COMBAT REGULATION for the MILITARY NAVAL FLEET

People’s Commissariat

of the Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of SSR Main Naval Staff of the VMF

COMBAT REGULATION

for the

MILITARY–NAVAL FLEET OF THE UNION OF SSR

(BU-45)

Translated by Major James F. Gebhardt, U.S. Army (Retired)

Directorate of the Naval Publishing House

NKVMF of the Union of the SSR

Moscow 1946 Leningrad

©English Translation, 2020, James F. Gebhardt 2

Table of Contents

Order of the People’s Commissar of the Naval–Military Fleet of the Union of the SSR

Introduction

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Chapter 2. Naval Forces and Their Combat Purpose

Chapter 3. Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation

1. Fundamentals of Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation

2. Selection and Delegation of Forces and Means of a Large Maneuver Formation

3. System of Subordination in a Large Maneuver Formation and Coordination with Adjacent

Forces

4. Organizational Order

Chapter 4. Preparation of a Large Formation for Combat

1. Fundamentals of Preparation for Combat

2. Planning and Organizing for Combat

3. Selection and Organization of Forces and Means

4. Combat Preparation of a Large Formation prior to Battle

5. Preparation of the Region of Actions prior to the Beginning of Combat

6. Occupation by a Large Formation of a Departure Position for Combat

Chapter 5. Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat

1. Fundamentals of Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat

2. Organization of Command and Control of Combat

3. Combat and Movement Formations

4. Command and Control of Combat

5. Combat Documents, Instructions, Reports, and Notifications

6. Signal Codes, Codebooks, and Tables

Chapter 6. Support for a Large Formation in Combat

1. Fundamentals of Support

2. Organization and Command and Control of Support

3. Reconnaissance / Intelligence

4. Security

5. Defense (PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, PKhO)

6. Camouflage and Deception

7. Navigational Support

8. Materiel–Technical Support

Chapter 7. Political Work in Support of the Combat Actions of a Large Formation

Chapter 8. Daily Combat Activity of Large Maneuver Formations

A. Reconnaissance

1. Fundamentals of the Conduct of Reconnaissance

2. Systematic Reconnaissance

3. Episodic Reconnaissance


B. Patrol Service

1. Fundamentals of Patrol Service

2. Long-Range Patrol

3. Close-in Patrol

4. Reconnaissance Patrol

5. Blockade Patrol

C. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-air Defense of a Region

2. Anti-air Defense of the Coastal Region (Base)

3. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region Distant from the Base

D. Anti-submarine Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-submarine Defense of a Region

2. Anti-submarine Defense of a Base Region

3. Anti-submarine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base

4. Defense of the Anti-submarine Zone [line]

E. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region

2. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Base Region

3. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region Distant from the Base

F. Anti-mine Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-mine Defense of a Region

2. Anti-mine Defense of a Base Region

3. Anti-mine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base

4. Penetration of a Mine Obstacle

G. Emplacement of an Obstacle at Sea

1. Fundamentals of Obstacle Emplacement

2. Emplacement of a Positional Obstacle

3. Emplacement of an Active Obstacle

H. Equipping of a Region with Navigational and Hydrographic Means

1. Fundamentals of Equipping a Region

2. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Coastal Region

3. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Sea Region Distant from the Base

I. Movement of a Large Formation at Sea

1. Fundamentals of Movement by Sea

2. Movement of a Large Formation of Combat Surface Vessels

3. Convoying of Transports

4. Escorting of Submarines

J. Anchoring a Large Formation in a Roadstead

1. Fundamentals of the Organization of an Anchorage

2. Anchoring in Base

3. Anchoring in a Roadstead Not in the Base

Chapter 9. Combat of a Large Formation in the Open Sea


A. Offensive Combat at Sea

1. Fundamentals of Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea

2. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions

3. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea in Poor Visibility Conditions

4. Offensive against an Enemy in a Distant Region of the Sea by a Large Formation

Consisting Primarily of Submarines

5. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea, Executed by a Large Formation Consisting

Primarily of Aviation

B. Meeting Engagement at Sea

1. Fundamentals of a Meeting Engagement

2. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions

3. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Poor Visibility Conditions

C. Defensive Combat at Sea

1. Fundamentals of a Maneuvering Defense

2. Defensive Actions of a Large Formation at Sea

Chapter 10. Combat of a Large Formation in an Equipped Naval Position

1. Fundamentals of Positional Combat

2. Positional Combat in Daylight

3. Positional Combat in Periods of Darkness

4. Positional Combat in Foggy Conditions

Chapter 11. Combat of a Large Formation in an Enemy Coastal Region

A. Offensive in an Enemy Fortified Region

1. Fundamentals of the Offensive against an Enemy Position

2. Offensive against an Enemy Position [protected by] Mines and Artillery

3. Offensive against an Enemy Anti-submarine Position

B. Raiding Actions

1. Fundamentals of Raiding Actions

2. Attack on an Enemy Anchorage

3. Attack on Coastal Lines of Communication

4. Shelling of a Coastline

5. Amphibious Landing of a Reconnaissance–Diversionary Force

Chapter 12. Combat of a Large Formation for the Landing of an Amphibious Assault Force

on a Coastline

1. Fundamentals of Combat for an Amphibious Landing

2. Combat for Landing of an Amphibious Force on a Sea Coastline

3. Combat for Landing of an Amphibious Force in an Island Region and in Narrows

4. Return Embarkation of an Amphibious Landing Force

Chapter 13. Defeating an Enemy Amphibious Assault Landing

1. Fundamentals of an Anti-amphibious Landing Defense of a Coastline

2. Defeating an Amphibious Landing on a Sea Coastline

3. Defeating an Amphibious Landing in an Island (Skerrie) Region

Chapter 14. Naval Gunfire Cooperation with Ground Forces Operating on the Shore of a

Seacoast


1. Fundamentals of Naval Gunfire Cooperation

2. Systematic Naval Gunfire Cooperation

3. Episodic Naval Gunfire Cooperation

__________

Under the observation of Captain 1st Rank N.A. Zhukov and editor Captain 3d Rank A.O. Poznazerko


Abbreviations Encountered in This Document

BO – beregovaya oborona [shore or coast defense]

BSS – boyevoy signalnyy svod [combat signal code, by context, the use of one, two, or three

semaphore flags for ship-to-ship signaling]

BUMS-37 – Boyevoy Ustav Morskikh Sil 1937 [Combat Regulation for Naval Forces–1937]

DOT – dolgovremennaya ognevaya tochka [permanent (concrete and iron) strongpoint (pillbox)]

DZOT – derevo-zemlyanoye ognevoye cooruzheniye [earth and timber strongpoint (pillbox)]

FKP – flagmanskiy komandnyy punkt [senior commander’s command post, at sea or on shore]

KP – komandnyy punkt [command post]

MOR – morskoy oboronitelnoy rayon [naval defensive region, a command one level below fleet,

as well as geographically designated zone]

MTO – materialno–tekhnicheskoye obespecheniye [materiel–technical support]

MTO – minnotorpednaya oborona [mine–torpedo defense]

OV – otravlyayushchiye veshchestva [poisonous substances (hazardous materials in today’s

vernacular)]

OVR – okhrana vodnogo rayona [guard force of the offshore zone]

PDO – protivodesantnaya oborona [anti-amphibious landing defense]

PKO – protivokaternaya oborona [anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense]

PKhO – protivokhemicheskaya oborona [anti-chemical defense]

PLO – protivolodochnaya oborona [anti-submarine defense]

PMO – protivominnaya oborona [anti-mine defense]

PVO – protivovozdushnaya oborona [anti-aircraft defense]

RKKA – Rabochye-Krestyanstkaya Krasnaya Armiya (Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army)

SNiS – sluzhba nablyudeniya i svyazi (observation and reporting service)

SSSR – soyuz sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik [Union of Soviet Soviet Socialist

Republics]

TsK VKP(b) – tsentralnyy komitet velikoy kommunisticheskoy partiy (Bolshevik) [Central

Committee of the Great Communist Party (Bolshevik)]

TUS – tablitsa uslovnykh signalov [table of encoded signals]

UKV – ultrakorotskiye volny [ultra short wave]

VMB – voyenno-morskaya baza [military–naval base (as opposed to a “commercial–naval

base”)]

VMF – Voyenno-Morskoy Flot [military–naval fleet (as opposed to the “commercial–naval

fleet”]


VNOS – vozdushoye nablyudeniye, opoveshcheniye i svyazi [air observation, warning, and

communications]

VPU – vspomogatelnyy punkt upravleniya [auxiliary command and control post]

VVS – voyenno-vozdushnyye sila [military air forces]

VZD – “vozdukh” [“air,” a radio-transmitted voice warning of enemy air attack]

ZPS – zvukopodvodnaya signalizatsia [underwater sound signaling]

Translator’s note: In addition to the above list of abbreviations, this document contains several

Russian terms, the definitions of which bear further explanation in the context of their use.

chast’ – unit in English, one level below soyedineniye and one level above podrazdeleniye in the

Russian organizational naming convention. When used in reference to ground forces, it describes

operational-size units (brigade, division); in the naval context, it could describe a sub-element of

a submarine brigade or naval aviation regiment, or a brigade of naval infantry.

front – also “front” in English, but not a cognate. The Russian front was a ground forces formation

equivalent in hierarchy and function to a US or British army group, to which were subordinated in

descending order armies, corps, divisions, regiments or brigades, and so on. As an example, the Karelian

Front controlled the Soviet Army units in the Murmansk area.

dozor, morskoy – naval patrol, a means of guarding vessels and shore-based objects in the

overall system of naval patrol service. It is accomplished by surface vessels, submarines, and

aircraft, on lines of patrol in designated zones, in positions at entrances and exits to anchorages,

straits, and narrows, and in other places where early warning of enemy approach is required.

(Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet military encyclopedia], Moscow: Voyenizdat,

SVE, Vol. 3, 1977, p. 223. This 8-volume set will hereinafter be referred to as SVE)

otryad – detachment in English; as used in this text, a permanent or temporary formation of

vessels which has been assigned a specific mission, i.e., for minelaying or mine clearing, for

providing fire support or movement support. The type, size, and number of vessels assigned to

the detachment will vary in accordance with the assigned mission. (SVE, Vol. 6, 1978, pp. 169-

70)

podrazdeleniye – subunit in English, a tactical unit one level below chast’. In ground army or

naval infantry forces, a unit of battalion and below size.

razvedka – reconnaissance or intelligence in English, depending on context. In this document,

the term razvedka is translated as reconnaissance when it refers to the act of gathering

intelligence (by surface vessels, submarines, aircraft, and covert agents), and intelligence when it

refers to high-level organizational or analytical structures, i.e., the intelligence department of

Northern Fleet staff, or to a product of reconnaissance, for example, intelligence data.

rekognostsirovka – This Russian term is used to describe the actual conduct of reconnaissance

by a unit commander, executed by moving to a position that overwatches the terrain (portion of

the sea) in which his forces are expected to engage the enemy. In the naval application, this

activity may be accomplished with a submarine or aircraft sortie, in which the force commander

personally participates, using the on-board technical capabilities (periscope, vision ports, et

cetera) of the combat system in use.

skrytnost’ – in English, concealment, secrecy, or security; the choice being governed by context.


soyedineniye – in English, a large formation comprised of several smaller formations (chasti in

Russian) of various types. In the naval context in the World War II era, this term refers to a

squadron of surface vessels or a brigade submarines, or a large standing formation of aircraft of

the same or mixed types. (SVE, Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 426-27)

upravleniye – consistently translated to English as command and control in this document. The

most common use of this term in this text is upravleniye boya [command and control of combat,

battle, engagement], while contemporary published definitions of this term are normally

associated with command and control of combat assets, including both technical assets and force

assets. The definition of the term as it relates to forces is “the activity of commanders and

leaders, staffs, political organs, services, and other organs of upravleniye, in support of the

combat preparation and combat capability of forces, preparation of operations and combat

actions, and their leadership during the execution of the assigned missions, The process of

upravleniye includes continuous gathering of information, assembly, study, application and

analysis of the data in regard to the situation, making the decision, assigning tasks to subordinate

elements, organization and maintenance of vzaimodeystviya [coordination], preparation of the

forces and staffs for combat actions and their direct supervision, conduct of measures for

political work and all forms of support of combat actions, and organization of control

[monitoring] and assistance to subordinate commanders, staffs, and forces.” (SVE, Vol. 8, 1980,

p. 203).

vzaimodeystviya – consistently translated to English as coordination in this document. The

Russian sense of this term is “agreement in missions (tasks), lines (areas), and time of actions of

subunits [battalion and below], units [brigades and divisions], large formations [above division

level, including large naval maneuver forces], and combined types of armed forces, branches of

forces, naval forces and special forces, in the interests of achieving common goals of combat and

operations; one of the principles of military art.” (SVE, Vol. 2,, 1976, p. 123).


________________________________________________________________

ORDER

of the People’s Commissar of the Military–Naval Fleet

of the

Union of SSR

1 December 1945 No. 500 Moscow

Contents. Confirmation and implementation of the Combat Regulation of the Military–Naval

Fleet of the Union of SSR (BU-45).

1. Confirm and implement the Combat Regulation of the Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of

USSR (BU-45).

In connection with the fact that the experience of war has still been insufficiently studied,

consider this Regulation in the course of 1946 to be temporary.

2. Commanders of fleets are to require from large formation commanders, the officer component

of large formation staffs, and the commanders of vessels (units) to carefully study the Regulation

in the process of its implementation in the combat preparation and on the basis of on-hand

experience of the war. If necessary, the inclusion of changes and supplements to the Regulation

should be forwarded by their proponents by 1 October 1946.

3. By 1 January 1947, republish the Regulation as a permanent document.

4. The instructions contained in the Regulation should be strictly observed in accordance with

the situation.

5. The Temporary Regulation of the Naval Forces of the RKKA 1937 (BUMS-37) is rescinded.

People’s Commissar of the Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of SSR

Admiral of the Fleet KUZNETSOV


Introduction

1. The Combat Regulation of the VMF of the Union of SSR is a tactical document, which

examines both various forms of combat of large formations, as well as its daily combat

activity.

Issues of an operational nature, which found significant expression in the Combat Regulation

of the Naval Forces (BYMS-37), are not laid out in this regulation in the examination of combat

actions.

2. The practice of the Great Patriotic War with German fascism established that the basic

provisions of the Combat Regulation of Naval Forces (1937 edition) are correct. In this current

regulation, only several older sections and paragraphs of the previous regulation have been

deleted and, in accordance with the experience of the war, appropriate supplements and changes

have been made in a number of other sections and paragraphs.

3. The present regulation examines contemporary battle first of all as a battle of large

formations of branches of naval forces, in which participate a variety of combat equipment on a

massive scale. This requires strictly executed coordination in combat of all branches of naval

forces. Only the unification of these forces can success be achieved. Therefore, the contents of

this regulation are oriented on the combat activity of large maneuver formations, consisting of

various forces that are coordinated with each other.

4. The officer component of the Military–Naval Fleet should be imbued with the thought of

the unconditional necessity of continuous coordination in battle and in practice have mastery of

its organization, which is provided in this regulation.

5. Combat conditions are varied, and thus this regulation cannot provide exhaustive

instructions for all cases of combat practice. It establishes only the fundamental principles of the

conduct of combat actions and methods of leadership of large formations (of vessels and units)

of naval forces.

6. The instructions of this regulation, which are addressed to the commander of a large

maneuver formation and his staff and to the commanders of the vessels and units which are

assigned to his element have the nature of mandatory requirements and, in the main, respond to

the question – what should be done in corresponding cases of combat activity of the large

formation.

The detailed instructions concerning the methods of actions during execution of this or that

mission, which are developed in the provisions of this regulation, lie in the instructions for

typical forms of combat activity, of both maneuver and homogeneous large formations of the

naval forces.

7. The present regulation is a document for the organization of a large formation for

combat. Therefore, the instructions of the regulation in the chapters which relate to the conduct

of battle and daily combat activity of large maneuver formations are oriented on one scheme,

which encapsulates the fundamental issues of organization and command and control of combat:

organization of a large formation for a given form of combat, its preparation for combat,

command and control in combat, and the support of success.


8. The issues of combat support are laid out in this regulation in the form of requirements for

support of a large formation directly in combat (Chapter 6), organized by the staff of the large

formation.

Combat actions of a supporting nature, on a larger scale, which are organized in the sequence

of execution of a separate mission of the large formation, are examined in the present regulation

(Chapter 8) as self-standing actions of a large maneuver formation for support of the combat

activity of naval forces.

9. Broad use of the Combat Regulation of the VMF by the officer component of the Military–

Naval Fleet and its leadership during the conduct of combat actions will facilitate its access for

study, as a document for service utilization.


Chapter 1

General Provisions

1. The Military–Naval Fleet of the Union of SSR is intended for the defense of the state

interests of the Soviet Union in the naval theaters of military actions.

The Officers, petty officers, and sailors of the Military–Naval Fleet of the USSR are

required firmly to keep in mind their duty before the Socialist Motherland, with all their

efforts to strive to execute their assigned missions and, no matter what the circumstances in

a combat engagement with the enemy, not permit a loss of honor and the military honor of

their large formation (unit).

2. The complex composition of naval forces of the active fleet (including large formations of

surface vessels of various classes, submarines, naval aviation, shore-based artillery, naval

infantry, forces of PVO and other special purpose units, the high mobility and the broad

employment of aviation in combat at sea, the broad use of radio-location [radar] and other means

of detecting the enemy and observation in combat, have led to great intensity of the forces that

are participating in combat and the rapid development, and also decisive nature, of combat

engagements at sea.

This requires from the commanders of large formations and units of naval forces,

which are participating in combat actions, of high skill in the organization of coordination

of various forces and in their command and control in battle. [It also requires] their mutual

support, outstanding training of commanders and of all subunits, careful preparation for

an anticipated battle, and a high level of knowledge of how to use the combat equipment,

the mobility and great intensity of moral and physical forces.

3. Naval forces execute combat missions independently – in combat with the enemy’s naval

forces or during the execution of sea transport – as well as in coordination with ground forces

during combat with the enemy in a coastal region.

The latter condition requires from large formation and unit commanders of the naval forces

special preparation in coordination with the ground forces of the Red Army.

4. Each combat mission is executed by a large formation of naval forces as a part of an

operation at sea, conducted under the leadership of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet or the

MOR (VMB or specially designated operational chief), and should pursue a concrete operational

goal, which flows from the requirements of a given operation.

By its success, each battle should support the success of the operation.

5. The struggle with the enemy at sea is conducted by means of destruction of his forces.

The sole means for achievement of this goal in a naval operation is combat.

The destruction of the enemy’s personnel and materiel means and the morale of his forces

and their capability for resistance is achieved by combat.

6. Modern means of combat possess great power, long range of actions, and mobility.

They create the following possibilities:

in offense – to conduct a strike across the entire depth of an enemy combat formation, to

encircle it, to capture it and to destroy it;


in defense – to disrupt the enemy’s combat formation and, having blocked his path, bring

his offensive to collapse.

Every battle – offensive and defensive – has the purpose of inflicting defeat on the enemy.

The constant striving to engage in battle with the enemy, for the purpose of his more total

defeat, should lie as the basis for informing also the actions of each commander and sailor of the

VMF. Without any special orders, the enemy should be skillfully and rapidly attacked wherever

he is detected.

This type of striving should be developed in all of our existing forces, in order that they not

place themselves under the strikes of a concentrated enemy which is superior in forces.

Skillfully using the situation at sea in the course of daily combat actions, we must defeat

the enemy piecemeal, leading in this manner to his total defeat.

7. Simultaneously with combat actions for the destruction of the enemy forces, our

naval forces conduct the battle at sea for the use of the sea for the execution of military

transport and for broadening their operational zone (a system of strongpoints).

8. Combat actions which support the use of a given region of the sea for our own forces, or to

prevent its use by the enemy, should be conducted daily, corresponding in scale and intensity

with the requirements for executing operations.

In doing this, our naval forces should be prepared for combat engagements with the enemy

both in the region of our coastline and at sea, on the enemy’s sea lines of communication and

near his shores.

Ongoing vigilance – active reconnaissance in combination with rapid deployment of forces,

should ensure timely participation in combat of both individual combat entities as well as their

large formations, without excessive tiring of our forces.

Complete readiness for repulsing a sudden attack on a base of our fleet and aviation and

readiness to rapidly respond with a powerful strike for strike of the enemy should be supported

even in peacetime.

9. The execution of each combat mission is associated with the overcoming of the

enemy’s counter-actions:

Active nature of actions, envisaged with the anticipated threat from the enemy by our

offensive against it mitigates [removes] this threat; a pre-emptive offensive by a mobile forward

detachment against a powerful enemy detachment threatening our unit will disrupt the systematic

nature of his actions in combat and at the same time enable our forces to achieve their specific

goal of combat. In these efforts, the nature of combat actions depends each time on the actual

composition of our forces and on the ratio of our forces to the enemy forces, as well as the

situation which, in a number of cases, permits the execution of decisive actions against a more

powerful enemy force;

The conduct of a surprise strike on the enemy, who is not suspecting this and not prepared

to repulse the strike, by means of deep penetration into the enemy’s combat formation (with

aviation, light forces, submarines) – deprives him of the time for organizing an effective counter-

action in combat, and by persuading the enemy in the superiority of our audacity, deprives him

of confidence in his own actions.


Preparedness in all circumstances to launch against the enemy with our own, earlier

organized strike and the level of preparedness in the execution of defensive methods make large

formations of naval forces powerful and durable in combat.

The fundamental form of the employment of forces in combat and conditions of enemy

counter-actins is the coordination of various branches of forces. This begins with

coordination between separate tactical entities (vessels – flights of aircraft), which are engaging

the enemy, and ends with coordination between large formations of various branches in a large

battle.

10. During the execution of a given combat mission, combat with the enemy requires the

accumulation of forces and combat means in a quantity sufficient for overcoming his counter-

actions which interfere with the achievement of the operational goal of the combat. However,

when the situation in combat permits (in addition to the achievement of the specific purpose of

the combat), also to destroy all the present enemy forces, the absence of which significantly

facilitates the conduct of subsequent combat at sea (in particular, if the enemy has difficulty

replenishing his forces). Then the commander of the large formation that is conducting the battle

should display daring and initiative, and modify the previous purpose of the combat to a more

general purpose – the destruction of the enemy forces which he has engaged.

11. The intensity of combat actions at sea does not remain constant. Both the enemy, each in

response to the actions of the other, increases the number of forces participating in the combat

and, in this manner, frequent combat engagements can lead to a concentration of forces on one of

the sectors of combat actions and generate a confrontation of much greater scale.

Thus a series of local combat engagements at sea of modes scale can transition into a general,

large naval engagement. In a favorable situation, such combat should be carried to the end, that

is, a decisive defeat should be inflicted on the enemy at sea.

12. When combat actions are occurring daily at sea, the situation is constantly changing. A

complicated complex of all conditions of the situation presents in each given case a series of

difficulties for executing our own missions, and at the same time contains a number of difficult

circumstances for the enemy. These factors can and should be used for the successful

development of combat with him at sea.

Well established reconnaissance provides the possibility of timely detection and evaluation

of the difficult circumstance in which the enemy has fallen. Use this for execution of a strictly

composed, bold and unanticipated by the enemy combat action, which can inflict on even a

powerful enemy significant losses and lead to the successful development of subsequent actions.

13. Carefully observing for changes in the situation, using every available opportunity, we

must at the same time ourselves create a situation which favors the conduct of combat actions

against an enemy who is powerful at sea.

By appropriate deployment of our own forces, gradually equipping the region of actions, by

destruction (piecemeal) of the enemy’s operating forces and holding his forces under constant

pressure, we must contain and weaken the enemy, gradually depriving him of the capability

for executing combat missions at sea, and using this circumstance for development of our

own combat actions.


14. In the course of the development of combat at sea the enemy, preserving his forces,

perhaps will not commit to combat his fleet’s large-scale forces, and may not conduct

engagements with them.

Just the same, we must be prepared for a large battle at sea with powerful enemy forces, both

in regard to deployment of our own forces and means and in regard to their combat and political

preparedness.

15. Combat at sea can be developed in various forms.

The offensive – for achievement of our own goals, and defense – for preventing the enemy in

the achievement of his goals, are fundamental to all forms of combat with the enemy.

Offensive combat is the basic form of combat actions of the naval forces of the VMF

SSSR: only decisive offensive combat can achieve defeat of the enemy.

However, combat actions at sea cannot always and everywhere offensive in nature. Defense

will be necessary every time when an offensive is impossible or inappropriate. The purpose of

defense is to hold back the enemy’s offensive, and in this manner prepare his defeat by

subsequent transition to the offensive.

16. The methods of conducting combat during an engagement with the enemy, both of

modestly large formations and single vessels, batteries, and aircraft which have coordinated

amongst themselves in daily combat actions, and in massively large formations – in decisive

combat with powerful enemy forces – depend in large measure on the on-hand composition of

forces, the utility [appropriateness] of the combat means, and on the level of combat and political

preparedness of the enlisted component.

Combat conditions are multi-varied. Therefore, in combat it is necessary always to select the

method of actions which correspond to the actual situation and avoid well known patterns which

will facilitate the enemy’s conduct of the battle.

17. It is not necessary to be equally strong everywhere. For the support of success in

combat, it is necessary to create decisive superiority in forces and combat means against

the enemy on the main (decisive) axis.

The composition of forces that are conducting the main (decisive) strike (main forces in

combat), depend in each case: on the nature of the mission being executed, on the situation

(including the ratio of forces), and also on the existing composition of the naval forces of a given

sea.

The grouping of forces in battle, their concentration on the axis of the main strike and the

distribution of forces for actions on secondary axes determine the combat formation of the large

formation conducting the battle.

18. For defeat of the enemy, however, it is insufficient simply to concentrate forces and

means for the main strike. It is necessary to accomplish the coordination of all branches of

naval forces which are operating on the main axis, into the entire depth of the enemy

formation, and the agreement of actions of the large formations and units on the secondary

axes.


Modern combat is conducted by unified forces of all branches of the fleet. Their coordination

in combat has decisive significance and is organized, normally, in the interests of surface forces,

which are executing the primary role in naval combat.

19. The organization of coordination should flow from the combat capabilities of individual

branches of the naval forces and their weapons, in accordance with which it is necessary to posit

their combat missions.

The coordination of forces which are participating in battle should be organized and

goal-focused on the basis of achievement of the following data points:

the enemy’s counter-actions;

the massing of our own strikes;

mutual support of the maneuver of attacking forces with a combination of parallel and

successive actions;

designation of the leading role of the forces executing the main mission.

20. The organizational basis of coordination of forces in combat is the large maneuver

formation, which consists of surface vessels, submarines, and air forces, and in a number of

cases also naval infantry, shore-based artillery, and PVO troops, for resolution of a specific

mission.

21. The commander of the large maneuver formation is responsible for execution in

combat of the assigned mission and achievement of the operational goal of the combat.

The large formation commander has the following obligations: within the limits of his

available capabilities, during the execution of his mission to support coordination with him of

other large formations and units, fulfilling their requests for assistance and providing them

suggestions concerning cooperation in battle, and to inform them regarding his own condition

and the situation.

The large formation commander is obligated to familiarize his subordinates in regard to the

situation and assign them combat missions in a timely manner.

The large formation commander is obligated to maintain, among his subordinate units, strict

discipline in combat, to require from them unspoken execution of combat orders and to

demand support from units which are attached for this purpose from other large formations and

are coordinating with his large formation.

22. The overall supervision in combat of a large maneuver formation, as a rule, is

entrusted, depending on the predominant significance in it of these or other forces:

in the open sea and during an attack against an enemy coastline – to the commander of

the large surface vessel formation;

in a remote region of the sea, during prolonged anticipation of the enemy – to the

commander of the large submarine formation;

at sea, when the basic force of the large maneuver formation is aviation – to the

commander of the large aviation formation of the fleet VVS;

in a region of our own coastline – to the commander of the VMB or commander of the

large formation of shore-based artillery (BO sector) or of the naval infantry.

23. Victory in battle is secured by the following:


a correct, based on calculations, decision of the large formation commander and careful

preparation for the battle;

uncompromising will for victory of all commanders and enlisted men;

well organized, active and uninterrupted reconnaissance actions;

suddenness of actions [surprise];

decisive offensive by superior forces and means on the main axis;

active, skillful, and initiative-based actions of the commanders and enlisted men;

continuous coordination of all branches of naval forces in the battle;

timely and well focused commitment to the battle of available reserves;

skillful use of the conditions of the sea situation and means of equipping the region of

actions;

well laid out command and control;

uninterrupted combat supply of the forces operating in combat.

24. Maneuver is one of the most important conditions of the achievement of success.

Maneuver, executed by large formations in combat, has the purpose of improving or

preserving a favorable circumstance for ourselves relative to the enemy, prior to the infliction on

him of a crushing strike. Maneuver should be rapid and concealed.

Maneuver facilitates surprise for the enemy of the chosen method of conducting strikes on

him, and in this manner supports his inability to resist.

Maskirovaniye1of our combat formation and leading the enemy into confusion in regard to

the concept of the ongoing actions have the same significance.

Maneuver by fire and by combat means – organized and massed use of the large

formation’s weapons against a selected enemy target – is a powerful means for accomplishment

of a surprise strike in combat.

25. Success is always on the side of the one who is bold in combat, constantly maintains

the initiative in his hands, and dictates his will to the enemy.

The commander of a large formation should supervise the combat actions of his large

maneuver formation with initiative.

Judicious initiative is based on a correct understanding of the mission and situation. It

includes the urgency to find the best methods of executing the received mission in a complicated

situation; in use of all developing unanticipated favorable possibilities and timely undertaking of

measures against arising threats.

The display of initiative should not go against the general concept of the higher-standing

command and should enable the best execution of the assigned mission.

In a case of acute change of the situation, the commander should undertake on his own

initiative a decision and quickly report it to his superior and inform adjacent units.

1 This term describes a wide range of “camouflage” measures, ranging at the bottom from simple

camouflage of vessels and objects through tactical and operational measures designed to conceal forces

and maneuvers or to deceive the enemy as to size and composition of forces, direction of main attack, and

so on. It may also include operational security measures, such as false and misleading communications,

which are designed to confuse the enemy.


The readiness to take upon oneself the responsibility for a bold decision and persistently

conduct it to the end is a fundamental action of all commanders in combat.

Bold and judicious actions should always be supervised by the leader and his

subordinates.

The initiative of subordinate commanders should in all measure be encouraged and used for

the achievement of overall success.

26. The purposefulness of the decision and clarity of the missions are the basis of command

and control of combat.

The decision that is made should be firmly and persistently brought to fruition.

An order must be executed with the full intensity of the force.

Subordinate commanders should know and understand their combat missions.

They should be knowledgeable regarding the overall actions of the large formation in each

phase of the battle and with regard for changes in the situation.

The large formation commander should control the preparation and execution of the combat

missions – by his subordinates, and his requirements regarding support – by coordinating units.

27. Combat assets which belong to naval forces, and the methods of combat with the enemy,

are continuously developing and modernizing. Their constant study and mastery of them to

perfection are the primary obligations of all commanders and enlisted men.

The study of the effects of a new weapon in combat and the search for the most effective

method of its employment for achievement of victory are always present.

Upon completion of the battle, the conclusions drawn on the basis of collection and

discussion of observations in combat should be used for subsequent preparation of vessels and

units.

28. The complexity and intensity of modern combat demands from the enlisted component

and commanders enormous intensity of physical and moral efforts.

The large formation commander is required to display in any conditions of the situation

concern in regard to his enlisted personnel and subordinate commanders.

Knowledge of his subordinates, constant discussions with them, attention to their combat

lives, feats, and needs, their inculcation in the spirit of unfettered, self-sacrificing execution of

the combat mission, provide the commander the combat cohesion of his large formation (unit),

his political firmness, the existing combat readiness, and on the whole success in combat.

Commanders and enlisted men should be inculcated in the spirit of hatred toward the enemy

and with the unswerving will toward his destruction in battle.

29. Combat at sea requires a large expenditure of ordnance and fuel. The expenditure of the

combat supply determines the strength of the strikes inflicted on the enemy; the expenditure of

fuel and other means – are a step in the execution of maneuver and combat support of the large

formation’s actions.

Therefore, the organization of the materiel support of combat is a most important obligation

of commanders of all degrees and the staff of a large formation.


In accordance with the decision that has been made, the expenditure of materiel means in

combat in the quantity required for the execution of the planned actions against the enemy, on

the main and secondary axes, should be supported by timely delivery of them. The forecasted

expenditure of ordnance is confirmed [approved] by the large formation commander during the

preparation for combat.

The on-shore expenditure of combat means, in relation to the battle plan, requires its

regulation in the form of command and control of the combat.

It is necessary during the planning for combat to maintain a reserve of materiel resources for

an unanticipated circumstance of combat.

30. In all cases of the combat activity of a large formation, keep in mind that the enemy is

striving to obtain information with the help of espionage, by means of listening to conversations

and transmissions with all communications means. Therefore, constant vigilance and

preservation of military secrecy have special significance both during anchorage at base and as

well in moving out to sea.


Chapter 2

Naval Forces and Their Combat Purpose

31. Combat actions at sea are executed by a variety of branches of naval forces, consisting

of the following components:

surface vessels;

submarines;

naval aviation;

shore-based artillery;

naval infantry;

forces of PVO;

special purpose units.

The combat activity of naval forces of each fleet is supported by the following elements:

service of observation and communications;

hydrographic service;

logistic service;

medical service;

accident and life-saving [rescue] service.

32. Surface vessels are distinguished by large variation in classes in accordance with their

combat purpose. The variety of classes support the best execution of each combat mission by

vessels built for this purpose.

In addition to their fundamental purpose, surface vessels, possessing universality, are used as

well for conditions of the situation for execution of other missions assigned to them

(reconnaissance, mine emplacement, transport of troops, and so on). Such employment of these

vessels is supported by their supplementary armaments and equipment.

Along with that, surface vessels, as an exposed force, are the most often subjected to the

strikes of various enemy naval forces, in particular by aviation, and therefore are in need of

special support requirements.

33. Battleships are intended for the destruction of powerful enemy surface vessels and the

suppression of shore-based batteries, and also for providing to the large formation combat

staying power. They are included primarily in the strike groups of large combat formations as

vessels that possess maximum caliber of naval guns, the greatest defense against enemy strikes,

and great maneuverability.

34. Aircraft carriers have their basis in the armament of combat aircraft, intended for

support of air superiority in the region of battle, the destruction of combat vessels and transports

at sea, and in distant military–naval bases, and also for direct combat support of fleet large

formations (reconnaissance, PVO, PLO).

35. Cruisers have as their purpose support in combat of light forces and the execution of

missions as forward detachments of a large combat formation, possessing powerful naval guns

and defensive armor.


Cruisers are used in combat for execution of reconnaissance and combat security, and also

for support of torpedo attacks of escort destroyers. In addition, they are used for emplacement (in

general) of active mine obstacles.

36. Destroyer escorts have as their primary designation the execution of torpedo attacks at

sea in nighttime conditions. In addition, they are broadly employed for patrol and reconnaissance

service at sea, the conduct of the mission of combat and movement security, and as well for

emplacement of mine obstacles and for artillery support of amphibious landings.

37. Guard vessels have as their purpose the escorting of vessels in crossing by sea and in

combat, and as well during anchorage in their base, the conduct of close-in patrol and convoying

of transports at sea.

38. In addition to basic groups of vessels, vessels of other classes, transport and auxiliary

vessels that in daily combat actions of naval forces execute varied and responsible combat

missions, have great significance in fleet combat actions.

Torpedo cutters are used in combat in large groups for inflicting on the enemy a powerful

torpedo strike, and also for executing surprise torpedo attacks on enemy anchorages of vessels

and base targets in poor visibility conditions.

The vulnerability of torpedo cutters to aviation and gunnery actions of vessels at close

distances requires their coordination with other naval forces (including guidance and lead).

Submarine chasers have as their basic purpose the search for submarines during PLO of a

sea region, and also for convoying transports and escorting submarines.

Surface minelayers are fundamentally charge with emplacement at sea of positional mine

obstacles.

Minesweepers on the whole are employed for minesweeping efforts in base regions and in

channels at sea. Fast minesweepers are used for supporting surface vessels against mines in

combat.

Monitors and gunboats serve the purpose of combined shelling with ground forces

operating along the coastline.

Amphibious assault vessels (landing craft, assault, close-in support, and so on) are intended

for landing amphibious assaults on an unequipped shore.

Transports (military and commercial) serve for hauling and military cargoes at sea.

Auxiliary ships (floating bases [dry docks?], repair shops, hydrographic ships, rescue

vessels, hospital ships, and others) are intended for execution of various fleet requirements.

39. Submarines, possessing the capability for prolonged actions at sea and the launching of

powerful, concealed torpedo strikes, and also for the execution of active and maneuverable mine

emplacements, are used in combat in strike and supporting groups of a large combat formation,

and also in independent actions on enemy sea lines of communication and near bases.

Submarines serve as a reliable means of concealed and prolonged reconnaissance, primarily

near a hostile coastline.


In addition, they are employed for landing reconnaissance–diversionary parties, for

hydrographic support of combat actions of surface vessels and air forces, and as well for delivery

of cargoes to a blockaded base.

The conditions of habitation, especially the provision of materiel components (battery

charging and so on), and the necessity for centralized supply of all forms of material–technical

support of submarines, requires the basing of submarines (on the scale of a division or brigade)2

at special shore or floating bases.

40. Naval aviation, consisting of large formations of mine–torpedo, bomber, fighter, and

low-level attack and reconnaissance aircraft, is a powerful strike force in combat. It possesses

great universality in the employment of various combat means, the capability for maneuver, the

conduct of strikes at great distances, the massing of a strike in a brief time interval, and

prolonged actions against the enemy by a series of successive attacks.

Naval aviation is used for conducting torpedo–bomb and low-level strikes on the vessels of

the enemy fleet at sea and in bases, the destruction of sea lines of communication, and the

activity of enemy naval and air bases, as well as for mine emplacement.

The assigned missions are executed both independently and in coordination with fleet vessels

and aviation of the Red Army.

Naval aviation also is used for execution of reconnaissance and guiding submarines and

surface vessels to the enemy, for the adjustment of naval gunfire and the fires of shore batteries,

the execution of the PLO mission and delivery of smoke screens.

Along with this, the combat employment of aircraft of naval aviation is limited by the short

lingering time of their actions in combat and their lowered survivability in this effort. The

combat activity of naval aviation depends significantly on weather conditions.

41. Mine–torpedo aviation is intended for the destruction of enemy vessels and transports at

sea and in anchorages by means of torpedo attacks and the emplacement of active and

maneuvering mine obstacles.

Mine–torpedo aviation, together with bombers, is the basic strike force of naval aviation.

42. Bomber aviation has as its purpose the destruction of enemy vessels and transports at

sea and in bases, the destruction of other targets on military–naval bases, the destruction of

enemy aviation on his airfields, and the suppression of its activity.

43. Fighter aviation is intended for covering vessels, military–naval bases, and other fleet

targets against strikes by enemy aviation, and as well the support of the combat activity of other

aviation types.

44. Low-level attack aviation has as its purpose the destruction of enemy light forces and

transports in bases and in crossings by sea, the destruction of enemy personnel in amphibious

assault landings, the support of fleet light forces, bombers, and torpedo-carrying aviation during

their actions at sea and in a coastal region, and the suppression of the activity and destruction of

enemy aviation on its coastal airfields.

2 In this era, a submarine division would be six boats of the same class, the brigade a combination of

divisions of submarines of the various classes.


45. Reconnaissance aviation is intended for reconnaissance of the dispositions and

composition of forces of the enemy fleet and the nature of his combat activity, observation for

movement on sea lines of communication, exposure of the airfield network and basing of enemy

aviation, the discovery of the system of defensive fortifications on the coastline; defended targets

on military–naval bases, and the enemy’s logistic and PVO systems.

46. Shore-based [coastal] artillery – stationary and mobile (railroad and with mechanized

prime movers), is used for the defense of military–naval bases and other military targets located

on the coastline, against attack by enemy naval and ground forces, and also for participation in

offensive actions on the coastal flank of the Red Army.

For support of ground defense of its own combat formations, coastal artillery needs

attachment to it naval infantry units or ground forces of the Red Army.

47. Naval infantry is intended for amphibious assault landings, conducted by it both

independently and in the component of a large fleet maneuver formation, and also of large-scale

amphibious landings together with ground forces.

In anti-amphibious landing defense of our coastline, and also in ground defense of shore-

based fleet targets, naval infantry participates along with other forces, occupying entire separate

sectors or executing the mission of a mobile strike group.

In addition, naval infantry can be used for securing [guarding] anchorages for vessels and

naval aviation airfields against air and amphibious assault attacks, and also for serving as mobile

escorting forces for repositioning shore batteries, and for guarding combat formations of

stationary artillery.

48. PVO troops have as their purpose the defense against attack from the air of vessels,

units, and various shore-based targets of the fleet, and are assigned their own anti-aircraft

artillery, and receive attachment of fighter aviation, searchlights, barrage balloons, and special

means of service of air observation, information, and communications [SNiS].

Independent units and subunits of PVO may be attached to a variety of large formation of

naval forces and their separate smaller units.

49. Special purpose units of naval forces consist of rifle–machine gun, machine gun–

artillery units, as well as engineer, technical equipment, and chemical units. The former are

charged with direct and indirect fire defense of a coastline against an enemy amphibious assault

landing from the sea, the reinforcement of the fires of shore-based artillery at close ranges; the

latter have as their purpose the creation of engineer and chemical defense for support of the

combat actions of shore-based artillery, naval infantry, ground forces, and as well the vessels of

the fleet that are standing at anchor in harbors.

50. Service of observation and communications [SNiS] consists of various means of

observation and communications, positioned basically along the coastline, and intended for

support of command and control of the actions of the fleet, its large formations, and of individual

vessels and units.

The use of the assets of the service of observation and communications is based on the

permanent and organized coordination system of shore-based theater equipment (SNiS posts,

communications nodes, technical observation stations) with means of observation and

communications of fleet and aviation large formations.


51. Hydrographic service, including special subunits and systems of theater-level

navigation equipment, is intended for support of the fleet combat actions in the realm of

hydrographic study and equipping of the region of combat actions – by means of attachment to

the component of an actual large formation of special maneuvering subunits. In addition, the

mission of hydrographic service is the deployment and support in use of a system of shore-base

and floating means of navigational equipping of the theater.

52. Logistic service of the fleet is intended for the materiel-technical support of the combat

activity of the naval forces in theater and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases

which support the conduct of combat actions of each large maneuver formation.

53. Medical–sanitary service of the fleet with it subunits supports large formations of naval

forces with immediate at the time of their combat actions services to the wounded, injured by OV

[hazardous substances], and the sick.

54. Accident–rescue service of the fleet is intended for rendering aid to vessels damaged in

battle, the raising of sunken vessels, and the clearing of channels of sunken vessels that hinder

sailing.


Chapter 3

Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation

1. Fundamentals of Organization of a Large Maneuver Formation

55. A large maneuver formation is a temporary large formation, organized for a given

operation from various branches of naval forces, coordinating in the execution of their assigned

combat mission.

The recommended selection of forces and means and the establishment of a precise system of

subordination and coordination between all the units of the large maneuver formation and with

adjacent units lie as the basis for its formation.

56. The organization of command and control of a large maneuver formation should be

constructed in accordance with the requirement of unity and conformity of actions of all the

forces executing the common mission in combat, the concentration of their efforts for inflicting

defeat on the enemy. This is achieved by unification of the leadership in battle into one person

and unity of the tactical concept among the enlisted component of the entire large formation.

57. A large maneuver formation is a complicated large formation with various forms of

subordination to the large formation commander. Depending on the assigned mission, it has in

quality the fundamental to one or another permanent large formation (which which possesses a

staff prepared for command and control of combat). It is reinforced by attached units of other

large formations (or entire large formations), and in combat acts together with units of adjacent

large formations designated for support.

If the limitation of the combat mission does not require a large force for its execution, a

maneuver group is formed in its place, which includes in itself the necessary quantity of various

branches of force.

58. Large maneuver formations are organized simultaneously with the assignment to its

commander of the combat mission.

Large maneuver formations are organized in advance, when this is called for in connection

with the plan of the operation. This enables, before the beginning of its execution, the

organization of the large formation for purposes of its planned preparation.

2. Selection and Delegation of Forces and Means of a Large Maneuver Formation

59. The calculations for selection of the forces and means of a large maneuver formation are

undertaken by the staff of the command that is organizing the operation, based on the

requirements for successful execution of the combat mission assigned to the large formation.

60. The selection of forces and means of the large maneuver formation is carried out on the

basis of a preliminary tactical estimate for the purpose of ensuring the presence in the large

formation of a full-value composition of basic forces, supporting forces, and a reserve.

The regulatory composition of forces and means consist of the following elements:

basic forces – for execution of the actions in direct achievement of the end goal of the

combat;

supporting forces – for inflicting strikes on the enemy with the purpose of disrupting his

counter-actions in combat and supporting tactical deployment;


reserve – for supporting the forces acting in combat, and also for cover of a forced

withdrawal of our forces.

61. The distribution of forces and means in the composition of the combat formation of a

large maneuver formation, in accordance with the missions assigned to them in battle, is

accomplished by the commander of the large maneuver formation in the process of his reaching

of a decision for execution of the mission assigned to his large formation.

3. System of Subordination in a Large Maneuvering Formation and Coordination with

Adjacent Forces

62. Complete clarity should be established in the system of subordination within the large

maneuver formation and with coordinating adjacent units in combat.

The forces designated in subordination to the large maneuver formation are subordinated to

the commander of the large maneuver formation and his orders.

the forces of the permanent large formation are in total subordination to the commander

of the large maneuver formation, as their permanent commander;

the attached forces are in operational subordination to the commander of the large

maneuver formation, who assigns them their combat mission.

The remaining forces which are acting jointly and executing the common combat mission

and forces designated for support of the units of other large formations coordinate with the

forces of the large maneuver formation and execute the requirements of its commander in regard

to support, having received their combat mission from their own higher level of command

(which is instructed in his combat order).

63. The direct supervisors of the commanders of units being placed in the component of the

large maneuver formation maintain responsibility for the composition, overall combat training,

and combat readiness of their units, the political–morale condition and discipline of the enlisted

personnel, special material–technical support, and condition of ordnance and all combat means

of their units. Control for the condition of the above-mentioned units and organization of the use

of their ordnance, combat means, equipment, and also MTO of attached units in the upcoming

combat lies in the staff of the large maneuver formation.

64. The requirements of the staff and political section of a large maneuver formation are

executed, as a rule, by the staff and political section of the basic large formation.

65. For facilitating the command and control in combat of attached units and supporting

units, as a rule, the former send to the staff of the large formation during the preparatory period

and conduct of battle their representatives – liaison officers: the latter also designate liaison

officers, receiving in turn from the staff of the large formation its representatives.

4. Organizational Order

66. The large maneuver formation organizes in accordance with the order of the Commander-

in-Chief of the Fleet (VVS, MOP, VMB) in regard to organization of forces for executing a given

mission.

67. The organizational order contains the following elements;

the designation of the large maneuver formation commander;


the composition of forces of the basic large formation;

the orders to the commanders of permanent large formations regarding transfer of

subordination of the latter of the full component or specific parts of them for attachment to

the basic large formation.

instructions in regard to the period of being in attached forces status in the component of

the large maneuver formation;

instructions regarding the time and place of the assembly of forces.


Chapter 4

Preparation of a Large Formation for Combat

1. Fundamentals of Preparation for Combat

68. The commander of a large formation (unit) bears full responsibility for the

condition and combat readiness of the forces subordinated to him.

The commander of the large maneuver formation, which has received the combat mission, is

obligated to the full preparation for the upcoming combat actions of all the forces designated for

its accomplishment, to organize coordination of the forces participating in the combat, to

coordinate his own actions with other large formations and to undertake all necessary measures

of preliminary support.

69. The basis of the preparation of large formation for combat is the decision of its

commander.

This decision determines the starting position of the large maneuver formation, which must

be created by the time of the initiation of combat for its successful conduct, including the

following elements:

the distribution of forces [in a geographic sense] and equipping in the region of actions

by the moment of the initiation of combat;

the training readiness of the enlisted component of the large formation for the upcoming

actions;

the volume of information regarding the formation that is necessary for orientation of

one’s own actions in combat.

70. The central moment in the effort of the large formation commander and starting

point for organizing the preparation of the large formation for battle is the drawing up of

the plan of battle (of combat actions).

In the preparatory period for combat, on the basis of the developed plan of combat actions,

the commander of the large formation complete the following tasks:

organize the forces designated for participation in combat, in the component of the large

maneuver formation, in accordance with the received mission;

organize command and control of the large formation and upcoming combat;

issue the necessary warning orders for combat;

organize coordination of the forces participating in the battle;

reach agreement of [his] actions with other large formations (not participating in the

given battle);

conduct materiel–technical preparation and replenishment [make up manpower and

equipment shortfalls] of the large formation;

conduct political work for support of the upcoming combat;

conduct special training (combat preparation) of the large formation before the battle;

execute measures for preliminary combat support of the large formation;

concentrate [assemble] the forces at the place of battle and occupy the start position for

the initiation of combat.


For the purposes of reducing the overall duration of preparation for combat, the commander

of the large formation should strive to restructure the processes of preparation so as to conduct

them in parallel.

A large portion of the preparation is conducted, as a rule, in base; the remaining on the

movement to the combat region.

71. Only an energetically conducted preparation of the large formation will ensure the

successful conduct of the battle.

The chief of staff is obligated to direct the preparation of the large formation for

combat. The preparation should be planned from the moment of receipt of the combat mission.

The tempo of preparation of the large formation for combat and its detailed steps in

execution depend on the time available.

2. Planning and Organizing for Combat

72. During preparation for battle, the commander of the large formation is obligated in

his effort, while assisting his own staff and the commanders of subordinate and

coordinating units, to support to the greatest degree the systematic nature of the conduct of

the upcoming battle.

A correct and unified understanding by the commander and the chief of staff of the received

mission and role of the large formation in conducting the operation should support a successful

preparation of the large formation for combat.

73. The chief of staff is obligated, on the basis of a detailed analysis of the existing specific

situation, using the multi-faceted necessary estimates [calculations], under his guidance, to

prepare for the large formation commander conclusions from the evaluation of the situation

which specify the following:

in what measure the enemy forces, by their composition, displacement, or condition,

might counteract or interfere with the execution of the mission assigned to the large

formation;

to what degree other conditions of the situation (including as well the condition of one’s

own force) encumber the successful execution of the mission;

by what actions of our own forces and supporting measures can all these difficulties be

overcome or mitigated.

During the evaluation of the situation on the whole, it is crucial to determine for the

commander of the large formation at what is primary and what is secondary that given moment.

74. For preparation of the decision of the commander, in the production of the estimates the

chief of staff brings together his own staff officers, necessary specialists and representatives of

coordinating large formations, and as well the commanders of units and subunits designated for

execution of their individual combat missions.

In the absence of information regarding the situation, it is required to organize the collection

of reports by means of his own reconnaissance (with the large formation commander’s

permission) and the use of data available from higher level staff and other large formations.


The chief of staff should be constantly prepared to give the commander of the large

formation the information necessary to him for preparation of the decision.

The more consequential the mission, the greater is the requirement in personal

rekognostsirovka3 by the commander for study and evaluation of the situation.

75. The large formation commander is obligated to investigate the situation in detail

and undertake a confident decision concerning the methods of action in the upcoming

battle. This decision will serve as the basis for development of the plan of actions and the

preparation of the large formation for combat.

The decision requires the determination of a concept of the upcoming actions in accordance

with the missions established by the senior commander:

first, a clearly expressed idea of the decision, i.e., a selection of the axis of actions in combat:

(1) of the principal action (the main strike), the actions supporting the success of the execution

of the mission assigned to the large formation, and (2) the end goal of the battle, corresponding

to the assigned mission;

second, a precise division of the overall goal of the large formation’s actions in combat by

successive phases (immediate and subsequent missions);

third, the establishment of the combination of forces and actions, and also special measures

which will support the successful execution of the large formation’s mission at each phase of

the combat.

Simultaneous with this, the commander should decide issues of the organization of command

by creating for battle groupings of forces, and on the foundation of his staff develop the

organization of command and control of the large maneuver formation.

The incompleteness of information regarding the situation does not relieve the

commander from the obligation to undertake a timely, specific, and firm decision.

76. Making the decision, the large formation commander is required to confirm the estimate

of the power of the combination of actions chosen by him, in particular on the main axis. He

should be convinced in the sufficiency of the quantity of the following elements for execution of

the mission: time (including that required for preparation for the battle); forces, means, and

personnel; in case of necessity – to request augmentation from his higher commander and appeal

for support by jointly acting large formations, in conformity with the overall situation.

77. Upon making the decision, the commander should conceal the concept of the upcoming

operation with special measures for the purpose of confusing the enemy.

78. On the basis of the large formation commander’s decision, the staff develops the plan of

battle (combat actions), which includes the following elements:

operational goal of the battle;

commander’s concept;

3 This Russian term is used to describe the actual conduct of reconnaissance by a unit commander,

executed by moving to a position that overwatches the terrain (portion of the sea) in which his forces are

expected to engage the enemy. In the naval application, this activity may be accomplished with a

submarine or aircraft sortie, in which the force commander personally participates, using the on-board

technical capabilities (periscope, vision ports, et cetera) of the combat system in use.


overall goals of actions of the large formation in accordance with the intended phases of

combat;

combat tasks of tactical groupings and units of the combat formation and their

coordination;

combat support (reconnaissance, security, all forms of defense, navigational support);

organization of command and control;

materiel–technical support of the battle.

The battle plan is a separate document; it represents in its aggregate the materials for the

above-listed issues.

79. The large formation chief of staff draws into the development of the battle plan the flag-

level specialists. They are required to announce [declare, state] to the chief of staff ahead of time

all their fundamental instructions and intended measures for support of the large formation

commander’s decision.

80. The correct organization of preparation of combat requires the knowledge of

commanders who are participating in the battle, of their tasks, and their understanding of

the concept of the large formation commander. Therefore, the commander should, upon

receipt of the combat mission, provide preliminary warning instructions to the commanders of

subordinated and coordinating units concerning their employment and, after making his decision,

assign to them their combat missions, assuring them the time required for their preparation.

81. Personal discussion of the large formation commander with subordinate commanders

during the assignment to them of their combat missions is the most reliable means to create the

required focus of actions in combat and unity in understanding of the situation.

82. Oral assignment of the mission involves the following elements:

laying out for the subordinate commanders the situation which prompted the given

decision, and informing them concerning the composition of the acting forces;

laying out the idea of the decision of the large formation commander;

distribution of combat tasks among the subordinate commanders (beginning with the

primary forces), the designation to each his goal of actions, orientation regarding the

terrain (the target of the actions), time and forces designated as available; and in relation to

the general goal of actions of the large formation in each phase of the battle;

a determination of the persons who are responsible for the organization of coordination of

forces in separate sectors of the battle and for their supervision in battle, and also – changes

in the standing organization of the large formation in accordance with the decision undertake

for combat (attached or supporting units);

the designation of coded signals for indicating the start or change of axis and cessation of

activities envisaged by the battle plan.

83. By this categorical form of laying out the combat tasks (without instruction as to means

of their execution), the large formation commander should inspire in his subordinates the

necessity that whatever happened, they must execute in the interests of the end goal of battle,

preserving for themselves independence of actions and also responsibility for them.

The oral delivery of the mission has equal weight to the combat order.


84. In the presence of available time for preparation for combat, the staff develops combat

documents (combat order and so on), formulates them and, upon approval, distributes them to

subordinate and coordinating commanders.

In supplement to an oral delivery of the mission and combat documents, the staff should

develop a table of coded signals for the given battle, which is drawn up on the basis of the large

maneuver formation commander’s decision regarding the special actions in the battle.

85. A decisive moment in the preparation of the large formation for battle is the

organization of effective coordination of all forces participating in the battle – the

agreement of their for the stated goal, in place and time, for achievement of the results

required of them by the battle plan at each stage of the combat.

Coordination in battle depends much on the initiative of the commanders of lower units of

the large formation; it should be organized in the preparatory period for the battle.

86. The large formation commander should, during the assignment of combat missions,

familiarize the designated commander with the given portion of the purpose of actions in relation

to other coordinating units of the large formation by pointing out – who, what is supporting, and

also by instruction of the subsequent actions of units, and so on. These instructions should lie as

the basis for organization of coordination between the lower units of the large formation.

87. The commanders of smaller units of the large maneuver formation are required,

before the battle, by personal confirmation between them to establish the following:

the coordination necessary, on the basis of specific requirements in the battle (support of

attacking – suppression of enemy counter-actions or distraction of his forces to themselves);

the coordination of their own actions (oriented on the actions of other equal-size units at

each stage of the battle or by time, or by local lines);

their coded signals within tactical groups in the combat formation, for command and

control by coordination in combat.

88. The large formation staff, during the development of the battle plan, points out separate

moments of coordination of the large formations component units and, when necessary, develops

a coordination plan for these units (battle planning table).

89. On the basis of decisions made by the subordinate and coordinating component units,

which have been established between them [and provided to] the staff of the large formation, the

latter makes the necessary corrections to the coordination plan and issues corresponding

instructions to the component units.

90. Tight control by the staff of work at the large formation for preparation of the

battle is necessary for timely completion of the organization of the upcoming battle.

Separate moments of personal discussion in coordination between component unit commanders,

in particular those that pertain to actions on the main axis, should be conducted by the chief of

staff. For observation of the preparation of the decisions by the subordinate commanders and for

rendering them assistance, in necessary cases specially instructed staff officers can be sent out to

them. The formulated decisions or copies of the instructions should be quickly delivered to the

staff by the specialists.


91. In the presence of sufficient time, separate nodes of the upcoming battle should be played

out under the guidance of the large formation commander, with the attendance of commanders

participating in the combat actions.

92. The chief of staff is the first deputy to the commander of the large formation for

command and control; he should be prepared for this role.

Concern for the support of the bringing to life of the large formation commander’s concept is

solely the responsibility of the chief of staff.

Only the chief of staff has the right to issue instructions in the name of the commander.

93. The chief of staff, assisting the large formation commander, in the planning and

organization of the battle, is obligating for the following tasks:

to organize the command and control of combat;

to organize combat support of the actions of the large formation in combat, as well as

during the preparation for combat;

to organize the materiel – technical support of the combat;

to organize control for timely execution of the plan for preparing the large formation;

to prepare his own staff for command and control of the upcoming battle and supervise

the subordinate staffs and their preparation.

3. Selection and Organization of Forces and Means

94. In accordance with the battle plan and completed tactical estimates, the forces and

combat means in the large maneuver formation most appropriate by their capabilities for

the combat requirements of the given mission should be designated for the execution of

each task.

The large formation commander is obligated to supplement fully the designated forces in

order to meet the requirements assigned to them (in regard to quantity and quality), bringing in,

when required, additional forces and means, changing their technical structure, searching for new

combinations of forces and means, or creating combat means specially for the execution of the

given mission in the large formation’s preparatory period.

95. The flag-level specialists of the large formation are obligated to provide instruction and

oversee the special and technical preparation for the large formation in accordance with the

conditions of the conduct of the upcoming combat.

When necessary, they should bring in materiel means and personnel from other units and

large formations for reinforcement.

96. The experience of previous combat actions should be fully exploited. Commanders and

enlisted personnel who have gained this experience should be used as instructors.

97. During the organization of the large maneuver formation, in consonance with the battle

plan that has been made, the commander should distribute his forces and materiel means for their

most effective use in combat.

In doing this, it is necessary to designate a portion of the forces and means as reserves, for

unforeseen circumstances in the battle.

4. Combat Preparation of a Large Formation prior to Battle


98. Perfected combat preparation of a large formation, of vessels (units) is a daily obligation

of commanders at all levels.

In the period of preparation of a large formation for the execution of the assigned

combat mission, its combat preparation should to a maximum degree provide for the

training of the enlisted component within limits of available time and as well the

preparation of its ordnance and equipment for the execution of the upcoming tasks, i.e., it

should be absolutely specific during this period.

99. The large formation commander is obligated, to the degree of the specificity of the

concept of the large formation’s battle actions, to provide subordinate commanders tasks for

combat preparation of their units and subunits, corresponding to their designation, and also

implement this with coordinating units.

Elementary special and technical routines of the enlisted component and commanders in

execution of their tasks at their battle stations should receive special attention, and as well

between vessels and units – in a tactical situation that mimics reality.

When necessary, in-depth training in the use of weapons and combat means should be

conducted.

100. Commanders at all levels are obligated by personal example and their leadership, by

special exercises and physical preparation, to develop the habits of their personnel component to

the conduct of combat service in a regime that approximates the anticipated situation in combat.

101. The commander should use every opportunity for gradual and positive growth in the

combat situation of the more responsible commanders, of entire subunits and units of his large

formation – by means of directing them during the preparatory period for combat for execution

of individual battle commands.

5. Preparation of the Region of Actions prior to the Beginning of Combat

102. During the period of preparation for the execution of combat actions, in accordance with

the assigned mission, the large formation commander should be concerned that the situation

in the region of the upcoming battle favors the success of its conduct.

A favorable situation is created by the following actions:

appropriate equipping of the region of actions;

preliminary actions against enemy forces;

anticipation of required changes in the situation, on the basis of careful observation of the

region of upcoming actions;

forestalling the enemy in the deployment of his forces.

103. The large formation staff, in accordance with the developed battle plan, should provide

for the equipping of the area of actions: with communications and observation means, with

orientation features – navigational and for employment of weapons, with obstacles that will

encumber enemy actions, with capabilities for vessel (unit) anchorages suitable for temporary

use.

104. The battle plan should envisage actions against enemy forces in the area of the

upcoming battle, which are accomplished during the preparatory period: increasing the pressure


and fatigue of the enemy force or distracting them to a false axis, confusing the enemy and

weakening his vigilance.

105. A well organized, energetic command and control by the chief of staff, persistent and

active execution of reconnaissance – in the period of the upcoming combat – should ensure for

the large formation commander and his subordinate commanders detailed knowledge of the

actual situation and the enemy’s intentions in the region of combat by the moment of its

initiation.

6. Occupation by a Large Formation of the Departure Position for Combat

106. The disposition of forces of the large maneuver formation at the moment of

initiation of combat should correspond to the decision undertaken by the large formation

commander, and should support the successful conduct of the battle with the methods

specified in the large formation commander’s decision.

The means of command and control of the large formation and flag-level command post

should be deployed by this time and all preparation for combat in the large formation should be

completed.

107. An obligation of the chief of staff is the confirmation of complete concentration of

forces of the large maneuver formation for battle and the organization of continuous monitoring

of the course of their readiness for execution of their missions, in accordance with the battle plan,

for reports to the large formation commander.


Chapter 5

Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat

1. Fundamentals of Command and Control of a Large Formation in Combat

108. The commander of a large formation (unit) is fully responsible for the organization

of command and control of combat of a large formation of naval forces and for their

actions in combat.

Executing the received combat mission, the large formation commander is obligated

personally to command and control the conduct of the battle (combat actions) for complete

achievement of the results required by the operational goal of the battle.

109. Command and control of a large formation of naval forces requires the following

actions:

the commander’s timely making of the decision at each stage of the battle;

the determination of the forces, means, and time required for execution of his decision;

the naming of special goals of the actions of the large formation and assigning combat

missions to units in accordance with their forces and the means designated for this purpose;

uninterrupted and results-focused coordination of the actions of units ( large formations)

and branches of naval forces, which are resolving the overall combat mission;

controlling [monitoring, inspecting] the actions of his own forces;

changing and more precisely defining the tasks of his subordinate units in the course of

the battle.

110. At the base of command and control lies the commander’s decision, made by him

during the preparation and at the battle site, in the course of its development, in

accordance with the actual unfolding situation.

These decisions should support the proper focus of actions of all units of the large maneuver

formation and their coordination between themselves for the successful conduct of the battle.

The most important obligation of the commander in combat is making the following

decisions:

in determining the target and moment of conducting the main strike on the enemy;

in determining the overall goal of the actions at the given and subsequent stages of the

battle;

in raising the combat capability and defensive capability of the large formation in the

conditions of the battle situation (secondary strikes and all forms of support);

by organizing powerful groupings of forces for actions in the subsequent stage of the

battle.

111. The command and control of the battle (combat actions) of the large formation

should be accomplished continuously, which is achieved by the following actions:

precise organization of command and control of the battle, with an appropriate concept of

actions in combat;

the construction of the combat or movement formation (disposition at anchorage) on the

basis of tasks designated for units of the large formation;


permanent mutual information sharing concerning the situation transmitted from lower to

higher and higher to lower, and to adjacent commands.

Among the obligations of the staff are the following requirements:

the organization of reconnaissance and command and control in combat, in accordance

with the decisions and intentions of the commander;

the organization of command posts communications, and observation posts for the large

formation and their command and control in the battle;

the organization of all forms of support;

the assembly, study, development of information regarding the enemy and his forces, and

in regard to weather conditions in the region of actions, and report these things to the

commander;

the drawing up [composition] of the combat instructions on the basis of the commander’s

decision, transmitting it to the forces participating in the battle, monitoring their actions and

timely execution of the instructions;

monitoring for the execution of the coordination plan in battle and command and control

of coordination with the aid of flag-level specialists and liaison officers;

constant vigilance regarding materiel support of the large formation’s units in combat and

the availability of the closest supplies;

the composition of combat reports and their dispatch for confirmation to higher level

staff, and also for informing subordinate and adjacent units.

115. The obligation of flag-level specialists of the large formation and the chiefs of special

services – in accordance with instructions from the chief of staff, is to control the combat

employment and use of ordnance, combat means and equipment for the large formation in

combat. During the course of the battle, they should report to the chief of staff their suggestions

regarding the strengthening of coordination of forces for separate sectors of the combat.

The flag-level specialists and chiefs of services are required to inform the chief of staff

constantly on the expenditure of ordnance, combat means, and supply, and also losses of or

reduction in combat capability of individual combat entities in the process of the battle.

116. The flag-level command post (FKP) is organized on one of the large formation vessels

which has sufficient means of communication (or at an on-shore site prepared for this purpose).

This [command post] will support the command and control of the battle, with direct observation

from it of the region of combat and over the actions of our own forces, which will be on the axis

of the main attack.

A reserve command post of the large formation is organized on another vessel, where the

large formation’s deputy commander will be positioned.

The large formation commander commands and controls the battle, as a rule, from his

command post.

During the command and control of the battle from the FKP on shore, with limited visibility,

the large formation commander for the purposes of personal observation of the actions of the

principal groupings of his forces has the right to move to a specially prepared observation point

or to go out to sea on a special vessel (aircraft) with the minimal number of staff officers. If this

is the case, the FKP continues to fulfill its requirements, supporting reliable communications

with the large formation commander.


117. The staff, as an organ of combat command and control, should be tightly organized

for work directly in combat in accordance with the battle plan.

The chief of staff is required to distribute his staff personnel to accomplish the following

tasks:

study of the fluid battle situation and development of subsequent actions;

transmission of combat instructions and collection of reports and information;

control [monitoring] for the condition and actions of the large formation’s units in

combat;

tracking combat actions for the drawing of conclusions from the combat experience.

In addition, the organization of the effort of the staff personnel should be constructed in

accordance with the division of the large formation’s combat formation into groups and their

missions, and also with the combat functions of the special services.

118. Command and control of the battle is supported by organized and focused

continuous active observation in the battle region.

Observation is organized by the large formation staff both from the FKP as well as from

vessels and units belonging to the large formation, with the aid of their technical means, and also

means specially designated for this purpose.

Observation should capture both the actions of the enemy and the overall situation in the

battle region, as well as the actions of our own vessels and units in the large formation.

119. For command and control on the scale of a large maneuver formation, command

communications and coordination communications are specially organized in each separate case.

Command communication serves for transmission of combat instructions from the senior

leader to subordinates and for receiving reports from them. It is organized by instruction of the

senior leader in accordance with the battle plan; however, this does not reduce for the

subordinate leaders the requirement of all of them to have the means to maintain

communications with the senior leader.

Coordination communications ensures agreement of actions of individual combat entities

and the large formations of various branches of force, which are operating together during the

execution of the common combat mission. These communications within each group of the

combat formation are organized in accordance with instructions of the commander, who has

responsibility for organizing coordination on a separate sector of the battle, and in the large

formation as a whole – the large formation chief of staff.

120. The continuity of communications is supported by the employment of various means of

communication on each axis and of various methods of transmission (duplicative

communications), and also my avoiding enemy interference.

Radio communications are the fundamental means of command and control for all

branches of naval forces in all forms of combat.

Skillful use by the large formation staff of radio means in conditions of interference

accomplished by the enemy has decisive significance for command and control of battle of a

large maneuver formation. Therefore, the organization of radio communications and their use in

combat should be carefully considered by the large formation staff and should satisfy the concept


of the decision of the commander and combination of forces and actions at each stage of the

battle.

The chief of staff and flag-level communications officer (chief of communications) of the

large maneuver formation are personally responsible for the organization of continuous

communications. Each officer of the staff is required to confirm receipt of combat instructions

addressed to him that are passed through communications means.

121. In conformity to the commander’s decision, the chief of staff issues to the large

formation communications instructions (with an attached schematic) for a given battle (or

movement) and the procedure for changing it in accordance with the stage of battle.

The means of communication of a large maneuver formation should be organized so that,

coordinating with the permanently acting system of theater communications, together they

comprise a unified system. In the period of the large maneuver formation’s presence in bases

and other locations, all of their exchanges should be accomplished through the permanent theater

communications system.

122. The organization of communications in a large formation should specify the principal

schematics of communication between groups of the combat formation and with adjacent forces

in the course of all stages of the battle.

The following special communication schematics are drawn up for support of the

command’s communications and coordination communications in a complex large maneuver

formation:

a) Common schematic. This includes transmissions “to the fleet,” which everyone receives

and listens to (directly, or from a large formation communications node or through repeater

vessels and stations); lines for communications with the higher command, with adjacent and

basic groups of the combat formation, and also constantly operating schematics (nets, lines of

coordination). This same schematic is used for reconnaissance organized by the command.

b) Detachment internal schematics (in accordance with the number of groups) for

command and control of coordination within each group of the combat formation.

c) Special schematics for command and control of those units which are operating in

specific conditions or are not able to be included in the overall schematic for technical reasons or

by the conditions of the situation (communications with submerged submarines, with amphibious

assaults, fire adjustment parties, and so on).

123. The communications system of the large formation should include active use of radio

interference for the purpose of disrupting enemy command and control. This is especially

important when in contact with enemy reconnaissance forces.

124. Security of command and control should be observed irrespective of the method of

exchange and be supported by the following measures:

cipher (code), by encoding and authenticating tables, and also by tables of coded signals

(TUS), developed for each operation (battle);

by selection of a communications means which will ensure security [secrecy] in a given

concrete situation;

by the use of the unacknowledged receipt method of transmitting;


by strict communications discipline and possible reduction of its volume to the necessary

minimum.

125. It should be kept in mind that in the conditions of a naval theater, the uses of radio

communications and underwater sound signaling (ZPS) are the most crucial. Therefore, in all

cases, in accordance with the situation, these can be used as means of command and control,

to the greatest degree supporting secrecy, avoiding them in this sequence:

a) personal conversations;

b) callsigns of communications officers;

c) sending of messages with confirmed names;

d) transmissions of encrypted and encoded messages by wire communications;

e) transmission using authentication tables and tables of coded signals by wire;

f) authentications by wire with required change of the encoding charts and tables with the

coded naming of units, positions, and so on;

g) transmissions by encoded messages and text signals by means of visual communications

and UKV;

h) transmission of encoded signals by means of ZPS;

i) transmission of encrypted messages and encoded messages by means of radio

communications;

j) transmission of encoded signals by means of radio communications;

k) transmission of open [“in the clear”] radio texts;

l) open (“clear”) conversations by radio-telephone.

126. In accordance with the contents of the previous paragraph, take the following measures:

- conduct preparation for combat (movement) exclusively by personal discussion and

exchange of documents;

execute command and control before encountering the enemy by means of

communications, the range of which does not exceed the range of the visible horizon;

at the beginning of the deployment, execute by coded signals, given by visual means

or by wire; in doing so, transmission by radio is permitted only in those cases when there is

no other means of communication;

From the moment of encountering the enemy, the use of radio communications is

permitted. However, those units which still have not been detected by the enemy should use

long-range radio exchanges when necessary.

127. Open [clear] transmission with the use of radio communications can be conducted

only in the following cases:

loss of the time necessary for encrypting (encoding), can lead to worse results than open

transmission (reports concerning attacking cutters, detection of a submarine, the appearance

of aircraft, and so on);


the enemy, intercepting the transmission, is not in a condition to interfere with the

execution of the instructions (adjusting artillery fire, and so on);

128. Mutual recognition signals have special significance for command and control of

combat. Only those will act decisively and confidently in naval combat in complex and dispersed

combat formations, in smoke, in fog, and in nighttime who are firmly convinced that their vessel

(aircraft) will not be mistaken for a vessel (aircraft) of the enemy.

Therefore, one of the critical tasks of the large formation staff and its constant concern still in

peacetime are the organization of mutual recognition of one’s own forces and ensuring the

discipline of mutual recognition.

129. The large formation staff should always have a reserve communications means, and

also periodically confirm the readiness of the communications means for the large formation for

rapid transmission of combat instructions and the receipt of anticipated reports.

130. One of the important methods of command and control in a large maneuver formation is

the use of liaison officers.

The resolution of issues of combat employment of attached and designated [liaison officers]

for support of units should be ensured by the presence in the staff of representatives of these

units and large formations.

Liaison officers that are participating in the staff of large formations in the development of

the organization of the upcoming combat are the best means to ensure command and control of

the attached and supporting units in the battle itself.

3. Combat and Movement Formations

131. During the conduct of battle (combat actions), a large formation of naval forces is

arrayed in a combat formation.

132. The combat formation represents a grouping of all the forces and means that are

participating in the battle and are focused on the combat mission – both permanent elements of

the large formation as well as those attached to them for the duration of the battle or designated

from coordinating large formations for its support.

The construction of the combat formation should correspond to the concept and plan of the

battle and, changing during the course of the battle, should at each stage ensure the following:

infliction on the enemy of a decisive defeat on the chosen axis of the actions by means of

executing concentrated strikes with the principle mass of our own forces and combat means;

the most effective employment of forces in accordance with their capabilities and the

coordination of branches of naval forces;

the best exploitation of the sea situation;

the possibility of fighting off sudden strikes of enemy naval forces from the flanks and

rear of the large formation, and as well from the air, and

the possibility of rapid shifting of large formation efforts to another axis for development

of the success achieved there or for parrying the enemy’s strikes.

133. The groupings of large formation forces in an offensive and in a defensive battle vary;

they are determined by the nature of the combat actions.


134. The offensive nature of combat actions, in accordance with the decision of the

fundamental issue in the offensive – the selection of the main strike – require the creation of one

or several strike groups (including aviation strike groups), positioned in the second echelon of

the combat formation (aviation group – on airfields in an appropriate degree of readiness) or

echeloned in their own sequence – when it is necessary to conduct repeated strikes on the enemy

main target (the number of echelons corresponds to the number of strikes being made).

The preparation of the main strike in an offensive battle, by exposing the resistance of

separate portions of the enemy’s combat formation and launching preliminary strikes against

them, requires the presence of forward detachments, which are positioned across the front of

the first echelon, which as a rule exceeds the width of the enemy’s front.

Support of the actions of the strike groups in the time frame of the launching of the main

strike on the enemy requires the formation by that moment of supporting groups and their

action on secondary axes for distracting the enemy forces from the main axis by means of

conducting secondary strikes, constraining his maneuver, or covering the forces acting on the

main axis against enemy strikes.

In addition to those listed groups, it is necessary to have reserve forces and means in the

combat formation, which will respond to unforeseen requirements in the battle.

135. The defensive nature of actions, in accordance with the decision for the defense – by

determining the main axis of enemy counter-action to the offensive, requires the creation of

powerful covering groups, which engage in actions on these axes.

The support and reinforcement of the covering group on the main axis, as well as the

development of success of its actions, requires the presence in the combat formation of one or

several strike groups, which have a developed plan of actions for each axis.

In addition, a reserve of forces and means is designated in the combat formation for

replenishing the strike groups [for battle losses] and for unforeseen requirements.

136. Each group of the combat formation of the large formation normally consists of several

tactical groups of varied or single-branch composition, each of which are executing separate

combat tasks and coordinating between themselves during the execution of the overall mission.

The commander of a group of the combat formation is required to establish combat tasks to

the commanders of tactical groups and to organize coordination between them

Each tactical group in the combat formation occupies a concentrated position or is ablt to be

dispersed until the moment of the initiation of execution of its mission.

137. Vessels and units from the component of the large formation or attached to it receive

combat tasks from the group commander; [vessels and units] selected from the coordinating

large formations receive specific support requirements, and also fire missions.

138. Combat formations in all cases should be supported with reconnaissance, combat

security, and all forms of defense.

139. The movement formation of a large maneuver formation is constructed for supporting

the movement of the large formation’s basic forces.

The construction of the movement formation should correspond to the decision for moment

and support the following:


rapid deployment into combat formation in accordance with the battle plan

rapid change of grouping, depending on the situation during movement;

fending off enemy attacks;

concealed movement.

140. The basic forces of the large formation are constructed in one or several columns with

movement security (the columns are divided into echelons).

For the launching of counter-strikes during enemy attacks, a vessel strike group and an

aviation strike group are created. One or several mobile detachments and patrols are

designated on the axis of the anticipated encounter with the enemy.

The movement formation includes reconnaissance and air coverage.

141. The disposition of a large maneuver formation at anchor is supported by discipline

in the large formation, which has the following purpose: to conceal from possible enemy

observation the disposition of large formation units; for convenience of defense in the event of

enemy attack; the possibility of rapid departure and deployment into a combat formation in

accordance with the battle plan.

The basic forces of the large formation are positioned, concentrated in the positions safest

and most convenient for refitting and rest.

Outpost security is organized in accordance with the defensive plan for the anchorage.

The disposition in the anchorage also envisions the conduct of reconnaissance and air

coverage.

142. The groupings of combat and movement formations, and also the disposition at

anchorages of heterogeneous large formations, including principally surface or submarine, air, or

shore-based forces, differ among themselves by type and disposition of forces. However, these

groupings preserve both their designation and their function.

4. Command and Control of Combat

143. The goal-orientation of the decision made by the commander during the course of the

battle, and the unity of understanding of the mission and situation of the battle by all

commanders in the large formation and in the coordination of units secures the success of the

battle’s conduct.

Making a decision in combat, the commander should – in all circumstances – firmly

recall and correctly clarify the mission assigned by the senior commander, and also

comprehensively and soberly evaluate the actual situation.

144. The commander’s undertaken decision should persistently be brought to life, not

succumbing to the enemy’s actions and secondary moments of the situation.

The chief of staff is required to provide [ensure for] the commander free and uninterrupted

command and control of the battle.

145. By his decisions at each stage of the battle, the commander creates the following:

a common goal-focus of actions of all groups of the large formation’s combat formation.

concentration of efforts of large formation units that are coordinating among themselves

for overcoming the main encumbrance at a given stage of the battle;


support of success – by selection of the target of a strike, the moment of its launching,

and the execution of appropriate maneuver of the strike and support groups.

The chief of staff supports the reconnaissance necessary for this knowledge of the situation –

in the first place concerning the enemy’s actions in the battle.

146. The establishment in combat of additional tasks of the large formation commander directs separate groups and units of the large formation to overcome enemy counter-actions in

the path of execution of the primary mission, preserving for them the initiative in achieving,

during the course of the battle, the common purpose of the given stage of the battle.

The large formation commander is required in combat to demand the complete intensity of

all efforts from his subordinates.

The staff of the large formation accomplishes control over the actions of the units of its large

formation and observation for the actions of adjacent large formations, and as well ensures

mutual information sharing in combat.

147. In accordance with the results of the actions of units and separate groups of the combat

formation, on the sector of observed success, the commander should concentrate the effort

of his entire large formation and achieve the development of success and total defeat of the

enemy.

The informing of the large formation concerning partial success is a powerful means for

mobilizing the efforts of its enlisted component.

148. Command and control of the large formation in combat should be supported by brief,

quickly broadcasted encoded signals that are designated in the appropriate plan for the given

battle (TUS).

149. Special attention of the large formation staff should be given to accounting for the time

required for transmission of combat instructions and the organization of their execution – for

determination of the moment of their timely dispatch.

150. The tempo of the execution of command and control in combat depends entirely on the

intensity of the combat actions. This requires development of a measurement for making rapid

decisions. The large formation commander must react without any delay to any change in

the combat situation, preserving at the same time his own forces by means of appropriate

organization of effort through the duration of the battle.

The time shift is executed only with the concurrence of the large formation chief of staff.

151. At various moments in the battle, combat actions are not identical by their intensity.

Periods of weakening of the combat intensity are decisive for command and control of the battle.

The commander who does not use this time for analysis of the situation, forecasting, and

organizing the subsequent actions of his large formation, loses an opportunity, which will be

difficult to re-establish in the subsequent conduct of the battle.

152. Upon foreseeing large-scale changes of the situation in the region of combat actions

(changes in visibility, maneuver conditions, and so on), the commander should issue

instructions ahead of time for transition in the actions of the large formation in accordance with

the new battle plan.


153. Over the course of the entire battle, the commander should preserve a reserve of

forces and means in his hands, renewing them by the degree of expenditure, for preservation of

the constant possibility to command and control by combat and react to changes in the combat

situation.

5. Combat Documents, Instructions, Reports, and Notifications

154. The combat order is the fundamental means of transmitting the decision and

establishing the tasks of large formation units during the its preparation for battle (combat

actions).

Separate instructions in the form of commands (written and oral) are issue in the name of the

large formation commander or chief of staff, depending on their contents. In the latter case, they

are recorded by the chief of staff of the large formation and preserved in one copy [exemplar]

personally by him.

A common mission that has an offensive nature, as a rule, is divided into the immediate and

subsequent mission.

The order is issued for the accomplishment of the large formation’s immediate mission.

150. The order should be brief, sequentially and categorically express the commander’s

decision, and the missions of subordinate large formations (units).

The order should be laid out in the following sequence:

First point – a compressed evaluation of the actions of the enemy grouping which can

influence the course of the battle;

Second point – the immediate mission, assigned to the large formation (unit);

Third point – the immediate mission of direct adjacent forces and instructions regarding

boundary lines with them;

Fourth point – brief outline of the idea of the commander’s decision, of the order being

issued;

Fifth and final point – combat missions of subordinate large formations (units) in the first

stage of the battle (without instructions as to methods of executing the missions), with listed

attached forces and supporting units and indication of the goal of actions of the large formation

in the subsequent stage of the battle.

Beyond in the order of sequence in separate points are indicated the following:

time of readiness of the large formation for execution of the mission (if it has not already

been announced in a separate instructions);

location of the command post of the large formation commander intended displacements

of it, and also the deputy commander of the large formation at the reserve command post;

sequence of submitted reports;

All copies of the order are signed by the commander and chief of staff.

Orders are issued for the battle (combat actions), movement of the large formation, and

anchorage outside the base.


157. In the preliminary instructions, which advise subordinate commanders and commit

them to prepare their units for the upcoming actions, the secret classification of the combat being

prepared for and the contents of the order cannot be compromised.

158. When it is not possible to determine in advance when and in what conditions the large

formation will execute its mission (various conditions of weather and visibility, varied

composition of the forces and nature of enemy actions), in place of the order the large formation

commander can issue to his subordinate large formations (units) a combat instruction.

The following elements are indicated in the combat instruction:

the overall goal of the actions or mission of the large formation;

the composition and organization of the participating forces;

variants of the anticipated situation and the concept of the commander in regard to them;

individual requirement by the commander of groups of the combat formation for

execution of unit missions, for coordination and the subsequent conduct of the battle;

supplemental general instructions regarding the nature of the actions in combat and in

regard to the organization of command.

The commander and chief of staff sign the combat instruction.

159. In supplement to the development of the combat order, when necessary the staff

develops instructions for combat (or other form of combat actions).

The instructions for combat contain detailed instructions concerning the sequence of

execution of the unit tasks in combat, the execution of the general maneuver, concerning

coordination of the large formation’s units, the organization of support, expenditure of ordnance,

combat assets, and so on.

The instructions for combat are signed by the chief of staff and approved by the large

formation commander.

160. During the preliminary preparation of an offensive battle in a specified region of

actions, the staff of the large formation should be developing a battle planning table, which in

excerpts (or in total) informs those who are conducting coordination for the battle.

The planning table can be general, which encapsulates the entire battle, or partial – for the

offensive actions of the basic strike groups at one stage of the battle.

The planning table contains the following elements:

the sequence of coordination of the large formation’s units by stages of the battle

(successive support of single actions by other and their parallel support for each stage);

re-subordination with the development of the battle of temporarily attached units.

For movement, the planning table lays out the movement sequence of large formation units

for each stage (change of the movement formation, order, route of march, rendezvous).

The planning table should be drawn up in the form of a schematic of coordination with

explanations at the bottom.

The planning table is signed by the chief of staff and approved by the large formation

commander.


161. For specification of the coordination of special branches of naval forces (aviation) with

the basic forces in combat and the employment of separate forms of weapons (artillery), a plan

of employment in battle for these forces or ordnance is developed.

The indicated plan contains the following elements:

overall mission of the named forces;

the accepted method of their employment in the given battle;

the distribution of portions of the force for separate tasks, at various stages of the battle,

with instruction as to the quantity of ordnance designated for each task;

the designation of a reserve of forces and means at the disposal of the commander of a

given type of force;

the delineation of reserve forces and means for actions in combat upon supplementary

instructions of the large maneuver formation commander.

The plan for employment of special forces (or means) in the battle is signed by the large

formation commander of these forces (aviation group) or the flag-level specialist, and also by the

large maneuver formation chief of staff and approved by the large formation commander.

162. Command and control of a large maneuver formation directly in combat is

accomplished by means of issuing combat instructions.

163. Combat instructions differ in nature from command and control of a large formation in

combat.

In the instruction of general axis of movement of the combat formation – the large

formation commander executes supervision for the execution of the maneuver of the large

formation in combat.

In the declaration of the overall goal of actions – the large formation commander unifies

the efforts of all groups of the combat formation for achievement of the actions of a new stage of

the battle.

In the statement of a unit task to a group of forces – the large formation commander directs

separate groups for the concentration of efforts for overcoming enemy counter-actions.

In the order concerning execution of concrete actions – the large formation commander

adjusts the actions of subordinate large formations (units) in combat.

By an encoded signal – the large formation commander sets in motion [movement] the

combination of forces that were earlier prepared for execution of complex actions in the battle.

The combat instructions are transmitted by all means of communications.

The execution of each combat instruction should be confirmed.

164. The success of combat command and control depends to a significant degree on the

timely receipt of reports and information concerning the combat situation.

Reports (to the [senior] leader) and information (to adjacent and subordinate forces) makes

possible the correct evaluation of the situation and the making of the appropriate decision. This

obligates all commanders and staffs in a battle to not neglect reports and information.


165. The principal requirements for each report and information are the reliability of

their data, the correctness of the evaluation of their data, the precision of the expression [of

the data], and the timeliness of their dispatch.

166. The procedure for submitting scheduled reports (submitted by a specified time) should

be established by the staff which organized the battle (combat actions): who, in what time period

and concerning what [subject] should be reported.

167. Unscheduled combat reports are submitted on the initiative of a subordinate

commander or staff.

It is necessary to report the following information without delay:

concerning an enemy surprise attack;

concerning the establishment of contact with the enemy or its absence in the place where

it was envisaged;

concerning an acute change in the situation (including weather) and nature of the

enemy’s actions’

concerning the execution of the assigned mission;

concerning the undertaking on personal initiative of a decision in connection with a

changing situation.

168. The first report should be brief and transmitted as quickly as possible so as to

anticipate [forestall] enemy actions. Immediately following that report, submit a more

detailed report.

A report concerning the enemy should briefly comment, as a rule, on the following issues:

detection or not (of the enemy);

when detected;

where detected (quadrant or coordinates);

what kind (of enemy), how many, how disposed;

what is he doing or what did he do (the enemy);

what is he doing or what does the reporting element envisage he will do;

location of the reporting element.

The subsequent explanation should support the transmission initially of the most important

issue.

If the meteorological situation should be brought to attention, then report also the

meteorological conditions in the region of the reconnaissance.

Reports, as a rule, indicate the source of receipt of the information (personal observation,

reports from subordinates, information from adjacent forces, and so on).

The commander (and in large formations also the chief of staff) signs the report.

169. It is necessary to keep in mind that command and control of a large maneuver formation

is conducted not in isolation from other large formations and units, operating in the same region;

mutual information is required in this situation.

Mutual information [exchange] supports the receipt of timely support from adjacent units,

assistance from their command, and attraction of all of their forces for overcoming resistance

being encountered in the battle.


6. Signal Codes, Codebooks, and Tables

170. The use in the Military–Naval Fleet of signal codes (single-flag, two-flag, and three-

flag) supports the transmission of any instruction, report, and information in combat. However,

they do are not capable of rapid composition, transmission, and decoding of the most required

combat instructions (reports).

The Combat Signal Code (BSS), specially composed for command and control of a large

maneuver formation in combat, on the basis of satisfying the demands of combat command and

control, contains the required combat instructions and reports and should be capable of their

rapid transmission by all existing communications means.

171. For the purposes of facilitating command and control of a large formation, during the

conduct of complex actions of a typical nature (coordinated fires with ground forces, landing of

an amphibious assault, and so on), are developed on the scale of the fleet; special combat codes,

which contain the most necessary and special expressions, are developed on the basis of the

conduct of combat actions, and contain the most demanded and special expressions. The use of

these codes is on a par with the signal codes and TUS for command and control of a large

formation in combat.

Combat codes should be corrected as necessary as a result of the experience of their use in

combat and in combat preparation.

172. The table of coded signals (TUS) is a necessary means in the process of conducting

battle with a large naval force for executing rapid command and control of earlier organized

actions of the large formation’s units.

The TUS is developed by the staff on the basis of the commander’s decision regarding the

possible actions in combat, those undertake in the preparatory period, and organization of the

large formation’s command and control approved by him. As a rule, the TUS contains the

following elements:

variants of the anticipated nature of the actions of the large formation (in accordance with

the preliminary instructions);

the orders concerning the execution of complex or simple actions of the large formation’s

units, organized during the preparation for combat, but executed in combat only upon

decision of the large formation commander;

reports, anticipated during the course of the battle, in accordance with the battle plan, and

the required rapid response to them;

reserve, supplementary signals for their use in addition to orders issued in the course of

the battle.

The TUS is approved by the chief of staff and the commander.

In the absence of time for development of a combat instruction, the TUS can be used to

replace it.


Chapter 6

Support of a Large Formation in Combat

1. Fundamentals of Support

173. Combat actions at sea require multi-faceted and pre-planned measures of support.

All forms of support of a large formation in combat should be focused on the execution of

the combat mission, and comprise an overall system of measures which have the special purpose

for supporting and improving [raising] the combat capability of the large formation, and creating

the conditions that will encumber the enemy’s combat actions.

174. Forms of support in combat include the following:

reconnaissance has as its purpose the timely detection of the enemy and the

determination of his combat formation for the correct mission-focus of our own actions;

security is organized with the goal of facilitating the defense of the secured force with

timely warning of them concerning the presence of the enemy and fending him off with

forces specially designated for this purpose, and as well to oppose enemy reconnaissance.

defense of the large formation has the mission to fend off all forms of enemy attack with

our own forces and means: PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, and PKhO are required forms of support

of a large formation in combat;

maskirovaniye [camouflage and deception] of the large formation in combat has the

purpose of providing concealment of the concentration and maneuver of one’s own forces

and the attempt to distract the enemy to a false axis; maskirovaniye is necessary in all cases

of the combat activity of a large formation;

navigational support should ensure the safety of maneuver of one’s own vessels in the

combat region, and complicate the enemy’s sailing in the same region;

materiel–technical support of vessels and units of the large formation in combat

consists in the execution of timely combat resupply for the uninterrupted conduct of combat.

2. Organization and Command and Control of Support

175. The commander conducting the large formation’s battle should envisage measures of

support in his decision, but the commander of each vessel (unit) subordinate to him, resolving

the taskings he has received, is required to undertake measures for his own support.

The chief of staff organizes the combat support of a large formation in accordance with the

decision and the commander’s instructions.

An obligation of the chief of staff is continuous monitoring [control] for the execution of the

combat and materiel–technical support of the large formation in combat.

176. Combat support of a large formation is executed by forces and means specially

designated for this purpose, and also by forces and means of security vessels (units).

The chief of staff, for purposes of economy, should strive to combine the execution of

various support tasks in combat, delegating various forms of support to one or the other forces.

177. Depending on the unfolding conditions of combat, one or another form of combat

support assumes greater significance, or in some cases the commander of a large formation, by


declaration of the chief of staff, makes a decision on the assignment of vessels and units to new

missions or reduces their missions of support, out of necessity.

The chief of staff should forecast and upon the large formation commander’s decision issue

instructions to the supporting forces in regard to their actions during the changing of the combat

formation at all stages of the battle, and also prepare a commander’s decision concerning the

execution of this or that large formation maneuver for the purposes of its defense.

178. During the preparation for combat, the staff should organize coordination of the

reconnaissance forces with those groups of the combat formation which are directly supporting

reconnaissance, reaching personal agreement between them.

3. Reconnaissance

179. Reconnaissance is the most important form of combat support.

In addition to observation conducted on the enemy across the entire theater; in combat

reconnaissance should be accomplished continuously; it should be focused, active, and

commanded and controlled in the interests of the conduct of combat.

The more complex and dangerous the situation, the greater should be the effort and intensity

of reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance, as a rule, should be conducted in a concealed manner.

180. Reconnaissance in the period of combat should be organized during the large

formation’s preparatory time for the battle.

The staff organizes reconnaissance on the basis of the decisions and instructions of the large

formation commander. The commander should indicate to his staff what he wants to know and

when it wants to know it.

It is the obligation of the chief of staff to develop the reconnaissance plan, which he presents

to the commander for approval.

The large formation chief of staff personally establishes the tasks of the vessels and units in

executing reconnaissance, organizing the combat support.

181. In combat, the requirement may emerge to organize additional reconnaissance.

Each vessel (unit) commander is required independently to conduct reconnaissance and

observation in the region of combat in accordance with the demands of his mission, not

waiting for special instructions to do this.

182. Tactical reconnaissance supports the unleashing and conduct of battle and has as its

own purpose the revealing of the situation for the making by the large formation commander of

correct decisions in the course of the battle.

The tasks of reconnaissance flow from the combat mission of the large formation, in

accordance with which are indicated the following: targets, axes (regions), depth, and the

duration of reconnaissance and observation.

The basic targets of tactical reconnaissance should be enemy forces and their actions.

The primary mission of tactical reconnaissance is the timely revealing of the enemy’s

combat formation.


The clarification of the situation before the enemy gains us tactical superiority and supports

taking the initiative in our own hands.

Tactical reconnaissance begins before the battle and subsequently transitions in the future to

reconnaissance of the combat region.

Aircraft, surface vessels, technical means, and also submarines are designated to execute

reconnaissance tasks.

The most important means of tactical reconnaissance is aviation.

Reconnaissance tasks are executed, in addition to special designated forces, also by other

units of the combat formation of the large formation, along with their own combat taskings.

183. The commander who is executing reconnaissance should know to whom, at what time,

about what specifically, and by what means and methods to report. If he has not received

instructions or they do not accord with the conditions of a changing situation, the reconnaissance

asset [razvedchik in Russian, which can be a single scout or covert agent; an aircraft, submarine,

or surface vessel commander, and so on – the agent of the reconnoitering action], should transmit

the reconnaissance data for the best resolution of the large formation’s overall mission.

It is an obligation of the large formation staff to inform in a timely manner the participants in

the battle, and higher level staffs and formations of the reconnaissance data.

184. Pre-reconnaissance is organized by the commanders of tactical groups in the course of

deploying their forces, for purposes of confirming date about the enemy, necessary for their

execution of the attack.

As a rule, in combat conditions, pre-reconnaissance grows into direct conduct of the

attacking groups.

185. Reconnaissance by combat is organized both in the preparatory period of a large

formation for combat, as well as in the process of combat itself, when the large formation

commander requires additional data, and a patrol or enemy security is complicating the

penetration of our reconnaissance assets to the principal targets. In this case, additional forces are

committed for reinforcement of the reconnaissance assets.

The large formation commander establishes the mission of the forces designated for

additional reconnaissance by combat, and the senior commander of the force designated to

conduct the reconnaissance exerts direct leadership and commands and controls the combat.

186. Special forms of reconnaissance – mine, artillery, chemical, meteorological, and others

– should always be considered and executed in coordination with tactical reconnaissance. It

should be focused wholly on the basic combat mission.

The tasks of special forms of reconnaissance include the following:

mine – discovery of mine danger in the battle region;

artillery – discovery of enemy firing positions along the coastline;

chemical – discovery of chemical danger in the battle region;

meteorological – determination of meteorological situation in the battle region.

The large formation chief of staff is obligated to organize special reconnaissance of special

forms.


187. Planning the conduct of reconnaissance in battle, the chief of staff is required to

designate a portion of reconnaissance forces and reserves for the following purposes:

to render assistance to reconnaissance assets [persons, vessels, aircraft – whatever is the

agent of reconnaissance];

replacing disabled reconnaissance assets;

strengthening [reinforcing] reconnaissance upon detection of the enemy;

increasing reconnaissance forces in response to weather conditions.

In conjunction with this, the staff commands and controls the conduct of reconnaissance,

reacting to changes of the situation in combat.

188. Reconnaissance during combat of a large formation in nighttime and in fog should be

conducted and directed at the enemy.

In view of the difficulty of observation, an especially important role in nighttime and in fog

is exercised by various means of technical detection.

4. Guarding [security[

189. Combat guarding [security], which has as its primary mission to defeat enemy

surprise attack on the guarded forces in combat, is organized by the chief of staff on the basis of

the large formation commander’s instructions.

During the organization of combat guarding, the chief of staff is required to establish the

composition, missions of the guarding force, the time and sequence of their deployment, their

transition from one guard task to another, their means of communication with the guarded units

of the large formation, and the procedures of their informing in regard to the situation.

190. The guarding differs from their own designation depending on the danger which they

are assigned to mitigate.

The forces and means designated for guarding are determined by the available data

concerning the enemy, the nature of the upcoming actions, and the composition of the large

formation being guarded, and also the conditions of the region of actions and visibility.

Strictly necessary forces are designated for guarding in combat.

191. The vessels and aircraft of combat guarding are positioned relative to the guarded

vessels and guard screens.

The position of the screen should support the following:

the creation of depth of the defense of the large formation (in combination with

reconnaissance);

coverage on the threatening axes;

the most effective use of ordnance and safety of maneuver for both the guard force itself

as well as the object of guard.

192. Coordination of the combat guard with the guarded vessels, considering the surprise

nature of the attack, should be organized for precise and rapid actions of the guard force.

This organization of coordination should determine the following:


the distribution of observation of the air, of the water, and of the horizon, with the

assignment of sector responsibilities to each of the vessels of the guard force;

the organization for fending off enemy attacks with guard force weapons and maneuver;

the nature of the maneuvering of guard force vessels during their avoidance from attac,

torpedoes, bombs, mines, and also the nature of their own fires.

193. The commander of the vessels being guarded are obligated to support the guarding

forces with their own fire and maneuver, taking into consideration the overall situation in the

course of the battle.

5. Defense (PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, PKhO)

194. One of the most important measures for combat support of the large formation in battle

is the organization of all forms of defense, both of the entire formation as a whole, and of its

assigned vessels and units.

PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, and PKhO should be constructed in accordance with the following

measures:

the organization of observation for the enemy and his actions on vessels and in units of

the large formation;

the organization of avoidance from attacks, and also from torpedoes, bombs, mines, and

other means, used by the enemy for attack;

the organization of the liquidation of the consequences of enemy attack.

195. The chief of staff organizes all forms of defense of the large formation in combat in

accordance with the instructions of the large formation commander.

Declaring his decision to the commander of the large formation, he should consider the

following aspects:

the necessity for agreement of the actions of all forms of defense with combat guarding

and reconnaissance;

the possibility by means of combining all forms of defense and coordination of

supporting forces between each other to economize them for execution of the basic combat

mission.

196. As a rule, when organizing the defense of the large formation in combat, the chief of

staff uses for development of measures for PVO and PKO the flag-level naval gunfire officer of

the large formation, for development of measures for PLO and PMO the flag-level mine officer,

and for PKh the appropriate flag-level chemical officer of the large formation.

6. Maskirovaniye [camouflage and deception]

197. The employment of maskirovka by the large formation in combat has its own special

purpose – to conceal from enemy observation one’s own forces, actions, and intentions. It should

be conducted continuously, actively, in various forms, with the use of the natural environment.

198. The general planned maskirovka measures in combat, developed by the large formation

staff, in accordance with the large formation commander’s concept.

The plan should contain the following elements:

the tasks of maskirovka in individual periods and phases of the battle;


the nature of the maskirovka measures;

the place and time of their execution, and as well

the supervisory personnel who are responsible for execution of these measures.

199. All measures for maskirovka are executed by the vessels and units themselves,

which should mastery over how to accomplish them. The commanders of vessels and units of

the large formation, which are conducting the combat, are required, without special instructions,

to undertake all measures for partial or complete security of their own forces from visual or

technical observation by the enemy.

The use of smoke screens, demonstration actions, false information, and various methods of

imitation should be in strict alignment with the overall battle plan. Commanders of vessels and

units are required to report to the large formation chief of staff in regard to any deviations from

the plan of maskirovka measures prompted by the changing situation.

7. Navigational Support

200. Measures for navigational support of a large formation in combat are executed, as a rule,

by higher-level staffs (VMB, MOR, fleet) in accordance with the battle plan.

In individual cases, in the period of combat, special subunits of navigational support in the

region of actions are subordinated to the large formation commander. In special conditions of the

situation, the measures of navigational support are executed by the staff of the large formation in

accordance with instructions of its commander, with forces and means designated for this within

the component of the large formation itself.

8. Materiel–Technical Support

201. A modern naval battle, characterized by the rapid flow id ura conduct, by great intensity

of its forces, and rapid expenditure of materiel–technical means, requires timely replenishment of

large formation vessels and units with fuel and ordnance, sufficient to provide for uninterrupted

combat actions.

202. The chief of staff issues instructions for replenishment of ammunition, fuel, and also

other means in the period of preparation of the large formation in the form of preliminary

instructions. After the establishment of combat missions, they are [adjusted] to be in

conformance with the commander’s decision.

203. The expenditure in combat by vessels and units of on-hand ordnance, fuel, and other

means should occur in accordance with the subsequent execution of the combat missions, not

permitting in this the expenditure of ammunition and fuel not called for by the battle situation.

Each vessel and unit commander should be able to concentrate his forces and means at

decisive moments, comparing the expenditure of means with the tempo of combat.

Each commander of a vessels (unit) bears responsibility for the rational expenditure of

ammunition, fuel, and other means which support the resolution of the assigned combat mission.

During pauses in battle, the commanders of vessels and units which are executing the attack

are required to report to the chief of staff in regard to their quantity of ammunition and fuel

remaining.


Chapter 7

Political Work in Support of the Combat Actions of a Large Formation

204. The instilling of political consciousness, high moral spirit among the sailors, petty

officers, and officers is the main mission of political work.

Political work in large formations is conducted continuously and has the goal to rally the

enlisted component of the Military–Naval Fleet around the party of Lenin–Stalin and the Soviet

state; to inculcate the sailors, petty officers, and officers in the spirit of devotion to the

Motherland, faithfulness to their military oath, and undeviating observation of military

discipline; to strengthen the combat power and political–moral condition of the Military–Naval

Fleet; and to inculcate among the enlisted component the correct understanding of the purpose

and nature of war, the firm and undeviating will for victory over the enemy.

205. The political work of in the VMF is organized on the basis of the decisions of the TsK

VKP(b)4 and Soviet government, the orders and directives of the Supreme Commander in Chief,

of the People’s Commissar of the Military–Naval Fleet of the USSR, and the Main Political

Directorate of the VMF.

The concrete contents of the political work depend on the combat situation and are specified

in the orders of the command and by directives of higher-standing political organs.

All activity of the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol5 organizations

should be directed at the strengthening of the political–moral condition, the elevation of the

combat power of the large formation, and in the successful execution of the combat missions.

206. The commander of the large formation and commanders of vessels (units) bear

responsibility for the condition of political education in large formations. Political

education of the sailors, petty officers, and officers is the main task of the deputy

commanders for political affairs.

The large formation commander, his deputy commander for political affairs, and under that

person’s leadership the political department of the large formation, vessel and unit commanders,

their deputies for political affairs, and party and Komsomol organizations of vessels and units

directly organize and conduct political work.

Personal discussion of commanders and political workers with their subordinates is the

most important form of political work in the Military–Naval Fleet.

The large formation commander and the political department of that large formation executes

political leadership in large maneuver formations, the command of which is exercising

leadership of the combat (combat actions of the political formations included in the large

maneuver formation for the period of combat actions are subordinated to the political department

large maneuver formation.

4 Tsentralnyy Komitet Velikoy Kommunisticheskoy Partiy (Bolshevik) Central Committee of the Great

Communist Party (Bolshevik)] 5 Komsomol [expansion – Kommunistichiy soyuz molodezhi – Union of Young Communists, the “youth

branch” of the party, which recruited and groomed teenagers and young adults for membership in the

Communist Party. It was a “pass through” step for many young sailors to get to full party membership.]


207. In all forms of combat activity, political work should always be mission focused,

specific, and operational [active, effective].

Its forms and methods should respond to the tasks and conditions of combat. The more

complex and difficult the combat situation, the more active should be the conduct of the political

work.

The political effort should have the following content in support of the combat actions:

explanation to the enlisted component of the combat mission and the generation of trust

in their own forces;

in offensive combat – the creation among the sailors and commanders of the offensive

upsurge, bold striving to defeat the enemy, and complete dedication to execute the combat

mission;

in defensive combat – maintaining among the enlisted component a special

stubbornness, steadfastness, and preparedness to transition from the defense to the offense.

208. During the preparation of the large formation for combat, the commanders and

political are required to complete the following actions:

create a high political – moral condition of the enlisted component of the large formation,

strengthening in it military discipline, hatred toward the enemy, a striving to mercilessly

destroy him, unwavering preparedness to fight courageously, to stoically face death in the

name of victory;

to strengthen and develop among the enlisted component the political vigilance necessary

to preserve state and military secrets, to conduct a merciless struggle with traitors and panic

mongers;

to inspire the enlisted component to combat feats [acts of bravery], to glorify and

propagandize the heroism of Soviet fighting men, to strengthen faith in the indestructible

power of our weapons and in the victory of the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

to inculcate the sailors, petty officers, and officers with the strong desire to improve their

combat mastery and most complete use in battle of their weaponry and equipment.

209. The commander of a large formation, vessel (unit) should assign to his deputy

commander for political affairs specific tasks for political support of the combat actions.

The deputy commander for political affairs is required to organize measures which support

the unconditional execution of the commander’s decision (his combat order); he should

constantly be involved in the tasks and orders received from the senior leadership.

210. Personal checking by the large formation commander of the condition of units prior to

battle is an important obligation of the commander for raising the combat capability of the large

formation.

211. In battle, the deputy commanders for political affairs, political organs, and political

workers are obligated to take the following actions:

lift up the fighting spirit of the enlisted component, to show examples of bravery,

courage, endurance, and staying power;

to study the political–moral condition, the behavior of people in combat, to report the

results to the commander of the large formation, vessel (unit), to undertake the necessary

measures for correcting deficiencies;


to take decisive measures in the struggle with cowards and panic mongers;

to inform the fighting men and commanders concerning the course of the battle;

to mobilize the enlisted component for the most rapid repair of damage to weapons and

equipment damaged in combat

to display concern for supplying [also feeding] the fighting men and commanders;

to take measures for timely removal of the wounded from combat posts and command

posts and support their rapid return to duty and a caring attitude toward them.

212. Timely and accurate information regarding the condition of the large formation (unit)

and the combat situation has special significance in political work. All commanders and political

workers, from bottom to top and also from top down, should organize political information.

213. In a large formation, consisting of various branches of forces, support for total

agreement of actions and other efforts of all other forces participating in the battle is the principle

element of support of political work among the officer component.

214. In conditions of combat coordination with ground forces, political organs of the VMF

should establish close communication and mutual information with the political organs of the

Red Army.

The strengthening of the combat bond of the Military–Naval Fleet and the Red Army is one

of the most important tasks of political work.

215. Political organs and political workers are obligated daily to conduct political work in

logistical units and subunits, to expose deficiencies, and take measures such that during

preparation for combat and in combat, logistic units perform their work accurately and

uninterruptedly.


Chapter 8

Daily Combat Activity of Large Maneuver Formations

A. Reconnaissance

1. Fundamentals of the Conduct of Reconnaissance

216. Reconnaissance includes the aggregate of actions of a large formation in its separate

units directed at obtaining required information regarding the enemy and also the situation in the

region of its actions.

Reconnaissance should be focused in accordance with the mission in the interests of

which it is conducted. This obligates [those who conduct it] to organize observation on

specific targets, and not over the region as a whole.

217. By its duration, reconnaissance is divided into systematic and episodic.

Systematic reconnaissance is executed in the course of a prolonged time for the purpose of

establishing constant observation on the enemy’s actions for timely discovery of his intentions,

and for estimating the situation during the preparation of planned combat actions.

Episodic reconnaissance is conducted in the course of time required for acquiring the

information required for organizing and conducting specific combat actions.

218. Depending on the nature of the mission and on the situation in the area of observation,

reconnaissance undertakes various forms.

Reconnaissance by combat is conducted when, for the gathering of the required information

one has to engage the enemy in battle, in order to penetrate to the target of observation or in

order to force the enemy into a fight in order to observe his force.

Search is executed for the purpose of establishing the location of this or that enemy force.

A reconnaissance patrol is organized for the purpose of detecting and in a timely manner

alerting our own forces concerning the enemy’s departure from base or crossing a subsequent

line.

Observation for a moving enemy is conducted to vector our own striking forces toward the

enemy at sea for exposing the enemy’s intentions.

Landing reconnaissance groups is conducted from sea or air, when the situation on the

enemy’s coastline must be exposed.

219. The organization of reconnaissance should support the reliability, execution,

continuity, conduct, and necessary depth and breadth of reconnaissance.

The reliability of the execution of reconnaissance is achieved by correct selection of the

forces and means, supported by the appropriate persistence for overcoming the enemy’s counter-

actions, and by duplicating the means of reconnaissance and communications. Combat

persistence is supported by the covering of reconnaissance groups with special forces.

Continuity in the conduct of reconnaissance, supported by the timely exposure of the

enemy’s intentions, is achieved by the appropriate calculation of the use of force for observation,

by the organization of their replacement, by consideration for the meteorological situation and

the correct organization of communications.


The depth and breadth of reconnaissance should enable the exposure of the entire combat

formation of the enemy and be determined based on the reconnaissance mission.

2. Systematic Reconnaissance

220. For the conduct of systematic reconnaissance, various forces and means are selected

with the calculation that the insufficiency of one force as a reconnaissance asset can be made up

by the use of other types of forces. The supervision of reconnaissance is rested on the

commander of the large formation which is executing the basic observation of the enemy.

221. During the selection of the means for reconnaissance, in the first place, where possible,

various types of stationary means of technical observation should be employed.

222. No single means of reconnaissance should act in isolation. The success of

reconnaissance is conditioned by the coordination of all means, which are focused on the

execution of the data-gathering task. For achievement of this goal, the large commander

should take the following steps:

distribute the reconnaissance tasks between individual groups with the calculation of

mutual agreement as to time, place, and method of observation, also considering the enemy’s

counter-actions and maskirovka;

organize the information of the reconnaissance assets concerning the actions of adjacent

reconnaissance units;

organize the exchange of acquired data between reconnaissance assets operating on a

given axes, for preservation of succession and continuity of reconnaissance.

223. Organizing reconnaissance, the large formation commander should consider which

combined actions with his forces could be rendered by the forces of other large formations which

are operating in the same or adjacent regions, and by means of negotiating with the commanders

of these large formations organize the desired coordination in reconnaissance.

224. Reports acquired by reconnaissance should be fully confirmed. This is supported by the

following means:

distribution of tasks between individual reconnaissance groups, for the purpose of

focusing their attention on a narrower circle of observation targets;

establishment of parallel observation by various forces and means on the most important

targets;

organization of time frame of observation by the reconnaissance assets with a view

toward their replacement or reinforcement;

the use of photo-reconnaissance.

Timeliness of the receipt of information by the commander should be supported.

225. The large formation commander and his staff develop a reconnaissance plan and organize

its execution as the basis of reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance plan should contain instructions regarding the following issues:

the reconnaissance tasks (what and by what time is acquisition required);

composition of the reconnaissance groups and distribution between them of tasks (who,

what targets they are reconnoitering, over the course of what time period);

methods, time frame, and recipient of reports;


replacement of reconnaissance groups;

reserve forces and means.

Simultaneously with the establishment of the plan, the large formation staff, in accordance with

the reconnaissance decision that was made, should develop the TUS.

226. The large formation commander personally assigns reconnaissance missions to subunits.

The instructions that accompany this process follow:

on-hand information regarding the enemy

information concerning our own and adjacent reconnaissance subunits;

the mission of the given subunit: what, where, and time of completion; scale and form of

aerial photography;

with whom will the collection effort be coordinated and how will coordination be

effected;

when will departure occur (takeoff, route of march, when observation will be complete,

to where will asset return, and so on);

degree of secrecy of the reconnaissance.

227. The commanders of the reconnaissance groups should be confirmed in the knowledge of the

reconnaissance asset as to the region of their actions, the reconnaissance targets, tactical methods

of the enemy, methods of reconnaissance, the use of technical means, and on-hand data in regard

to the meteorological conditions in the area of reconnaissance.

228. In accordance with the mission, the location of the reconnaissance region, and the duration,

the reconnaissance should be organized at the base of the forces which are conducting the

reconnaissance. It should satisfy the following requirements:

as close as possible to the reconnaissance targets;

reliable and suitable communications with the large formation in the interests of which

the reconnaissance is being conducted, and between separate reconnaissance groups;

cover and maskirovaniye of the vessels and aircraft from enemy counter-actions and

observation from the sea and air;

the possibility of using force, depending on the weather and time of day.

229. For the execution of uninterrupted command and control of the large formation in the

reconnaissance process, the large formation commander should take the following steps:

establish reliable communications with the vessels and aircraft that are at sea and in the

air;

control the locations of the vessels and aircraft, using radio-reported data and radio-

locating equipment;

rapidly develop the reports of reconnaissance assets with the consideration of

repositioning them in the event of the suitable of new targets;

have in constant readiness a reserve of forces for replacement of disabled reconnaissance

assets or for support of reconnaissance assets in the event of strong enemy counter-actions;

pass along to reconnaissance assets in the air and at sea data that is obtained from other

reconnaissance assets that is useful to them;

for rapid communications use developed TUS and retransmission tables of aircraft.


230. The precise organization of all forms of special support – navigational (including aircraft

vectoring), communications, aerial photography, and materiel–technical support is an obligation

of the large formation chief of staff.

3. Episodic Reconnaissance

231. The missions of episodic reconnaissance are limited to a circle of issues associated with

given combat actions, for support which reconnaissance is organized. The forces dedicated for

episodic reconnaissance should be selected to that can most fully execute the reconnaissance

tasks (discovering the situation at a given time and region of the upcoming actions, uncovering

the enemy’s combat formation, weather reconnaissance, and so on).

232. The organization of forces for episodic reconnaissance depends on the complexity of the

task and the situation. The forces assigned for the conduct of reconnaissance on specific axes,

which are supported in the group under the command of the senior commander of those forces,

should resolve the basic mission for that given group.

233. For uncovering the enemy’s intentions, it is necessary to determine his combat

formation, to expose [reveal] his main forces, and determine their composition and purpose. This

requires combat persistence of reconnaissance groups, which is achieved by assigning to them

appropriate cover (air and vessel).

234. The starting [baseline] data for the organization of episodic reconnaissance should be

obtained by prior operational reconnaissance reports concerning the enemy in the reconnoitered

region, and also specific questioning of the large formation supporting the reconnaissance.

Command and control of reconnaissance in the process of its conduct is supported by reliable

two-way communication of the large formation staff with the reconnaissance groups and separate

reconnaissance assets, and also with the staff of the large formation that is supporting the given

reconnaissance.

235. The security [secrecy] of episodic reconnaissance should be achieved by

maskirovaniye of the direct actions of the reconnaissance groups, both in parallel execution of

reconnaissance to disorienting enemy axes and also by short-duration observation and

unacknowledged transmission of reports.

236. Interruptions in observation of the enemy should not exceed the time for which a change

in the compositions of forces and his actions can occur, which can strongly influence the

execution of the large formation’s mission, in the interests of which the reconnaissance is being

conducted. The staff of the large formation executing the reconnaissance draws up the

reconnaissance planning table. For support of continuity, the conduct of reconnaissance by

various forces and means should be envisaged, depending on weather conditions.

237. The reduction of time for transmission of reports is achieved by development, in

accordance with the goal of the reconnaissance and situation, a table of encoded signals

238. For the ensuring of the reliability of reconnaissance data, the preliminary preparation of

the enlisted component which is conducting the observation of the enemy (study of the region of

actions, silhouettes, types of formations, and enemy tactical methods) should be organized .

B. Patrol Service


1. Fundamentals of Patrol Service

239. Patrol service is organized with the purpose of detection of the enemy during his

approach through a specific zone and to warn our own forces of this fact.

In a number of cases, patrol forces are charged with the mission of preventing the penetration

of the enemy beyond the limits of this zone or to delay his movement.

For the execution of this mission, the patrol service should organize the following tasks:

observation, which will support the timely detection of the enemy;

support, imparting to the entire system of patrol service combat stability;

communications between the observing and supporting forces and the fleet command

(MOR, VMP), which is providing timely transmission of reports about the enemy and

receiving instructions of the command.

240. Depending on the mission of the patrol service, it can be differentiated by the following

varieties:

long-range patrol, which has the purpose of supporting the deployment of our own

forces for combat with an attacking enemy on the approaches to base;

close-in patrol, which supports the safety of the anchorage of vessels against enemy

attack from seaward;

reconnaissance patrol, which is organized along the route of the movement of enemy

vessels for the purpose of alerting our own forces about the passage of enemy vessels to an

agreed upon line, for the launching of attacks on him by our fleet forces.

241. The missions of patrol service are resolved in combat with the enemy, and not in

just passive observation. Vessels and aircraft what are conducting patrol service should be

prepared for fending off the enemy’s attempts to intercept a patrol and interfere with its

execution of its mission.

242. Depending on the situation, the patrol service can execute its mission in the following

forms:

permanent screens, when the vessels located at selected locations of the designated

zone, conduct continuous observation within its limits;

patrolling, when the vessels or aircraft periodically monitor a designated region by

moving through it;

observation by shore-based technical means, when the geographic conditions of the

region permit such observation to cover all the possible movement routes of the enemy;

creation of guarded obstacles on possible routes of movement of the enemy, which will

facilitate his detection and delay.

243. Patrol service is organized with consideration for the various conditions of

observation and weather (day, night, fog, snow), which should be envisaged by the patrol

service plan.

2. Long-Range Patrol

244. A long-range patrol has as its purpose the detection of attacking enemy forces, delaying

or weakening them, by this means supporting the deployment of our own guarding forces, and

more favorable conditions for their conduct of battle.


These tasks require a designation of forces capable of conducting observation over a broad

expanse of the ocean surface and in the air, both day and night. Rapid-moving, steadfast in battle

forces, the composition of which is gauged against the possible composition of the attacking

enemy force, should be assigned to this mission. The coordination of the forces of the patrol

should be envisaged with the forces that are conducting reconnaissance in the theater.

245. The positioning of the line of observation of the patrol forces should support detection

of the enemy that is attacking our base and expose his composition and intentions at that distance

from the intended battle site of the guard force, so that the latter can occupy the position pre-

supposed by the battle plan in a timely manner.

246. The supporting forces should be deployed to points of the coastline or at sea at a

distance from the observation line and a level of preparedness that upon detection of the enemy,

it has the possibility of rapidly joining together with the forces which detected him, and which

supports the timely exposure of the composition and intentions of the enemy.

247. Command and control of the overall system of long-range patrol should be exercised in

one person – the senior from among the commanders of the large formations which are executing

patrol service, or a specially designated commander.

248. The large-formation commander who is conducting patrol service should receive from

the large formation guard forces commander instructions in regard to the place selected by him

for the battle; concerning the necessity of providing him a reserve of time for deployment of his

forces for combat; concerning cooperation of the patrol forces upon which the guarding forces

are relying; concerning the actions of the patrol forces during the entry into battle of the large

formation guard forces.

He should also agree with the commanders of the adjacent large formations on the issue of

mutual assistance during the execution of this mission.

249. The preparation of a large formation for patrol service is conducted by the staff of the

VMB (MOR) on the basis of the decision and instructions of the base commander (region

commander-in-chief). It includes the following actions:

planning the patrol service;

preparation of units for execution of the patrol mission;

composition of the combat instruction for patrol service, which defines the methods of

actions of the force in a given concrete situation and including encoded signals;

the organization of basing for the patrol forces.

250. The staff of the VMB (MOR), during the planning of the patrol service, is obligated to

the following:

to calculate [estimate] the deployment of the observation forces and supporting forces

and determine the degree of reliability of detection of the attacking enemy forces;

to calculate [estimate] the necessary equipping of the region with observation and

obstacle means;

to calculate [estimate] the replacement of the patrol forces, considering their autonomy;

to provide for a reserve of forces for replacement of disabled platforms;

to develop a system of mutual recognition for our own vessels and aircraft.


251. The commander of the large formation, which is conducting patrol service, establishes

the missions of the patrol groups. In this process, he should be informed of the following

elements:

data concerning the enemy and his anticipated actions;

reports concerning adjacent patrol groups;

the procedures of executing the tasks with indication of the lines, time of observation,

maneuvering, route of march to the line of observation;

reporting procedures concerning the enemy;

mutual recognition system;

time and place of passage through the patrol line of our own forces;

procedure for summoning supporting force;

procedure for conduct of battle and withdrawal;

actions at night, in fog, and in stormy weather.

252. The commander of the patrol groups, in the procedures of preparation for patrol service,

should confirm the knowledge of the vessel commanders – region of actions, instructions for

patrol service, and also ability to employ technical means of observation.

253. The command and control of patrol service is accomplished in the following manner:

by reliable two-way communications of the commander of the patrol large formation

(using a non-acknowledgement method of transmitting reports) with vessels and aircraft,

which are located at sea, and also from shore-based posts;

by control for the positioning of vessels and aircraft, using, when possible, one’s own

technical means of observation;

by rapid processing of received reports; by re-designating, when the situation requires,

separate groups for observation in new sectors or for rendering support to groups which are

observing the enemy;

by maintaining in readiness for sortie (flight) to sea rapid-moving forces for reinforcing

support, when the situation requires it;

transmission to patrol forces and adjacent forces information necessary to them

concerning the actions of the enemy and our own forces.

254. The crossing of the line of observation of our own patrol forces by our own vessels, in

conditions of low visibility, should be forbidden, with the exception of limited sortie to sea (or

return0 of vessels after a timely alerting of our patrol forces.

255. The commander of the large formation which is conducting patrol service should

envisage all forms of special support: navigational, communications, and materiel–technical.

3. Close-in Patrol

256. Close-in patrols have as their basic purpose the prevention of surprise penetration into

the vessel anchorage region of enemy light forces and submarines, and also of his aircraft.

Guard vessels are used for the execution of these tasks, large and small subchasers and

aircraft, shore-based locating stations, and shore-based batteries.

The overall command of the forces patrolling on the approaches to the base is accomplished

by the commander of the offshore water region (OVR) VMB.


257. Stationary technical means of observation, positioned on the shore and in the water,

should be used first of all for the organization of observation. Mine obstacles, nets, and boom

obstacles are emplaced to reduce the area of possible penetration by the enemy.

In sectors where observation by stationary assets cannot be supported, it should be

accomplished by vectoring surface vessels and aircraft, taking measures for supporting them

against attacks by enemy aircraft and submarines.

258. Shore batteries, aircraft, large and small subchasers, and guard vessels are used for

pursuit of a detected enemy and the launching of strikes on him. These forces should be

maintained in readiness to sortie to sea for active measures after detection of the enemy.

4. Reconnaissance Patrol

259. The basic mission of the reconnaissance patrol is the detection of the enemy’s crossing

of a pre-determined line and the timely reporting of this to the command.

During the execution of this mission, the reconnaissance patrol uses submarines, deployed in

a screen on the patrol line, and aircraft which are conducting systematic searches for the enemy

in the designated zone. The forces conducting reconnaissance in theater cooperate in the

execution of this mission.

As a rule, command of the reconnaissance patrol is entrusted to the large formation

commander (unit) that is conducting the basic observation of the enemy.

260. Upon the presence of a powerful counter-acting enemy, cover is assigned to the patrol

forces (primarily aviation), which will accompany the patrol forces or can be summoned by

them.

The difficulty of supporting the patrol forces with cover requires observation of the

concealment of the line of deployment of the observation forces.

261. As a rule, the forces of the reconnaissance patrol are authorized to attack a detected

enemy only after reporting its movement to the commander; this should be discussed during the

assignment of the mission (with the exception that if necessary, [the attack] of specially agreed-

upon targets).

5. Blockade Patrol

262. Blockade patrol has as its purpose the detection of the enemy and with attacks his

destruction or his delay until the arrival of the main blockading forces.

Depending on the situation, the blockade patrol can be executed by various types of naval

forces.

263. Considering the proximity of the patrol to enemy bases, which facilitate the latter’s

combat with the patrol, and the remoteness of the main blocking forces, and also the strike

mission of the patrol, the blockade patrol should be comprised of adequately powerful forces.

264. As a rule, mine and net obstacles are established in the area of actions of the blockade

patrol for covering the forces of the blockade patrol and for constraining the sortie of enemy

vessels.


Air coverage of patrol forces is achieved by designation for this purpose of aviation groups,

located at forward airfields at a high level of readiness for takeoff.

C. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-air Defense of a Region

265. Anti-aircraft defense (PVO) of a region has as its purpose the prevention of the combat

activity of enemy aviation in the defended region. Its missions include the following:

timely detection of enemy aviation and provision of warning to forces and means of PVO

and possible targets of attack by the enemy in the defended region;

defeating enemy attacks from the air on targets located in the region;

prevention of other types of combat activity of enemy aviation in the defended region

(reconnaissance, emplacement of mines, adjustment of fires, and so on;

reducing the effectiveness of each raid and rapid liquidation of the consequences of air

attack (liquidation of mine obstacles executed by forces of OVR).

The primary mission of PVO of the region is to support from the air the combat

activity of the fleet and sea lines of communication in the defended region, and as well

to shield from the air the vessels and transports at their anchorages in base.

266. For successful execution of the mission, PVO in the supported region should be

organized in the following manner:

uninterrupted all-around observation for enemy aviation;

the use of all forces and means of PVO in their coordination, which will provide for

reliable defeat of air attack in any conditions of the air and sea situation;

the use of measures which reduce the effectiveness of raids (maskirovka, reducing the

signature of defended targets, their dispersion, creation of false targets, and so on).

267. The nature of PVO, which is executed in coastal regions and in distant regions of the

sea, varies in the following manner:

anti-air defense of the coastal region is characterized by participation in it of various

forces and means both of coastal as well as vessel anti-aircraft artillery, along with

interceptor [fighter] aviation;

anti-air defense of a region of the sea distant from the base is primarily accomplished

by the coverage of vessels from the air by aircraft carrier-based aviation or by aircraft of

long-range capability and firing assets of the vessels themselves.

268. Anti-air defense of a region, as a rule, is conducted in the form of close coordination of

interceptor [fighter] aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. The most powerful form of PVO is the

creation of air superiority over the given region; in separate cases, during the absence of

interceptor aviation, PVO takes the form of only anti-aircraft artillery defense.

2. Anti-air Defense of a Coastal Region (Base)

269. The basic system of PVO of a coastal region (base) is a large PVO formation, which

executes the mission of anti-air defense of a coastal region and consisting mainly of large

formation PVO forces, including attached interceptor aviation, attached in accordance with the

situation Red Army PVO and vessel anti-air artillery. It is coordinated with units of smoke

maskirovka and decontamination, as well as with local anti-air defenses.


Among all these forces and means of PVO, interceptor aviation is the most active and

primary force in combat.

270. All vessels of the fleet and shore-based units (aviation, shore-based artillery, naval

infantry), irrespective of the presence of special means of PVO, supporting them in base,

should contest enemy aviation with their own means. Uninterrupted observation of the air

space, constant readiness of firing means for defeat of enemy aircraft, timely measures for

defense (maskirovka, dispersion of possible targets of attack, construction of cover, organization

of fire prevention protection and medical assistance) are obligations for vessels and units of the

fleet in any situation.

271. The service for air observation, notification, and communications (VNOS) in the

PVO system has the following missions: timely detection and recognition of aircraft, recognition

concerning the air danger to PVO units of the region (base), to vessels, to defended targets, PVO

of the fleet and PVO units of the Red Army. In addition, the VNOS service conducts observation

of the terrain in a coastal region and reports the appearance of enemy naval and airborne assault

forces.

The service of air observation should be all-around and conduct uninterrupted observation

using special posts, both on shore (PVO forces) as well as on all fleet vessels.

272. Interceptor aviation covers vessels and transports during anchorage and supports the

combat action of naval forces in the defended region.

The selection of the means of action of interceptor aviation depends on its quantity, on the

assigned mission, and on the conditions of the naval and air situation.

273. The service for vectoring interceptor aviation has the mission to guide interceptors to

detected enemy aircraft for the purposes of their attack and destruction. It consists of vectoring

posts, organized on the territory of the region and on vessels (transports), which are being

covered by the interceptors in passage in the coastal region.

274. The fire of anti-air means has the purpose of destruction of enemy aircraft and air

[parachute]-landed assault forces upon their attack on defended targets. Anti-aircraft artillery

batteries of PVO of the region (base) in the first place should defend the vessels (transports) and

other more valuable targets. Anti-air artillery of vessels, while anchored in base, come into the

overall system of anti-air defense of the base.

275. The commander of large formation PVO bears full responsibility for anti-air defense of

the region (base) and commands and controls it from the PVO KP of the region (base).

Interceptors are commanded directly by the large formation commander (unit) of interceptor

aviation from his own KP, located, as a rule, jointly with the region (base) PVO KP.

During accompaniment by interceptors of vessels (transports) in their movement by sea in

the base region, command and control of the interceptors in combat is executed by the

commander of the vectoring post (a fighter pilot), located on one of the covered vessels.

276. The region (base) PVO plan is drawn up by the large PVO formation staff, based on

the missions assigned, by the air and sea situation, and the available forces and means of the

large formation.

The region (base) PVO plan establishes the following parameters:


what, when, where, and at what time is coverage by PVO forces required;

the system of air observation, recognition, and communications;

the system of air corridors and the organization of recognition for our own aircraft;

the system of vectoring interceptors;

the organization of coordination of PVO forces and means;

the variants of disposition of vessels (transports) in base and procedure of shifting PVO

means for each variant;

the measures for the defense of vessels and shore-based units, which are components of

the base, with their own means;

the organization of coordination with the PVO system of adjacent regions, fleet PVO, and

Red Army PVO;

measures which will reduce the effectiveness of air raids, including the procedures for

smoke-laying of targets and individual sectors of the region.

277. Coordination in combat of the units of a large PVO formation specifies the combat

instruction for PVO of the region (base), by the development by the staff on the basis of the

plan of anti-air defense of the region (base).

278. The signal of air warning is given upon detection of a group of enemy aircraft (not less

than three). An active net of wire communications and radio communications is used for issuing

this warning. The recognition signals concerning aviation danger should be broadcast outside of

any priority. Any type of conversation (exchange), irrespective of their sequence, is ceased upon

the password “Air” (by telephone) or “VZD” [vozdukh – air] by telegraphy.

The password “Air” for other purposes is categorically forbidden.

3. Anti-air Defense of a Sea Region Distant from the Base

279. Anti-air defense of a sea region distant from the base is organized in the course of

preparation and conduct of a separate operation by fleet large formations with the mission to

provide air cover of all forms of combat activity of vessels and units in that region.

280. For accomplishment of PVO in a distant region from base, a PVO group should be

created which is comprised of the following assets:

a PVO unit of the fleet (ZA batteries, ground and air radio-direction finding stations,

barrage balloon subunits);

large formation and unit interceptor aviation (shore- and carrier-based);

vessels designated for PVO;

aviation of the interceptor type, with powerful machine gun–cannon armaments, capable

of executing the PVO mission.

281. One of the commanders of the large formations (of a unit or of the aircraft carrier)

which is concluded in the PVO group is named the PVO group commander and executes the

mission in coordination with the PVO means of the fleet large formation being covered and with

PVO forces of the naval defensive region.

During the conduct of combat actions of a large scale, the command of the group PVO is

exercised by the PVO commander of the fleet.


282. In the sequence of preparation for execution of the mission and in the course of its

execution, the PVO group commander and his staff have the following obligations:

to carefully study the nature of enemy air actions and determine their focus in the given

region of the sea;

to establish precise organization of the air regime in the region (scheme of recognition

and notification), which excludes the possibility of the sudden appearance of hostile aircraft;

to develop the procedure for coordination of the PVO group with the PVO system of the

covered vessels and units;

to plan for the organization of communications, which will support combat command and

control of the group.

283. The typical organizational documentation for PVO of a sea region distant from a base is

developed by the staff of the PVO group [in the form of] combat instructions for PVO of a sea

region distant from the base.

This documentation should indicate the following:

the general mission of the PVO group;

the distribution of forces and means, their tasks, their command and control of the tasks

and the VNOS system, with consideration for possible variants of the situation;

the system of vectoring interceptor aviation;

the combat readiness of the forces and means belonging to the PVO group.

284. The measures organized by the large formations and vessels that are conducting the

combat actions in a sea region distant from the base for their direct PVO are specified in section

5 of Chapter 6 of this regulation.

D. Anti-submarine Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-submarine Defense of a Region

285. Anti-submarine defense (PLO) of a sea region pursues the goal of supporting the

anchorage and sailing in a region of combat vessels and transports against enemy submarines,

and also the prevention of actions the latter against shore-based targets, their conduct of

reconnaissance, and emplacement of mines in the region.

This requires the creation of barriers, which prevent the penetration of enemy submarines

into the most important sectors and presents a threat for their sailing in the region. It also requires

the organization of the daily struggle with hostile boats with the goal of their systematic

detection, identification regarding them, and destruction of boats which have penetrated into the

region. It involves the taking of measures to encumber the actions of submarines in the region.

286. Depending on the mission and the conditions of the situation in which anti-submarine

defense is being conducted, it can have three fundamental variants:

anti-submarine defense of a base region, organized for a prolonged period, with the

use, in addition to maneuver forces, of various positional obstacle assets and stationary

means of observation, under the cover of the shore-based batteries of the region;

anti-submarine defense of a region distant from base, created for the time of presence

in that region of our own vessels and transports and organized for the assistance of maneuver

forces and means with limited participation of positional and stationary means;


defense of an anti-submarine zone [line], which has been created in the sea on the

movement path of submarines in the form of a series of strong obstacles, which will not

permit penetration of enemy submarines into the regions of the sea where vessels and

transports, where there are channels for the passage of vessels and transports that are

defending the anti-submarine zone.

287. Anti-submarine defense of a region can be conducted in the form of direct defense

against submarines of valuable targets, as well as in the more active form of search for

submarines in the defended region, then attacking and destroying them.

288. The various elements of the PVO mission in a region require the designation of various

forces and means especially for this purpose: net and boom obstacles; vessels equipped with

hydro-acoustic and radar means of observation and detection; aircraft which have radar

capabilities; and shore-based hydro-acoustic stations.

The basic anti-submarine large formation in a theater is the brigade of guard vessels, which

consists primarily of large and small submarine hunters [subchasers].

Small vessels, aircraft, SNiS posts, radio-direction finding and various other locating stations

located in a region are also used for this purpose.

289. The less enemy submarines are subject to monitoring, the more boldly they

operate. Therefore, it is important that a detected submarine not remain un-attacked by

our anti-submarine forces.

2. Anti-submarine Defense of a Base Region

290. The mission of PLO of a base region is charged to the large formation of the guard

force of the VMB’s offshore region. For executing this mission, this formation is provided with

guard vessels, reconnaissance aircraft, communication and observation posts, and other means.

Shore-based defense batteries and base aviation support it , and long-range patrol vessels

coordinate with it.

291. The PLO OVR VMB is comprised of the following elements:

net and boom obstacles for equipping the region with anti-submarine barriers;

small subchasers for search and pursuit in the closest in sectors of the base region;

large subchasers for execution of the same mission in more distant sectors.

Vessels that are conducting patrol in the system of the OVP VMB are also used for PLO

purposes.

In accordance with the execution of their missions and the division of the region into sectors,

PLO forces are formed into groups, the commanders of which are named from among the senior

commanders of divisions or vessels.

292. The plan for equipping an offshore region of a base for anti-submarine defense

should be developed by the VMB staff in peacetime and approved by the command of the MOR

(of the fleet). It should provide for reliable defense against the penetration of submarines to the

anchorages of vessels and the locations of the most important port infrastructures (docks,

refueling stations, ammunition loading sites, and so on). It should envisage guarding of the

channels and the defense of individual vessels against torpedoes, complicating the penetration of


submarines into the maneuver area of the base, and detection of submarines which are attempting

to penetrate or have already penetrated into the region.

293. In accordance with the existing equipment and forces and means available at the base,

the staff of the OVR develops a PLO plan for the region, which is in compliance with the OVR

commander’s decision, and then approved by the VMB commander.

The PVO plan of the base region should encompass the following organization:

constant anti-submarine vessel patrolling;

systematic searches for submarines by subchasers and aircraft;

strike groups comprised of subchasers and aircraft for pursuing detected submarines in the region;

recognition forces located in the base region;

a reserve, in the event of the necessity for replacement of aircraft or vessels which have spent

their ordnance or have become disabled;

the establishment of booms, nets, and anti-submarine mine obstacles.

294. The organization of observation for submarines requires the mounting of shore-based hydro-

acoustic stations and other technical means. These stations should have direct communications with strike

groups of subchasers with whom they have designated coordination, as well as with the anchorages of the

latter in readiness at base, and also in the time of their pursuit of submarines in the working area of the

stations.

In a region of passage into the anti-submarine obstacles which does not provide hydro-acoustic

observation coverage, observation from vessels equipped with hydro-acoustic means of observation

should be organized.

Subchasers and aircraft should conduct systematic searches for submarines in the maneuver region of

the VMB and in approaches to the anti-submarine barriers. The searches for submarines should be

conducted not only during the day but also at night, especially in regions where submarines may be

recharging batteries.

295. The limited supply of depth charges requires that vessels present in base and aircraft be in

constant readiness for sortie out to sea, for replacement of vessels and aircraft that are pursuing

submarines which have expended their ordnance.

For support of vessels that are located at sea with the required combat stability, it should be planned

to cover them from the air and, when the situation requires, support in the event of an attack on them by

enemy surface vessels.

The component of the vessels at sea should support a successful encounter with a surfaced submarine.

296. The OVR staff should develop, adapted to the concrete situation, coordination of the vessels in

search and strike groups with aircraft in the PLO system (for day and night).

During the use of our own submarines in the PLO system, special measures should be taken which

will exclude the possibility of mistaken attack of these submarines by our own PLO forces and encounters

of the latter with our submarines.

Concerning the passage through the PLO region of our own submarines, vessels and aircraft that are

at sea, observation posts and various types of locating stations should be informed ahead of time with

instructions as to the time and route the boats will be following.

297. The OVR VMB staff should have concentrated and analyzed all reports regarding detection

of submarines in the base region. Using these data, the staff is required to regulate the movement of

vessels in the region.


The flag-level destroyer staff of the OVR is responsible for the training and preparation of the enlisted

component to execute attacks during the search for submarines and for timely supply to all PLO forces of

special anti-submarine means. The flag-level communications officer of the OVR is responsible for the

condition of the hydro-acoustic means on all OVR vessels and should be informed regarding the condition

of all posts and stations that are being used for the PLO mission of the base.

3. Anti-submarine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base

298. The anti-submarine defense of a region distant from the base of temporary anchorage of

vessels or their actions near the coastline is the responsibility of the commander of the MOR in

the large formation which has been designated, from the component of the brigade of outpost

vessels, with other vessels attached to it (including guard vessels from the large formation) and

reconnaissance aircraft.

299. In accordance with the mission of the guarded force and the decision of the large

formation commander, the PLO staff develops the PLO plan for the region.

In the first place should be the employment of obstacle means of PLO (if they are available),

for defense of a region where an anchorage is a possibility or low-speed vessels are

maneuvering.

In this same region should be envisaged as well more effective constant observation for

submarines, and searches for submarines should be organized with vessels and aircraft on the

approaches to it.

The monitoring of a region, emplacement of basic obstacles, and organization of observation

for submarines is done in advance, before the arrival of the guarded forces into the region.

Alternatively, the PLO forces which are executing this mission (monitoring the region) should be

included in the first echelon of the supporting large formation.

In distant regions which are closer to enemy airfields, give special attention to covering the

PLO forces from the air.

300. As a rule, rapidly emplaced obstacle and observation means, and also shallow-draught

vessels at anchor, equipped with hydro-acoustic and radar gear, can be used for equipping the

region for submarine detection. Searches for submarines are conducted by vessels (equipped

with hydro-acoustic and radar gear), which are reinforced by the use for the same purpose of

aircraft. A vessel strike group should be designated for pursuing submarines that are detected by

aircraft.

301. The chief of staff of the large formation PLO should be aware of the presence in his

formation of the necessary supply of anti-submarine means (on large vessels and transports).

The staff develops procedures for replenishing of PLO forces which have expended their depth

charges and other anti-submarine means.

4. Defense of the Anti-submarine Zone [line]

302. An anti-submarine zone [line] is created with the aid of a combined utilization of

various positional means, guarded by maneuver forces at a significant segment of the route of

enemy submarines, favorable by geographic conditions for the creation of an anti-submarine

position.


The command of the forces of the anti-submarine position is given special appointment by

the large formation commander.

303. The basic anti-submarine position has as its purpose to block the penetration of

submarines through it. It is an artificial line, created using anti-submarine nets and mine

obstacles, constantly guarded by vessels and air forces, by shore posts and shore batteries.

It has the purpose to force enemy submarines which are attempting to penetrate through the

zone [line] to expend their energy reserves. Observation and pursuit of these submarines should

be organized for a significant extent of the sea on both sides of the obstacle.

The anti-submarine zone on the enemy side should be covered by anti-surface vessel mine

obstacles which will prohibit raids on it by enemy surface forces.

For protection against enemy aviation, the anti-submarine line should be supported by

powerful anti-air defenses.

304. The basic large formation forces which are defending the anti-submarine position are

subchasers (large and small), and also units of reconnaissance and strike aviation. Strike aviation

groups and interceptor aviation are responsible for support of the designated light surface forces.

The mission of those defending the position is the detection and destruction of enemy

submarines which are attempting to penetrate beyond the anti-submarine line, and to defeat

attacks on the line of enemy surface and air forces.

305. The plan for equipping the anti-submarine position is developed on the basis of the

directive of the MOR (fleet) command and approved by the Fleet Commander-in-Chief. The staff

of the large formation which is defending the anti-submarine line develops the plan for its

defense.

Typical instructional documents include combat instruction for the defense of an anti-

submarine position.

306. The staff of the large formation should prepare a procedure for replenishing expended

anti-submarine means (booms, nets, mines, depth charges) and for re-establishment of emplaced

obstacles.

E. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-cutter and Anti-Minelayer Defense of a Sea Region

307. The mission of anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense (PKO) of a sea region is the

support of safety of vessels during their anchorage and sailing in the region, and also the

valuable floating and coastal targets (docks, cranes, and so on) against torpedo attacks of cutters

and minelayers, and also from guided torpedoes.

308. Torpedo attacks by cutters and minelayers have a surprise and rapid nature. This

requires that all PKO systems be in constant readiness for fending off surprise attacks, and the

actions of its individual sections be undertaken with precision and initiative.

309. PKO should be included in the overall system of region defense. Its organization

depends on the conditions of the disposition of the guarded region:


anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense of the base region is accomplished with the aid

of vessel and air forces of the base, of shore batteries, of locating stations and permanent

boom obstacles;

anti-cutter and anti-minelayer defense distant from a base region, in which

supporting vessels are located temporarily, is organized with the use only of vessels and

aviation.

310. The organization of observation over surface waters on approaches to the defensive

region and in the region itself, delay and destruction of attacking forces, defense of vessels from

torpedo attack, and liquidation of the consequences of an attack all are elements of the general

scheme of construction of PKO.

2. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Base Region

311. The PKO of a base region is one of the missions of the base OVR. The OVR commander

executes this mission using his forces: close-in patrol vessels, special anti-cutter batteries,

locating stations for the detection of vessels, SNiS posts, and aircraft attached for this purpose.

These forces are supported by specially designated coastal artillery batteries and antiaircraft

batteries positioned along the coast with searchlight posts and base aviation.

312. Observation for the purposes of PKO is organized, as a rule, with reconnaissance

aircraft, shore-based observation posts, and vessels of the close-in patrols and as well by locating

stations, which are coordinated at night with the searchlight posts.

The use of light screens comprised of searchlights (suspended, with sights and guides), and

also illumination rockets and aviation illumination bombs, should be organized for blinding

attackers and facilitating the firing at enemy vessels in the conditions of nighttime on approaches

to the booms.

313. The following firing lines [zones] should be created for the purpose of delaying and

destroying enemy cutters and minelayers:

the fire of close-in patrols;

the fire of shore-based batteries of medium caliber, which are supported at night by

guided searchlights and other means;

the fire of anti-cutter batteries and machine guns immediately in front of the booms, and

also supported at night by searchlights.

Passages to the channel should be defended by not less than two rows of anti-cutter booms

and anti-torpedo nets.

In addition, internal guard of the channels should be envisaged, along with individual

shielding of the vessels from torpedoes, which could be launched by torpedo cutters or

minelayers and torpedo-carrying aircraft (low-flying), which penetrate into the place of vessel

anchorages.

The coordination of all these forces and means of defense should be organized in order to

provide for the uninterrupted destruction of attacking cutters and minelayers and to guarantee no

passage beyond the boom line.


314. Cutters (primarily armored cutters) should be positioned in combat readiness outside the

booms for execution of the counterattack, and low-level attack aircraft, with pilots trained for

night actions, should be on airfields and used for pursuit of enemy cutters.

3. Anti-cutter and Anti-minelayer Defense of a Region Distant from the Base

315. PKO of a coastal sea region distant from the base, temporarily used for large formation

vessels, is the responsibility of the forces designated by instructions of the MOR commander

(guard vessels, armored cutters, low-flying attack aircraft, and others), in cooperation with the

forces of the patrol and PKO of the vessels themselves being guarded.

Command of the forces which have been assigned the PKO mission for the region is

designated to the senior among the commanders of these forces.

316. The region PKO plan is developed by the staff of the large PKO formation,

simultaneously within the overall complex of other forms of necessary for this defense, with

consideration of prolonged presence of vessels of the guard large formation in the region and the

possible tension [intensity] of the guard forces.

317. Observation across the surface of the sea in the coastal region should be organized

both on shore (observation and searchlight posts), as well as in the open sea (from vessels and

patrol aircraft), and also from the guard vessels themselves.

The staff of the large PKO formation should develop the organization of observation with the

aid of shipboard technical means at night and in fog, and also the organization of the use of

vessel-mounted illumination means.

318. Defeat of the attacks of cutters and minelayers requires the organization of firing lines:

the fire of patrol vessels;

the fire of shore-based batteries (if they are present);

the fire of guard vessels.

All vessels should be issued indicators, within the limits of which sectors they are permitted

to conduct fires.

Counterattacks and pursuit of the enemy should be organized.

319. The disposition of vessels located in the region and supporting the PKO of the region,

should be in agreement with the commander, large PKO formation of the region, in regard to the

greatest degree of safety possible of the anchorages and for the execution of the combat

missions.

F. Anti-mine Defense of a Sea Region

1. Fundamentals of Anti-mine Defense

320. Anti-mine defense (PMO) of the sea region has as its purpose the support of safety of

sailing against mines in the region by vessels and transports.

This mission includes the following elements:

systematic and controlled sweeping of the channels and maneuver regions;

escort of vessels through dangerous regions behind minesweepers;


observation for enemy vessels, cutters, and submarines, and for emplacement of mines by

hostile aircraft;

observation for floating mines and their destruction;

recognition [identification] of mines observed in the region;

support the safety of sailing against mines by navigational means;

monitoring of the magnetic condition of vessels which are going out to sea.

321. PMO, depending on the conditions of its execution, is divided into the following

varieties:

anti-mine defense of the base region, which is constant and uninterrupted mission of the

VMB and executed under the cover of base forces and means;

anti-mine defense of a region distant from base, organized both for support of the

safety of daily sailing of vessels and transports in the region, and also for support of passages

in the region of combat actions of vessels and large formations;

breach of mine obstacle, with the goal of supporting the possible passage of vessels and

transports through the mine obstacle, which has the nature of a positional obstacle.

322. The basic form of PMO in a region of the sea is systematic, daily sweeping for the

purpose of maintaining the safety of sailing against mines along a selected system of channels.

In individual cases, absent the time and means for preparing channels, PMO is accomplished

in the form of escorting vessels behind minesweepers.

322. The basic large formation that conducts the minesweeping effort in theater (within the

limits of the MOR), is the minesweeper brigade, consisting of minesweepers of various types,

equipped with trawls for sweeping all existing forms of mines.

2. Anti-mine Defense of a Base Region

324. The mission of anti-mine defense of a base region is entrusted to the OVR VMP. The

basic forces used for this mission are the minesweeper divisions. Aircraft, equipped with special

gear, are attached to the OVR large formation for the detection of mines. In addition, patrol

vessels, SNiS posts, and radar and hydro-acoustic stations are employed.

325. The PMO plan of a base region is developed by the OVR VMB staff and approved by

the base commander.

The PMO plan should envisage the following aspects:

a system for sweeping channels and maneuver regions;

procedures for conducting inspection of swept channels;

the organization of anti-mine observation in channel areas for enemy aircraft,

submarines, and cutters;

defense of minesweepers during their work against attacks by enemy aircraft,

submarines, and light forces;

a reserve of minesweepers for escorting with minesweepers vessels that are departing

from and returning to base and for clearing channels in which the enemy has placed

obstacles;

navigational support of sailing through channels and the production of suitable maps,

based on all data, of the mine situation of the region.


327. In the event of the emplacement of enemy mines in one or two channels, the system of

channels should support the capability for departure and return to base by other channels.

This system should also feed into the plan for clearing channels.

327. Systematic clearing should be accomplished daily in both daylight and darkness, and

prior to and after vessels have arrived or departed from base. Sweeping should be envisaged for

encountering all forms of mines that the enemy might be using in the conditions of the situation.

The system of sweeping and the measures of maskirovka that are implemented should

prevent the enemy’s identification of the location of channels by observation from aircraft and

submarines.

The sector of the sea in which mines are found is to be closed for sailing, and can be opened

only after complete clearing of it from mines and the conduct of controlled sweeping.

328. As a rule, in regions closer to base, irrespective of the conduct of systematic sweeping,

vessels should move after sweeping, even if the sweep was against the most dangerous type of

mine in the given case.

Observation for the emplacement of mines from aircraft is conducted in the following

manner:

establishment in the most critical portions of the region of special floating means for

observation and determining the location of mines delivered by aircraft;

illumination of aircraft from shore-based searchlights;

the use of radar for fixing the dropping of mines by aircraft.

The site of fall of mines dropped by aircraft should be monitored by controlled sweeping.

329. Observation for floating mines should be conducted by all vessels that are sailing in the

base region, and also by all shore posts. The detected floating mines should be destroyed by OVR

means in the shortest possible time.

330. Sailing in a region along swept channels should be supported by navigational means,

without violating the secrecy of the disposition of the channels.

331. Command and control of PMO of a base region is exercised by the OVR commander

through his staff. Leadership of anti-mine defense in separate sectors is delegated to the

commanders of the subunits designated for systematic sweeping in the sector. Fast-moving

minesweepers, which form special subunits, should be designated for escort of vessels behind

minesweepers.

332. The flag-level OVR VMB mine officer (minesweeper brigade), as a rule, is responsible

for the technical preparation, supply, and training of minesweepers and crews.

3. Anti-mine Defense of a Region Distant from the Base

333. PMO in a region distant from base is executed by forces of the minesweeper brigade

and attached guard vessels, and also by the forces of patrols and reconnaissance aviation that are

coordinating with them.


334. The PMO plan for a region distant from the base is drawn up by the staff of the large

minesweeper formation on the basis of a directive of the commander of the MOR (fleet).

Special attention should be given during the planning, to the provision of cover of the

minesweepers against attacks on them by enemy aviation and surface vessels, for maintenance of

the secrecy of sweeping, and also for navigational–hydrographic equipping of the region.

333. The commander of the large formation, with the goal of preventing surprise enemy

attack on the minesweeping vessels, is required to organize reconnaissance and patrol service on

the approaches to the region being swept.

Air cover should be envisaged for fending off attacks from the air on the sweeping vessels.

4. Penetration of a Mine Obstacle

336. The forcing of a mine obstacle is a mission that requires a great amount of time in its

preparation and execution, and also precision in the conduct of sweeping effort.

Upon the necessity for forcing a mine obstacle for departure of vessels to sea or their return,

in genuine cases [not false minefields], sweeping should be conducted decisively by all available

means.

337. An obstacle breaching detachment should be organized from the large maneuver

formation for the purpose of breaching a mine obstacle, which has in its component the

following basic forces: minesweepers of all categories, special mine breachers, escort cutters and

smoke-laying cutters. Aviation and cutters are attached for the conduct of mine reconnaissance.

The fight against enemy counter-actions is enabled by supporting vessels (cutters) and aviation.

As a rule, the commander of the large maneuver formation designates the minesweeper

brigade commander [to be in charge of this operation].

338. The breach of a mine obstacle in daylight or dark conditions can take the form of

forcing an enemy obstacle that was created and is being defended by them, or the forcing of

one’s own mine obstacle for the passage through it of one’s own vessels, if the situation requires

this.

339. The execution of a breach, depending on the nature of the tasks and local conditions, is

carried out, as a rule, in the form of sweeping and winnowing out a channel to its entire depth,

with subsequent escort of vessels through the channel behind minesweepers or in the form of

forcing the mine obstacle while simultaneously escorting vessels behind minesweepers.

340. The staff of the breaching detachment which is planning the breach of the mine obstacle

should develop a breaching plan, which envisages the following stages:

mine reconnaissance, which has as its purpose to determine the axis of the breach, for

which it is necessary to establish the depth of the obstacle, the density of the obstacle, the

type of mines, and determine the outer boundaries of the obstacle. Mine reconnaissance is

conducted with the aid of aerial photography and minesweepers (with shallow draught)

which are equipped with special hydro-acoustic devices;

sectioning the mine obstacle, producing a breach on the designated axis by means of

bombing the defined area of water from the air and with escort cutters, with required

directionally focused winnowing.


Forcing the mine obstacle, which is accomplished after sectioning the mine obstacle on

a chosen breach axis by an echeloned formation of special vessels – mine breachers – with

cover for them against shallow mines, and then by [regular] minesweepers.

341. In view of the complexity of coordination of the various groups which comprise the

breaching detachment, and of the maneuvering of a large number of vessels during the breach of

the mine obstacle, close agreement of the actions should be supported by the large formation

staff and the conduct of special table games and tactical training.

During these exercises, personal conversations between the group commanders have special

significance.

342. The actions of the breaching detachment and all the forces that are coordinated with it

during the forcing of the obstacle are specified by the combat instruction, developed by the

staff of the breaching detachment on the basis of its commander’s decision, in accordance with

the mine reconnaissance and the segmentation of the obstacle, and include the following

provisions:

selection of the means for breaching (sweeping, breaching and sweeping vessels for

forcing the obstacle, and escorting vessels behind the minesweepers);

constructing a combat formation for forcing the obstacle;

forming up and maneuver, which will be executed during the sweeping;

the actions taken upon completion of the sweeping effort;

combat support of sweeping;

cessation of sweeping effort.

343. During the period of forcing the obstacle, the commander of the large formation is

located within the combat formation of the large formation, as a rule, between the first and

second echelons of minesweepers. [From this position] he commands and controls the breaching

of the obstacle, directs the movement of the breachers, and of the following columns of

minesweepers depending on the results of the forcing actions.

344. In conditions which permit the possible counter-actions of the enemy from seaward, or

from the shore, the breach of a mine obstacle should be supported by appropriate cover, which is

executed, as a rule, by surface vessels, smoke-laying aircraft, and a strike aviation group.

345. After forcing the mine obstacle with direct escort of vessels (transport) behind the

minesweepers, the cleared channel is widened to an established norm for its systematic use.

G. Emplacement of an Obstacle at Sea

1. Fundamentals of Obstacle Emplacement

346. The emplacement of an obstacle at sea serves the purpose of creating conditions which

facilitate the actions of our naval forces and encumbers the actions of the enemy.

Mines, nets, and booms are used for obstacles. In isolated cases, sunken vessels are used in

narrows.

347. Depending on the purpose and conditions of the situation, the emplacement of obstacles

is divided into the following categories:


emplacement of positional obstacles, which is executed for the purpose of reinforcing

the stability of the defense of the region in its operational zone, in the system of obstacles in

a mine–artillery position;

emplacement of combined mine–net obstacles of an anti-submarine zone or boom

obstacle in narrows;

emplacement of an active obstacle, which has as its purpose to inflict losses on the

enemy by the sinking of his vessels and transports with temporary constraint of his actions in

the obstacle’s region. As a rule, the emplacement of this obstacle is accomplished within the

limits of the enemy’s operational zone and consists mainly of mines that are emplaced in

lines or banks; nets are not used for this purpose;

sunken vessels in channels and narrows.

348. The emplacement of obstacles by surface vessels and submarines is executed, as a rule,

in secrecy. The emplacement of mines by aircraft is sometimes carried out in the open – in a

demonstration, for limiting the enemy’s actions in the region they use and to distract his forces

from the minesweeping effort.

2. Emplacement of Positional Obstacles

349. As a rule, the commander of the large formation which is executing the mine obstacle

mission is designated as the commander of the vessels which are directly emplacing a positional

obstacle. The vessels and aircraft designated for cover and guarding of the basic forces are

subordinated to him, and depending on the situation in the region, base aviation and shore

batteries support his actions.

The commander of the large formation is obligated to provide communications with the

forces executing the reconnaissance in theater, and to organize with his own forces observation

in the region of emplacement for the purpose of timely receipt of reports concerning the enemy.

350. In accordance with the nature of the tasks, the length of time required for their

completion, and the anticipated enemy counter actions, separate groups of the combat formation

are created, the commanders of which are appointed as senior among the commanders of the

large formation or vessels which are participating in support of the emplacement of the obstacle.

351. On the basis of the large formation commander’s decision, the staff develops an

obstacle emplacement plan.

The plan should contain the following elements:

the conduct of control sweeping of the necessary channels and region of obstacle

emplacement;

the designation of the necessary forces and means directly required for emplacement of

the obstacle;

providing the time required for emplacement of the obstacle, and also for repetitive

delivery of ordnance, passage and return to base, during the emplacement of a positional

obstacle by segments;

measures of combat support of the obstacle emplacement (reconnaissance, patrol,

guarding, maskirovka);

organization of the destruction of floating [as in “un-tethered”] mines;

navigational support for achievement of precision of emplacement;

combat formation of the large formation during the execution of the emplacement;


organization of command and control of the large formation during the emplacement of

the obstacle;

actions in the event of fog and enemy interference.

352. The large formation commander establishes the tasks of the vessels and units in a

combat order for emplacement of an obstacle (on the basis of the directive of the Fleet

Commander-in-Chief).

The details of the emplacement are indicated in the instruction for emplacement. Tables of

encoded signals should envisage procedures for the actions of vessels participating in the

emplacement during encounters with the enemy at sea.

During the emplacement of a positional obstacle by individual groups of the large formation,

operating separately, the large formation staff, as a rule, draws up a planning table for obstacle

emplacement.

353. The chief of staff of the large formation is obligated to provide timely delivery to the

vessels of required obstacle means and to manage their reception. The flag-level mine officer of

the large formation is obligated to support the special preparation of the enlisted component for

use by the large formation in the emplacement of obstacle means.

3. Emplacement of an Active Obstacle

354. The commander of the large maneuver formation which is executing the emplacement

of an active obstacle is named, as a rule, as the commander of the large formation executing the

basic support of emplacement of the obstacle against enemy counter actions.

For reinforcement of the large formation and for cover from the air, the necessary vessels and

aircraft are attached to him.

355. The emplacement of an obstacle is executed depending on the concrete situation of

surface vessels, submarines and aircraft.

Surface vessels install the most powerful obstacles, and require support from fleet forces.

Submarines install mines covertly in the depth of the enemy’s defense and, as a rule, in

enemy channels which they have previously exposed.

Aircraft are used for emplacement of mines in the depth of the enemy’s defense, all the way

into his internal channels.

356. For inflicting on the enemy the maximum damage, active emplacement of obstacles, as

a rule, is conducted in secret.

Depending on the decision that has been made in regard to the large formation’s components,

the presence of a forward detachment should be considered, by its composition sufficient for

containing or distracting the enemy away from the region of emplacement.

357. On the basis of the large formation commander’s decision, the staff develops the

obstacle emplacement plan.

Special attention in this plan should be given to issues of support of the precision of

knowledge of the site of obstacle emplacement.

A typical instructive document is a combat instruction for emplacement of an obstacle.


358. In addition to the basic variant of the obstacle emplacement, reserve variants should be

developed in the case of the impossibility of executing the first variant.

H. Equipping a Region with Navigational and Hydrographic Means

1. Fundamentals of Equipping a Region

359. Navigational–hydrographic equipping of a region of actions has as its purpose the

support of the necessary accuracy of sailing of one’s vessels and flights of one’s aircraft during

their execution of combat missions. At the same time, it should be not accessible for use by the

enemy for these same purposes.

Navigational–hydrographic equipping is accomplished by the installation of special

equipment and means (range or alignment markers, radio beacons, searchlights) on shore or in

the water (landmark or survey markers, buoys, floating beacons).

Command and control of the overall system of navigational–hydrographic equipping is

exercised by manipulation detachments and posts.

360. The execution of this mission varies in nature:

the emplacement of navigational–hydrographic equipment in a coastal region,

carried out for the purpose of supporting the safety of sailing in the coastal area over the

course of a long period of time;

the emplacement of navigational–hydrographic equipment in a region of the sea

distant from the base, which is accomplished primarily for support of individual combat

actions of the fleet which is far away from its coastal region.

381. The emplacement of the equipment is accomplished by special hydrograhic vessels, as

well as combat vessels designated for this purpose.

362. As a rule, the emplacement of the equipment is carried out covertly.

Constant control, which ensures the locating of the navigational markers at the site, the

proper work of all means of protection, and conformity with changing conditions of the situation

should be organized during the installation of the equipment.

Provision should be made for removal of the emplaced equipment upon completion of the

combat actions that it is supporting.

2. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Coastal Region

363. As a rule, equipping in our own coastal region is executed by hydrographic vessels.

Combat support of hydrographic efforts is executed by forces designated by the MOR (VMB).

The command of the maneuver group being formed is given to a specially designated supervisor.

The safety of vessels during the time of installment of the equipment is supported by the

system of patrol service and batteries of shore-based artillery. The group commander is required

to receive instructions for combat support from the MOR (VMB) staff.

364. The group commander develops an emplacement plan on the basis of the directive of

the MOR (VMB) senior commander.


Special attention in the plan should be given to the secrecy of the emplacement, the

confusing of the enemy, and the provision of safety against enemy attack of slow-moving ships

during their effort in regions far from base.

365. The VMB staff supports the timely readiness and uploading on the ships of the

equipment means to be emplaced.

3. Navigational–Hydrographic Equipping in a Sea Region Distant from the Base

366. The installation of the equipment at a site on the sea distant from one’s own coastline is

accomplished, as a rule, by submarines or fast-moving surface vessels. In individual cases, the

vessels which are supporting the combat actions of fleet vessels and aviation can themselves

serve as beaconing platforms.

367. Leadership of the emplacement of the equipment rests on the commander on the group

of vessels which are executing the installation process.

368. In planning the installation of the equipment, the group commander should envisage

coverage of the equipment emplaced by the vessels in the event of their detection by the enemy

and the measures that will ensure the accuracy of the equipment’s installation.

369. The commander places in a combat instruction for the installation of the equipment

means the tasks for those vessels participating in the emplacement.

A planning table (planning schematic), which indicates the sequence of execution of the

various parts of the mission is provided as a supplement to the combat order.

Dispersal actions for the group during an encounter with the enemy during the execution of

the mission should be envisaged in the table of encoded signals.

I. Movement of a Large Formation at Sea

1. Fundamentals of Movement by Sea

370. The movement of a large maneuver formation is conducted for the execution of a

specified mission. Calculations for the organization of the movement are conducted with account

of the mission and the anticipated situation en route.

The movement should be organized so that the formation arrives at the designated

location by the designated time and in the highest level of readiness for execution of the

assigned mission.

371. In the movement, the large formation is expose to danger from attack by air forces,

submarines, and surface vessels, and as well the threat of ships being blown up on mines. This

calls for the requirement of organizing all forms of defense for the movement, observation of

secrecy in departure, and movement of the large formation in a state of readiness for a swiftly

conducted enemy strike during an encounter with him.

372. The nature of the movement can be varied depending on the composition of the forces

of the large formation executing it.

A movement of a large formation of surface combat vessels is characterized by rapid

movement and flexibility of command and control, thanks to the training and preparation of the


enlisted component of the vessels in combined sailing, and as well to the great independence of

the units of the large formation in relation to their defense while on the move.

Convoying transports is characterized by limited speed of their movement, the absence of

practice in combined sailing and reforming, and also in the employment of means of intra-

squadron communications. Along with this is the necessity to strengthen the guarding of the

transports.

Escorting submarines is executed by surface vessels and aviation which are supporting the

safety of the movement of a large formation (group) of submarines. Escorting submarines is

conducted only within the limits of regions especially dangerous to them. Submarines that are

under the threat of attacking aircraft or surface vessels have the possibility of submerging. This

creates peculiarities in the calculations and organization for the movement of such a large

formation.

373. The movement can be executed both by the entire large formation simultaneously, in a

common movement formation, as well as separately by following detachments in independent

movements of formations and single vessels.

Movement in a common movement formation is the most often utilized form of

movement. It permits the execution of more fully active defense against attack by all types of

enemy forces, supports greater combat stability for the large formation during an encounter with

the enemy, and simplifies communications with separate vessels (units) in the movement. But

during a common movement of all vessels of a large formation, it is difficult to preserve secrecy

of movement and our own intentions. At the same time, command and control of the large

formation movement becomes complicated.

The movement by several independent detachments permits better maskirovka of one’s

plan, supports great flexibility in command and control within each detachment, but complicates

command and control of the greater large formation. The capability for defense of each

detachment in such a movement is weakened, due to the consequences of lack of close support.

Movement of individual vessels, by various courses or following one after the other, to the

greatest degree masks the very fact itself of the movement of a large formation, and also the

intent of the large formation commander. In as much as the defense of individual vessels and

their combat stability are reduced in comparison to the first two forms of movement, the basis of

supporting such a movement of vessels is the secrecy of it. Command and control of the large

formation on the whole during such a movement is complicated by the dispersion of the vessels

over a significant expanse.

Movement with combat is planned and executed when the requirement exists to overcome

previously known, organized by the enemy, counter actions on the route which our vessels will

follow.

374. The conditions of visibility and weather may change during the movement. This

obligates, during planning of the movement, the consideration of the route segments and

their navigability both at day and night, the forms of the movement formation in fog and

stormy weather, and the maneuvering required for re-forming from one movement

formation to another.


375. Support of the movement is achieved by a number of measures which are undertaken by

both the large formation forces themselves, as well as by the instruction of the fleet (MOR, VMB)

staff.

The measures undertaken by the large formation itself consist in the conduct of

reconnaissance, in organization of guarding, and in self defense by units and vessels of the large

formation.

The fleet (MOR, VMB) staff for support of the movement should organize systematic

observation and combat with the enemy actions that threaten the safety of the large formation

movement being executed, and also informing it concerning these actions by the enemy.

The commander of the large formation should in a timely manner query the higher

commander of the MOR (VMB) concerning all special measures which he requires for support of

the movement.

376. The movement formation of a large formation (including also during movement of

single vessels) is determined by the order establishing the combat tasks of each group of

forces for the movement, in accordance with mutual disposition of the groups.

2. Movement of a Large Formation of Combat Surface Vessels

377. The movement of a large formation of surface vessels is supported by the forces of the

basic large formation and the forces attached to them for direct guarding, by vessels and units,

and also by coordinating forces.

378. The basic forces accompanying [escorting] at sea is the movement guard, the mission

of which is the reinforcement of all forms of defense of the basic forces. Cover from the air to

the basic forces ensures safety against air attack.

If an encounter with the enemy is more likely, as a rule forward detachments or patrols are

designated, with the mission to provide for the basic forces the possibility of reforming into a

battle formation or avoiding combat.

For the purpose of guarding itself against unanticipated enemy actions and to have the

possibility of reacting to his intent in a timely manner, the staff of the large formation organizes

reconnaissance with its own and coordinating forces.

The movement formation of the large formation should be constructed in such a manner

as to ensure rapid occupation of a starting position, the required plan for executing subsequent

tasks for which the movement is being conducted, and as well with consideration for the

necessity measures for the defense of the large formation against all possible forms of enemy

attack.

379. Anti-air defense is accomplished by means of organization of observation and

notification on all vessels of the large formation; by fending off air attacks with anti-aircraft fires

of the vessels and interceptor aviation of direct cover; by strikes of coordinating air assets against

enemy aviation on airfields closest to the movement area and by intercepting them in the air.

380. The movement sequence of each group should support all-around observation of the air

space by technical as well as visual means.


381. The positioning of vessels of long-range and close-in guard should correspond to

the required creation of the most effective fires of anti-air defense of the guarded vessels.

382. The large formation should be supported by interceptor aviation against strikes from the

air; close to our own shores – fighters from ground-based airfields; in distant regions – fighters

from aircraft carriers. In the absence of aircraft carriers, other forms of aviation which possess

sufficient firepower should be used. A reserve of fighter aviation should be maintained for the

strengthening of PVO upon the detection of a large-scale attacking enemy air force; this reserve

should be maintained in readiness for takeoff from an airfield or aircraft carrier.

The commander of the large formation should constantly know which forces he can rely

on for air cover, and considering this, make a decision upon the changing of the situation.

Separate vessels should be designated for the rescue of the crews of downed aircraft.

383. Anti-submarine defense of a large formation requires the organization of observation

for submarines in dangerous zones; the notification concerning detected submarines; pursuit of

the detected submarines; measures being taken to complicate the attacks of submarines

(increased movement speed, changes of course, movement into shallower depths, and so on).

384. Vessels that have hydro-acoustic and radar sets should be designated for guarding the

basic forces against submarine attacks. As a rule, two anti-submarine screens are formed with

these forces.

The distant guard performs continuous hydro-acoustic observation for submarines within the

limits of the danger sector for submarine attacks.

The vessels of close-in guard should be positioned with consideration for the detection and

attack of enemy submarines at the limit of their torpedo firing from the guard vessels. Their

positioning and maneuvering should not permit the breach of their line by enemy submarines.

385. The structuring of vessels in each group of a movement formation should ensure

freedom of maneuver for avoiding attacks by submarines, aircraft, and torpedoes.

386. The commander of the large formation should utilize reports from MOR (VMB)

concerning mines and the organization of observation for mines, and in especially dangerous

regions, control searches for mines by vessels and aircraft or the passage of basic forces behind

minesweeping.

387. The organization of fending off torpedo cutters and minelayers of the enemy

requires that sectors of observation and defeat of attacking torpedo cutters and minelayers have

been designated for each vessel of long-range and close-in guard, and also of basic forces.

388. During the dark period of the day, special attention of the large formation staff should

be given to the support of the safety against surprise enemy attack, which is achieved by

concealed movement, strict organization of the use of communications means, a well organized

system of observation,, appropriate construct of the movement formation, and the preparedness

of weapons for immediate action.

All-around observation should be organized on all vessels in the movement formation, using

visual and technical means, across the entire horizon, and with the assistance of hydro-acoustic

means in the depth of the water.


389. The large formation staff should take the following steps during the preparation of the

decision for the movement:

conduct an analysis of the large formation movement by movement stages;

envisage the required combat support and appropriate construct of the large formation’s

movement formation

develop a battle plan in the event of an encounter with the enemy;

determine the required materiel support of the movement and, when necessary, the

supplementary replenishment of fuel and ordnance at sea;

envisage the necessary supplementary instructions (in the event of fog, separation of

individual vessels, for reconnaissance, and so on).

390. The commander of the large formation issues the movement order. This document

indicates the following: the anticipated situation in the movement, the end purpose of the

movement, tasks of the vessels and units in the first phase of the movement.

The order is supplemented by instructions for movement, in which are indicated the sectors

of observation for air and the horizon in the [positional] order of the basic group of forces, the

sectors of firing by anti-cutter guns, and other details of the support of the movement.

391. The battle plan that has been developed by the staff and approved by the large formation

commander in the event of an encounter with the enemy is distributed to the commanders of

vessels and units orally or in the form of a separate combat instruction.

392. During the large formation’s movement by several separate following detachments, the

large formation staff should draw up a movement planning table. This document should

designate the route of march by phases of movement, control lines, rendezvous, and so on.

393. In designating a rendezvous [location], the staff should organize it to accommodate the

following instructions:

place of meeting;

time of meeting (in the period of from _____ to);

with whom to rendezvous;

compass bearing [heading or azimuth] of approach;

procedure for notification of approach of each joining group and exchange of recognition

signals;

course and speed after rendezvous.

394. The departure of the large formation from base should be supported by a number of

measures, which are executed by the VMB forces, with attached forces of the large guard

formation.

The large formation plan of departure from base is developed by the large formation

staff, in consonance with the large formation departure support plan for that has been

developed by the VMB staff. It should include the following elements:

the accomplishment of minesweeping;

the organization of observation of the channels after sweeping;

the conduct of searches for submarines;

reinforcement of the air guard in the region;


the conduct of reconnaissance at sea on the approaches to base and along the route being

followed by the large formation;

escorting the large formation with guard forces within the limits of the most dangerous

[area of the] region.

The organization of the reception by the base of the large formation should encompass

analogous measures and in supplement to them the organization of notification and meeting by

base forces of the large formation as it comes into the base.

3. Convoying of Transports

395. The mission of convoying transports is the support of their safety of movement against

enemy actions.

Convoys include in their composition both transports and the combat vessels that are

escorting them.

396. As a rule, the senior from among the large formation commanders or vessels that have

been designated for convoying the transports is appointed as the convoy commander. The

commander of the convoy detachment is subordinated to him, along with the vessels of

extended and close-in guard. Aircraft (PVO and PLO) assigned for support of the movement,

vessels that are executing reconnaissance in theater, and the posts which are conducting

observation also support him.

The vulnerability of a convoy requires a covering force – vessels and aviation – for

supporting it against enemy attack on the threatening axis.

397. Depending on the nature of the threat to the convoy, its movement route should be

divided into sectors and, in accordance with the type of danger in each of them, special attention

should be given to the movement order [sequence, formation].

398. For the execution of the anti-air defense, all around observation should be organized

with the assistance of radar, in order that the detection of enemy aircraft occurs at a sufficient

distance which will permit timely takeoff of interceptor aviation from aircraft carriers or shore-

based airfields.

The arrangement of the transports and guard vessels should support the most effective

antiaircraft defense of the transports.

399. The low speed of convoy movement requires organization of all around observation for

submerged submarines near the convoy, and for submarines maneuvering surfaced at greater

distances from its zones. This is accomplished by organizing, in addition to observation from the

guard vessels (both close-in and distant) systematic searches for submarines around the convoy

by aircraft, both at day and during the night.

400. The staff of the large formation should develop for the given period of movement

the process of coordination of PLO aviation with the guard vessels for the destruction of

detected boats.

401. Anti-submarine defense should not be weakened upon the onset of darkness. With the

aid of radar, vessels and aircraft should continue to conduct observation for submarines that are

maneuvering on the surface, and with the aid of hydro-acoustic gear – for submarines that are

maneuvering in a submerged condition. The convoy commander is required to give vessels and


aircraft instructions for illuminating the submarines, which have been detected in surface

condition, and in regard to the use of shipboard artillery against them, and also regarding pursuit

of submarines that are submerging.

402. The large formation staff should develop a procedure for replacement in the positions of

guard vessels which leave the convoy formation in order to pursue detected submarines, and the

organization of the guarding of the remaining transports.

403. The use by the convoy of warnings regarding underwater threats to it requires special

attention. These warnings come in the process of information flow to the fleet developed from

the data of operational reconnaissance.

404. The fending off of the attacks of light forces is executed by the forces of the convoy

itself directly.

The defeat of attacks on the convoy by large enemy vessels is accomplished with the aid of

the convoy covering forces.

405. Special measures should be undertaken for support of the secrecy of convoy movement.

Radio conversations of the transports and vessels should be forbidden, and measures take for

careful darkening, and in daytime, for smokeless movement of vessels and transports.

406. The staff of the large formation, during the preparation of the decision for convoying

transports, should envisage the actions of the transports under various options of the anticipated

enemy attacks (by aircraft, submarines during both daylight and nighttime, surface vessels).

Vessels should be designated for rescue [recovery, aid to] damaged transports.

407. In accordance with the decision made by the convoy commander, the staff develops a

combat instruction for convoying transports for the given situation of the movement and a

table of encoded signals, which contains instructions for actions of the vessels during various

options of engagement with the enemy.

408. The large formation staff should develop and coordinate with the VMB staff or with the

senior naval leader the plan for departure of the convoy from port, its forming up, with a

calculation of the measures of its support.

409. The convoy commander should select for his command post at the time of the

movement at a place where he can best command and control the large formation during its

support for the safety of the convoying of the transports.

4. Escorting of Submarines

410. In the escorting of submarines, the necessity arises when, for some reason or other

(shallow water, mine danger, limited time reserve), they are deprived of the possibility

independently to overcome the resistance in their movement created by the enemy.

The mission of escorting submarines supports the safety of their movement against enemy

actions and their timely arrival at their designated position.

411. Supervision of escorting submarines is assigned by a directive of the Fleet Commander

or of the MOR to the commander of the submarine large formation or the VMB commander.

The escort commander is the senior among the commanders of the large surface vessel

formation which comprises the escort force.


During the period of escort, the escort commander has in subordination to him the

submarines that are being escorted; he exercises command and control at a place of combat with

the submarine force being escorted, along with the supporting aviation groups. He has liaison

officers at his location from the submarine and aviation forces.

The commander of the large submarine formation, designated to supervise the submarines

being escorted, or the VMB commander, are required to prepare the boats for movement. Their

command post, as a rule, is on shore.

412. In individual cases, during the support of a mass departure or return of submarines, in

addition to direct escorting of submarines, special measures are undertaken to enforce the

passivity at this time of enemy aviation, of his submarines, and of his surface vessels or to

support the safety of sailing against mines (special minesweeping).

413. Using close-in guard, the escort should ensure for the submarines anti-submarine, anti-

cutter, and anti-air defense.

The use of more distant [extended outward] guard should supplement those same types of

defense and support the anti-mine defense of the submarine group and the close-in guard.

Air cover is achieved by the most effective PVO of the escort and the submarines during

movement.

Air patrol supports the warning of the large formation in regard to the approach of enemy

surface vessels.

Surface vessels and aviation strike groups are designated for support of the escort.

414. The staff of the large submarine formation, or the VMB staff, jointly with the escort

commander develops a plan, the combat instruction for escorting submarines, and the table of

encoded signals.

The instruction should contain the following elements:

the start and finish points of escorting;

the system of rendezvous of the submarines with the escorting forces;

the speed of movement in individual phases of the movement, taking into consideration

the possible submergence of the submarines;

the support measures for the movement (reconnaissance, mine sweeping, patrol, guard);

the march order of the large formation during the movement;

the procedures for command and control with surfaced and submerged submarines and

the use of communications means;

actions in the event of fog.

415. The vessel on which the escort commander is positioned should be provided with

reliable means of communication with submerged submarines, and also with aircraft.

416. Rendezvous of the submarines with the escort, as a rule, is designated for daylight

hours. The following measures should be considered:

measures which will exclude the danger of our own boats being attacked by enemy

submarines during prolonged waiting for the arrival of the escort vessels;

measures which reduce the possibility for our surface vessels to place themselves under

attack of hostile boats, which are located in the same region.


417. The procedures for departure and arrival of submarines at base should be coordinated

ahead of time with the VMB staff, for the conduct of the necessary measures for safety of sailing

of the submarines in the base region. These measures include the following: sweeping of

channels, conduct of a search for enemy submarines, reinforcement of air guard in the region at

the time of passage of the boats, and the conduct of reconnaissance in the base region.

J. Anchoring a Large Formation in a Roadstead

1. Fundamentals of the Organization of an Anchorage

418. While anchored in a roadstead, large formation vessels might be subjected to various

enemy actions. This obligates the commander of the large formation to undertake measures

which will ensure the safety of the vessels against enemy attack, preserving for them the

possibility of their execution of the anchoring task.

419. The conditions of anchoring a large formation can differ acutely between themselves

according to the degree of support from local forces and means.

Anchoring in a base permits the use of the on-hand in a given region organization of anti-

air, anti-submarine, anti-cutter, and anti-mine defense for defense of vessels against enemy

attacks, along with VMB ground defense and sentry units for guarding along the coast. The

reduced combat readiness of the large formation by [others’] performance of these tasks can be

used for the execution by vessels and units of the large formation for other tasks associated with

being anchored in base.

Anchoring in a roadstead outside of a base requires from the commander of the large

formation the organization of the defense using all of his own forces and means. As a

consequence of this, a unit of forces should be designated from the large formation for

organization of watch duty (close-in patrol) and reconnaissance, and the remaining vessels and

units should be at a heightened level of combat readiness.

420. Depending on the conditions of the situation, large formation vessels are either

positioned all together within the limits of an expanse where they can be supported by the most

active defense against enemy attack, or dispersed and camouflaged within the limits of a

significant sector of the coastline, using the outline of the coastal terrain features.

421. The system of defense of anchoring in a roadstead of a large formation should

encompass the following elements:

the organization of observation on the seaward sector for enemy air, surface, and

submarine [elements], and from shoreward – for the possibility of a ground-based enemy;

defeat of all possible, in a given situation, forms of enemy attack, under various

conditions of the situation;

pursuit of the enemy;

liquidation of the consequences of the attack.

2. Anchoring in Base

422. Anchoring a large formation in a base should provide for the best conditions for

execution of the anchoring mission and suitability of defense in the event of an enemy attack,

and also the possible of a rapid departure and assembly into a combat formation for the conduct

of battle when fending off an attack on the base by large enemy surface forces.


While anchored in a main or rear-area base, priority is given to the requirements of

distribution of vessels (units) for ease in executing the anchoring tasks. Anchoring at a forward

base requires the maintenance of combat readiness.

423. The positioning of the vessels is determined in accordance with the plan of their

execution of the anchoring tasks, approved by the base commander, and with account for

supporting them against unanticipated enemy attack, while at the same time including them in

the VMB defensive plan.

424. Upon approach to a base, the commander of a large formation should receive

instruction from the VMB commander regarding the participation of his formation’s ships

and units in the fending off of an enemy attack on the base and clarify the procedures for

guarding the large formation vessels and units from landward, as well as the presence and

readiness of emergency lifesaving means of the base.

425. The commander of the large formation, upon approach to the base, is required by

separate orders to carry out the following tasks:

inform the large formation vessels and units regarding the combat situation in the base

region;

state the mission of the large formation at anchor;

indicate the place of positioning of vessels and units on the base;

inform [his formation] regarding the base system of defense;

establish tasks for the vessels and units that are participating in base defense;

announce the procedures for actions in the event of a surprise enemy attack;

establish the [standards of] combat readiness, preparedness for sortie, and measures of

maskirovka.

3. Anchoring in a Roadstead Not in the Base

426. The anchorage of a large formation not at a base presents great danger for the vessels of

attack from enemy air forces, submarines, torpedo cutters, and surface vessels, and in isolated

cases also by enemy ground units.

Such an anchorage is permitted only for a short time period and only when the combat

mission requires it, or the situation has forced it (damage to vessels, storms, and so on). In this

case, special attention must be given to the organization of the defense of the large formation and

the maskirovka of the vessels and units.

427. The large formation commander is obligated to request in a timely manner from the fleet

(MOR) staff the necessary assistance for organizing the defense of the large formation during the

time of anchorage.

He should also establish coordination with the local senior naval officer for use of on-hand

and available forces and means for the purpose of reinforcing his own defenses.

428. When in an anchorage not at a base, the large formation commander is required to take

the following measures:

organize the receipt from reconnaissance that is being conducted in theater reports

regarding enemy actions which may threaten his large formation, and to be included in the

system of information flow of the VNOS service;


organize his own reconnaissance, patrol service on the approaches to the anchorage, and

direct guarding of the basic forces of his large formation, both on the sea axis and from the

air, as well on the landward axis, and also the use of all forms of defense of the large

formation;

organize measures of maskirovka of his vessels and units.

428. While anchored in a roadstead which is not guarded by ground forces, as a rule, naval

infantry units are brought in for ground defense of the anchorage. If ground units of the Red

Army are available, the large formation staff should organize contact with them and facilitate a

mutual exchange of information regarding enemy actions.

430. The large formation commander issues an order for the anchorage of his large formation

not at a base. The anchorage order contains the following elements:

data concerning the enemy that is threatening the large formation anchorage;

the disposition of vessels and units of the large formation in the anchorage;

the composition and tasks of sentry guards (close-in patrol);

reconnaissance tasks;

measures of PVO, PLO, PKO, PMO, and PKhO, and also against shelling from the sea

and shore;

special instructions for ensuring combat readiness and preparedness of the large

formation to sortie to sea;

instructions in the event of a weather change.

431. The staff of the large formation develops the following procedures for support of the

safety of its approach to and departure from the anchorage:

procedures for inspection of the anchorage region during the approach to the roadstead

(controlled sweeping and search for submarines), the deployment of patrol and direct guard

forces;

procedures for departure from the roadstead and forming into a movement formatoion;

the system for recognition of vessels and aircraft by day and by night.

In addition to those indicated, the procedures for movement within the roadstead are

established.

432. The large formation staff should in a timely manner confirm the presence at the

anchorage site of the necessary reserves of fuel and other forms of materiel–technical and

combat supplies, which the large formation might require. In the event of their absence or

insufficiency, the staff is responsible for their acquisition [delivery].


Chapter 9

Combat of a Large Formation in the Open Sea

A. Offensive Combat at Sea

1. Fundamentals of Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea

433. The primary goal of offensive combat at sea is the complete defeat of the enemy.

This is achieved by decisive maneuver of a large formation, directed at the deploying enemy

forces, by smashing or paralyzing his combat formation with powerful strikes of our weapons

against selected targets and the development of success for the achievement of the established

goal.

Offensive combat is distinguished by decisive and persistent, planned, and prepared actions

of the attacking force.

Those who act with skill and daring are victorious in combat.

434. The nature of offensive combat at sea depends on the execution of tasks, the

composition of forces and means of the attacking force, on the composition of forces and form of

actions of the defending enemy, the visibility conditions, and the remoteness of the combat area

from forward bases and airfields.

Offensive combat at sea is distinguished by an intense battle with a mobile enemy, which in

itself represents the most important element of his maneuver defense.

The offensive requires concentration in battle of superior forces and means on the axis of the

main attack.

435. Offensive combat at sea can be different in various situations.

Offensive against a freely maneuvering enemy, who is defending as a consequence of

seeking to avoid a meeting engagement or as a result of an unfortunate for him outcome of

such an engagement. This form of offensive combat requires decisive paralysis of the

defender’s methods by breaking up his combat formation, enveloping or encircling him, for

the execution of a strike on the enemy’s main forces with the goal of destroying them.

Offensive against an enemy who is defending a moving target (amphibious landing

force, convoy, damaged vessel, and so on).

This variety of offensive combat requires a direct breakthrough by the principal attacking

force to the defending hostile target for its destruction, with simultaneous distraction of the

forces of the defense by means of launching secondary strikes, or preliminary suppression of the

enemy defense, and by that means developing success on the axis of the defended target, for its

destruction of capture.

Offensive against an enemy defending at sea in poor visibility conditions, which is

executed, as a rule, by searching for the enemy in order to inflict on him a powerful torpedo

and naval gunfire strike.

Offensive against an enemy in a distant region of the sea with a large formation,

consisting primarily of submarines, which requires their sailing toward the enemy in order

to break into the depth of the hostile combat formation and inflict on the main enemy target a

series of successive strikes.


Offensive against a defending enemy at sea executed by a large formation, consisting

primarily of aviation, which requires direct breach of the hostile combat formation by the

main forces of the attackers and the launching of strikes on the enemy’s main target for the

purpose of its destruction, with simultaneous preliminary suppression of the hostile defense.

436. Depending on the level of preparedness, the offensive combat at sea can be:

An offensive prepared in a timely manner against a reconnoitered enemy at sea,

characterized by detailed organization of synchronization and the execution of measures for

the creation of a favorable launching position for the battle;

An organized directly at sea offensive against an enemy, characterized by hasty

preparation and organization of coordination by means of brief combat instructions and

signals.

437. The offensive against an enemy defending at sea, depending on the executed maneuver

of the large formation, can take the form of a breach of the enemy’s combat formation, his

envelopment, the wide encirclement of countervailing forces, and pursuit of the retreating

enemy.

438. A breach provides the possibility of launching decisive actions in the depth of the

enemy’s formation, facilitates the rapid disorganization of the defenders, and destroys the unity

of his actions.

A breach is achieved by means of using offensive methods built on the principle of force,

secrecy, and rapidity of actions of the attacking force.

439. Envelopment of the hostile forces, executed from two axes, complicates the enemy’s

ability to avoid strikes, disrupts his execution of maneuver, and forces him to disperse his

defensive efforts, which in turn facilitates the launching of the main strike at the enemy’s

principal target.

The most complete form of envelopment is encirclement. The execution of encirclement

requires superiority of the attackers in forces and the presence in the construct of his combat

formation of a fast-moving group (light forces, aviation), and as well can be achieved by the

maneuvering of a submarine screen.

440. The wide encirclement of a hostile group of the enemy formation (of a forward

detachment, a flank covering force) that is capable of countering the offensive large formation is

supported by the launching of a strike on the enemy from his most vulnerable axis. The wide

encirclement can be executed with the presence in the large formation of superiority in speed

over the enemy.

441. Pursuit of a retreating enemy, if conducted energetically, gives the possibility of total

destruction of the enemy force damaged in combat or refusing to engage in battle by the actions

of the superior attacking force. It is executed by means of delaying the retreating force or by

parallel pursuit.

442. Preliminary strike is a powerful means by which are achieved the weakening and

disorganization of the enemy’s combat formation, with the goal of ensuring success of the main

strike in combat.


Preliminary strikes can be executed during the period of approach of the attacking force upon

discovery through reconnaissance of the enemy, and as well at the initial period of the battle,

during the tactical deployment of the large formation.

Preliminary strikes upon closing with the reconnoitered enemy, as a rule, are conducted by

aviation and submarines, and also by surface vessels which are elements of the forward

detachment.

443. The main strike in offensive combat at sea is conducted by decisive means for

paralyzing the hostile counter actions – thus achieving the purpose of the combat. It is executed

simultaneously between our own strike groups, which are conducting their required actions

against the enemy by means of a series of attacks.

444. The basis of the large formation commander’s decision in offensive combat at sea

should be the posture of the actions of the forward detachments, which force the enemy in

place of deploying to reveal the defensive system of his combat formation, and thus expose

his weaker places, which then permits the axis of the main attack to be determined.

An offensive against an enemy defending at sea requires the constructing of a broad front of

forward detachments, which will make possible immediate contact with the enemy and rapid

discernment of the weak spots in his defense for launching of the main attack. This also

facilitates the execution of the envelopment of his combat formation.

Simultaneously with this, the combat formation of the attacking large formation should

be sufficiently deep and echeloned, possess combat stability, and permit the accumulation from

the depth of strikes against the enemy. As a rule, the combat formation for an offensive against

an enemy defending at sea should consist of not less than two echelons.

445. The most important elements for the success of an offensive battle at sea are the

following:

knowledge of the enemy against which the offensive is being organized;

correct selection of the start time for the offensive, with consideration of the duration of

daylight and the weather conditions;

observation of secrecy of preparation of the offensive and approach to the enemy, which

will support the surprise of the strikes that are launched;

careful organization of coordination of the forces participating in the combat in

accordance with the decision undertaken on the basis of the date of pre-reconnaissance of the

enemy;

high level of combat and political preparation of the large maneuver formation;

organization of uninterrupted communications.

The commander of the large formation, upon receipt of the offensive mission, before

departure to sea is required to organize the preparation of his large formation for combat.

446. Preliminary reconnaissance is a necessary element of the preparation for an offensive.

It permits the attacking force to establish the composition of forces and combat (movement)

formation of the enemy, his course, speed, and other data that is necessary for exposing the

strengths and weaknesses of the hostile defense, and the correct construct of the commander’s

intent.


In deciding the question concerning the organization of pre-reconnaissance, the large

formation commander should consider the possibility of the disruption of surprise of the

offensive, upon detection of this reconnaissance by the enemy.

Tactical reconnaissance in combat, focused on the interests of the identified mission, is a

necessary support of success during the conduct of offensive combat at sea.

2. Offensive against a Defending Enemy at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions

447. An offensive against a defending enemy at sea, executed by a maneuver formation

consisting of surface vessels, submarines, and aviation, is distinguished by the greatest extent of

actions against the enemy.

The complete defeat of the enemy is achieved by a decisive offensive in combat on the main

axis, supported by bold actions on secondary axes.

448. The large formation commander in an offensive action is obligated to use the most

effective of his forces for disrupting the enemy combat formation and the destruction of his

forces piecemeal, in this manner ensuring the destruction of the enemy’s main force.

The coordination of the large forces necessary for this [outcome] demand coordination of the

various attacking groups between each other and the forces held in reserve for the infliction of

repeated strikes in battle, the development of success, and pursuit of the remaining enemy forces.

The large formation commander should support [ensure] the conduct of the battle in

accordance with the decision that he has made by the construct of the echeloned combat

formation, their distribution along axes in accordance with the chosen form of offensive,

with calculation of the peculiarities of the use in battle of various types of naval forces in

the concrete situation.

449. Offensive combat at sea should be supported by organized tactical reconnaissance,

executed by aviation, submarines, and surface vessels, which duplicate each other, for refining

the data in regard to the enemy (pre-reconnaissance), by continuous observation of the enemy in

battle, and by guiding our own attacking groups to him. The large formation commander is

obligated to dedicate not only reconnaissance in the direction of the detected enemy but also on

adjacent axes for the purpose of detecting in a timely manner the possible appearance there of

hostile groups.

450. Forward detachments of the large formation offensive force, consisting of aviation,

light forces, and submarines, have the following tasks:

launching of preliminary strikes against the enemy for the purpose of weakening him;

forcing the enemy to deploy for a defense, and;

probing for weak spots in his combat formation.

During an offensive against a freely maneuvering enemy, the large formation commander,

when necessary, should envisage reinforcing the forward detachments with heavy cruisers.

The independent role of forward detachments and their critical tasks in the opening period of

the battle require appointment of the most experienced and energetic officers for their leadership

in combat.


451. Strike groups of the large formation, consisting, as a rule, of surface vessels and strike

aviation, execute the main attack.

The echeloning of forces within each strike group should support coordination between the

tactical groups which comprise the strike groups, permitting each of them to use the attack of

their predecessor or their adjacent group for suppression of enemy resistance and facilitation of

their own penetration into the depth of the enemy combat formation.

452. The reserve during an offensive at sea consists of units used for reinforcing the strike

groups and for development of success. As a rule, the reserve is comprised of strike aviation,

positioned on airfields in readiness for takeoff.

453. Organizing the preparation of offensive combat, the large formation commander should

ensure preliminary development of the coordination of the various forces, for their launching of

strikes in the battle.

Organizing tactical reconnaissance, the large formation commander, having insufficient data

from operational reconnaissance, should envisage a search for the enemy at sea, with the purpose

of refining the enemy’s location and elements of his movement, and also the exposure by

reconnaissance of other enemy groups at sea, which are capable of synchronizing with the enemy

which is the target of the offensive.

During an offensive against an enemy which is defending a mobile target, special

significance should be given to the timely exposure of the location and composition of the hostile

covering force.

Creating a starting position for the initiation of combat which corresponds to his intent, the

commander should designate a time of concentration at the site of combat for surface vessels,

submarines, and aviation; the regions (points) of concentration, the sequence of its execution,

combat tasks, and as well the axes of approach of the individual groups, considering in all of this

the limits of possible changes in the axis of the enemy’s movement and combat stability of the

earlier deployed groups of the combat formation.

Instructions for coordination in offensive combat at sea are issued by the large formation

commander in a combat instruction.

454. Surprise and speed of an offensive stun the defender and complicate his organization

and the execution of counteractions. The rapidity and secrecy of closing with the enemy and

speed of tactical deployment support forewarning to the large formation of the hostile forces’

battle formation, which should facilitate the energetic actions of the forward detachments and on

the whole the conduct of offensive combat.

455. Tactical deployment of the large formation includes pre-reconnaissance of the enemy,

the necessary refinement of the axis and moment of the main strike, the construct of the large

formation’s combat formation, the launching of preliminary strikes, and creation of favorable

conditions for execution of the main strike.

Commanding and controlling a tactical deployment, the commander of the attacking large

formation should envisage timely positioning on the enemy’s course of movement of a

submarine screen, deployed early for participation in the combat. He should summon to the

combat region his strike aviation and torpedo cutters, and also interceptor aviation for gaining air

superiority in the combat region. The large formation commander should direct the maneuver of


his surface vessels in accordance with the chosen form of offensive (breakthrough, envelopment,

encirclement).

When positioning the submarine screen, the large formation commander should ensure the

subsequent command and control of them in combat, and exclude their mutual interference with

surface forces during the execution of the main strike and the development of success.

456. The ensuring of secrecy of the tactical deployment of a large formation during an

offensive is achieved by suppressing enemy reconnaissance, demonstration actions which create

a false impression of the concept of the offensive, blinding the defender with smoke screens, and

deployment of forces, when necessary, out of view of the enemy.

The forward detachment commanders should support the deployment of the large formation

main forces by their energetic actions, with the goal of eliminating interference with their

deployment and constraining the mobility of the primary hostile target or his main forces. They

provide to the large formation commander reports regarding the course of the combat, changes in

the situation, and the actions and intentions of the enemy.

If submarines are present in the composition of the forward detachments, the commanders of

the latter should facilitate their breakthrough into the combat formation of the enemy or their

occupation of positions on the enemy’s movement course.

457. During the period of the main strike, the large offensive formation executes a series

of parallel and successive attacks, conducted by a variety of tactical groups, echeloned in depth

for overcoming anticipated enemy counteractions. The number of echelons, as a rule,

corresponds to the number of firing lines in the enemy’s defensive system and should ensure the

overcoming of the entire depth of his combat formation.

The target for the main strike during an offensive at sea against an earlier reconnoitered

enemy begins at a favorable time, based on the decision made during the preparation for the

battle, and refined as a result of the pre-reconnaissance of the enemy.

The moment of the launching of the main strike should be determined in combat by an

encoded signal of the large formation commander.

458. During an offensive against an enemy defending a moving target at sea, the main strike

can be directed at a hostile group (escort of covering) which is defending the target, or the

directly on the target itself.

Deciding to launch the main strike on the hostile covering (or escort) group, the commander

should direct strike groups to maneuver decisively and boldly, in consonance with the effects of

their ordnance, to the destruction of the enemy, in this process suppressing every attempt by the

enemy to transition to a counterattack and to contain the mobility of his attacking forces.

For launching the main strike directly against the defending enemy target, the large formation

commander directs strike groups into the breach of the combat formation on the axis of the main

attack, simultaneously supporting them with distracting attacks by supporting groups for the

purpose of facilitating the breach past the cover and through the enemy guard force.

459. When attacking a freely maneuvering enemy, as a rule the target of the main strike is the

hostile main force.


Using attacks synchronized between his own tactical groups achieves the purpose of limiting

the mobility of the target, supports the success of the inflicted strikes on the whole, and as well

the execution of the required effects – the destruction of the enemy.

460. The attacks which constitute the main strike should be executed decisively and boldly,

with the greatest pressure of the forces and means being used, in this way ensuring the required

results of the effects on the selected target in the enemy’s combat formation.

Organizing the attack, the group commander should undertake the possible measures of its

support for reducing losses among the attackers. However, he should understand that this support

is only a means for facilitating the achievement of the goal of the attack. The attack itself can be

considered successful only when by its result it coincides with the achievement of the required

effects on the enemy during the infliction of the main strike.

The calculation of the combat power of the attacking tactical group, combined with its depth

and axes, and the mutual support of the attackers for suppression of enemy counteractions,

together enable the irresistibility of each of the attacks which constitute a portion of the main

attack.

Precise organization of coordination of the attacking groups with each other should create the

conditions which will deny the enemy the ability to avoid the strike as a whole.

461. The bearing (axis) of the attack is indicated by the strike group commander who is

organizing the coordination. He should accordingly conform the purpose of each attack, in the

process using his ordnance, the nature of the target being attacked, its armaments, and the

enemy’s direction of movement.

462. The commanders of the attacking groups should select positions for naval gunfire

attacks at the most effective ranges of fire and course angles which will permit the full use of

their guns on the axis indicated for the strike group by the commander.

Selecting the position for the attack, it is necessary to consider changing it during the course

of the battle.

The group commanders should attack the weakly armed targets from close ranges.

The position of the attacking torpedo group, as a rule, at the beginning of maneuvering for

attack is selected on enemy bow angles. When attacking transports which are insufficiently

guarded, it is advantageous for the attacking group to penetrate into the enemy combat formation

with hull course angles.

If submarines are participating in the main strike, the common maneuver of the large

formation, by launching or pushing the enemy toward the boats, should support a position for

the submarine attacks upon the initiation of their maneuver on bow course angles of the enemy.

The position of the attacking aviation groups during its selection for the aerial torpedo or

bombing attacks is determined by the axis of the enemy’s movement, by the common maneuver

of the large formation, by the selection of the axis of approach of our own aircraft to the battle

region, and by the light conditions and height of the ceiling.

463. The determination of the results of the main strike should be made by the large

formation commander by means of organizing uninterrupted observation of the target of

the strike and changes in the nature of the actions of the enemy large formation.


464. The large formation commander executes the development of the success of the main

strike on the axis of pursuit of the target of the offensive battle quickly, not ignoring for a

moment, even though temporarily, the opposition of the attacked enemy.

The large formation commander is required to hold the initiative that was displayed in

combat by individual groups, by his partial success in the opening of a new axis which will lead

to the end goal of the battle.

The development of success in offensive combat at sea is achieved by the infliction of the

enemy of successive strikes, executed by still capable [not having exhausted their ordnance]

groups of the combat formation and by reserve forces, and also by pursuing the retreating enemy,

465. The pursuit of a retreating enemy for concluding an offensive should be conducted

energetically and unhesitatingly – to total destruction of the enemy remnant forces that are trying

to avoid defeat.

For this to be accomplished, uninterrupted contact with the fleeing enemy and rapid breaking

up of his attempts to transition into a counterattack or to break off from the pursuing force must

be accomplished.

The withdrawing enemy should be delayed by a general maneuver of the large formation

which guides the movement of the enemy to a place favorable for deployed or dispatched

forward units of his large formation.

The greatest success is achieved by two-sided, parallel pursuit, which deprives the enemy of

the possibility for executing a defensive maneuver.

A pursuit lacking initiative of a retreating enemy, as a rule, will not lead to a successful

accomplishment of the mission.

3. Offensive against a Defending Enemy in Poor Visibility Conditions

466. An offensive against an enemy at sea defending in poor visibility conditions (in the dark

period of the day or in fog) is executed by a large maneuver formation consisting of surface

vessels, submarines, and aviation. It requires organization of a search for the enemy for the

launching strikes, with the rapid development of their success or subsequent defeat of the enemy

and his total destruction by concentrated large formation forces at dawn or after the fog has

dissipated.

The offensive in foggy conditions is executed by the same methods as an offensive at night,

however the large formation commander should consider that the density and height of the fog is

not constant; in fog it is possible to use illumination means, an also reconnaissance and bomber

aviation (and in thick fog, torpedo carriers).

467. A number of peculiarities influence combat in conditions of low visibility:

the limit of visual perception of the situation and the impossibility of simultaneously

observing it across the entire battle region;

the sporadic [interrupted] nature of combat engagements;

the limited possibility of employing visual communications;

the difficulty of identifying one’s own vessels and aircraft, the heightened danger of their

combat encounters between each other, which place high demands on the commanders of


vessels and units in regard to rapidity and boldness in actions, in the ability to risk and to

undertake independent decisions.

468. Depending on the concept of the battle in conditions of low visibility, the search for the

enemy can be conducted in various forms:

a search in a combat formation divided by depth and axes consists of a large number of

separate strike groups. This form of search, as a rule, is used for inflicting on the enemy a

series of successive torpedo strikes, executed in darkness (or in fog) by light surface forces,

submarines, and torpedo-bearing aviation, with subsequent development of success during

the offensive in conditions of good visibility.

A search in a compacted combat formation consisting of one or several strike groups,

operating jointly. This form of search is used, as a rule, for launching torpedo and naval

gunfire strikes on enemy surface vessels and immediate transition following the strikes into

the development of success.

469. Squadron minelayers are the principal forces that most appropriately correspond

in their tactical capabilities to the demands of conducting combat at sea in poor visibility,

and the most suitable for execution of the search at sea.

470. Search in a dispersed combat formation of the large formation is organized, as a rule,

in the form of pre-reconnaissance of the enemy forces that are in movement at sea. It is executed

by a sufficient number of search (strike) groups, consisting on the whole of squadron

minelayers.

The number of search groups, their construct and axis to the enemy should be calculated by

the large formation commander and correspond to the situation.

The search (strike) groups of squadron minelayers should be supplemented for increasing the

combat power of repeated strikes on the enemy by groups of torpedo-bearing aviation,

submarines, and torpedo cutters.

471. The large formation commander is obligated to facilitate the search by all means of

reconnaissance of the enemy, using for this purpose all available capabilities, and also by

orienting and directing both the search and the reconnaissance in accordance with the results of

systematic analysis in the FKP of data of evening and nighttime reconnaissance and reports of

the search groups.

472. The large formation commander should envisage the concentration toward an offensive

at dawn (or upon dissipation of the fog) of aviation and surface vessels in the main portion of the

battle region, for conclusion of the success of the separate attacks, which weakened and

disorganized the enemy’s large formation during the period of low visibility.

As a rule, the reserve forces are used for this purpose, and all the combat-capable [not

having exhausted their ordnance] strike groups from the search.

The presence of a reserve is necessary also for covering the reassembly at dawn of the

dispersed strike groups.

473. The organization of coordination of the search groups requires instructions from the

large formation commander during the preparation for the battle:

concerning the purpose of the actions in the search period and targets of the strikes;


concerning the subsequent conduct of search in the boundary areas between adjoining

participants of the group;

concerning the actions after execution of the attack of each group and regarding the axis

of bypass in avoidance of encounters with our own groups;

concerning the procedure of terminating the search upon the onset of daylight (dissipation

of the fog).

These instructions support the focusing and organizing of the search, and also its secrecy,

with the least use of communications for commanding and controlling it.

474. The starting position for the initiation of an offensive in low visibility conditions should

be prepared in the following aspects: by preliminary deployment of the submarine screen in the

region of the upcoming battle; by the movement of squadron minelayers and torpedo cutters to

forward bases or in regions designated to them for awaiting subsequent deployment in search,

and also by repositioning aviation to forward airfields.

In addition, the large formation commander should determine the start position of the reserve

forces in accordance with his decision regarding its use.

475. Organizing tactical reconnaissance, the large formation commander should support

uninterrupted observation of the enemy and successive reconnaissance as compared to daytime

effort, designating when necessary surface vessels or submarines for the handoff to them of

observation of hostile vessels by air reconnaissance.

476. For ensuring the continuity of effects on the enemy in the search period and maintaining

contact with him after detection by his search group, the commander of the latter is obligated to

direct the remaining groups to the enemy before the launching of the attack by the following

groups.

477. Search in a compact combat formation is constructed on the bases of joining together

several naval gunfire and torpedo strike groups for combined search, with broad use of

technical observation means, utilizing combat guard and reconnaissance.

478. Coordination between the strike groups (naval gunfire and torpedo), and as well

between them and the forward detachments (combat guard vessels), which are determined by the

concept of the battle, should support the execution of a powerful main strike, focused on the

disablement of enemy vessels (deprivation of their mobility), and rapid development of success,

accomplished, as a rule, by light surface forces of the large formation.

479. In a situation during which the offensive battle at nighttime or in fog continues into a

daytime battle, the evening phase of the latter should be used by the large formation for

preparation for the battle in conditions of low visibility. This permits the creation of the required

starting position, provides for the necessary dispersion, and the conduct of deployment for search

in accordance with the latest data on the enemy.

480. Depending on the nature of the decided offensive tasks, the targets of the strikes

inflicted on the enemy in combat are determined by the large formation commander during the

preparation for the battle.

The basic targets of the strikes in offensive combat, in conditions of poor visibility, as a rule,

are hostile large vessels and transports.


The basic instructional document for offensive combat at sea in poor visibility conditions is

the combat instruction, which includes encoded signals.

During the preparation for the battle, the large formation commander should also determine

the time and place of rendezvous by the onset of daylight, along with the means and procedures

for mutual recognition.


Consisting Primarily of Submarines

481. In distant regions of the theater, in which actions of surface vessels are difficult or

altogether impossible, and the actions of aviation are limited, an offensive against an enemy at

sea is executed by a large formation consisting primarily of submarines and attached supporting

aviation units. In individual circumstances, fast-moving vessels located at sea, which have great

sailing range, may also participate.

482. The success of an offensive against an enemy large formation by submarines in distant

sea regions is achieved by the submarines’ breaching of the enemy combat formation for the

launching of powerful torpedo strikes against its basic targets, combined with the actions of

aviation and surface vessels (if such are present), directed for the support of these strikes.

483. The basic form of coordination of aviation with submarines during an offensive in

a distant region of the sea is the execution of an air search for the enemy and vectoring the

submarines to them.

The coordination of surface vessels with submarines is accomplished by the former in

steering the enemy toward the submarines. The weakening and disruption of the hostile PLO can

be achieved by preliminary strikes of aviation and surface vessels for facilitating the submarines’

execution of the main attack.

484. During the preparation of an offensive of a large submarine formation in a distant region

of the sea, the large formation commander (as a rule, the commander of the submarine brigade)

should give special attention to the organization of reliable two radio communications between

submarines and the aviation that is synchronized with them, and also the surface vessels (if the

latter are present), as a necessary condition for the success of their coordination, and to receipt of

reconnaissance date regarding the enemy from the higher level command.

485. The combat formation of the large submarine formation, as a rule, is echeloned in the

direction of the enemy’s movement and dispersed in breadth for the ensuring of tactical

reconnaissance, preliminary weakening of the enemy, and of group maneuver using the

submarines, guided by aviation.

Aviation, as a rule, consists of several search groups and an aviation strike group (if its

radius of actions is sufficient).

In the presence of large formation surface vessels, they form a separate supporting surface

group.

486. Tactical deployment of the large formation is conducted gradually on the basis of

received data regarding the enemy’s movement. It should ensure the shifting of the submarine

screen of submarines required for the initiation of its penetration of the enemy’s PLO.


Coordination between the search and strike groups is achieved by continuous informing of

the latter in regard to the place, composition of the enemy, and his movement elements.

The shifting of the submarine screen, which is begun in the surface mode, should, as a rule,

be supported with cover of the submarines’ maneuver from the air.

457. Upon the enemy’s closure to the submarine screen, the commander of the boat which

first detected the enemy is required to main continuous contact with the enemy and vector the

remaining submarines toward him. They close with the enemy in the shortest possible time for an

attack and in accordance with the previously developed and published encoded signal for the

scheme of the attack.

488. The main attack of the large submarine formation is executed, as a rule, using the

preliminary effects on the enemy’s PLO by aviation and the first echelon submarines.

The accumulation of strikes in combat is achieved by repeated attacks both by the

submarines that are breaching the enemy combat formation and again reforming – for executing

the breach, and also by attacks by aviation and surface vessels.

In accordance with the execution of the combat tasks, the main strike should be focused, by

the instruction of the large formation commander, directly on the enemy main forces for the

destruction of his anti-submarine guard and aircraft carriers.

489. With the participation in the main attack of aviation, the large formation commander

dispatches to the battle region in a timely manner the aviation group, having established its

mission as attacks on targets of the main strike which are capable of disrupting the actions of the

submarines.

490. The development of success in combat, which is executed by the submarines by means

of successive attacks and by those which have remaining ordnance, and also by reserve aviation

groups, requires the persistence of the strike group and individual submarine commanders, and

also by uninterrupted command and control by the large maneuver formation commander.

491. Command and control of a battle in a remote region of the sea is accomplished by the

large formation commander, as a rule, from a shore-based FKP. The large aviation formation

commander is also located at that same command post.

The flag-level command post, through its communications network, supports the vessels and

units of the large formation by the retransmission of their situation and when necessary –

repeating communications between them.

The basic instructional document for an offensive in a distant sea region is the combat

instruction, which includes encoded signals.

492. The organization of an offensive battle of a large submarine formation in conditions of

poor visibility (at night, in fog) requires special development and instructions in the battle order

regarding the methods of executing the main strike with recognition of their identification by

corresponding encoded signals.


Consisting Primarily of Aviation


493. In conditions when the offensive on the enemy may be conducted by aviation without

participation of surface vessels (for various reasons), an air offensive is executed by a large

formation of naval aviation, independently or with participation of submarines available at sea

and torpedo cutters which may be drawn from nearby coastal [units[.

494. The success of such an offensive depends most of all on the intensity of the use of a

large quantity of aircraft and their correct targeting, as well as on the organization of the

coordination of the aviation with the submarines and torpedo cutters, which by the means of their

repeated attacks complete the destruction of the enemy that was begun by the aviation.

495. Having received the mission of attack on an enemy which is located at sea, the aviation

large formation commander, reinforced by attached units of submarines deployed at sea,

organizes the following in consonance with the battle plan:

pre-reconnaissance of the enemy forces by aviation and appropriate repositioning of the

submarines;

preparation of the first and second echelons of strike aviation for combat;

re-deployment of the screen of attached submarines to the region of the planned battle;

coordination with the forces located at sea and capable of supporting the aviation large

formation in combat;

preparation of a reserve group of aviation.

If sufficient time is available, the large formation commander should conduct a timely

airfield maneuver which will ensure the rapid takeoff of the aviation strike groups and aviation

reserve to the battle region.

Organizing coordination of his units, the large formation commander gives special attention

to the knowledge of the aviation groups of the regions of deployment of our own submarines and

surface vessels (if any are present at sea).

496. The combat formation of the large formation includes the following elements:

tactical reconnaissance, consisting of several aviation search groups and a

reconnaissance patrol of submarines, which have the tasks of pre-reconnaissance of the

enemy and vectoring our aviation toward him;

forward aviation group (first aviation echelon), designated for delivering a preliminary

strike;

main forces (second aviation echelon), which delivers the main strike;

group for development of success, consisting of submarines and other vessels (torpedo

cutters) which are participating in the battle;

aviation reserve.

497. The main strike of the large formation, which consists primarily of aviation, is

executed as a series of successive attacks of aviation strike groups.

The moment of sortie of the strike groups is determined upon signal of the large formation

commander. The targets of the main strike should be determined ahead of time, during the

preparation of the battle.

During an offensive against a freely maneuvering enemy, the target of the main strike, as a

rule, should be the hostile main forces. During an offensive against an enemy defending a

moving target, the target of the main strike, as a rule, is against the latter.


The large formation commander should try to establish an approximate reduced time interval

between the preliminary and main strikes.

499. Development of success in combat, which is focused on the complete destruction of the

main hostile forces, is achieved by a series of repeated strikes, executed by submarines deployed

to the region, torpedo cutters, and reserve aviation groups, and as well by aviation of the first

echelons that have re-armed.

The large formation commander, as a rule, gives the aviation commander of the first echelon

the right on site to determine by his signal the moment of the initiation of the development of

success, and by this signal quickly supports his actions with the reserve aviation group.

500. Command and control of the battle of a large formation consisting primarily of

aviation is exercised by the commander of the large maneuver formation from a shore-based

command post. With him at this command post are the commander (or chief of staff) of the large

submarine formation and liaison officers from the groups of surface vessels. They are required to

monitor the situation at sea and in the air, inform their own units regarding changes in it in a

timely manner, and report to the large formation commander the situation at sea, their evaluation

of it and their recommendations as to the use of submarines and surface vessels.

The commanders of the aviation groups 9first and subsequent echelons), which are executing

the strikes at sea, should be located together with their groups and guide them to the battle site of

their actions.

The commander of the attached large submarine formation (torpedo cutters) should execute

command and control at sea with submarines (torpedo cutters) on the basis of the tasks assigned

by the aviation large formation commander.

The jointly synchronized surface vessels and the large formation execute the requirements of

the large aviation formation commander in regard to support, pass through their liaison officer.

The staff of the large maneuver formation supports, through its own communications center,

the vessels, units, and large formation participating in the battle by passing to them the situation,

and when necessary also duplication of communications between them.

The basic instructional document for the multi-branch offensive battle is the combat

instruction, which includes the necessary encoded signals.

B. Meeting Engagement at Sea

1. Fundamentals of a Meeting Engagement

501. In a meeting engagement, which is a special form of offensive combat at sea, a

maneuvering large formation conducts an attack on an enemy which also simultaneously

attacking it.

502. The meeting engagement is characterized by an unclear situation in the initial period of

the combat with subsequent acute and rapid changes, transitory conditions at the moment of

combat confrontation with the enemy, an uninterrupted struggle for capturing and holding the

initiative in battle, striving by each of the contesting parties for their own offensive to achieve

the desired outcome, and in doing so with their defensive actions disrupting the causal factors of

the enemy’s offensive.


503. Success in a meeting engagement at sea is ensured by bold, energetic actions of forward

detachments, which has engaged the enemy advance guard in combat; the seizure of the initiative

in one’s own hands and swift maneuver of the large formation, which will lead to encirclement

or isolation of a portion of the hostile force and their destruction by powerful, concentrated

blows of various coordinated forces; by rapid employment of separate groups and large

formations with the goal of presenting in the course of the battle the possibility of achieving the

desired outcome of the battle and total destruction of the enemy.

504. Various distinctive forms of combat actions are used in a meeting engagement:

Initiation of battle, which is the establishment of contact with the enemy in battle, preceding

its subsequent development and influencing, on the whole, the start of combat.

Advance guard battle, which is conducted by large forces of the forward detachments in the

form of rapid attack on the forward enemy units, with the purpose of weakening them and

attracting to ourselves the attention and actions of the main enemy force. This, in turn, facilitates

the deployment of forces for inflicting the main strike in the meeting engagement.

Temporary transition of the large formation to the defense (if the situation requires this)

for weakening by our own counterstrikes an enemy that is superior in forces, to expose his

intentions and by that facilitate the subsequent transition to a decisive offensive against him.

Special attention in a meeting engagement is given to rapid execution of air superiority in

the battle region from its very beginning, which is supported by both tactical reconnaissance in

combat and as well by the defensive capability of the large formation under the effects of enemy

aviation.

505. The organization of the initiation of a meeting engagement and the conduct of the

advance guard battle, in accordance with the large formation commander’s concept, requires the

timely repositioning of forces and the start of combat actions in the movement mode. Therefore,

the combat formation takes on these characteristics even during the movement to the battle site.

The march order leading up to a meeting engagement should, to the greatest possible

degree, approach a battle formation.

506. Typical for a meeting engagement is the designation of a powerful advance guard,

which is formed by the joining of forward detachments and including various other forces,

among them a submarine screen and an advance guard aviation group.

Command and control of the advance guard battle is executed as an independent and critical

mission in the initial period of the battle and is facilitated by the large maneuver formation

commander in combat – by comprehensive coordination of the advance guard with the main

forces. This requires appointment of an experienced and energetic officer as advance guard

commander, who is prepared for this role by the large formation commander.

507. The decision for a meeting engagement does not allow procrastination, despite the

normally confusing situation. The absence of data for selection of the axis of the main strike does

not exclude actions for the creation of favorable conditions for such strike, and itself requires

offensive actions which will clarify the situation.

In a meeting engagement, one must strive for the rapid disorganization of the enemy’s

combat and movement formations, the breaking them into separate, dispersed groups, and to the

defeat of these groups piecemeal.


508. The plan for a meeting engagement (the execution of maneuver) should be as simple as

possible and should be finally taken only upon exposure of the enemy’s intentions in combat.

Therefore, command and control in a meeting engagement requires the skill of rapidly

organizing one’s own actions directly in combat. Preparation of the large formation for a meeting

engagement requires prior development of coordination of tactical and strike groups in

preparatory combinations, identified by encoded signals.

509. A meeting engagement at sea, depending on the conditions of its conduct, can occur in

two forms:

a meeting engagement in good and average visibility conditions, which requires the

combining of offensive and defensive actions of the entire large formation, directed toward

the accomplishment of one’s own mission in combat and the defeat of the hostile offensive

with all the combat power of the various forces that comprise the large formation;

a meeting engagement in poor visibility conditions (at night, in fog, in polar

darkness), which requires offensive actions by large formation units which are executing a

search for the enemy, and simultaneous employment of defensive methods by the main

forces, which in these conditions represent the enemy’s main target for offensive actions.

2. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Good and Average Visibility Conditions

510. In attacking the enemy in a meeting engagement at sea in good and average visibility

conditions, conducted energetically in the enemy’s direction, the commander should with his

actions influence the enemy’s responding actions; in a combination of enveloping or encircling

maneuver, he should break the enemy’s combat formation into disparate groups and defeat them

piecemeal.

At the same time, he should conduct continuous reconnaissance of the battle region and in a

timely manner detect the intentions of the hostile force, his striving to execute a breakthrough,

envelopment, or encirclement, and rapidly parry these attempts by suppression of the activity of

the breaching units, by envelopment of the encircled enemy groups or cutting them off and

destroying them.

511. The basic decision of the large formation commander in a meeting engagement is the

correct understanding by him of the goal of the combat in conditions of the concrete situation

(upon meeting the enemy), which will permit him to determine the methods of actions necessary

for achievement of his own goals in combat and for preventing the enemy from executing his

intentions.

This requires from the large formation commander – from the beginning of the contact, to

orient his decision on the execution of his own offensive and in measured exposure with the

development of the battle of the enemy’s intentions, to input corrections, directed at extending

the enemy’s confusion in connection with his intended outcome of the battle.

512. In anticipation of a meeting engagement, the large formation commander should

organize the preparation of his large formation. This is achieved by the following actions:

orienting the commanders of large formation units concerning the enemy, with whom the

engagement at sea is anticipated;

clarifying for the goals of the upcoming battle and the concept of its initiation;


instruction as to the possible axes of the main strikes and methods of actions during

various options of the anticipated situation of the engagement.

The large formation commander should organize tactical reconnaissance in combat and

coordination with operational reconnaissance for closing with the enemy and during the battle,

and also determine – by the construct of the large formation’s movement formation – a starting

position for the initiation of combat and issue orders regarding preliminary deployment in the

area of the anticipated meeting with the enemy of individual large formation units.

513. The instructional document which determines the organization of coordination of the

large formation units in a meeting engagement and gives instructions regarding their methods of

action in anticipated variants of the situation is the combat instruction, which includes encoded

signals.

514. With the initiation of the confrontation with the enemy, the large formation

commander should not waste time in refining the situation, and by doing so lose the

initiative in battle.

By maneuver of the large formation for closing with the enemy in the shortest time, by

reconnaissance sightings, and by unleashing combat with the enemy using his own forward

detachments, the large formation commander should arrive at a decision for the large formation’s

offensive tasks, which were prepared during the deployment, and implement them into the

actions of his main forces.

515. Initiating the meeting engagement, as a rule, begins with preliminary aviation strikes,

which are a component of the first echelon of the large formation, on the enemy’s movement

formation, and energetic actions of the forward detachments which are executed upon signal of

the advance guard commander. Additionally, the submarines of the forward screen can attack the

enemy independently.

The initiation of the battle should ensure, by mutual maneuvering of the advance guard and

main forces in accordance with the commander’s concept, a start position of the large formation

for combat (bearing to the enemy, initiation of envelopment, and so on).

516. The basic task of the advance guard, which is supported by the required main

forces, is the imposition of their initiating actions on the hostile advance guard, exposure of

the enemy’s intentions, and support of the deployment of the force for the main strike.

This is achieved by the advance guard battle of the large formation, during which the

advance guards, consisting of various forces which are supported by aviation groups and naval

gunfire of the main forces, attack the enemy decisively.

The seizure of the initiative is supported by the suppression of the activity of the hostile

advance guard in the initial period of the battle and the creation of air superiority in the battle

region, and the attempts by the enemy to launch his main strike are hindered.

The advance guard commander, supported by the deployment of the main force and

suppressing the hostile groupings, continuously reports to the large formation commander

regarding the repositioning of the enemy and the changes in his combat formation.

517. In making the decision regarding the axis of the main strike and its method of execution,

the large formation commander specifies the basic contents of the tactical deployment.


The combat formation of the large formation in the period of the main strike, in addition to

tactical reconnaissance, and also the advance guard, comprised of various forces (first echelon

of the combat formation) and air cover, consists of strike groups (second echelon of the combat

formation), intended for launching of the main strikes and execution of strikes dispersed in

breadth and depth in accordance with the selected method.

The strike groups, as a rule, are formed from surface vessels and aviation, and in some cases

also from submarines.

518. The transition of the overall large formation or the advance guard to a temporary

defense can be required by the situation or executed in accordance with the battle plan, for the

purpose of weakening and exhausting the enemy and dragging him into encirclement, for

subsequent conclusion of the battle by transition of the large formation to a decisive offensive.

519. The main strike in a meeting engagement, as a rule, is launched against the enemy’s

main forces. The large formation commander should evaluate the significance in battle of that

portion of the enemy’s force which by its actions can influence the outcome of the battle, and

select the target and moment of launching the main strike.

The large formation commander should consider that the situation which favors the initiation

of the main strike, not necessarily awaiting the completion of the deployment of all the groups of

his combat formation.

The presence of several earlier developed variants of execution of the main strike of great

combat power permits their implementation in combat, using encoded signals for the appropriate

deployment of the force.

520. Commanding and controlling the execution of the main strike, the large formation

commander should undertake the necessary measures for reinforcing the power of the effects on

selected hostile targets, supporting continuous actions against the enemy by successive attacks of

strike groups and augmenting efforts by putting into action fresh strike groups from the depth of

his combat formation, and also by repeated attacks by re-armed tactical groups, created from

them for this reserve in combat.

521. The execution of the main strike should be supported by containing the mobility of the

attacking enemy and distracting his attention from the attacking forces, and also by energetic

neutralization by detection of hostile threats, directed against the strike groups. This is achieved,

in the main, by secondary strikes by the advance guard, by limiting the maneuver of the enemy

in accordance with the battle plan, and by requiring the enemy main force to conduct combat in

two vulnerable axes.

522. The development of success in a meeting engagement requires great attention of the large

formation commander to the enemy’s maneuver, which has the possibility of withdrawing from

the battle, using his own mobility for this purpose.

The maintenance of continuous contact with the enemy in combat is the first obligation of the

commander of each tactical group.

The basic form of the development of success in a meeting engagement is destruction of

the encircled units and pursuit of the retreating enemy.

For the beginning of the development of success, if the situation favors it, the large formation

units do not await the general signal.


523. With the onset of darkness (or fog), the unfinished combat, when decisive results have

not been achieved, should be continued in poor visibility conditions for accomplishing the defeat

of the enemy in a new situation.

524. The FKP of the large formation in a meeting engagement, as a rule, is selected in the

main forces. Command and control of the large formation is executed by means of phased

issuance of combat instructions in accordance with the degree of clarity of the combat situation.

The advance guard commander exercises, as a rule, broad initiative at the initiation of the

battle in accordance with the provisions of the battle instruction, which focus him in regard to the

methods of conducting battle with the large formation in various conditions of the situation.

Until the clarification of the enemy’s intentions in combat, the increase in the activity of

tactical reconnaissance requires reinforced attention to communications for rapid passing of

reports and obligates the staff to provide for this the organization of communications of the large

formation and its command and control.

3. Meeting Engagement at Sea in Poor Visibility Conditions

525. A meeting engagement at sea in poor visibility conditions, which has been initiated as a

result of the movement of the enemy, detected by search, in a meeting engagement from a

movement formation, or also as a result of a search, is distinguished in the contemporaneousness

of the conditions of its decisiveness and the intensity of the strikes that are launched.

526. The search of a large formation, conducted in a dispersed combat formation,

requires revealing (unmasking) the movement of large combat vessels and aircraft carriers,

which are the target of the enemy’s search, and to conduct battle, mainly by torpedo forces, using

for this separate groups of squadron minelayers, torpedo-bearing aircraft, submarines, and

torpedo cutters. A large number of search groups and powerful torpedo strikes most fully

accomplish the task of disabling the enemy’s basic forces.

527. The search of a large formation in a compact combat formation increases the

combat power of the main battle strike, using the naval gunfire of the large vessels. This form of

meeting engagement requires additional support of large combat vessels in opposition to the

offensive actions of the enemy, primarily against his torpedo attacks. Search in a compact battle

formation also requires reinforcement of the means of tactical reconnaissance for detection of the

enemy’s basic forces.

528. The organization of tactical reconnaissance in a meeting engagement in poor

visibility conditions is a decisive moment, which determines the success of the search and

the required attachment for this purpose of a large quantity of aviation with modern

technical means of observation.

529. In night combat, which has arisen as a result of combat which was not terminated

during good visibility, the persistent pursuit of the enemy by a portion of the force and

continuous observation of tactical reconnaissance of him should support the deployment of strike

(search) groups and pre-reconnaissance of the enemy, for the purposes of striking him with the

main attack.

530. Combat which has not been terminated in conditions of poor visibility requires

development of success or renewal of the meeting engagement by the large formation basic


forces with the onset of dawn and the anticipation by one’s own deployment of the concentration

of enemy forces.

531. The movement formation of the large formation, in anticipation of the possible

encounter at sea with an active enemy in poor visibility conditions and the intention to conduct a

meeting engagement, should support a high level of combat readiness of the large formation and

flexibility of the maneuver of tactical groups, which in return are facilitating the deployment, the

identification of the enemy, and additional combat support.

The advance of the forward detachments, on the whole comprised of squadron minelayers,

which are covering the movement of the main forces, is achieved by rapid execution of

preliminary strikes on the detected enemy and focus on the subsequent maneuver of the large

formation.

The launching of powerful naval gunfire and torpedo strikes is supported by the presence in

the composition of the main force of a powerful torpedo group, primarily of squadron minelayers

or submarines, which have remained in the battle region for completion of the defeat of the

enemy.

532. The deprivation of the hostile ships’ mobility in combat is a basic form of

counteractions against the enemy during the conduct of the main strike in low visibility

conditions.

533. The necessary support for the development of success – maintaining contact with the

attacking enemy forces – should be organized during the preparation for the battle.

C. Defensive Combat at Sea

1. Fundamentals of a Maneuvering Defense

534. A large maneuver formation conducts defensive combat at sea during an encounter with

an enemy when the situation requires it.

The large formation commander, by the organization of a maneuvering defense, by persistent

and decisive actions of the units of his formation directed at the achievement of the safety of his

own basic forces, should force the enemy to back away from initiating an attack.

535. The mission of a large formation in a defensive battle is resolved on the whole by the

following actions:

by maneuver of one’s own large formation or its quick-moving groups, which cut off the

hostile attempts to outflank, encircle, or disperse the defenders’ combat formation;

by counterstrikes on the attacking enemy forces;

by employing measures of maskirovka (using smokescreens, maneuver, by confusing the

enemy).

536. The defensive combat of a large formation is characterized, depending on the situation

of its conduct, can be of the following varieties:

defense of free maneuver of the large formation, most typical during an encounter at

sea with superior enemy forces or as a result of an unfortunate development of a meeting

engagement for the large formation. The defense at sea of a freely maneuvering large

formation is achieved by the infliction of a series of surprise, brief, counterstrikes with


successive separation from the hostile force, which bear the character of uncompleted combat

engagements, interrupted upon the initiative of the defender;

defense of a large formation associated with the guarding of a target (amphibious

force, convoy, damaged vessel), characterized by the necessity for the large formation to

defend in conditions of restricted movement of the guarded target and to fend off the enemy

attack from multiple axes. This is achieved by head-on maneuver of a fast-moving strike

group of the defender on the axis of a designated threat, for anticipating and capture of

hostile attacking groups, by delaying the attacking enemy with forward detachments and

simultaneous avoidance by the target of enemy strikes;

defense of a large formation in retreat, conducted in conditions of pursuit by a stronger

enemy;

defensive actions of the large formation in limited visibility conditions.

537. The basic decision of the large formation commander in defensive combat at sea is the

striving to cause harm to the enemy and to disrupt his attempts for an attack, by one’s own

maneuver and counterattacks by strike groups.

By constructing the combat formation with reconnaissance and forward detachments

dispatched toward the enemy, with a centralized positioning of strike groups, which will permit

their deployment to the main axis in the shortest time period, achieves support of the exposing

and paralyzing energetic actions of the attacking enemy.

538. During the preparation of a large formation for defensive combat at sea, great

significance is required for the timely development of the organization of the execution of

counterstrikes.

The increased depth of the large formation’s defense by means of the organization of

preliminary strikes, which weaken and disorganize the attacking enemy with aviation strike

groups, deployed for this purpose to forward airfields, plays a special role.

In addition to this, the strengthened air danger at sea requires cover of the large formation

from the air in a defensive battle with counterattacks of interceptor aviation, as a rule, from

aircraft carriers, which are components of the large formation’s combat formation.

The presence in the large formation of submarines facilitates the defense of the large

formation against large enemy surface vessels, by means of vectoring them by maneuver of the

large formation toward the submarines.

2. Defensive Actions of a Large Formation at Sea

539. In good and average visibility conditions, success in defensive combat at sea is

supported by timely revealing of the offensive intent of the enemy, by initiating actions of the

forward detachments, and by rapidly executed counterstrikes, directed at disorganizing the

enemy’s attack.

540. For weakening the surprise of the hostile attack during an encounter with the enemy in

movement, it is necessary for the large formation constantly to be prepared for avoiding

preliminary strikes of the attacking force and for defeating them, and as well for reforming in the

shortest time into a combat formation for closing with the enemy; the latter is achieved by

positioning units in march order that corresponds to the requirements of a start position for the


initiation of a defense, and also by timely receipt by the commanders of large formation units of

instructions regarding the methods of actions during the encounter with the enemy.

541. The deployment of the large formation for defense during an encounter with the

enemy during movement or its redeployment with this goal as a result of the unfavorable

outcome of a meeting engagement should support the most complete and focused use of the

various large formation forces, for fending off the enemy’s attack.

The combat formation of a large formation for conducting a defensive battle at sea should

envisage the following:

tactical reconnaissance, which provides timely detection of the enemy and exposure of

his offensive maneuver;

forward detachments, sent out on the axes of anticipated enemy offensive and

coordinated between each other in the gaps that separate them;

a ship-based strike group, which has the task of conducting counterstrikes against the

attacking enemy;

an aviation strike group, which has the nature of conditional support, located in

readiness for takeoff;

aviation cover in the air.

542. The defense of a freely maneuvering large formation requires the creation of

conditions which complicate the enemy’s breach and isolation of individual defending units and

facilitates the massing of one’s own forces on the threatened axes, and as well the execution of

maneuver for avoidance of outflanking and encirclement or to break off from the enemy. This is

achieved, as a rule, by a compacted disposition in the combat formation of tactical groups (in

sight of each other).

The counterstrike is executed in the form of a sudden transition of the defenders to a brief

counterattack, undertaken each time on one’s own initiative and executed for throwing off the

attacking enemy, with the purpose of separating from him and gaining time and space.

The use of smoke screens achieves support for closing with the enemy and breaking free

from him of one’s own attacking groups, and also containing the maneuver of hostile vessels,

which are forced to avoid the smoke screens placed in their movement paths.

542. The commander of a large formation should develop the desired success of the

counterstrike – the transition of his large formation to an offensive with the increased ratio of

forces in favor of the defenders, or, when the situation is more focused, by a decisive separation

from the enemy and the departure of the large formation from the battle toward its own forces or

to a coastline.

544. The defense of a large formation that is tied down to the protection of a target requires the large formation commander to consider the following:

the necessity for shifting the strike group in the shortest possible time from one to another

threatened axis;

mutual support from adjacent forward detachments;

support of the defended target against massive effects of hostile aviation and the group

maneuvering of enemy submarine groups;

avoidance by the defended target from offensive maneuver and enemy strikes.


During the defense at sea of a moving target, counterattacks, as a rule, bear the nature of a

series of persistent, repeatedly renewed attacks by vessel and aviation strike groups, conducted to

delay the attacking enemy and constrain his movement.

In this, the attacking forces should decisively counteract the enemy’s attempts to draw them

away from the guarded target and constrain their movement with our own constraining actions.

545. The defense of a large formation in withdrawal is conducted, as a rule, by delaying

the lead units of the pursuing enemy and counteracting the cutting off of the withdrawal route

and the outflanking of the lead of the enemy large formation’s combat formation.

Special significance during the withdrawal is given to the dispatch to the rear of the combat

formation of the retreating large formation of a cover group (with submarines, if they are

available), which are a supporting unit of the basic forces and which form a powerful rear

guard. For combating the pursuing enemy groups, an additional forward detachment is

dispatched toward them.

The withdrawal of a slower moving group requires great energy of the rear guard for its

support and more persistent counterattacks, in consonance with the employment of smoke

screens.

In a particularly complex situation, when the successful conduct of a defense by the large

formation is not possible, the large formation commander, for the preservation of the greater

portion of his force, can make the decision to withdraw in a dispersed manner. This type of

withdrawal is executed only upon order of the large formation commander.

540. In poor visibility conditions, defensive actions of a large formation are conducted on

the following bases:

the employment of a special organization of observation by visual and technical means,

which will ensure timely detection of the enemy;

increased readiness of the large formation for fending off an attacking enemy with

powerful torpedo and naval gunfire strikes;

rapid execution of maneuver for avoidance and separation from the hostile force;

use of the necessary measures of maskirovka (observation of maskirovka discipline,

smoke screens, false fires, blinding the enemy).

The initial position for defense at sea in low visibility conditions should be supported by the

restructuring of the large formation before the onset of darkness or before entry into fog, with

dispersion in breadth and echeloning in depth of the march order, to a degree which will enlarge

the maneuver capability of the large formation units, and also support the covering of the basic

forces from the direction of the probable appearance of the enemy.

During a favorable situation, as a rule, a forward-focused search for the enemy by torpedo-

bearing forces which can force him to go over to the defense, and also demonstration actions of

specially designated groups to distract the enemy away from the movement region of the large

formation’s main body can be organized.

The commander should give particular concern to the combined movement of his large

formation when it is being subjected to strikes by attacking enemy groups.


Having issued instructions for combat, he should ensure the concentration of the large

formation after the encounter with the enemy, and also by dawn (with the dissipation of fog) –

the designation of the rendezvous location.

547. Command and control of a maneuvering defense in conditions of good and average

visibility requires from the large formation commander the pre-designation of initiative in

combat to his forward detachment and rear guard commanders and personal leadership of the

actions of the main strike group.

Command and control of a maneuver defense in poor visibility conditions requires significant

independent actions of the tactical groups and careful organization of coordination of their

execution of the defensive maneuver in battle, with the briefest use of communications for

issuing combat orders.

The instruction for the conduct of a defensive battle at sea is issued in the form of a combat

instruction, which includes the encoded signals required for command and control of the large

formation in battle.


Chapter 10

Combat of a Large Formation in an Equipped Naval Position

1. Fundamentals of Positional Combat

548. Large formation combat in an equipped naval position is characterized by the

participation of all branches of naval forces and with a special role in it of shore-based artillery

and positional means, the coordination of which has decisive significance in the battle with

enemy forces that are attacking the position.

The initiative of the initiation of combat and the selection of the axis of the strikes are in the

enemy’s hand. The success of the defense depends on the staunchness and obstinacy of the

defending forces, on the effectiveness of the coordination of fires of all types and of the

positional obstacles, on the defenders taking the initiative into their own hands at the decisive

moment in the battle and transition to a decisive offensive, by which will be achieved the end

goal of the defense – the total and complete defeat of the attacking enemy, or the forcing of the

enemy to cease his attack by inflicting significant losses on his basic forces.

549. In combat for an equipped naval position, the large formation should use its significant

tactical advantages over an enemy superior in forces, having received, thanks to the total

concentration in the position of the available forces and means of the fleet, both maneuver

(surface vessels, submarines, aviation) and the positional (shore-based batteries, mine obstacles,

nets, booms), the direct support in combat by its entire logistic system, and in conditions of

limited mobility of the enemy, associated with his own movements in a complex situation of

obstacles and navigational dangers.

550. The positional combat of a large formation, depending on the visibility conditions, can

take on various natures:

Positional combat during daylight hours is characterized by the leading role of

maneuver by fire of the shore-based artillery and air strikes, which are in coordination with

vessels at the in the mine obstacles at the enemy main strike’

Positional combat at nighttime is characterized by the broad use of torpedo cutters and

minelayers and the massed fires of shore-based artillery, which is conducted with the

assistance of radar and aviation illumination means, in combination with mine obstacles in

positions, for the purpose of forcing the enemy to abandon his offensive actions;

Positional combat in foggy conditions complicates the defense by limiting the conduct

of reconnaissance in sectors of the position which are covered by fog, by single cutters and

technical means of observation.

551. The forms of the conduct of battle of a large formation in an equipped naval position

can be varied:

a series of powerful preliminary strikes on the approach of the enemy to the

defensive line of the position for disrupting his combat formation and the accumulation of

strikes with the purpose of forcing the enemy to abandon his attack on the position; these

strikes are launched suddenly, primarily by aviation, submarines, and light forces of the

fleet’s surface vessels;

a concentrated strike by all available forces and means on the enemy, which has

become entangled in a mine obstacle; this form of strike provides the greatest opportunity


for total defeat of the enemy, which lacks the possibility in this case to terminate his initiated

attack;

combat with enemy forces which have penetrated within the position, which consists

of uninterrupted attacks and counterattacks, and also the creation of obstacles in channels and

maneuver regions within the position, for the purpose of destroying the enemy and depriving

him of the possibility of developing his initial success.

552. The organization of a positional battle envisages the equipping of a region of actions in

accordance with a battle plan.

An equipped naval position includes the following elements:

mine, net, and boom obstacles;

prepared shore-based artillery positions;

engineer equipping of the shoreline positions for the purpose of preventing amphibious

assault landings;

equipped command posts;

observation and communication posts;

technical means of detection and observation;

navigational–hydrographic equipping of the position.

The equipping of the position for combat is conducted in advance and partially reinforced or

reconfigured immediately before the battle. In calculating the equipping of the position, it is

necessary to begin from the basic possible axes of the enemy’s attack.

553. A mine–artillery position, consisting fundamentally of mine obstacles defended by

shore-based artillery, has the purpose to complicate the enemy’s offensive, to contain his

movement, and support the launching against him of decisive strikes by naval forces which are

deployed to the position.

The constructed mine–artillery position, executed in accordance with the necessity of

successive defeat through the entire depth of the enemy’s combat formation, should have the

following features: a) a forward defensive belt, b) a main defensive belt, and c) a

supplementary defensive belt.

Each belt of the defense is adapted to natural defensive lines, either a single or several

artificial lines are created in them; in addition, flanking defensive nodes are created in the

shoreline positions.

The most important requirement for the main defensive belt is that it be impenetrable

by the enemy.

554. The designated force (large maneuver formation) which is deployed in the mine–

artillery position is comprised so it can execute the following tasks:

conduct a stubborn and active defense;

cause the collapse of the enemy attack;

by subsequent transition of the defenders to a decisive attack, achieve total defeat of the

enemy.

The large maneuver formation which has been designated for the positional battle should be

comprised of the following assets: shore-based artillery, naval aviation, naval infantry, and as

well torpedo cutters and submarines.


Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers are also considered for participation in this combat.

The fire system of the shore-based artillery should be constructed so that in combined strikes

with naval aviation and light forces, it creates for the enemy an insurmountable defensive belt of

positions and inflicts on him the greatest losses, forcing him to withdraw.

555. The forces which are deployed in the forward defensive belt act in the defense as

forward detachments, with the purpose of delaying the enemy attack, disrupting his combat

formation, weakening him and, having re-armed in a timely manner, bought time for the

execution of all of one’s own forces and means for the battle in the main defensive belt.

556. The forces which have deployed for actions in the main defensive belt as part of the

covering group, according to the number of required axes, have as their purpose the halting of

the enemy’s attack and by deployment of the strike groups to launch against him all the

coordinated forces for a decisive defeat.

557. The reserve forces and re-armed units of the strike groups, deployed in the

supplementary defensive belt, act against individual groups of enemy which have penetrated

within the belt, cutting them off from the enemy man body and destroying them.

558. From the moment of the completion of the equipping of the mine–artillery position, by

an organizational order of the MOR (fleet) commander-in-chief, one of the large formation (unit)

commanders of shore-based artillery should be designated the position commandant. For

support of the unity of the position and serviceability of the naval means, its equipping uses the

guard force of the offshore zone (OVR) VMB (MOR).

559. With the deployment of the maneuvering forces for combat into the position, the

commander designated for the defense of the position of the large maneuver formation assumes

command and control of the battle.

The organization of command and control of the battle in a naval position should be

supported by the following assets:

appropriately and reliably defended flag-level command post position;

equipped, in supplement to the FKP, observation points for the large formation

commander on each consequential axis of the position;

prepared and equipped reserve command post;

the organization of reliable, duplicative communications with all groups of the combat

formation.

2. Positional Combat in Periods of Daylight

560. A large maneuver formation of naval forces that has been designated for the defense of

a position, deploying for battle, constructs a combat formation and conducts critical preparation

to meet an enemy attack from any axis to which the enemy may access.

This deployment (“in anticipation”) should include organization of the following elements:

reconnaissance on the approaches to the position;

combat guard in front of the main defensive belt;

covering group on the critical axes;

strike groups for actions on the forward and main defensive belts;

reserve, positioned in a supplementary belt.


The deployment for combat also includes the following measures:

increase of the combat readiness of the shore-based artillery;

occupation of start positions for mobile artillery;

departure to positions of submarines from the forward detachment;

strengthening of observation and combat guard in all sectors of the combat formation.

The document for organizing the deployment of the large formation for battle is the combat

order for deployment for combat in position, which is issued ahead of time (without

indication of the effective time) and implemented upon encoded signal.

561. The plan for positional combat of a large formation should envisage all possible

variants of an enemy offensive and in response to them—a decision for the defense:

the combat actions of the forward detachments in the forward belt of the defense;

the battle of the covering group in the main defensive belt and the strengthening of it with

the reserve

the launching against the enemy of a decisive counterattack with multiple variants;

a counter-offensive in the development of the achieved success;

re-establishment and reinforcement of the equipping of the position after defeat of the

enemy offensive;

combat for the supplementary defensive belt and liquidation of the enemy breach.

The document for the organization of the conduct of the battle for the position is the combat

instruction, supplemented with the required counter-strike (counteroffensive) planning table

for each separate variant.

562. Command and control of the battle in the period of the struggle the forward defensive

belt, the axis of the strike groups for inflicting preliminary strikes, is conducted, as a rule, by the

direction s of the large formation commander.

All enemy units which are operating against the defensive position should be subjected

to continuous strikes of the defending large formation.

563. The commanders of the covering groups conduct a stubborn defense of their sectors of

the defense independently, receiving reinforcement from the large formation commander and

reporting to him during the course of the battle their correct evaluation of the situation in their

sector.

The decision regarding the direction and moment of the main counterstrike is a

fundamental obligation of the large formation commander.

Precise organization of coordination of all forces participating in the counterstrike, and their

preliminary preparation by means of appropriate training, are required conditions for the success

of the execution of the counterstrike.

Command and control of the main strike is conducted, as a rule, by the large maneuver

formation commander from a forward observation post or from a vessel (aircraft).

564. The deployment for the counterstrike on the main defensive belt should be

developed by the staff in several variants, which correspond to the decision for organization of

the defensive position, and should be executed in a planned manner.


The main strike should be launched against the enemy with all forces and means at that

moment when the basic enemy attacking forces are tangled up in the mine obstacle.

The strike groups, consisting of various branches of forces and supported by the stubborn

defense of the covering group on the axis of the enemy attack, coordinating with the covering

group forces of adjacent axes, should with rapid, increasing in strength strikes inflict the greatest

losses on the enemy main forces and groups which are supporting them.

The mission of the defending large formation in all of this consists of stubbornly

holding the position, defeating the attackers with powerful, deep fires and decisive,

repeated attacks and counterattacks from various axes, to halt the enemy offensive.

The slightest confusion of the enemy, which has resulted from the inflicted losses (attempt to

cover his withdrawal), should be immediately used for transition of the defenders to a decisive

offensive against the enemy.

565. Immediately after the main strike (or before it), when the enemy, as a consequence of

inflicted losses has halted his attack and begun to withdraw, it is necessary immediately to go

over to the development of success. This is achieved by decisive pursuit of the enemy by strike

groups, covering groups, and reserve groups that have been pre-designated for this purpose.

566. Combat with the enemy which has penetrated into the supplementary defensive

belt is conducted on the whole with the purpose of preventing the enemy’s execution of his

assigned mission.

This is achieved by maximum intensity of artillery, low-level attack aviation and torpedo

attacks by artillery, aviation, and vessels (torpedo cutters submarines) and the emplacement of

maneuverable mine obstacles which to a significant degree will hinder the actions of the enemy

vessels that are breaking through.

The units and large formations participating in the deployment of forces to the supplementary

belt should display the greatest independence in their actions.

567. The receipt of operational reconnaissance data, which determines the increasing

intensity of the situation in the given region of the theater of combat actions, is necessary for

supporting the timely deployment of the forces designated for its defense.

568. Special significance in combat for a position defended by a mine–artillery position, in

which are participating a concentrated variety of fleet forces, is accorded to prior organizational

materiel–technical support of the battle calculated in accordance with the battle plan.

The resources of combat supply should be replenished ahead of time for the conduct of a

prolonged defense, dispersed and covered against enemy effects.

3. Positional Combat in Periods of Darkness

569. In periods of darkness, positional combat of a large formation is characterized by

favorable conditions for the actions of torpedo cutters and torpedo-carrying aircraft in the main

defensive belt, with systematic illumination of the region of their actions by aviation bombs.

Special attention is given to the energetic actions of surface vessels which have torpedo

armaments, and the actions of submarines in the forward defensive belt, for the purpose of total

disorganization of the enemy’s offensive.


Positional combat in nighttime conditions requires the making of a separate decision

during its preparation and development of a battle plan for the dark period of the day, as

well as special equipping of the position for uninterrupted observation of the enemy in the area

of the position with the aid of technical observation means.

570. The deployment of forces to a position “in anticipation” at nighttime, as opposed to the

same in daylight conditions, requires instructions in this regard, issued in an order for

deployment for combat in the position. The execution should be indicated in a separate encoded

signal.

The nighttime battle plan should specifically address the dividing up of the regions of

anticipation of an enemy night attack and the axes of torpedo attacks for squadron minelayers

and submarines, torpedo cutters, and torpedo-bearing aviation, as well as regions of actions for

shore-based artillery batteries.

571. In nighttime conditions, the development of coordination of various forces, both in the

forward belt and in the main belt, has great significance.

A separate commander should be appointed for the organization of coordination and their

supervision in a nighttime battle at the forward defensive belt. The supervision of the

coordination on the main defensive belt, as a rule, is executed in their own sectors by covering

group commanders.

572. An enemy who has been forced to retreat in nighttime conditions should be pursued to

the limits of the position of the large maneuver formation.

With the onset of first light, the mission of the large formation is to concentrate rapidly the

forces for the final defeat of the enemy forces remaining in the position.

4. Positional Combat in Foggy Conditions

573. The following peculiarities accompany the combat of a large formation in a naval

defensive position in foggy conditions:

the impossibility of using illumination means for search and observation of the enemy;

the possibility of using artillery and torpedo ordnance in positions only with access to

data from technical means of observation;

dependence of combat actions of aviation on the fog condition (thickness, ceiling) in the

region of each airfield;

inadequate visibility conditions, which require the preparedness of the large maneuver

formation for actions in daylight conditions in separate sectors of the position.

Especially important during the preparation for positional combat in foggy conditions,

depending on the areas of fog infiltration, is the calculated distribution of airfields and landing

fields.

In conditions of fog in the position area, the large formation staff should organize the

weather reconnaissance very carefully.


574. The plan for positional combat in foggy conditions should envisage combat actions

during various types of fog in various sectors of the position – up to total clearing of an area,

which requires a high level of preparedness of the forces and means for actions in conditions

similar to daylight.

Independent actions of the cover and strike group commanders, in accordance with the

situation in combat in foggy conditions, should be considered ahead of time and developed in the

large formation staff.


Chapter 11

Combat of a Large Formation in an Enemy Coastal Region

A. Offensive in an Enemy Fortified Region

1. Fundamentals of the Offensive against an Enemy Position

575. An offensive against an enemy defending in a position requires prepared actions of the

large formation directed at the suppression of counteractions of a reconnoitered enemy, and as

well superiority of the attacker in forces on the axis of the main strike, their massed employment,

and high morale state of the enlisted component of the large formation.

The defeat of the enemy is achieved by weakening him with preparatory strikes in the period

of preparation for the offensive, and by suppressing his defensive system on the axis of the main

attack in the period immediately prior to execution of the offensive, with a simultaneous and

decisive forward advance of the attacking forces.

576. Depending on the mission of the attacker, the nature of the positions equipping, and the

composition of the defending forces, the offensive against an enemy position can have two basic

forms:

an offensive against an enemy mine–artillery position, with the goal of capturing it or

destroying the enemy forces. This requires the suppression of the nodes of the enemy

defense, their seizure, and breach of his defensive zones.

an offensive against an enemy anti-submarine position, for overcoming the anti-

submarine line created by the enemy, when an independent breach of it by submarines is

associated with high losses. This form of offensive against a position requires weakening of

the hostile positional means and disorganization of the maneuvering forces of the anti-

submarine defenses. This [offensive] is supported by concealed, subsequent breach by

submarines of the enemy’s reconnoitered anti-submarine zone.

577. An offensive against an enemy position can have various forms, depending on the

strength of the equipping of the position and the stubbornness of its defense:

a rushed attack or breach of the position requires simultaneous suppression of the

enemy defense through its entire depth and be supported by surprise [sudden] actions of the

attacker or his overwhelming superiority in forces;

a methodical offensive requires successive actions of the large formation, directed at

overcoming the hostile defense piecemeal;

an outflanking of the position is executed with the goal of launching the main strike on

the enemy in the flank or rear of his combat formation, by which will be achieved the defeat

of the enemy on his most vulnerable axes. Outflanking the position, as a rule, requires the

landing of an assault force (amphibious, airborne, or combination) on the flanks or in the rear

of the enemy.

The most decisive results of the offensive are achieved by simultaneous bypass of both flanks

of the position or by bypassing one flank, with a simultaneous breach of the front of the position.

578. In an offensive against a fortified enemy region, two basic periods are distinct: a) the

period of preparation of the attack and b) the period of execution of the attack.


Over the period of preparation of the offensive, reconnaissance and approach to the hostile

position are executed, and also discovery by preliminary strikes of the weak places in the enemy

defense is carried out.

The execution of the offensive, which is conducted in close contact with the results of the

combat actions conducted over the course of the preparatory period, requires special deployment

of the forces which are executing the main strike and the development of its success.

579. The basic decision of the large formation commander for an attack on an enemy position

is the selection of the most favorable axis of the main attack and the time of its initiation, and as

well the concentration of the necessary forces and means for suppressing the activity of energetic

enemy forces and the destruction of the position’s equipping. All the reconnaissance data

regarding the system of the hostile defense and the results of preliminary strikes which were

executed during the preparatory period for the offensive should be used.

2. Offensive against an Enemy Mine–Artillery Position

580. In the period of the preparation of the offensive, the large formation commander should

organize the following actions:

a detailed reconnaissance and study of the position’s defense, in addition to data already

in hand;

weakening of the enemy, the forces and means of his defense, using preliminary strikes

and a determination of the weak spots in his combat formation;

development of the attack plan for the position;

departure of the large formation to start positions for the offensive.

The secrecy if this preparation is an indispensable condition for the offensive.

581. The approach to the enemy position n the preparatory period of the operation is

executed by forward detachments, consisting, as a rule, of light forces and powerful aviation

groups. Their mission is the destruction of the enemy guard force and demonstration actions

which will force the enemy to prematurely deploy for combat and thus expose his shore-based

defensive system.

Tactical reconnaissance has the purpose during the preparation of the offensive of

establishing the enemy’s combat formation and the system of his positional equipping (location

of shore artillery batteries, boundaries of mine obstacles, lanes through them, and so on). It

supports the combat actions of the forward detachments.

The approach to the position and combat actions during the preparatory period of the attack

are organized specially for this by issued combat orders (warning orders).

582. Preliminary strikes, over the course of the preparatory period, are launched to weaken

the enemy, to destroy his maneuver forces, to damage his fire systems and positional means, and

also to constrain his actions in the position region and disrupt his command and control and

logistics.

As a rule, preliminary strikes are executed by bomber and low-level attack aviation, and have

the nature of aviation preparation of the offensive. The results of the strikes should be confirmed

by controlled reconnaissance.


Over the course of this period, the large formation commander should organize the

preliminary weakening of the system of the enemy’s mine defense and [provide] support in the

maneuver region for the actions of naval gunfire of surface vessels. He should also conduct naval

gunfire reconnaissance of the shore-based defense.

583. The large formation commander makes the decision for the offensive against an enemy

mine–artillery position on the basis of discussion and study of all the reconnaissance data and the

results of the combat actions in the offensive’s preparatory period. He takes into consideration

the combat power of his own naval gunfire and aviation, and as well the possibility of

overcoming the mine obstacles and destruction of the enemy’s defensive fortifications.

Base on the concrete mission of the offensive, the large formation commander should

determine the forces that will be required for achievement of the end goal of the offensive, and as

well establish the required composition of the main forces for suppressing the enemy’s

counteractions to the offensive.

Careful organization of coordination of the forces participating in the battle and special

development by them of the chosen methods are necessary conditions for the success of the

offensive.

584. The combat formation of the large formation that is being redeployed for execution of

the breach of the enemy position is built on the base of the plan developed for the offensive and

is echeloned in accordance with subsequent actions in combat:

tactical reconnaissance during the execution of the offensive has as its basic assignment

determination of the timely detection of the defenders’ maneuver, directed at execution of its

counter-strike.

main forces, consisting of several strike groups, acting with fire and maneuver on the

axes selected for the offensive, with the purpose of suppressing the enemy counter-actions to

the breaching of his position;

supporting groups, which by demonstration actions force the enemy to disperse his

defensive efforts;

breakthrough forces, which comprise the echelon of development of success, and

operate on the axis of the end goal of the offensive.

585. Tactical deployment of the large formation in accordance with the developed battle

plan should be executed in the shortest possible time period, by which is achieved forestalling of

the enemy in actions and supports the surprise of the main strike.

For an unanticipated initiation of the offensive, the start position of the attacking large

formation should be camouflaged (selection of dark period of the day, favorable illumination

conditions, use of smokescreens, and so on). The departure of the tactical groups to their

designated locations should be conducted only at the time designated for them.

Preliminary strikes which are executed in the period of tactical deployment have the

character of spontaneous preparation of an attack of defenses, by anticipating and supporting

each other.

The synchronization of mutual supplementary strikes launched against the enemy by

aviation, surface vessels, and assault forces for the gradual paralysis of his resistance has special

significance for the success of the methodical attack.


588. During the outflanking of the position by the main strike, launched at the flank or rear

of the enemy, the reserve groups should destroy or capture the hostile targets which are resisting

the flanking movement, and as well destroy the enemy mobile reserve groups. This strike, as a

rule, is executed by the landing of a naval or airborne assault (and also a combination) on the

flank or rear of the hostile position and bears the same nature in battle as an amphibious landing.

589. The overall success of the offensive against a mine–artillery position is the

accumulation of a series of partial successes, persistently developed unto the complete defeat of

the enemy.

This is achieved by timely introduction into the battle of the echelon for development of

success and the rapid actions of the forces which are executing the main strike on the axes of the

enemy targets, the destruction and seizure of which lead to the achievement of the end goal of

the battle.

590. An offensive against an enemy mine – artillery position in poor visibility conditions

facilitates the achievement of surprise and weakening of the forces of the defending enemy (by

breaching attacks of light forces and aviation strikes) and also the seizure of individual nodes of

the hostile defense by assault, and the reduction of interference on the part of the enemy’s shore-

based artillery.

Upon making the decision to use poor visibility conditions for the attack on the enemy

position, the large formation commander should be guided by reconnaissance data regarding the

hostile mine defense, with the possibilities of having means of breaching the mine position and

the level of combat preparedness of his units.

591. Command and control of the large formation during an attack on a position should be

conducted in a planned manner. During the period of the execution of the attack, when the

necessity arises, the large formation commander posits additional, called for by the situation,

combat tasks to individual units. During the offensive against an enemy mine–artillery position,

the greatest danger is delay and anticipation of instructions, which permit the enemy to re-

establish his combat capability.

The basic instructional documents for the period of the execution of an offensive against a

position are the following:

planning table, which specifies the sequential actions of the units and their coordination

for each phase of the battle;

plans for the use of aviation and naval gunfire in combat.

The combat order for the attack, when by virtue of the developing situation the combat

actions of the large formation in the preparatory period of the offensive grow directly into

actions for execution of the attack, it is possible to have a form of combat instructions which

contain indicators of the overall goal of the actions of the large formation in the battle, in regard

to the axis of the main attack, in regard to the moment of its initiation, and the positing of

individual missions of the attacking units.

The large formation commander commands and controls the battle located, as a rule, on one

of the surface vessels among the large formation’s main forces.

3. Offensive against an Enemy Anti-submarine Position


592. An offensive against an enemy anti-submarine position should envisage careful

preparation, in the course of which it is necessary, as a rule, for aviation forces to reconnoiter the

forward and rear boundaries of the anti-submarine zone, the position of the basic obstacle lines

(mines, nets, booms), the system of the hostile guard force, the locations of hydroacoustic and

radar stations, and so on.

Preliminary strikes, which are conducted during the preparation for the breach, should

weaken the enemy’s positional equipping and disorganize the guarding of the position.

The commander of the large submarine formation, as a rule, is designated as the commander

of the maneuver formation which is executing the offensive against an enemy anti-submarine

position

593. The decision for the breach, which is made on the basis of reconnaissance data, is made

over the course of the preparatory period. The large formation commander should determine the

axis of the breach, the moment of its initiation, and the sequence of its execution, as well as the

targets of supporting strikes, the timing of their initiation, their sequence, and the required

results.

The large formation commander also envisages the necessary overall duration of the

supporting strikes, sufficient for overcoming by the submarines of the entire depth of the

obstacle or the sectors of greatest difficulty for them.

594. The construct of the combat formation, which corresponds to the concept of the

offensive against the enemy anti-submarine position, must support the established battle plan in

sequence and duration of the suppression of hostile forces and, along with this, the planned

breach of the submarines.

The combat formation during the breach of an enemy anti-submarine position, as a rule,

consists of the following elements:

tactical reconnaissance;

aviation advance guard, which has the mission of launching preliminary strikes for the

purpose of weakening the enemy’s positional means and disorganizing his guard system.

[These strikes] bear the nature of direct aviation preparation of the offensive.

main forces, which consist of strike groups and of aviation and surface vessels, which

are conducting the suppression of the guard force and maneuver forces of the anti-submarine

defense;

breaching force, consisting of several echelons of submarines, distributed along axes in

accordance with the breaching plan.

595. Tactical deployment of the large formation is conducted, as a rule, gradually, upon

signal of the large formation commander. It should condition the timely sortie of the leading

submarines to the position of the initiation of the maneuver for the breach, and also the

suppression of the enemy anti-submarine actions in the zone of the position guard, by the

moment of the submarines’ contact with it.

Supporting strikes, primarily conducted by aviation, are shifted in a planned manner into

the depth of the hostile combat formation. They are intended to accomplish successive

suppression of enemy counteractions and uninterrupted interference with his observation,

necessary for the support of our submarines’ breach.


596. Command and control of the battle during an offensive against an enemy anti-

submarine position requires rigid preliminary agreement of the actions of units by time and lines

and should envisage the independence of actions of submarines at the moment of the initiation of

their breach.

The fundamental document for organizing the breach of an anti-submarine position is the

combat instruction for breaching, which envisages basic and alternate variants of the

breakthrough, in accordance with the decision that has been made and the contents of the

necessary encoded signals. The offensive planning table is issued in supplement.

During the execution of the breach, as a rule, the large formation commander is located on a

surface vessel which is an element of the large formation main forces.

B. Raiding Actions

1. Fundamentals of Raiding Actions

597. Raiding actions of naval forces represent an equivalent of offensive combat in the

enemy’s coastal region; they achieve the following objectives:

destruction (piecemeal) of enemy forces;

holding enemy forces under constant pressure;

constraining the enemy’s freedom of action in his operational zone.

The enemy always should experience combat pressure, created by the threat of the

attack of our forces on his coastline and especially on his bases.

Raiding actions are characterized by the following: the suddenness of their execution, the

rapid tempo of the attacks, the speed of the combat, the careful preparation of forces and means

for the suppression and rapid breach of the enemy in execution of the mission.

598. The following are variants of raiding actions:

attack on an anchorage of the fleet;

attack on coastal lines of communication;

shelling of a coastline;

landing of a diversionary assault force.

599. Depending on the equipping of the enemy’s region of actions and the regime which is

supporting him in theater (the enemy’s obstacle system, shore-based defense, patrols, guards, and

reconnaissance), raiding actions are executed with simultaneous distraction of the enemy’s

attention from the main strike, or by breaching with force, overcoming resistance on the main

strike axis.

600. Success is supported by the following elements:

secrecy of preparation;

careful organization of tactical reconnaissance, with discovery of the system of defense

of the attack’s main targets’

distracting the enemy’s attention to a different axis;

special preparation of one’s own forces and means for overcoming enemy obstacles.

Command and control of the battle should be based on independence and the agreed actions

of the various forces of the large maneuver formation, which is executing the raid.


2. Attack on a Fleet Anchorage

601. An attack on a fleet should be executed by the following forces:

aviation (land- or carrier-based);

torpedo cutters, in coordination with aviation;

vessels of the fleet, together with aviation;

submarines, independently and in coordination with aviation.

602. The organization of a large maneuver formation for an attack on an enemy anchorage

envisages the presence of basic forces which launch the main strikes at the primary targets from

several directions and in an echeloned manner, and a supporting force which is launching

preliminary strikes at the boom obstacles for their destruction, suppressing or complicating the

actions of the shore-based batteries (at the time of combat) and searchlights (which are

interfering in the breach), defeating the enemy patrols, identifying lanes in the booms, and so on.

In addition, the large formation includes reconnaissance, which transitions into vectoring in

the battle.

The combat formation of the large formation that is executing the raid is divided into a

forward detachment and the main forces.

The mission of the forward detachment is to support the main forces’ approach to the fleet

anchorage and to provide reliable orientation for the attack.

603. During the preparation for the raid on the anchorage, the chief of staff, in accordance

with the large formation commander’s concept, should do the following:

organize reconnaissance of the base the enemy’s fleet anchorage defensive system;

develop the plan for the raid;

organize the preparation of the means and forces for the raid.

During the execution of reconnaissance, it is necessary to mask the concept of the raid

itself.

The plan for the raid necessarily envisions a preliminary and a main strike on the place and at

the time, to agree upon the actions of the strike and support groups for the most effective defeat

through the entire depth of the defense on the axis of the main attack, and to determine the

procedure for covering the withdrawal.

604. Deployment for the initiation of the battle during an attack on an enemy anchorage

should be executed secretly, as a rule in the dark period of the day, with consideration for

executing the missions and rolling up of the forces for withdrawal by the onset of daylight and

the concentration of enemy forces capable of inflicting a responding strike on the large

formation.

606. The large formation commander bases his command and control of the battle on close

coordination of the strike and supporting groups which are maintaining contact between them

and the independence of their actions, and as well on the secrecy of the deployment of his forces.

Therefore, command and control of the attacking groups should envisage a modest number of

signals which specify only the basic phases of the raid.

3. Attack on Coastal Lines of Communication


606. An attack on coastal lines of communication incurs losses, constrains the enemy’s

freedom of actions in his operational zone, and disorganizes hostile transport by sea. The targets

of a raid can be units of the enemy’s combat forces and his transport means.

An attack on coastal lines of communication requires reliable coordination of operational and

tactical reconnaissance, which supports the correct orientation of the forces which are executing

the mission of the attack and the purposes of their strikes.

Systematic change in its forms and methods, and as well the surprise of its execution, which

should complicate the enemy’s organization of counteractions, has special significance for the

success of the attack.

607. An attack on coastal lines of communication, depending on its remoteness from the

attacking force’s base and the visibility conditions, can have several varieties:

an attack on hostile lines of communication located near the attacker’s base; this

form of raid, as a rule, is executed by torpedo cutters and aviation;

an attack on hostile lines of communication located distant from the attacker’s base;

this form or raid, as a rule, is executed by submarines and aviation;

During both the first and second variants, in favorable conditions of the situation, surface

vessels can be used; the effects of which on the enemy can achieve the results of the attack. The

use of surface vessels for raids on enemy coastal lines of communication requires reliable cover

of their actions against hostile air strikes.

An attack in good and average visibility conditions is executed by various forces; among

them, as a rule, aviation has special significance.

An attack in poor visibility conditions is executed primarily by torpedo forces (including

torpedo-bearing aircraft).

608. The combat formation of a large formation during the attack on hostile lines of

communication includes the following elements:

tactical reconnaissance, which executes the tasks of pre-reconnaissance of the enemy

and the vectoring to it of the our own forces;

strike groups, which execute the raid, in the composition of which are groups designated

for support of the actions of the attacking forces by constraining enemy movement,

distracting his attention, emplacement of smokescreens, and so on;

covering group, as a rule consisting of a portion of the air forces, which have their own

assignment to support the withdrawal of the strike groups after the raid on the enemy.

During the use of surface vessels for the attack, the large formation combat formation takes

on the form characteristic for an offensive against an enemy at sea.

In poor visibility conditions, the number of strike groups is increased by reducing the number

of entities in each of them and the combat formation of the large formation is extended in

accordance with the plan for the search for the enemy.

609. During the preparation of the attack, the large formation commander should give special

attention to the following actions:

organization of pre-reconnaissance of the enemy, reducing the time parameters between

the moments of the appearance of the reconnaissance assets within view of the enemy and


the initiation of the strike, with the impossibility of maintaining the secrecy of the

observation;

maintenance of the secrecy of the executed deployment for creation of start positions and

closing with the enemy;

organization of the struggle with enemy reconnaissance.

610. Tactical deployment for a strike during a raid on hostile lines of communication

located close to the attacker’s base, as a rule, is conducted rapidly, upon encoded signal of the

large formation commander.

The actions of the strike groups, directed at suppression or distraction of the attention of the

enemy’s guard force and constraining the mobility of the basic target of the strike should create

the necessary conditions for execution of the tasks of all the attacking groups.

611. During the attack on the hostile lines of communication, tactical deployment from the

attacker’s base and tactical deployment for strikes launched by submarines are conducted

gradually by conjoining them on the enemy’s movement courses.

612. The main strike during the attack on hostile coastal lines of communication, for the

purpose of reducing the duration of the combat engagement, as a rule is launched directly on the

basic hostile target, the destruction of which is the purpose of the actions. This is achieved by

simultaneous breach of the enemy guard force, which is executed by all the strike groups, which

are supporting each other by their attacks and suppression of the enemy guards or distracting

their attention.

613. The development of success during the raid includes the destruction of the enemy

vessels damaged by the attacks, which should be carried out by attacking units with remaining

ordnance.

The large formation commander, based on the concrete situation, should determine by his

signals the moment of termination of the battle, not subjecting without dire necessity his own

forces to danger of destruction by the hostile cover or enemy reserves brought to the battle scene.

614. The withdrawal of the large formation after executing the raid mission is supported by

covering forces, which by this time the large formation commander should have designated as

their mission.

615. In poor visibility conditions, the execution of the raid mission against enemy coastal

lines of communication require from the large formation commander the organization of a search

for the enemy for launching the main strike against him.

In conditions of a confined or broken up [as regards the terrain] region, the large formation

commander can organize the launching of a strike on the enemy with torpedo cutters or

submarines, which have been deployed in patrol screens on the enemy’s route of movement.

616. The large formation commander exercises command and control of a raid on enemy

coastal lines of communication from a shore-based command post (positioned as close as

possible to the battle region), and in the presence in the composition of the large formation of

surface vessels – from one of them. Liaison officers from the large submarine and aviation

formations should be collocated with the large formation commander.

During the presence of the large formation commander at a shore-based command post or on

one of the surface vessels, which is in the covering force, he commands and controls the actions


of units by means of issuing instructions regarding the clarification of the situation, and from the

initiation of tactical deployment hands over broad initiative to the strike group commanders.

During the presence of the large formation commander on a surface vessel which is an

element of one of the strike groups, he, as a rule, personally commands the group, executing

command and control of the large formation by issuing combat instructions.

The basic combat document for organization of a raid on enemy coastal lines of

communication is the combat instruction for an attack, which includes encoded signals.

4. Shelling of a Coastline

617. Shelling of an enemy coastline is conducted for the following purposes:

destruction of shore-based enemy infrastructure (plants, warehouses, railroad bridges, and

so on);

reconnaissance of the coastline by fire;

demonstration actions for distracting the enemy’s firing assets and attention to a false

direction;

increasing the pressure on the forces of the enemy coastal defense.

Depending on the nature of the mission and the situation in the region of actions, forces are

designate for the conduct of shelling.

The strike (firing) group, acting against a single target, should not consist of more than two

firing vessels;

The support group contains guard vessels and cutters and aviation, which are executing

tasks of combat support of the strike (firing) group and adjusting the artillery fires.

During the shelling of several shore-based targets, several strike (firing) groups and

supporting groups are created, under the overall leadership of the large formation (division)

commander.

618. During the preparation of the plan for the conduct of shelling, which is being developed

by the large formation staff, the following provisions should be envisaged:

calculations [estimates] and preliminary drawing up of the maneuvering of the strike

groups, in several variants for the anticipated situation;

special combat preparation of the firing vessels for the execution of their assigned tasks;

organization of the summoning of aviation for cover and for support of fire (adjustment

and illumination).

619. The shelling of the coastline should be conducted at the distances [ranges] of fire

most favorable successful accomplishment of the assigned mission.

During the selection of the capabilities and methods of shelling, the large formation

commander should consider that the shelling by vessels of a piece of terrain, as a rule, does not

give satisfactory results and practically can only affect the morale of the enemy. An exception

might be the case of shelling of areas of insignificant size, under conditions of precise knowledge

by the firing vessel, of their locations.

During the execution of our own fire missions, the large formation should conduct

combat with the enemy which is counteracting the shelling. This is achieved by creating


interference with enemy radar, suppression of his counter-fires, and defeat of his

counterattacking forces, and also by cover which is executed by specially designated forces.

620. During the presence of several strike (firing) groups on each axis (combat sector), the

execution of tasks and coordination with supporting groups is supervised by the strike (firing)

group commander.

The overall leadership of the battle, by its phases, is executed upon signals of the large

maneuver formation commander.

5. Amphibious Landing of a Reconnaissance–Diversionary Force

621. A reconnaissance–diversionary force can be amphibiously landed with the following

missions:

the conduct of reconnaissance and delivery of scouts to an enemy coastline;

the conduct of diversionary actions for the purpose of destroying coastal strongpoints,

shore batteries, SNiS posts, radio transmitters, communication nodes, the demolition of

bridges and other infrastructure, mining the enemy’s road network, and so on;

the capture of live prisoners;

the reception from shore of our own scouts and diversionary parties upon completion by

them of their missions.

622. Reconnaissance–diversionary landings are executed by reconnaissance units of naval

infantry, and in some cases, special teams (sapper–demolitions, engineer–assault).

Depending on the mission and target of diversionary actions, a party [group] can be

designated in composition from reinforced company to, on rare occasion, a battalion, to small

groups of 2–3 men for the reconnaissance–diversionary force.

623. A reconnaissance–diversionary detachment can be delivered to shore in the following

manner:

on combat vessels, both surface and submerged [submarine];

on amphibious assault means (motor boats, cutters, fishing boats, sailboats, and so on);

by aircraft, utilizing parachute insertion.

624. The reconnaissance–diversionary landing should be conducted in secrecy; its

preparation, the landing site, and site of pickup are especially important to conceal. The landing of a reconnaissance–diversionary force should be conducted simultaneously with

other actions of large maneuver formations (shelling of a coastline, attack on a fleet anchorage,

and so on), often as a component of those actions or independently. In this case the commander

of the large maneuver formation organizes demonstration actions at several points

simultaneously to distract the enemy’s attention.

625. During the landing of the reconnaissance–diversionary force, for precise delineation of

the actions on shore, the landing detachment should be divided into the following groups:

for seizure of control of the shoreline in the landing area;

for covering the flanks and rear;

for capture of strongpoints and exploring the terrain;

for demolition of designated targets on shore.

626. The withdrawal to shore for pickup and the pickup itself of the reconnaissance–

diversionary parties, in the case when in the given region such activities are not recommended


for execution, for the purposes of their best support they can be accomplished with the cover of

naval gunfire and aviation.

627. The preparation of the reconnaissance–diversionary force is conducted on terrain that is

closest to the terrain at the landing site, and requires organization of training in embarkation and

landing.

The preparation should be conducted in daylight as well as in night conditions.

628. The plan for diversion, depending on how it is organized, is developed by the staff of

the large maneuver formation, together with the commander of the reconnaissance–diversionary

detachment (party), and approved by the large formation commander.


Chapter 12

Combat of a Large Formation for the Landing of an Amphibious Assault Force

1. Fundamentals of Combat for an Amphibious Landing

629. The large formation’s battle for an amphibious landing is a basic phase of the naval

portion of the amphibious assault operation.

The battle for the landing of the assault force includes the approach to a shore under the

enemy’s control that has been designated for the landing of troops, their landing on the shore,

and the securing by them of a landing bridgehead, for the purpose of supporting the subsequent

development of combat actions on the enemy’s coastline.

The landing bridgehead is a portion of the coastline, the capture of which supports the

possibility of landing and deploying for subsequent offensive actions the main forces of the

assault and deprives the enemy of the capability of defeating the vessels and landing forces at

their landing points with rifle, machine gun, and precision artillery and mortar fires, both from

the flanks and from the depths. Depending on the composition of the assault force and the terrain

conditions (forest, hills, and so on), the dimensions of the bridgehead may be varied.

The battle for the landing is considered completed with the landing on shore and deployment

on the coastline of all the troops of the assault force – with their armaments and supplies

necessary for initiating subsequent actions.

630. The following peculiarities pertain to an offensive by ground troops which have been

landed on a defended enemy shore:

successive accumulation of forces and means on the enemy coast that has been seized;

the impossibility of massive introduction into combat of tanks and ground artillery in the

initial period of the battle;

the vulnerability of the troops of the assault force during their approach to the shore from

artillery and mortar fire, attacks from the sea and air, which create the threat of and even the

total prevention of the advancement of the troops and their suppies.

Once initiated, a landing should be conducted until the end with all its energy,

persistence, and decisiveness.

If the landing is unsuccessful at one point or in sector, it should be shifted to a place where

success is being developed.

631. A demonstration landing is a landing of troops on a secondary, but for the enemy still

significant axis, conducted for the purpose of distracting the enemy’s attention from the landing

of troops on the axis of the main attack and requiring the enemy to bring up his tactical reserves

to the site of the demonstration landing.

The vessels and troop units which are conducting the landing for demonstration purposes

should set about their concrete mission in consonance with their forces; they should conduct their

actions energetically and persistently.

632. A false landing can be considered as a landing which only imitates a genuine landing of

troops, at the same time the troop units are actually conducting a landing at another location.


633. Upon the gaining of success of the landing in a sector or at a point of a demonstration

landing, the forces executing it can develop success, now refocused on the demonstration sector

(point) by the efforts of following echelons and reserves, and shifting the axis of the main strike

of the landing upon a confirmed failed landing to an earlier selected axis.

634. The battle for the landing can occur in various conditions:

the landing of an assault on the shoreline of a sea: in this case, the battle for the

landing has the nature of a surprise deployment of naval forces in front of a chosen sector of

an enemy coastline, supported by the naval gunfire and aviation suppression of enemy

resistance and the occupation by ground forces of a landing bridgehead on the shore.

The landing of an assault in an island (skerrie) region, and also a sea crossing: in this

case, the battle for the landing is initiated with the accumulation of forces on a start line that

is closely located to the enemy coastline, and is supported by powerful fire support of the

crossing of forces by shore-based artillery from firing positions distributed at the start line.

635. The direct landing of the assault can be executed in various forms:

a landing with means specially constructed for that purpose;

a landing from combat surface vessels or from submarines;

a landing from special or equipped for this purpose transport vessels, with transfer of the

assault force [from the transport vessel] to landing assets;

a landing from aircraft by means of dropping the assault forc by parachute or landing on

earlier seized landing fields;

a landing from unit-level crossing means (pontoons of all types, amphibious trucks,

rubber and collapsible boats), and also with at-hand means (fishing boats, seiners, yachts, and

so on).

2. Combat for Landing an Amphibious Force on a Sea Coastline

636. The landing of an assault on a sea coastline can be conducted in both day and night, on

an unequipped coastline and directly into a port, with preliminary artillery [naval gunfire] and

aviation working over of landing points and without it. The senior commander of the landing

operation makes the decision regarding these issues. The large maneuver force commander

(landing detachment) – the landing commander, is responsible for detailed development of the

landing plan and the battle planning, jointly with and the commander of the force being landed –

assault force commander.

637. The selection of the landing region is made by the overall commander of the landing

operation. The designation of the specific landing site of each detachment that is executing in a

sector of the coastline assigned to him is carried out by the commander of the landing

detachment jointly with the commander of the assault force, in regard to the selection of landing

points in his sector.

The selection of landing points demand careful confirmation of the data regarding the

enemy (number of troops, fire means, defensive fortifications, possible bringing forward of

reserves), regarding the terrain in the landing area (relief, vegetation, nature of soil, presence of

docks and piers, roads, potable water, structures), regarding the tidal in- and outflow, the nature

of the sea floor near the shore, the presence of anti-landing obstacles in the water, and the system

of guard forces on the seaward approaches to the landing points.


These data should be confirmed by photographic and, when possible, navigational, engineer,

and minesweeping reconnaissance.

638. In all cases, during the preparation for combat the landing commander should conduct

a commander’s reconnaissance of the landing sector (from aircraft, surface vessel, or

submarine). The landing commander and assault force commander should personally participate

in the reconnaissance. In addition, when possible, the commandants of the landing points and

commanders of forward detachments, and as well the commanders of vessel support

detachments, of the landing means, the flag-level specialists of the landing detachment, and the

chiefs of branches of troops of the assault force being landed [should participate in this

reconnaissance].

639. The large maneuver formation that has been designated for execution of the battle for

the landing is called the landing detachment, and consists of the following forces:

the ground force large formation of the landing;

units (large formations) of naval infantry with their landing means;

detachments of transports and landing assets;

detachments of vessel support, which have the mission of fire support of the assault

landing;

the forces which are supporting the deployment in battle for the landing and the landing

of the assault on the coast (minesweepers, subchasers, patrol vessels and cutters);

units (large formations) of naval aviation (reconnaissance, interceptor, low-level attack,

and bomber).

640. The coastal belt in the landing sector which is equipped during the landing with docks,

warehouses, trenches, shelters, and defensive fortifications is the landing base and serves the

following purposes:

concentration of the landing forces and their deployment during transition to the

offensive;

the organization of medical treatment and evacuation of the sick and wounded;

the creation in this belt of temporary transit supply dumps and axes of flow of cargoes for

troop units;

the anti-landing defense of the rear area of the landed forces;

cover of a withdrawing landing force.

As a rule, the naval infantry large formation commander is designate as the commandant of

the landing base and its garrison comprises the naval infantry with their accompanying floating

means and special commands.

A landing point commandant is designated for each landing point (as a rule, the

commander of the naval infantry subunit which is occupying the given landing point).

641. Command and control of the battle until the completion of the landing of the assault

force is executed by the landing commander. The assault force commander, who is also his

deputy for ground units, is located together with the landing commander and, from the moment

of the deposit of the assault force on shore, commands and controls their direct actions on shore.

He goes to the shore together with the landing of the main body assault forces. In preparation for

the landed forces to initiate the execution of their subsequent mission on shore, command and

control of the battle is shifted to the assault force commander. This moment is determined by the


report of the assault force commander in regard to his preparedness for independent actions to

the landing commander.

642. The commander of the large naval infantry formation is the deputy commander of the

landing for command and control of the actions of the naval infantry during their seizure of the

landing base.

With the landing of the first wave of the forward detachments (as a rule, consisting of a

naval infantry unit), the large naval infantry formation commander goes ashore for organize of

the landing base and its defense.

643. The battle for landing the assault force on a sea shore includes two basic periods:

the period of the battle for seizure of the landing base;

the period of the battle for seizure of the landing bridgehead.

The battle for the seizure of the landing base consists of the following elements:

deployment of the landing assets and forces supporting the landing;

breach of the enemy’s guard zone on the water and on shore, by combined actions of the

forces of the first wave and forward detachments, and also by the forces of ship-board

support and aviation;

seizure of the shoreline belt and the organization on it of a landing base.

The battle for seizure of the landing bridgehead consists of the following elements:

pushing the enemy away into the depth of the territory by forward detachments of the

assault with support from the sea and air;

breach of the enemy’s defensive belt by assault forces designated for this purpose, their

departure to the forward edge of the bridgehead, and digging in there.

644. During the organization of the battle for the landing, the landing commander, together

with the assault force commander, is obligated to take the following actions:

foremost of all, to establish the landing bridgehead that is necessary for the support

of success, along with its forward edge (the first task of the assault force on shore), and

as well, together with the large formation (unit) naval infantry commander, establish the line

of cover for the landing base;

determine for the forces at his disposal the sector of coastal frontage of the landing;

establish the quantity and disposition of landing points for the first wave of the forward

detachments in accordance with the selected axis of the attack of the ground forces for

occupation of the landing bridgehead, and also designate alternate landing points;

determine the axis of the main attack on shore and corresponding landing points

designated for execution of the landing of his ground forces;

establish the composition of forces and means of the assault force that will be brought

ashore after the occupation of the landing bridgehead;

organize anti-landing and anti-air defense of his flanks with units of naval infantry, with

attached PVO forces, and also guard from seaward and the air for the landing detachment

forces;

establish the procedure [sequence] of re-embarkation of the force upon completion of the

battle for the coastline or in the event of termination of the operation.


The selection of the main axis of the landing is determined by the choice of the primary

axis of the actions of the assault forces on shore.

645. The commander of the landing should envisage overcoming by the landing detachment

of the enemy’s mine–artillery position, if such a position is deployed in front of the landing

sector, and also overcoming the enemy guard force at sea, organizing for these general situations

for combat in the enemy coastal zone.

646. When landing forces on transports and assault vessels, the landing commander is

obligated, taking into consideration the use of his forces in battle for the landing, to distribute

them throughout the transports in such a manner as to support at each landing point the rapid

landing of forces and their introduction into the battle.

In addition, during the preparation for the battle, he is obligated to undertake the following

measures:

develop the disposition of the transports in the battle for the landing, with consideration

for possible change in the axis of the main landing;

determine the sequence of offloading of the transports and the site of their [subsequent]

assembly;

distribute the landing assets and determine their grouping, subordination, and formation

of their movement to the landing site;

select the initial line for the landing assets.

647. The battle for the landing, as a rule, is calculated and the landing of the main body of the

assault force is conducted based on the estimate that the battle for the landing bridgehead will be

concluded during daylight hours and, upon its consolidation, the landing of the remaining assault

units will continue during darkness.

648. The battle for the landing envisages the following phases:

reconnaissance of the landing points;

seizure of the landing points and equipping them for the purpose of subsequent landing of

the assault forces;

fire support of the seizure of the landing points, and also for the forces being landed for

the capture of the landing bridgehead;

aviation support of the capture of a base and landing bridgehead by means of conducting

bombing and low-level attacks, the landing of an air assault force, and counter actions against

enemy ground force and aviation counteractions;

support of the landing base against enemy attacks from the sea and air.

649. Reconnaissance of the landing sector should be organized by the landing detachment

commander for the purpose of confirming existing data regarding the depth of the enemy’s

defense, the location of his shore artillery batteries, and the nearest reserves which can mount an

anti-landing defense.

The landing detachment’s reconnaissance is continuous from the initiation of preparation of

the battle for the landing. By the initiation of the landing, it should provide information which

details the enemy’s defense for the ultimate construct of the combat formation of the forces

being landed.


In the initial period of the battle for the landing, air reconnaissance, reconnaissance and

forward units of naval infantry are gathering data regarding the firing system and obstacles in the

enemy’s anti-landing defense, which are necessary for command and control of the landing, the

rendering of support to the forces, the axis of the landing of forward detachments, and the

landing of the main assault force, and as well the axis of movement of the forces after landing.

650. By the seizure of the landing points, their stubborn occupation, and forward

movement for the purpose of forcing the enemy to withdraw from the water’s edge and to

deprive him of the possibility of using heavy infantry firing means – naval infantry units

should support the movement to shore of the assault’s main forces.

651. The seizure of the landing base, as a rule, is conducted on a broad front with the

execution of a maneuver of supporting and demonstrating groups of the assault force. Mainly for

this purpose naval infantry units are used which have been placed in the composition of the

landing detachments as elements of the first wave of forward detachments and which maneuver

by their own landing assets.

652. The combat formation of the forces of the first wave of a forward detachment during the approach to the landing point should be echeloned in landing means (2–3 waves) and

include the necessary reinforcing units, the landing commands, engineer [sapper] commands for

the construction of temporary piers, and fire-adjustment teams for naval shelling. The following

units of the forward detachments are in landing assets right behind the first wave to the landing

points.

The landing of the forces of the first wave of the forward detachments should follow at a

distance from each other so that they do not come under the enemy’s destructive fires

simultaneously, and preserve the capability of changing the axis of their intended strike.

Coordination between the waves establishes the suppression of enemy resistance which has been

identified by the forward rush of the first wave.

653. The landing of the forces of the first wave, if it is unable to secure a sufficiently

complete surprise, requires reliable suppression of the enemy’s resistance by preliminary

artillery and air preparation. During this action, the shifting of artillery is conducted upon

the approach of the first wave to the shoreline edge, upon signal of the commander of the

first wave.

654. The naval infantry units that have landed on the shore at each landing point should

block and destroy enemy firing points for the purpose of occupying a line for covering the

landing and subsequently to continue the attack into the depth of the enemy’s territory, together

with the field forces of the landing to a distance from the shore of 5–7 kilometers under the

overall command of the forward detachment commander.

From the moment of the departure of the forward detachment beyond the line of cover of the

landing base, the naval infantry, on order of the forward detachment commander, withdraws to

the coastline for direct defense of the landing base or for re-formation and preparation for a new

operation and is again placed in direct subordination to the naval infantry large formation

commander.

655. Following are the basic instructional documents for the battle for the landing:

the order for the battle after the landing, in which the concept of the landing

commander should include “the first task of the assault force on shore”;


the planning table for the landing battle;

the coordination schematic for the landing of the assault force.

656. Fire support of the seizure of the landing points and the battle of the landing forces for

capture of the landing base consists of the following requirements:

suppression of the fires of shore-based and field artillery batteries, machine guns, and

mortars, positioned both in the open, as well as encased in permanent and semi-permanent

fortifications;

destruction of enemy personnel which are deployed at the forward edge, in the depth of

the defense, and on the flanks of the landing region, and also the suppression of their combat

actions;

prevention of the approach to the landing points of enemy reserves, both infantry and

motorized and armored units;

accompaniment by fire of the first wave of the forward detachments, by the suppression

of targets which were not identified earlier;

placement of barrier fire on the flanks and on armor-threatening axes;

participation in a “fire wall” and the subsequent concentration of fire at nodes of

resistance and accumulations of enemy forces.

657. The landing commander plans the artillery support for the landing, with the attached

senior naval infantry artillery commander and the senior commander of the artillery assault

[force] for organization of the offensive against the shore, with the purpose of seizing the landing

bridgehead on the basis of a common battle plan.

The plan for the employment of artillery in the battle for the landing contains

calculations [estimates] for the planning of artillery support:

a) during the seizure of the landing base;

b) during capture of the landing bridgehead.

658. Command and control of the artillery of the assault force, by degree of its commitment

to action during the landing, is consolidated in the commander of the artillery assault force.

Command and control of the naval gunfire support for the assault during the battle is

executed upon instructions of the flag-level artillery staff of the landing, initially on the basis of

the demand [call] of the naval infantry artillery commander and commanders of the landed

forward detachments, and with the landing on the shore of the senior commander of the artillery

of the assault on the demand [call] of the latter.

Overall supervision of the fires of all vessels and assault force artillery at shore and naval

targets before the conclusion of the battle for the landing remains with the landing commander.

After the landing of the landing force commander and his report to the landing commander that

he is prepared to execute his subsequent mission, target designation for naval gunfire at shore-

based targets is executed by the landing force commander, and for targets at sea – it remains with

the landing force commander.

The vessel supporting detachment, as a rule, continues its shelling support to the landing

force and supports it against attack from seaward.

659. Aviation support of the battle for the landing is based on the following actions:


reconnaissance of the sea axis during deployment of the landing detachment for combat

and subsequent observation of the landing sector and approaches to it from the sea;

reconnaissance of the land axis, the defensive and rear-area belts of the enemy, of

flanking axes, of ground routes, and of approaches of reserves;

adjustment of the fires of naval vessels;

destruction and suppression of the fire of batteries, firing points, and also of enemy

personnel, both independently and in cooperation with naval gunfire;

delivery of masking smokescreens during the deployment and landing of the assault force

and the isolation of the sector of the landing from neighboring sectors;

direct cover of the landing with interceptor aviation;

the landing, in a favorable situation of parachute assault forces with the mission to seize

landing points, shore batteries, and nodes of communication routes [road intersections].

660. The basic aviation unit designated for supporting the actions of the landing detachment

in the period of the battle for the landing is a combined [mixed] aviation group, the commander

of which, as a rule, is located at the flag-level command post of the landing force commander.

The plan for the use of aviation in the battle for the landing is assembled by the aviation

group commander together with the staff of the landing force and approved by the commander of

the landing force.

Calls for aviation in the conduct of the battle for support to the naval infantry and land-based

forces of the assault force are executed by the aviation group commander upon demand [call] of

the naval infantry large formation commander and the assault force commander.

In the presence of army aviation which is participating in the battle for the landing, its

command and control during the course of the combat is executed through the aviation group

commander of the landing detachment.

3. Combat for Landing an Amphibious Force in an Island (Skerrie) Region

661. The landing of an assault in an island region differs from a landing on an open coastline,

having a number of advantages over it:

the movement across the water expanse (by sea) is significantly shorter and, as a rule,

proceeds under the cover of shore-based means (artillery, both shore and field, shore-based

aviation, and so on);

the attacking force, executing a series of repeated crossings, have the possibility of broad

use of small, river-type crossing assets all the way down to makeshift level.

At the same time, a number of difficulties also are incurred for the landing:

in skerries and island regions, the actions of heavily armed vessels are problematic, as a

rule, due to their large draught and length;

the defending force has the possibility of broad employment in superiority of the defense

in a confined area;

as a rule, the actions of artillery with grazing fires are complicated in cross-

compartmentalized terrain.

662. Combat for the landing of forces in an island region consists of the following phases:


consolidation in an earlier captured portion of the island region, as a launching position

for the crossings;

seizure of the junctions of channels (in the skerries), and also in the islands which

comprise the basis of the given island region;

exits to the mainland in the island region and the organization of anti-landing defense of

the portion of the landing, for the defense against its return seizure by the enemy’s

countermeasures.

The creation of a launching [starting] position for the crossings is conducted gradually, in

a concealed manner, and its mandatory consolidation, as a rule, by naval infantry units.

663. An earlier captured island or external edge of the skerrie should be equipped with

artillery positions (and heavy mortar positions) for fire support of the forces pushing into the

depth of the island region, with shelters, with piers and equipment for rapid transfer of troop-

required cargoes.

With the movement into the depth of the island region (skerries), the occupied islands should

be equipped with positions for shore-based artillery; channels that are not being used by the

assault force should be barricaded; obstacles should be emplaced in the primary channels.

664. The forward detachment, which as a rule consists of naval infantry units, reinforce

with sappers, chemical reconnaissance units, mortar units, and howitzer artillery, operates along

axes selected by the landing commander with the support of armored cutters.

665. The selection of landing points of the forward detachment and the main axis of the

landing is made on the same fundamentals as in combat for a landing along a coastline of the

open sea, with the calculation of the subsequent exit to the mainland in conditions which are

more favorable for the approach of transports and assault landing assets with troop-required

cargoes and forces.

The landing of the main landing forces begins with the moment of the penetration of the

forward detachment into the depth of the defended region (skerries) to a depth which will ensure

the successful landing of the main forces.

666. Artillery and aviation working over of the enemy’s defense has, in addition to the

tasks that are executed in a battle for the landing on the coastline of an open sea, has tasks for the

isolation by fire of the islands that are not being occupied by the landing force and of channels

that the enemy is not using.

During the crossing of narrows, the width of which permits the use of shore-based and field

artillery, this artillery is assigned the task of working over and suppressing the enemy defense. In

doing this, the field artillery should displace closer to the water’s edge.

667. Islands between shores in narrows (strait, bay) are occupied in the first place for the

deployment on them of field artillery and the creation of a line of accumulation of landing forces,

and also as intermediate supply bases.

668. The landing commander with his staff is located where they can conduct the most

suitable command and control of the landing. This place, as a rule, is a combat vessel, or a shore-

based command post with appropriate equipment.

The flag-level vessel (shore command post) is provided with mobile means of

communication (aircraft, cutters, ground vehicles).


4. Return Embarkation of an Amphibious Landing Force

669. The return embarkation of a landing force is conducted in the following situations:

upon termination of the operation after the execution of the mission of the assault force

on shore;

upon termination of an initiated assault landing for various causes.

The return embarkation of a landing force can occur in conditions of passive enemy actions

and under direct energetic attacks of the enemy.

670. The commander of the landing detachment, during the decision of the mission for return

embarkation of the landing force, is required to accomplish the following actions:

support the loading site of the force against enemy attack from the sea and air;

support the defense of the points of the return embarkation of the landing force against

enemy vessels and ground forces;

support the re-insertion of the assault detachment [the vessels] into the movement order.

When drawing up the battle plan for the landing, considering the return embarkation,

the landing commander is required, along with the landing force commander, to resolve

the issues of the defense of the withdrawal of ground forces and the landing base, and as

well to establish the procedures of exchange of the ground forces at the forward edge of the

defense of the landing base with naval infantry units.

Special attention should be given to the flanks of the sector of return embarkation of the

assault force.

671. The forces which are supporting the return embarkation prepare in advance a zone of

cover of the re-embarkation.

Engineer fortifications and obstacles with flames and explosives are broadly employed at the

front of the forward edge. In the zone of cover, as a rule, a series of intermediate and intersecting

positions is created, which have the purpose to delay the enemy’s advance.

Naval infantry forces should prepare positions of direct cover of the landing base (re-

embarkation) with the mission to hold off the advancing enemy until complete evacuation of

the ground forces.

672. The fire support vessels, in the event of the evacuation of the assault force, are

redistributed between the cover units and conduct fires on their call.

The positions of direct cover of the landing base are selected with consideration of the most

complete use of naval gunfire support and the ordnance capabilities of the landing force’s naval

infantry.

673. Aviation which is participating in the battle with low-level and bombing attacks,

together with naval gunfire, are required to delay the advance of the enemy, acting against his

personnel, tanks and artillery, on calls of the assault force commander and naval infantry large

formation.

Interceptor aviation and PVO units, and as well the anti-aircraft means of the vessels and

naval infantry, create a powerful PVO for the re-embarkation.


674. The re-embarkation of the troop units and their cargoes and materiel components for

the landing assets or transports is conducted upon the instructions of the landing base

commander.

The sequence of the withdrawal of the assault force and loading of troops, equipment, and

supplies is determined by order of the landing commander in accordance with the decision made

by him, jointly with the assault force commander, in the battle for the withdrawal of the force.

675. Naval infantry units of the landing detachment are required stubbornly to defend the

landing base during the re-embarkation of the landing force. Only after loading of the ground

forces can they begin their withdrawal to their own landing assets.

The naval infantry landing assets remain for the entire time of the battle at the disposal of the

naval infantry unit commanders. Their use by the commandants of the re-embarkation points for

movement of troops and supplies to the transports is possible only upon the required return of

them to the shore before the beginning of the withdrawal of the naval infantry.

676. Command and control of the re-embarkation is executed by the landing commander,

who is located in a place where he can satisfactorily supervise. Command and control of the

combat of the ground forces unto their withdrawal to the position of direct cover of the landing

base is executed by the landing force commander. Upon movement of the ground forces through

the position of direct cover of the landing base to the shoreline, the naval infantry large

formation commander exercise command.

The senior naval infantry commander at the time of battle is located on shore and departs

with the latter only when the basic portion of naval infantry has been loaded onto their landing

assets.

677. In all cases of a re-embarkation of the landing force, the landing commander is

required to support the re-embarkation of all soldiers [fighting men] and officers, and

foremost of all the wounded.

The landing commander bears responsibility equally with the landing force commander for

any materiel left on shore – ammunition and other military cargoes, which remain in a condition

that the enemy can exploit in their use.


Chapter 13

Defeating an Enemy Amphibious Assault Landing

1. Fundamentals of an Anti-amphibious Defense of a Coastline

678. The defeat of a hostile amphibious landing is a decisive phase of an anti-landing

operation and is executed in the close coordination of naval forces with the ground forces that are

positioned on the coast, along with their aviation.

Combat with an enemy amphibious assault force that is attempting to land on the coast is conducted by naval forces by means of inflicting on him strikes on the approach of the enemy

assault detachment to the shore, during the offloading of the assault force from the transports

onto the landing assets, and by driving back into the water the assault units that have landed.

This is accomplished by fire and the counter-maneuver of naval infantry and shore defense units.

[These efforts are conducted] with the support of naval forces, ground forces, and their long-

range artillery and aviation, which are executing the defense of the coast.

Combat with an enemy which has landed on the coast and is developing their offensive

for the purpose of seizure of a landing bridgehead that is necessary to him is conducted by means

of execution of counter-strikes by ground-based forces, which have been concentrated quickly

from the depth and flanks to the landing sector, by encirclement and destruction of the assault

force. [This action is] supported by naval forces (shore-based artillery, vessels, naval aviation

and naval infantry.

679. The mission of defending a coastline on the whole lies with the forces of the coastal

front. Overall command during the defeat of an enemy amphibious assault on a sector of

the coast should be unified and laid out [designated or assigned] in preliminary instructions

of the commander-in-chief of the coastal front, depending on the situation, to the naval or

ground forces commander.

As a rule, in the battle for the landing of the assault, the commander of the large formation

naval forces supervised directly the unified actions of naval and ground force units up to the

enemy’s landing on shore.

From the moment of the landing of the enemy’s forward detachments on shore, the

commander who is exercising command and control of the forces reports this by signal. Units of

the fleet transition into his subordination or support him, depending on the procedure which was

defined earlier.

The naval commander bears responsibility for preparation for defeat of the landing of the

assault force on shore. The procedure for the subordination to him [the naval commander] of the

ground force units at the time of the execution of this mission should be determined ahead of

time.

The forces commander is responsible for the preparation for the battle with the assault force

on shore.

680. The defeat of the enemy assault landing on shore can have various forms, depending on

the conditions of the battle.

Defeat of the amphibious assault landing on the sea coast in the area of the VMB makes

possible the use of the fleet forces (both those permanently assigned to the VMB as well as those


based on the VMB) and aviation, which is placed at the disposal of the fleet (MOR) command for

conducting combined actions with the VMB in anti-amphibious landing defense. In these

conditions, the dedication to the defense of ground force garrisons and the use of [ground] lines

of communications for their maneuver are facilitated.

Defeat of the amphibious assault landing on the sea coast in an area outside the VMB

region requires the organization of a special detachment of anti-landing defense (PDO

detachment) consisting of various branch forces and capable of executing maneuver in an island

region.

681. The defeat of the amphibious landing of the hostile force in combination with ground

forces requires the following actions:

agreement on the plans for reconnaissance of the naval large formation and the ground

forces and uninterrupted exchange by them of reconnaissance data;

agreement on the plans of actions of the naval large formation and ground forces and

organization of mutual information [exchange];

organization of the fire system of the forward edge of the defense of the coastal belt and

the barrier system on the seaward approaches, and also near and on the shore;

organization of the deployment of forces of the naval large formation and the maneuver

groups of the ground forces during the various battle preparations, depending on the

situation;

drawing up of an overall plan for the employment in combat of naval and ground force

aviation, and also vessel, shore-based, and [ground forces] artillery for strikes on the enemy

amphibious assault force at sea, on the approach to the shore, and on shore.

2. Defeating an Amphibious Landing on the Shore of a Seacoast

682. The battle in a sector of the enemy’s amphibious assault landing with the goal of

preventing his force from reaching the shore is conducted successfully when the enemy has been

detected in a timely manner on his approach from the sea, has received a number of strikes on

the water, and is approaching the shore having suffered significant lose of his combat capability.

Therefore, the VMB commander (BO sector commandant) is obligated, regardless of the fact

that reconnaissance of the sea which was organized by the fleet and MOR staff, to conduct

reconnaissance with his own forces and means at sea, in this manner supporting the timely

deployment of his forces for battle.

The reconnaissance should determine the axes of the main, supporting, and demonstrative

enemy landings; the composition, number, and grouping of the transports, landing assets, and

vessel support detachments.

683. The planning for combat for defeat the amphibious assault force on the shore of a

seacoast should envisage the following actions:

organization of combat guard and emplacement of obstacles on the seaward approaches

to the shoreline;

strikes at the transports, both from the sea and air, as well as fire from the shore;

prevention of the trans-loading of the assault forces from the transports to the landing

assets;

prevention of the approach of the landing assets to the shoreline;


strikes at landing points, if the enemy manages to land, and isolation of the landed forces

from the transports (interrupt further supply);

the conduct of counterstrikes on the landing points and on their flanks with the goal of

disorganizing the landing and the enemy’s actions for capture of a landing base;

neutralization and distraction of enemy fire support;

the battle with enemy aviation, which is supporting the landing of the assault force.

684. The commander of the VMB (BO sector commandant) is obligated to organize

coordination of the forces of the VMB (BO sector) first of all for creation of powerful fire

concentrations against the enemy on the approaches to his shore. In this process, he should

pay special attention to the concentration of all firing means (shore-based and field artillery,

naval gunfire, mortars, machine guns) of the VMB (BO sector) on the most critical portions of the

coastline, in conjunction with the resolution of this same mission of the artillery and mortars of

the ground forces of the Red Army for conducting fires from the depth of the defense.

685. The coordination of the force of the VMB (BO sector) with ground forces which are

participating in the defense of the coastline, during the period of the assault force landing on the

shore, is organized by the VMB commander (BO sector commandant), using for this the fire and

maneuver of infantry and mechanized forces.

686. The preparation of the VMB (BO sector) for defeating the amphibious landing

force consists, as a rule, of the following actions:

combined rekognostsirovka, as a rule, by the commanders of the ground force units,

naval infantry, shore-based artillery, vessels, and aviation in the area of possible enemy

amphibious landing;

combined games and exercises for defeat of an amphibious assault landing;

development of communications and combat command and control;

mine and engineer equipping both in the water and on shore;

deployment of the materiel assets and transport in accordance with the defense plan.

687. Engineer support for the defeat of an amphibious landing consists of the following

measures:

equipping of the approaches from the sea with obstacles against enemy landing assets,

and as well landing forces which are wading ashore;

establishment of engineer obstacles and fire–explosive means on shore;

development and improvement of the quantity of roads for maneuver of mobile reserves

and shore-based mobile artillery;

construction of firing positions for mobile artillery (towed by mechanized tractors, on

self-propelled mountings, and railroad-mounted);

equipping of the most threatened points of the coastal defense with strong points and

permanent firing points;

preparation and equipping of command and observation posts;

creation of permanent fortifications at resistance nodes of the flanking portions of the

coastline and which will permit the accumulation of forces for launching a counterattack on

the landed amphibious assault force.

688. The instructions for the anti-amphibious assault of a defense are expressed, as a rule, in

the form of a combat instruction for the PDO of a VMB (BO sector). In addition, excerpts


from the table of deployment of PDO forces for various stages of the combat preparation of the

anti-landing defense are distributed.

689. The basic mission of the large naval infantry formation during the defeat of an

enemy amphibious landing on the shore is the decisive resistance to all the enemy’s

attempts to penetrate into the territory of the coastal belt of the defended portion of the

coastline. Therefore, the main efforts of the large formation are directed at the destruction of the

landed amphibious assault forces.

During the enemy’s attempt by individual units to dig in on the shore, the VMB commander

(BO sector commandant) are required to cut off the landed units and their landing assets from the

enemy main forces and with all available means, combined with the actions of the Red Army

ground forces and aviation, destroy this portion of the assault force.

690. If misfortune occurs in the defeat of the landing of enemy assault forward detachments

and the penetration of his units into the coastal belt, the large naval infantry formation, with

energetic attacks on land and on sea, continues to conduct the battle with the landed enemy

forces, launching against him counterstrikes along the shore and cutting him off from the landing

points, along with similar actions by the forces of the Red Army, [thus resulting] in the

destruction of the landed enemy forces.

Simultaneously, naval infantry units with counterattacks from the rear complete the

encirclement of the enemy on the shore.

691. The timely arrival of mobile reserves to the enemy’s landing points has special

significance in the battle for defeat of the assault landing. Therefore, the following measures

are implemented during the deployment of the anti-landing defense:

transport assets are assembled for movement by rail and without rail, and also by water

routes of communication;

march routes for the movement of maneuver groups and mobile reserves are marked and

prepared ahead of time;

graphics [tables showing times and distances] are assembled for the transfer of maneuver

groups and mobile artillery from various points of the coastline;

landing bridgeheads and landing sites are prepared for mobile reserves which may be air-

landed.

692. During the preparation of the PDO, a series of depots [dumps] with ammunition, fuel,

and other forms of supplies is created on the coastline for the most rapid replacement of combat

expenditures.

3. Defeating an Amphibious Landing in an Island (Skerries) Region

693. Combat for the prevention of an enemy amphibious assault landing in skerries or an

island region consists of the following phases:

hindering the enemy’s seizure of the exterior portion of the island or skerrie region by the

launching of strikes on the enemy on the approaches to the area from seaward;

holding under one’s own control the nodes of basic channels and defended islands;

prevention of the enemy’s seizure of the flanking sectors of adjacent islands;

hindering the enemy’s maneuver, his penetration into the skerries region, isolating him

from other enemy forces and subsequently destroying him;


The battle for the amphibious landing in skerries has a mobile character with broad use of

light infantry units and subunits on cutters, and also low-level attack aviation.

694. A large maneuver formation – an anti-landing defense detachment – is organized for

the battle in skerrie and island regions, which consists of the following assets:

a unit (battalion, regiment) of naval infantry with its own landing assets;

sapper units with river-crossing means and obstacle capabilities;

machine gun and machine gun–artillery units and subunits;

skerrie vessels (armored cutters, gunboats, monitors);

shore-based artillery units and subunits;

means of positional obstacles and shore-based torpedo batteries;

reconnaissance aviation units and, if necessary,

attached ground forces.

Low-level attack aviation units and subunits can also be attached to the PDO detachment.

Depending on the situation, a naval or naval infantry officer is designated as the commander

of the PDO detachment.

695. The anti-landing defense detachment, as a rule, occupies a sector of the islands which

have one or two nodes of basic channels. Its boundaries are determined by the situation, and in

skerrie regions should pass from the exterior edge of the skerries to the mainland.

The channels that lead in from the sea to the mainland cannot be used as boundaries between

detachments.

696. The PDO detachment commander, when organizing the defeat of the landing, is

obligated to accomplish the following actions:

energetically to counteract the enemy in the occupation of a start position for his

offensive into the depth of the region (edge of skeeries, outer islands in an island region,

intermediate islands, and opposite shores of narrows);

to organize a patrol along the exterior perimeter of the islands and on the approaches to

the junctures of channels;

to organize ambushes by torpedo cutters, submarines, and shore-based torpedo batteries;

to organize fire ambushes, both by artillery and mortar batteries as well as by individual

weapons and mortars, machine guns, and rifle fire on the islands;

broadly use naval positional means and the means of engineer ground force obstacles;

for the purposes of deceiving the enemy in the exterior islands an internal boundaries of

the skerries, organize false batteries, imitate the accumulation of forces, and create a false

hydrographic situation.

697. Upon the enemy’s penetration into the depth of the defense, the PDO detachment

commander is required to cut off the breaching enemy unit with all available forces,

prevent his connecting with remaining enemy fleet forces at sea, and broadly employing

counter-landings of naval infantry for encirclement and destruction of the enemy that has

breached.

698. During the preparation of the anti-amphibious landing of the defense of an island

(skerrie) region, the PDO detachment commander is required to conduct commander’s

reconnaissance [rekognostsirovka] of the more dangerous approaches. The commanders of units


and subunits of naval infantry and ground forces, the commanders of skerrie detachment vessels,

and shore-based artillery units, officers of special services, and also aviation representatives

should participate in his personal reconnaissance.

699. Engineer preparation of the sector of the anti-amphibious landing detachment consists

of the following measures:

equipping of firing positions and observation posts for batteries and individual weapons

on the islands;

construction of DOT and DZOT for machine guns, regimental and anti-tank artillery;

emplacement of obstacles in passages, the capabilities of which the enemy will use, and

preparation of channels for the maneuver of our own vessels and naval infantry units;

erection of false fortifications for the purposes of maskirovka;

emplacement of engineer obstacles on islands and fords between them;

gathering up of crossing means for the maneuver of reserves.

700. The command post of the PDO detachment commander should be equipped with a

sufficient quantity of observation points, which support the most complete observation of the

channels and approaches to it in the defended sector.

The command post should be provided with mobile communications means.

Radio communications, mobile means of communications and, in individual situations,

underwater cable (between strongpoints) are broadly used for command and control of the battle

in skerries and island regions.


Chapter 14

Naval Gunfire Cooperation with Ground Forces Operating on a Coastline

1. Fundamentals of Naval Gunfire Cooperation

701. Fire cooperation of ground forces which are operating on a coastline in support of their

flank includes direct assistance to them by the fires of naval guns, and as well the fire of shore-

based artillery batteries. To effect this cooperation, proper coordination of vessel and shore-

based batteries with ground force artillery is required, and as well accounting for the special

capabilities of the naval gunfire systems.

702. The basic tasks of the large fleet formation or single vessels (shore batteries) during fire

cooperation with ground forces operating in a coastal environment are the following:

the defeat of enemy units and his other targets which cannot be achieved by the firing

actions of [ground] troop-level artillery;

flanking the enemy’s coastal defensive positions;

penetrating to the rear of the enemy for disrupting them;

in individual cases – reinforcing troop-level artillery of ground force large formations.

During fire cooperation with ground forces, only those firing tasks which in a given situation

cannot be resolved by troop-level artillery can be assigned to vessels and batteries of the fleet.

703. The coordination of vessels (batteries) with the ground forces being supported

ensures reliable command and control and the establishment of concrete firing tasks.

Flexible command and control in battle is achieve by the establishment of special signals for

command and control of fires and for mutual identification of forces and vessels, and also for

mutual exchange of liaison officers with supported forces.

704. The complexity and criticality of the mission of executing in conditions of close

coordination with ground forces and counteracting the enemy demand careful preliminary

preparation of the battle by the commanders who are organizing the coordination.

Preparation of fire cooperation includes the following tasks:

communications with ground-force units in execution of assigned tasks that have been

strengthened and are capable of constant use;

organization of coordination with them (consistent with the plans of actions received in

the refining of the fire missions);

reconnaissance of the sea portion of the region of actions;

artillery reconnaissance of targets and reconnaissance of the ground sector of the battle;

organization of artillery observation and target designation;

special preparation of the materiel units and ammunition;

special equipping of the region of action in the deployment of our own forces for

execution of cooperation;

the organization of combat support of firing cooperation.

As a rule, each departure of a vessel in fire cooperation requires additional measures for

support from its side of the sea and air by forces and means of the MOR (fleet).

705. It is necessary always to combine the conduct of fire cooperation with the creation

of conditions which support the execution of firing tasks against the enemy’s


counteractions, organized by him on the flanks of his own forces. This is achieved by

appropriate equipping of the region of the firing positions, covering them from seaward and from

the air, the designation to artillery units the means and air forces for combat with enemy shore-

based artillery, and the preparation by units the forces and means to cover the firing vessels with

smokescreens from shoreward.

706. During the preparation and deployment of forces, measures of secrecy and the

maskirovka of our own actions should be implemented, for the achievement of the effects of

tactical surprise, which in significant measure will enable success of the artillery attack.

During the execution of each firing mission, it is necessary to consider the advantage of a

surprise commencement of fires at the target (with pre-registration point) and the use of this

method in all cases when the situation permits.

707. Fire cooperation with ground forces, depending on its duration, has various

characteristics, determined by its two forms:

Systematic fire cooperation, which is called for by ground forces in cooperation over the

course of a prolonged time period and which are being used both in the offense as well as the

defense, and require special preliminary preparation of the region of actions and organization of

combat support over a prolonged period.

Episodic fire cooperation, when it is not possible to execute prolonged fire support

cooperation, but it is necessary even for a short time period. This is characteristic in conditions of

the offense (breach of the enemy’s defense) and calls for, as a rule, the use of naval gunfire with

powerful artillery.

708. The nature of firing tasks and the situation on the flank of the ground forces calls for

employment of the following forms of fire cooperation:

planned conduct of fire, used with the participation of vessels (batteries) in artillery

attacks of large troop formations, which is organized ahead of time and characterized by

specific stages of firing actions against the enemy;

on-call fire responses, used both during participation in combat of ground forces, during

the execution of earlier prepared fire attacks, as well as during the execution of counter-

battery firing;

surprise attack from the sea, associated with the execution by vessels of a maneuver for

increasing the effects of the naval gunfire achieved by this tactic.

2. Systematic Naval Gunfire Cooperation

709. Both vessels (of all classes) which have artillery armaments, and shore-based artillery

on railroad mountings or have mechanical tractors, can be used for systematic fire support of

ground forces. As a rule, vessels with 100–152 mm caliber artillery armaments, primarily

from a number of mobilized ships (cannon boats) or vessels of special construction

(monitors) are brought in for this purpose.

As a consequence of the complexity and criticality of the missions associated with executing

fire cooperation, it is necessary that it be executed from day to day by the permanent crew of the

vessel, batteries, and aircraft.


710. As a rule, a large maneuver formation – a fire support detachment, the composition

and organization of which is determined by the naval commander depending on the situation and

the established mission, is created for fire support of ground forces.

The fire support detachment consists of a basic core of shipboard artillery or shore-based

batteries, and also aircraft which, as a rule, are incorporated into an aviation group (for tactical

reconnaissance, fire adjustment, laying smokescreens, anti-submarine defense of the vessels);

artillery reconnaissance subunits attached from the shore-based defense, SNiS posts,

hydrographic parties, and also PVO assets that are set aside for support.

Command of the fire support detachment, as a rule, is rested on the commander of the

shipboard (shore battery) artillery group which is executing the basic mission.

711. In the process of preparing the large formation for combat, the staff of the fire support

detachment should implement the following measures:

establish a unified understanding of the tasks and situation in the region of actions (on

sea, on land, and in the air) with the staff of the ground force command;

develop a fire support plan which includes the issues of combat support – on the basis of

elaboration of the firing tasks of the ground forces command and the decision taken by the

XXX plan for use of artillery in combat (during participation in an offensive);

table of prepared fire strikes (during participation in a defense);

communications schematic;

table of encoded and recognition signals.

Special attention should be given to the understanding and development of ground and naval

maps.

An orienting schematic (target schematic) should be given to the ground force as an

appendix.

713. As a rule, the fire cooperation detachment is placed in subordination to the MOR (fleet)

commander-in-chief, from whom it receives combat missions, and renders fire cooperation to

the ground forces on the principle of support, executing fire missions received from the

ground forces command.

In separate cases, when systematic fire cooperation to the flank of the ground forces is

organized without designation by the MOR of cover for support from seaward, the fire

cooperation detachment can be given in operational subordination to the army command. In this

case, the fire cooperation detachment receives combat taskings directly from the army command,

informing the MOR (fleet) regarding them.

In both cases of subordination, the concrete development of the issues of fire coordination

and drawing up of the plan for use naval gunfire and shore-based artillery, on the basis of the

overall coordination plan, is executed by the staff of the fire cooperation detachment.

714. Depending on the situation and the composition of forces, the fire cooperation

detachment commander executes command and control of the large formation from the flagship

vessel of the large formation or from the shore-based command post.

The flag-level artilleryman of the detachment and the ground forces artillery commander

should exchange liaison officers or be located together at the same command post.


715. Equipping the region of actions, it is necessary for the fire cooperation detachment to

accomplish preparation of the firing positions for vessels (shore batteries), establish the

navigational–hydrographic situation, install orienting markers and construct defensive

fortifications for posts of artillery observation and adjustment, SNiS posts and lines, all of which

is accomplished in accordance with instructions of the MOR or fleet staff.

716. The organization of communications should exclude mutual interference during

command and control by the large formation in combat and command and control of the artillery

fires.

As a rule, the following lines of communication should be established:

command communications – communications with the vessels and units, and also with

the higher level command;

coordination communications – both from the large formation commander with the KP

of the ground forces commander and from the firing vessels (shore batteries) with the directly

supported ground forces unit, and also between the various branches of naval forces;

artillery communications – both from the flag-level artilleryman with the senior

commander of the large artillery formation and from each firing vessel (shore battery) with

its adjusting post (aircraft).

Communications from the firing vessel to shore and from the shore between posts of

observation and communication [SNiS], observation and fire-adjustment posts are supported by

fleet assets.

Communications of the command of the supported ground force units with the shore-battery

communication posts rest with the ground forces command.

717. Artillery reconnaissance, for the most part the gathering of reports concerning the

enemy and also the finding of positions for vessels (batteries) is executed by the forces and

means of the fire cooperation detachment. In this effort, the data that is made available from the

ground forces artillery reconnaissance system should be used.

718. The frequent departure of vessels (batteries) to firing positions or their prolonged

presence in one or the other region associated with execution of fire cooperation missions

increases the danger of enemy attack on them, from both the air and shore (artillery fire), and

also from mine obstacles in their region of actions. The overcoming of enemy counteractions

represents a fundamental difficulty during the execution of the mission of fire cooperation and

requires from the large formation commander the undertaking of corresponding decisions in the

course of combat actions and flexible command and control of his large formation in combat.

3. Episodic Naval Gunfire Cooperation

719. Upon designation of a vessel (shore battery) for one-time fire cooperation against a

selected enemy target, it is necessary to consider the situations in theater and in the region of fire

cooperation:

the operational regime in the given region of the theater;

the capability to develop powerful fires on the enemy targets in a brief time period;

the possibility of rapidly and in a concealed manner executing the movement to the

region of actions;

the capability of executing the mission in the designated time frame.


720. During the execution of episodic cooperation to the flank of ground forces, as a rule the

fire cooperation detachment is not created. In this case, the execution of the mission of fire

cooperation is assigned to individual vessels or a group of vessels, singled out from one large

vessel formation.

721. The commander of the group of vessels designated for execution of the mission of fire

cooperation organizes the preparation of his group for combat under the guidance of the large

formation commander and combat mission he receives through him.

In the process of preparing the fire cooperation, the large formation staff’s particular

attention should be given to the following tasks:

receipt of the latest reconnaissance data, both regarding the enemy ground force and

regarding the air and naval enemy;

receipt of the data concerning the dispositions of our own ground force units;

elaboration of the firing tasks from the ground force command;

the organization of artillery observation and target designation in the battle region;

the organization of all forms of combat support for the group which is executing the basic

missions.

722. The typical instructional document for the organization of episodic fire cooperation is

the combat order. As a rule, this document contains the ground force’s orientation schematic

(target schematic).

723. The successful execution of the mission during episodic fire cooperation in large

measure depends on the presence of reliable reconnaissance data in regard to the enemy

ground force. When it is impossible to receive ahead of time these data from the ground force

command, the large formation staff is required to obtain it with the assistance of artillery

reconnaissance, organized by the MOR (fleet) staff.

724. During the execution of episodic fire cooperation, reliable coordination with the ground

force units and elaboration of firing tasks should be supported by the obligatory exchange of

liaison officers with the lead artillery commander of the supporting large formation.

725. Support of the firing vessels with observation and adjustment encompasses, as a rule,

the use of a system of observation posts of the ground forces artillery, by sending ahead of time

representatives to ground artillery reconnaissance organs or, in separate cases, the use of artillery

reconnaissance subunits from shore batteries of the defense, and also with one’s own fire-

adjustment aircraft.

726. During episodic fire cooperation, normally there is no possibility for equipping the

firing positions for firing vessels; this, in the presence of limited time for the execution of firing

tasks, requires the use of the most precise methods of firing and orientation of vessels in

their firing positions.

The execution of fire missions in nighttime conditions requires the adjustment of fires using

illumination of the targets for refining the fire support.

727. The expenditure of ordnance during a brief period of fire cooperation against the enemy

depends on the nature of the specific mission and conditions of the situation. Therefore, it can be

limited by any type of norm.
