May 2007Investigation: Benoît Hervieu - Fabiola León Posada

Reporters Without Borders - Americas desk5, rue Geoffroy Marie - 75009 Paris

Tél : (33) 1 44 83 84 84 - Fax : (33) 1 45 23 11 51E-mail : americas@rsf.org

Web : www.rsf.org

COLOMBIAParamilitary “black eagles” poisedto swoop down on the press

They use various code names, pseudonymsand trademarks. One day it could be the“United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia”(with AUC as its acronym) or the “Free ColombiaSelf-Defence Groups, United List.” Another dayit might be “Free Colombia Democratic Front” or“Social Front for Peace.” When they want toclearly announce their colours and carry out tar-geted murders or threats against peasants,unionists, human rights activists and sometimeseven former comrades-in-arms, they call them-selves the “Black Eagles.”

Recruited from the 1980s onwards with the aimof neutralising far-left guerrilla groups,Colombia’s roughly 30,000 paramilitaries wereofficially demobilised between March 2003 andMarch 2006. But in fact they are far from beingdisarmed and far from putting an end to theircriminal activities. Three years of negotiationswith President Alvaro Uribe’s government haveresulted in only a very small proportion of theseprofessional fighters being reintegrated intosociety. Many have become drug traffickers orcontract killers. The “Justice and Peace” lawadopted on 21 July 2005 guarantees them vir-tual impunity. The judicial hearings in which avery few have confessed to crimes have beenheld without their being confronted with theirvictims.

According to the estimates of both the govern-ment and human rights groups, between 5,000and 8,000 paramilitaries, organised into 22groups, are still active or have been revived in atotal of 12 departments. These so-called“demobilised” paramilitaries are press freedompredators, murdering two journalists in 2006and forcing around 10 others to flee the regionwhere they lived and worked. Have of thesecases occurred in the course of a terror cam-paign by the “Black Eagles” against the mediain the northern coastal departments of Córdoba,Sucre and Bolívar last September and October.

Demobilisation was supposed to cure the pro-blem of the paramilitaries, but has the remedybecome worse than the disease? Colombia andits press are debating this question, at timewhen the country has recently discovered 3,700mass graves and the Uribe administration is

being openly criticised for its links to paramili-tary groups.

Reporters Without Borders visited Colombiafrom 28 April to 5 May, partly to attend aUNESCO World Press Freedom award cere-mony in Medellín on 3 May, but primarily to carryout a field investigation into the impact that thedemobilisation of the paramilitaries is having onthe activities and security of journalists. As wellas Medellín, the press freedom organisation alsovisited Bogotá and the capital of Córdobadepartment, Montería, which is where the para-militaries first emerged.

Reporters Without Borders spoke to journalistsof all kinds, both local and national, both thosewho are still working and those who have had toflee. It also spoke to politicians, elected officials,civil servants and representatives of press free-dom and human rights groups. Far from tryingto get to the bottom of the entire situation of acountry at war, this field trip concentrated onhighlighting demobilisation’s perverse effects,the enormous difference between the way thenational and local media cover the war, and thescant protection received by threatened journa-lists. The local journalists spoke only on condi-tion of anonymity, for obvious safety reasons.

Devoting this report to the paramilitaries is notmeant to divert attention from violence againstjournalists by the leftist guerrillas of theRevolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia(FARC). Reporters Without Borders regards theFARC as press freedom predators, just as itdoes the AUC militias and other paramilitarygroups. Germán Hernández Vera, editor of theDiario del Huila regional daily in the southwes-tern city of Neiva, was forced to flee his regionin March after receiving repeated threats thatwere thought to have come from guerrillas. TheFARC blew up the studios of local radio stationHJ Doble K on 22 March, injuring 10 people.Radio Caracol news director Darío ArizmendiPosada had to leave the country in March afterreceiving death threats from guerrillas. TheFARC were also responsible for a sabotagecampaign against radio and TV installations inthe southwest of the country in the first quarterof 2005.

Colo

mbi

a :

Par

amil

itar

y “b

lack

eag

les”

poi

sed

to s

woo

p do

wn

on th

e pr

ess

1

Colo

mbi

a :

Par

amil

itar

y “b

lack

eag

les”

poi

sed

to s

woo

p do

wn

on th

e pr

ess

2

A state within the state

“That is Mr. SalvatoreMancuso’s house,” said aMontería taxi driver.“Down there, on the upperfloor, is Mr. CarlosCastaños’s apartment.Just below it was theapartment of Mr. Salvatore

Mancuso until his murder in Medellín.” Therewas an unexpectedly nostalgic note to his com-mentary. He referred to the paramilitary celebri-ties as if they were neighbours. He even referredwithout too much hesitation to the “BlackEagles,” who have been back in the news “forsome time.” But there was no question of refer-ring loudly to “paramilitaries” and even less to“paracos” (a derogatory term) or the “demobili-sed ones,” as “they” are never very far away.There are nearly 5,000 of them in this northern,Caribbean-coast department, where the AUCwere originally recruited by coffee and cottonplantation owners, with government support, toresist guerrilla incursions.

“The turning point came after the 1985 murderof Ernesto Rojas, the long-standing leader ofthe People’s Liberation Army [a leftist guerrillagroup that stopped fighting in 1991],” said JoséFrancisco García Calume, a local ConservativeParty parliamentarian and president of theDepartmental Peace Commission. “Once theyhad achieved their military goals and acquired areal military structure, the AUC got involved inpolitics and, at the same time, drug trafficking,”Rojas continued. “AUC units started extortingmoney from municipal governments and to formtrafficking networks. They also started investingin agriculture, construction and even health ser-vices. So you can speak of a state within thestate.” Andrés Angarita, a demobilised paramili-tary from the Bloque Córdoba, was gunneddown in Medellín at the start of April for beingready to talk about the links between the para-militaries and municipal health chief ManuelTroncoso, the brother-in-law of SalvatoreMancuso.

By dint of massacres, expropriations and forcedeviction of peasants, the department ofCórdoba was carved up by parallel armies that

were the forerunners oftoday’s “Black Eagles,”groups with such names asthe “Tangueros” or“Mochacabezas “ (literally,“decapitators”) led by bro-thers Fidel and CarlosCastaño. A total of 30,000displaced persons swelled Montería’s popula-tion to 350,000.Two local journalists were killed in the course ofa bloody crackdown at the end of the 1980s onmembers of the political opposition suspected

of being guerrilla sympathi-zers. One was freelance jour-nalist Oswaldo Regino Pérez,a contributor to theCartagena-based daily ElUniversal, who was murde-red on the Medellín road in1988. The other was William

Bender, the host of two programmes on radioVoz de Montería, who was killed the followingyear after accusing paramilitaries and drug traf-fickers of joint involvement in the August 1989murder of Liberal Party leader Luis CarlosGalán, who had been expected to win the follo-wing year’s presidential elec-tion.

“This is how Monteríabecame one of the epicentresof paramilitary violenceagainst the press,” said alocal radio journalist who fledto Bogotá after being the target of a paramilitaryattack in 1988 and only recently returned toMontería. “These two murders are emblematic.Regino’s murder highlighted the collusion bet-ween the paramilitaries and army, representedhere by the 11th Brigade, which had classifiedhim as a ‘subversive’. While Bender’s murderrevealed how the paramilitaries and the drugtraffickers, especially Pablo Escobar’s Medellíncartel, were converging. The problem here isthat the paramilitaries became one of the lea-ding economic forces in the region, if not theleading one. At the same time, they managed toconvince people they were responsible for thedefeat of the guerrillas. As a result, the press isinaudible.” And those who do not accept thissituation must take great care.

Salvatore Mancuso

Carlos Castaño

Luis Carlos Galán

Pablo Escobar

A media maverick is killed

Paramilitary hatred of thepress reemerged in all itsviolence with the murderof Gustavo “El Gaba”Rojas Gabalo, the starpresenter of one of thethree local radio stations,Radio Panzenú, on 4

February 2006. Tubby, cheeky and very outspo-ken on the air, “El Gaba” was having a drink witha friend in the southern part of Montería whenhe heard his car alarm go off twice. When hewent over to see why, two men on a motorcycleopened fire, hitting him in the head and collar-bone. He never regained consciousness anddied 44 days later in a Medellín hospital.

Three suspects were arrested on 1 April 2006 –Ramiro Antonio “El Guajiro” Berrio, Santiago “ElNegro” Luna Primera and Manuel “El Pambe”Pérez Jiménez. All three are currently detained,but in connection with another crime. “Underpressure from El Negro’s brother, a councillor inthe neighbouring department of Bolívar, the wit-nesses changed their stories, the prosecutionwas abandoned and the media were never ableto follow subsequent developments in thecase,” said a newspaper journalist who tried tofind out. A fourth suspect, known as “FuegoVerde,” who had been identified as the personwho fired the shots at El Gaba, was himself mur-dered on 19 March of this year.

A traumatic blow for the Montería press and aglaring case of impunity, El Gaba’s murdercontinues to be the subject of theorizing. Callingit a “political crime,” a Radio Panzenú journalistsaid: “El Gaba” did not investigate. He denoun-ced the corruption of local officials in his outs-poken way. His diatribes could affect careers,and this was particularly so with Manuel Prada,a staunch AUC supporter and candidate forCórdoba department governor. “El Gaba”’smurder happened to come on the eve of theMay 2006 elections, at a time when the processof paramilitary demobilisation was close tocompletion.”The victim’s daughter, Erlyn Rojas, expoundedanother theory with a great deal of care:“Senator Gustavo Petro of the [left-wing]

Democratic Pole accusednearly 2,000 close sup-porters of President Uribeof paramilitary links inFebruary, triggering theso-called ‘para-political’scandal. It was allegedthat Salvatore Mancusohad himself ordered my father’s murder and thata recording was available on the Internet,except that the webpage could not be acces-sed. It was said the former AUC leader couldnot stand my father’s allegations that he was lin-ked with municipal public health directorManuel Troncoso.”

Distinguishing between the “mendicant” localpress, in this instance, small local radio stationsthat “depend on state money and so cannot sayanything,” from the bigger, regional news mediathat dare to say more but risk violent reprisals,Calume, the parliamentarian, offered a moreglobal analysis of the “El Gaba”’s murder and itsimpact, not only on the press but also onColombian society as a whole. “Gaba” was oneof the first, certainly here, to make a distinctionbetween demobilisation and disarmament asregards the paramilitaries,” he told ReportersWithout Borders. “And he paid for that with hislife.”

“El Gaba” approved of the process launched bythe government but realised its limitations. TheFátima accord signed on 3 May 2004 betweenthe government and the former AUC was a fai-lure as regards social reintegration.Nonetheless, it gave the paramilitary chiefs twomajor guarantees – no extradition and no deten-tion in top-security prisons.

Calume added: “Of the 5,000 paramilitariesdemobilised since March 2006 in this region, athird of whom are in Montería, only 3 per centhave found a job in the formal sector, that is tosay, working for security companies, and 17 percent in the informal sector, namely makeshiftmethods of public transport such as motorcy-cle-taxis. As for the rest, they have gone back tocriminal activity, this time on an individual basisand without ideology. As a result of internal feu-ding among paramilitaries, 150 people havedied in Montería alone in the past two years.”

Colo

mbi

a :

Par

amil

itar

y “b

lack

eag

les”

poi

sed

to s

woo

p do

wn

on th

e pr

ess

3

Gustavo Rojas Gabalo

Gustavo Petro

Journalists with little backing

At the Montería city hall, where people wouldrather forget such figures, they conceded thatex-paramilitaries who have been recycled intonew forms of employment “pose major law andorder problems.” One municipal official said:“There were 32,000 registered motorcycle taxidrivers in the city on 31 December, many ofwhom were former paramilitaries but manyothers were the children of people displaced bythe paramilitaries. Two former AUC membersworking in this sector were murdered inFebruary.” Insisting, despite all the evidence tothe contrary, that press freedom was “doingrather well,” she condemned “the irresponsibi-lity of some media, that don’t do any thoroughinvestigation and indulge in partisan exaggera-tion.”

The press does not get much more supportfrom the Defensoría del Pueblo (People’sDefence), a governmental human rights bodythat was created under a 1992 law with powersthat are limited to making recommendations. Itsrepresentative in Córdoba department, JuliaRodríguez, who has held the position since lastNovember, tends to play down the threats topress freedom. “We sometimes receive demobi-lised paramilitaries, who want to sort out theiradministrative situations, but it is above all vic-tims who come to see us,” Rodríguez said. “Wehave not had any complaints from journalists,but we applied some pressure in the “El Gaba”case. I think press freedom is in better shapehere.” Rodríguez also acknowledged that “thedemobilisation process has had the perverseaffect of fuelling ordinary crime and of allowingthe guerrillas to stage incursions again, not tospeak of phenomena such as the Black Eagles.”

She also said there continued to be few com-plaints because “the public is still not takenseriously by the army and police, and peopleare afraid to make a report when they are vic-tims.” The 2,000 complaints addressed to theNational Commission for Reparation andReconciliation by Montería residents who suffe-red at the hands of paramilitaries were fewerthan those addressed to civil society organisa-tions such as Comfavic (Córdoba department’sCivil Committee for Families who are Victims,for Reconciliation and Peace), which is defen-

ding 5,000 people. A woman crossed herself onhearing the words “Black Eagles” in the run-down office of one of its representatives, lawyerMario Enrique de Oca Anaya. Nearly 2,000human rights complaints have been registeredat this office, 1,300 of them concerning thearmy, police and the intelligence agency knownas the Department for Security Administration(DAS). “Eighty per cent of the murders in thisdepartment are blamed on paramilitaries,” DeOca said, adding: “In a single week, the “BlackEagles” managed to recruit 60 youths from dis-placed families.”

No let-up in self-censorship

“To think that the paramilitaries nowadays talkof justice, peace and even respect for the envi-ronment... at this rate, the public will end upbelieving them and we really won’t be able totalk about anything,” a radio journalist said toReporters Without Borders. Nidia Serrano, whoruns the Cartagena-based El Universal’sCórdoba office, which employees seven journa-lists, added: “The most terrible thing here is thatall economic, political or judicial activities are tosome degree or another linked to the paramilita-ries. Even when you tackle the most neutral andapparently risk-free subject, you don’t know if infact you are talking about them.”

The department of Córdoba has two daily news-papers (El Universal’s Córdoba edition and theEl Meridiano de Córdoba, suspected by some ofbeing controlled by Salvatore Mancuso), threeradio stations (Radio Panzenú, Voz de Monteríaand the Catholic station Frecuencia Bolivariana,which gives two hours of news a day, as againstnine hours a day in the case of the other two),three TV stations (NotiCórdoba, Nortevisión andTelecinco) and 22 community radio stations.These media cover a total of 28 municipalities.The editorial policy everywhere is to complywith the law of silence, especially when bulletsare flying. “There may be less fear since demo-bilisation, but not less self-censorship,” saidone radio journalist with irony. “Anyway, it isimpossible to have anything but the officialnews, such are the risks that our personal sour-ces would run if we tried to investigate,” he said.“So we wait for the news to come from elsew-here before relaying it.”Co

lom

bia

: P

aram

ilit

ary

“bla

ck e

agle

s” p

oise

d to

sw

oop

dow

n on

the

pres

s

4

Here is an example. ALiberal Party departmen-tal parliamentarian,Orlando Benítez Palencia,travelled on 11 April 2005to the municipality ofValencia, where the AUCinstalled their “FidelCastaño” school. As a

precautionary measure, he told SalvatoreMancuso in advance. But another paramilitarychief, Diego “Don Berna” Fernando MurilloBejarano, one deeply involved in organisedcrime and drug trafficking, regarded Valencia aspart of his territory. So he allegedly had Benítezmurdered outside his rival Mancuso’s finca.Under house arrest since 27 May 2005, “DonBerna” is nowadays allowed to enjoy a comfor-table retirement in exchange for his cooperationwith the demobilisation process.

“Everyone knew who did what and why,” said ajournalist. “The public was the first to know. Wehad the information, with which our public wasperfectly familiar. But we had to wait two daysuntil the national daily El Tiempo published itbefore we in turn could publish. That way, weprotect ourselves from threats. But just imagine,we are in a situation in which the public alreadyknows what we dare not broadcast or publish.”

The correspondent of a daily newspaper basedin a different region put it like this: “There is noneed for internal censorship. The external threatis fully applied. The ‘paracos’ always begin bythreatening people close to the journalist, todeter them from going to far with an investiga-tion. As I want to avoid using anonymous sour-ces, I rely on official statements. The other solu-tion, when a story really takes off, is to send in ajournalist from headquarters to protect the localcorrespondent. This is what the national presshave long been doing.”

Although some former AUC members have star-ted to trust him, this journalists fears that thingscould get even tougher for the local press in thecoming months. “Nothing of substance hasbeen envisaged for reintegrating the paramilita-ries into society. In December, the paramilitarieswill cease to be paid governmental aid [8 millionpesos or about 3,000 euros] in return for theirdemobilisation. What will happen after that?”

Moving towards “legalizing”the paramilitaries

The situation looks even more alarming at thenational level and some people argue that thethree-year demobilisation process and theadoption of the Justice and Peace law amountto “legalisation” of the paramilitaries. This is theview of journalist Camilo Tamayo and sociolo-gist Teófilo Vásquez, who work for the Centrefor Investigation and Popular Education, aBogotá-based organisation specialising in infor-mation about political violence founded byJesuits in the late 1960s. For them, the reappea-rance of such groups as the Black Eagles lastOctober and the many abuses associated withthe demobilisation process have come as nosurprise.

Uribe gave himself a yearto crush the FARC guerril-las when he became presi-dent in 2002, but the FARCmilitary structure remainedintact and only one of theirchiefs, Simon Trinidad, was captured and extra-

dited because of his drug-trafficking links, they said.The failure of the fightagainst the FARC is one ofthe reasons why there hasnot been more demobilisa-tion. When the AUCs leave,the guerrillas move back in.

The other reason, they said, is that the govern-ment completely ignored paramilitary involve-ment in drug trafficking. As a result, demobilisa-tion split the former AUC into two camps, thepro-narcos and the rest. And unfortunately, itwas the former, including such people as “DonBerna”, who gained the upper hand.

This explains the significant presence of revivedparamilitary groups such as the “Black Eagles”in the “drug trafficking triangle” – the depart-ments of Nariño and Valle del Cauca, where 60per cent of Colombian cocaine is produced, andthe cocaine exporting centres of the Caribbeancoast departments and those borderingVenezuela.

Liberal Party senator Juan Manuel Galán, theson of the politician assassinated in 1989, isCo

lom

bia

: P

aram

ilit

ary

“bla

ck e

agle

s” p

oise

d to

sw

oop

dow

n on

the

pres

s

5

Diego Fernando Murillo

Bejarano

Alvaro Uribe

Raúl Reyes, FARC

equally severe in his assessment of demobilisa-tion, saying Colombian history is repeatingitself. “The demobilisation process ignored thecentral issue of drug trafficking, whose exportshave never been so high,” Galán said. “It alsofostered impunity with the Justice and Peacelaw, which envisages only five to eight years inprison for the most serious crimes. Some drugtraffickers have even claimed to be paramilita-ries in order to take advantage of this leniency.As for narco-trafficking paramilitaries like “DonBerna”, the authorities made direct use of themto pacify cities such as Medellín and get rid ofPablo Escobar’s cartel. This is how the parami-litary chiefs manage to avoid being extraditedby the government. Now the demobilised para-militaries can implicate a government that madeallowances for them or relied on them. Officialsand paramilitaries are bound by an ability toblackmail each other.”

CINEP’s staff said they understand “why theUnited States, unhappy with the results ofefforts to combat drug trafficking, kept its dis-tance from the demobilisation process.” Andwhy the new Democratic majority in the UScongress is now blocking funding for theColombian army’s fight against drug trafficking.

No access to judicial information

Long known for its cartel, Medellín is the coun-try’s second largest city and the capital ofAntioquia department. It is currently the settingof another of demobilisation’s failures, its judi-cial component, and the media are amongthose paying the price. Around 30 per cent offormer AUC members are located in this depart-ment. The regional media, such as the daily ElColombiano and the TV station Teleantioquia,find it very hard to provide regular coverage ofthe armed conflict and related aspects,although the situation is not quite as bad as it isin Montería thanks to a significant nationalmedia presence in Medellín. At stake is thesecurity of its approximately 400 reporters, pho-tographers and cameramen. Print media repor-ters leave their bylines off their articles. But alsoat issue is the physical inability to attend thejudicial hearings - for want of trials - held fordemobilised paramilitaries.

“The constitutional court ruled last Septemberthat these hearings should be public, as theywould help people to understand all the aspectsof the paramilitary phenomenon and the scale ofits human toll, and - who knows - to begin aprocess of reconciliation,” a Medellín journalistsaid. “But the paramilitaries filed a petitionagainst this ruling and the prosecutor’s office isdenying us access to it. The judges also cite‘reserva sumarial’ – the ability under Colombiancriminal law to refuse to give out informationabout an ongoing judicial procedure – to keepthe hearings under wraps. At the same time, theparamilitaries are not brought together with theirvictims at these hearings. The victims are instal-led in separate room and have to follow the pro-ceedings on a video monitor. This is also a wayof preventing the victims from talking to much.And they are banned from taking notes ormaking recordings.”

Several “paisa” (Antioquian) journalists said justone photographer and one cameraman are allo-wed into the building when the hearing beings.“The judges take their seats and the hearing’sparticipants arrive at 8:30 am,” a broadcastjournalist told Reporters Without Borders. “Thecameraman and the photographer than havethree quarters of an hour to film and take pho-tos for all their colleagues. They are made toleave at 9:15 am.”

As they are so effectively sealed off, informationabout the hearings is hard to verify. “We arereduced to becoming rumour mongers,” ano-ther regional journalist complained. “We couldnot, for example, confirm a leak about the invol-vement of a general and the DAS [the intelli-gence agency] in senator Luis Carlos Galán’smurder. Similarly, we had to hastily put out acorrection about an unconfirmed report on therole of a paramilitary chief nicknamed ‘Macao’in the murder of José Emeterio Rivas.” A journa-list with radio Calor Estéreo, Rivas was murde-red on 5 April 2004, shortly after criticisingcontacts between paramilitaries and municipalofficials in the northeastern city ofBarrancabermeja.

The way local journalists portrayed the situationdid not entirely match the description given byAlvaro Sierra, the editor of the daily El Tiempo’sopinion pages, a veteran specialist in coverageof the armed conflict. “You cannot say there isCo

lom

bia

: P

aram

ilit

ary

“bla

ck e

agle

s” p

oise

d to

sw

oop

dow

n on

the

pres

s

6

no access to the paramilitary hearings,” he said.“Information discreetly circulates between jud-ges and the media. But it is true that we are tal-king about the national media. Working for ElTiempo or one of the two leading rival commer-cial TV stations, Radio Caracol and RCN, initself offers protection. The ‘reserva sumarial’cited by the judges in practice concerns theregional media much more than the nationalmedia.”

Media under attack for criticising government

The creation of a National Federation ofColombian Journalists on 3 May, bringing toge-ther 1,000 journalists from 24 regional organisa-tions, will doubtlessly not suffice to patch up thedeep divisions in the country’s press – divisionsthat are ideological as well as professional andterritorial. Elected on a security platform in 2002and reelected in May 2006 without having tosubmit to a run-off, President Uribe has longenjoyed broad support thanks to a fall in crimerates. “The number of murders in Antioquia fellfrom 9,000 in 2001 to 3,000 in 2006,” saiddepartmental governor Aníbal Gaviria Correa –whose brother was murdered by the FARC – atthe closing of the World Press Freedom Dayceremonies on 4 May.

Medellín is one of the few cities to offer demo-bilised paramilitaries support and retraining pro-grammes. Press freedom is one of the benefi-ciaries of this, said Vice-President FranciscoSantos Calderón, who was also at Medellín.“Until 2002, an average of 12 Colombian journa-lists were being killed each year, as against twoin 2006 and none since the start of 2007,”Santos said. “It was the restoration of law andorder that reduced this grim toll, even if illegalarmed groups still pose the biggest threat tojournalists,” he added.

Not everyone was convinced, especially someof the journalists present. “One can concedethat everyday security has improved but not tothe point of ending the armed conflict, which iswhat the government would sometimes haveyou believe,” said a journalist working for thenational press. Press coverage of oppositionsenator Gustavo Petro’s allegations of links bet-

ween the paramilitaries and the government andUribe family have led to a distinct cooling in thealready fraught relations between the media andthe president. Three days after the publicationof an article on the subject, Uribe refused on 26April to invite the print media to meet with himat the Case de Nariño (his official residence).

More seriously, journalists often complain of a“lack of editorial pluralism” in the leading mediaand their “manipulation by the authorities.”Hollman Morris, a specialist in the armedconflict and the producer of the programme“Contravía” on the state-owned Canal Uno TVstation, said: “Before Uribe became president,media that criticised the government were notattacked the way they are now.”

Morris and fellow journalists Carlos Lozano ofthe communist weekly Vozand Daniel Coronell, thehead of the Noticias Unonews and current affairsproduction company (whois now in exile) have allbeen in the president’ssights. They have alsoreceived threats believed

to have come from military intelligence officials.Morris was described as a “FARC spokesman”in a video circulated in late2005 by a mysterious para-military offshoot called theSocial Front for Peace. Hewas also one of the peoplewhose phones were ille-gally tapped for two yearsby the Directorate forPolice Intelligence (Dipol)in a major scandal revealed by no less a person

that defence minister JuanManuel Santos on 13 May.

A journalist at Noticias Uno,whose programmes arecarried by Canal Uno,condemned “the silence ofthe authorities about thesescandals, starting with the

‘para-political’ scandal, which after all resultedat the end of last year in the arrests of 13 natio-nal parliamentarians and 22 local parliamenta-rians, the resignation of two ministers and theDAS deputy director, and the initiation of judicialCo

lom

bia

: P

aram

ilit

ary

“bla

ck e

agle

s” p

oise

d to

sw

oop

dow

n on

the

pres

s

7

Hollman Morris

Daniel Coronell

Carlos Lozano

proceedings against the governors of five[Caribbean coast] departments, all of themUribe supporters.”

Are leading media groups tooclosely allied with government?

A total of 35 privately-owned broadcast compa-nies with frequencies granted by the state wentbankrupt between 1998 and 2001, ReportersWithout Borders was told by Noticias Uno direc-tor Jaime Honorio González. “This situationresulted in a complete overhaul of Colombiantelevision and a reduction in broadcast timereserved for news,’ he said. “Two major com-mercial TV stations today have 80 per cent ofthe viewers, while Canal Uno has what is left.The possibility of covering sensitive newstopics, not to speak of ones seriously critical ofthe authorities, is reduced to the minimum.” Acolleague added: “Alvaro Uribe built his careerwith the support of the paramilitaries when hewas governor of Antioquia and mayor ofMedellín. He hates it when the media remindhim of it now, but he also has ties with the com-munication sector. In the days when he was alocally elected official, he managed theComunica S.A. group and wrote columns in ElColombiano.”

Accusations of pro-government attitudes, kow-towing and nepotism are not appreciated at theleading privately-owned media. “Everyoneknows that the El Tiempo newspaper is jointlyrun by two cousins, Rafael and Enrique Santos,”said Alvaro Sierra of El Tiempo. “Everyone alsoknows that the former is the vice-president’sbrother and the latter is the defence minister’sbrother. There may be a conflict of interest, butit is false to say that the newspaper is control-led.” Another El Tiempo journalist nonethelessrecognised the existence of “embarrassment atreporting certain delicate information.”

Charges of being “Uribista” are also rejected bystaff at the two leading radio and TV broadcas-ters, Caracol (owned by the Santo Domingo hol-ding company) and RCN (owned by the ArdillaLulle industrial group, which also owns the air-line Avianca). Caracol TV joint news directorDarío Fernando Patiño went out of his way to

give what he saw as evidence of independencewhen he spoke to Reporters Without Borders.“When the president speaks, we check that hedid not say the opposite last year. We have noteven had an exclusive interview with him sincehis reelection. We refuse to let the security for-ces accompany us when we are doing reports inthe provinces, and politicians and judges put alot of pressure on us when we do corruptionstories.”

Called “Paracol” by its detractors, Caracolemploys 70 journalists at its Bogotá headquar-ters and 32 regional correspondents. It reportshaving the same problems as other news mediawhen trying to cover the paramilitaries. “It is vir-tually impossible to establish contact with theparamilitaries,” said Patiño.“They put out wha-tever information they like, information that isunverifiable and never confirmed by the judicialor police authorities.” Patiño claimed to pursue“socially aware” editorial policies. “It is a matterof principle for us that we don’t interview parti-cipants in the armed conflict if they are not see-king peace with the government. We couldinterview a demobilised AUC paramilitary or aguerrilla from the National Liberation Army (ELN)if they are currently in peace talks with theauthorities. It is also all right to interview theFARC if they are releasing a hostage, but not if

they just want to make pro-paganda.”

Installed in a virtual fortressin Bogotá since a FARCrocket attack in 2002, RCNemploys about 100 journa-lists, half of them at itsheadquarters, and devotes

about 35 per cent of its programming to news.Executive producer Jorge Medina Moreno said:“Each edition has a large degree of autonomyand we prefer to develop ‘lighter’ news, onhealth or education for example, in the morningor at midday. The more political subjects aregrouped together in the evening editions.”

Coverage of the armed conflict is more a matterof constraints and obstacles for RCN, ratherthan choices. “On the one hand, the TV formatleaves little time and money for the thoroughinvestigation required by subjects such asdemobilisation of the AUC or negotiations withthe ELN, in which the office of the president isCo

lom

bia

: P

aram

ilit

ary

“bla

ck e

agle

s” p

oise

d to

sw

oop

dow

n on

the

pres

s

8

Nicolas RodríguezBautista, ELN

almost obligatory as a source,” Medina said.“We did not get authorisation to attend theparamilitary hearings. But we were the onlyones to cover the negotiations in Cuba betweenthe ELN and the government. Then, theconstant threat to our regional correspondentsforces us to ‘make life simpler.’ Violent crimedoes not allow real press freedom. Three of ourjournalists have had to go into exile in recentyears because of the risks and our director,Alvaro García, and one of our women journalistsare currently getting special protection.”

In Medina’s view, the current threats to RCNcome more from non-political criminals andappear to be linked to the twice-weekly pro-gramme “Caza Noticias” (Chasing the News), inwhich viewers can report crimes on the air forthree minutes. Because of its unprecedentedratings, the RCN management is planning togive it a daily slot.

All protection for journalists isnot equal

The leading news organisations can afford theservices of costly private security companiesbut the rest have only the rather unreliable stateauthorities to turn to. Provincial journalists oftenhave no choice but to flee to the capital afterbeing threatened or attacked by armed groupsor ruthless local officials. Some of them werebrought together for a meeting with ReportersWithout Borders by the Bogotá-basedFoundation for Press Freedom (FLIP), aReporters Without Borders partner organisation.They were from Antioquia, Norte de Santander(in the northeast), Tolima (in the centre), Huila (inthe southwest) and from the Atlantic coast.Their only offence was to have reported on thehuman rights situation or the armed conflict intheir region. The paramilitaries tried to kill one.Another was the target of FARC reprisals.Others were followed by the DAS or, worse still,investigated by the DAS in complicity with“demobilised” AUC members.

They describe themselves as “paralysed” andcondemned to an underground existence. Theydo not dare make themselves not known forlack of confidence in the authorities. But theyknow they cannot resurface unless they accept

protection... which is not always reliable. Thework of press freedom organisations such asFLIP or Medios para la Paz, which specialises intraining, has been complicated by demobilisa-tion. Paramilitary organisation calling itself the“Social Front for Peace” threatened 28 NGOs -including these two - several times in thesecond half of last year.

The national police has a Human Rights Group(GRUDH) with 64 offices throughout the countryincluding ones in Medellín and Cali and a centralone in Bogotá. Around 60 threats are reportedto the GRUDH each week, but few involve jour-nalists. Its leadership acknowledges that itsinvestigative resources are limited. So far, fiveColombian journalists are benefiting from anOrganisation of American States protection pro-gramme in which it is the GRUDH’s job toensure good implementation “in accordancewith the risk estimate.” Under the programme,the police have to know the threatened indivi-dual’s location at all times and include that loca-tion in their regular rounds. Three of the journa-lists are in Norte de Santander department, oneis in the far-north department of César and oneis in Bogotá. An interior and justice ministryvehicle has also been lent to a journalist in theeastern department of Arauca.

But not everyone can afford to go into internalexile either. The representative of an organisa-tion that supports community news media offe-red this ironic comment: “For the small media,above all the community media [of which thereare about 700 legalised ones in Colombia], thechoice is between exposing oneself to dangeror letting oneself be controlled by the armedgroups. In the latter case, at least protection isguaranteed.”

Recommendations

A fall in the crime rate in Colombia has on thewhole contributed to a reduction in the numberof journalists being murdered each year there.But Reporters Without Borders continues to beworried by the situation of press freedom andfree expression. Firstly, the fall in the number ofjournalists being murdered is also due to thefact that many of those working for local mediaopt for internal self-exile as soon as they startgetting threats. Secondly, the principal sourceCo

lom

bia

: P

aram

ilit

ary

“bla

ck e

agle

s” p

oise

d to

sw

oop

dow

n on

the

pres

s

9

of these threats and attacks on the press conti-nues to be the armed groups, above all theparamilitaries, whose demobilisation has notresulted in their disarmament and their reinte-gration into civilian life. Thirdly, the inequalitiesbetween the national and local media haveincreased as regards not only their capacity tocover the armed conflict but also their access topublic information. Finally, journalists in dangerdo not get equal protection.

Reporters Without Borders therefore recom-mends that:

- the process of demobilisation of armed groupsshould be extended in such way that they areproperly disarmed and their members are rein-tegrated into society.

- in line with the Inter-American Commissionof Human Rights, the national police HumanRights Group should be given adequateresources and personnel so that it can not

only protect journalists but also investigate thesource of the threats against them.- the media should provide more coverage ofviolations of press freedom and free expres-sion in Colombia.

- the press should be granted unrestrictedaccess to the hearings involving paramilita-ries, as their public nature was established bythe constitutional court in September 2006.

- the leading media should help to reinforcethe structures that are created to representand defend journalists, such as the NationalFederation of Colombian Journalists, whichwas created on 3 May.

- every effort should be made to shed light onthe scandal of the illegal tapping of the phonesof opposition journalists and others that wasrevealed by the defence minister on 13 Mayand, if necessary, the composition and duties ofthe intelligence services should be overhauled.

Colo

mbi

a :

Par

amil

itar

y “b

lack

eag

les”

poi

sed

to s

woo

p do

wn

on th

e pr

ess

10