective good of any single members, the greater the likelihood that that member will get such a significant proportion of the total benefit from the collective good that he will gain from seeing that the good if provided, even if he has to pay all of the cost himself',

Olson's proposition suggests that heterogeneity is favourable for successful

collective action, since a heterogeneous group may possess certain members whose

interest in collective good is comparatively higher than the average members as they

gain from the collective good proportionately higher than the rest of the community I I.

Such an argument, which Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002) term as 'Olson effect'

has been further explained empirically by various scholars working in the area of

farmer-managed irrigation systems, where the local elites have taken the

responsibility of providing assured and timely irrigation water to the community, from

which they gain proportionately higher, compared to other members of the

community.

Wade's pioneering study of farmer-managed irrigation systems in Andhra

Pradesh suggests that economic inequality was not necessarily an obstacle to co­

management of resources. The South Indian villages studied by Wade are marked by

sharp inter-household differences in terms of landholding and wealth. In the

Kottapalle village, where Wade conducted his field work, holdings were typically

scattered and land owners had a plot close to an irrigation outlet and another plot

close to the tail-end of another outlet. For this reason, all land owners had a common

interest in establishing and enforcing a system of regulating access to water (1988:

185 - 90), Wade had examined, also, the leadership role played by the village elites,

a factor, which was commonly associated with successful collective action and

effective co-management of natural resources. He has found that economic inequality

II Further advancement to this argument has been done by scholars of critical mass, who argue that a heterogeneous group has more chance of success in collective action, since it possesses a 'critical mass' - a pool of highly resourceful and interested individuals·- who will provide the collective good for the rest of Ihe community (see, Heckathorn, 1993: Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Marwell et al., 1988; Oliver, 19RO and Oliver et ai., 1985),

63

provided the necessary impetus for playing a suitable leadership role. Since the

benefits of co-management of irrigation systems were positively related to land area,

the elites had a disproportionately greater interest in effective regulation of water

resources. This greater benefits in proportion to their landholdings motivated the elites

to take the role of leadership, which in tum, ensured successful collective action

(I988: 190). Similarly, Vaidyanathan (1986) has explored the historical importance of

local elites in promoting the emergence of irrigation management regimes in India,

China and Japan. 12

A few more studies have also found evidence of a non-negative role played by

heterogeneity of the community. Some of these studies are proven outside the

subcontinent. Based on his study in Mali, Vedeld concludes that small size and

homogeneous groups were not the general preconditions for greater ability to perform

collectively in stratified village society (2000: 125). Vedeld identifies five different

sources of heterogeneity, such as,

a) political heterogeneity (disagreement on the legitimacy of the leaders)

b) heterogeneity in endowment (unequal access to land and CPR)

c) heterogeneity in wealth or entitlement (large differentiation in crop production

income)

d) heterogeneity in economic interests (diversity in the type of use of CPR)

e) heterogeneity in cultures (large differences in level of education, values and life

orientation).

Out of these five sources of heterogeneity, according to Vedeld, heterogeneity

among leaders or political heterogeneity was crucial for collective action. In the two

villages studied by him, successful collective action was possible only in one due to

homogeneous leadership structure despite the presence of other sources of

heterogeneity. In the other village, the leaders were heterogeneous along most

dimensions. Thus, Vedeld has concluded that homogeneity among leadership and elite

groups enhanced the capacity for collective action in a social group even when there

was heterogeneity in other respects. Vedeld states 'a heterogeneous community is

capable of finding solutions to the collective action dilemma, as long as there is a

12 For arguments about the role of leadership in resource management, see, Chand, 1994; Jayraman, 1981 and Jewit, 1998.

64

reasonable degree of homogeneity among the leadership group' (2000: 125). He also

adds that capacity for collective action was particularly undennined or at risk when

hcterogeneity in economic interests between the elite groups intensified and coincided

with political, endowment, entitlement and cultural heterogeneity. Collective action is

enhanced by political elites and leaders being a bit better endowed (more CPRs or

lands) and a bit wealthier than the average community members, since the larger asset

owners are likely to benefit more and be willing to take on extra burdens in

maintenance and enforcing the regimes (2000: 125 - 26).

Varughese and Ostrom (200 I) from their study of 18 forest user groups in

Nepal, conclude that heterogeneity was not necessarily a strong predictor of local

level collective action. They have identified three sources of heterogeneity, i.e.

locational differential, wealth disparity and socio-cultural differentials of the forest

user groups. Out of the three sources, the first and the last source of heterogeneity

have negligible positive association with collective action, whereas wealth disparity

indicated a modest negative relation with the level of collective action. Thus,

Varughese and Ostrom argue that heterogeneity is a challenge that can be overcome

by crafting innovative institutional arrangements well matched to their local

circumstances (200 I: 762).

Ostrom and Gardner (1993), from their empirical analysis of several fanner

managed irrigation systems in Nepal, also acknowledge that asymmetries

(heterogeneities) among the participants of a common pool resource management

could present substantial barriers to equitable water distribution among head-end and

tail-end fanners. However, these asymmetries, they opine, 'are frequently overcome

in settings where fanners are made aware of their mutual dependencies' (1993: \09).

A clear perception of mutual dependency and assurance of cooperation help a

heterogeneous community to succeed in collective action dilemma. Ostrom and

Gardner (1993) mention that when the users of a resource expected to relate to one

another for a long tenn basis, such expectations of mutual dependency and assurance

of future cooperation became easy and they tended to design rules that lead to higher

yields and to a reduction in the asymmetry of results.

65

Drawing upon a survey of 104 peasant cooperative institutions in Paraguay,

Molinas (1998) has fond an inverted U shaped relationship between economic

heterogeneity and group performance for local level collective action. Molinas

mentions that 'in highly equal communities a coordination problem may arise because

nobody has a differentiated incentive to be the committee's organiser' (1998: 420). At

the same time, a high degree of inequality makes it difficult for committees to

organise effectively. Molinas has concluded that a moderate level of inequality was

related to high group performance. Contrary to this, Bardhan (2000) presents a model

of U shaped relationship between inequality and local level collective action for

harvesting in fishery. They argue that collective action can be successful either in low

or extreme high level of inequality.

2.2.3. Heterogeneity as an Impeding Condition

Several Scholars have also pointed out the negative role played by group

heterogeneity in local level collective action for commons management. Scholars who

argue in favour of negative impact of heterogeneity state that the members in a small

and homogeneous group have frequent and personalised relationships and thus,

consider the more indirect and long-term consequences of their choices instead of

immediate costs and benefits. Besides, close and face-to-face nature of these

relationships ensures that people are well informed about each other's actions and

preferences. Moreover, in small and homogeneous groups the incentives are more to

behave in a group-oriented way (Baland and Platteau, 1996: 298 - 99). Nugent (1993:

624) adds that in smaller and more closed groups the operational costs tend be lower

and the ability to observe any free riding by others would be greater.

The advocates of community based resource management, who argue for a

homogeneous community for successful resource management, thus, put forward a

conceptualisation of the community, which is territorially bounded, small sized and

homogeneous in nature. It implies that social inequality and heterogeneity of the

community structure is negatively associated with successful resource management

by the community. It is in such situations that the problem of free rider pose a severe

challenge to successful community management of local resources. The solution,

which is put forwarded, is to create homogeneous sub-groups, who have similar

interests within a larger village community. Wilson and Thompson, for example, in

66

their attempt to analyse the break down of 'ejidos' (the pastoral commons) in Mexico

argue that, "pastoral management at community level has proved a failure,

presumably owing to the excessive size of the group concerned, However, this failure

of group management, indeed, has led in a significant number of cases to the

formation of grazing- coalitions within smaller groups where cooperation is assured

and benefits are enjoyed under severe ecological conditions" (1993: 300), The most

etlcctive of these smaller grazing associations are, they claim, based upon the

extended family. In the field of irrigation too, available empirical evidence tends to

suggest that cooperation for successful management of irrigation systems work better

in relatively small groups (Bardhan, 2000: 851). Coward, likewise, points out that "for

the purpose of irrigation organisations the critical unit is the 'irrigation community',

composed of field neighbours, and not the village community composed of residential

neighbours" (Coward, 1980: 208; cited in Wade, 1988: 214). Dayton-Johnson (1999)

conducted a study in 49 community managed irrigation systems known as 'unidades

de riego' in the central Mexican state of Guanajuato. His study concludes that social

heterogeneity is consistently and significantly associated with lower levels of

infrastructure maintenance. Inequality in landholding has also a negative effect on

maintenance. From his study of 22 community irrigation systems in several countries,

Tang (1991) has reached the conclusion that even a slight variance in family income

among irrigators tended to be associated with variation in the extent to which rule

conformance and good maintenance occurred among the members.

Evidence found elsewhere is valid in Indian sub-continent as well as in regard

to the nature and size of the community and the success or otherwise of community

management of resources. Easter and Palanisami (1986) from their study of tank

irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu confirm that egalitarian social structure and uniform

land holding pattern encouraged collective action. The smaller the variation in farm

size, the I,Tfeater the likelihood that farmers would participate in decision making and

in the formation of Water Users' Association. Farmers believed that they would get

more or less equal benefits and had equal influence on the allocation of water

supplies. Likewise, Jayaraman (1981) notes in a study of surface water irrigation

projects in Gujarat, that relatively egalitarian structure of the community denoted by

size of the landholding and similar interests of members were significant factors

influencing the farmers' coming together to form Water Users' Association.

67

Some other scholars argue some degree of cultural homogeneity, in terms of

common set of beliefs and shared norms, is quite conducive for collective action;

since it substantially reduces the cost of negotiation and monitoring (Aggarwal,

2000). Shared norms are given priority in collective action, as they tend to combine

the user groups, even if they are diversified in several other aspects. Shared norms, in

a context of collective action for commons management, form the basis of binding

agreements (see Bardhan, 1993b; Ullman-Margailt, 1978).

Quiggin (1993), in his paper on 'Common Property, Equity and Development',

also argues the negative role played by group heterogeneity in arriving at a common

decision for common property management. He argues that collective decision­

making process required for CPR management would work 'if the group of common

property owners is relatively homogeneous' (Quiggin, 1993: 1130). Contrarily,

diversity with respect to income or in other dimensions limits the likelihood of

emergence of a generally accepted pattern of resource use. John Quiggin particularly

stresses that 'equality in endowments is essential to the successful management of

common property institutions' (1993: 1129; also see Quiggin, 1988). One of the

negative impacts of endowment heterogeneity, which Quiggin mentions, is that

households with better endowments of land, labour and capital would be at an

advantageous position to comer or exploit the benefits of collective action, and

therefore, would receive a higher economic return. Platteau and Abraham (2002) also

point out such capture of a larger share of benefits from any coordinated action or . h . 13 developmental probJfamme III a eterogeneous commumty.

Perhaps, one of the systematic attempts to study the role of heterogeneity and

inequality of income distribution in cooperative behaviour for common property

management is by Ravi Kanbur (1992). Kanbur makes his argument by a review of

Jl The elites' capture of larger share of benefits from any developmental projects has been recognised now as the major dilemmas of decentralised development, where communities are traditional, hierarchical and heterogeneous in several aspects. Access to critical endowments like land, education and political positions puts the rural elites in a commanding position to take the leadership role on behalf of the community and, thereby, procure more benefits than average members of the community from any developmental project. For such elites' capture in decentralised development, see, Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999,2000; and Platteau and Abraham, 2002.

68

vanous scholarly works on common property, which includes works by Alexander

(1982), Cordell and McKean (1986), Coward (1979), Hariis (1977), Johnson and

Libecap (1982), Ostrom (1990), Schlager (1990), Tang (1992) and Wade (1986).

Based on a review of the work of above scholars, Kanbur concludes that 'greater

equity or greater homogeneity promotes greater efficiency in common property

management by facilitating the adoption of cooperative agreement' (1992: 21). He

further mentions that the existing agreements for common property management are

more likely to breakdown as the community becomes more heterogeneous.

The arguments of homogeneity versus heterogeneity and small versus big

notwithstanding, it has now been acknowledged that community plays a significant

role in conservation and management of local natural resources. Having recognised

such a claim, the question that remains is what makes a community? Or, which type

of community that the scholars of community-based natural resource management are

talking about. It seems from the arguments from advocates of community-based

conservation that a . distinct community exists', which should be made an integral part

of resource management activities. Having narrated the revival history of community

in general and its role in conservation and management of natural resources, in

particular, and having discussed the particular community characteristics that affect

- either positively or otherwise - I now move forward to discuss the nature of

community that we talk about in community-based conservation.

2.3. Images of the Community

Relatively a few concepts in social science literature have drawn the kind of attention,

as has community.14 And, in the changing circumstances of developmental discourse,

14 The communitarian-libertarian debate is very old in sociology. Unlike libertarians. who argue for greater individualism, individual liberty, individual choice, communitarians stress that individuals are not free-standmg agents, but members of the community. and give primacy to collectivity, community feeling and unselfishness and sacrificing characteristics of individuals. To understand this debate of communitarianism versus libertarianism see, Bell. 1993; Chatterjee, 1998; Phillips, 1993; and Selznick, 1992. Moving beyond this dichotomous distinction of communitarianism and libertarianism, Etzioni (1996) has coined the concept 'responsive community'. A responsive community is one, which does not always fix or set binding rules or norms for its members, but responds to the expressions of individual values. viewpoints and communications in refashioning its cultures and structure. For Etzioni. the central problem lies in the constant tension between centrifugal forces of autonomy and centripetal forces of community. Centrifugal forces lead individuals to set free and break out from community. dangerously reducing the social realm. And centripetal forces tend to collectivise the energies of members in the service of shared goals. and therefore. curb the individual freedom of

69

returning back to community has become the order of the day. However, the most

obvious notion that are juxtaposed to community in any discussion of it are 'small,

homogeneous, harmonious, territorially fixed, ascribed social units', having certain

common norms, in which there exists face to face interaction. Despite the current

writings on community-based conservation assert that community is central to

renewable resource management, they, however, seldom devote much attention to

analyse the concept of community or to explain precisely how the differential

elements of community affect the management outcomes.

Without paYIng much attention to the internal characteristics of the

community, the advocates of community-based conservation put forth the claim that

local communities have been existing in harmony with nature and thus, demonstrate

enduring patterns of sustainable, equitable and efficient use of the natural resource

(Berkes, 1991; Bromley and Cernia, 1989; Korten, 1986; McKay and Acheson, 1987).

Even the traditional, collective and inward looking characteristics of Eastern or third

world communities have been emphasised to strengthen the claim on behalf of

community. To quote Berkes and Farvar:

renewed interest in community is partly due to the new-found pride in traditional values and institutions. both in the Third World and in the West. Most cultures - certainly most of those in the Third World countries -emphasise responsibility to the community. rather than the unbridled individualism glorified in some Western industrial cultures. Communalism is an important mode of thinking and of managing resources through out the world. Fom nomads of Arabian peninsula to native Amerindian people. It is no accident that traditional resource-management systems are often community-based. .. (1991: 3-5).

Emphasising the traditional characteristics of communities, the scholars of

community-based conservation, often take resort to functionalist anthropological

approach, which envisions tradition as comprehensive set of binding rules that exists

for the welfare of the whole system (see Li, 1996). They further claim that such rules

guarantee livelihood security by providing 'access to vital natural resources, by

members (Etzioni, 1996: 304). [n such a circumstance, a responsive community tries to make a perfect balance between the two forces, resulting in the smooth functioning of the community. Also, see, Etzioni 1968 1991 for an understanding of the concept 'responsive community'. , ,

70

which, everyone in the community is assured of the opportunity to meet their basic

needs' (Berkes and Farvar, 1991: II).

Further, the advancement of research in game theory also emphasised the

small and bounded-ness characteristics of the community. Scholars focusing on

repeated games as a theoretical construct to avoid the problems of collective action

and free-riding, rely on concepts such as complete infonnation, face-to-face

interaction, trust, assurance, reciprocity, etc. which seem to present only on small,

egalitarian, homogeneous and territorially fixed communities (see Nugent, 1993;

Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick, 1995; Axelrod, 1981). Such conditions for successful

cooperation suggest that successful communities are small and homogeneous enough

to pass infonnation among its members, who interact with each other continuously on

a face-to-face basis over a longer period of time. Further, trust and reciprocity are

prone to exist in the context of small groups, primarily because, 'pre-play

communication, which is obviously easier to achieve when people are few, allows

individuals to reveal and signal their intended plans of action and to learn about

others' intentions' (Platteau and Abraham, 2002: 108).

Much of the literatures on community-based conservation emphasise upon

either cultural, - i.e., shared nonns, trust, reciprocity, face-to-face interaction - or

physical - i.e., smallness in size, territorial fixity, etc. - characteristics of the

community. Arun Agrawal sums up these two much emphasised characteristics of the

community as 'community - as - shared understanding' and/or 'community - as - social

organisation' (see, Agrawal, 1999; Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).

Such a vision of the community as small, integrated entities using locally

evolved shared nonns and rules to manage resources sustainably and equitably is

powerful. It allows for contesting the dominant views, which advocates for either

nationalisation or privatisation of natural resources. Based upon such a vision of

community, scholars in recent years, have been successful in challenging the previous

dominant notions (see Li, 1996) such as: the tragedy of the commons and the

inevitability of private property in natural resources (e.g. Berkes, 1991; Acheson,

1989; Bromley and Cernia, 1989), and the perceived ignorance of peasants and

superiority of western knowledge, science and management (e.g. Chambers, 1983).

71

However, by viewing community as a unified organic whole, such an understanding

of community fails to capture the differences within communities and ignore how

these differences affect resource management out comes. To quote Agrawal and

Gibson:

'it also fails to reflect local politics and strategic interaction within commllnities as well as the possibility of layered alliances that can span mllitiple levels of politics" (1999: 633).

In reality, however, almost all communities, including the tribal ones, are

di\ided in itself. Besides the communities being hierarchical and conflict-ridden in

nature. the individuals within it are also caught up in over lapping circles of

relationship (see Sundar and Jeffery, 1999: 37). For instance, within one village

indi\idual may have links with other caste members within and outside the village,

with political parties, religious organisations, etc. Certain factors of community - such

as caste, race, religion, gender, etc. - may act as dividing lines within community.

Several scholars have countered such mythic view of community, as it is

usually (mis)representated in community-conservation debate. Agrawal (1999) finds

such static notion of community problematic both at representational and conceptual

levels. At the representational level it gave a wrong notion of the community, 'since

actual existing communities seldom correspond to the ideal of small, hannonious,

cooperati\e social entities', which the community-conservation debate imagined of

community to be. At the conceptual level it is problematic, since it is ditlicult to draw

any direct relationship between the shared understanding of community and its

physical characteristics of 'smallness' in size (A/,Tfawal, 1999: 101).

The notion of shared understanding and face-to-face relation that the

advocates of community-based conservation portray are also criticised in several

ways. Shared understanding, unanimity, homogeneity is as much a part of community

a~ divergent opinions, differences and heterogeneity. To quote Sabean, "what matters

is not that villagers share the same views, but that they share a language in which

those views can he discussed and disa/,Tfeements can be sorted out" (Sabean, 1988: 28;

cited in Sundar and Jeffery, 1999: 37). It is the negotiation of differential opinions

among the members of community, which is important from community-based

72

conservation point of view, rather than shared understanding itself. Further, the

smallness of a community also does not ensure that its members will interact

automatically and will share a common understanding. Shared understanding always

requires negotiation, renegotiation and frequent interaction among the members who

are prone to hold di fferential opinions. And such interaction does not occur

automatically, rather it requires some mediation, may be in the form of 'language,

expression, telephone, computer, touch, sight, or hearing (Agrawal, 1999: 104). 'Both

face-to-face and non face-to-face interactions" Young (1990: 314) points out, 'are

mediated relations and in both there is separation and miscommunication as there is

consensus and communication (cited in, Agrawal, 1999: 104).

2.4. Gaps in the literature and the Research Question

Situations requiring collective action may take several forms, one of which is the

system of managing Common Pool Natural Resources, such as fisheries, forests and

tank irrigation management. However, the present research tries to locate collective

action in the case of co-management of forests, and more specifically in the Joint

Forest Management programme in Orissa.

The extensive revIew of relevant literature carried out in two chapters

indicates several gaps in the research pertaining to our understanding of' community'

and its role in conservation and management of natural resources. To begin with, the

notion of community, as it is portrayed in community-conservation literature as a

simple, homogeneous and unified whole with shared understanding, is misleading.

Such an a priori understanding of community leads scholars to come up with a biased

finding that homogeneous communities are only suitable for collective action for local

resource management. And this further neglects the efforts of heterogeneous

communities to succeed in conservation activities.

A few questions may be raised in this regard. Communities do not always

remain homogeneous or does one find them be thus. Given the process of social and

economic change during the past 3-5 decades, different groups within a community

have responded varyingly to the source of such changes. And the already existing

heterogeneity, in terms of social differentials of caste, clan or tribe, has reproduced

73

itself in other spheres of activities. How, then, does one expect collective action to

succeed in such communities?

An acknowledgement of the intemal differentiations in the community

engaged in conservation of natural resources forces us to face several challenges.

Since the present research aims to explore the community's involvement in the case

of lorest resource, it is necessary to primarily pose the questions in the context of

community-based forest management. IndilTerence of scholars towards the internal

divisions of the community has resulted in lesser attention being paid to the question

as to how such internal dilTerentiations affect the management outcomes. Therefore,

an attempt has been made to answer a set of questions, such as how joint management

of forest takes shape in a stratified community; in what way the social differences

such as caste, class and differences in land ownership affect the forest management

outcomes; whether the management outcomes fulfill the desired interests of all the

sections of community or is it being influenced by a particular section of the

community; what is the nature of the community engaged in the joint management of

forests and how does this affect the management; from which section does the

leadership come; how the does the leaders manage to keep the balance between

different interests of different sections of society; etc.

A mere statement that heterogeneity has either positive or negative impact on

local level collective action, as has been the case with community-based conservation

literature, is not Justi fiable. On several accounts and through diverse sources, the

communities are heterogeneous, and the need to mobilise these ditlerences for

resource management remains a challenge. Even though the communities are

heterogeneous for several reasons, collective action for local resource management

requires crafting of institutions and rules of access and use, to which the members of

the community should exhibit consensus and comply with those rules collectively.

What is interesting to notc in such circumstances is how do the challenges that

heterogencity poses are overcome and consensus is built for crafting rules for resource

managemcnt. Or, in other words, the question that arises now is how do such

differences are negotiated and mediated with respect to, first, formulation of rules for

resource management, second, compliance of such rules, and third, monitor the

violation of such rules and provide for some kind of punishment for rule breakers.

74

How do such heterogeneous communities mobilise diverse groups, diverse opinions

and diverse interests to manage their resources, which becomes the major thrust of the

present research.

Since the research tries to explore the nature of the community and its

involvement in the forestry activities in Orissa, the dissertation also makes an attempt

to study the nature, evolution and functioning of Joint Forest Management of Orissa.

A journey to the history of several forest enactments and policies concerning forestry

in Orissa becomes an essential part of the thesis to explore the historical evolution of

people's participation in torcst conservation and management activities, finally

culminating in Joint Forest Management programme.

2.5. Objectives

This research primarily aims to explore the relationship between group heterogeneity

and local level collective action for management of local forest resources. In the

course of inquiry. the thesis makes an attempt to illustrate the factors and processes

that mobilise the differential interests and heterogeneous aspects of the community

and lead it towards a consensus in managing local forest resources through Joint

Forest Management Programme of Government of Orissa.

The specific objectives of the dissertation are as tollows:

, To historically analyse the process of people's participation in forest management finally culminating in Joint Forest Management in Orissa

, To examine the role of heterogeneity upon the pattern of dependency on forest and upon the management outcomes

, To explore the process of collective action for forest management III a heterogeneous community

, To explore the factors and processes that mobilise differential interests, overcome problems of heterogeneity and sustain collective action in a heterogeneous community

75

2.6. Methodology

2.6.1. The Research Design

The major thrust of the present research lies in exploring the factors that help

sustaining collective action in a heterogeneous social setting and to observe how such

heterogeneous aspects are mobilised to bring a consensus with regard to rule

formulation, rule compliance and monitoring rule violation. The study is exploratory

in nature. The empirical work for the study was carried out in two heterogeneous

village communities in Dhenkanal district of Orissa. Out of those, one has been

successful in managing its local forest resource through the Joint Forest Management

Programme of Govemment of Orissa, and the other has been a failure in its attempt to

do so. While the successful village has a one decade plus history of forest

conservation and management till the period when the field work was done, the

failure village was able to sustain its institution of Village Forest Protection

Committee only for five years - after which the institution as well as the attempt to

conserve forest broke down - making only a five year history in forest protection.

The reason behind such a selection was to facilitate the inquiry as to how one village

became successful in forest resource management, despite the fact that both were

heterogeneous in nature. And second, what factors and processes were present in the

successful village, which helped the community in negotiating the differences to bring

a consensus for local forest management.

2.6.2. Selection of the Study Area

The empirical work for the research was carried out in Orissa. Forests cover nearly 37

per cent of the total geographical arca of Orissa, spreading over 57,167 sq. Kms.

throughout the 28 Forest divisions in the state (Directorate of Forests and

Environment, Government of Orissa, 1997). The total percentage of forest cover is

comparatively high than that of India, which is 19.45 per cent. The state ranks fourth

in terms of forest area in India (Madhya Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Andhra

Pradesh being the first three states having 135,164; 68,621 and 147,112 sq. kms. of

forest cover respectively; see, Forest Survey of India, 1997).

The State of Orissa was taken for the purpose of the study as community's

involvement in conservation and management of local forest resources through locally

76

evolved institutions is very much prominent In rural Orissa. Such community

involvement in forestry activities has been structured by both community-initiated

institutions as well as by state sponsored institutions through the Joint Forest

Management Programme. Whether initiated by the community itself or created

through government initiation, a fact, which is clear for Orissa's forestry activities, is

that 'the community has played a significant role in protecting and conserving local

forest resources since long'. Out of the total forest area, 11,098 sq. kIns. (93,859 Ha.)

have been successfully managed by 1060 VSSs (Vana Samrakshyana Samiti, the

official forest protection committee created through JFM programme) throughout the

state as of January 1997 (Ori Forest. 1997). Orissa is the third state in India so far as

forest area managed by JFM is concerned, (M.P, Andhra Pradesh being first and

second in the order, having 38,468 and 15,243 sq. kIns. under JFM respectively, see,

Wastelands News, 15 (I): 67). Besides, the community management of forests has a

long history in Orissa, even though the state government passed the JFM resolution

giving the people a share in the management only in 1993. As per the data available,

Community Forest Management is practised in 15 districts of Orissa, where 5,402

self-initiated village Forest Protection Committees are protecting 3,09,750 Ha. of

forest land on their own.

In the state of Orissa, the district of Dhenkanal was chosen for empirical work.

Community's involvement in conservation and management of forest resources has a

long history in the district, dating back to the Prajameli (Peoples' Revolution) of

1937, when the local people agitated against the then colonial state for complete rights

over forest resources and abolition of forest tax (see, Mahapatra, 1999: 36). Secondly,

the social composition of the district is heterogeneous in nature as people of several

castes as well as tribes live in it. Besides, both community-initiated and state­

sponsored institutions have structured the community's involvement in forest

protection in the district. The following paragraphs give the numerical data pertaining

to the functioning of JFM and CFM - Community Forest Management, through

locally evolvedlinitiated institutions - in the district.

The Dhenkanal district, which also constitutes a Forest Division - one among

28 administrative units or Forest Divisions of Forest Department of the state -

consists of five Forest Ranges, namely, i) Sarangi, ii) Kamakshya Nagar (East), iii)

77

Dhenkanal, iv) Kamakshya Nagar (West) and v) Hindol. There are, in total, 162 VSSs

functioning in all the 5 Ranges of the Division as on 15 th• March 2000. There are 18

VSSs in Sarangi Range, 51 VSSs in Kamakshya Nagar (East) Range, 50 VSSs in

Kamakshya Nagar (West) Range, 24 VSSs in Dhenkanal Range and 19 VSSs in the

Hindol Range.

In the Dhenkanal district, there are in all 732 self-initiated village Forest

Protection Committees protecting forests of their own. The villages involved in CFM

have come together in recent years to form a federation of Village Forest Committces

in the district. There is a apex Zilla Committee at the district level, which is ·further

divided into 8 Block Committees. The 8 Block Committees of Community Forest

Management in Dhenkanal District are i) Dhenkanal Sadar Committee, ii) Gondia

Block Committee, iii) Odapada Block Committee, iv) Hindol Block Committee, v)

Kamakshya Nagar Block Committee, vi) Bhuban Block Committee, vii) Parjang

Block Committee and viii) Kankada Hada Block Committee. Each Block Committee

is further divided into several Cluster Committees. There are in all 43 Cluster

Committees in the district, which falls under eight Block Committees. The Cluster

Committee comprises of several Village Forest Protection Committees in the locality.

Thus, the 732 Village Committees are further grouped into 43 Cluster Committees,

which further constitute eight Block Committees, and these eight Block Committees

are combined together to form the Dhcnkanal Zilla CFM Committee. The Zilla

Committccs of several districts have also joined together to form the apex state

committee, which is known as Orissa Janga/ Manch or Orissa Forest Forum. 15

2.6.3. Selection of the Villages (Sampling Procedure)

To study the underlying factors that help sustain collective action in heterogeneous

communities, it was decided to take two village communities for an in-depth study:

one where collective action is successful and the other where it is a failure. Besides

the above- mentioned basic criterion, the following additional criteria were identified

for selection of the villages:

• The social fabric of the villages should be heterogeneous in terms of caste, economic rewards, landholdings, use of the resources, etc.

• The villages should be proximate to the forest (in bctween 0 to 5 KMs)

J5 For details regarding institutional arrangements of Community Forest Management in Orissa, See, Mahapatra, 1999.

78

• The villagers should be dependent on the forest

The two study villages were chosen following a two stage sampling procedure.

First, a quick survey of 10 villages was made, which were selected randomly, in the

Dhenkanal Sadar Block of Dhenkanal district of Orissa. Brief information regarding

social composition of the members of the village community, their past history of

forest protection, and their degree of success in collective action in designing

institutions for effective management of local forest resources were collected. In each

village, during the short visit, the president of the village forest protection committee,

the headman of the village, a few elites and the common villagers whom the

researcher came across were contacted and interviewed.

To gauge the relative success of the villages in collective action, the existence

of village level institutions to design rules of access and use was taken into

consideration. The performance of villages in collective action was further divided

into three categories: None/Low - no local institution existing currently for forest

protection or the institution had collapsed, rules were not complied, monitoring was

not done. Moderate - local institution for forest protection existed, rules were

followed, monitoring was done to catch rule breakers, but not strong enough to

restrict the members of outside community. High - rules were followed, strong

monitoring system existed to catch rule breakers from both inside the community and

outside.

Social di fferentiation, in terms of caste and tribe were taken into account to

decide the heterogeneous status of the village. The villages, which comprised a single

caste or tribe were leveled as homogeneous at the first instance. Though it is an

accepted fact that those villages may have been heterogeneous in several other

respects, however, to distinguish these villages from the rest, which comprised

members belonging to several castes and/tribes, they were considered as

homogeneous, and were kept out. Further, it was not feasible from the short survey to

highlight the other sources of heterogeneity of the villages. Therefore, in the first

stage of the survey the villages having single caste/tribe were leveled as homogeneous

and vice-versa.

79

A brief analysis of the survey was done to choose two villages for an in-depth

study based upon their success or failure of collective action. The analysis can be

briefly summarised in the following table.

Table 2.1: A Quick Survey Report on the Ten Villages

Name of the Villages Social Since when Collective action composition protecting

Gandadhar Prasad Heterogeneous 16 years High lhankira Heterogeneous 40 years High Biradia Heterogeneous 1993 - 98 None Ambanali Heterogeneous 1993 - 98 None Kadua Homogeneous 1993 - 98 None Kruslma Kumar Pur Heterogeneous 1993 - 98 None (K.K Pur) Nagiapasi (NP) Heterogeneous 10 years High Korian Heterogeneous 5 years Moderate Krushna Prashad Heterogeneous IS years High Padmalav Pur Heterogeneous 15 years Moderate

As was mentioned earlier. the villages were divided into three categories based

upon their relative success in forest conservation activities. The following paragraphs

describe such categories briefly.

i) High Degree of Rule Compliance and Strong Monitoring System: Out of the ten

villages taken tor the quick survey in the first round, rules compliance and the

monitoring system to punish the rule breakers were found to be strong in tour

villages, namely, Gangadhar Prasad (G. Prasad), lhankira, Nagiapasi (N. Pasi), and

Krushna Prasad (K. Prasad). All these four villages were heterogeneous in nature,

constituting members from several castes and tribes.

These four villages were successful in crafting local institutions, which could

design rules regulating the access and use of the forest produces. And such rules were

backed by a strong monitoring system, which also included assigning punishments to

those who failed to comply with the rules. In three cases, such as in G. Prasad,

lhankira, and N. Pasi, the rules were written down in a register, below which the

heads of the households of the villages had put their signatures or thumb impressions.

RO

It made the point clear that rules that were created for regulating the access and use of

the forest in these villages were well circulated and the members of the communities

were all aware of them.

The village G. Prasad was found to be protecting its Village Forest of 177

acres since 1985 - 86, and now the village institution is a JFM Committee. In the

early 1980s, the village forest of G. Prasad was completely deserted and the forestland

was just like a barren hill track. Since that was a 'Village Forest' as per the legal

classifications, the state Forest Department had taken little efforts towards its

regeneration. Then, in mid 1980s, the villagers decided to regenerate the forest and

stopped allowing grazing inside the forest area. Later, the villagers undertook a

massive plantation programme and now the forest stands looking evergreen.

Similarly, the Jhankira village was also engaged in protecting its village forest for the

last 40 years. This village had the longest history of forest protection from among the

ten villages taken for quick survey, where the protection activity started in the 1960s.

Compared to these two villages, where protection activity had been carried out in the

Village Forest areas, the village N. Pasi and K. Prasad had taken the responsibility of

protecting Reserved Forests attached to their village through JFM programme. The

Reserved Forests of these two villages were highly degraded prior to the protection by

the communities, and with active efforts by these two villages the protected patch had

grown into thick forest during the time of fieldwork.

Protecting the forest from the free-riders, who violate the rules for personal

gain without contributing towards its protection, is detinitely a challenging task before

any community aiming to protect a forest patch. And the problem becomes more

serious when the free-rider belongs to another community. However, these four

villages had been successful in prohibiting both insiders and outside members of the

community from breaking rules created for forest protection. This was possible

because of the personal efforts that these community members had taken to patrol the

forest areas during night times. All the tour villages had developed a rotation system,

and accordingly, the responsibility of guarding forest was shared among the

households of the communities. Currently, N. Pasi and G. Prasad have appointed a

permanent forest guard from inside the village, whose responsibility is to check the

illegal entrance into the forest.

81

These four villages were categorised as 'High Collective Action' communities

smce, local institutions existed for making rules for forest protection; rules were

obeyed by the members of the community; and finally a strong monitoring system

existed to find out both insiders and outsiders, who tried to violate the rules.

ii) Strong Rules with a Weak Monitoring System: Korian and Padma Lav Pur (P.L.

Pur) were the two villages, among the ten, where there also existed local institutions

with strong rules for forest protection. 80th the villages were heterogeneous, in terms

of their caste composition, with a preponderance of Tribals in the P.L Pur village. In

the other village, the social composition included households belonging to several

castes and a few tribal households.

The efforts towards collective action for forest protection are a relatively new

phenomenon in the Korian vi llage, which started forest protection in the mid 1990s.

In the last five years, the village has been successful in crafting an efficient institution,

which could come out with strong rules for forest regeneration. The members of the

community also found to be very much sincere in complying the rules. However, the

village institution was not able to develop monitoring systems to restrict the free­

riders, mostly members of outside community. The forest guards, that the Korian

Forest Protection Committee has appointed, have been able to minimize the

occurrences of free riding by members belonging to their own community. However,

the institution has not been successful in prohibiting members from neighbouring

villages from accessing the resource and using the forest without contributing

anything. In other words, the community has been facing challenges to establish a

common property regime inside the forest, since members from other communities

continue to access the forest, without paying anything for their use of the resource.

Similar has been the case with P.L Pur village. Although the P.L Pur Forest Protection

Committee has been able to design strong rules for forest protection and induce its

members to comply with those rules, monitoring has been a problem, especially with

the outside free riders. With their 15 years efforts in protection, the forest area has

regenerated substantially, which has become an attraction in the recent years for

outside non-members to free ride. However, monitoring the action of these outside

non-members has not been successful in P.L. Pur village.

82

These two villages were categoried as 'Moderate Collective Action' villages,

Since the communities were not successful enough in establishing a complete

common property regime inside their protected patch of forest, even though Forest

Protection Committees and strong protection rules.

iii) Non-existence of Institutions: In the remammg four communities, namely,

Biradaia, Ambanali, Kadua and Krushna Kuamr Pur (K.K Pur), no local institution

was found which could design rules for forest protection. In fact, all these four

communities belonged to one revenue village of Krushna Kumar Pur. Even though,

for the government records, these four were different hamlets of one single village,

yet the four communities were separate social entities having their own jajmani

system, around with the village economy/society revolved. The hamlet Kadua was a

completely Scheduled Tribes settlement, with 'Sabar' and 'Juanga' tribes inhabiting

in it. The rest three were heterogeneous so far as their social composition is

concerned.

All the four communities started protection activities separately in the forest

patches adjoining their hamlets in the year 1993. Initially, the original K.K. Pur

hamlet started the protection activity and inspired by its efforts, the other three

hamlets also established a Forest Protection Committee in their hamlets. However, in

the four communities the institutions created were not capable enough in bringing out

strong rules for regulating the members' activities concerning forest use. Whatever

rules the institutions created in the beginning, they were not followed strictly. Kadua

was the first hamlet where such institution became defunct due to non-conformity of

rules and non-existence of a monitoring system. Gradually, the remaining three also

followed the same path and within five years, the Village Forest Protection

Committee in these four hamlets had become non-existent, and along with it the

efforts towards forest protection.

These four communities were categoried under 'No Collective Action'

category, since these communities failed to establish a common property regime in

the forest and did not continue their efforts for forest protection.

83

After analysing the relative success of the ten villages in collective action for

forest protection and categorising them into None, Moderate and High, in the second

stage two villages were chosen keeping in mind the earlier mentioned criterion of

success and failure.

Thus, two village communities, namely, Nagiapasi and K.K Pur were finally

taken for the detailed case study. The village Nagiapasi was taken since collective

action for forest protection and management was successful in this village. At the

time, when the fieldwork was conducted, the village had a strong and efficient Forest

Protection Committee functioning to regulate people's access and use of the forest

resource in the village. The Forest Protection Committee was started in the village in

the early 1990s and is still functioning. Besides being a successful village in its efforts

for forest protection, there was an additional reason for choosing Nagiapasi village.

Since one of the objectives of the dissertation is to study the history and working of

JFM in the state, Nagiapasi village was chosen, which had registered itself with state

the JFM programme. The second village chosen for the detailed study was K.K Pur.

K.K Pur was the failure village, and the village had only 5 years' history of forest

protection.

2.6.4. Method and Tools Used for the Collection of Data

The fieldwork was carried out in two phases during the year 2001. In the first phase of

the fieldwork, the survey of ten villages was undertaken and the two villages, i.e.,

Nagiapasi and K.K. Pur were identified for a detailed field study. The second phase

involved a detailed observation of the two villages for a period of three months, i.e.,

from September to November in the year 2001.

A combination of participant observation, interview and focused group

discussion methods were used to elicit the relevant data from the two chosen villages.

A common interview guide was followed for both the villages while collecting the

required informations from the villages. Besides the socio-economic profile of the

households in the two villages, data pertaining to their dependency upon forest, type

of use and access into forest, efforts to initiate the protection measures, and the overall

history of collective action in the two villages were collected.

84

During the period of the stay in the villages for fieldwork, the evening hours

were spent in different village common rooms, where the villagers usually get

together to play cards or to gossip.16 Several rounds of discussions were made with

the villagers at these common rooms to understand the overall environment of the

village, the internal politics of the village and the perceptions of the villagers towards

access, use, dependency and efforts to protect the local forest resources.

16 There existed several village common rooms in these two villages. Such common rooms were called Kotha Ghara in the local language. The right to access these Kotha Ghara was found to be caste specific in Nagiapasi village, since specific caste groups had their own Kotha Ghara. For example, the SCs and STs did not go the Kotha Gharas belonging to the upper castes. In the Nagiapasi village, four such Kotha Ghara existed, while in K.K Pur, there was only one Kotha Ghara. The Kotha Gharas in Nagiapasi were quite old. The common rooms meant for SCs and STs in this village were Kachha buildings made up of mud and thatched roof. while the other two, meant for upper caste households were semi-pakka buildings made up of stones with tile roofs. However, the K.K Pur common room was relatively a new building, a pakka one, constructed outside the village settlement and was usually dominated by persons belonging to upper castes. Interestingly the SCs and STs were not prohibited from entering that common room.

85

CHAPTER - III

Contextualising the Research Locales

This study aims to explore the dynamics of collective action for the management of

local forest resources in heterogeneous social set ups. In the process, the research tries

to examine, first, the possibility of collective action in heterogeneous village

communities, and second, how the internal socio-economic and political

differentiations affect the community's endeavour towards successful collective

action. The empirical work for the study was carried out in two village communities

in the Dhenkanal District of Orissa. Before going further in analysing the specific

situation/conditions in the villages, which either facilitated or obstructed the processes

of collective action, it is apt to give a brief introduction to the study villages, as well

as the district and the State in which they are situated. Such a narration of socio­

economic and geographical features will not only give an idea of the research sites,

but will also help in conceptualising the present study by linking it to a wider context.

3.1. The Orissa State

3.1.1. A Brief History

The present State of Orissa was famous in the mythology and ancient history in the

name of 'Kalinga' and in medieval history as 'Utkal', both of which corresponds to

the meaning of excellence in 'Kala' or arts. The 'Kalinga war', as is well known in

world history, is said to have converted king Ashoka to Buddhism and non-violence,

and it is considered as a major landmark in the politico-cultural evolution of ancient

India. King Kharavcla, who conquered Magadha to take revenge of Kalinga's defeat

to King Ashoka in the b'feat Kalinga war, established a mighty Kalinga empire in the

second century B.C. In the twelfth century A.D., the domain of Kalingan Empire was

extended from Ganga in the north to Godavari in the south by king Cholaganga Deva

of Ganga dynasty, who also built the famous Jagannath temple at Puri. Orissa was

annexed to Mughal Empire in 1552 A.D. by king Akbar and Marathhas occupied the

territory after the decline of the Moughals. Finally, the British took over the

administration of Orissa in 1803. Under the British administration, several parts of the

present day Orissa were under the control of then British Indian provinces of Madras,

86

Central Province and Bengal-Bihar Presidency. On April I, 1912, the Province of

Bihar and Orissa was created bringing together parts of Bengal Presidency and

Central Province. The modem Orissa took its present form on April I, 1936, by

separating Orissa from the combined State of Bihar-Orissa, and then combining it

with some of the Oriya-speaking areas of the then adjoining States of Madras

Presidency and Central Province. Orissa is considered as the first State in the country

to be formed on linguistic basis. After independence, in 1948, 25 feudatory States

merged with the territory of Orissa, and by August 1949, all the princely States,

including the big ones like Mayurbhanj, were a part of the state of Orissa.

3.1.2. Physical Setting and Location

Orissa is situated in the eastern coast of India. The state is surrounded by Andhra

Pradesh on the southeast, Madhya Pradesh on the west, Bihar in the north, West

Bengal in the north-east and Bay of Bengal in the east. It extends over an area of

155,707 sq. Kms. Orissa has a costal line of 250 miles along the Bay of Bengal. [t

constitutes 4.74 per cent of the land and 3.74 per cent of the population of India

(Census ofIndia, 1991).

The state may be broadly divided into four geographical regIOns, such as

'northern plateau', 'central river basin', 'the hills of Eastern Ghats', and 'coastal

plains'. The northern plateau, with its hill ranges and cultivated valleys stretches

across Bihar and West Bengal. About 45 per cent of this area is covered with forests,

and contains much of State's primary resources like coal, iron ore and hydro-power

(Sundar et aI., 2001: 77). The central river basin is well irrigated and produces good

crops of rice. The River Mahanadi crosses through this basin and creates a delta along

with River Brahrnini and Baitarani. A big dam is constructed in this region upon the

River Mahanadi at Hirakud in Sambalpur District, which is a major source of

irrigation for this area. The hills of the Eastern Ghats, situated in the southern parts of

Orissa, including the districts of Koraput, Ganjam and Phulbani, are characterised by

terrace rice cultivation and shifting cultivation. Several industries are being set up in

this region, which take advantage of the mineral reserves of this area. The coastal

plain along the eastern coast with its fertile alluvial soil is densely populated,

comprising of 64 per cent of the total population of the State (Sundar et aI., 2001).

This region has the little forest cover in the State, and agriculture is the primary

87

economic activity of the region. This area of Orissa grows several crops like cashew,

coconut, banana, rice, and thus is rightly recognised as the 'rice bowl' of the State.

The e1imate of Orissa is characterised by high temperature and medium to

high rainfall. The cropping pattern of the State may be broadly divided into three

seasons, namely, autumn, winter and summer, spreading from July to October,

November to February and March to June respectively. The State grows crops like

rice, maize, jawar, bajra, groundnut, black gram, horse gram, mustard, jute, etc.

3.1.3. Administrative Setup

At present, the State of Orissa constitutes 30 districts. There were 13 districts in

Orissa up to March 31, 1994, and it was only on April 1, 1994 - on the State

formation day - that 17 new districts were created by bifurcating the erstwhile 13

districts. The 30 districts are further subdivided into 58 subdivisions and 314

Community Development Blocks, out of which 118 are tribal Blocks. There are two

Municipality Corporations, namely, Bhubaneswar and Cuttack, 31 municipalities, 70

Notified Area Councils (NAC) and 124 towns in the state. Following the three-tier

local government system, Orissa has 30 Zilla Parishads, 314 Panchayati Samitis and

5,261 Gram Panchayats. There are in all 50,972 villages in the State of Orissa

(Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Orissa, 1999).

3.1.4. Demography

The population of the State was 31,659,736 as recorded in the 1991 census. As per the

1991 census, Orissa ranks eleventh in India in terms of population. Orissa continues

to be one of the least urbanised states, with only 4,234,983 (13.37 %) people living in

urban areas and 27,424,753 (86.63%) in rural areas. The density of population is 203

per sq. km. As per the 1991 census, out of the total population of 31,659,736, the

Scheduled Case population was 5,129,314, which was 16.2 per cent of the total

population. The Scheduled Tribe population of the state was 70,32,214, which

constituted 22.21 per cent of the total population.

The literacy rate of the state was 49.99 per cent as per 1991 census. The

literacy rate for males and females were 63.09 per cent and 34.68 per cent

respectively. The female literacy rate of Orissa (34.68 %) is quite less in comparison

88

to that of the female literacy rate of the country, which is 39.29 per cent. The literacy

rate for the rural areas in the state is 45.46 per cent, which is slightly higher than the

country's literacy rate for rural areas (44.69 %). The literacy rate for the urban areas

in the state is 71.99 per cent.

3.1.5. Forest cover

As per the Forest Department record of government of Orissa, the classified forests

spread across an area of 57,167 sq. km., which is nearly 37 per cent of the total

geographical area of the state. The per capita forest cover in the state is 0.15 hectares.

However, the spread of the forest area in the state is highly uneven, with districts like

Phulbani having 54 per cent of its land under forest cover, whereas districts like

Balasore has only 6 per cent (CPSW, 1994: 31). Notwithstanding the forest

department record of 37 per cent land under forest cover, the actual forest cover in the

state is very less owing to the degradation and denudation of the forest area. As per an

estimate, dense forest having a crown density of 40 per cent or more in the state is

only 26,101 sq. km. and open forest (having a crown density of 10 - 40 %) is 20,629

sq. km., and the remaining land is 'forest' only in the forest department records

without any tree cover (Sundar et al., 200 I: 17). The forests of Orissa are mostly sal

dominated (43 %), with some areas of mixed deciduous and teak forests in coastal

plains and Eastern Ghats, and mangroves along the coast (CPSW, 1994).

From the management perspective, the state forests have been divided into

three categories, namely, reserved forests, demarcated protected forests and un­

demarcated protected forests. The reserved forests have been under the direct control

of the state forest department, which enjoys not only property rights over such forests

but also management responsibilities. But, in the case of protected forests, the

management rights and responsibilities are conferred on the forest department,

whereas the property rights on the land remain with the state revenue department.

89

3.2. The Dhenkanal District17

3.2.1 A Brief History

Dhen.l(anal was an erstwhile princely state, which was annexed to the Indian Union in

1947. Prior to its merger with independent India, it was ruled by several dynasties. As

per the Nasik Rock inscription, the oldest available record about the history of the

district, during 2nd Century A.D, Dhenkanal was a part of the Sattabahana Empire,

which became a part of the Gupta Empire in the 3'd & 4th Century. During the 6th &7'h

Century, the region remained under the sway of the Bhauma Karas, and during the 8th

and 9th Century the Sulki dynasty ruled over some part of the Dhenkanal state.

By 16th Century A.D, some portions of the region were being ruled by a

sahara chief named 'Dhenka'. However, the tribal chieftain was defeated and killed

by one Sridhar Bhanja, who named the region as 'Dhenkanal' after the sabara chief

'Dhenka'. In 1529 A.D, Gajapati Prataprudra Deva, the king of Orissa mainland,

instructed one of his commanders Hari Singh Vidyadhar to attack Dhenkanal. Hari

Singh defeated the Bhanja king and became the first ruler of Dhenkanal kingdom,

who also shifted its capital from Karamul to Dhenkapidha and ruled the kingdom tiII

1594 A.D. After Hari Singh Vidyadhar, 18 other kings ruled over the DhenkanaI

kingdom. Shankar Pratap Mohindra Bahadur, who ruled the state from 1918 to 1947,

was the last king to rule Dhenkanal.

3.2.2. Physical Setting and Location

Situated in the central part of Orissa, Dhenkanal district lies between 85° 58' to 86° 2'

East longitude and 20° 29' to 21 ° II' North latitude. The landlocked district of

Dhenkanal is surrounded by Keonjhar district in the North, Cuttack district in the

South, Jajpur district in the East and Angul district in the West. The Dhenkanal town

is situated on the National Highway 42, which runs from Cuttack to Sambalpur. The

district constitutes 2.95 per cent of the total geographical land and 3 per cent of the

total population of Orissa (Census of India, 1991).

17 The infonnation about the district was gathered from several secondary sources like District Census Handbook, District Gazetteer and official website of the district (www.dhenkanal.nic.in).

90

Geographically, the district can be divided into three natural divisions: the

southern hilly region, the river valley region with tribunals, and the northern hilly

region. The district has mainly five varieties of soil, namely, Alluvial soil, Red loam

soil, Sandy loam soil, Gravelly soil and Cleaving loam soil. Climate-wise, the district

is usually hot with high humidity during April and May, and cold during December

and January. The monsoon generally breaks during the month of June. The district has

a moist climate with two distinct climatic zones, i.e., the northern region, which is

comparatively less moist and the southern and south-eastern region which is more

moist and humid in nature. The climatic variation has influenced the formation of

different flora and fauna occurring in the region.

3.2.3. Administrative Setup

The presently existing Dhenkanal district was created on April I, 1994 by bifurcating

the erstwhile Dhenkanal district into two separate districts, namely, Angul and

Dhenkanal. The newly created district has 8 Blocks (talukas), namely, Dhenkanal

Sadar, Gondia, Odapada, Hindolo, Kamakshya Nagar, Bhubana, Parjang, and

Kankadahada. The district comprises 172 Gram Panchayats, 8 Panchayat Samitis

(Taluka Panchayat) and one Zilla Panchayat.

3.2.4. Demography

The population of Dhenkanal district was, 9,47,870 as per the 1991 Census. The

decadal growth rate of the population for 1991 - 200 I was recorded to be 12.46 per

cent, and thereby total population reached up to 10,65,983 by 2001. The Scheduled

Castes constituted nearly 16 per cent of the total population of the district numbering

a total of 1,51,914 as per the 1991 census. The district has a considerable number of

Scheduled Tribe concentration, which accounted for 13 per cent (1,20,226) of the

total population (Census of India, 1991). The density of population in Dhenkanal

district was recorded to be 206 per squire kilometer as per the 1991 census, which

increased to 239 by 2001. The district has an urban population of only 78,112 (8.25

%), while the major chunk of the population (91.75 %) live in rural areas.

3.2.5. Forest cover

The Dhenkanal Forest Division, one among the 28 Forest Divisions of Orissa,

constitutes five territorial Ranges located at Dhenkanal, Hindolo, Sarangi, Kamakshya

91

Nagar East and Kamakshya Nagar West. It also has one Wildlife Range, located at

Kapilas Zoo. The forest area of Dhenkanal region may be described as north Indian

tropical moist deciduous, which also includes good bamboo species in it. The forest is

further divided into several sub types, such as Northern tropical semi evergreen

forests, Late rite semi evergreen forests, North Indian Tropical moist deciduous

forests, North Indian tropical moist peninsular sal forests, Northern tropical dry

deciduous forests, Moist Bamboo forests, and Dry deciduous scrub. The dominating

species of the forest include: sal, teak. jam un, kasi, sunari, simi/i, etc.

3.3 The Study Villages

The empirical work for the research was carried out in two village communities,

namely, 'Nagiapasi' and 'Krushna Kumar Pur' (K.K. Pur), situated in the vicinity of

Kapilas Reserved Forest in the Dhenkanal Sadar Block of Dhenkanal district of

Orissa.

The Dhenkanal Sadar Block has a total population of 1,22,374, out of which

18,275 (\5 %) are Scheduled Castes and 17,382 (14.2 %) are Scheduled Tribes

(Census of India, 1991). The block comprises 357 wards, 23 Gram Panchayats and

one Panchayat Samiti.

The procedures and methods of selection of these two villages have been

discussed elaborately in the previous chapter. The villages are situated to the east of

Dhenkanal town, the district headquarters, at a distance of 5 kilometers from each

other. The following paragraphs attempt to introduce the villages by indicating their

location and other basic information. The following maps exhibit the location of the

study area, indicating also the Dhenkanal district's position in the state of Orissa.

92

Maps Locating the State, District, Block and the Study

Villages

j arkha "~"c, \ '-

&.i?ll"·-~lI"'1 'R~U~; \--i I " ", , ,'" '''~,< - ,

.~'

'i

A~ISTR CTKEONJHAR

The Study Block (Dhenkanal Sadar

Source: mapsofindia.com

93

Location of Study Villages in the Dhenkanal Sadar Block

Map of Dhenkanal Sadar Block •

I-L __ " __ _

.- ...... '-... - .,,,,,,-

--~ ---~"-... _--­~----------- --. _ 0

• ,

w_ ----:~~ ': (~ ,n

t')\ ':e~-

/'

'-~~--. " ~./', -,";,\.

,

.. "

•

• c

• • •

•

Study Village 1 Nagiapasi

Study Village 2 K. K. Pur

KapiJas Reserved Forest

~~-,--. <$ y ...... ~ ........ ,.,.""'_ "'-llJOoo

--'~"I"""""_) ..... ~ ... ~~,"""-',, __ . >=--~_-:1 ---.. __ . -.~ !I._ ... _. -- ::::::::><=:::

~_ •. ___ ." ____ "-".""" ~O!r....._"T"""""'-_. _ .... _ ._-• ,0. __ --_", .. _'-<;._01

• +

•

Source: District Census Handbook, Dhenkanal

94

3.3.1. The Village 'Nagiapasi'

The Nagiapasi village, situated towards the east of Dhenkanal town, is one among

several other villages of the 'Beltikiri Gram Panchayat' of Dhenkanal Sadar Block.

The village is represented by 3 ward members in the Beltikiri Gram Panchayt. A

narrow pakka road, which runs from the district headquarters to Kapilas temple (Siva

Temple), is the only thoroughfare to get access to the village. After traveling nearly 30

kilometers on the Dhenkanal - Kapilas Road, one has to take a left diversion and

catch a kachha road, which runs amongst thorny bushes, and go further about 3

kilometers to reach Nagiapasi village. The village constitutes 155 households with a

total population of 1500 as per the 1991 census. The total land area of the village is

350 hectares, including village wasteland, gochar, forest and other non-agricultural

lands, as per the 1991 Census.

The settlement pattern is very much organised in Nagiapasi village, with

houses on both sides of village lanes. There are different colonies belonging to

different castes. The Scheduled Tribes colony existed in the beginning of the village,

and that of Scheduled Castes at the end. The housing pattern for Scheduled Tribes

were observed to be unsystematic and unorganized, with their huts scattered here and

there. Further, the newly built pakka houses, constructed under the Indira Awas

Yojana, were also not properly ordered. However, the Scheduled Castes colony was

observed to be organised, with houses situated in lanes. The Karana settlement had

the widest road in the village followed by Khandayat and Gopala settlement.

The village offers schooling up to 10'h standard, with a Primary, Middle and a

High School existing within it. Nagiapasi has two temples and a place of worship for

village goddess (Gram Devti). It also has four village common rooms (kotha ghara),

out of which Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes possess one each. These

common rooms are the gathering places for villagers, where they relax, play cards,

gossip and discuss about their day-to-day affairs and problems. The Scheduled Tribe

youths, particularly, also use their common room for sleeping during night times. The

village also has one Anganwadi Kendra, which, however, was not functioning at the

time of fieldwork.

95

3.3.2. The Village K. K. Pur

Situated to the east of Dhenkanal town, the village Krushna Kumar Pur (K. K. Pur) is

one among the other villages of Kaimati Gram Panchayat. The revenue village K. K.

Pur also consists of other three hamlets, namely Biradia, Ambanali, and Kadua.

However, for the present empirical purposes only the main K. K. Pur village was

taken into consideration. Despite the village consisting of four hamlets, including the

main K. K. Pur, however, in real practice they are all separate entities, having both

geographical as well as social distances. Each hamlet is considered to be a separate

social unit, with its own caste structure and jajmani relations. The village K. K. Pur is

positioned in the Dhenkanal - Kapilas Road, which also connects Nagiapasi village

with Dhenkanal, at a distance of nearly 25 kilometers. K. K. Pur constitutes 85

households making a total population of about 700. The total K. K. Pur revenue

village including three other hamlets mentioned above constitutes 649 hectares of

land including wastelands and forest as per 1991 Census.

Unlike Nagiapasi, the housing pattern in K. K. Pur is very much scattered in

nature. The Dhenkanal - Kapilas main road passes through the village and therefore,

one can find the colonies of the village on both sides ofthe road. The Scheduled Caste

households were observed to be dispersed and settled mostly on the two sides of the

main road. However, the Scheduled Tribe houses of the village were clustered, and

situated in close proximity to each other. The village K. K. Pur has a well organised

Brahmin colony, which consists of 15 households. Most of the houses in this colony

were pakka in nature.

The village contains only a Primary School, which provides education up to

class five. For high school education the children of K. K. Pur either go to Nagiapasi

or to Kaimati. A few others also travel to Beltikiri, the neighbouring Gram Panchat,

for such purpose. Community life in K. K. Pur was not that organised as in Nagiapasi.

Only the Scheduled Tribes have maintained their common room (community hall) in

the village. On further inquiry, it was revealed that the village had a few community

halls in the past, which were not maintained properly and thus became extinct. During

the time of fieldwork, the villagers were observed to be working forward to revive

such community halls in their village.

96

CHAPTER IV

The Forestry Debate:

Evolution and Functioning of the Joint Forest Management

An analysis of the Joint Forest Management programme - a participatory

programme in forestry sector, which evolved in the 1990s' - and the policies

concerning its evolution will be incomplete without looking back to the history of

forest management in India since the pre-colonial period, and how the forestry debate

has been shaped in the country over the years. Though the discipline of

'Environmental History' is in its nascent phase, yet, the scholars working on it have

much focused upon the social impacts of forest policies since the British period, and

have contributed towards an evolution of 'forestry debate' in India. 18 This chapter

alms to analyse the history of forest management in Orissa to see how people's

participation has emerged in the forestry sector, which finally took the shape of Joint

Forest Management (henceforth JFM) programme in the state. However, before

moving forward to the specific situation in the state of Orissa, I make an effort to

narrate the historiography of the forest management in the country.

The chapter has been divided into two parts. The first part deals with the

historical development of 'scientific forestry' in the country starting from the colonial

period and the second deals with the specific data pertaining to the state of Orissa,

where the empirical work for the dissertation has been carried out. However, the

analysis in this chapter concerning Orissa is limited to the secondary data, in which

several government policies, forest department notifications and several other

published works on Orissa's experiment with JFM have been reviewed.

18 The discipline of 'Social Ecology and Environmental History' mainly focused on the policies of conservation adopted during the British period and the subsequent social and ecological changes that occurred in the colonial India. Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha, as general editors, have produced a series of books on 'studies in social ecology and environmental history', published by Oxford University Press. For an understanding ofthe discipline see the pioneering works of Arnold and Guha, 1995; Baviskar, 1995; Gadgil, 1985; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Guha, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1994; Grove, 1995, 1998; Grove el. al., 1998; Rangarajan, 1994, 1996; Saberwal, 1999; Singh, 1998; and Sivramkrishna, 1999.

97

4.1. Approaching the 'Forestry Debate' in India

The characteristic features of 'scientific forestry', the consequent deforestation,

adoption of conservationist measures by the colonial rulers, and the socio-ecological

changes that were brought in as a result of new method of forest management have

figured much prominently in the 'forestry debate' in India. The forestry debate in

India, through an analysis of colonial and post colonial forest policies, have much

highlighted the impacts that the change and continuity of state forest policies since

colonial period had upon the life of the communities dependent upon the forest as

well as the physical condition of the forest itself. The analysis of forest policies,

particularly of the colonial period, reveals the fact as to how the community, which

has taken the centre stage in current decade's forestry policies, has been neglected and

marginalised throughout history. It unpacks the historical process, wherein by

introduction of a new method of forest management, development of forest policies

and legislations, the traditionally held rights of forest dependent communities have

been curtailed progressively. An analysis of broad features of the history of forest

management at an all India level will make the understanding of specific situations

pertaining to the state of Orissa much clear.

4.1.1. Forestry in Colonial India

Formal management of forests in India is one of the oldest in the tropical world,

dating back to 1860s, with the creation of Forest Service and appointment of Brandis

as the first Inspector General of Forests. During the period prior to the British

Conquest, forests were owned and managed by self-sufficient village communities

with traditional practices and indigenous knowledge, though the de jure ownership of

the forests were in the hands of the king. 19 The village communities residing near the

forest areas used to depend upon forest for their basic livelihood requirements, and

this dependence was institutionalised through a variety of cultural and religious

mechanisms. Madhav Gadgil in his seminal article on ecological history of India has

19 Guha (1983, 1989) from his research in Tehri-Garhwal area of sub-Himalayas confirms such a claim. To quote Guha (1983: 1883), "in Garhwal. for example. the waste and forest lands never attracted the attention of pre-British government. While the native kings did subject the produce of the forests .... ". Guha also mentions about such community control of forests in the pre-colonial period in the Madras province in south India.

98

mentioned about the existence of 'ecological prudence' in pre-colonial rural

communities of India. By 'ecological prudence' of pre-colonial rural communities,

Gadgil points out towards the 'exercise of restraint in the exploitation of natural

resources such that the yields realised from any resource are substantially increased in

the long run, even though that restraint implies foregoing some benefits at the present'

(Gadgil, 1985: 1909). Guha's (1983) and Gadgi\'s (1985) analysis of forestry

practices in pre-British India emphasises the sustainable way in which forest

rcsources were appropriated and protected by rural communities in pre-British India.

However, such a claim has been contested by several other scholars who point out the

ongoing process of deforestation in the pre-colonial India. Scholars like Richard

Grove (1995, 1998) insists that deforestation had assumed a significant proportion

even before the advent of colonialism, and the pre-British India was not a period of

harmony between needs of the forest dwellers and the physical conditions of the

forest. Rangarajan (1996) also highlights the process of deforestation that took place

during the Maratha and the Moughal period.

The contradictions of the scholars regarding the pattern of forest use during

the pre-colonial era notwithstanding, the beginning of colonial rule experienced a sea

change in the attitude of the state towards the forest resource and the pattern of forest

use and management in India. To understand the British attitude towards the forests,

their policies for forest use and management in India and the subsequent changes that

were brought about in colonial India, it is essential to examine the historical

background and the social changes that Britain was undergoing at the time of

colonisation. At the time when Europeans came to India, England was experiencing

far-reaching changes at home due to Industrial Revolution, which had serious bearing

on Indian forest use and management. First, there were changes in the pattern of

resource use from subsistence mode to industrial mode featured by domination and

transformation of resources for use as commodities. Secondly, the proportion of

population relying upon subsistence gathering, food production and agriculture

declined sharply, resulting in breakdown of cohesive local communities; and finally,

with the automisation of rural communities and manufacture and commerce becoming

the dominant activities, the resource exploitation using new technology became

unrestrained (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 115-16). With such a historical background the

99

British rulers perceived of forests as a raw material to be used for industrialisation and

in the process of production.

Similarly, Rangarajan (1996) mentions that the history of military and

agricultural revolution of Britain conditioned the negative attitude of the British

towards fixest resources in India. In the seventeenth century, much prior to the

establishment of the colonialism in India, the military troops in Ireland had to clear

the forest to deny cover to the Irish rebels who used to hide in the woods. Thus, the

British perception of the fixest was that of a 'abode of robbers, lawless squatters,

pO\erty-stncken, stubborn and uncivil" (Rangarajan: 1996: 17). Secondly, in the

context of a~'Tarian re\olution in England, the cutting of trees and the clearing of

wastelands for cuilivation were considered as a sign of progress.

Wllh such a history of negative and ditlerential attitude towards forests, the

colonial treatment of India's f(lrest had sih'llificant impacts upon the physical

condition of the forest as well as the socio-cultural Ii fe of forest dependent

commumties. ColonialIsm has been, thus, described as an 'ecological watershed' for

India and the colonial treatment of India's forests as an 'onslaught on forests' for the

destructl(ln of forests. which has been made to fulfill the strategic requirements of the

colonial state (Gadgil and Guha. 1992: 116-23: Guha, 1989: 37-43).

PrImarily. there were three factors or 'strategic requirements' of colonial state,

which had shaped the forest policies of the British India (Gadgil and Guha, 1992;

Guha, 1983. 1(89). First. the building up of railway network, which began in the

1850s, resulted in large-scale dct(lrestation to fulfill the requirement of huge

quantities of good quality timber. The early years of railway expansion resulted in an

unprecedented assault on India's t()rests 211 The second requircment came from British

Royal Navy, which m:cdcd hugc quantities of teak for ship building activities. The

dense forest resourccs of India acqUIred a fresh dimcnsion in the context of Anglo­

French war. By the cnd of eighteenth century, as a result of heavy demand from the

Brillsh Royal Navy, there were hardly any oak trees in English royal forests, which

--'-- ------

llJ For dela,l. regarding the amoun! of dcll)rcsl"IHlIl becausc Df raIlway "xpansjon. see. Guha. 1983: 1883 - 84.

100

were much required for ship building activities (Rangarajan, 1996: 19). The Indian

Teak and Sal became the prime attraction of British Navy and ships building work

gained momentum in both east and west coasts of India. The Indian forests suffered

the most during the period of two world wars due to such timber extraction for ship

building activities. Thirdly, the British desire to consolidate their power by extending

cultivation had also its impact on Indian forest. The need for greater revenue from

agricultural land resulted in clearing off of forests and converting them into cultivable

land for taxation.

The above three processes resulted in large scale deforestation and the

immediate problem before the British was then as to how best to manage and control

the tree wealth, which no longer then had remained as an inexhaustible resource. Such

a situation finally resulted in the introduction of scientific management of forests in

India and the first ever Indian Forest Act, 1865. The 1865 Act adopted conservationist

measures to protect the forest resources from large-scale deforestation, by establishing

state control over the forestlands. The Act is rightly considered as 'the first step

towards rule of property for the forests of British India' (Rangarajan, 1996: 30). The

plans to complete state control of forestland and thereby reducing the customary

rights of forest dependent communities generated a conflicting response among the

then British officials. The responses varied from total state control of all forest and

wastelands to self-regulation of forest by village communities. In the then British

administration, on the one hand there were officials like B. H. Baden-Powel, who

intended to extend state control over all uncultivated lands, while, on the other,

another section of officials like Sir Henry Maine and Dalyell had criticised the very

idea of state control, and were of the opinion that expropriation of forest would

damage the tribal interests and rights to land and forest produces (Rangarajan, 1996:

30 - I).

However, the then Inspector General of Forests Dietrich Brandis, adopted a

middle path of 'selective annexation of those areas, which were vital for commercial,

strategic or climatic reasons' (Guha, 1990: 83 - 4), and accordingly, the Indian Forest

Act, 1865 was revised in 1878. The 1878 Forest Act ensured that the state could

demarcate and establish its monopoly control over valuable tracts of forest, needed

especially for strategic purposcs. The long-standing claims of local communities over

101

forests were curtailed and the state control over forest resources was marked by the

new forcst Act. The revised Forest Act of 1878 successfully established complete

state monopoly over country's forest resources and classified it into three categories,

namely, reserved forests, protected forests and village forests.

Keeping in mind various provisions of the earlier two Forest Acts, the colonial

government, as a part of its forest managcment initiatives, formulated a Forest Policy

in 1894 indicating various plans and priorities of the state in the forestry sector. The

forest policy of 1894 gave primacy to agriculture and provided for liberal diversion of

forestland and whenever required for the purpose of agriculture. The 1894 Forest

Policy broadly classified the forest into four categories, first, forests, the preservation

of which was essential on climatic grounds; second, forest, which afforded a supply of

valuable timber for commercial purposes; third, minor forest, which provided fuel and

fodder for local consumption; and fourth, pastures and grazing grounds (Rai and

Sharmah, 1998).

The main objective of the forest management during the colonial period, as

evident from the forest policy and the forest acts, was sustained production of

preferred timber species. Forests in India contained a large number of timbers species,

only a few of which were marketable having some commercial value. The rest trees,

shrubs and herbs, which did not have a commercial value at that point of time were

regarded as weeds and thus were removed mercilessly giving enough space to

preferred species to grow. The scientific management aimed at converting the mixed

forest crops into almost pure even-aged artificial entities consisting largely of

preferred species. This design was conceived mainly to simplify management and

ensure supply of equal quantity of timber to the industry year after year.

Besides the alarming deforestation as a result of railway expanSIOn, ship

building activities for Royal Navy and clearance of forest areas for agricultural

extension, the introduction of conservationist measures by the scientific management

of India's forests has had significant consequences upon the life of the people as a

whole and particularly those dependent upon forests for daily livelihood requirements.

102

To begin with, the commercial forestry introduced by the British transformed

the inexhaustible forest resource of India into one of limited resource. The age-old

relationship of mutuality between forest dwellers and forests was broken down,

lebelling the forest dwellers as intruders and destroyers of forests. The traditional

patterns of forest use and practices, and protection system also broke down as

indigenous rights declined. The social authority and religious sanction to control

access and protection of forest were lost (Poffenberger et at., 1996: 20). Further, the

Indian Forest Act 1878 ignored all communal ownerships and communal use of the

forest areas, and in certain case granted individual concessions to some forest

produces. Such a transition from collective to individual use of forest resulted in a

'functional damage to agrarian life and breaking down of a well established and

socially codified link between man and forest' (Guha, 1985: 1946).

The colonial forest policy, which recognised only individual rights of forest

use, initiated the process of fragmentation of the community and erosion of social

bonds. This erosion of social bonds, which had regulated the customary use of the

forests led to what Guha (1983, 1985, 1989) describes as an . alienation of man from

nature'. This alienation, when became extreme, resulted in people del,'Tading their

own surroundings in which they once lived in symbiosis (Guha, 1989: 58).

Secondly, the scientific forestry, which draws much of its influence from

earlier colonial forest policies, declared the production of a handful of timber species

as the goal of the forest management. Only those species with a commercial value,

were selected and taken care of, and the trees, shrubs and herbs, which did not have a

commercial value at that point of time, were regarded as weeds and were removed

creating space for marketable species (Guha, 1985, 1989). Thus began the dilution of

biodiversity, disturbing the balance among various ecological subsystems.21

Broadly speaking, the forestry debate of the colonial period revolved around

two schools of thought. On the one hand, there are scholars like Ramchandra Guha

and Madhav Gadgil, who describe the colonial period as an 'onslaught on India's

21 However, Rangarajan, 1996: 6 challenges such a claim of Guha of distinguishing commercially valuable trees vital to foresters and multi-species forest crucial for subsistence.

103

forests' and highlight the ever-increasing process of deforestation, which they opined

occurred to satisfy the strategic needs of the colonial state/government. According to

this school of thought, the negative attitude of the British towards the forest resource

- which they inherited from their historical experience - and the process of railway

and agricultural expansion and ship building activities led to large-scale deforestation

of India's forests, which forced the British government to adopt conservationist

measures, which had significant bearing upon the social life of agrarian and forest

dependent communities of colonial India.

The second school of thought of environmental history of India, represented

mainly by the works of Richard Grove, however, challenges the basic assumption

made by Guha regarding the character and chronology of colonial conservation.

Grove (1995, 1998), pointing towards the conservationist measures of colonial

government, states that colonial conservation has had much more wider reasons than

the narrow justification for fulfilling the strategic and commercial interests of the

empire in obtaining timber, a claim much popularly held by Guha and others.

Contrary to the first school of thought's claim of 'ecological prudence' (see,

Gadgil, 1985), Grove claims that deforestation had assumed significant proportion

even before the beginning of colonial rule. JustifYing the conservationist policies of

colonial state, Grove states that 'the fear of famine, climate change, and gross agrarian

failure, which were resultant features of ongoing deforestation, was a vital factor in

bringing about policies for forest, soil and water conservation' (Grove, 1998: 2). He

points out to the then prevailing ecological conditions, which emerged due to the

large-scale deforestation during the pre-colonial period, particularly in the Mughal

period, for which the colonial state has had to come out with conservation policies.

Two prominent ecological conditions, namely, soil erosion, which had become

prominent in India by 1920s, and the fear of widespread climate change, forced the

colonial state to comply with conservationist prescriptions. Colonial conservation,

may thus be understood, as Grove insists, 'as a state response to ecological crisis

emerged at the economic periphery rather than at the metropolitan centre' (Grove,

1998: 85).

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4.1. 2. Forestry in Independent India

The policy of commercialisation, which was at the centre of the forest management

during the Raj, was reinforced, intensified and extended even after independence. The

legal successor to the colonial state - the political and economic elites of modem

independent India - continued to rely on earlier colonial legal usurpation and

reinforced the rights of the state to exclusive control over forest protection and

management. Forest laws and policies were promulgated on the assumption that

national interest was best served by capitalising natural resources for consumer goods

and international market. That was the time when India was modernising its economy

through infrastructural and industrial developments. Forest based industries expanded

with the country's march towards modernisation; and handsome state subsidies were

given as incentives in the supply of forest raw materials to the pulp and rayon

industries (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 186; Guha, 1989).

Besides its social impacts that Ramachandra Guha and Madhav Gadgil point

out, colonial treatment of India's forest had significant impact upon the physical

conditions of the total forest cover of the country. India, after independence, inherited

forests over-exploited due to two World Wars. By the time of independence, 9 million

hectares of private forests had been devastated owing to merciless cutting by the

British for personal profit and greed (Shah, 1998: 432). The main thrust, therefore, of

the then Government of India was to rehabilitate the vast degraded forest areas and

also, at the same time, to increase the production of industrial wood to generate

greater revenue. It was in this context that the National Forest Policy of 1952, the first

of its kind in independent India, was enunciated and sustained production of industrial

timber was made the primary national goal.

4.1.2. a) The National Forest Policy, 1952

A new national forest policy was lunched in 1952 for proper management of India's

forest so as to derive maximum benefit from them. The policy stressed on maintaining

60 per cent of the geographical land in hilly regions and 20 per cent land in plain land

under forest cover. Unlike the previous Forest Policy of 1894, which gave primacy to

agriculture, the new policy discouraged indiscriminate extension of agricultural land

by clearing forest cover (Rai and Shannah, 1998). The policy gave primacy to

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national interest and sustained yield of timber, even though there were provisions for

local communities to derive benefits from the local forest resource. To speak in a

nutshell, the basic tenets of the forest policy of 1952 were the following:

• To evolve a system of balanced and complementary land use, in which the land is to be allotted to that type of use, which will produce the most and deteriorate the least.

• To check the denudation of hilly areas to prevent soil erosion. • To establish tree-lands by affforestation measures for the amelioration of

physical and climatic conditions promoting the general well-being of people. • To ensure increased supply of fuel wood, fodder and small wood for

agricultural implements. • To ensure sustained supply of timber and other forest produces required for

defence, communication and industry. • To generate maximum annual revenue for the nation from the forest resources.

The 1952 Forest Policy has been criticised from two important angles. First,

the new policy document was based upon the principles of the earlier Forest Policy of

1894. In a similar fashion to the 1894 policy, the National Forest Policy of 1952 was

an 'explicit assertion of state monopoly right at the expense of the forest dependent

communities' (Guha, 1983: 1888). Such marginalisation of rights of forest dependent

communities was justified in the name of 'national interest', which was placed much

higher in comparison to secondary interest of any particular community. The policy

document stated that "the country as a whole should not be deprived of a "national

asset" by the mere accident of a village being situated closer to a forest area' (GOI,

1952). Thus acceptance of colonial norms with regard to establishment of state

monopoly in forest management practices, without questioning, characterised the first

ever forest policy of independent India.

Secondly, the basic objectives of the policy, as mentioned in the prevIOus

paragraph, were hardly compatible with one another. The sixth objective of realising

maximum revenue from the forestland could hardly be stated in compatible with the

other five objectives. Again the objective of sustained supply of timber for defence,

communication industry came in the way of increased supply of fuel, fodder and

small timber for agriculture to the forest dependent communities. Finally, there was

no clear-cut priority being assigned to the objectives in the policy document.

106

4.1.2 b) From Conservation-Oriented Forestry to Production Forestry

The attempt towards monopoly control of India's forest took a wider dimension in

1956, after the annexation of princely states into the Republic of India. The private

forests, which were earlier in the hands of big Zamindars and the princely states, came

under the jurisdiction of Government of India. Since then, organised efforts began in

real sense to manage India's forests with a strong administrative set up (Rawat, 1998:

367).

In a significant move, at around 1960, the Government of India appointed Dr.

Von Mon Roy, an expert of forest industries, to give an assessment of the country's

raw material situation. He strongly recommended creation of large-scale plantation of

quick growing species like 'Eucalyptus' (Shah, 1995: 9). The then forest officials

opined that "the extreme low productivity of India's forests was due to the

uneconomic and conservation-oriented approach that had characterised Indian

forestry, which has now to be shifted to policies based on the production of

economically attractive resources through plantation of quick growing and high­

yielding tree species' (Guha, 1983: 1889). Thus was born the large-scale monoculture

plantation of Eucalyptus, creating a landmark in the history of forest management in

India. The strategy of the forest management in the early independence period was

production of more and more commercially valuable species and clear-cut the existing

forests and replace them with industrial wood, in as short a time as possible. Hence,

large-scale plantation of quick growing species like Eucalyptus and tropical-pine was

made.

The report of National Commission on Agriculture (1976) was another

landmark of change in forest management of post-independent India. Preoccupied

with the notion of development and industrial production it focused on conversion of

mixed miscellaneous types of forests, which contained highest biodiversity but little

commercial value, into man made forests of commercial species. NCA recommended

the 'Social Forestry' programme in its first mid-term report in 1972 on all wastelands.

The idea was to meet the needs of the people by creating resources at their doorstep,

on community land and with their involvement. It was also assumed that social

forestry would rescue traditional forest by reducing the pressure on them. The

107

plantation activity spread rapidly from 52,000 ha. planted in 1951-56 to 2,148,000 ha.

in 1979-84 (Shah, 1996: 24).

The evolution of the India's experience with 'social forestry' programme was

based on the rhetoric, which analysed the problem of deforestation being caused by

the actions of the rural poor (Agarwal, 1986; Blair, 1986; Saxena, 1991; Tewari,

1991). The alarming rate of deforestation in the early years of independent India was

thought to be generated by the increasing number of human and livestock population

in the rural areas. It was believed that the rural poor in search of their livelihood

engaged in deforestation and degradation of forest areas of the vicinity. This resulted

in environmental deterioration, drought and soil erosion (Tewari, 1991: 294). In such

a situation, social forestry was envisioned as a solution to fuel wood crisis and

environmental degradation. Social forestry was expected to reduce pressure from

natural forests by generating the resources at the door-steps of communities, for

which they depend and destroy the forest (NCA, 1976).

Broadly speaking, there were three factors, which had significant bearing upon

the forest management policies of independent India up to the period of 1980s. First

and foremost factor has been the soft attitude towards the process of industrialisation

and large-scale growth of wood based industries. Soon after independence a large

number of wood based industries grew up in consonance with India's march towards

industrial development. For example, the paper industry, which derived substantial

part of its raw material from the forest, has increased its production from 92,800

tonnes in 1948 to over one million tonnes in 1978 (Guha, 1983: 1888). Such growth

of paper and other wood based industries resulted in greater demand for raw material,

ultimately resulting in large-scale deforestation.

The second factor to characterise the early decades of forestry in independent

India was the changing strategy towards 'production forestry'. The expanding process

of industrialisation soon after independence required huge production ofraw material

in the shortest period and with a lowest possible cost. Being faced with the challenge

of greater fuel wood and raw material production to support the industries, the forest

management practice took a dynamic tum towards 'production forestry' in contrast to

the 'conservationist approach' of the colonial age. The National Commission of

lOR

Agriculture legitimised such an attempt of the then forests by outlining a new strategy

to forest management, whose first element 'should have to be production forestry for

industrial wood production' (NCA, 1976: 39).

Thirdly, the launching of 'Social Forestry' programme oflate 70s, had been an

important feature in the forest management in the early decade of independent India.

The programme was designed to rescue traditional forest by reducing the increasing

pressure on them. However, the great aims of social forestry programme had been

criticised by several scholars, who viewed social forestry as merely 'production

forestry in another name'. Out of its three components, i.e., Farm Forestry (plantation

in private plots), Village Woodlots (plantation in village common lands and

wastelands), and Street Plantation (plantation in roadsides and railway tracks); only

the first one was highly successful, which resulted in large scale eucalyptus plantation

in agricultural lands and supply of raw materials to wood based industries, though the

stated aim of Social Forestry were quite different, such as supplying fuel, fodder and

small timbcr to agriculturalists. The rich farmers took maximum advantages form the

social forestry scheme and converted their agricultural land into plantation of fast

growing species that could serve the wood based industry, thus generating maximum

profit and avoiding labour problem (Mukherji, 1995: 33). Social Forestry was, thus,

visualised by scholars as yet anothcr step towards the 'industrial orientation of Indian

forestry', which aimed at increasing supply of raw materials to the pulp and rayon

industries (Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 189). Besides, the large-scale eucalyptus

plantation, through Social Forestry programme and more particularly through Farm

Forestry programme, had also been criticised for its role in rapid depletion of soil

nutrients, declining of food production, exhausting the ground water, etc.

4.1.3. Forestry in Pre-Independent and Independent India: A Comparison

There seems to be a continuity between the basic tenets of forest management

practices of the pre-independent India and that of independent India up to the period

of 1980s. This continuity may be located within the broader discourse of

'development', which had a continued feature in both colonial and independent India.

Even after independence, the state continued to be the sole mentor of delivering the

process of development and thereby capitalising the maximum benefit out of the

developmental process. The only difference cited between these two periods in the

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context of development was that while the policies in the earlier period favoured the

British, later, it was the economic and political elites of modem India who were

successful in manipulating the policies in their favour (Baviskar, 1995).22

The establishment of state monopoly over the forest areas - a factor common

to both colonial and early decades of independent India - has always resulted in the

marginalisation of the interests of the forest dependent communities. The forest

policies, even after independence, were formulated in such a way as to best serve the

interests of the state and its allies. Reiterating the primacy of state interests over the

interests of the forest dependent communities, Guha states:

, The dominant interests behind the formation and execution of state policy have differed. While. before 1947 forests were a strategic raw material cl1lcial for imperial interests such railway expansion and world wars, in the post-independent period it has been the commercial and industrial interests who dictated forest policy. In both cases, however, the successful implementation of the policy has been achieved only at the expense of the forest communities and their life-support systems' (1983: 1892 - 3).

The forest management practices in independent India did not represent a

sharp departure from that of the colonial period. Whatever changes were made since

independence till the beginning of 1980s, were largely limited to modification and

additions, while the basic objective had remained the same. Guha (1983) identifies

another characteristic feature of continuity between the forest policies of the two

periods, i.e., the 'disjuncture between the theory and practice in the policies'. There

was a sharp distinction between policy formulation and its implementation in the

forest policies of India in both the periods. The populist measures of recognising the

needs and interest of forest dependent communities had always found a place in the

forest policies of our country. Even the Forest Policy of 1894 had included features

like 'promotion of general well-being of the country', 'fulfillment of the needs of the

people', etc., and in the 1952 policy in independent India, there were provisions for

ensuring increasing the supply of fuel wood, fodder and small wood for agricultural

implements of rural population (Rai and Sharmah, 1998). However, in their actual

implementation such objectives were strategically ignored.

22 For a critique of national development policies since independence and its continuity with the colonial period, see, Baviskar, 1995: chapter - 2.

ItO

4.1.4. Emergence of a Fresh Approach

The beginning of 1980s saw a paradigm shift in the forest policies of independent

India. Even the social forestry programme of 1970s could not achieve much success

with regard to solving the problems of degradation and deforestation of India's

forestlands. The increasing rates of deforestation, loss of biodiversity, recurrent

droughts and publication of research reports showing the degradation of forests by

several civil society and research organisations created a platform to reconsider the

forest policies and forest management practices of our country during the early

1980s.23 Further, the marginalisation of rights of the forest dependent communities

and the large-scale deforestation, which further curtailed their share of forestland, had

resulted in varying kinds of responses from the deprived communities - sometimes

limited to particular geographical locations and other times at a larger national level.

Organised protests and struggles in relation to exploitative policy of the Government

became manifest in many parts of the country. The most celebrated was the 'Chipko

Movement' in northern India, where local people embraced the trees targeted for

cutting by commercial loggers. Besides reveling the socio-environmental devastations

being wrought by Government policies, these movements brought into focus the

potential benefits of community management. 24 Taking all these matters into

consideration, a need was felt by the development planners and foresters for a revised

approach in forest management and policy. It was affirmed that Forest Department

had failed to improve the forests on its own, despite total control over the forestland.

The experience of scientific management of forests in India has made one

thing clear that neither people themselves nor the Forest Department alone can stop

degradation of the forests. As a consequence, it was felt necessary to combine the

efforts of the two to manage the forests efl'ectively for mutual benefit. The

Government of India realised this need and the revised National Forest Policy was

21 Perhaps the publication of 'The State of India's Environment: A citizens Report' in 1984 and 'The State of India's Environment: A Second Citizens Report' in 1985, by a Delhi based NGO Center for Science and Environment (CSE, 19R4, 1985), was the first organised attempt by any civil society organisation to publicise the degrading conditions of India's forest resources.

24 More than a protest against commercial forestry, the 'Chipko Movement' was viewed by some scholars as an assertion of community control over forest resources (Lynch and Talbot, 1995: 5-6). Even Guha considers the Chipko movement as local peasant protest against marginalisation of their source of livelihood and for having access to forests (see, Guha, 1989).

III

cnacted in 1988, prohibiting the clear cutting of well-stocked natural forests and

banning plantation of exotic species.

4.1.5. The National Forest Policy, 1988

One of the important factors, which distinguished the new policy from that of the

1952, is its approach towards sustainability. Unlike the previous policy of 1952,

which was primarily production oriented, the new policy has given much priority to

environmental stability, soil conservation, maintenance of ecological balance and

abovc all meeting the subsistence requirements of the local people. The policy set the

national goal of having one-third of the total geographical area under the forest cover.

The basic objectives of the National Forest Policy, 1988 may be stated as the

following (GOI, 1988):

• To maintain environmental stability through preservation and restoration of the ecological balance.

• To conserve the natural heritage of the country by preserving the remaining natural forests with vast variety of flora and fauna.

• To check soil erosion and denudation in the catchment areas of rivers, lakes, reservoirs in the interest of soil and water conservation, for mitigating floods and draughts and for the retardation of siltation of reservoirs.

• To increasc substantially the forest cover through massive afforestation and social forcstry programmes.

• To meeting the requirement of fuelwood, fodder, minor forest produce and small timber of the rural and tribal population.

• To increase the productivity of forests to meet the essential national needs. • To create a massive people's movement with the involvement of women, for

achieving these objectives and to minimise pressure on existing forests.

The revised policy strongly felt that people who were living in and around forests

must have a stake on the forests and the aspirations of such people must be met.

Further, environmental stability and maintenance of subsistence requirements of local

pcoplc were seen above earning revenue from the forests. Thus, mono-cultural

plantation was discouraged and mixed forests were preferred. With this the focus

shifted fonn 'commerce' and 'industry' to 'ecology' and satisfying the basic needs of

the people, providing fuel wood, fodder and strengthening forcst-tribal linkage.

[n the changing scenario, with the awakening of environmental awareness and

passing of the New Forest Policy of 1988, the tenn 'conservation' received a wider

112

connotation. The attention now shifted from 'preservation of forests' for industrial

and other commercial use to 'sustainable management of forests' through

conservation and sustainable utilisation, which could fulfill the present and future

needs of the local people and the national interests as well. While the earlier

conservationist policies debarred the local people from gaining access to forest lands,

the later management techniques created space for involvement of local people, local

knowledge and local wisdom in a wider range of activities such as preservation,

maintenance, sustainable utilisation, restoration and enhancement of forest resources.

4.1.6. Evolution of Joint Forest Management

The years following the launching of the National Forest Policy, 1988 have been a

period of great development in Indian forest history. Several attempts have been made

to come out with policy resolutions in conformity with the objectives of the new

forest policy, one of which is the implementation of the Joint Forest Management

(JFM) Programme. The historical ground for the JFM was prepared by the New

Forest Policy, 1988, which emphasised environmental protection, meeting the

requirements of fuel wood, fodder, minor forest produces (MFP) and small timber for

rural and tribal population; and creating massive people's movement with

involvement of women for achieving these objectives. On June 1, 1990, the

Government of India adopted a National Joint Forest Management Resolution, which

set guidelines for partnership between local communities and state Forest Department

for the protection and management of state owned forests through Forest Protection

Committees. In a radical departure from earlier focus on policing and protection of

state owned forests, the new approach emphasised the shared responsibility for

management and sharing of profits with the local communities.

The genesis of the JFM can be seen in two sources. On the one hand, it is

located in the efforts of some progressive Foresters to form forest protection

committees (FPCs), particularly in west Bengal. Here, the Arabari Project initiated by

Dr. Ajit Banerjee is widely cited as a classic example (see, Campbell, 1992). When

the Arabari experiment was successful in protecting forests by the FPCs, other forest

officers too adopted the approach widely leading to a rapid spread of JFM. On the

other hand, a growing body of research argued that JFM represented a spontaneous

reemergence of community forest management in the region, or a reassertion of tribal

113

autonomy movements, which had a long history in the regIOn (Deb, 1993 and

Poffenberger et al., 1996). Giving a subaltern approach to the origin of JFM, Deb

(1993) writes:

" ... a thread of the sense and intention of an community control of the forests seems to have been spun ji-om the popular spirit of indigenous peoples' movement in the region" (Deb, 1993: 371).

JFM represents a significant policy shift In the Indian forest management

system, which can be best illustrated by comparing it with earlier policies. Comparing

it with the earlier practices of forest management, Joshi (1998: 4 - 5) identifies the

following distinguishing features that sharply differ from the earlier policies.

• From production for commercial market and to generate revenue, to production for fulfilling the basic needs of the forest dependent people,

• From an exclusive focus on timber to focus on Non Timber Forest Products (NTFP) like fuel wood, fodder, etc. which are central to the livelihood of forest dependents,

• From monoculture to mixed forests that includes a diversity of tree species, • From plantation of similar age to plantation of diverse age for sustained supply of

timber and other forest products to meet the needs of the forest dependent, • From authoritarian administration through policing to participatory management

through sharing, • From dc-empowering people to empowerment of people.

In the new JFM model, people dependent on forests are to be consulted and

their views are to be taken as the basis to plan the management of forests. The

execution of management plan is to be done through Village Forest Committees,

which will be constituted by taking two members from each family (one male and one

female), maintaining complete transparency in all matters. The Forest Department is

to provide necessary funds for various activities in the forest to the village forest

committee and also essential technical guidance. Contractors are not to be brought for

execution of works. Species selection for planting is to be made only as per people's

preference. The people are entitled to take the usufruct right free of cost. They are

also entitled to take a share in timber and other major forest products when harvested

as per JFM plans (Mukherji, 1995: 35).

Having discussed the evolution of JFM in India from a historical perspective,

by tracing the history of forest management since the colonial rule, let me now move

114

forward to deal with the specific data pertaining to the state of Orissa. Though the

basic objective of forest management in both colonial and post-colonial periods in the

state of Orissa is not very much different from that of the all India situation, yet there

are some particular happenings in the state, which distinguishes it from the rest of

India. The remaining sections of the chapter attempts to historically analyse the

process of people's involvement in the forest management, which finally took the

shape of Joint Forest Management.

4.2. The History of Forest Management in Orissa and the Evolution of JFM

4.2.1. Forestry in Pre-Independent Orissa

The history of formation of Orissa as a separate State and the history of forest

management had coexisted in the pre-colonial period. Prior to being a separate State,

several parts of Orissa were under the then British Indian Provinces of Madras,

Central Province and Bengal and Bihar Presidency. On April I, 1912, the Province of

Bihar and Orissa was created bringing together parts of Bengal Presidency and

Central Province. It was only in April 1936, that the present State of Orissa was born

as a new Province of British-India by separating Orissa from the combined State of

Bihar and Orissa, and then combining with it some of the Oriya-speaking areas of the

then adjoining States of Madras Presidency and Central Province. Thus, an organised

attempt to manage the forests Statewide by establishing monopoly through reservation

of the forests started in 1936 with the creation of Orissa as a separate State.

Given the dispersed nature of Orissa under colonial rule, forest management

too had a varying origin. Forest management started in Orissa more than a century

ago during 1883 - 84, when it was a part of Bengal Presidency. For the first time, in

1884, the 'Orissa Forest Division' was constituted for both Bihar and Orissa at Angul

(Dhenkanal District) under the administrative control of the Conservator of Forest of

Bengal Presidency with the headquarters at Darjeeling; and forest blocks were

declared as Reserved Forests under the Indian Forest Act, 1878, with effect from

January I, 1884. The total area of Reserved Forests of Orissa Forest Division at Angul

was 692 sq. km. (Padhi, 1984: 180). Demarcation of forest areas for settlement and

reservation was the main focus of the then management strategy. Notifications were

liS

issued in this regard in Angul and Khurda. By 1888 - 89. there were a total of 968.6

sq. km. of Reserved Forests in Orissa Forest Division. In 1891 - 92. the Orissa Forest

Division was divided into two subdivisions, namely, Angul and Khurda. with

Reserved Forests of 725 and 303 sq. km respectively (RCDC. 1996: 3).

Out of the total of seven Forest Divisions of the newly formed Province \If

Bihar and Orissa, there were three Divisions in the Orissa part. namely. An/:,'lli. Pun

and Sambalpur, with a total of 1,920 sq. km of Reserved Forests and 2,769 sq. km of

Protected Forests under its administration (RCDC, 1996: 4). Before being a part of

Bihar-Orissa Province, Sambalpur was in Central Province, where the Sambalpur

Forest Division was already existing since 1887. The old Sambalpur Division had a

vast geographical area with scattered forest patches. Thus, the Division was bi furcated

into Sambalpur East and Sambalpur West with effect from April I, 1928 for efficient

management.

Forest management in the true sense, started in Orissa with the reorganisation

of the State as a separate Province on April I, 1936. In that year a Forest Department

was formed under a Conservator of Forests with headquarters at Angul. With the

merger of Ganjam district with the new Province, Ganjam and Parlakhemundi

Divisions were transferred to Orissa from Madras Presidency. Forest administration in

Ganjam started from 1885-86, and by 1906 almost all forest blocks were reserved

under the Madras Forest Act, 1882. In 1936, Sambalpur East and Sambalpur West

were renamed Sambalpur and Barapahar Division. In 1938, Ganjam and

Parlakhemundi Divisions were reorganised with effect from January 3, 1938, into four

divisions, namely, Russelkonda, Chhatrapur, Parlakhemundi and Baliguda. Later,

Russelkonda and Chhatrapur were renamed Ghumsor North and Ghumsor South with

effect from April I, 1941. In October 1945, Baliguda Division was divided into

Baliguda and Udayagiri Division. Thus, by the time India got independence, there

were nine Forest Divisions in Orissa, namely, Angul, Puri, Sambalpur, Barapahar,

Parlakhemundi, Ghumsor North, Ghumsor South, Baliguda and Udayagiri Divisions,

with Reserved Forests of 3,615.6 sq. km, Demarcated Protected Forests of 541.3 sq.

km and Reserved land of 3,286.7 sq. km, making a total of 7443.6 sq. km forest area

(RCDC, 1996: 4).

116

4.2.2 The Post-Independence Period

4.2.2. a) The Period of State Monopoly (1947 - 85)

The major factors affecting forest administration and management in post­

independence Orissa have been merger of ex-princely and ex-zamindari areas with the

State, the enactment of Orissa Forest Act, 1972, and several other Government

resolutions. Several feudatory States were merged with the State of Orissa with

independence, as a result of which the forest areas under their control also came into

the hands of the Orissa Government. To prevent these rulers of ex-princely Statcs

from destroying or selling away the forestlands in their territory, two important Acts

were passed soon after independence - the 'Orissa Preservation of Private Forests

Act' in 1947, which prohibited the owners (mainly rulers of princely States) of any

forest 'to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise alienate whole or any portion of the forest

area'; and the 'Orissa Communal Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation)

Act' in 1948, which came into force with effect from February 5, 1948. This Act

prohibited any landlord 'to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise assign or alienate or

convert any communal forest or private lands into Raiya/i land or create occupancy

right there in'.

In 1948, 25 feudatory States merged with Orissa and the extent of forest area

under the control of Government increased. After the merger of the princely State of

Mayurbhanj in January 1949, the Reserved Forest areas including the Demarcated

Protected Forests and Reserved lands totalled 26,332.5 sq. km. In this year, the

headquarters of Forest Department shifted from Angul to Cuttack, the then State

capital. Before being a part of Orissa State, these ex-States had their own separate

forest administration under their respective kings. In some of the big ex-States like

Mayurbhanj and Bolangir-Patna, there were full-fledged Forest Department with rules

and regulations for management of forests almost similar to those in vogue in the

British-Indian Provinces. These princely States belonged to a political group called

'Eastern States Agency of Orissa and Chhatisgarh Districts' under a political agent

with headquarters at Sambalpur. A Conservator of Forests was posted at Sambalpur,

who was acting as Forest Advisor to princely States except Mayurbhanj.

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In the mid-fifties, another important event took place in the history of forest

management of the State. With the abolition of the Zamindari system in 1952, the

forest areas under the Zamindars came under the direct control of the Government.

Though most of the Zamindars vested in the Government of Orissa since November

27, 1952, the management of forest areas under these Zamindaris continued to be

under Allchal Sasall (regional administration) till November 14, 1957. From

November IS, 1957 these forests were transferred to the Forest Department,

Government of Orissa. With the merger of ex-princely and ex-Zamindari areas into

the State of Orissa, the total forest area increased from 7,443.6 sq. km to 65,677.76 sq.

km by 1959.

Even though Orissa became a separate State in 1936, there was no single

unified forest management practice in the State. The independent State Government

also did not pay any attention in this regard. It was only in 1959, that the State

Government appointed a Forest Enquiry Committee, which in its report observed that

the total forest area was 65,677.7 sq. kms, constituting about 42 per cent of the total

land area of the State. Thus, for the first time in 1959, the legal status of different

types of forests under the administration of the State of Orissa as a whole came into

the picture (see Table 4.1 below).

Table 4.1: Legal Status of Forests in Orissa in 1959

Type of Forest Area (in sq. km) Reserved Forest (A Class) 20,619.09 Reserved Forest (8 Class) 1,865.44 Reserved Land 2,495.02 Demarcated Protected Forest 537.83 Un-demarcated Protected Forest, unreserved 19,840.25 lands, Khesra Forest and un-classed Forests Ex-zamindari Forest 20,132.45 Private Forests 187.64 Total 65,677.72

Source: (Padhi. 1984)

However, most of the areas under un-Reserved, Khesra Forests, un­

Demarcated Protected Forests, un-Reserved Lands and open forests including those of

the ex-Zamindari areas were only barren land and hills without vegetation, although

they were called 'forests' under the law.

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One of the important recommendations of the Forest Enquiry Committee was

the passing of a unified Forest Act to be applied to the whole State of Orissa. In the

absence of a single Forest Act for the whole State, there were two Forest Acts

applicable to the State till 1972. The Madras Forest Act, 1882 was in force in the

districts of Ganjam, Koraput, Baliguda and some areas of Kandhamal district,

whereas Indian Forest Act, 1927 was applicable to the rest of the State. Under Madras

Forest Act, 1882, there were two categories of forests: Reserved Forests and

Unreserved Forests. Different princely States and ex-Zamindari areas in the above

mentioned districts framed their own rules under the Madras Forest Act, 1882. Under

the Indian Forest Act, 1927, there were three categories of forests: Reserved Forests,

Village Forests and Protected Forests. However, in practice, no Village Forest was

formed in Orissa till 1972. Protected areas were managed differently in different areas

by rules framed under Indian Forest Act, 1927. For example, while there were

demarcated Protected Forests in Angul and Khurda, no such forests existed in

Sambalpur.

The existence of two different Acts within a State often created confusion and

administrative difficulties. It imposed extra strain on the Governrnent machinery.

Thus, it was felt that this could be avoided by one unified Forest Act. Consequently,

Orissa Forest Bill was introduced in the State Legislative Assembly in 1942.

However, owing to certain controversies, the Bill was dropped. Finally, in 1954, the

Indian Forest Act (Orissa Amendment) was passed as a follow-up of the Indian Forest

Act, 1927, as applicable to Orissa. Before the enactment of the Orissa Amendment

Act, 1954, there were Reserved Forests under both Madras Forest Act, 1882 and

Indian Forest Act, 1927; Reserved Lands and Unreserved Lands under Madras Forest

Act and Demarcated Protected Forests and Un-demarcated Protected Forests under

Indian Forest Act, 1927. Recall that in the princely States there were A and B type

Reserved Forests and Khesra Forests. The Khesra Forests were named differently in

different localities, e.g., Sadharan Forests. Katra. Krisi. Gramya lungle. etc; which

were meant for the fulfillment of requirements of the local people. However, with the

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amendment of Indian Forest Act in 1954, all Reserved Forests, whether A or B,

became Reserved Forests and the Khesra Forests were declared as Protected Forests.25

In a similar fashion to the all India situation, where the policy of

commercialisation in forestry sector continued even after independence, the Orissa

government continued to rely on the earlier colonial legal framework, thus reinforcing

the rights of the State to exclusive control over forest protection and management.

The 1954 Orissa Amendment of Indian Forest Act brought more and more forest

areas under Reserved category, depriving a large number of local communities of the

usufruct rights and concessions that they enjoyed earlier. Moreover, by declaring

Khesra Forests as Protected Forests, the rights and concessions of local people were

further curtailed. Though there were provisions for Village Forests in the Indian

Forest Act, 1927, they were only on paper, as is evident from the report of the Forest

Enquiry Committee, 1959, which did not recognise any existence of such Village

Forests in Orissa.

Though the Forest Enquiry Committee, 1959, recommended a unified forest

Act, it took thirteen years for the Orissa Government to materialise the Act, when in

1972 Orissa Forest Act was passed. But the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 did not have any

new promise for the forest-dependent communities of Orissa, rather it re-established

the colonial legacy. The forest areas that were already declared as Reserved Forests

and Protected Forests under the Indian Forest Act and the Madras Forest Act

remained the same under the new Act. The draft bill of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972

had freely drawn from the Madras Forest Act and other existing State Forest Acts and

followed the sequence of Indian Forest Act, 1927.

For administrative convenience, the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 had divided the

total forest area into three categories, such as Reserved Forests, Village Forests and

Protected Forests. Chapter II of the Act was devoted to the Reserved Forests,

25 Property rights over the forestland detennine the difference between different types of forests, such as Reserved, Protected or Village. While in the case of Reserved Forest, the Forest Department enjoys property rights over the forestland, in Protected Forests, the management rights and responsibilities of the forest are conferred on Forest Department. whereas the property rights on land remain with the Revenue Department.

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according to which the State Government was conferred with the power to declare

any land as Reserved Forest, in lands which were the property of Government or over

which the Government had property rights. Once declared as Reserved Forest, the

Government enjoyed monopoly rights not only on the physical area of the forest, but

also on the trees and other forest produce therein. The sheer monopoly of rights was

visible from the fact that under Section 26 of the Act, a Divisional Forest Officer was

empowered to close any public or private way or watercourse or stop use of water by

any people inside a Rescrve Forest without the previous sanction of the State

Government. Although there was a provision in thc same section that such an action

could be taken, if a substitute arrangement for the similar already existed, it was the

State Government, which had to be reasonably convinced about such alternatives, not

the common people, who are the real users of the resource. Entering into the forest

area, which was declared as reserved, grazing cattle in it and/or using any forest

produce was also regardcd as an offence, punishable under section 27 of the Act.

Chapter III of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 was devoted to 'Village Forests'

with only three sections in it (Section 30 - 32). Even though the Act spoke of the

formation of Village Forests and vested the responsibility of management of such

forests with the village communities, it was silent about the details of such

management by them. The details pertaining to how the Village Forest Protection

Committee would be constituted, their rights, duties and responsibilities or how it

would share benefits from such forestland were also not dealt within the Act. Instead,

the State was given powers to declare all or any provisions of the rules for Reserved

Forests as being applicable to the Village Forest, thereby extending its rights to

Village Forests also.

The legislation regarding 'Protected Forests' was dealt with in Chapter IV of

the Orissa Forest Act, 1972. Under Section 33 of the Act, the State Government was

vested with power to declare any land that was not included in the Reserved Forests,

but which was the property of the Government or over which Govemment enjoyed

property rights as 'Protected Forests'. Whcreas in the case of Reserved Forests, the

forestland was reserved by the Government, in Protected Forests, the Government

was given the power to issue notifications to declarc any 'trees or class of trees in a

Protected Forests' as reservcd. Unlike the case of Reserved Forests, where the Forcst

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Department enjoyed property rights over the land, in Protected Forests the

management rights and responsibilities of the forests (mainly trees and forest

produces) was conferred to the Forest Department, whereas the property rights of the

land remained with the Revenue Department. Section 36 of the Act empowered the

State Government to make rules to control and regulate certain matters like cutting,

sawing, conversion and removal of trees and collection of any forest produce from the

Protected Forests. The provisions regarding punishing those who enter into a forest

area and collect any forest produce, as was in vogue for Reserved Forests, were also

made applicable for Protected Forests.

4.2.2. b) Beginning of a New Era: Involving Local People in Forest Management

(1985 -)

The 1980s have been an important decade for India from the developmental point of

view. That was the time when concepts and approaches like 'people's participation',

'indigenous rights and practices', 'bottom-up approach', 'community-based resource

management', etc. were gaining momentum not only among academicians but also

among development practitioners and policy makers. The decade-long debate on

poverty and environmental degradation also influenced policy makers to recognise

people's requirements and rights on environment. The large-scale deforestation and

resource degradation had made it amply clear that conservation of natural resources

without the involvement of people is hard to accomplish and cannot ensure

sustainability. As a consequence, the Government of India came out with its

resolution on National Forest Policy in 1988, which treated 'the requirements of

fuel wood, fodder and small timber such as house building materials for tribals and

other villagers living in and around forest area as the first charge on forest produce'.

The changes that took place at the national level had, in fact, already begun to

emerge in several States. In keeping with these changes in approach, the situation in

Orissa too began to change. A new era may be Stated to have begun in Orissa's forest

history during the mid-80s with the declaration of the 'Orissa Village Forest Rules,

1985'. Orissa was one step ahead of the rest of the country by implementing the

Orissa Village Forest Rules in 1985, three years earlier than the National Policy. It

was, indeed, the first Government resolution to involve people in forest management.

Though the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 under Section 30 - 32 (Chapter - III) had dealt

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with the fonnation of the Village Forests, the modalities regarding the process of such

management had to wait till 1985.

As per the 1985 Rules, the management of every village forest was vested

with a committee comprising the sarpanch of the gram panchayat concerned, and its

ward members, the Forester, Revenue Inspector and the village-level workers and

such other persons of the community as may be nominated by the village. The total

number of members of the committee was limited to eight. The Rules also called for

representation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Women and Landless persons.

It now became the duty of the committee, and therefore, of the community to protect

and ensure preservation of plantations and report to the nearest local forest office or

police station in the event of any injury to such plantations. The proper distribution of

forest produce among the members of the community became the responsibility of the

committee, which was empowered to fonnulate principles for that purpose.

The first step towards the involvement of local people in protection and

conservation of Reserved Forest was taken in the 1988 Government resolution. 26 This

stated that:

"the question of involving village communities for effective protection and conservation of Reserved Forests was, for sometime past, under the active consideration of the Government. After careful appraisal, the Government is of the view that the task of protecting forests is so urgent and so enormous that the rural community should be fully and actively involved in it. Accordingly. it has been decided that the scheme of involving rural community will be implemented in the State ".

As per this resolution, the villagers were assigned specific roles in the

protection of Reserved Forests adjoining their villages and in return were granted

certain concessions in the matter of meeting their bonafide requirements of firewood

and small timber for house construction and agriculture.

26 Through Resolution No lOF (Pron) -47/88/17240 FFAH dated August I, 1988 of Govemment of Orissa in Forest Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Department, which came into force on October 2, 1988.

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The resolution stated that it would be the duty of the Divisional Forester

concerned to assign peripheral Reserved Forests to adjoining villages and constitute

Forest Protection Committees for each assigned village. The committee comprised the

sarpanch of the gram panchayat concerned, the ward members belonging to the

village, the local Forester, Revenue Inspector, V.L.W. and such other persons of the

said village not exceeding three as may be nominated by the gram panciJayat

concerned. It was mentioned in the resolution that the sarpallch of the gram

panchayat and the local Forester would be the chairman and convener of the

committee respectively; and that care would be taken to ensure that the committee

included persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, women and

landless categories, as far as possible. The villagers were instructed to furnish an

undertaking to the Divisional Forest Officer concerned through the committee for

proper upkeep and maintenance of the assigned Reserved Forest areas. This resolution

was amended in October 198827 and as per this new amendment the committee need

to be constituted in consultation with local villagers and the non-official members of

the Forest Protection Committee should be selected by convening a meeting of the

villagers concerned. However, the sarpanch of the gram pallchayat and the local

Forester continued to be the chairman and the convener of the committee respectively.

By another Resolution in December 199028, the Protected Forests were also included

for assignment to the adjoining villages.

It can be pointed out from the review of Government attempts to involve local

people in forest management in the State that the endeavour to give people access

over the forest resource and a voice in management had come in a phased manner,

depending upon the legal classification of the forest. One of the major drawbacks of

these policies was that it made the Forest Protection Committees of the villages a

political body by making the president of the gram panchayat its chairman. Several

intricacies were overlooked by making the panchayat president as the head of the

village Forest Protection Committee. While the gram panchayat was a political unit,

which constituted more than one village, Forest Protection Committees were confined

27 Vide Resolution No. - 10F (Pron) 47/88 - 23638 dated October 13, 1988 of Government of Orissa, Forest, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry Department.

28 Resolution No. lOF (Pron) 4/90/29525/FF AH dated December II, 1990 of Government of Orissa.

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to particular villages and/or in certain cases to a segment of a village. In actual

practice, one sarpanch was to take care of several Forest Protection Committees

falling within his/her panchayat, which obviously was a difficult task. Besides, the

sarpanch coming from a different village might not be truly committed to the cause of

forest protection for an alien village.

4.2.2. c) Evolution ofJFM in Orissa

At the national level, the ground for Joint Forest Management was prepared by the

New National Forest Policy, 1988, which emphasised creating a massive people's

movement with involvement of women for achieving its objectives. On June I, 1990,

the Government of India adopted a National Joint Forest Management Resolution,

which set guidelines for partnership between local communities and the State Forest

Department for the protection and management of State owned forests through Forest

Protection Committees.

In response to the Government of India Resolution and to make the

involvement of local people in forest protection more effective and transparent, the

Government of Orissa issued a Resolution29 to implement the Joint Forest

Management programme in the State. This marked the beginning of JFM as is

understood today, in Orissa. It dealt with exhaustively the involvement of the local

community in the protection of adjoining forests, formation of Vana Samrakshana

Committees, and the constitution, function, duties and responsibilities of such

committees. It also provided for the constitution of a State-level steering committee

chaired by the Minister of Forest to monitor and guide the implementation of this

scheme.

The Joint Forest Management Resolution of the Govemment of Orissa entrusts

the gram panchayat with the duty of convening a general meeting of all adults living

in the selected village on the suggestion of the D.F.O/Range Officer/Forester, where

the forest officialls will explain the scheme of Joint Forest Management to the

villagers. Based on the response, motivation and willingness of the villagers and after

taking account of other related factors facilitating the community protection of the

29 Bearing No. 16700 - 10F (Pron) 20/93 F & E dated July 3, 1993.

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forest, the D.F.O will recommend the establishment of Vana Samrakshana Samiti

(VSS) of the village. According to the resolution, the VSS should include two adults.

including a woman member of every household living in the village as its members.

Under this new Joint Management Plan, the protection and management

responsibility of the forest patch is wholly entrusted to the members of the forest

protection committee. It shall be the duty of the members to prevent forest offences

and pass on relevant information and intelligence in this regard to the forest

department officials. The management activities of the forest are to be carried out by

the executive committee of the VSS. Each VSS should have its own executive

committee comprising ten to fifteen members, which should include Ward Members

representing the village, six to eight representatives selected/elected by the villagers,

the Forester and Forest Guard concerned, and nominee of an NGO functioning in the

local area to be selected by the D.F.O. The Forester of the locality concerned and the

Naib Sarpanch (Vice-President of the gram panchayat) will be the convener and

chairperson of the executive committee respectively. It is stated in the Joint

Management Plan that usufructs like leaves, fodder, grass, thatch grass, broom grass,

thorny fencing materials, brushwood and fallen lops and tops and twigs used as

fuel wood shall be available to the members of the VSS free of cost. It shall be the

duty of the executive committee of the VSS to ensure equal distribution of all

intermediate yields in the shape of small wood poles, firewood, etc., as may be

obtained in periodical clearance of the forest. However, the timbers and poles, as may

be obtained from a major harvest or final felling, shall be shared between the Forest

Department and the VSS in equal shares.

4.2.3. Analysis of Forest Policies in Orissa

The forest policies of the country since independence can be summarised in three

points, which also influence the forest management practices in Orissa. First. during

the early colonial period, there was large-scale deforestation, which later led to the

introduction of scientific management of forests in India and the first ever Indian

Forest Act, 1865. Though specific data for such a period are not available for Orissa,

the situation of the country was no different from that of Orissa at that time. Second,

during the late colonial and early independence period, the State strengthened its

monopoly over the forests and adopted the policy of conservation, whereby more and

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more forestland was put under the category of 'Reserved Forest', and access to such

forests was denied to common people. Third, being unsuccessful in its attempts to

increase the forest cover by creating a monopoly over it, the State adopted

'participatory policies', and is making efforts to involve people in the protection and

management of forests.

The scientific management of Orissa's forests has had significant

conscquences for the lives of those who depend upon forests for their daily livelihood

as well as the physical area of the forest itself. The State's monopoly over forest

resources by putting more forestland under 'Reserved' categories has deprived a large

number of people of the usufruct rights and concessions enjoyed before. It was

perceived that people's interference inside the forest area, even if for their livelihood,

would result in a decrease in forest resources. Thus, the policy of the state monopoly

was adopted tor greater enhancement of forest resources itself. But an analysis of the

physical area of the forests after independence reveals that deforestation has

continued in spite of tough policies to keep the local people away from the forests.

Table 4.2: PhYSical Area of the Forest in Orissa after Independence (Area in Sq. Kms.)

Year Reserved Demarcated Un-demarcated Total Forest Protected Forest Protected Forest

1948 3,615.6 541.3 3,286.7 7,443.6 1959 24,979 538 39,973 65,490 1969 24,166 562 42,733 67,461 1979 - - - 60,223 1985 28,311 19,625 7,848 55,784 1993 27,087 16,133 13,967 57,167

Source: RCDC 1996 & CPSW, 1994

It can be pointed out from Table 4.2 that the forest area had suddenly

increased soon after independence from 7,443.6 sq. km. in 1948 to 65, 490 sq. km. in

1959 and on till 1969. The inclusion of ex-zamindari and ex-princely forest into the

State of Orissa might be cited as two major factors behind such an increase in forest

area after independence. In the year 1960 - 61, ex-zamindari forests of 1,500 sq. km.,

which were initially under the control of the State revenue department, were

transferred to the State forest department (CPSW, 1994: 32). From 1969 till 1985, the

127

I

physical area of the forest had decreased, increasing slightly in 1993. Despite this

total decrease in forest cover, there has been an increase in forest area in the

'reserved' category from 24, 166 sq. km. in 1969 to 28, 311 sq. km. in 1985. This

clearly reveals that the Government policy of putting more forest areas in the

'reserved' category, thereby denying local people of access to the forest did not serve

the desired result of increasing forest cover in the State. This calls for an analysis of

the cause of deforestation in the State elsewhere rather than putting the blame on the

forest-dependent communities. Deforestation in the State from independence till 1985

amounted to 2,073.97 sq. km. according to forest department records, out of which

542.79 sq. km. were reserved forests, 308.64 sq. km. were demarcated protected

forests and 1,222.54 sq. km. were un-demarcated protected forests (see, Table 4.3).

These included multipurpose river valley projects and subsequent resettlement of

displaced people besides several other purposes like railways, roads, minor irrigation

projects, etc.

Table 4,3: Deforestation in Orissa from 1947 to 1985 (Area in sq. kms.)

Purpose of Deforestation Reserved Demarcated Un- Total Forests Protected demarcated

Forests Protected Forests

. River valley projects and 397.52 288.08 1,170.16 1,855.76 : resettlement of displaced

people Industrial purposes 31.49 2.84 0.15 34.48 Capital conservation 7.79 13.14 - 20.93 Railways 24.1 0.1 - 24.2 Minor irrigation projects 11.3 - 0.11 11.41 Public purposes 30.57 0.2 49.47 80.24 Roads 0.23 - - 0.23 Miscellaneous purposes 39.79 4.28 2.65 46.72 Total 542.79 308.64 1,222.54 2,073.97

SOllrce: Status o/Orissa's Environment. 1994. CPS1¥. Bhubaneswar.

Of the total area deforested, 1,855.76 sq. km. (89.47 per cent) was attributed to

river valley projects as per Government records. However, in real practice, once a

river valley project came up, it not only submerged a few sq. km. of forests, but

caused massive deforestation in its periphery. For instance, during 1930 - 75, more

than 45 per cent of the forests were lost around Sambalpur and Jharsuguda in a radius

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of 20 miles because of the Hirakud Dam Project (CPSW, 1994: 46). Table 4.4 reveals

the actual land area lost due to various multipurpose river valley projects in Orissa.

Table 4.4: Land Degradation in the Peripheries of Reservoirs of Multipurpose River Valley Projects in Orissa between 1972 and 82 (Area in sq. kms.)

Name of the Open Closed Total Area without Total Project Degraded Forest Forest Forest Area

Forest Lost Vegetation Lost Hirakud 765 1,290 2,055 39 2,094 Machkund 988 1,491 2,479 61 2,540 Rengali 469 LI43 1,612 88 1,700 Salandi 722 1,930 2,652 64 2,716 Total 2,944 5,854 8)98 252 9,050

Source: Status of Orissa's Environment, 1994, CPSW, Bhubaneswar.

Diversion of forest areas for non-forest purposes, including agriculture,

constituted another potential source of deforestation in Orissa. During 1972, the

Orissa Government decided to provide land for agriculture to the landless poor in the

name of 'Land Distribution Fair,.30 As a result, the Tehsildars not only distributed

land from Un-demarcated Protected Forests to the landless, but also regularised all

sorts of earlier encroachments over these lands (RCDC, 1996: 16).

The Government polices concerning forestry, whether regulatory in the initial

years of independence or participatory since the mid-1980s', have always targeted

increased forest cover in terms of more trees. This emphasis on quantity of forest

cover has neglected the issue of quality of our forests. The National Forest Policy of

1988 also envisaged a target of 33 per cent of national forest cover. From the State's

point of view increased forest cover had always been the end (motive) of the forest

department, and the community's involvement in forestry activities either through

Social Forestry Projects or JFM had been perceived as a means to that end. A quick

look at the physical status of the forest cover in Orissa during 1981 - 83 and 1993 -

95 reveals that though the total forest cover had not changed as per the forest

department records, there was a substantial decrease in the quality of the forest (see,

10 Through Resolution No.I6419-IOF - M - 149172 (FMI Dt. 16- 12 -72).

129

Table 4.5).31 However, the recent World Bank study (Kumar et at. 1999) emphasised

quality of our forests, and given priority to the problem of 'degradation' rather than to

that of' deforestation'. 32

Table 4.5: Quality of the Forest Cover in Orissa, 1981 - 83 and 1993 - 95 (Area in sq. kms)

Period Dense Forest (40 Open Forest (10 - Total Forest % or More Crown 40 % Crown Land cover Cover)

1981 - 83 28,573 24,391 59,555 1993 - 95 26,1 0\ 20,629 59,555

SOllrce: SlIndar el al .. 2001: 17

The continuous decrease in forest cover of the State since 1969 has been of

great concern from the policy perspective; and has resulted in the enactment of

several policy resolutions restricting the access of local people to the forests. An

analysis of the Forest Policies in the State of Orissa reveals that merely blaming the

people for deforestation and thereby gradually decreasing their use rights over the

resource had not resulted in increased forest cover. With the failure of the

Government mechanism to protect its forest resources, on the one hand, and the

growing demand from the local people for h'Teater rights over the resource, on the

other, and above all with the paradigm shift in academia over the discourses of

development and participation, the focus of the forest management shifted from a

kind of regulatory administration to a participatory one, involving local people in

management.

A striking feature of forestry activities In Orissa is that the Government's

policy of involving communities in protection and management of forests has come

much later than the actual efforts by the communities themselves. The traditional

village governance system of forest resources both by tribal and non-tribal

communities had existed strongly in Orissa much before the enactment of State

) I The total forestland in this table also includes degraded forests with less than IO per cent crown cover and thus is more than the added forest area of dense and open forests .

. 12 For a detailed discussion of 'quantity vs. quality' debate in Indian forestry, see, Sundar el aI., 200 I: 15 - 20.

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policies of involving them in forest management. Unlike in other States where

policies were framed to involve local people in forest management, forest policies in

Orissa may be viewed as an attempt to give an official shape to the efforts of the local

people to protect their forest and to bring them into an umbrella policy of the state

government. As per an estimate, by the late 1980s, there were 3,000 - 4,000 village

communities protecting 10 per cent of Orissa's forest area (Kant, 1990 in

Poffenberger and McGean, 1996: 34). By the end of \993, with the State Government

order of JFM, the area under community protection in Orissa had increased to 27 per

cent (Poffenberger and McGean, 1996: 34 - 5).

Several reasons are cited for such community control of forests in the State of

Orissa. Increasing resource scarcity due to deforestation and degradation of local

forestland and the resulting livelihood insecurity is identified as a dominant reason for

community's involvement in forest protection in Orissa (cf. Poffenberger et al. \996).

Inadequate livelihood alternatives due to limited urbanisation and industrialisation in

the State are also cited as reasons for compelling villagers to preserve their local

resources for livelihood security (Raju et at. 1993; cited in Sundar et al. 2001: 79).

The existence of village-level local institutions, often parallcl to gram

panchayats, has also played a crucial role in community control of forest resources in

Orissa. Sashi Kant observes that (1990) the formation of bigger gram panchayats,

which in some cases spanned several villages, had created a space for local

organisations at the community level to retain their functions of fulfilling the needs of

single communities in a less politicised manner. While the panchayats functioned as

political institutions of the locality with active party politics, village-level institutions

were engaged in activities like management of village ponds, temples, schools and

other common resources. Such institutions in many cases included traditional village

organisations with the village head as its leader, emerging youth clubs, women's

organisations, etc.

Sundar et al. (200 I), from their study of JFM in four Indian States including

Orissa, also point out the important role played by village youth clubs in the

protection of local forest resources in Sambalpur and Koraput districts of Orissa.

Complementary to these village-level organisations, several NGOs at the State level

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have also tried to promote participatory forestry at the community level. Several

State-kvel NGOs like Regional Cooperation and Development Council (RCDC),

Vasundhara, Bruksha 0 Jeevara Bandhu Parishad (BOJBP) have created mass

campaigns for community forestry and have facilitated the formation of federation of

Village Forest Protection Committees at the State level (see, Mohapatra, 1999).

State intervention in forestry activities starting from colonial days, which

threatened the livelihood security of the local people dependent upon forests, is also

treated as a reason for community's involvement in it in certain cases. A few studies

outside the state of Orissa are worth mentioning here. Agrawal (2000) from his study

of Van Panchayats in Kumaon, Uttar Pradesh, states that sustained protest by the

communities against the State's monopoly of forest resources resulted in the origin of

the community's involvement in forest protection. 'The incessant, often violent,

protests forced the then British Government to appoint the Kumaon Forest Grievances

Committee to look into the local disaffection', which, in tum, recommended the

formation of Forest Councils and empowering them to control their local forests

(Agrawal, 2000: 60).33 In another context, Sivaramakrishna (1999) mentions that in

colonial west-Bengal there were large forested areas, which had remained beyond the

direct control of colonial Government - 'zones of anomaly' as he phrases it (1999:

30) - and it was these areas in which community forest management revived.

Contrary to this, Sundar et al. (200 I: 31) argue that community management of forest

resources had not been 'a sphere of non-intervention, but a different type of

intervention'. Now, reverting to the discussion in the context of Orissa, it can be

observed that the different management strategies to Reserved Forests and Protected

Forests by the Government authorities also contributed to some extent to the

resurgence of community forestry in Orissa. While the Reserved Forests are directly

controlled and managed by the Forest Department of the State, Forest Department has

limited control over Protected Forests, since the ownership of the land lies with the

Revenue Department. Saxena (1997: 60) argues that this 'ambiguous status of the

protected forests' had created a space for community initiatives in forestry. The

limited control of the Forest Department over Protected Forests is further revealed by

the fact that in some of the Protected Forests in Orissa, 'villagers had even the rights

.\l See (Guha, 1989: chapter 4 and 5) for a detailed description of such protests against the State's monopoly over the forcst resources in Tehri Garwal area of Uttar Pradesh.

132

to cultivate (with pennission from the revenue department). in addition to access to

forest produce' (Orissa Forest Enquiry Committee. 1959: cited in Sundar ct al. 200 I:

80).)4 Weak control and poor management practices by the forest department is also

cited as a reason by Saxena (1997) for community initiatives in the Reserved Forests

of Orissa.

It is very difficult, however, to isolate any particular reason for the emergence

of community's involvement in forestry activities in Orissa and its quick spread even

before the enactment of State policy resolutions in this regard. Degradation of local

forest resources and the consequent livelihood insecurities because of it. existence of

prior institutional arrangements at the community level to look after common village

affairs, loose and complex forest rules, active efforts by several leading NGOs, etc.,

are among several reasons for the rapid spread of community's involvement in forest

protection in Orissa. Once a village community assumes the responsibility of forest

protection, its demonstration effects have often led to similar initiatives by the

neighbouring villages, which, in tum, had led to the quick spread of community

protection. Whatever be the reasons for community protection, it is an accepted fact

that in Orissa, the Forest Department has played a limited role in involving people in

forest protection and management, even long after the passing of the State resolution

concerning JFM. Owing to several factors like this, people' s involvement in forest

protection in Orissa is more appropriately tenned 'Comrnunity Forest Management'

(CFM) or 'Community Forestry' (CF) than 'Joint Forest Management'J5

4.2.4. Functioning of JFM in Orissa

The working of the JFM in Orissa can be best understood, when viewed from an

institutional perspective. Joint Forest Management is an institutional alternative to

involve the local communities in the protection and management activities of the

forest resource. In order to understand the functioning of such institutions in Orissa.

we have to look at the overall institutional arrangements that exists in different parts

of Orissa to involve people in protection and management activities of the forests.

34 It should be mentioned here that Protected Forests in Orissa constitute 52.6 per cent of the total forest cover of the State compared with the all India figure of 29.2 per cent (Sundar el al. 200 I: 80) .

. 15 For details regarding Community Forest Management Practices in Orissa. see. Human and Pattanaik, 2000; Sundar et at. 200 I.

133

4.2.4. a) The JFM - CFM Ambiguity

It is worth mentioning that people's involvement in forest protection and management

in Orissa is an age-old phenomenon. In other words, JFM is not the only institution to

involve local people in forestry activities. In fact, initiatives for people's involvement

in forestry have begun in the state much earlier to the formal announcement of such

policies by the government. Several village communities in Orissa have been

protecting the forest attached to their village on their own initiatives for long. There

are also instances of village institutions with more than century's old history of forest

protection in Orissa (see, Sundar et. al., 1996).

Over the years, three different types of community institutions have emerged

to give shape to people's initiatives in forestry activities. The first type of institution

has evolved out of people's initiatives where the community manages the forest on its

own without any coordination with the State or voluntary organisations. Though there

is no comprehensive information about this practice of Community Forest

Management (CFM) in the State, an NGO report is, perhaps, the only systematic

attempt to count these cases. It says, 5,402 villages are protecting some 309,750

hectares of forest area in fifteen out of thirty districts of Orissa (for details, see Down

to Earth. Vol. 8, No.9).

The second type of institution developed as a result of the Social Forestry

Project of the Government of Orissa, where several villages are involved in plantation

activities in both forest and non-forest areas. As per the available data, 9,055 Village

Forest Protection Committees are protecting some 78,646 hectares of land, including

village wastelands, under Social Forestry Project in fifteen districts of Orissa (for

details, see, Ori-Forest, Jan. - March, 1997).

The third type of institution emerged under the JFM programme in which both

the village community and the Forest Department share the responsibility of forest

protection and management. There are some 6,768 Vana Samrakshana Samitis

protecting 645,176.64 hectares of forests as of April I, 1999.

134

Out of these three institutions, the former and the latter are engaged in

involving local people in the management of forests in forest-fringed villages, and the

institutions have emerged out of social forestry programme in developing forests in

village wastelands or village commons. The existence of these three types of

institutions often creates confusions and the state government is yet to prioratise these

three. Further, most of these institutions only exist in pen and paper without

functioning properly. Even in the JFM programme, the state Forest Department, in

order to increase the number of committees, formed VSSs in several villages. But it

hardly paid any attention whether the committees were functioning or not. For several

committees the department did not even sign the Memorandum of Understanding

(MoU), and the number of committees, where the Micro Plan for JFM was prepared

was even much lower. As the government record shows, while the total number of

JFM committees formed in Orissa was 6,768 as of April 1, 1999, the number of

committees where the Micro Plan was prepared for joint management was just 172

(see, Table 4.6). It clearly indicates the seriousness of the state Forest Department

towards the implementation and sharing joint responsibility with the village

communities in protection and management of local forest resources. Further, no

serious attempt has been made so far by the state government to coordinate all the

three types of institutions that are engaged in a common endeavour of involving rural

communities in forest conservation.

135

Table 4.6: Formation and Working orVana Samrakshyana Samiti in Orissa (As on April 1, 1999)

SL Name of the No.ofVSS Area No.ofVSS NO.ofVSS NO.ofVSS No. Division fonned assigned where where where

for Executive MoU Micro Plan protection Committee signed prepared (in Heel.) fonned

I. Angul 256 37,586.18 256 I 17 2. Athagarh 77 7,349.59 77 70 2 3. Athamallik 84 7,017.36 84 66 2 4. Dhenkanal 112 13,774.98 112 101 9 5. Keonjhar 201 16,322.14 152 113 10 6. Baliguda 206 10,378.00 184 174 8 7. Boudh 162 52,222.60 40 40 12 8. Ghumusur (N) 22 702 23 4 2 9. Ghumusur (S) 85 13,489.30 85 51 2 10. Nayagarh 5 585 5 5 4 II. Parlakhemundi 518 46,639.00 402 402 22 12. Phulbani 473 29,504.04 473 473 10 13. Puri 28 5,580.00 28 5 3 14. Bolangir 325 36,882.31 68 - 2 IS. Jeypore 466 27,628.24 22 22 6 16. Kalahandi 669 52,840.00 - III 2 17. Khariar 270 21,268.00 18 - 6 18. Nabarangpur 371 31,995.06 56 - 4 19. Rayagada 748 48.133.55 14 14 6 20. . Badarama - - - - -21. Bamra 258 25,664.26 223 223 6 22. Bonai 119 8,496.45 114 114 6 23. Deogarh 143 11,633.44 143 6 6 24. Rairakhol 97 9,676.00 - - 2 25. Sambalpur 423 58,941.00 423 45 6 26. Sundargarh 437 46,881.57 437 437 6 27. Baripada 191 21,822.37 191 120 6 28. Karanjia 22 2164.20 21 21 5 Total 6768 645,176.64 3651 2618 172

Source: Forest Department, Government of Orissa

4.2.4. b) The Problem of Boundary

One of the major shortcomings of JFM in the state of Orissa, or for that matter in

India, is the conflict arising from boundary issues. Resolution of conflicts that arise in

the process of management is the major challenge before any community protecting

forests. Sarin (1996) identifies four potential sources of conflict in community based

forest management, i.e. first, contlict among the community institution's members;

136

second, conflict with neighbouring non-members; third, conflict with other external

commercial and industrial agents; and finally, conflict with the State, primarily with

the Forest Department. A Forest Protection Committee under the JFM programme

may be efficient enough to resolve the contlicts arising among its own members by

frequent negotiations and meetings among themselves. However, conflict with the

neighbouring villages poses a serious challenge for a community protecting forests

though Joint Forest Management plans. Contlict with neighbouring villagers arises

mainly because of the weak and controversial legal and organisational framework of

the State Joint Forest Management policy. In many cases, communities living in

distant areas also have use rights on the forest over generations. When the same forest

patch is given to the adjacent community for protection according to the Joint Forest

Management programme, the rights of the community that was earlier dependent

upon the forest for its livelihood get curtailed, as it does not share the protection

responsibility. The protccting community usually never allows other communities to

access its patch of forests. Thus, here arises a contlict between the community that

protects the forest and other communities that do not protect it but depend upon it for

their Iivelihood 36

4.1.4. c) The Legal Challenges in JFM

Conflict over boundaries, as discussed above, may chietly be attributed to the

ambiguous legal status of the village forest protection committees under JFM. The

State Government resolution declares the Van a Samrakshana Samitis only as

functional groups. However, these committees have no legal or statutory ground, and

thus, it becomes difficult for them to manage resources on a long-term basis. Though

the 2000 JFM resolution of Government of India spells out the legal backup of the

Vana Samrakshana Samitis, the details have not been worked out in the State. Thus,

whenever a forest protection committee catches a forest offence, it has to be handed

over either to the police or to the Forest Department. The forest protection

committees, as formed under the state government JFM resolution, do not have any

power to solve the case at their level. Moreover, if a protection committee awards

punishment to anyone on this issue of forest offence, it can be challenged in a court of

law, as the committee does not have any legal power in this regard.

\(, See. Rout, 2003 for a detailed case study of a boundary conflict in JFM between two neighbouring communities in the state of Orissa.

137

4.1.4 d) Problem of Attitude in JFM

The problem of attitude, especially of the Foresters, presses another challenge to the

working of Joint Forest Management in the state of Orissa. The authoritarian attitude

of forest bureaucracy finds no place in the Joint Forest Management agreement. The

foresters have to give up their narrow attitude and share the responsibility of

management with the people. The Arabari experiment in West Bengal became

successful only because of progressive bureaucracy. The forest officials should not

think that the forest area belongs to them and that people have no business in it. The

Forest Department has its own style of functioning and it has to be satisfied before it

signs the JFM agreement. Such an antipathy towards the capability of the people to

protect the forest and to the process of involvement of local people in forest

management on the part of forest department officials often poses a real challenge for

the success of Joint Forest Management in the State.

To conclude, the success of any co-management regime depends upon the

genuine participation of its stakeholders. Both the partners in JFM, the local

community and the Forest Department or the State need to work together for the

success of the programme. Challenges in JFM can emerge from both sides. If the

Forest Department does not become serious in the agreement, people will gradually

lose interest in forest protection. The opposite also holds true in many cases. The

major thrust of . Joint Forest Management' lies in its 'jointness' or the developing

partnership between community and forest department on equal terms, which suffers

the most in the case of Orissa.37 Since several institutions that have emerged in

different periods are in existence for community's involvement in forest protection,

and Government's role in establishment and functioning of these institutions has been

limited, a healthy partnership on equal terms between communities and forest

department has become a misnomer in the context of Orissa. It is, of course, true that

unlike several other States like Andhra Pradesh and Kamataka, where the programme

is being implemented with heavy outside funding, JFM in Orissa has been

implemented with State Government funds. There has not been any sincere attempt by

the State forest department to implement JFM in the true sense of the term. Moreover,

17 For a critique of 'jointness' in Joint Forest Management, see, Lele, 1998; Sundar, 2000; Sundar el

al,2001.

138

the recent Supreme Court orders concerning eviction from forest areas and formation

of Central Empowerment Committees to look after these issues has put a question

mark on the Government's attitude towards real participatory forestry involving

forest-dependent communities. Besides, several communities engaged in forest

protection in Orissa also do not want to come under the State JFM programme, since

they have to share the woodlots, which they have created and maintained out of their

own efforts since long (see, Mahapatra, 1999). Thus, in such a context, what is

required is commitment and trust on the part of both the partners of JFM, i.e.,

communities and forest department to make the JFM a truly participatory programme

in the State.

139

CHAPTER V

Heterogeneity and the Capability of Local

Communities for Collective Action:

Some Empirical Findings

The theoretical and empirical reviews in the previous chapters suggest that social

composition of the community, in terms of heterogeneity or otherwise, playa crucial

role in shaping the capabilities of the local communities for collective action for

natural resource use and management. Further, heterogeneity, in the context of local

resource management, assumes special significance owing to the fact that a

heterogeneous community produces different dynamics, which, in tum, not only

affects the process of collective action, but also leaves its impression upon the

resource itself. In order to assess the contested role of heterogeneity in collective

action for natural resource management, it is important to conceptualise

'heterogeneity' and then contextualise it in the empirical situation.

With a view to assess the contested role of heterogeneity, the present chapter

attempts to understand how heterogeneity affects the capabilities of communities in

use and management of their local forest resources. This chapter begins with a

conceptualisation of heterogeneity for the purpose of empirical research and then

contextualises it in field settings. In the process, a theoretical discussion is also

undertaken to understand how, when and why heterogeneity affects the collective

action initiatives of local communities. Finally, based upon the findings of the two

study villages, the chapter explores how heterogeneity has affected a) the resource

dependency, b) the collective action initiatives, and c) the resource management

outcomes in the two studied communities.

5.1. Conceptualising Heterogeneity

There are mainly two major sources or types of heterogeneity, which are much

discussed in collective action literature having the potential to affect collective action

at the local level. They are, first, heterogeneity of interest in the collective good itself

140

and secondly, heterogeneity of resources available to the members of the commumty

to contribute towards production of such collective good. Explanation of

heterogeneity of interest can be traced, though less prominently, in Olson's (1965)

seminal work "The Logic of Collective Action" in which he mentions about

'exploitation of the great by the small' (1965: 29). By such an explanation, Olson

means the existence of two categories of people; first, those who have a larger interest

in the collective good; and second, those whose interest, though positive, is relatively

small. Since the former are so interested, Olson argues, they will provide the good

themselves, regardless of the actions of the less interested parties. The later exploits

the' great' by not contributing at all, as they know that they will get the good anyway

provided by the great.

Heterogeneity of (alternative) resources available to the group members has

been much discussed by Oliver et al. (1985), Heckathorn (1993), Molinas (1998).

Resource heterogeneity refers to the fact that all the members in a group are not

equally endowed, and thus, their capacity to contribute for the production of collective

good is different. While economically endowed members have all the resources

available to contribute for production of collective good and hence, are expected to

participate in collective action, the expectation from less endowed members to

participate in such action is less. To these two types of heterogeneity, Baland and

Platteau (1996) adds one more, i.e., socio-cultural differentials of a community.

Further, another important type of heterogeneity, i.e., political heterogeneity, has also

been mentioned by Trond Vedeld (2000) from his study of two Fulani village

societies of Mali.

Out of the three sources of heterogeneity that Baland and Platteau (1996)

discuss, they are of the opinion that only cultural differences and differential interests

have potentially serious negative impacts on collective action. And the third source of

heterogeneity, i.e., differential endowments, according to Baland and Platteau, docs

not always pose potential dangers to collective action for natural resource

management. They even go further to acknowledge resource heterogeneity to be

compatible for collective action. This is because, even though individuals vary on the

basis of possession of land or any other economic assets, they may have a common

141

interest in regulating the use of resources, and thus, as a matter of principle can be

expected to participate in collective action (1996: 302 - 05).

It should, however, be pointed out that the above three sources of

heterogeneity, as propounded by Baland and Platteau (1996) are not necessarily

independent from one another. It is, therefore, ambiguous to say that one source is

conducive to collective action and the others are not. The cultural division of society,

such as in terms of caste, class and ethnic groups often lead to differential

endowments among people. They may, in turn, generate different interests among

resource users. Thus, to say that differential endowments are conducive for collective

action and the other two are not, is self-contradictory as these three sources are linked

with each other. Instead of dealing these three types of heterogeneities as separate

entities, an attempt has been made in the present work to analyse them as interrelated

entities, so as to see how one source generates and, in turn, is being generated from

other.

Drawing from the works of above scholars, the thesis attempts to explore four

different types of heterogeneity in the context of collective action for local forest

resource management in two village communities of Orissa. They are:

i) Socio-Cultural Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity resulting from

race, caste and other types of cultural divisions of communities.

ii) Resource Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity originating from

variations in intra-village economic resources.

iii) Interest Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity arising from differential

interests in the use of the forest resource (the collective good itself).

iv) Political Heterogeneity - Heterogeneity resulting from existing

differentiation and factionalism among the leadership groups in the

villages.

5.2. Contextualising Heterogeneity in the Field Settings

5.2.1. Socio-Cultural Heterogeneity

Intra-community social and cultural differentiation has been acknowledged as one of

the potential sources heterogeneity by scholars. Among several other factors that

142

generate socio-cultural differentiations within a community, caste occupies a

prominent position, particularly in the Indian rural context. Further, the presence of

one or more tribes/tribal group(s) in a community, divided along caste lines, makes

the situation more critical. In order to assess the socio-cultural heterogeneity of the

study villages, existence of several caste and tribal groups has been taken into

consideration.

Caste has been recognised as the most important source of social

differentiation in the Indian society, which stratifies the society into various segments.

Now, turning the analysis back to empirical settings, it can be observed that both

Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur villages are heterogeneous so far as the above-mentioned

sources of heterogeneity are concerned. The villages are multi caste in composition,

with each caste having its own religious and socio-cultural festivals. Caste continues

to be an important source of heterogeneity in the villages, which divides the villagers

into various segments and imposes certain restriction upon particular castes.

The population of Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur, which compnse 155 and 85

households respectively, is divided into eleven caste groups and three tribal

communities. The caste and sub-caste groups found in the villages are Brahmin

(traditional priest), Khandayat (traditional warrior caste), Karana (record keeper),

Gopala (milkman), Teli (oil presser), Gudia (Sweet maker), Dhoba (washer man),

Barika (barber), Tanti (weaver), Hadi and Pana (both are Scheduled Castes).

'Juanga', 'Sabara' and 'Dehuri' are the three tribal groups, that reside in the two

study villages. Out of the eleven above mentioned caste groups, Brahmin, Khandayat

and Karana are the three upper castes and occupy a higher ritual status in the overall

caste hierarchy. The Hadi and Pana castes, which are the untouchable castes in the

villages, enjoy the lowest status in the caste hierarchy. The remaining castes are

service castes or 'backward castes', who have some or the other traditional occupation

attached to their castes. The relative position among these castes in the hierarchy is an

ambiguous one. Among these service castes, Dhoba and Barika are included in the

Scheduled Caste category (see Table 5.1).

Though the Scheduled Tribes are not a part of the caste system, generally, but

in these two villages, as both castes and tribes coexist, tribals are looked down in the

143

general social hierarchy. To distinguish between tribals and non-tribals, the higher

caste settlements in the villages are called 'Bhadraloka Sahi' in local language, which

can be translated as 'gentlemen's settlement' into English. However, the Scheduled

Castes' settlements do not come under this Bhadraloka Sahi. The SCs and STs almost

enjoy similar social status in the villages and also have their settlements adjacent to

each other.

The Khandayat caste is the numerically dominant caste in the two villages

constituting more than 40 per cent of the total households. Among the three upper

castes, Karanas are next to Khandayat in the Nagiapasi village (with 6.4 % of the total

households), whereas Brahmins occupies second position with 17.7 per cent of the

total households in K. K. Pur (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Castes and Tribes in the Study Villages

Castes and Tribal Groups Nagiapasi K. K. Pur UPPER Brahmin I (0.6 %) 15 (17.7 %) CASTES Khandayat (Warrior Caste) 66 (42.6 %) 40 (47 %)

Karana (Record Keeper) 10(6.4%) 1(1.2 %) MIDDLE Gopala (Milk Man) 29(18.7%) 4 (4.7) (Service/Back Teli (Oil Presser) 3 (1.9 %) -ward) Gudia (Sweet Maker) 6 (3.9 %) -CASTES Dhoba (Washer Man) 8 (5.2 %) -

Barika (Barber) 2(1.3%) -Tanti (Weavel) - I (1.2 %)

LOWER Hadi 9 (5.8 %) -(Untouchable) Pana 4 (2.6 %) 4 (4.7 %) CASTES SCHEDULE Juanga 17(11%) 6 (7 %) DTRIBES Sabara - 12(14.1 %)

Dehuri - 2 (2.4 %) Total 155(100%) 85 (100 %)

The social inequality, in terms of caste and tribal divisions, is quite visible

from various socio-cultural ceremonies of the villages. Though the institution of

untouchability does not exist, as it was earlier, yet, the reminiscence of it can be felt if

one deeply observes the socio-cultural lives of the villagers. On occasions of village

festivals and ceremonies, when the villagers arrange community lunches or dinners

for the whole village, the Scheduled Castes and Tribes are given food separately.

144

Though inter-caste dining exists in the villages on such occasions, the members trom

the Brahmin family sit separately from others keeping some distance, or prefer to take

food either in the beginning or in the last to mentain their ritual superiority trom the

other caste people. Two implications can be derived from such a situation. While on

the one hand such community lunches and dinners foster a sense of unity among

villagers, which, in tum, act as a platform for further collective action. on the other it

perpetuate inequality among castes and continuity of untouchability. though in a

di fferent sense.

The tribal popUlation in the village has maintained their ethnic identity

through their unique language and customs. Besides partaking in common village

functions, they also observe their own festivals. Usually members trom other castes

do not attend these festivals. However, tribal people trom neighbouring villages take

part in these as invited guests. The Scheduled Castes of the village, in order to

maintain their distinct identity, also celebrate similar occasions and invite people of

their own caste trom the neighbouring villages.

The socio-cultural heterogeneity, based upon caste and tribal group divisions,

is also reflected in the overall village social life. The imprints of such social divisions

make themselves visible on the way in which villagers interact with each other and

pass their leisure time. Usually the members of lower caste groups address the upper

caste members as 'babll' and interact with them with great respect. Age, which

normally carries respect with it while in any communication, doesn't seem to make

any difference in a communication between lower caste and upper caste members. For

example, even if an old man belonging to the lower caste groups has to interact with a

small boy of higher castes, he has to communicate with great respect, which is not

vice versa. However, the upper castes maintain mutual respect in interaction between

themselves.

Entertainment, merry making and passing leisure time amongst the villagers

are also found to have influenced by the caste divisions. The villagers usually play

cards, gossip and get together during the evening times and also during the day times

in the non-agricultural periods. Spending time at house during evening times was not

found to be a norm for rural men folk, since they club together into different groups

145

and pass their time either by gossiping or playing cards. However, such gossip groups

are formed on caste lines, and it is rare to find a lower caste member passing time

among the upper caste members.

5.2.2. Resource Heterogeneity (Arising from Variations in Intra-village

Economic Resources

The second source of heterogeneity having potential to affcct collective action

initiatives at the local level is the differential endowments among the members or

variations in intra-village economic resources. To analyse the heterogeneity in terms

of critical resources among the members of the community, somc of the major

endowments of the households, such as land, cattle, and housing pattern were studied.

Land. being an important resource for rural (agrarian) communities, deserves a special

attention here. Along with land, the occupation pattern of the villagers, from which

the source of livelihood (income) is derived, was also taken into consideration.

The landholding pattern in the two villages is very much scattered in nature,

with predominance of marginal farmers having land less than 2.5 acres, who

constitute 54.2 per cent and 48.3 per cent of all households respectively in Nagiapasi

and K. K. Pur. The skewed nature of distribution of landholding pattern is visible

from the fact that in the Nagiapasi village, while 11.6 per cent of the households own

44.7 percent of the total land of the village, 78.1 per cent of the households own only

33.2 per cent of the village land. out of which 23.9 per cent households do not have

any land of their own. Similar is also the case with K. K. pur. Viewed household wise,

whereas 37 and 24 households are landless respectively in Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur,

only seven households possess land varying from 7.5 to 10 acres in Nagiapasi, and

four households possess land varying from 5 to 7.5 acres in K. K. Pur. The average

landholding per household is 1.8 acres in Nagiapasi and more than three-fourth of the

households are below land size of the total household average. Similar picture is also

visible in K. K. Pur village where the over all average landholding size per household

is 1.64 acres and only 23.5 percent of the households posses an average land more

than that (see Table 5.2).

146

Table 5.2: Landholding Pattern in the Study Villages (Area in Acres)

Landhold Nagiapasi K.K. Pur ing Size No.ofHH Area (in Average No.ofHH Area (in Average

Acres) land owned Acres) land owned perHH per IIll

Landless 37 - - 24 - -(23.9 %) (28.2 %)

0.01 - 2.5 84 93.25 1.11 41 56 1.36 (54.2) (33.2 %) (48.3 %) (40 %)

2.51 - 5 16 62 3.87 16 61 3.81 (10.3 %) (22.1 %) (18.8 %) (43.5 %)

5.01-7.5 1 1 67 6.1 4 23 5.75 (7.1%) (24 %) (4.7 %) (16.5 %)

7.51-10 7 58 8.28 - - -(4.5 %) (20.7 %)

Total 155 280.25 1.8 85 140 1.64 (100 %) (100 %) (l00 %) (l00 %)

The housing pattern of the villages is also very mueh divergent in nature. Only

13 per cent of the households in Nagiapasi and 14.1 per cent in K. K. Pur possess

pakka house. A majority of the houses in both the villages (66.4 % and 62.4 %

respectively) are kaccha house made up of thatched roof and mud wall. Such houses

are very much vulnerable to natural calamities and the roof materials of the house

have to be changed every year. A moderate number of households (20.6 % and 23.5

respectively) have semi-pakka house (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Housing Pattern in the Study Villages

Type of House Nagiapasi K. K. Pur Kacha 103 (66.4 %) 53 (62.4 %) Semi-Pakka 32 (20.6 %) 20 (23.5 %) Pakka 20(13%) 12 (14.1 %) Total 155 (100 %) 85 (100 %)

The occupation structure of the villages has to be looked in, since the income

of the households springs from the occupation that they adhere. Cultivation is found

to be the main source of income for a majority (63.2 % and 53 respectively) of the

households in both the villages. In Nagiapasi village, only a scant number of houses

(5.2 %) have lucrative occupations like, business, contractorship and government

service. The fib'llrc for the same is slightly high (12.9 %) in the case of the second

village. Considerable number of households in both villages (30.9 % and 31.7 %

147

respectively) adhere to low Income earning occupations like daily labour and

artisanship (See Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Occupation structure in the Study Villages

Occupation Na2iapasi K. K. Pur Cultivation 98 (63.2 %) 45 (53 %) Business 5 (3.2 %) 4 (4.7 %) Contractor-ship 2(1.3%) 3 (3.5 %) Daily Labour 41 (26.4%) 23 (27 %) Artisan 7 (4.5 %) 4 (4.7 %) Govt. Service I (0.7 %) 4 (4.7 %) Shepherd I (0.7 %) 2 (2.4 %) Total 155(100%) 85 (100 %)

The above two sources of heterogeneity are not separate entities independent

from each other. As, in deed, discussed earlier, there exists a perfect blend between

these two sources of heterogeneity. The three higher castes of the villages, i.e.

Brahmin, Khandayat and Karana, not only enjoy higher social status and prestige in

the village, but also possess a substantial amount of important resources like land and

cattle. In the Nagiapasi village, these three castes put together possess to an extent of

three-fourth of the total land area of the village. The Khandayat caste, in this village,

alone occupies nearly 60 per cent of the total land. While only 15 per cent of the

landless households fall in these three castes, a majority of the landless families

(nearly 48 per cent) come from Scheduled castes and Scheduled Tribes (see Table

5.5).

Similar picture can also be observed in K. K. Pur, where the three higher

castes, which constitute around 65 per cent of the total households, possess 95 per

cent of the total land area of the village. The Khandayat caste, in this village also,

occupies nearly 60 per cent of the total land area. So far as landless households in this

village are concerned, more than 66 per cent of them come from SC and ST

households (See Table 5.6). One more important observation is that the three castes in

both the villages not only posses greater amount of the total village land, but the

average landholding per household for these three castes is also highest in the

villages.

148

Table 5.5: Castes and Land Distribution: Nagiapasi (Area in Acres)

Caste Landless %of 0.1 2.5 2.51 - 5 5.01-7.5 7.51 - to landless No. Area No (to each

Area No. Area No

caste's total)

Bralunin - - - - - - I Khanda)'at 5 7.6 40 47.25 7 25 9 54 5

(13.5 %) Karana I to 3 3.5 4 17 I 7 I

(2.7 %) Gopala 7 24.2 16 13.25 5 20 I 6 -

(19 %)

Other 4 21.05 15 21.75 - - -

Castes • (10.8 %)

SCs II 84.6 2 2 - - -(29.7 %)

ST 9 52.3 8 5.5 - - -(24.3 %)

Total 37 84 16 II 7 (100 %)

* Other castes mclude 3 reb, 6 Gluba, 8 Dhoba, and 2 Banka households. ** SCs include 9 Ha<ii and 4 Palla households

Table 5.6: Caste and Land Distribution: K. K. Pur (Area in Acres)

Area

10 40

8

-

Total

No. Area

I 10 66 166.25

to 35.5

29 39.25

19 21.75

13 2

17 5.5

155 280.25

Caste Land % of landless 0.1 -2.5 2.51 - 5 5.01-7.5 Total -less HH (to each No. Area No. Area No. Area No.

caste's total) Bralunin 3 20 2 4.5 8 32.5 2 11.5 15 Khandayata 3 7.5 27 42.75 8 28.5 2 11.5 40 Karana 0 - I 2.5 - - - - I Other 2 66.6 3 3 - - - - 5 Castes •

SCs 3 75 I 0.25 - - - - 4 STs 13 65 7 3 - - - - 20 Total 24 - 41 16 4 85

* Other Caste mcludes 4 Gopala (mIlk-man) and one Tanti (Weaver) households ** STs include 6 JlIanga, 12 Dehllri and 2 Sabara households

Area

48.5 82.75

2.5 3

0.25 3

140

Table 5.5 shows that all the big landowners, i.e., land falling in between 7.5 to

10 acres, in the Nagiapasi village come from three higher castes of Brahmin,

Khandayat and Karana. None of the Scheduled caste, Scheduled Tribe and other

service Caste households have land more than 2.5 acres. While a minimal number of

households from Khandayat and Karana caste are landless, a substantial majority

(84.6 %) of the Scheduled Castes and more than half of the Scheduled Tribe

households are landless. Table 5.6 also presents a similar picture for K. K. pur village,

149

where only Brahmin and Khandayat households possess land more than 2.5 acres in

the village.

Apart from a few Scheduled Caste and Tribe households, who own less than

one acre of land, most are landless in both the villages, and run their family by

working as wage labourers (see Tables 5.7 and 5.8). Some of the scheduled caste

tiunilies are attached to particular higher caste households as servants. They work in

their tields during agricultural seasons as attached labourers and look after their cattle

and do other works like guarding their fruit trees etc. during non-agricultural seasons.

In both the villages, persons having good income earning occupations like govt.

se("\ice and contractorship come from the higher castes of the village. All the

Scheduled Caste households in K. K. Pur and a majority of them (53.8 %) in

Nagiapasi are artisans, engaged in basket weaving activities. They weave baskets of

ditTerent sizes and other kinds of pots made up of bamboo sticks, which the villagers

use for agricultural and other household purposes. Generally, the women members

and children of the family do such activities. while the male go out for wage

labouring. However, during weeding and harvesting seasons, when the demand for

labourers increases. the women members of such families also go out for work.

Table 5.7: Castes and Occupation: Nagiapasi

Caste CuJtiva Business Contra Daily Artisan Gov!. Shepherd Total -tion -ctor Labour Service

Brahmin 1 - - - - - - I ( 100%) (100%)

Khandayat 55 I - 10 - - - 66 (83.3%) ( 15%) (15.2 %) (100%)

Karana 6 - 2 I - I - 10 (60%) (20%) (10 %) (10%) (100%)

Gopala 21 2 - 5 - - I 29 (72.4%) (6.9%) (17.2 %) (35%) (100%)

Other 10 2 - 7 - - - 19 Castes (52.6%) (10.5%) (36.9 %) (100%) SCs 2 - - 4 7 - - 13

( 15.4%) (30.8 %) (53.8%) (100%) Juanga 3 - . 14 - - - 17

( 17.6%) (82.4 %) (100%) Total 98 5 2 41 7 I I 155

150

Table 5.8: Castes and Occupation: K.K. Pur

Caste Cultiva- Busi-ness Contra- Daily Artisan GoV!. Shepherd Total tion ctor Labour Service

Brahmin g 2 2 - - 3 - 15 (53.4 %) (13.3 'Yo) (13.3 %) (20 %) (l00 %)

Khandayat 33 2 4 - I - 40 (82.5 %) (5 'Yo) (10 'Yo) (2.5 %) (100 %)

Karana I I (100 'Yo) (100 'Yo)

Other I 2 2 5 Castes (20 'Yo) (40 'Yo) (40 'Yo) (100 'Yo)

SCs 4 4 (l00 'Yo) (100 'Yo)

STs 3 17 20 (15 'Yo) (85 %) (l00 'Yo)

Total 45 4 3 23 4 4 2 85

5.2.3. Interest Heterogeneity

The third and important source of heterogeneity among the villagers is the differential

interests of the users in the resource itself. It should be clarified here that the

differential interests in the forest resource arise out of their differential use of the

same. As different sections of society depend and use the same forest for different

reasons they develop differential interest in it.

Interest heterogeneity of the resource users has been analysed taking into

consideration both horizontal and vertical differences in the use of forest produces by

the cummunity members.

5.2 3. a) Horizontal Differences

The horizontal differences in forest use by the community members correspond to

several user-groups depending upon the same forest area for different forest produces,

without involving any kind of hierarchy. To begin with, there are three (one in

Nagiapasi and two in K. K. Pur) shepherd households in the villages, whose primary

interest in forest is fodder. These households possess a flock of sheep and goats of

their own, which they take to the forest almost everyday for grazing. Further, they

also take the cattle of other members of the community for grazing, for which they are

paid either in cash or kind. Often, they also gather green leaves and grass in head­

loads from the forest, which they use for feeding their cattle. These households are

151

fully dependent upon forest for their livelihood, and most importantly, they look upon

the forest onl y for the fodder requirements.

The second user group having a particular interest in forest is the basket­

weaving households, who look forward to forest for raw material like bamboo. Such

households constitute seven out of 13 (53.8 %) Scheduled Caste households in

Nagiapasi and all the 4 Scheduled Caste households in K. K. Pur.

The third user group in this category is the tribal households who collect non­

timber forest produces like Sal leaves and Sal seeds, which is used to prepare leaf­

plates and Sal oil respectively. Usually the women members belonging to these

households are involved in such collection. These households along with the basket­

weaving households depend minimally upon the forest for fodder requirements, since

they hardly possess any cattle of their own.

The agrarian households of the villages may be considered the fourth user

group having specific interest in forest, who collect small timber from the forest for

making a!,'licultural equipments. This category constitutes the majority of the

households in both the villages.

It is important to point out that though these interests do not involve any

hierarchies of scale, yet they often clash with each other. For example, the interest of

the shepherds came into conflict with rest of the community, when the communities

started protecting the forest and stopped allowing !,'fazing inside the forest for quick

regeneration in the initial years. Similarly, in the initial years the Scheduled castes

were also prohibited from taking bamboo from inside the forest, who complained

against no restriction for upper caste agrarian households in collecting small timber

from forest for making agricultural equipments.

5.13. b) Vertical Differences

A part from the speci tic dependencies upon forest, as mentioned above, it is found that

people mostly use forest for two important requirements such as fuel and fodder. An

analysis of the people's dependence upon forest for these two purposes revels the fact

that dependency varies a lot among the households in the village and all the

152

households are not equally dependent upon forest for such purposes. To analyse the

differential use of the forest with regard to purposes like fuelwood and fodder in the

villages, the households were asked to give their opinion on a five-point scale with

options ranging from 'do not depend' to 'fully dependent'.

Based on the information on the amount of fuelwood collection by households

in both villages, it is observed that a majority of the households (65.1 %) in Nagiapasi

and nearly half (47 %) of the households in K. K. Pur depend fully on forest for their

fuelwood requirements. Relatively fewer households in Nagiapasi (2.6 %) and K. K.

Pur (1.2 %) do not depend upon forest at all for their fuelwood requirements. These

households are found to be relying upon alternative sources of fuel wood like LPG

gas, electric stoves, etc. Substantial proportion of households in both villages (14.2 %

in N agiapasi and 30.6 % in K. K. Pur) collect only minimal to half of the amount of

total fuel wood requirement of their households from the forest (see Table 5.9).

Besides forest, these households also look forward to some other sources like crop

residues, cow dung cakes, and dry leaves and other materials from their own land to

fulfill their fuel wood requirements.

Table 5.9: Dependency upon Forest for Fuelwood in the two Villages

Tvpe of Dependencv Nagiapasi K. K. Pur Do not depend 4 (2.6 %) I (1.2 %) Less than hal f 13 (8.4 %) 5 (5.9 %) Half 9 (5.8 %) 21 (24.7 %) More than Hal f 28 (18.1 %) 18(21.2%) Fully Dependent 101 (65.1 %) 40 (47 %) Total 155 (100 %) 85(100%)

To gauge the relatively differential interest in forest use with respect to fodder

collection from forest, the households were asked to express their opinion in a five

point-scale as to how much of fodder they collected from nearby forest. It is observed

that there existed a differential interest so far as people's fodder collection from the

forest. Substantial number of households in both villages (23.9 % in Nagiapasi and 13

% in K. K. Pur) do not have any fodder requirements at all, since they do not have any

cattle of their own. Notwithstanding the fact that these households are depending

upon forest for so many other reasons, they never look forward to the forest for fodder

153

requirements. Even the cattle owning households in both villages vary in their opinion

about their dependency upon forest for fodder, and such dependency is, thus,

observed to be scattered in the villages. The dependency of 12.9 per cent households

in Nagiapasi and 32.9 per cent households in K. K. Pur ranges from half to less than

half respectively. Unlike fuel wood, for which a majority of the households in both

villages relied totally upon forest, only 36.8 per cent of the households in Nagiapasi

and 23.5 per cent households in K. K. Pur arc fully dependent upon forest for fodder

(See Table 5.10). The alternative sources of fodder, for those households who collect

minimal to less than half of total required fodder from the forest, were found to be

crop residues, grass and weeds from own land, fodder purchased from market etc.

Table 5.10: Dependency upon Forest for Fodder in the Two Villages

Type of Dependency N a!!.iapasi K. K. Pur Do not HH without cattle 37 (23.9 %) 11(13%) depend H H with cattle I (0.6 %) -Less than hal f I (0.6 %) 3 (3.5 %) Half 19(12.3%) 25 (29.4 %) More than half 40 (25.8 %) 26 (30.6 %) Fully depend 57 (36.8 %) 20 (23.5 %) Total 155 (100 %) 85(100%)

Thc horizontal and vertical differences of forest use mentioncd above depict

the existing heterogeneities of interest with respect to the use of resource among the

community members. Based upon these, three different types of dependency and use

of the forest resource can be identified in the two villages.

1. High depmdency: The Scheduled Castes and Tribes of the villages use the forest

resource the most in the village. They depend upon forest for several reasons.

Forest produces have become a source of livelihood for them, as a majority of the

people of these two communities arc landless. The members of the tribal

community collect various Non Timber Forest Produces (NTFP) such as, Sal

leaves, Tendu leaves, Sal seeds, Rope making materials, Broom making materials,

etc, from the forest. They earn their livelihood out of these NTFPs. All the

Scheduled Caste households in K. K. Pur and a majority of them (53.8 %) in

Nagiapasi are engaged in basket weaving activities. Bamboo is used as raw

154

material for this, which they collect from the forest38 The Tribals also use some of

the fruits and roots from the forest as their food. Besides, these two communities

also depend upon forest for fuelwood, fodder, house building materials, etc.

Certain households from middle and upper castes, who do not possess any land,

can also be included in this category.

1. Moderate depe1lde1lcy: The landed middle and uppcr caste households in both

villages, though very much depend upon the forest, yet, their dependency is not as

severe as the former category. One of the major distinctions between the two is

that while the former depends upon the forest for fulfilling their livelihood, the

latter depends for supplementing it as they derive their livelihood from

agriculture. People in this category collect small timber from the forest for making

their agricultural equipments39• Besides, they also collect fuel wood, fodder and

house building materials from the forest. However, the amount of fuelwood and

fodder they collect is comparatively less than that of the previous category.

Agriculture being the primary occupation of these households, their fodder and

fuel wood needs are fulfilled to a certain extent by erop residues and cow dung

respectively. Cowdung, in fact, forms one of the important sources of fuel wood

for rural landed households40. Some of the households also depend upon their own

lands and backyards for fuel wood and fodder requirements. In other words,

families falling into this category manage to find an alternative to fuel wood and

fodder, and thus, depend less on forest for such requirements.

3. Low depende1lcy: A few rich families in both the villages, whose livelihood is

derived from sources like, government service, business, contractor-ship, etc., use

38 There also exists a gender differential in the forest use by these two communities. While almost all the tribal women go to the forest for NTFP collection, barring a few, it is the duty of the Scheduled Caste men to get bamboo from the forest. Women members from the Scheduled Caste families generally do the basket-weaving job.

39 The villagers each year celebrate 'Akshya Trutia', an agrarian festival, after which they begin their sowing activities. As a customary practice, each cultivating household makes new agricultural equipments for this festival. The well-off families usually make ploughs on such occasions, while the poor families manage with spades, sickles, etc. however, all depend upon forest for this purpose .

• 0 This does not mean that landless families do not possess any cattle at all. Ownership of cattle population also varies depending upon landholding. While the landless families keep more goats and sheep, landed households own more bullocks and cows, since they need them for their agricultural works. Thus, landed households use more cow dung as fuelwood than landless households do.

ISS

forest less frequently than others. These families use alternative sources for

fuel wood like electric heater, kerosene stoves, bio-gas, etc. A few households also

use LPG gas. The dependency upon forest fuel wood is almost minimal for this

section of population. Requirements like fodder and small timber for agricultural

equipments are also negligible, as most of the families in this category do not

posses any cattle at all and depend upon sources other than agriculture for

livelihood.

5.2.4. Political Heterogeneity

Political heterogeneity is identified as the fourth source of heterogeneity having

potential to affect collective action. Political differentials (heterogeneity) or political

unity (homogeneity) directly corresponds to the kind of leadership pattern and the

authority structure that exists in the communities to give shape to collective action

initiatives by the members of the community. By political homogeneity, Baland and

Platteau (1995) indicate the extent of agreement by the members of community 'about

the authority structure, about the way in which the leaders make and implement rules

and allocate property rights (also see Vedeld, 2000). Viewed in this sense, political

homogeneity means greater support, faith, trust and confidence in the authority

structure, or to put it in nutshell 'agreement over the leadership'. Political

heterogeneity, in contrast, implies situations where there is limited agreement, faith

and confidence in the leaderls of the community. Further, political heterogeneity also

means a fragmented leadership group, without having any internal understanding and

agreement among themselves.

With a view to gaugue the political heterogeneity of the villages, the authority

structure of both villages has been taken into consideration. The authority structure of

the villages is analysed probing into the questions of first, agreement over leadership

and second, decision making arrangements in both villagcs.

Agreement over the authority of the leader is found to follow from his

(leader's) capabilities to fulfill the expectations of the villagers. When the villagers

have confidence over the capabilities of the leader, the agreement over his authority is

found to be morc. To access the degree of agreement over leadership of both the

156

villages, two questions were asked to the villagers during the course of group

discussion with them, namely,

1. What are the important characteristics that a leader should have for forest protection?

2. Do you think your leader has these characteristics?

While the opinions of both the villagers are quite similar for the tirst question,

they differ among themselves concerning the second. Honesty, transparency, capacity

to ensure equity, having resource, interest and time for forest protection, etc. are

found to be the preferred answers to the question of leadership traits. Most of the

members of the tlrst village (Nagiapasi) agree over the issue that their leader do

possess these qualities and thus is acknowledged by all the villagers. On the contrary,

it is a popular opinion among the members of the second village (K. K. Pur) that none

of their tiveleaders of Forest Protection Committee has all these qualities.

Most of the forest users with high dependency being Scheduled Tribes and

Scheduled Castes, who are conventionally marginalised sections in village societies,

ensuring equity to them forms an important challenge in ITont of leaders in Forest

Protection. Special emphasis has been given to understand the perception of these

marginalised groups regarding the capabilities of their leaders in ensuring equity. It is

observed that persons belonging to these sections in K. K. Pur are more discontent

with their leaders than their counterparts in Nagiapasi. The Scheduled Castes and

Tribes of Nagiapasi village are found to be satistled with their leader and state that

they are treated on par with any other upper caste household in the village so far as

benetlt sharing from the forest produce is concerned, even though inequality on the

basis of caste still remains in many other spheres in the village.

To further highlight upon the political heterogeneity of the two villages, the

leadership group, which has devoted its time, energy and commitment for the cause of

forest protection in two villages has been observed. Authority structure in the

Nagiapasi village was found to be quite uni-polar with a single leader throughout its

history of past one decade of forest protection. Since its inception there has been one

leader of Nagiapasi Vana Samrakshana Samiti (VSS). The president of the Committee

comes from Karana Caste, one of the traditional dominant castes of Orissa. The

157

authority of the family from which the present president comes has been respected by

the villagers from generations. The leadcrship of the president of the VSS is not

confined to management of the forest resource alone. He is the overall headman of the

village and takes the initiative in almost all viII age affairs. The leadership structure in

the Nagiapasi village has originated from the social field and has been extended to all

fields including political.

Unlike the Nagiapasi village, the leadership groups in K. K. Pur are fairly

heterogeneous and divided in most directions. The leadership structure in the village

is very much segmental in nature. There are several structures or layers of leadership

in the village. The overall structure ofleadership has been compartmentalised and it is

observed that different sets of people oblige different persons for leadership. The

person who was the president at the time of formation of the Forest Protection

Committee had so many other interests other than forest protection. Mention has to be

made here that in the five year history of forest protection, the village has seen five

different presidents of Forest Protection Committee. Each one of them were changed

either due to allegations of incapability or development interest in some other

activities other than forest. Besides this, there are also inter-personal rivalries among

the leaders in K. K. Pur. Since all the leaders derive their authority from the members

of the same village, there has always been a competition to attract the followers. Such

a process has resulted in antagonism between the folIowers, who are members of the

same village community. The personal qualities of the leaders have not been that

much strong, as in the case with the other viII age, to withstand the anomic situations

in the vilIage.

The second criterion to gauge the political heterogeneity of the two villages is

the decision making process. An attempt has been made to explore the decision

making process and the arrangements for it in both the villages to understand how it

influences the overall political structure of the villages as well as the initiatives for

forest protection. The process of arriving at a decision very well depends upon the

physical and political structures that facilitate the process. Decision-making has been

found to be more consensual in nature in Nagiapasi compared to K. K. Pur. The

structural arrangements for arriving at decisions too vary between the two villages.

Even though there is uni-polar leadership in the first village, most of the caste groups

158

or colonies have their own leaders and common rooms41, where they decide about

their own caste groups. Before any decision is taken it is discussed and debated

among the members in those common rooms. Sometimes, the discussions reach a

positive end, while at other times it does not. Once such process is over, then, it

comes to the overall village meeting and people from other castes, who are not even

concerned with the decision to be taken, are given a chance to express their opinion.

Finally, after much negotiation the meeting tries to arrive at a conclusion, which is

acceptable to the majority of the community. Such a process of arrangements to arrive

at decisions is found to be missing in K. K. Pur village. Only Scheduled Tribes are

observed to have their common room in the village. On further query about the

absence of such common places for other caste people of the village it is found that

they used to exist long back in the village. But due to lack of proper care and unity in

the village, they do not exist today.

To have a further understanding of the system, data on how the villagers

selected their last Panchayat (ward) members was collected. While in K. K. Pur they

were selected through general panchayat elections where several members contested,

in the first village, the members were elected unopposed. There was only election for

the Panchayat president at Nagiapasi village. The people of the concerned wards (the

lowest layer of the decentralised govcrnment) decided among themselves whom they

should select as their candidates, and finally it was decided at the village meeting.

The above discussion should not lead one to conclude that decision-making is

very much formal in Nagiapasi. The discussions that take place between them over

the issue of decision-making, are very much informal in nature and are often carried

forward to the fields, forests, or the roads. Since the villagers meet each other every

day in their day-to-day life, discussions made are very much spontaneous and

informal in nature.

41 Four village common rooms (Kotha Ghara in local language) are found in the village, which are mostly used for playing cards. gossiping, relaxing, etc. Besides Scheduled Castes and Tribes who have their own common rooms and a, a practice do not go to other's, the remaining two are mostly used by members belonging to other castes. These common rooms are found to be the hot bed of politics in the village and all the decisions that are taken are debated and discussed in it.

159

Discussions, debate, negotiation and renegotiation are found to be popular

ways through which decisions are taken in the first village. Even though the leader

takes decisions himself sometimes, yet, people in the village are informed about it and

their opinions are heard. The major reason for the discontent among the members of

the K. K. Pur about their leaders have been that they were not consulted even for

those decisions that affect their use of forest. Such processes of decision making

retkct the style ofleadership in both villages.

Based upon the assessment of the degree of agreement upon the authority

structure and the decision-making process in both villages, K. K. Pur is found to be

more heterogeneous politically than Nagiapasi. In Nagiapasi, the members of the

community seem to have greater agreement over the authority structure and greater

confidence upon their leader and the ways in which the leaders implement rules and

allocate benefits. On the contrary, authority structure in K. K. Pur is less agreed upon

having limited trust and confidence from the members of the community.

5.3. When, How and Why Heterogeneity Matters

5.3.1. Towards a Theoretical Understanding

There is little agreement over the possible effects of heterogeneity on people's

cooperative behaviours. Yet, the omnipresence nature of heterogeneity among

resource users generates the questio!1 of when, how and why they matter in the

process of resource use and the initiatives for collective action. One answer to such a

question may be that - it affects the capacity of the members to contribute or invest

for collective action. While some members in a community possess relatively large

amount of production factors (resources) required to produce collective goods; they

may have better access to collective goods than others. Heterogeneity also matters in

collective action when it affects the payoff the actors receive from different outcomes

(Schlager and Blomquist, 1998). The outcomes in a collective action may distribute

rewards and benefits differently across the resource users, leading to conflicts over

determining an equal allocation for all. Now, the question arises why there is

differential rewards or benefits In collective action outcomes? The differential

rewards and benefits arise because of differences in the possession of valuable

resources (or as Baland and Platteau call it differentials endowments) among resource

160

users. For example, some resource users (better-endowed individuals) may have

invested more heavily than others, and hence, may expect their additional investments

recognised and receive more benefits and rewards. They may, therefore, support an

outcome structure, which allocates benefits unevenly among resource users.

The success of any collective action etTorts requIres effective and proper

communication and mutual trust among the resource users. While equal share of

benefits requires effective communication and proper dissemination of information

across the members of the group, the outcome structure, which supports uneven

distribution of rewards and benefits reqUIres strategic and opportunistic

communication and withholding of available information (Scharpf, 1997).

Heterogeneity among actors in terms of available resources may generate information

asymmetry and mistrust among resource users, which can have a powerful and

negative effect on collcctive action outcomes. Information asymmetries, further, can

contribute in creating an atmosphere of distrust and deception discouraging

individuals from working together for a common cause. Boyce (\988) extends the

argument as to how resource heterogeneity creates an atmosphere of distrust, thereby

affecting collective action outcomes negatively. Acknowledging the fact that resource

heterogeneity leads to an outcome structure which favours unequal allocation of

benefits and rewards, Boyce argues that inequality may increase the scope for a

powerful minority to impose rules of the game that benefit them at the cost of large

majority in the community. Anticipating opportunistic behaviour from the powerful

and better-endowed minority, the weak and less endowed members may not trust

them and thus, might refuse to cooperate with them.

When collective action involves active steps to conserve a resource, costs are

usually incurred in the beginning while the benefits out of it come later. Thus,

variations in the availability of resources to the members of a group may have impact

upon the initial contributions or costs that has to be incurred for the production of

collective goods, thereby decreasing its chance of beginning. Such a variation may

impact collective action either through the intervention of survival constraints or

through the availability of outside economic opportunities (Baland and Platteau, 1999:

774). In a community having potential resource heterogeneity, the level of wealth of

the poorer members may be so low that their participation in collective action violates

161

their survival constraint. This constraint automatically reduces their participation,

since they are forced to attach considerable importance to their present income. It

ultimately results in their unwillingness to undertake collective action measures and

invest for production of collective goods, even though such actions would increase

their future permanent income. Secondly, in a heterogeneous community some may

have better access to outside economic opportunities than other, the future income

from collective action for them may fall below than the alternative income available.

As they always have the chance of shifting to an alternative income, which is, of

course, more than that of income from collective action, they will have an incentive

for not investing in collective action and exploiting the depleting the collective good.

On the other hand, members deprived of such outside income opportunities attach a

higher value to the future income from the collective action.

Implementation of rules and regulations is very much central to the success of

collective action, especially in the case of common property. To achieve superior

outcomes in collective action, agreements must be faithfully implemented. Ostrom

(1990:44) divides implementation into two parts - commitment and monitoring. Once

an agreement is reached, the members must still commit themselves to follow the

rules and abide by the agreement; and there has to be some system of monitoring to

impose sanctions upon those who violates those rules. Heterogeneity may have

negative impacts both upon the twin processes of commitment and monitoring.

Commitment to mutually agreed rules, to some extent, revolves around interpersonal

trust among community members. Individuals are more likely to be committed to a set

of regulations if they know that enough others are also committed (cf. Axelrod, 1981).

As has been discussed earlier, heterogeneity may affect the mutuality of trust that

members have upon each other and thus, deteriorate the probability of collective

action. Resource heterogeneity and socio-cultural heterogeneities often induce

members to break mutual trust, commitment and agreed set of rules. In such

circumstances, few members perceive that the only ones who would be affected by

such violation of rules are those from the other group or those who are wealthy.

Commitment problem, to a large extent, is solved through monitoring.

Monitoring individual actions for violating rules and imposing sanctions against those

who do such activities, provides resource users the assurance they need to remain

162

committed to a set of rules. Monitoring is crucial for commitment, and commitment is

crucial for the supply of rules that allow individuals to achieve better outcomes

(Ostrom, 1990: 45). Heterogeneity among resource users can affect monitoring of the

agreement. Some resource users because of their greater access to resources rcquired

for harvesting of benefits from collective action can violate the agreed rules and

harvest more than what is allocated to them without easily being caught (Schlager and

Blomquist, 1998: 8).

Heterogeneity in terms of socio-cultural differential can too have a negative

impact upon collective action. Socio-cultural differentials within a community may

create different interpretations of the agreed rules enforced for implementation,

different views about who should enforce them and different perceptions of social

customs, convcntions and norms supporting cooperation (Baland and Platteau, 1996:

302).

Baland and Platteau (1996: 303) explains that in contrast to socio-cultural and

cconomic heterogeneity, heterogeneity of interest has the maximum potential for

threatening collective action aimed at resource conservation. When uscrs have

different interests in the management of a resource, designing a common objective for

regulating the commons is problematic. Such differential interests become more

complex when users have alternative income earning opportunities and if they reside

outside the area where the resource is located. Heterogeneity of interest is often

combined with gender differentials. Or in other words, contlict between men and

women regarding the use of village commons can also be regarded as contlict of

differential interest. The interests of men and women in the management of a resource

may vary due to their differential relations with the resource. Folbre (1994) points out

that the concepts of self-interest may be highly gendered, partly as a by-product of the

social organisation of childrearing, the process of socialisation and the cultural

construction of gender roles. Women may have a less bounded concept of themselves

than men, a greatcr propensity for interdependent utilities and even altruism (Folbre,

1994: 26 in Molinas, 1998: 415). These behaviour differences may induce different

attitude towards cooperation by gender.

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The above explanation of the negative impact of ditft:n:nt types of

heterogeneities, however, may not necessarily lead one to think that heterogeneity

always has such impacts on the process of collective action. Several scholars have

pointed out the non-negative impact of heterogeneity on collective action for the

management of natural resources. Some have also suggested ways in which

heterogeneity can even act as a positive factor leading to successful collective action.

For Baland and Platteau, resource heterogeneity or "differential endowments"

may not have any negative impact upon collective action as they may have a common

interest in regulating the use of the resource. As a matter of fact, they can be expected

to participate in collective action despite their variations in income and other valued

resources (1996: 305). They further point out that unless and until the less endowed

members of the group are excluded from the benefits and rewards of collective action,

they are equally likely to contribute for resource regulation. When economic

inequalities do not generate differential interests in the resource, it can even be proved

as a favourable factor for collective agreement 'if the rich members can assume the

leadership roles'. Wade (1988) has explained such a situation where economic

inequality generates necessary incentives for the rich to assume leadership roles from

his study of the Kottapalli village in Andhra Pradesh. Wade mentions that, since the

benefits of unified action are positively related to land area, the elites have a

disproportionately great interest in the effective regulation of water resources and this

helps ensure that the required collective organisation is started and efTectively run.

Along with leadership roles, the elites also provide the authority structure

required for proper enforcement and implementation of regulatory rules. In this

regard, Wade writes that 'many who might be tempted to free-ride are socially

subordinate to others in the user group, and are checked from doing so by sanctions

which derive from wider order of caste and property without the irrigation council to

use its own authority (1988, 193). Elaborating such idea of assuming authority

structure by the rural elites, Bardhan states that 'in many local communities some

rudimentary forms of cooperation have been sustained and enforced over the years by

traditional authority structure. While there may have been some bit of sharing ethic,

the predominant social norm was often that of an unequal patron client system, in

which the powerful who might enjoy disproportionate benefits from institutions of

164

cooperation enforced the rules of the game and gave leadership to solidaristic efforts

(1993a: 638).

5.3.2. Heterogeneity in the Context of Collective Action for Natural Resource

Management: Empirical Findings

The above theoretical discussion forms a framework to empirically analyse how

heterogeneity plays a role in the context of collective action for natural resource

management. An explanation of the effects of heterogeneity on collective action

initiatives for local resource management requires a-priori understanding of how it

affects the dependency structure of the community. Since the type of forest use and

dependency is crucial for its successful management, the impact of heterogeneity

upon the dependency pattern of the communities becomes essential to understand how

heterogeneity affects the initiatives for its protection (collective action) and the final

management outcomes. Keeping this in mind, an attempt has been made to understand

how heterogeneity affects the forest dependency pattern in two villages, or in other

words, how the forest dependency varies along with variations in one's social and

economic conditions. Since fuel wood and fodder form the two major forest use in the

two villages, dependency of the community members on these two forest produces

has been assessed in the context of social and economic differentials.

5.3.2 a) Intra-Community Heterogeneity and its Impact on Resource Dependency

Broadly speaking, two different types of forest dependencies have been observed in

the two villages. The first type of forest use is the 'household specific' forest

use/dependency. As mentioned in the above section, there are certain households who

depend upon forest for particular purposes. Such type of forest use is invariably

related to their occupational patterns and livelihood options. These differential forest

uses has been discussed in the section under the heading of 'horizontal differences'.

A deeper understanding of forest use by the communities reveals the fact that

this horizontal difference in forest use is constructed along with intra-community

socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities. For instance, it is only households from

Scheduled Caste category, who look forward to the forest for bamboo as a raw

material to their basket weaving activities. None of the non-Scheduled Caste

households have been observed to involve in such type of forest use. Further, with

165

the passmg on of the occupation from one generation to the other, the forest

dependency also passes to the next generation in the same household. Such type of

forest use is directly related to their occupation pattern, which, in tum, is related to or

derived from one's caste position. Therefore, both socio-cultural heterogeneity (in

tenns of caste divisions) and economic heterogeneity (in tenns occupational

differences) have been observed to playa crucial role in detennining one's forest use

and dependency.

Similar argument can also be extended to other types of 'household specific'

forest dependencies such as NTFP collection by tribal women, dependency for small

timber by upper caste agrarian households, etc. In each of these dependencies,

occupational pattern (economic situation) and one's caste position (social status) act

as measures deciding factors in forest use and dependency.

Thc sccond category of forest use and dependency is that for fuel wood and

fodder, for which substantial number of households are looking forward to the forest.

Notwithstanding the differences in degrees about the community members'

dependency upon forest for these two purposes, almost all households are depending

upon forest for fuelwood and fodder. In order to gauge the impact of heterogeneity

upon forest use for these two types of forest produccs, the differential dependencies

of various members of the community has been analysed in the backdrop of their

social and economic position in the community.

It is observed that dependency upon forest for fuel wood has been constructed

on the lines of both the earlier two mentioned sources of heterogeneity, i.e. socio­

cultural and economic. Fuelwood collection from the forest in both the villages is

related to caste positions of the households and their landholding pattern in a

structured way. Higher a household's position in caste hierarchy, the lower is its

dependency on forest for fuel wood. Almost all the Scheduled Caste and Tribe

households in both villages collect the required fuelwood for their household

consumption entirely from the forest. However, a considerable number of households

from higher castes collect half to minimal amount of fuel wood from the forest. There

are a few households in both the villages, which do not depend at all upon the forest

for their fuel wood requirements (see Tables 5.11 & 5.12).

166

Since the upper caste households are agrarian households, with agriculture

being their primary source of livelihood, they somehow manage to fulfill certain

portion of their fuelwood requirement from crop residues, cow-dung cakes, fuel wood

from own land, etc. In other words, these households always have an alternative

choice with respect to their fuel wood requirement. Such an alternative option reduce

their degree of dependency upon forest for fuelwood. Tables 5.11 and 5.12 depict the

fuel wood dependency of community members belonging to different caste groups in

both the villages.

Table 5.11: Castes and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in Nagiapasi

Do not Less than Half More than Fully Depend half half Depend

Brahmin - 1(100%) - - -

Khandayat - 9(13.6%) 5 (7.6%) 16 (24.2%) 36 (54.6%) Karana 4 (40%) 3 (30%) 1(10%) 1(10%) I (10%) Gopala - - 3 (10.3%) 4 (13.8%) 22 (75.9%) Other Castes - - - 6 (31.5%) 13 (68.5%) SCs - - - - 13 (100%) luanga (ST) - - - I (5.9%) 16 (94.1 %) Total 4 13 9 28 101

* Other castes mclude 3 Telt, 6 Gudw, 8 Dhoba, and 2 Banka households. * * SCs include 9 Hadi and 4 Pana households

Total

1(100%) 66 (100%) 10 (100%) 29 (100%) 19 (100%) 13 (100%) 17 (100%)

155

Table 5.12: Castes and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in K. K. Pur

Do not Less than Half More than Fully Depend half half Depend

Brahmin I (6.6 %) 4 (26.7 %) 6 (40 %) 4 (26.7 %) -

Khandayat - I (2.5 %) 14 (35 %) 12 (30 %) 13 (32.5 %)

Karana - - 1(100%) - -Other Castes 2 (40 %) 3 (60 %)

SCs 4(100%)

STs 20 (100 %)

Total I 5 21 18 40

* Other Caste mcludes 4 Gopala (milk-man) and one Tantl (Weaver) households * * STs include 6 luanga, 12 Dehuri and 2 Sabara households

Total

15 (100%) 40(100%) I (100 %) 5 (100 %) 4 (100 %) 20(100%)

85

The resource dependency of the two communities with respect to fuelwood

has also been compared with the landholding pattern of the villages to understand

how possession of an important resource like land (economic heterogeneity) affects

the forest use and dependency.

167

The size of the landholding and dependency for fuel wood are perfectly

correlated with each other in the sense that with an increase in the size in the holding

the dependency upon forest for fuel wood shows a gradual decrease. While all the

landless households (except one in each community) depend fully upon forest for

their fuelwood requirements, such entire dependency upon forest for fuel wood is

limited among landed households. The single landless household in the K. K. Pur,

which does not depend at all upon forest for fuel wood, is the well-off Brahmin

household of the village. A substantial number of households in both villages having

land above 5 acres collect only minimal to less than half of their needed fuel wood

from the torest and barring one in Nagiapasi none depend fully upon the forest for it

(see Tables 5.13 & 5.14). The fuelwood dependency of various households having

different landholding sizes is given below in Tables 5.13 and 5.14.

Table 5.13: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in Nagiapasi (Land in Acres)

Do not Less than Half More than Fully Total Depend half half Depend

Landless - - - I (2.7%) 36 (97.3%) 37 (100%) 0.01 2.5 1(1.2%) 3 (3.5%) 4 (4.8%) 13 (15.5%) 63 (75%) 84 (100%) 2.51 - 5 2 (12.5%) - 4 (25%) 9 (56.2%) 1(6.3%) 16(100%) 5.01 -7.5 1(9.1%) 4 (36.4 %) 1(9.1%) 4 (36.3%) 1(9.1%) II (100%) 7.51 10 - 6 (85.7 %) - I (14.3%) - 7(100%) Total 4 13 9 28 101 155

Table 5.14: Landholding Pattern and Dependency on Forest for Fuelwood in K. K. Pur (Land in Acres)

Do not Less than Half More than Fully Total depend half half

Landless I (42 %) - 2 (8.3 %) - 21 (87.5 %) 24 (100 %) 0.01 - 2.5 9 (22 %) 13(31.7%) 19 (46.3 %) 41 (100 %) 2.51 - 5 2 (12.5 %) 9 (56.2 %) 5 (31.3 %) - 16(100%) 5.01 -7.5 3 (75 %) I (25 %) 4(100%) Total I 5 21 18 40 85

In a similar fashion, the dependency on forest for fodder is significantly

affected by caste divisions and landholding pattern in two study villages, with limited

dependency of households belonging to higher castes and possessing relatively high

landholding size for such purpose. The study, therefore, reveals that socio-cultural

heterogeneity and economic heterogeneity do have a significant impact on resource

dependency of the community members. The resource dependency pattern changes

168

with variations III households' caste position and economic status. However, no

relationships can be established between political heterogeneity and resource

dependency pattern of the communities.

Having gained an understanding of how heterogeneity affects the resource

dependency pattern in the communities, the subsequent sections of the chapter

engage with the explanation of how heterogeneity affects the collective action

initiatives of the members of the community and the resource management outcomes.

5.3.2. b) I/ltra-Commullity Heterogelleity a/ld Its Impact 011 Collective Actio/l alld

IUallageme/lt outcomes

Community based common pool resource management presupposes that a well­

defined resource base exists out there, for the effective management of which the

community should collectively act upon. With a given resource base, the problem

that a community faces is its sustainable maintenance, so that benefits from the

resource can be derived on an cnduring basis. Efforts towards sustainable

maintenance are often eroded because of the urge towards free-riding, where each

resource user tries to achieve maximum gain from the resource unmindful of the

resource needs of the other users and the physical availability of the resource for

them. Therefore, the collective action dilemma for common pool resource

management revolves around two central problems: provision problem and

appropriation problem (Ostrom, 1990, 200 I).

Provision problem in a CPR situation focuses on the cost that the resource

users invest to ensure up-keeping and maintenance of the resource, or, in other

words, providing the resource themselves on a sustained basis. Appropriation

problem, on the other hand, is related to allocating the fixed benefits of the resource

cquitable among resource users to avoid free-riding as well as conflicts over resource

sharing. These two problems are inter-twined with each other and any failure in

solving one of them affects the success of the other. For example, if the provision

problem is solved and adequate investment is ensured for the maintenance of the

resource without designing appropriate rules for equitable resource allocation, the

users will lose the incentive to further contribute towards the resource. The opposite

also holds true in the sense that well-designed rules for resource allocation will not

169

succeed in the absence of assured contributions for the maintenance of the resource.

These problems in the context of CPR management is solved by a robust institution

with we\l-designed provision and appropriation rules, credible commitment on the

part of the resource users to those designed rules and a strong monitoring system to

reduce the violation of such commitment.

Based upon this theoretical approach to the co\lective action problem in the

CPR situation, an attempt has been made to understand how the two communities

worked towards solving these problems and how the above-discussed heterogeneities

atTected the etTorts of the communities in solving these problems.

5.3.1. b) L Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Provisioning of the Resource

Being situated in the vicinity of Kapilas Reserved Forest, the two village

communities are highly dependent upon the forest for their day-to-day livelihood

issues. In the beginning of 1990s, when the two communities thought of initiating

co\lective action measures for protection and maintenance of the forest patch

adjoining their vi\lages, the physical condition of the forests was in a degraded

situation owing to several factors like forest theft, excessive grazmg, poor

maintenance by the state forest department, etc.

The problems that the communities faced at the time of initiating the eo\lective

action measures were two fold: property right problem and second free-riding

problem. The property rights for the both the forest patches were highly i\l defined,

with no clear-cut use and ownership rights. Since the forest patches were under the

Reserved Forest category, theoretica\ly the State forest department was supposed to

be the sole right holder over the resource. However, in practical terms the resources

were being used by members belonging to several communities for their livelihood

requirements. In the absence of any 'secured claim to the resource' (see Bromley,

1992) and institutional arrangements to regulate the use, the resources were used

under' open access regime'. Being an open access resource, free-riding was intrinsic

to it, which formed the second cha\lenge before the community members at the time

of beginning of forest protection. There was no contro\led use of the resource among

the community members, and the uninterrupted access of other communities had

made the situation more critical.

170

Therefore, the immediate task for Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur was to establish a

common property regime over the resource, and thereby regulate the use of the

resource by insiders of the community, deny access to outsides and design a well­

defined property right structure with proper negotiation with the State Forest

Department. In these regards, institutions were established in both the villages. With

a given resource to protect, the next problem that members faced was that of

'provisioning of the resource'. Since the resource base for both villages was in a

highly degraded condition, it required definite investments to be incurred on it for

availing benefits of it. The investments that were required in the beginning were both

economic and non-economic costs in nature. The economic cost required was in

terms of cash contributions by all the households for meeting the expenses towards

initiating the process, arranging meetings with the Forest Department officials, and

appointing a guard to patrol the forest area to control forest thefts. The non-economic

costs involved voluntary labour donation to demarcate the forest area taken by the

community for protection, clearing of weeds, and some plantation activity where

required. The third form of initial investment also included closure of grazing

activities for some initial years to facilitate natural regeneration of the forest. Both

the communities formed almost similar rules in these regard to solve the provision

problem of the resource. The rules included collection of rupees five per month per

household towards forest protection, voluntary labour donation by each household on

a rotational basis and imposing a self-restriction on grazing activities inside the

forest.

Having discussed the 'provision problem' with respect to CPR situation in

both the communities and the rules that were designed to tackle such a situation, let

us move forward to discuss what role heterogeneity played in the whole process.42

Both the communities went hand in hand with each other so far as establishment of

the institutions and formation of rules to solve the provision problem were concerned.

However, the situation differed in the villages with respect to the commitment and

monitoring of those designed rules.

" It should be made clear beforehand that since collective action was negatively affected and was a failure in K. K. Pur, the discussions carried out in this section focuses mostly upon that village.

171

Commitment to the designed rules with regard to the efforts towards solving

provision problem became problematic in the K. K Pur village since different socio­

economic groups behaved differently. While almost near total conformity to designed

rules was shown in Nagiapasi, such credible commitment was found to be absent in

the K. K. Pur village. The community members in this village responded positively in

the initial year and the collective activity of forest protection began with a nice start.

However, trom the second year onwards, the ground rule of paying rupees five per

month per household was not properly confirmed by all the member households of

the institution. The Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste households, who

constituted more than one-fourth of the population (28.2 %), were the first ones to

violate the rules of payment towards forest conservation. There were several reasons

for this non-conformity of rules in K. K. Pur village. The important concern was that

of poor monitoring by the Village Forest Protection Committee, the community

institution established for the purpose. The committee failed to collect the

contributions each month and asked the households for payment of the 'Forest Fee' at

the end of the year for the whole of 12 months. The SC and ST households, majority

of whom wcre poor and were managing their household budget by means of wage

labouring, found it difficult to pay Rupees 60 at once.

The above observation of non-commitment of rules by SC and ST households

paves the way to understand how socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities form

an obstacle in the way of collective action for local common pool resource

management. Some of the landed, agrarian, upper caste households made the

payment in terms of kind (paddy) soon after their harvest. But, since the SCs and STs

were deprived of landed property and were adhering mainly to non-agricultural

occupations, such type of contribution in terms of kind was also not possible on their

part. The above analysis doesn't, however, mean that all the SC and ST households

retrained trom making monetary contributions towards forest protection. There were

few SC and ST households who did contribute their share. However, a majority of

the defaulters were from this socio-economic category, along with poor households

of other castes. It, therefore, becomes clear that it is not only socio-cultural divisions

(heterogeneity) that mattered in commitment to rules, the economic heterogeneity

had also played its role in the process. Poverty, non-lucrative and low-earning

172

occupations of few households came in the way of efforts towards a collective and

community activity.

However, the situation was different with respect to non-economIC

contributions for solving the provision problem. The well off, high caste households

behavcd differently from that of lower caste, poor households when it came to

donating voluntary labour for forest protection activities. The upper caste households

of K. K. Pur, particularly those belonging to the Brahmin caste, (which constituted

17.7 % of the total households) lagged behind others with respect to voluntary labour

donation. Other caste groups of the village, including the Khandayat households,

accepted this rule positively and contributed their part for it. Some of the Brahmin

households, particularly those whose livelihood was derived from occupations like

business, contractors hip and government service, were the first ones to violate this

rule. Besides social prestige, lack of time due to their tight scheduled occupation

were some of the reasons given for their non-confirmity of rule of voluntary labour

donation.

Besides socio-cultural and economIc heterogeneities, interest heterogeneity

also affected the collective efforts to some extent in K. K. Pur. Differential interests

in the resource came in the way of commitment to the rule of limited grazing during

the beginning of forest protection. In fact, in both the villages there were oppositions

to this rule from certain sections of society. When the institutions crafted the rule of

closing grazing activities to facilitate natural regeneration, the few shepherd

households in both the villages along with other cattle holding landless households

expressed their disagreement towards the rule. However, the situation could be

controlled in Nagiapasi, since the village followed a strong monitoring system to

catch the rule breakers. Besides, the village had enough common wastelands, where

such households continued their b'Tazing activity. On the contrary, K. K. Pur lacked

both enough common lands to provide as an alternative to the forest for grazing, as

well as a strong monitoring system, which could ensure rule conformity. Since forest

was the only source for them to feed their cattle, showing commitment to the rule

again carne in the way of their livelihood and this rule was also violated.

173

5.3.2. b) ii. Heterogeneity and Its Impact on Appropriating of the Resollrce

The appropriation problem in CPR situation relates to distribution of benefits from the

resource in an equitable and sustainable manner. The communitics under study,

designed several rules to ensure equity of the distribution of benefits and

sustainability of the resource system. Since free-riding was the major problem at hand

during the time of forest protection, the communities tried to put a regulation upon the

use of the resource, by denying access to the members of other communities and

controlling the use by insiders. Fuelwood being an important element of forest use,

the first rule concerning appropriation of the resource was that of putting a restriction

on fuel wood collection from the forest. Accordingly, both the institutions came out

with following rules for effective appropriation:

• Fuelwood collection from the forest will be allowed only through head-load.

• None will be allowed to collect fuel wood through bullock cart or bicycle.

• None will be allowed to enter the forest with an axe. Only sickle and other

small instruments will be allowed.

To these rules, the Nagiapasi added one more rule of paying a small token

amount of 50 paise per head-load of fuel wood collected from the forest. The forest

protection committees of both the villages also put a regulation on other forms of

forest use, like collecting timber and bamboo for house construction andlor repairing,

bamboo for using as raw material for basket weaving, etc.

K. K. Pur again faced challenges from different sections of the community so

far as conforming to these rules for effective distribution of benefits for forest

resource. The basket weaving SC households, to begin with, complained of paying for

the bamboo, which they used to collect from the forest free of cost before. The

complaint was also targeted against landholding upper caste agrarian households, who

didn't have to pay anything for collecting small timber for making agricultural

equipments. The committee, however, tried to justify this inequality in the rule

formation by the reason that upper caste landed households collect small timber very

rarely, since making agricultural equipments was not an everyday affair, whereas the

basket weaving households required bamboo on a regular and large scale basis.

174

Some of the ST households, who earlier used to collect fuel wood from the

forest and sell them in the nearby market, also found it difficult to commit to the

newly designed rules. Collection of fuel wood in head-load was enough for self­

sufficiency, but was insufficient for selling in market. Thus, committing to rules again

came in the way of their livelihood.

The differential approach to the rules of the game in the K.K. Pur village with

respect to forest protection and management, created a situation of 'mistrust' among

members belonging to different 'socio-cultural' and 'economic' forest user groups.

Therefore, heterogeneities not only directly affected the process of collective action,

by di fferential treatment to the designed rules and commitment to those rules, but also

indirectly affected the collective action efforts by hampering 'trust' and 'assurance'

among different forest use groups. Such erosion of trust and assurance among

members belonging to different socio-economic groups made it more difficult on the

part of the community to come together and exhibit collective behaviour for local

resource management.

Besides socio-cultural, economIc and interest heterogeneity, the political

heterogeneity of K. K. Pur village also played a crucial role in the process of

collective action for local forest management. However, it is important to point out

that, while the former three sources of heterogeneity affected the 'commitment of the

community to the designed rules', political heterogeneity affected most the

'monitoring' part of collective action process. Credible commitment and a strong

monitoring system are two important elements that are required to avoid a situation of

tragedy in a CPR situation. Since every resource user is better off individually by not

committing to the rules, it is only through a strong monitoring system that

commitment can be brought about to the designed rules. While the whole community

is expected to commit to a set of designed rules, it is only a small group of

individuals, who do the monitoring job. The institution and more particularly the

leadership of the institution should be strong enough to ensure a proper monitoring

system.

The political heterogcneity of the K. K. Pur village resulted in a weak

institution without proper monitoring of the rule violation. The broader conflicting

175

characteristics ofleadership group of the K. K. Pur got reflected in institution building

for forest resource management in the village. The opposing leaders were always busy

in search of finding faults with each other so as to take privileges out of it. Therefore,

the political heterogeneity, which couldn't establish a robust institution and strong

monitoring system, was crucial one in affecting collective action in K. K. Pur village.

Thc role of political heterogeneity in the failure of collective action of K. K. Pur will

be describcd in detail in the next session, which tries to find a link between different

sources of heterogeneity, resource depcndency and success or otherwise of collective

action.

In the absence of a robust institution and a strong system of monitoring the

situation that prevailed in K. K. Pur with respect to forest use was that of a Prisoner's

Dilemma Game, where defection to the designed rules became the dominant strategy.

The average resource users couldn't foresee a success in collective action measures

and futurc benefits out of it owing to the conflict among the leadership groups, which

led to a weak institution and monitoring system. Therefore, it became rational on their

behalf to gain maximum benefit possible from the resource system without

contributing towards its maintenance. Further, trust and assurance could also not be

built among different socio-economic groups, which resulted in further non­

commitment to the rules.

5.4. Heterogeneity, Resource Dependency, Collective Action

and Management Outcomes: Finding a Linkage

The relationship between group heterogeneity and collective action initiatives for

positive and sustainable resource management has been an ambiguous one. In other

words it becomes difficult to come out with elear-cut conclusions that would reveal ,

either a positive or a negative relationship. However, as the present study finds out,

heterogeneity does playa crucial role in the whole process. When, how and where it

makes a difference depend upon several factors, including the institutional

arrangements, monitoring system and the nature of leadership. For example, despite

several similar conditions, the members of Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur have acted

differently towards certain factors. The socio-cultural and economic heterogeneity

176

have been able to generate interest heterogeneity in the village, however, they have

failed to atTect the commitment towards designed rules.

Several generalisations can be derived from the findings of the present study.

To begin with, the socio-cultural heterogeneity and economic heterogeneity are

always inter-related, and combined they generate differential interests among

community members towards the resource. Interest heterogeneity in most occasions is

an outcome of socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities. However, there exist an

impL1rtant difference between interest of the community members for the resource and

interest of the members in the process of collective action. The poor and those

belonging to the lower strata in the socio-cultural and economic heterogeneities are

relatively more dependent upon the resource, and therefore has a greater interest in the

resource than upper caste landed households. However, their interest in the process of

collective action has been found to be limited, since participating in the process

generates survival constraint for them. Participating in the collective action or leading

the process of collective actIOn is found to be the responsibility of the upper caste

landed members. The second generalisation that can be derived from the empirical

observations is that several sources of heterogeneity affect the collective action

process in different ways. The analysis of how several sources of heterogeneity affect

the collective action process and resource management outcomes has been made clear

in the following tigure.

Figure - 5.1

r

Socio-cultural COLLECTIVE ACTION lI~teroR·neity I. Provisioning of the Resource

~ U Differential 2. Appropriation of the Resource Dependency

f--- --(Interest

~ "ctcrogcn~ity)

Economic H~t~roRen~ity

MANAGEMENT OUTCOMES I. Availability of the Resource 2. Sustainability of the Resource

Political lIet~roRen~ity

177

Figure 5.1 depicts the framework to find out the relationship between different

sources of heterogeneity, resource dependency and the process of collective action.

As the figure shows, the socio-cultural heterogeneity and economic heterogeneity are

always inter-related - one generates the other and in the process is generated by the

other. The socio-cultural heterogeneity of the communities generates a system in

which, certain sections of society enjoy a definite status in the economIc

heterogeneity, and the vice-versa holds true also. And the combination of these two

produces a definite pattern of resource dependency. As the empiric observation

reveals, the resource dependency of the two communities has been found to be

profoundly determined by the above two mentioned sources of heterogeneity. Even

though these two sources of heterogeneities do not have any definite impact upon the

process of collective action in the Nagiapasi village; however, they successfully affect

the resource dependency pattern of the village. Therefore, intra-community

heterogeneity necessarily generates differential dependency, but differential

dependency doesn't always necessarily generate differential management outcomes.

This generalisation is substantiated by the fact that while socio-cultural and economic

heterogeneity have been successful in generating differential resource dependency

pattern in both the villages, such heterogeneities have been successful in affecting

management outcomes and collective action process only in K. K. Pur village. The

collective action process and resource management outcomes in Nagiapasi village

have remained untouched from the impacts of heterogeneity, despite the fact that the

resource dependency has been affected. Therefore, the relation between these two

sources of heterogeneity and (differential) resource dependency is shown in clear

arrow, whereas the relation between (differential) resource dependency and

management outcomes is shown in broken arrow.

The socio-cultural and economIc heterogeneities affect the management

outcomes in two ways. First, it directly affects the resource management outcomes,

since the different members behave differently towards the rules of the game. In the

K. K. Pur village, different segments of community committed themselves differently

to the designed rules and therefore affected the collective action process negatively,

which further affected the management outcomes. Secondly, these heterogeneities

178

also affect the management outcomes indirectly through the interest heterogeneity. On

occasions, the interest heterogeneity, created by the socio-cultural and economic

diversity of the community, affect the management outcomes. For example, the

ditlerent segments of community in K. K. Pur having both vertical and horizontal

differential interest in the forest approached the collective action problem differently.

Political heterogeneity, which has been the crucial factor in determining the

management outcomes in both villages, on the contrary, is found to act independent of

other factors. Political heterogeneity has affected the process of collective action and

resource management outcomes in both villages differently, by creating a difference

in the monitoring system. The political homogeneous environment in Nagiapasi

Village is solely responsible to establish a strong system of monitoring of rules. The

intluence of such political homogeneity and leadership roles upon management

outcomes in the Nagiapasi village forms the subject of analysis of the next chapter.

On the contrary, the heterogeneous political culture and structure of K. K. Pur has

generated a leadership structure, which is more engaged in conflicting with each other

and monitoring each other's behaviour rather than the collective action process.

The extent of the existence of political heterogeneity in both the communities

has already been discussed in the previous section. The broad observation was that

politically K. K. Pur was more heterogeneous than Nagiapasi, with intra-community

factionalism characterising the political front of the village. Now let me explain how

the political heterogeneity of the community plays its role in the collective action

initiative of the village, including crafting of the institution (forest protection

committee), designing of the rules (to counter provision and appropriation problem),

commitment and monitoring of the rules and finally the management outcomes in

terms of availability and sustainability of the resource.

Before stepping further in exploring the role of heterogeneous political

environment in the collective action process for local forest management in the K. K.

Pur village, it is apt to have a further insight into the political atmosphere of the

village and its factional politics. The fragmented and heterogeneous nature of political

environment of K. K. Pur village has been more affected by the party politics, which

has also made the situation more difficult for forest protection in the village. The

179

overall political front of the village is divided into three factions belonging to

ditTerent political parties. The first group belongs to the Congress party. Its leader,

who is a Brahmin by caste, is a temporary resident of the village, since he also owns a

house in the nearby Ohenkanal town. Having a residence in the Ohenkanal town

(which is the district headquarter) has facilitated him in developing good rapport with

the higher party leaders and other government officials. Such an outside linkage with

political authorities and government machineries has helped in having more followers

back in the village and strengthening his position as a community leader. The leader

of the second faction belongs to a regional party called 8iju lanata Oal (810). He was

Khandayat by caste, and had a strong base in the village. And a person belonging to

Teli (oil presser) caste headed the third faction. Even though this leader is not

politically active like his two counterparts, yet he is an influential man in the village

and had good relations with government official as well as members of different

political parties.

With this brief idea about the village politics and factionalism of K. K. Pur, let

me now explain how they matter in the process of crafting of the community

institution for forest protection. The idea of forest protection and formation of a JFM

committee in the village was first initiated by the leader belonging to the first faction,

who was from the Congress party. Since he was staying in Ohcnkanal town, the

district headquarters and had contact with the forest officials, he took the initiative in

forest protection activities and started mobilising people back in the village. But the

other leaders of the village complained that a non resident of the village can not have

proper understanding of the requirements of the villagers and, thus lacked confidence

in his attempt towards forest protection. It should be made clear that the opponent

leaders, who resisted the process, were not against the idea of forest protection or

mobilising people for that purpose. It's only that they didn't want the leader of the

first faction to take political advantage from the situation. However, they could not

halt the process of committee formation as the idea of forming committees for

protection of local forest resource was a popular idea in the locality by then, and

further the people were also very much enthusiastic about it. When the forest

protection committee was formed, the leader who had taken initiative was made the

president of the forest protection committee.

180

With the fonnation of forest protection committee, the political opponents of

the president of the forest protection committee also became antagonist towards the

efforts of forest protection and the committee as well. Since the president of the

committee was staying outside the village, it was not possible on his part to look after

each and every matters related to forest protection in particular and village affairs in

general. This became a clue for other leaders in the village to take advantage, who

wanted to remove him out of the committee and were successful in their attempt in

the ground that he (the president) stays outside the village and thus is not able to give

leadership to protection activities. The leader of the second faction was very much

active in the process of dislocating the first leader, who then became the president of

the forest protection committee.

With the change of leadership in K. K. Pur forest protection committee, the

first president who had taken initiative for such activities in the beginning became

passive towards the village forest protection measures and advised his followers back

in the village to keep themselves away from such a committee. The forest protection

committee of K. K. Pur could not withstand such conflicts among the leadership

group and village factionalism, and ultimately broke down before getting the approval

from the forest department.

The political heterogeneity of K. K. Pur intluenced the collective action

process and resource management outcomes in the village by affecting the

participation of the community members. As the name itself suggests participation is

very much central to any collective action initiative. The community members

participated differently in K. K Pur village, which fonned an obstacle in the process

of crafting of the institution, desil,TJling of effective rules and commitment to those

rules. The process of monitoring suffered the most in K. K. Pur because of the

unstable leadership and weak institution. Monitoring IS one of the important

responsibilities of the leadership, which represents the community members in the

institution. However, the frequent changing and non-serious leadership of the village

institution at K. K. Pur failed to establish an strong monitoring system, which could at

least restrict the violation of rules in the village.

181

Such a depiction of village politics and factionalism makes one thing clear

that, whether positive or negative, the rural elites/village leaders playa significant role

in any collective activity for resource management. The village elites or local leaders

form the 'critical mass' (see, Marwell et. aI., 1988; Oliver, 1988; Oliver et ai., 1985)

of rural communities and possess the potential either to make or mar collective action.

When critical mass is united, it takes initiative for collective action, and sustains it

with its able leadership and efficient authority. But when critical mass is divided, a

faction of critical mass may initiate the idea of collective action, but it becomes

difticult for that faction to sustain it in the midst of factionalism with other groups of

critical mass. The role of such critical mass in success or otherwise of collective

action initiatives and management outcomes will be discussed in detail in the next

chapter.

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Chapter VI

Collective Action Despite Heterogeneity:

Revisiting the 'Pre-Condition' Debate

It has now been an acknowledged fact in the natural resource management literature

that communities, who are the prime users of the resources, can best manage common

pool resources at the local level with collective participation. The two important

features of common pool resources, i.e., 'subtractability' and 'non-excludability',

often put the resources at a vulnerable condition in the hands of private or public

management, and hence, demand for a collective management by the local

communities. The collective management of common pool resources requires above

all robust institutional arrangements and well designed collective action at the local

level, or else the resources have the chance of becoming open access with free-riding

by its users, ultimately leading to the situation, which Garrett Hardin (1968) has

pointed out as 'tragedy of the commons'.

In its effort to understand how the local common pool resource is managed in

the study villages, the present chapter attempts to examine the process of collective

action that the community members exhibited for successful management of their

forest resources. lt has been pointed out earlier while introducing the study villages

that collective action has been successful only in Nagiapasi village, whereas, attempts

towards it had failed in K. K. PUr.43 The first part of the chapter is devoted towards

elucidating the process of collective action of the members of the Nagiapasi village

community for the protection of their local forest resources. The second part of the

chapter engages itself with the main thrust of the thesis, i.e., the 'issue of

heterogeneity and collective action'. It discusses the causative factors responsible for

the success of Nagiapasi as well as the failure of K. K. Pur in their efforts towards

collective action for local forest management, given the situation that both are

.) The relative success or failure in collective action has been discussed in detail in the methodology section in chapter - [1. To recapitulate, the success of collective action of Nagiapasi in forest protection comes from the existence and functioning of the village level institution meant for the purpose, which is characterised with high degree of rule compliance and a strong monitoring system. The absence of these account for the failure of collective action in K. K. Pur.

183

heterogeneous communities. In the process, the chapter re-considers some of the 'pre­

conditions of collective action' as frequently mentioned in the literature, by looking at

leadership issues, institutional factors and non-economic (incentive) aspects of

collective action.

6.1. From Common Pool to Common Property: Establishing

Institutional Arrangements in Forests

6.1.1. Explaining Forest Dependency

Both the study villages are situated adjacent to the Kapilas Reserved Forest of the

Dhenkanal district having a distance of five kilometres from each other. The adjacent

forest areas have been an important source of livelihood for a majority of the

population of the villages. Collecting fuel wood and fodder has been observed to be a

daily routine for most of the households of both the communities. Whether they

collect directly or otherwise, almost all households in the two villages use the produce

from the forest in their day-to-day livings. An example to substantiate this may be the

fuel wood dependency of the villagers - the poor people, mainly tribals and other

lower caste people collect the fuel wood themselves, whereas the rich employ others

to collect fuel wood for them on payment basis. Some households also buy fuel wood

for their household requirements. The farmers collect small timbers from the forest to

build agricultural equipments. There are certain agrarian festivals in which the

farmers go to forest for collecting small timber to build new equipments.

Collection of forest produce has been the sole source of livelihood for certain

families. Particularly members from the scheduled tribes collect Sal leaves, Sal seeds,

mahua flowers, rope making material, fuel wood and several other forest produce

from which their daily expenditure comes. There are certain basket-maker families

from among the Scheduled Castes who depend upon the forest for bamboo to be used

as raw material in basket making. While the male members of the family collect

bamboo from the forest, it is the female members who make baskets out of it. A

majority of the households belonging to all castes in both villages depend upon forest

at the time of annual repairing of the house. As most of the houses are kacha houses

with thatched roofs, people have to depend upon forest for bamboos, ropes and other

things that are required at the time of annual maintenance.

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6.1.2. Forest as Common Pool Resource

The important position, which forest holds as a resource in the lives of the members

of both the study villages is self explanatory from the ubiquitous dependency on

forest. Such being the importance of the forest, it is apt to assess the physical quality

of the resource in both the villages. The physical quality of the forest patches of both

villages can be best described as that of a 'common pool resource'.

The access to adjacent forest patches of both the villages was unregulated in

the beginning, in the absence of any proper institutional arrangements. Since the

forest patches were of 'Reserved' categories, the official control over them was with

the State forest department. However, the state forest department was having only the

de jure rights over the resource, as it was unsuccessful in controlling the free-ride

over the resource. The community members, without any exclusive property rights

over the resource, also faced the same problem of excluding others from accessing the

resource. Therefore, for both the village communities it was very difficult to exclude

the non-members from accessing the resource and establish any kind of property right

regime over it. Combined with this characteristic, i.e., difficulty of exclusion, the

physical quality of the forest patch of both the villages also possessed the other

characteristic of 'subtractability'. Since the physical quantity of the forest was limited,

the joint use of the resource involved its subtraction. In fact, before the establishment

of the forest protection committee in Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur, there was severe

competition among the community members and also with members of other

community to gain the maximum benefit out of the resource. Such a condition of the

physical quality of the resource obviously generated a situation of free-riding and over

use in both villages and also affected the quantity of the resource.

6.1.3. Establishing a Management Regime: Crafting Institutional Arrangements

in the Forest

The common pool characteristics of the forest patches adjacent to both study villages

exposed them to the vulnerability of over-exploitation and degradation. In the absence

of any well-defined property rights arrangements, the management regime, which was

prevailing before the establishment of Village Forest Protection Committees in

Nagiapasi and K. K. Pur was that of an 'open access'. It was open access primarily

185

because neither of the village communities possessed any rights over the resource,

whereas everyone including several members from outside the two communities were

also using the resource for their requirements. Therefore, in such a situation it could

be said that every one, including the non-members, enjoyed 'privileges' over the

physical resources, none having any rights over it (see Bromley, 1989, 1999).

In such a regime of 'privileges' and 'umestricted access', the incentives,

which the community members of both villages as well as the non-members faced,

were that of the 'non-cooperative Prisons' Dilemma'; where each resource user was

better off by free-riding (see Runge, 1992). None of the members paid any attention

towards the conservation of the resource and the physical condition of the forests

deteriorated with time. The obvious result was depletion of the resource base. The

barren hill slopes and deforested and degraded forest patches of both communities

gradually started affecting the livelihood options of the community members. Sooner

or later scarcities in fuel wood, fodder and other raw materials for household

requirements became prominent in the village life.

The group discussions with the women members of SCs and STs of both the

villages revealed the fact that people had to travel miles in search of fuelwood and

fodder. The worst sufferers were the women in both the villages, since collecting fuel

wood was their responsibility. The poor and weaker sections of the both villages were

the people to be affected the most because of the depleting condition of the forest. The

household economy of the SC households who were engaged in basket making and

rope making activities suffered a lot due to non-availability of the raw materials.

Several factors like these forced the community members to re-think about their way

of using the resource in an uncontrolled manner. Arguing in a similar tone, McKean

(2000) also observes that common property regimes had evolved in situations, where

the demand on a resource had become too great to tolerate open access use any

longer, so that property rights in the resource had to be created. Besides the resource

scarcity and the livelihood difficulties that followed it, the already existing success

stories of community forestry in several villages of Orissa also provided a sort of

moral boost to the community members to think about forest protection activities in

their communities also.

186

Grappled with the problem of livelihood insecurity and resource degradation.

the members of both village communities pondered over the idea of establishing

proper institutional arrangement over their local forest resource for its protection hom

near degradation and for ensuring the livelihood requirements that used to spring hom

the resource. From here began the history of forest protection and institution building

over the forest resource in the communities. Disillusioned with its prior efforts of

establishing a state property regime over the forest and the consequent failures, the

state forest department of government of Orissa also came forward to support the

newly generated interest of village communities for establishing a new kind of

management regime over the forest, i.e., 'common property'.

Resource protection has been a matter of village affairs a decade ago. Both the

villages started protecting the forest patch near to their village in the beginning of

1990s. That was the period when community forestry was gaining momentum in

Orissa both at the community level as well as at the administrative level. The

government of Orissa had passed its Village Forest Rules in 1985 giving the

responsibility of village Forests to local communities. By 1990, the Orissa

government has passed several resolutions regarding giving a share to local

communities in management of protected forests. Finally, in 1993, the government of

Orissa came out with its Joint Forest Management programme. Encouraged by these

efforts of the government and owing to their own requirements these two villages

formed Forest Protection Committees to manage their patch of forests as 'common

property' .

The Nagiapasi village was the first to materialise its community members'

efforts for forest protection and K. K. Pur followed the path in a couple of years. The

forest protection committee started in N agiapasi in 1991, and by 1993 the village K.

K. Pur formed such a committee. The self-initiated protection committee of Nagiapasi

got recognition hom the local DFO's office in 1994 and in 1999 it was registered with

the Joint Forest Management programme of the government of Orissa. However, the

enthusiasm, which was shown by the members of the K. K. Pur village in the initial

years of forest protection, could not sustain itself and the villagers neither showed any

interest nor worked towards establishing a co-management system with the state

forest department. The village continued to work on its own in forest protection

187

without collaborating with the government. But, around \998, the Forest Protection

Committee became defunct in the K. K. Pur village. The leadership of the village

could not stand in the face of internal conflicts among the villagers and thus, the

committee broke down. The efforts towards forest protection and the institutional

arrangements designed for it could only sustain for 5 years in K. K. Pur village. On

the other hand, the protection committee in the Nagiapasi village is functioning till

date, and during the course of fieldwork it is observed that the village institution (the

committee) had established clear set of rules and regulations to regulate the use and

management of the forest.

With the formation of Protection committees In two villages, the forests,

which were 'open access common pool resources', became 'common property' of the

community, with clear set of rules about who should enjoy the benefits from the

resources and who should not. The fist step, which the communities adopted for

establishing the common property regime, was to decide on the boundary of the forest

area to be protected by them. The villagers in a meeting organised for the purpose of

forest protection decided the physical area to be protected by their community, and in

an effort to make it known to non-members of the community, the decided upon area

was marked with stone pillars, bamboo, etc. Several other natural elements like

particular trees were also used as markers to distinguish the would-be protected area

of villages. In order to avoid legal complications and also to get government

permission, the two villages approached the local forest officials and conveyed the

forest department their intention of forest protection and the physical area of the forest

to be protected by them.

After deciding upon the physical area to be protected, the second step which

the communities took in establishing common property regime, was to protect the

resource from free-riding by non-members by restricting the entrance of outsiders into

the forest. It is worth mentioning here that prohibiting the entrance of outsiders into

the marked forest area decided for protection was not an easy task for the

communities. The open access nature of the forest areas before the idea of community

protection had several intruders into it, including forest thieves, wood smugglers, and

common people from neighbouring villages, from whom now the forests required

protection. Given this situation, the communities had to really work hard in terms of

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patrolling inside the forest area day and night to check any kind of forest offences.

However, the community institution in K. K. Pur was not strong enough in this aspect.

The institution could successfully decide upon the area to be protected, however,

when it came to protect that area from outsiders, it could not efficiently handle the

situation in comparison to Nagiapasi. As a result, the forest again went back to the

open access regime in K. K. Pur with free-riding and over-exploitation being the

characteristic phenomenon. Therefore, the remaining part of the chapter depicts the

success story of Nagiapasi Village Forest Protection Committee by explaining the

property right arrangements in the new regime, as well as the process of collective

action exhibited by the members of the community for protection and management of

their local forest resource.

Before explaining the process of collective action III the village for local

resource management, it is appropriate to focus upon the property rights arrangements

in the newly established common property regime in the forest area protected by

Nagiapasi village.

6.1.4 Establishing a Management Regime: The Property Rights Arrangements in

the Forest

Property right is one of the most important institutions in natural resource use and

management, which not only decides who will have access to the resource, but also

determines the incentive structure that people gain from the resource. Property rights

over natural resources are, in fact, social relation in the resource that defines the rights

of the property holder to the resource in relation to other who have a corresponding

duty to respect that right. It, therefore, provides the resource user or the owner a

'secured claim to the resource or the services that resources provide' (Gibbs and

Bromley, 1991: 24). As Benda-Beckmannn et al. (1996) argue that 'property right is

an 'umbrella concept', which goes beyond the unitary concept of ownership and

includes several types of rights to different forms and use of resources. Property rights

over natural resource may be defined as authority to control and undertake particular

actions on it, which are recognised as legitimate by a larger collective and are

protected through rules (Commons, 1968; Wiber, 1992; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).

Schlager and Ostrom (1992) identify four categories of property rights over natural

resource management, such as access and withdrawal, management, exclusion, and

189

alienation. These rights may be divided into three broad categories as use rights,

ownership rights and decision-making rights.

Mostly in the case of natural resources, the property rights institutions vary,

with use right and ownership right as two end points upon which the decisions are

taken. With the creation of common property regime in the forest area adjacent to

Nagiapasi, the property right arrangement therein also took a dynamic tum. In the

erstwhile open access regime the property right arrangements were very much

ambiguous in nature. Since the forest patch was under the 'Reserve Forest' category,

the state was the sole right holder of the resource, possessing both use and ownership

rights. Therefore, the state also possessed the right to make decisions on both use and

ownership aspects. However, such a claim of the state was only de jure in nature,

since it was the local people who were observed to have the de facto use rights.

Notwithstanding the sole ownership of the forest being at the hand of the forest

department of the government of Orissa, it was, indeed, the local people who were

using the forest for their day-to-day requirements. But such a de facto use right of the

people was not accompanied with the decision making rights.

The property rights arrangements were reshuffled after the establishment of

common property regime in Nagiapasi forest. Since the new management regime was

created under the auspices of the State Joint Forest Management programme, the state

also became a stakeholder in the whole process, and the community shared the

property rights with it. After the creation of the Village Forest Protection Committee

in Nagiapasi, the community claimed to have the ownership right and the decision

making right over the resource, and thus, by dint of which, decided to restrict the

access of non-members to the forest area. Such a kind of rights was found to be absent

in the community, while the resource was an open access one.

It has been mentioned earlier that a secure claim of rights over a resource

depends upon the recognition of such rights by a wider collectivity and accompanied

back up by proper rules and regulations. When the Village Forest Protection

Committee got the recognition from the local forester as a potential Joint Forest

Management Committee, the claims of the Nagiapasi to have rights over the resource

also got wider acknowledgement. Finally, when the community signed the

190

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of the Joint Forest Management Programme

with the State Forest Department and became a formal JFM Committee the claims of ,

the community to have rights over use, ownership and decision-making affairs of the

forest got a legal back up. The state acknowledged the use and decision making rights

of the community and granted limited ownership rights to the community.

It is not enough to distinguish only between use rights and ownership rights

and the decisions taken on them in the case of the newly created regime in Nagiapasi

forest. The renewable characteristic of forest as a natural resource demands for

another kind of distinction, i.e. between the 'stock' and 'flow' of the resource, in

order to have a better understanding of the property rights arrangement in Nagiapasi.

Renewable natural resources are often distinguished between 'resource systems' and

'resource units' (Ostrom, 1990,2001). Resource systems are the stock variables of the

resource, which have the capability of producing maximum quantity of resource units

or resource flows, without damaging the stock or the resource system itself. While the

physical area of the forest and the number of trees therein are the resource systems,

the numerous forest produces that users appropriate from the forest are the resource

units. In the case of forestry, a controlled and regulated appropriation of the resource

units does not necessarily pose a danger to the resource system:

If we focus our attention on the property rights arrangements in the above­

mentioned distinctions, we may observe that the state retained with it the ownership

rights of the resource system and shared decision making rights over it with the

communities. However, when it came to the resource units, the community enjoyed

all the three property rights, i.e., use, ownership and decision making, over it. In the

new management regime, the community possessed both the use and ownership rights

over the resource units or different forest produces that were to be appropriated from

the resource system, and was free to take decision for their controlled, regulated and

equitable appropriation. Such rights over the resource units were both de facto and de

jure.

191

6.2 Managing the Common Property: Community Institution

and Collective Action in the Forest

The tenn 'collective action' in social sCience literature has been widely used by

different scholars to understand different situations. However, the element, which is

common to all, is 'mutual interest and the possibility of benefit from coordinated

action'. Situations requiring collective action take several fonns, one of which is the

management of common pool resources like fisheries, forests and irrigation. As has

been pointed out repeatedly, the very nature of common pool resource, i.e.,

'subtractability' and 'non-excludability' makes it necessary on the part of the resource

to be managed through collective action. To put it precisely, the management ofCPRs

requires collective action at the community level owing to three factors. First, the

good is jointly produced, or else it does not require collective action at all. Common

property is such that they cannot be produced in isolation by any single individual's

effort. Second, CPR confers benefits on all members of the group, making it

impossible or impracticable to exclude members who fail to contribute for production

of CPR. Third, production of benefits in CPR involves cost, which should come from

all the members of the community (Heckathorn, 1993: 331).

Collective action for protection and management of a renewable resource like

forest becomes crucial because of several factors. First, in such a case the collective

action should be regarded as a process. In other words, in order to ensure the

sustainability of the resource, the efforts towards collective action first should be a

sustainable one. The desired goals of forest protection and its sustainability can be

achieved only with regular and constant collective efforts towards it. Second,

collective action in the case of forest protection is a long-tenn affair, where there

always exists a gap period between beginning of the process and appropriating

outcomes from it. These factors and many more like this make the role of institution a

significant one in the process of collective action. Therefore, the success story of

collective action of Nagiapasi village has been studied by focusing upon first, the

institution, which was designed at the time of setting the agenda for the process,

second, the actual process of collective action, and third, the outcomes of the process.

192

6.2.1. Setting the Agenda for Collective Action: Designing the Community

Institution

Institution in the natural resource management literature is often described as rules,

regulations and prescriptions of using the resource in certain particular ways (Ostrom,

1990, 2001, Bromley, 1989). These rules and regulations affect the behaviour of

individuals in a group (North, 1991); and determine the interaction pattern among

them and with the resource as well.

Therefore, in the context of natural resource management, the institutions refer

to rules about who can use what resource, when, where and how. The complete array

of this rule structure is known as 'institutional arrangements', which determine the

way of resource appropriation. Institutional arrangements in forestry are not a static

concept. They evolve over a period of time and changes with the change in

management regime. For example, the institutional arrangements (rules for resource

appropriation), which were present in Nagiapasi when the resource was under open

access regime became different when the common property regime was created in the

resource. Different institutional arrangements created different incentive structures for

resource users, which determine the fate of the resource.

When the idea of forest protection and management was floating in the

Nagiapasi village, the first challenge in front of the community members was to create

an institution for the purpose, which could guide and monitor the process of collective

action. The villagers gathered together for the purpose and formed the Village Forest

Protection Committee of the village. Creation of a community institution for the

purpose of managing natural resources may take two broad forms. First, the institution

may be a completely newly created one designed for that particular purpose. These

newly created institutions may be internal to the community or may be an external

one or thrusted upon the community by external agents like state or civil society

organisations. Second, the already existing institutions may be used for the purpose

with or without modifications on it. Often, the traditional institutions of caste and

kinship system provide the base for it.

Nagiapasi adopted the second type of institution formation, where the existing

traditional institution acted as the base for designing institutional arrangement for the

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newly created common property regime in forest. This became obvious from the fact

that it was the traditional headman of the village, who called such a meeting to

consider about the idea of forest protection and facilitate the process. This headman of

the village, who became the president of the Village Forest Protection Committee,

brought with him the traditional obligations, compliances and the trust of the people,

which he used to enjoy in the community. Such a structural arrangement made the

functional aspect of the institution easy.

If the creation or starting up of the institution forms the organisational or

structural aspect of institution building, how the institution performs becomes it

functional aspect. The functional aspect of the institution is represented by the rules

and regulations, which it prescribes for its members. A study of the community

institution of Nagiapasi for forest protection and management, therefore, should focus

upon the rules and regulations which the institution designed and how these rules

determined the incentive structure of the resource users. The institutional rules are

often distinguished between two lines, i.e. formal and non-formal, and working and

non-working (See Ostrom, 1990, 200 I; Thomson and Frcudenberger, 1997). While

the formal rules are codified laws and regulations, non-formal rules are mostly

unwritten ones, derived from customs and practices. The distinction between working

and non-working rules depends upon its actual enforcement. While the working rules

are actually enforced and affect the way people behave towards the resource, non­

working rules are neither enforced not monitored. Working rules are, therefore, most

important in any kind of institutional arrangements and are defined as 'common

knowledge, that are enforced and monitored' (Ostrom, 2001: 167 - 8). Further,

working rules may be also of different kinds, such as operational, collective decision­

making, and constitutional (See Ostrom, 1990, 200 I; Thomson and Freudenberger,

1997). The following Table (Table - 6.1) captures the distinctions between formal and

non-formal and working and non-working rules.

Table 6.1: Categorisation of Rules

WORKING NON-WORKING

FORMAL Codified texts that are Codified texts that are not enforced enforced

NON-FORMAL Customs and unwritten rules Unwritten rules that are not that are en forced enforced

Source: Thomson and Freudenberger, 1997: 63

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6.2.1. a) Types of Rules at Work in Nagiapasi

Formal and Non-formal Rules: Both fonnal and non-fonnal rules are found to be

regulating the behaviour of the appropriators towards the resource base in Nagiapasi.

The very fact of Nagiapasi being a JFM village, where the state was also involved as a

stakeholder, brought to the village various fonnal rules, which, once at place,

continued to afTect the behaviour of the community members. The first and foremost

rule of granting the members of the Nagiapasi the exclusive access rights to the forest

area, which was crucial in establishing the Common Property Regime, was observed

to be a fonnal rule written down in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

between the Nagiapasi Village Forest Protection Committee and the Forest

Department, government of Orissa and endorsed by the local Forest Officer.

Similarly, several other fonnal rules were found to be operating in the Nagiapasi,

whose sources were either the MoU of JFM with the Forest Department or the JFM

resolution of the government of Orissa. A few examples of such fonnal rules include

the following:

• That the Forest Protection Committee should include two adults, including a woman

member from every household living in the village as its members.

• That the responsibility of the protection and management of the forest patch shall be

entrusted with the community institution.

• That the usufructs like leaves. fodder, grass, thatch grass, broom grass, thorny fencing

materials, brushwood and fallen lops and tops and twigs used as fuel wood shall be

available to the members of the community free of cost.

Besides fonnal rules, several non-fonnal rules were also observed in the

Nagiapasi village, which were detennining the manner of forest use in the village.

These non-fonnal rules were mostly unwritten and had the consensus of the

community members over their nature. Some of the non-fonnal rules were customary

in nature and were being practised since generations. For example, it is an accepted

nonn in the locality that fruit-bearing trees should not be cut or tampered with during

their harvesting seasons. The non-fonnal rules were mostly evolved out of common

practices, conventions and agreement of the community members over the issue of

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forest use and management. Following are the examples of a few non-formal rules in

operation in Nagiapasi.

•

•

That every household should contribute a fixed amount decided by the Forest

Protection Committee towards managing the expenditure of forest protection.

That none will be allowed to appropriate fuel wood from the forest either through

bullock carts or cycles and only head-load collection will be allowed.

If we examine these two types of rules carefully, we can observe that while

most of the formal rules concerned with the provisioning of the resource, the non­

formal ones deal with the resource appropriation. The formal rules, which were very

often the outcomes of the policy prescriptions of lFM provided the resource to the

community and thus, facilitated the community to have gainful access over the

resource. However, it was the responsibility of the community to design non-formal

rules, whether by ways of convention, consensus or common practices, for

appropriation of the resource in a sustainable manner ensuring equity to its members.

Working and Non-Working Rules: Enforcement, compliance and monitoring are

three important factors, which distinguish working rules from non-working rules. The

working rules are always enforced and monitored by some authority. And the

members also exhibit their compliance towards these kinds of rules. On the contrary,

non-working rules are neither enforced nor monitored. Working rules were found to

be more dominating and prominent in Nagiapasi than non-working rules, which had

both written and unwritten sources. It is a mistake to assume that all the formal rules

of the community were working rules. The matters concerning involvement of

women, which was clearly written down in the government document with regard to

lFM, was not observed to be a working rule in the community. Even though they

were members of the general body of the Village Forest Protection Committee in

record, but, in actual practice, they had very minimal role to play while it came to

making decisions regarding the manner of forest use and protection. There were

several such formal written rules which were hardly acknowledged and enforced by

the community, and therefore, could not become working rules of forest protection.

It is important to point out that the source of rules is not important in making a

rule working or non-working. Collective acceptance of the rules and near conformity

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to them are deciding factors in making a rule working. People have accepted some of

the formal rules, have developed consensus over them, and have enforced them with

proper monitoring, which, in turn, have become working ones.

6.2.1. b) MUltiple Levels of Rules in Nagiapasi

Having acknowledged the importance of rules in resource management and being able

to identify the type of rules and their characteristics that were existing in Nagiapasi

village, we are left with one more aspect of rules analysis, i.e., their level of ordering.

Based upon the nature and who formulates them, rules in use are stratified into three

hierarchical orderings: operational, collective-decision making and constitutional

(Ostrom, 1990, 200 I; Thomson and Freudenberger, 1997). The analysis in the

following sections tries to identify and examine the hierarchical ordering of rules at

these three levels.

Operational Rules: Operational rules in resource management are the most

immediate and obvious ones that directly determine the behaviour of community

members' concerning access and use of the resource. Operational rules attempt to

solve both the provision and appropriation problems of resource management. On the

provision side, such rules point to basic issues like who can get access to the resource

and who will be restricted from using the resource. On the appropriation side,

operational rules define the ways of resource use, and concern with matters like how

much resource unit can be harvested, when, where and using what tools.

Several operational rules were identified in Nagiapasi village, which affected

the incentive structure of members to use the resource. To begin with, the government

directives regarding transfer of the forest area to the village community within the

JFM framework formed the first operational rule, which excluded members of other

communities from accessing the resource, and entrusted Nagiapasi with exclusive

(property) rights over the resource. Further, the community designed several other

rules regarding how much forest produce one can harvest from the resource using

what types of instrument, who should contribute how much, etc. For example, the

Forest Protection Committee of the village instructed that only head loads of fuel

wood collection using tools like sickles will be allowed, and the committee strictly

pointed out that fuel wood collection in cycles, bullock carts or any other vehicles

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using instruments like axes or saws would be not permitted in the village. Several

such operational rules have been will be described in the following pages. while

dealing with the process of collective action in the village.

Operational rules in a resource management context are dynamic in nature.

Such rules change over time based upon emergence of fresh needs of the community

and its adaptation to new conditions. For example, in the initIal years of forest

protection, the Committee restricted grazing activities inside the forest area and

strictly monitored the entrance of outsiders into the resource. However, after a couple

of years, when the forest started regenerating, the grazing restrictions were lifted out.

The strict monitoring of outside entrance, which included patrolling the forest are

during the night time also reduced with time, when the community got social

recognition from neighbouring communities about its exclusive property rights over

the resource.

Collective Decision-Making Rules: Collective decision-making rules exist at the

second level, and can be described as procedures or guidelines for designing

operational rules, which directly affect the resource use and management pattern.

Thus, collective decision-making rules are responsible for creation of operational

rules and their effective enforcement. These rules determine the agency or individual,

who can make, modify and revoke operational rules in the field. In other words,

collective decision-making rules facilitate the way and prepare the condition for

evolution of operational rules.

The sources of collective decision-making rules may be formal or non-formal.

The government resolutions of JFM, which specifies rules regarding formation of

Forest Protection Committee in the village to look after the forest management affairs,

are examples of formal collective decision-making rules in Nagiapasi. Likewise, there

were several collective decision-making rules, which were non-formal in nature. The

community has long evolved village level institution or council with traditional

village headman as its president, which is entrusted with the responsibility of

managing village affairs. Such village council also reserves the right to make rules

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Three related issues, i.e., who makes decisions (regarding operational rules),

who participates in making decisions and how decisions are made, are of great

importance in analysing collective decision-making rules. The President of the Forest

Protection Committee, who was also the village headman, was observed to central

point in all decision concerning formulation of operational choice rules in Nagiapasi.

The president was assisted by other committee member, as chosen by the village

council during its formation. The key decision makers were always the important

persons of the village, who enjoyed higher status in the community either because of

their access to higher amount of land, higher education, or being from a higher caste.

The State is another agency which makes rules at the collective decision making level.

The Government's resolution concerning Joint Forest Management specifies the

procedures and entrusts with particular persons or groups with the responsibility of

making operational rules.

The group, which participated in rule making in Nagiapasi, was more

inclusive compared to group that actually made rules. For example, the elderly people

of backward and lower caste groups, certain women members of the community, were

also part of the group, which was responsible for making operational rules. But they

had minimal role in actual making of rules. Further, there were also few individuals,

for example, State Forest Department officials, the village school teacher and eminent

persons from the neighbouring communities, who participated in making operational

rules in the capacity of advisors.

Constitutional Rules: Constitutional rules in the context of resource management

exist at the third level, and determine the membership of the collective decision­

making unit. These rules define the boundaries of the community and decide upon the

office bearers who can make decision on behalf of the community, and entrust the ,

decision-making unity with desired power and authority. Constitutional rules also

reserve the right to change the collective decision-making rules at the local level.

The State is the dominant agent in making constitutional rules, although the

community enjoys limited rights with regard to the formulation of such rules. The

most important constitutional rule that was observed in the Nagiapasi village was the

State Forest Policies, more particularly the resolutions concerning JFM. Both the

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national as well as the State government's resolutions on JFM clearly delineated the

procedures for formation of Forest Protection Committee. Such constitutional rules

prescribed the rules regarding membership of the cornmittee and details pertaining to

the formation of the executive body responsible for making decisions at the local

level. For example, the decision to include one woman member from each household

in the general body of the committee and equitable representation from all sections of

society, including SCs, STs and women, in the executive body was a rule at the

constitutional level.

Having dealt with the issue of institution formulation and discussing the rules

at work at different levels, the discussions that are carried out in the following

sections focus upon the process of collective action efforts and its outcomes in the

Nagiapasi village.

6.2.2. Sustaining Community Institution: Collective Action as a Process

In order to explain the relative success of the process of collective action in both the

villages for forest management, two crucial elements of collective choice rights have

been identified: i) Access Regulation, and ii) Internal Use Regulation.

Access Regulation by way of norms determines who will have the rights to

access the resource and who will be excluded. The Internal Use Regulation concerns

management and regulation of the use of the resource among insiders of the

community or co-users of a resource, i.e., not merely access, but norms governing

how the resources should be used. To study Internal Use Regulation, five factors have

been identified: Rule Compliance, Contributions for Collective Action, Resource

Maintenance, Resource Sharing, and Conflict Resolution.

6.1.1. a) Access Regulation

Compared to the village K. K. Pur, where protection committee does not exit today,

access regulation was very much strong in the Nagiapasi village. In this village,

members of other community are prohibited to enter inside their protected patch of

forest. The Village Forest Protection Committee has demarcated its boundary for

protection. Even though it has not been possible to separate the protected patch by

fencing it, yet, no doubt there exists a social fencing inside the forest area. The

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members of the community know how much forestland has been entrusted to them for

management and regeneration. Further, the community has put stone pillars to mark

the protected patch from the rest.

Before the formation of protection committees, forests were 'open access

resources' in both the villages. Merely a decade ago, when the protection committees

were not in existence in any of the villages, the forests attached to these villages were

the main source of attraction for wood contractors. People from nearby localities were

also using the forest for their personal gains enormously. In fact, there was a

competition at that time to deplete forest resources, as depletion by one user was

curtailing the chance of another to do so. However, with the formation of protection

committees, both the villages were able to exclude others from entering into their

forests. They kept a constant eye upon the forest thefts and illegal use by other

communities. In a couple of years the use of the resource was regulated and only the

members of the community upon which the management responsibility was entrusted

became the sole users of the resource.

However, around 1998, when the protection committee became extinct in the

K. K. Pur village, the situation became grim as members from other villages started

accessing the resource. It took no time to revert to the earlier situation, as was in

practice before the formation of the committee. The forest became again a source of

income for wood contractors. Even the villagers themselves were found to cut trees

heavily from the forest areas in the night times. When the forest guards of the locality

were asked about the situation of the forest in this village, they answered that the

forest area was so vast that they were unable to control the forest theft. The Forest

Department and the community members are found to be playing a game of shifting

the blame to each other. The department officials put the blame upon the villagers for

illegal cutting of trees. They were of the opinion that the wood contractors had

liaisons with the local people and thus it became difficult to catch them. But the

picture from the community's point was found to be totally different. They blamed the

local Divisional Forest Officer for wood thefts and believe that contractors cut trees

with prior knowledge of the Forest Department. They held the opinion that Forest

Department itself was cutting all the trees, so what's wrong if they cut trees for their

household budget.

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6.2.2. b) Internal Use Regulation

There is no internal use regulation III the K. K. Pur village, as forest protection

committee no longer exists in this village. The analysis in this section is, therefore,

confined to the Nagiapasi village, where village level collective action has been a

successful one in the management of local forest resources.

Rule Compliance: The Forest Protection Committee or the Vana Samrakshana

Samiti (VSS), as it is known in the local language, is the general body of the

community for forest protection. The VSS is formed by taking two adult members,

which includes one female member, from every household. All the members have an

equal share in the benefits that come as a result of forest protection. There are certain

widows and extremely poor households in the village who are not the members of the

committee, as they find it difficult to make monthly contributions regularly to the

committee. However, as a member of the village community they too enjoy benetits

from the forest.

The VSS has its own executive body, which set of rules and regulation to be

applied to all the villages for regulating the use of the forest resource. The executive

body consists of 13 members, including a President, one treasurer, eight members

selected from among the community, the concerned Forester, Forest Guard, and

nominee of a local NGO. Weaker sections of society, such as Scheduled Castes,

Scheduled Tribes and women are properly represented in the executive body. Out of

the eight members, who are selected from among the community, four members are

women, which include one Scheduled Caste and one Scheduled Tribe woman. The

remaining four members consist two non-Scheduled Caste males and one Scheduled

Caste male and Scheduled Tribe male. The headman of the village is the president of

the executive committee. A vice-president has been chosen from among the eight

members. The local school teacher acts as the treasurer.

Some of the rules formed by the committee were clearly defined and were

written down in the village forest notebook in local language, i.e., Oriya. All the

villagers obeyed these rules framed by the committee. There were also provisions for

punishment for those who violated the rules. The punishment varied from payment of

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tines in cash to prohibition from use of the forest produces. Usually none violated the

rules as confonnity to rules brought them a share in forest produces. The benefits

from the forest have been a major incentive to obey the rules of the committee.

However. it is not appropriate to conclude that only economic incentives compelled

the villagers to abide by the rules and contribute to the committee for forest

protection. Often. the social obligations and the feeling of being together prompted

the villagers to pay for forest protection.

Contribution for Collective Action: Any collective action can only be sustaining till

members contribute towards it. [n the present context, collective action for

community management of forests would not have been possible without active

contribution of the members. The day-to-day management of the forest requires funds

raised through the contributions by the members. However, one should not limit the

meaning of the tenn contribution to merely financial contribution. Members of the

community contributed both in tenns of cash and kind for the purpose of

management. They provide free labour whenever necessary for the maintenance of the

resource. Besides. each household contributes rupees five per month, which IS

invested in protection activities. The monthly contribution for forest protection IS

collected twice a year. [t is observed that contribution for the forest is associated with

other contributions required for observing various festivals in the village, to ensure

that the villagers pay for it without fail. The committee also collects a minor charge of

50 paisa from those who collect a head load of fuel wood from the forests. Only a

head-load of fuel wood is allowed in return of minor payment to the committee and

none is allowed to collect fuel wood in bullock carts, or for that matter in any other

vehicles.

Resource Maintenance: The Van a Samrakshana Samiti of the village is primarily

responsible for protection and maintenance of the forest patch assigned to it under

Joint Forest Management prol,'fammc. One of the important things to ensure resource

maintenance is to check thefts and illegal cntrances into the forest. As discussed

earlier the committee has well defined rules in this regard to check forest thefts ,

among the members of the community. Although the committee keeps vigilance over

these matters, it faces the challenge of preventing people from neighbouring villages

violating the nonns.

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Protecting the forest from outside non-members is very much crucial since it

creates a common property regime in the forest. Once a village starts protecting a

patch of forest and starts regenerating it, the forest becomes an attraction of others to

access. Thus, the community members have to practise severe monitoring to prohibit

the outsiders from entering into the forest. For this purpose, the villagers in Nagiapasi

are practising Ihenga pali in the beginning and guarding the forest by rotation among

themselves.44

The committee has appointed a permanent forest guard from the village

later who is paid rupees one thousand per month. The monthly salary of the guard is

derived from the contributions that each household made for forest protection.

Resource Sharing: The executive body of the Nagiapasi VSS takes utmost care to

ensure that the benetits from the resource are distributed equitably among the

villagers. With prior permission from the committee, the villagers are allowed to

collect bamboo and minor timbers for house construction or for the maintenance of

rooftops of the house. The prices of these items are determined according to the

economic status and need of the user. By thus varying the prices, the committee

insures affordability by different sections. Its compliance by all is also an indication

of people's commitment to the process of participative management of forest in

Orissa. Each household was has been equal share from the resource pool. At the time

of the construction of a new house. people get the required bamboo and small timber

from the forest.

Conflict Resolution: Resolution of conflicts that arise at the time of management is

the major challenge ahead of any community protecting forests.45

In Nagiapasi

... thengu puli (whIch can be translated as stick rotation in English), a voluntary monitoring system, in which a wooden stick. then};a, their symbol of protection, is passed on from house to house making a symbolic transfer of responslhility of forest protection. Every household after fulfilling the task of watching, passes on the stick to the next household, whose tum it is to watch the forest the followmg night. The household that receives the stick is responsible for getting members of the other four households to join them when they proceed to the forest.

4S There are mainly four potential sources of conflict that may arise in any community, managing its local forests: i) conflict among the community members, ii) conflict with nelghbounng non-members, iii) conflict with other external commercial and industrial agents, and finally, conflIct WIth the state, primarily with the forest department (Sarin, 1996).

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village, the committee is observed to be efficient enough to resolve the conflicts

among themselves. None of the cases of forest offences by the members of the

community has ever gone either to the court or to the Forest Department in the past

one decade of forest protection by the community. The villagers try to resolve the

case within the village through the committee and impose fine on the offender, which

is also acceptable to the rest of the community. However, the community faces

challenges in dealing with the forest offences by the neighbouring non-members and

commercial interests, as it does not have either social or juristic control over them.

Such cases are usually refereed to the Forest Department.

6.2.3. Collective Action Succeeds: Explaining the Outcomes

The outcomes of collective action have been analysed taking into consideration the

forest regeneration, availability of fuel ,,"ood, fodder and other non-timber forest

produces and the time and distance covered in collection of these articles. These

outcomes or indicators of success have been further analysed in tenns of economic

efficiency, equity and sustainability.

The forest condition of both the villages were in a similar condition a decade

ago prior to protection, since both patches of forest belonged to the same Kapilas

Reserved Forest. As per the opinion of the members of both villages, the forest was

significantly degraded before protection and was giving the look of a barren hill. The

statement was also con finned from the discussion that was held with the local

foresters concerned. As a first step, the Nagiapasi Village Forest Protection

Committee fonnulated a rule to stop grazing inside the torest area. During this period,

the villagers continued the grazing operation in the village common land and the

forest guards of the village strictly monitored the process. With a closure to grazing,

the forest area started to regenerate after a few monsoons. Further, the Committee also

put a restriction on the collection of fuel wood. Only dry leaves and branches were

allowed to be collected as fuel wood. Collection of fuel wood through bullock carts

and cycles were discouraged and fuel wood in head-loads was only allowed. At the

time of fieldwork, a visible distinction had been marked between the forest areas of

both the villages. The forest area attached to Nagiapasi was lush green, whereas the

K.K. Pur side of the forest was highly degraded with a few trees here and there.

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The outcomes of collective action and forest regeneration also become explicit

if one takes an account of the time spent and distance covered for fuel wood

collection. During the group discussion with the members belonging to Scheduled

Caste and Scheduled Tribe of Nagiapasi, it was learnt that people had to spend less

time and travel less distance in search of fuel wood as a result of forest protection.

Particularly, women members belonging to the Scheduled Tribes in the village were

of the opinion that they were much benefited from the collective action effort of the

village, since they didn't have to go miles in search for fuelwood and other forest

produces. Further, since the forest was regenerated owing to closure to grazing in the

initial years, they now get plenty of dry Sal leaves as fuelwood. Increase in

availability of fuel wood to the villagers may, therefore, be considered as one of the

important achievements of forest protection in the village. In contrast, such a situation

was not observed in the second village whose nearby forest was highly degraded and

the tribal and other lower caste woman had to cover a great distance to get fuel wood.

The agricultural families of the village were also benefited from forest protection in

terms of getting small wood for building of agricultural equipments. In this way,

forest protection may be said to have increased the economic efficiency of the

community members.

Nagiapasi Forest Protection Committee almost followed an equitable pattern

so far as distribution of benefits of collective action was concerned. The executive

body of the VSS took utmost care to ensure that the benefits from the resource are

shared equitably among the villagers. With the prior permission from the committee,

the villagers were allowed to collect bamboo and minor timbers for house

construction or for the maintenance of rooftops of the house. Each household was

given equal share from the resource pool. At the time of the construction of a new

house, people got the required bamboo and small timber from the forest. Access to

forest resource and forest produces were need-based. In other words, forest protection

activities in the village and the method of resource appropriation fulfilled the different

requirements of all sections of society. Further, in matters of common dependency

such as for fuel wood and fodder, equal rules were applicable to all the members of the

community.

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Besides increasing economic efficiency and ensuring social equity in its

efforts of collective management of local forest resource, the Forest Protection

Committee of Nagiapasi also paid attention to sustainability of the resource in

question. Sustainable resource use requires constraints and restrictions on the current

resource use pattern, so that the resource can be protected from being degraded and

the requirements of future generations can be ensured. The operational rules that were

at work in Nagiapasi and the way of its resource management - including its rule

formation, rule compliance and monitoring - showed testimony to efforts towards

sustainability of the Village Forest Protection Committee. To begin with, the

committee put a restriction on grazing activities inside forest during the initial years to

allow regeneration of the forest. Further, any kind of resource appropriation from the

forest in Nagiapasi village was subjected to some restrictions. Cutting trees, either for

commercial or personal purposes, were totally prohibited in the village. Forest use in

terms of fuel wood collection, raw materials to be used for making different finished

products, like bamboo-basket, paper plates, etc. was heavily restricted; and the

community institution had a strong monitoring over these kinds of forest use patterns.

By putting restrictions on their resource use pattern, the community has exhibited its

commitment towards maintaining sustainability of the resource.

6.3. Heterogeneity Did Not Matter: Explaining the Reasons

The success of Nagiapasi in collective action efforts for local resource management

definitely poses a rationale to re-consider the pre-condition debate in collective action.

The success of collective action within intra-community heterogeneity, therefore

forces us to focus upon other factors instead of levelling homogeneous nature of

community as a pre-condition. In the present case, three other factors were discussed

which seems to be more important for success or otherwise of collective action rather

than just being a homogeneous community. They are i) the role of leadership, ii)

institution-leadership nexus, and iii) importance of past history.

6.3.1. The Role of Leadership in Natural Resource Management

The mainstream debate on collective action and community based (common pool)

resource management mostly revolves around on issues like size of the community in

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tenns of big or small and the nature of the community in tenns of homogeneity or

heterogeneity. There are also studies on institutional aspects depicting the role of the

institutions in collective action for community based natural resource management.

However, the issue of leadership has mostly been neglected. 46 In sociological

literature, leadership has been studied largely in the context of organizational

management, and has generated much response. Leadership is often considered as 'a

group process through which individuals initiate activities for achieving common

objectives of group or community by working together, stimulating each other,

supplementing abilities and resources, and evolving an effective organisational and

hierarchical pattern' (Chakrabortty and Bhattacharyya, 1993: 15). Scholars, therefore,

emphasise upon exploring leadership structure by looking at the social processes

which generate it rather than identifying persons (e.g., Wood, 1960).

Nevertheless there exists many vIews on what constitutes leadership; it is

usually accepted as 'a process of persuasion or example by which an individual or

leadership team induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared and

his or her followers' (Gardner, 1990: I). Leadership role should not be confused with

social status, official position and/or power, even though a leader may use one or all

three to maintain and exercise hislher position. While studying leadership structure in

the community context, one has to keep in mind two of its aspects, i.e., leadership

traits and leadership tasks. Leadership traits that originate from physical and mental

endurance, intellectual ability and maturity of social skills are linked with leadership

tasks that motivate, guide and manage the followers (Davar, 1996; Gardner, 1990;

Lala, 1986). Leadership traits have been differently emphasised by different scholars.

For example, while Gardner (1990) emphasises upon physical vitality and stamina,

intelligence and judgement in action, willingness to take responsibilities among

several other leadership traits; Davar (1996) emphasises upon traits like, creativity

and vision, decisiveness and initiative, flexibility, etc. Further, Lala (1986) points out

communication, competence, compassion, humility and integrity as important traits of

leadership.

46 For an exception, see, Wade (1988) and Ba1and and Platteau (1996).

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Leadership traits are often thought as a matter of birth. This 'Great Man'

theory of leadership sees power and leadership skills as being vested in a limited

number of people whose inheritance and destiny make them leaders (see, e.g.,

Premchander and Chidambaranathan, 2004). Here, leadership skills or traits are

identified with ascribed status, and such a view considers that leaders are born as

leaders. However, this view is replaced by the 'Big Bang' notion, which considers

that great events make leaders of otherwise ordinary people (Bennis and Nanus,

1985). According to this notion, leadership traits can be developed, and someone's

acceptance as leader of the group depends upon his or her possession of these

leadership traits.

Leadership is considered as a strong agency for bringing out societal change

because of its capacity to motivate people, increase people's confidence and organise

people for the purposes (Premchander and Chidambaranathan, 2004). Such leadership

tasks combined with the traits that the leaders possess are of great importance in the

arena of natural resource management too. The role of leadership in the context of

community based natural resource management assumes significance owing to

seyeral factors. Based upon their study of Cooperatives, Singh and Ballabh (1994)

broadly identify seven critical roles that leaders play in a community's efforts towards

management of natural resources. They are first, generation of idea; second,

motivation and inspiration of people to implement the idea and enlisting their

participation; third, acquisition of resource around which an organisation is to be

established; fourth, holding negotiation with government and non-governmental

organisations; fifth, mobilization of resources; sixth, development of management

systems; and seventh, conflict resolution. However, these overlapping functions can

be summarised into three in a context of community based forest management, such

as initiating the process of collective action for forest protection, giving continuity to

the process and resolving conflicts that come in the process of forest management.

Now, focusing upon our field observations, we can deduce that the differential

leadership structure and political atmosphere in both the villages have definitely

played a role behind success of one and failure of the other community in collective

action. The role of leadership in collective action has been studied by looking into

three aspects: initiating the process of forest protection, giving continuity to the

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process and resolving conflicts that come in the process of forest management. The

leadership structure in both the villages varies from each other in these criteria too.

While the leadership in both villages had equally greater interest in initiating the idea

of forest protection, when it came to sustaining the process of forest protection and

resolving conflicts that cropped up in between, a difference could be found between

them. It is important to mention here that failure in resolving the conflicts between

members of the community resulted in non-continuity of the process of forest

protection in the K. K. Pur village.

The issue of leadership also becomes crucial in collective action since any

collective action effort presupposes that there is a vision which is felt by one or a

group of people for a desired action, and which, in turn, has to be shared by the

collectivity. In the context of community's involvement in forestry, the vision may be

the expected benefits from forest protection or regeneration, which acts as an

incentive or the imagined hardship due to resource scarcity, or in occasions both. In

either case, the vision has to be first perceived and then shared by the whole

community for any collective effort. Indeed, when there is an absence of such a

shared value, as we observed in K. K. Pur, we do find people acting differently, often

contrary to the goals of a common action, despite the negative results of such

di fferentiated action.

Agreement over leadership has been one among several factors that has led

Nagiapasi village to succeed in collective action. There exists a little disagreement

over the authority of the leader in the village. In other words, almost all the villagers

pay their allegiance to one leader, a phenomenon, which is completely absent in K. K.

Pur. The disagreement of the members of K. K. Pur village community and the

internal conflict among the leaders, which was discussed in detail in the last chapter,

is sufficient enough to understand the role the political divisions of the village played

in collective action endeavours of the community.

6.3.2. Leadership Group as 'Critical Mass' in Collective Action

The 'Critical Mass' is generally understood or portrayed as a group of people who are

tirst and foremost stakeholders and, therefore, have a (positive or negative) role to

play in the movement. They are the people who first realize the need of a coordinated

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action and then whose job is to mobilize the collectivity in accordance of the common

goal. The role of critical mass becomes more significance in the context of collective

action for community based natural resource management owing to the long-term

projects of natural resource management. In other words, the critical mass not only

becomes instrumental in beginning a collective action, but also in giving it continuity

and making the process sustainable.

The above role may not lead one to conclude that the leaders, or critical mass

as I call it, always necessarily play positive role in collective action. They can very

well play a negative role too. Particularly if the leader is opposed to the idea of

collective action, s/he may mobilize the people against it. The situation becomes more

critical when the leaders of a community are divided and work against each other. In

such a case, when one leader starts a collective action effort, the leaders opposed to

herlhim also become opposed to the collective action process. The empirical data

from my second village makes the point much more explicit.

The descriptions of village politics in the previous chapter and their role in the

process of forest protection, makes one thing clear that, whether positive or negative,

the rural elites/village leaders play a significant role in any collective activity for

resource management. The village elites or local leaders form the 'critical mass' of

rural communities and possess the potential either to make or mar collective action.

When critical mass is united, it takes initiative for collective action, and sustains it

with its able leadership and efficient authority. But when critical mass is divided, a

faction of critical mass may initiate the idea of collective action, but it becomes

di fficult for that faction to sustain it in the midst of factionalism with other groups of

critical mass, who always want to divert the process. Therefore, for a collective action

effort to succeed, what is needed is a 'positive critical mass', who can begin the

process and sustain it by eliminating the conflicting interests of the community.

6.3.3. The Critical Mass: Leadership or Domination

The question of 'leadership' and/or 'domination' in the context of Natural Resource

Management needs an understanding of the social base in which both are embedded.

Central to the question of leadership and domination is the notion of power, which the

leaders possess and make use of to consolidate their position of leadership and/or

211

exercise dominance. And such 'power' may follow either from one's membership in

particular caste, possession of particular resource, access to certain positions, personal

charisma or political authority through institutionalized structures. The notion of

leadership in rural communities, since independence, has undergone a radical change

to the extent that often the old or erstwhile seats of power and authority are no longer

taken cognizance because of the new seats of them created by a democratic system of

governance through institutionalized structures. Consequently, the new seats of power

and authority in rural communities tend to be co-terminus with the term of office

whether as a Panchayat president or member. Yet, there are also situations in which

the new seats of power are held also by those who held it in the old regime of

conventional leaders.

For the analytical purpose I prefer to distinguish the rural leadership structure

into three categories. First, the traditional leadership, who hardly keep any interest in

the present village (political) matters. The non interference in village politics may

result either because of their incapability to cope up with the new situations of politics

or due to their being questioned and rejected by the emerging, new, modem

leadership that are built upon on political lines. Such leaders usually come from

higher caste/class of the village community. The second category belongs to the new,

emerging and young leaders who take an active role in the village politics and playa

decisive role in the modem institutions of democratic governance. The third category

belongs to the group of traditional conventional leaders, who have been successful to

cope up with the modem situation and try to function as per the requirements of the

time. Such leaders try to control the emerging leaders and the modem seats of

institutionalized power either directly or indirectly and try to consolidate their

position.

The field data from the tlrst village indicate the prevalence of the third type, in

which the lone leader is more or less accepted by the community and is the prime

mover of all community activities. He has been successful in controlling the younger

gcneration of leadership in the village. Though he doesn't take an active role in

village politics, particularly concerning the Village Panchayat matters, still his

opinion in selecting the right candidates from the village is taken into account. Such

control of young leaders, who actually hold power, may not be confused with

'dominance' in the sense that the leader takes the decisions himself without involving

212

people in it. The decisions about the fonnation of a Forest Protection Committee , arriving at commonly agreeable rules and finding means and ways to monitor the

violation of the rules were taken in the village meeting after discussion with other

important persons in the village. However, in all such meetings the leader has played

a decisive role, while taking the opinion of others in to account. Since the leader

belongs to the third type of the above categorization, his traditional means of

domination - i.e. higher caste status, ritual superiority, high landholding - has been

refonnulated to cope up with the requirements of the time. However, his traditional

position has always acted as an added advantage in consolidation of his power in the

village.

In contrast, the second village represents a typical scenano of the second

category, in which not only is the old seats of power constantly questioned and

challenged, the new ones also have several competitors. As a result, any attempt for a

common good in this village has to sunnount the obstacles from the others who

challenge the ones who may moot a colIective action. In such situations, success of

one group in achieving a common goal may to that extent act as an obstacle for other

groups to demonstrate a greater community interest.

6.3.4. Institution - Leadership Nexus

Besides a strong and positive critical mass, past record of togetherness, a third factor,

which may be regarded as the key to success of Nagiapasi forest protection activities

is the presence of a strong and robust community institution. The importance of

institutional factors in collective action for local resource management has been much

discussed in common property literature (Ostrom, 1990,2001, Wade, 1988; Bromley,

\989; Baland and Platteau, 1990, etc.). In most cases, institution has been used to

understand humanly systems of rules that once created goes beyond the individuals

and regulate the interaction and behaviour among the individuals. However, this may

not be the case always. Institutions may go beyond individuals in a highly democratic

and egalitarian context, where the office bearers of the institution function only as

incumbents of office. However, in a rural social context, where the primordial

loyalties, traditional obligations of kinship and personalities matter more than just

positions of office, it is difficult to think that institutions will always go beyond

individuals to regulate their behaviour and interaction. Therefore, in such

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circumstances, a combination of the institution and its leader as an individual both ,

function as the deciding factor. A strong leadership in Nagiapasi has resulted in

building a strong institution there, whereas the weak and conflicting leadership

structure in K. K. Pur has acted towards decaying of the community institution.

6.3.5. Past Record of Togetherness and Collective Action

Apart from a homogeneous leadership structure there are several other factors

contributing to the success of collective action in the Nagiapasi village. The overall

history of togetherness and we-feeling has played a significant role in this regard.

Though the village has a short history of forest protection, which dates back only to a

decade, different variations of collective action has existed in the village since long.

However, such common occasion to celebrate was found to be missing in the second

village these days. Whatever common occasions have existed in the K. K. Pur village

in the past, they have also been affected by village factionalism and conflict among

leadership groups.

The socio-religious festivals of the village, maintenance of the village temple,

school, club, etc., have played a crucial role in the success of the first village in

collective action. Karrikeswar farm is celebrated every year in the village since long.

Though there have been changes in the way in which the fatm is celebrated over a

period of time, yet the spirit remains the same. Earlier, it was a simple one-day affair,

in which the villagers were worshiping Lord Kartikeya (son of Lord Shiva ill Hindu

mythology). In the evening the villagers were gathering together for chanting and

singing religious songs. The Scheduled Castes were not so much a part of the festival.

The priests were performing the worshiping job on their behalf. They were allowed to

stand outside the temple and collect their offerings after the priest finished

worshiping. But, for the last 15 to 20 years, there has been a tremendous change in the

way of observing the occasion. It has become a three-day occasion now with various

entertainment programmes. The participation of Scheduled Castes has also taken a

new dimension. Though they are not allowed inside the temple still now, yet they

have become an integral part of the entertainment and other programmes. They are

214

also contributing for it and taking some responsibilities47 . This has developed in them

a sense of oneness among them and has fostered a feeling of getting involved in

community affairs.

However, the above description of oneness does not mean that the villagers do

not have any difference of opinion regarding the function, in particular, and other

things in general. Rather, the way in which the ditlerences are overcome becomes

important. Villagers are engaged in various rounds of group discussion before the

festival to mitigate the difference of opinions between different groups. Finally, all the

villagers gather near one evening before the occasion and everybody are allowed to

express his48 voice of dissent. The elderly persons and other leaders try to

compromise the issue if they can. Often, fines are also imposed on families found

guilty on such occasions. Despite all these, if the disagreement still persists, the

villagers try to persuade the discontent party to settle the issue for the sake of the

festival. Usually the disagreements are settled before the festival or otherwise the

disagreeing parties remain silent and participate in the festival keeping their

discontent at the personal level.

Let me now turn to describe why I am depicting such soeio-religious festivals

and what link it has with forest protection. Such festivals have generated a sense of

responsibility towards the community among the individuals. Through occasions like

this the younger generation inculcate the process of acting together for a common

goal from which everybody derives benefits. For every successful group action what

is required is organisation. And one may find the root of the organised body for forest

protection in festivals like this. When the villagers thought of protecting the forest, the

same platform was used for it. In fact, it was not difficult for the villagers to organise

for the purpose of forest protection, as they were already a part of an organised body.

The choice they faced that time was not whether to join the group, rather they had the

option of not joining the group of which they were already members by virtue of their

47 One can also find discrimination in the way in which responsibilities are distributed for the Jatra. While the upper caste people assume important tasks like collecting money, arranging lunch, etc, the Scheduled Castes people are given less important charges like getting fuel wood from forest for cooking, banana leaves for dining, helping in decoration activities, etc.

48 I am using the word 'his', since the village meetings are usually male dominated affairs.

215

birth in the village4Q

• Their calculus at that time was not about the cost of joining the

group, but it was about how expensive it would be not to join. Agrawal (2000) too has

come out with similar findings from his study of Van Panchayats of Kumayun while

describing the potentials of large groups in collective action rejecting the popularly

held notion that only small groups can succeed in such action. The same organisation,

leadership positions and even the meeting ground were used to decide about the rules

of forest use and management in the village.

Secondly, the annual meetings before the festival are also used as a forum to

resolve the conflicts over the issue of forest protection. Such meetings make the job of

forest protection easy in the village. Thus, collective action for the management of

local forest resource in the village does not exist in isolation of other activities of the

village. It is a part of overall village affairs and very well depends upon other

common activities of the village. It is important to note here that such

interdependence and interconnected-ness of various group actions makes the

community management of forests sustainable over a period of time. Such

interdependence reduces the chance of seizing of forest protection committee in the

village. If any dispute arises over the issue of forest protection and if the Forest

Protection Committee fails to resolve it, there is at least another forum to resolve such

conflicts and ensure the sustainability of forest protection.

49 This is in contrast to the popular economic notion that at the time of collect~ve ac~on the ind:ivid~s face the choice of whether to join the group or not and calculate how much mcentlve they WIll get If

they join the group.

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Chapter VII

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter on summary and conclusion is divided into three sections. The first

section recapitulates the background to the research and brings out the questions with

which the research had been undertaken. The second section presents a summary of

the findings. The third section analyses the observations and links the findings to the

thcoretical and empirical literature. Finally, the chapter highlights the policy relevance

of the research in the broader framework of development and resource management

discourse.

7.1 Recapitulating the Contextual Background

Ever since independence, Indian rural communities have become virtual laboratories

to test several developmental programmes, which were implemented with different

approaches and resulting in varying degrees of success. Grappled with the immediate

economic problems of underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment, the Indian

state planned for rapid economic growth with heavy hand of state, through the

policies of industrialisation and modernisation. For quite a long time, development

was considered only as the capacity of the economy to generate and sustain an

increased annual rate of growth. And economic growth was conceptualised in terms

of capital accumulation, growth of labour force and technological progress, which

were regarded as principal components of economic growth (see, Dube, 1988). The

industrial march of Indian economy got further boost from Nehruvian policy of

economic development, which considered industries and factories as temples of

modem India. This approach to development was strengthened further with research

on modernisation theory, which relied more on state and market, and postulated

modernisation through a powerful state intervention as the only path to development.

This approach had to have several consequences. To begin with, the ever­

increasing dominating role of the state in economic development resulted in shrinking

the space of local communities. Development, therefore, became the prerogative of

217

the state, the fruits of which, however, hardly trickled down. The consequences were

also visible in the natural resource sector. Nationalisation and state control of natural

resources were justified in the name of national development and national importance.

Forests and other natural resources were declared as national property, meant for

revenue generation and fulfillment of national interest. And the local interests and

local needs had to be sacrificed in the face of such larger issues. Further, the market

orientation of the modern state also relied on privatisation as another models of

resource use, in the process leaving hardly any space for local communities in such

activities.

Such policies of development and approaches towards natural resources were

bound to fail, owing to their non-representative character. A shift in paradigm at the

global level, therefore, began to emerge from the 1970s. The demonstrated

deticiencies of state directed development and the inability of the market to promote

sustainable use of natural resources, paved the way for local institutions to playa role

in the process. Thus emerged an era of community-based approaches towards

development as well as resource management. In the forestry sector, particularly,

several policies were adopted and resolutions were made from mid 1980s onwards to

involve local communities in protection and management of the forest resources. In

the process, the government of India adopted its Joint Forest Management Policy in

1990, and the same policy, with certain amendments were made applicable to the state

of Orissa in 1993. Keeping these changes at policy level in the background, the

present research has aimed at exploring the community initiatives for local forest

resource management. Emphasis was given to narrate the history of forest

management in the country and in the state of Orissa; and the evolution of community

participation in forest management practices. The dissertation has ... lIrried out an

elaborate discussion of the 'homogeneity - heterogeneity' debate in the collective

action, and their potential to affect the collective action outcomes.

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7.2. Summary of the Findings

7.2.1 History of Forest Management and the Emergence of Community

Initiatives

The review of the forest policies and management practices in our country reveals that

soon after independence, India not only inherited forests over exploited due to two

world wars, railway building network, etc., but also the colonial approach of

commercialisation and state monopoly towards forest resources. The results were

enactment of forest policies and laws that strengthened the state control over forest

resources, marginalised the interests of the local communities and undermined their

dependency upon the resource for livelihood. Such an approach, paradoxically also

coexisted with deforestation and degradation of the forest resources of our country. A

fresh approach emerged in the forestry sector in India during mid 1980s, and the New

Forest Policy of 1988 recognised the needs and demands of local communities in

forest resources. As a corollary, the National loint Forest Management Resolution

was passed in June I, 1990.

The situation in the state of Orissa was similar to that of the country. However,

efforts by the government to involve people in forest management started little early

in Orissa, with the enactment of Orissa Village Forest Rules, 1985; and several other

resolutions to involve local communities in management of reserved and protected

forests in 1988. Finally, in 1993, the state government came with the loint Forest

Management Programme to develop a partnership with the communities for forest

protection and management.

A striking feature about the forestry activities in the state of Orissa was that

the state intervention to involve communities in protection and management of forests

had come much later than the actual efforts by the communities themselves. In certain

regions of Orissa, communities had already demonstrated considerable potential to

manage their local resources sustainably much before the government policies to

involve them in such activities. The analysis highlighted several factors for such an

evolution of community initiative in forestry activities in Orissa. Among other factors,

degradation oflocal forest resources and the consequent livelihood insecurities arising

219

out of it, existence of prior institutional arrangements at the community level to look

after common village affairs, loose and complex forest rules, active effort by several

leading NGOs, etc., comprised the justification for the evolution of community

initiatives in the forestry activities in Orissa. Thus, the analysis considered

government policies in Orissa to involve local people in forest protection as an

attempt to recognise and give an official shape to the efforts of these local

communities.

The analysis has pointed out several challenges that community's involvement

in forestry in Orissa faces today. To begin with, there seems to exist institutional

ambiguity between those in which the community is a partner along with the state

government under its JFM programme and the other in which communities

themselves have come forward to protect their local resources, and are not partners of

the state forest department. Secondly, the unclear legal status of JFM committees

makes the situation more critical. Further, the dominating and authoritarian attitude of

the forest bureaucracy also creates bottleneck for the successful functioning of JFM in

the state.

7.2.2 Heterogeneities and Their Impact upon Capabilities of Communities for

Collective Action

Moving away from the analysis of government policies and historical aspects of forest

management, Chapter V has analysed the empirical data from the two villages and has

explored the role of heterogeneity in affecting collective action. Four different types

of heterogeneity were identified: Socio-political heterogeneity, resource

heterogeneity, interest heterogeneity, and political heterogeneity. The field data from

the two villages were structured according to the above mentioned ones. It was

observed that socio-cultural heterogeneity and resource heterogeneity coincided with

each other. Two different kinds of interest heterogeneity were observed in the study

villages: horizontal differences and vertical differences in forest use. Horizontal

differences pointed out interests in several different types of forest use by the

members of the community in two villages, without involving any hierarchy of scale

among them. The study identified four such different forest user groups in the two

villages, namely, the shepherds, the basket-weaving Scheduled Castes, the non-timber

forest produce colleting tribal households, and the agrarian households who depend

220

upon the forest for small timber for making agricultural equipments. Though these

different interests in the forest did not involve any hierarchy, yet, they clashed with

each other on occasions. The vertical differences in the forest explored the degrees of

dependency upon forest for two most important forest uses: fuel wood and fodder.

Based upon the vertical and horizontal differences, three different types of forest use

and dependency were identified: a) high dependency, where dependency was directly

related to the livelihood; b) moderate dependency, where dependency served as a

supplement to the livelihood; and, c) low dependency, where the livelihood existed

independent of forest use and dependency.

To assess the political heterogeneity, the authority structure, agreement over

leadership and the decision-making arrangements were taken into consideration. The

villagers were asked about the leadership traits that they expect from their leader and

the actual presence of those traits in their leaders. While members from both the

village communities agreed upon the expected leadership traits, they varied on actual

presence of those traits in their leaders. The leadership groups in the second village,

which was a failure in local resource management, could not match with the

expectations of their community members. On the contrary, the members of the first

village, where collective action has been a successful one, were quite content with the

performance of their leaders and opined that their leaders possessed the expected

traits. Besides, the overall villager factionalism was also observed to have an

understanding of the political heterogeneity in both the villages.

It was observed that both the villages exhibited the first three types of

heterogeneity, i.e., socia-cultural, resource and interest heterogeneity. However,

political heterogeneity in terms of disagreement over leadership and decision-making

was observed only in the failed village.

The thesis has also examined the impact of heterogeneity on resource

dependency, collective action and management outcomes. The socia-cultural and

resource heterogeneity have significantly affected the resource dependency patterns in

both the villages. For example, fuel wood collection from the forest was directly

related to the households' position in caste hierarchy and possession of critical

221

resource such as land. These two types of heterogeneity generated differences of

interest in the forest, and thereby differential use of the same.

To study the impact of heterogeneity on collective action and management

outcomes, an attempt was made to see how different sources of heterogeneity affected

provisioning as well as appropriation of the resource. Socio-cultural heterogeneity

affected provisioning of the resource by generative differences in the commitment to

the designcd rules of the institution. Commitment to rules became a problem, since

different socio-economic groups behaved differently towards the rules. Interest

heterogeneity also played its (negative) role in showing commitment to rules.

Different forest user groups showed non-commitment at different points of time.

Heterogeneities also created problems for the appropriation of the resource.

Differential approach to rules created a situation of mistrust among different forcst

user groups. Therefore, heterogeneities not only affected the process of collective

action directly by differential treatment to rules, but also they affected indirectly by

hampering 'trust" and 'assurance' among different forest user groups. Problems of

commitment created by these sources of heterogeneity could have been solved with a

strong monitoring system. However, political heterogeneity contributed towards

hampering the monitoring process. Political heterogeneity affected collective action

initiative by coming in the way of a) crafting of the institution, b) designing of the

rules to counter provision and appropriation problems, c) commitment and monitoring

of the rules, and finally, the management outcomes in terms of availability and

sustainability of the resource.

The analysis has tried to find a linkage between heterogeneity, resource

dependency and successful collective action in the context of natural resource

management. It was observed that socio-cultural and resource (economic)

heterogeneity are always inter-related - one generates the other, and in the process is

generated by the other. And the combination of these two produces a definite pattern

of forest dependency. The empirical evidences suggest how these two sources of

heterogeneity affected the forest use pattern in both the villages. However, such

capacity to affect the collective action process is not universal. Out of the two villages

taken for study, collective action efforts were observed to be affected only in one (K.

K. Pur) by these two sources of heterogeneity. In other words, intra-community

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heterogeneity necessarily generates differential dependency, but differential

dependency does not always generate differential management outcomes.

7.2.3. Successful Collective Action and the Non-Negative Role of Heterogeneity

Notwithstanding the existing heterogeneities in the two communities, and their

potential to affect resource use pattern and dependency in both communities;

collective action for local resource management was observed to be a success in one

village. Such an observation challenges the established notion in common property

literature that homogeneity of the community forms a pre-condition for success in

collective action. In Chapter VI, I have attempted to discuss the successful effort of

Nagiapasi village for local forest protection and have explained the reasons behind

such success. Collective action was regarded as a process in the successful village,

and the community achieved success in it by a) crafting robust institutional

arrangements through strong rules and monitoring systems, and b) establishing

'common property' regimes out of an 'open access' through reshuffling the property

rights arrangements.

The factors that accounted for such successful institutional performance were

efficient leadership, decision-making arrangements and management procedures that

allowed for negotiation and bargaining, previous communitarian approach of the

village, etc. In the newly established management regime, the state retained the

ownership rights of the resource system (resource stock) and sharcd the decision­

making rights with the communities. However, when it came to resource units

(resource flow), the community enjoyed all three property rights, namely, use,

ownership and decision-making. And such rights over the resources units of the

community were observed to be both defacto and dejure in nature.

The successful outcome of the collective action was analysed taking into

consideration a) the forest regeneration, b) availability of fuelwood, fodder and other

non-timber forest produces, and c) the time and distance covered in the collection of

these produces. Increase in the availability of fuel wood and fodder to the community

members in was considered to be one of the important criteria of success for

Nagiapasi. Forest protection committee of the village had designed efficient rules for

223

restricted use of the resource, and by doing so, had, in tum, shown its commitments

towards sustainability of the resource.

The analysis of the success of collective action in one village (Nagiapasi) -

characterized by 'non-negative' aspects of heterogeneity - took into consideration

several causative factors. The community in Nagiapasi, despite its heterogeneity, had

several factors enabling collective action. First, the leadership in the village was quite

strong. The leaders could command respect and compliance from all sections of the

community. Second, and following from the role of leadership, was the creation and

functioning of a robust institution, namely, Nagiapasi Vana Samrakshyana Samiti

(VSS). This institution was capable of ensuring a fair and uniform commitment from

all direct and indirect stakeholders, namely, the shepherds and basket weavers, who

were completely dependent upon forest for their livelihood, and the other agrarian

upper and middle caste households, who supplemented their livelihood by depending

upon the forest. The rules and procedures too were quite transparent, and such that

there was little scope for breaking them. Thirdly, as evident from the two above, there

prevailed a near-perfect nexus between leadership and the institution. Even after

several years of its formation, the institution has had a smooth functioning, with the

leaders upholding the values and commitment for forest protection in the village.

7.3. Discussion of the Findings

The analysis of the data raIses several issues for discussion. As is evident, the

leadership structure - or the 'critical mass' as [ call it - playa crucial role in

making collective action successful or otherwise. The role of he 'critical mass' in

generating the idea of forest protection, mobilisation of the people for the purpose,

and giving the process an efficient direction, etc., account for the success in any

collective action endeavour.

Much of the literatures, both theoretical and empirical, however, have pointed

out towards 'perceived benefits' from the resource as important incentive to

participate in collective action efforts. While saying so, they emphasise the rational

behaviour of community members and take recourse to game theoretical approach so

224

as to substantiate the claim. The game theoretic approach anal yses the rational

decisions of individuals, where decisions are taken comparing contributions for the

action and the perceived benefits from it. In such a situation, if the members realize

that their 'perceived benefits' from participation in the action would be greater than

contributions, they come forward to participate in the collective action. Having said

that, the analysis of the study tend to take a different direction and highlight the role

of the 'critical mass', which possesses equal potential to make people understand as

wel1 as misunderstand those 'benefits'. The analysis has pointed out how the real

interests of the stakeholders are often manipulated, who, therefore, fail to perceive

any interest from coordinated action.

The 'critical mass' does possess the potential to manipulate the interest of

the community members to such an extent that their real interest often gets merged

with those of the critical mass. The empirical observations from the failure village of

our study substantiate such a point. Recapitulate the factional politics of the failure

vil1age, and its role in collective action process for forest management: when there

was a change in leadership in the K. K. Pur Vil1age Forest Protection Committee, the

ex-president, who incidentally had initiated such a process in the village in the

beginning, became passive towards forest protection measures, and most importantly,

persuaded his fol1owers to keep themselves away from such a committee. A few years

back, the same group had taken great interest in establishing the community

institution, and had mobilized people to join the institution to receive future benefits

out of it. However, when the leader backed off from the process, so did his followers,

without rationally thinking what they would have received from forest protection, if

they had worked for it. The community members in such a case failed to perceive

their future benefits from forest protection, and did not join in the col1ective action.

The literature on the subject while highlighting the rational decision derived out of

perceived future benefits, however, fails to understand the mobilizing and/or

manipulating role ofthe critical mass in the process.

Contrary to the case of manipulation, the observations of the successful village

(Nagiapasi) depict how the village leader and president of the Forest Protection

Committee mobilized the interests of the community members, and directed the

community towards success in forest protection. The analysis of the study pointed out

225

that the role of 'critical mass' in making pcople realize, and therefore, perceive the

future benefits from collective action should not to be undermined while approaching

a question like what promotes participation in a collective action situation. In a

successful case, the critical mass mobilizes the people to establish a stake in the future

benefits, as a result of which they are expected to come to a bargaining or negotiation,

where they contribute something and expect to enjoy some benefits at the end. Once

the stakes are clear, people despite having differences among them, become ready for

a negotiation or bargaining for collective action.

A 'positive critical mass' in the context of collective action acts as the

visionary, who first foresee the vision, and then whose job is to share that vision with

the community. It should always be prepared to accept new ideas and values, which

could bring benefits to the general members of the community. Such a position of

critical mass makes it respectable, as well as acceptable, by the rest of the community.

Voluntarism, which is very much central to any collective action efforts, turns into a

popular norm in the community, if the critical mass induces and inculcate it in the

minds of the members of the community. It can do so by pointing out the future, but

hidden benefits of voluntarism. On the contrary, if the critical mass turns 'negative'

and/or divided among themselves, such voluntarism fail to become a nonn in the

community. In the situation of a divided critical mass, even if a section of it may

begin collective action by mobilizing people, but may not sustain it in the presence of

constant disorientation and manipulation of interests of the members of the

community by the other faction.

The second issue, which needs further discussion, is about the presence or

absence of institution. In their efforts to establish a precondition for successful

collective action, the literature emphasizes much on the size and social composition of

the community, and smallness of the community and its homogeneous characteristics.

Notwithstanding this, some scholars also point out towards non-negative role of

heterogeneity. Heterogeneity obviously stands in the way of successful collective

action and creates challenges for it. In such a situation, the presence or absence of

strong institutional mechanisms is of great importance. The findings of the present

study have also pointed out the significance of institutions in making the collective

efforts successful. The scholarly works, which have subscribed to the institutional

226

thinking, however, try to conceptualise institutions in a objective manner, where the

institution seems to exist outside the flesh and blood of the community, and are thus

expected to go above individuals and control their behaviours. While widely

acknowledging the crucial role that the institutions play in the success of any

collective action, the analysis of the present study, however, differ from such a

conceptualization of institution.

Any analysis of institution designed for collective action for local resource

management must highlight the social embeddedness of the institution. The

community institutions, whether created for a particular purpose or evolved, are

always embedded in the social structure of the community, and therefore, do not

function independent of it. The phenomenon of independent institutions operative

beyond social structure and or social relations may become a possibility in a

indi vidualistic, impersonal and modem context, where the leader of the institution

functions only as the incumbent of the office, and interacts with members as someone

who is only responsible to fulfill the obligations of the office. However, in a

traditional and rural community, that we have in India, where the leader has to fulfill

several other obligations to the members than just that of a president of the Village

Forest Protection Committee, such a phenomenon of 'independent institutions'

becomes an ambiguous one. One may recall the Weberian distinction of 'legal­

rational authority' and 'traditional authority' to understand the above point explicitly.

This social embeddedness of the institution creates a space for the 'critical

mass' to playa role in contributing towards either success or failure of the institution.

'Wnen the critical mass mobilizes people and work towards the establishment and

maintenance of the institution, the community exhibits a successful institutional

performance and the collective action achieves success in the process. The opposite

also holds true, as is evident from the empirical observation of the failure village,

where the critical mass disoriented people for collective action and came in the way of

successful institutional performance.

227

7.4. Concluding Remarks

The findings of the study prompt us to acknowledge that the success of a community

in collective action for local resource management is not to be located in its social

composition in terms of homogeneity or heterogeneity. Communities with sharp

internal differentiations do possess the similar potential to manage resources as the

homogeneous ones. However, since collective action requires consensus to be built

over the issue of compliance to the designed rules, there should be some mechanism

to negotiate the ditTerences and reduce the negative impacts of heterogeneity.

As evident from the findings of the study, what is most important from

resource management perspective is the existence of a 'positive critical mass' and

'strong institutional arrangements', which can design rules, ensure commitment from

the community members and carry out effective monitoring to reduce the possibilities

of breach of such rules. For any success in resource management, it is required that

the community and the institution designed for the purpose should always interact,

and move in a back and forth manner. For example, once the institution designs rules

for the purpose of forest use and management, it then becomes the responsibility of

the community to react towards those rules by way of showing commitment to them;

and again the institution is required to monitor those commitments. Therefore, a

community may be heterogeneous and different in other respects, but its members

should try to negotiate those di fferences and show consensus to those rules and have a

common approach towards them.

A challenge, therefore, before any heterogeneous community protecting its

local resources is how to build that consensus despite several other sources of

differences that divide them apart. In such a case, the potential of the existing

mechanism to discuss the differences, negotiate and re-negotiate them becomes

important. That existing mechanism may be the traditional leadership structures,

patron-client relations of rural communities, newly emerging and energetic youth

associations or may be any democratically elected political structure. Therefore, if a

community possesses such mechanisms, which can negotiate the differences and build

consensus, then that community has the potential to succeed in collective action

initiatives despite intra-group heterogeneities. To put it precisely, while searching for

pre-requisites for successful collective action for resource management, it is not

228

important to judge whether a community is homogeneous or not; rather it becomes

important to see whether that community has the common platform to negotiate

ditTerentials and overcome problems of heterogeneity. Heterogeneity, therefore,

creates a challenge for successful collective action, which can be overcome with a

positive critical mass and/or committed leadership, strong institutional arrangements,

and with a certain past record of consensus building and togetherness.

In conclusion, it is worthy to emphasise some of the practical relevance of the

research. The findings portrayed by the research become significant in the wake of

most recent trends in the forest policies of a number of countries that are attempting to

take resort to the community-based conservation, in an effort to depart from the

centralised exclusionary policies that have dominated for quite a long period of time,

and which now seem to have failed. These new Joint Forest Management plans

constitute a break from the colonial policies that had continued in our country with

little change, even after independence. However, without local mechanisms to build

consensus and proper institutional arrangements to design management practices, it

seems unlikely that such proposed cooperation and partnership between state and

local communities will be fruitful.

From a policy perspective, the state, therefore, should vigorously work

towards strengthening the communities institutionally and building capacity in them

to breed suitable institutions and leadership, before implementing any policies of

community-based resource management with or without channeling any fund for

such. Further, such institution building and strengthening of rural communities not to

be understood as forming committees only in government records by taking a few

community members including women, sometimes even without visiting the location.

As a first step, the forest bureaucracy should be sensitised towards the needs,

requirements and livelihood options of rural communities; and should be oriented

towards the global paradigm shift In approaches towards development,

democratisation and resourcc management. Finally, the presence of a vigilant, active

and progressive civil society becomes most crucial, implying that through

enhancement of education and mass awareness-building campaigns, the communities

come to know their rights as well as feel empowered to organize, and build

institutional arrangements required for successful and sustainable resource

management.

229

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