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Is the worlds longest active civil war nally coming to an end? In November

2012 the Colombian government and the left-wing guerrilla group Fuerzas

Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began full-edged peace

negotiations in Havana, Cuba. But the mood in Bogot is ambivalent, with

a yearning for peace tempered by a deep-seated distrust of FARC and its

negotiating tactics.

Developments over the past decade have brought Colombia to a point

where the prospects for peace are beer than at any previous time during its

48 years of conict. Since 2002, FARC has been steadily weakened; it has lostve members of its seven-person Secretariat, a majority of its foot soldiers

and a substantial proportion of its vital, experienced mid-level command-

ers. The group may now have decided that it is time to seek a dignied

exit rather than face a seemingly inevitable decline and further deaths on

the baleeld. And the international dynamics of the conict are shifting

as well. Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez seems to nally have tired of

playing informal host to the group, potentially depriving FARC of a crucial

safe haven and its senior commanders of the possibility of keeping out of

harms way. Meanwhile, political pressure on Ecuadorean President Rafael

Correa has led to greater action against FARC in that country. And if the

current peace negotiations falter, it seems likely that Colombias President

Colombia: Ending the

Forever War?

Kyle Johnson and Michael Jonsson

Kyle Johnsonis an investigator at the Corporacin Nuevo Arco Iris think tank in Bogot, Colombia, with an

MA in political science from the Universidad de los Andes. Michael Jonssonis a Lecturer at the Department

of Government, Uppsala University and the editor of The Political Economy of Conflict in Eurasia: Organized Crime

and Armed Conflict in the Post-Communist World(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

Survival | vol. 55 no. 1 | FebruaryMarch 2013 | pp. 6786 DOI 10.1080/00396338.2013.767407


3/21

68 | Kyle Johnson and Michael Jonsson

Juan Manuel Santos would be replaced in the 2014 elections by a far-right

candidate, who would not be inclined to negotiate further. This may thus

be FARCs best chance to seek a negotiated exit, and any concessions the

group is able to obtain should be considered a bonus, given how weak ithas become.

But the Colombian civil war is the quintessential intractable conict,

making the coming negotiations profoundly challenging.1 Structurally,

Colombias illegal markets, large inaccessible territory, vast inequality and

weak state institutions in peripheral regions make any outright military

victory against FARC highly improbable. This is also the fourth aempt

at peace negotiations during the conict and FARC has used previous epi-

sodes to buy time and gain publicity. No one has forgoen the last round of

talks in Cagun in 19992002, when FARC used a demilitarised zone it was

granted as a base to plan aacks against the Colombian military in other

regions, increase coca cultivation and recruit extensively, fully believing

that with more ghters they could take over the country.

But even if FARC is negotiating in earnest this time, several challenges

to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement remain. Firstly, mutual dis-

trust between the negotiating parties is strong and deeply seated. Secondly,FARC seems to be trying to expand the issues under consideration beyond

those agreed upon in preliminary discussions. Thirdly, while FARC has

announced a one-sided ceasere, the government has continued military

operations, creating a risk that military confrontations will impede progress

at the negotiating table. Finally, even if these issues are overcome, there are

signicant barriers to agreement and successful implementation over each

of the ve points under negotiation, illustrating in part why this conict has

lasted for almost ve decades.

A legacy of ashes

While most analysts consider FARC to have been founded in 1964, the

guerrillas themselves trace their roots back to a liberal self-defence militia

created during the 19481958 civil war known as La Violencia. The militia

was founded by the 21-year-old Pedro Marn, beer known under his aliases

Manuel Marulanda or Tirojo (Sureshot). After La Violencia ebbed, the


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Colombia: Ending the Forever War? | 69

These roots

created a credo

of military

resilience

group did not demobilise but lived on, controlling what they called inde-

pendent republics in and around Marquetalia, in the department of Tolima.

In 1964, a large contingent of government troops aempted to re-establish

government control, but Marulanda and a group of 48 ghters managed tosurvive the onslaught and escape into the mountains. In 1966, they changed

their name from the Southern Block to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia, and shifted their goals from agrarian reform to complete over-

throw of the government. These roots created a credo and organisational

culture of military resilience inside the group, and a foundational myth

used to instil a FARC identity in combatants even today. While FARC

propagates a left-wing agenda, the group has rst and

foremost remained an armed rural organisation, which

prides itself on its military skills and resilience, and

nurtures a self-image of protecting the rural poor from

the Colombian oligarchy.2

During the 1960s and 1970s, FARC was merely one

amongst at least seven small- to medium-sized left-wing

rebel groups in Colombia. But the group grew organi-

cally, spreading southeast from Tolima into Huila,Caquet, Magdalena Medio and Meta, which to this day remain some of the

areas where the group nds its strongest support.3The organisational struc-

ture of the group is modelled on regular armed forces, with a hierarchical,

top-down command-and-control structure. The group is formally governed

by a seven-member Secretariat, although Marulanda maintained extensive

personal power until his death in 2008. Many of the day-to-day and tactical

decisions are made by the Estado Mayor Central, which is composed of some

20 individuals, most of who are also commanders of FARC fronts. Below

them, the group is divided into six regional blocks. Each of the blocks has

somewhere between a handful and 2025 fronts (the basic operational unit,

with anywhere from 50 to several hundred members in each).4This bureau-

cratic organisation, which is reinforced by a strict disciplinary code known

as the statutes, with harsh punishments and meticulous record-keeping on

both the behaviour of combatants and the management of funds, was long

the source of FARCs remarkable military capability and resilience. During


5/21


the past decade, however, this structure has been turned into a major weak-

ness, since it is fairly easy to map out the command structure of the group.

Combatants have also grown tired of the draconian discipline and records

have been captured and used to collect extensive intelligence and criminalevidence against both combatants and civilian collaborators.

In 1982, FARC celebrated its 7th National Conference, after which the

group began to advance from the distant, rural areas of Colombia towards

medium-sized cities and economic centres.5 The number of fronts was

doubled by spliing the existing fronts in two and adding more combatants.

Recognising that this strategy required extensive nancing, FARC increased

extortion and took the historic decision to become involved in the emerging

drug trade in Colombia. This was initially through taxes and ensuring that

coca farmers were paid fair prices, but over time FARC became involved

in all steps of the trade, including selling cocaine to international track-

ers.6 From interviews with defectors and intelligence analysts, it is clear

that FARC has mainly used income generated from this trade to nance

its military struggle and does not pay wages to members. Recent research

has also pointed out that more than half of FARCs members aend ideo-

logical training on a weekly basis.7Few analysts with a deep knowledge ofColombia argue that FARC commanders are motivated by money, since the

life-style and risks involved do not reect such an aim. This implies that if

FARC demobilises, large-scale recidivism into organised crime is unlikely,

although units or commanders that are particularly deeply involved in drug

tracking may choose such a path. Among previous defectors from FARC,

recidivism into organised crime has been limited, especially compared with

ex-combatants from the right-wing paramilitaries.

From 1982 to 1999, the group grew from some 2,000 to an estimated 18,000

full-time members and 12,000 militia members.8Income from the drug trade

was supplemented by kidnapping, extortion or taxation in regions under

their control, and possibly state sponsorship.9 As FARC became stronger

militarily, it began to be viewed as a threat by the countrys traditional, local

elites, as well as by organised crime groups vying for control of the drug

trade. Drug trackers and wealthy landowners started funding private

militias or paramilitary self-defence groups that targeted FARC.10

Whereas


6/21


the guerrillas had long carried out executions of civilians, these paramilitary

groups (typically autonomous but allied with the state) turned dirty war

tactics into their main modus operandi, killing thousands of members of

the Unin Patritica, a political party with links to the guerrillas. The armedforces also escalated their war against FARC during this period, aack-

ing the guerrillas negotiation headquarters in 1990 on the same day that

Colombians voted for delegates to create a new constitution, signalling to

the guerrillas that they were not welcome in the new Colombia.11

Paramilitary groups, too, increased their aacks on the FARCs perceived

civilian support base, carrying out massacres to drive out guerrilla support-

ers before establishing a new, oppressive social order. FARC responded in

kind, leading to a degradation of the conict with mounting civilian casu-

alties during the 1990s. FARCs hierarchical structure and strict discipline

proved adept, as its troops were successful in bale, both against demoral-

ised government troops and irregular paramilitary forces. In the mid-1990s,

FARC inicted a series of stinging military defeats on the Colombian armed

forces by overrunning military and police outposts and taking countless

police and military hostage. In a poll conducted in 1999, a majority of the

respondents believed that FARC would win the military conict; in aca-demic circles, there were extensive discussions regarding the possibility of

state failure in Colombia.12But while this period highlighted the guerrillas

military strength, it simultaneously undermined prospects for transforming

FARC into a political party.

Peace negotiations between the FARC and the government of President

Andrs Pastrana began in 1999 in a demilitarised zone in southern Colombia.

These negotiations in Cagun were doomed from their inception, since

neither FARC nor the government were honestly pursuing a negotiated set-

tlement. FARC unilaterally froze the negotiations several times and brazenly

used the demilitarised zone as a rear operating base where it expanded

coca cultivation, recruited extensively, planned aacks in other regions

of the country and conducted military training.13A handful of FARC ex-

combatants interviewed in 2012 had been recruited inside the demilita-

rised zone and others remarked that the perceived plausibility of a military

victory motivated them to join FARC.14

The negotiations also turned into a


7/21


spectacle, with an estimated 25,000 civil-society representatives aending

some 1,000 workshops organised by the guerrillas. The government also

sent mixed messages as they simultaneously negotiated with the United

States on Plan Colombia, which provided them with almost one billiondollars in direct anti-narcotics support (and eectively counter-insurgency)

support between 2000 and 2001.15The negotiations fell apart, predictably, in

2002 and gave way to two years of intensive combat, during which FARC

was largely routed from the regions immediately surrounding Colombias

major cities. Given such painful experience, government negotiators today

seem bent on avoiding the mistakes of the past by keeping the agenda

narrow, rejecting suggestions of a ceasere, excluding civil

society, allowing only limited international participation

and emphasising the importance of fast progress.16

In August 2002, lvaro Uribe was elected president on

the basis of his iron-st stance against the guerrillas. His

Democratic Security policy looked to recover territory

under control of illegal armed groups, mainly FARC, by

military means; clear the roads of guerrilla roadblocks; cut narcotics pro-

duction; and increase the size of the armed forces and their intelligencecapabilities. A soldier from my town programme created a limited military

role for locals and massive payments were oered for information regard-

ing illegal actors. Over time, the Colombian police and army approximately

doubled in size to some 450,000, and developed critical counter-insurgency

skills, particularly special operations and intelligence analysis. In these

areas, US technology and know-how were arguably more important than

the total amount of money provided.

Between 2002 and 2008, these policies forced the FARC o of the main

roads and out of the centre of the country. In the north, the FARCs size and

capability for armed action had already been severely reduced by paramili-

tary groups, and this was compounded by state forces. Between 2004 and

2007 FARC deaths in combat reached a high, averaging around 1,500 annu-

ally. A government defector/demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration

programme invited ghters to demobilise and give information about

armed groups, in exchange for education, job training, psychological help,

The

negotiations

fell apart


8/21


and eective legal impunity.17The number taking advantage nearly tripled

in just three years, with more than 3,000 FARC combatants demobilising in

2008 alone. Mid-level commanders who had spent their entire adult lives in

FARC began to demobilise, reaching 452 in 2008 alone.18The number of cap-tured guerrillas spiked at 4,800 in 2003, then decreased as FARC was pushed

out of urban areas and the option of demobilising directly after combat,

rather than automatically being detained, became available.19 According

to ocial statistics, by 2009 FARCs size had fallen from around 17,000 to

about 8,500, and it was mainly present in its historical areas of inuence.20

While Colombias counter-insurgency strategy was thus largely successful,

it also contained a darker side. Pushed to show measurable results, some

military units developed a body-count syndrome, leading them to execute

captured FARC combatants, or to use proxies to kill civilians, later present-

ing them as FARC members killed in combat.21While this false-positives

scandal was exposed publicly only in 2008, the practice was widely known

inside FARC and often dissuaded members from defecting.

Improvements in military signals- and human-intelligence collection

capabilities played an integral role in the states ght against FARC. The

interception and decoding of radio and phone communications, used incombination with informants, guided air-strikes and special operations

led to the deaths of Ral Reyes (the groups number two), Mono Jojoy

(FARCs strongest military commander) and Alfonso Cano (supreme FARC

commander in 2011), and to tricking the guerrillas into handing over 14

high-prole kidnap victims to the government. After six years of devastat-

ingly successful military operations by the Colombian Army, FARC now

seems to have developed eective countermeasures. These include dras-

tically decreasing usage of electronic communications, relying more on

snipers and landmines, moving away from populated areas, and recruit-

ing new ghters using faster and more coercive methods than earlier. As

a result, the number of FARC combatants that demobilise or die in combat

has decreased.22Meanwhile, the number of aacks and their lethality has

increased, causing higher numbers of state casualties, suggesting that

FARCs combatant force is at least not diminishing.23 In some parts of

southern Colombia the guerrillas have sought improved relations with the


9/21


civilian population to regain voluntary rather than forced support, with

some success.24FARC is rebounding; it has not recovered to its 2000 level

but is stronger than ve years ago, and just in time for peace talks. The

Colombian conict may thus have reached a mutually hurting stalemate,since FARC has been diminished and cannot realistically expect to return

to its former size and military capability, while the Colombian government

cannot expect to win the conict through military means alone.25

Endgame?

Following six months of exploratory talks, peace negotiations were formally

announced in Havana on 26 August 2012, together with a framework agree-

ment which focused on ve points that were to be negotiated. The agenda

covered the core elements of the Colombian conict rural development,

political participation, the end of the conict, drug tracking and victims

but also emphasised that the negotiations should advance as quickly as

possible. The parties met again in Oslo in October and the formal nego-

tiations began in Havana in November. In the interim, however, FARC

sought to expand the agenda, the format and the timeline of the negotia-

tions, reducing initial optimism for a rapid, negotiated end to the conict.The negotiations face three major hurdles: strong distrust between FARC

and the government; incompatible expectations on the format, agenda and

timeline for the negotiations; and vital diculties in reaching agreement on

even the ve points that have formally been included in the negotiations.

In selecting its negotiating team, FARC has overwhelmingly chosen

political gures, including as spokesperson Ivn Marquez, a recognised

if dogmatic ideologue inside the group.26Unlike the Cagun negotiations,

commanders with a more military or drug-tracking prole have largely

been left on the sidelines, apparently signalling an intention to reach a

political agreement.27But FARC has also included Simon Trinidad amongst

its negotiators. Viewed as an ideologue inside the group, Trinidad is cur-

rently incarcerated in the United States for drug-tracking oences.28Also

included is Tanja Nijmeijer, a Dutch citizen who joined FARC in 2002. This

is an odd move, since Nijmeiers diaries, found in 2007 in a FARC camp,

revealed in detail how disillusioned she had become with injustices inside


10/21


the group.29These choices may be meant to show solidarity with impris-

oned guerrillas and generate international support, but also hint at a limited

understanding of how the group is perceived by the outside world, an

impression reinforced by a FARC request in November for US PresidentBarack Obama to pardon Trinidad so he could be at the negotiating table.30

Early statements by FARC negotiators also provide worrying signs that

they may not be ready to make the painful concessions necessary to reach

a selement. For instance, Secretariat member Andres Paris atly denied

FARC involvement in drug tracking, a claim which is entirely untena-

ble.31Likewise, a 35-minute speech by Ivan Marquez

in Oslo emphasised the victimisation of FARC sup-

porters while refusing to acknowledge the numerous

human-rights abuses commied by the rebel group.32

This reects FARCs self-perceived history of victimi-

sation and self-defence, harkening back to the aacks

against the independent republics during the 1960s

and the dirty war against Unin Patritica. On the government side, Juan

Carlos Pinzn, the current minister of defence, has made statements to the

eect that FARC members are purely criminals and thus apolitical. Theguerrillas have accused him of trying to sabotage the negotiations.33The

government negotiators have remained largely mute on these and other

FARC statements. This may be a wise negotiating tactic, but it has left the

Colombian public wondering how the government is responding to what

many perceive as unreasonable FARC demands.

The format of the current negotiations has clearly been designed to

avoid the mistakes of Cagun. Whereas the agenda in 1999 included 12

themes and 48 sub-themes, the current negotiations are focused on just

the ve issues. Likewise, since the extensive involvement of civil-society

organisations and international actors in the Cagun negotiations made

that process both unwieldy and a major publicity boon to FARC, the frame-

work agreement for the current negotiations almost completely excludes

civil society from a direct role in the negotiation phase and only a limited

role has been given to Norwegian and Cuban representatives. Finally,

FARCs use of the Cagun negotiations to strengthen its military capacity

Early statements

provide

worrying signs


11/21


explains the adamant refusal by the Colombian state to agree to any cease-

re during the negotiations.34

While FARC initially seemed to accept these ground rules, it then began

actively seeking to contravene them. FARC negotiators have sought toinclude civil society in the negotiations,35have added last-minute changes

to their negotiating team and signalled that negotiations will likely last

longer than initially expected.36These changes may be a negotiating tactic

aimed at maximising concessions and political capital, but they inevitably

raise the spectre of a creeping Caguanisation of the negotiations, leading

many to question the guerrillas intentions. Prolonged talks also decrease

the likelihood of success, since they leave more time for spoilers to inter-

vene, but also because the Santos administration needs to be able to show

palpable progress to maintain the talks.37The government, frustrated with

FARCs aempts to expand the agenda, announced that November 2013 is

the deadline for a peace agreement to be signed, a message not only for the

negotiating table but also the Colombian public.38Moreover, government

statements announcing the expansion of military forces and acquisition of

new airplanes are unsubtle reminders of the alternative to negotiations, and

are also intended to keep the army from becoming a spoiler. These issuesillustrate some of the dierences, perhaps irreconcilable, in the parties

expectations. The Colombian government is bent on imposing a victors

peace, while FARC seems to expect to negotiate on an equal footing; neither

seems realistically achievable. The government will not accept a re-run of

the Cagun experience, nor will it willingly elevate FARCs visibility and

perceived legitimacy, whereas the guerrillas are highly unlikely to yield to

military pressure alone. There is a real risk of an impasse.

Even if the negotiators are able to overcome these problems, each of the

ve points outlined in the framework agreement is likely to present chal-

lenges for both the negotiations and implementation of any agreement.

Firstly, development is sorely needed in rural areas of Colombia, where up

to ve of six people live in poverty, useful infrastructure is essentially non-

existent and the Gini co-ecient (a measure of inequality, ranging from 01)

for land ownership is above 0.6 in 84% of municipalities. This reects the

massive inequality of rural property in the country, where 41% of land is in


12/21


the hands of less than 4% of landowners.39Whereas the negotiating agenda

does not include a redistribution of land per se, it does speak of access to

and usage of land, formalization of ownership and unproductive lands.

The aims of FARC and the Colombian government here are not necessarilyat odds, but the key question is whether the state can mobilise sucient

resources to produce visible peace dividends in regions with strong

FARC inuence and poor rural populations. Moreover, any solution that

even implies redistribution is likely to meet erce resistance from wealthy

landowners, some of whom have already allied with large, armed crimi-

nal groups in an eort to keep an already extant land restitution process

from aecting them.40Similarly, if history is any indicator, any land reforms

could lead to an escalation in violence.41

The negotiations also call for guarantees for political participation by

the opposition in general, and for new movements that arise from the

peace process in particular. In the 1990s, the guerrilla group M-19 was

guaranteed two seats in parliament as part of its peace agreement. It is,

however, dicult to imagine such concessions being granted to FARC,

given its deep involvement in illicit economic activities and extensive vio-

lence against civilians.42The most likely political successor to FARC is theMarcha Patritica, a recently emerging social movement in which claims

to have around 300,000 members. While formally not related to FARC, the

movement shows some indications that it is the modern-day equivalent

of Unin Patritica. In early statements, the movement has acknowledged

that it shares some of FARCs analysis of Colombias problems and it has

not excluded the possibility of including demobilised FARC members

within its ranks. The armed forces also claim to have found Marcha

Patritica materials in FARC camps and reports indicate that the group has

nancially supported the movement to some extent.43Despite these nd-

ings, the government has oered to provide security guarantees so that

the Marcha Patritica can act as a political party, as long as it maintains

no connections to illegal armed groups, which the FARC will not be if an

agreement is reached.44This movement may thus be the seed of a political

party that could represent FARC and its political views. How such a move-

ment would fare in parliamentary elections, and whether the Colombian


13/21


police will be able to eectively protect it from political violence, are critical

but so far unanswered questions.

The end of the conict will likely prove the most dicult aspect of the

negotiations. Firstly, FARC needs to be disarmed; given the mutual distrustthis may require some type of international monitoring mission, with the

existing OAS mission in Colombia the most likely contender. The next step

involves the demobilisation and reintegration of FARC, which will require

ex-combatants to nd jobs. This has already proven dicult due to social

stigma, lack of education and insucient job skills. With their rural back-

grounds such individuals often also have trouble adapting to the urban

seings where they frequently resele.45 And if FARC

ex-combatants cannot support themselves nancially,

Colombias illegal economy provides a tempting option

given the skill set these ghters have. An additional chal-

lenge is what to do with the approximately one-half of

FARC ex-combatants who were recruited below the age

of 18, formally viewed as child soldiers by international

law. Finally, given the precedents of violence against

ex-combatants and FARC political representatives, pro-viding security will be a crucial challenge to the successful reintegration of

guerrilla members into civilian life, and one that is likely to see intermient

setbacks. That this troubles FARC leaders is plain; the framework agree-

ment specically notes that the government should increase their combat

in particular against whatever organization responsible for homicides and

massacres or that [conducts] aacks against human rights defenders, social

movements or political movements.46The murder in late November 2012

of dgar Snchez, a veteran of Unin Patritica and a contemporary leader

of the Marcha Patritica, is likely to revive decades-old fear and resentment

inside FARC.47

The negotiations will also address the issue of drug tracking. Here,

one question is whether FARC will be able to rein in some of its most noto-

rious trackers or whether such fronts will splinter o, though this risk is

mitigated by the fact that FARC has traditionally been strongly cohesive.48

By contrast, it seems almost unavoidable that, if FARC demobilises, the

Negotiations

will also

address drug

trafficking


14/21


heavily armed organised-crime groups, known as BACRIM, that operate

in other regions of Colombia will aempt to move into areas that the guer-

rilla group currently controls. Given that a power vacuum will emerge,

turf wars will most likely ensue and violence could paradoxically increasesharply in the short to medium term after a peace deal, especially given the

economic benets of monopolising the drug trade, even regionally.49Due

to the vast incomes generated by the illegal economy, extreme poverty, a

certain bandolero(outlaw) culture and ineective or absent state institutions

in peripheral regions of Colombia, this scenario seems dicult to avoid

entirely, even if the state increases its security presence. The BACRIM also

present a very dierent opponent from FARC, as they typically do not wear

uniforms, rarely mass in large rural encampments, and generally maintain

neither neat organisational structures nor keep detailed personal informa-

tion, and cannot legally be aacked using purely military means. Ironically,

these networks may thus prove much harder to combat than FARC, even

though they will not actively challenge and aack the state, but rather seek

to corrupt and co-opt it.

The framework agreement also covers the issue of truth and reconcilia-

tion and the human rights of the victims. The Judicial Framework for Peacealso provides incentives for combatants to provide information on their

crimes and give reparations to victims for which, in return, they will be given

weaker or alternative judicial sentences. The peace process will undoubt-

edly establish some type of truth and reconciliation mechanism. The issue

of reparations is a very thorny one in Colombia, especially since support to

ex-combatants has been generous compared to aid given to victims. It is also

unlikely that FARC can oer much nancially in terms of reparations, and

the land they have stolen is often in the hands of peasants or middlemen,

and contaminated by landmines.50

To tackle these issues and achieve a reasonable trade-o between peace

and justice, it is clear that a transitional justice process will have to be estab-

lished. The current Judicial Framework for Peace has been criticised for

oering the possibility of reduced or suspended sentences against those

responsible for crimes against humanity. But the highly negative image

of FARC amongst Colombian society in general will arguably mean that


15/21


the suspension of sentences for top guerrilla commanders will be limited,

although it probably will be oered to foot soldiers. This option is, however,

conditioned on combatants handing in their arms, recognising their role in

crimes, revealing the truth about their actions and giving reparations tovictims, as well as liberating all kidnap victims and demobilising all child

recruits.51The most likely scenario for FARC leaders will be the reduction of

prison terms as well as application of symbolic forms of punishment, such

as public apologies. Given that the guerrillas have demanded amnesty in

the past, the fact that they are willing to allow victims rights to be part of

the agreement represents an important recognition of current political and

legal realities regarding the obligatory application of transitional justice. A

related challenge is the topic of extradition, as numerous FARC command-

ers have been indicted by the US Justice Department. In recent decisions,

however, the Colombia Supreme Court has turned down requested extra-

ditions of some paramilitary commanders, arguing that the United States

does not oer guarantees for the rights of victims to truth and repara-

tions. This implies that the more that FARC leaders actively collaborate in

transitional-justice processes, the less likely it will be that they be extra-

dited.52The issue of possible extraditions, however, remains a challenge,since guerrilla leaders will not trade in their uniforms for a lifetime of incar-

cerations in a US prison.

* * *

Prospects for peace in Colombia remain precarious. The optimism initially

evoked by the announcement of negotiations has since been tempered by

FARC statements and their repeated aempts to change the framework of

the talks. The likelihood of a peace agreement seems to be slowly but surely

diminishing. In mid-November, FARC declared a unilateral end to oen-

sive military operations, seeking to extract political concessions in return.

While FARC operations have not stopped completely, they have decreased

by approximately 80% since the unilateral ceasere came into eect, accord-

ing to Colombia analyst Leon Valencia.53But Santos has vowed to maintain

military pressure and FARCs gesture has not been reciprocated. Early in


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December, for example, some 20 FARC members were killed in a bombard-

ment in Nario, and on 30 December another 14 were killed in Antioquia.54

Surprisingly, according to sources familiar with the process, these military

operations do not seem to have impeded the peace negotiations. The nextcrucial challenge to negotiators lies in reconciling FARCs need for recogni-

tion with the Santos administrations need for demonstrable progress in the

short term. Beyond the substance of the negotiations, this also involves dif-

cult psychological challenges. Having spent most of their adult lives inside

FARC and seeing many of their comrades perish in the ghting, FARC com-

manders will likely require substantial political concessions to lay down

their arms. But government negotiators may not have a mandate to agree

to this and segments of the Colombian public would have strong objections

against legitimising what many see mainly as a terrorist organisation. Peace

negotiators for both the Colombian state and FARC have their work cut out

for them.

But the possibility for peace nonetheless remains greater than at any pre-

vious time in nearly 50 years. The Colombian conict may at last be ripe

for resolution, since neither side can feasibly expect to win militarily and

the outcome of another failed round of negotiations seem unpalatable toboth the Santos administration and the FARC leadership, who can expect

political defeat and a very real risk of death on the baleeld, respectively.

An agreement would largely remove one of the two main challenges to

the Colombian states monopoly on violence. The other left-wing rebel

group, ELN, is much smaller than FARC and is ready to restart its own

peace negotiations with the government, which were abruptly ended in

2008. The second challenge, organised crime, will require a dierent set of

strategies, will never end in a negotiated selement and will likely never be

entirely resolved, but at best controlled, contained and repressed. Spending

fewer resources on military campaigns, however, frees up resources both to

combat organised crime more vigorously and to potentially improve state

institutional presence and social services in the most neglected municipali-

ties of Colombia. Hence, largely ending political violence would also enable

the Colombian state to make progress against criminal violence, and with

its highly capable security institutions, Colombia is much beer placed to


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1 Cynthia J. Arnson and TheresaWhiteld, Third Parties andIntractable Conicts: The Case ofColombia, in Chester Crocker, FenOsler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds),Grasping the Nele: Analyzing Cases of

Intractable Conict (Washington DC:United States Institute of Peace Press,2005), pp. 23168.

2 Mario Aguilera Pea, Las FARC: LaGuerilla Campesina 19492010. Ideas

Circulares en un Mundo Cambiante?(Bogot: ARFO Editores e ImpresoresLtda, 2010), pp. 4656; and EduardoPizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (19492010) De Guerilla Campesina a Mquina

de Guerra (Bogot: Grupo EditorialNorma, 2011), pp. 16778.

3 Aguilera Pea, Las FARC, pp. 545.4 Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina and

Graciela Uribe Ramn, El Ordende la Guerra. Las FARC-EP: Entre la

Organizacin y la Poltica (Bogot: CentroEditorial Javeriano, 2002), pp. 4057.

5 Jacobo Arenas, Cese al Fuego: UnaHistoria Poltica de las FARC (Bogot:Editorial Oveja Negra, 1985), pp. 935.Arenas was the ideological leader ofFARC until his death in 1990.

6 Ferro Medina and Uribe Ramn, El

Orden de la Guerra, pp. 98100.

7 Juan E. Ugarriza and Mahew J.Craig, The Relevance of Ideologyto Contemporary Armed Conicts:A Quantitative Analysis ofFormer Combatants in Colombia,

Journal of Conict Resolution, pub-lished online 5 July 2012, DOI10.1177/0022002712446131.

8 Mark Chernick, Economic Resourcesand Internal Armed Conicts:Lessons from the Colombian Case,

in I. William Zartman and Cynthia J.Arnson (eds), Rethinking the Economicsof War: The Intersection of Need, Creed

and Greed(Washington DC: WoodrowWilson Center Press, 2005), pp.178205.

9 Jerry McDermo, Colombian ReportShows FARC is Worlds RichestInsurgent Group, Janes IntelligenceReview, 1 September 2005.

10 Carlos Medina,Autodefensas,Paramilitares y Narcotrco en Colombia,

El Caso de Puerto Boyac, (Bogot:Editoriales Periodsticos, 1990).

11 Corporacin Observatorio para la Paz,Guerras Intiles: Una Historia de las

FARC (Bogot: Intermedio Editores,2009), p. 162.

12 Harvey F. Kline, Colombia:

Lawlessness, Drug Tracking and

achieve this than many other Latin American states facing similar problems.

Meanwhile, the Colombian population has already reaped some peace

dividends, as kidnappings have dropped precipitously, the economy has

grown robustly and the national homicide rate is about one-half of what itwas ten years ago. Resolving the conict with FARC will not be solve all of

Colombias challenges, but would allow the country to continue on its sur-

prisingly positive trajectory.

Notes


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Carving up the State, in RobertI. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure andState Weakness in a Time of Terror

(Washington DC: Brookings

Institution Press, 2003), pp. 16182.13 Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (1949

2010), pp. 25662.14 Authors interviews with FARC ex-com-

batants in Villavicencio, June 2011 andManizales and Bogot, September 2012.

15 The total amount of aid just forColombia was about $1.23 billion,of which over $900 million went toanti-narcotics and in eect counter-insurgent military aid.

16 Dilogos de Paz: Cinco Dudas en LaHabana, Semana, 17 November 2012.

17 Ariel Fernando vila Martnez, LaGuerra Contra las FARC y la Guerrade las FARC,Arcanos, no.15, 2010, pp.1819.

18 Gerson Ivn Arias, Natalia Herreraand Carlos Andrs Prieto,Mandos

Medios de las FARC y su Procesode Desmovilizacin en el Conicto

Colombiano, serie informes no. 10(Bogot: Fundacin Ideas para la Paz,2010), p. 12.

19 Ariel Fernando vila, La Guerracontra las FARC y la Guerra de lasFARC,Arcanos, no. 15, 2010, p. 19.

20 Observatorio del ProgramaPresidencial de Derechos Humanosy DIH, Impacto de la Poltica deSeguridad Democrtica sobre la Violencia

y los Derechos Humanos(Bogot:2010), p. 211; Soledad Granada,Jorge A. Restrepo and AndrsR. Vargas, El Agotamiento de laPoltica de Seguridad: Evolucin yTransformaciones Recientes en elConicto Armado Colombiano, in

Jorge A. Restrepo and David Aponte

(eds), Guerra y Violencias en Colombia:Herramientas e Interpretaciones(Bogot:Ponticia Universidad Javeriana,2009), pp. 27124.

21 Centro de Investigacin y EducacinPopular,Colombia: Deuda con laHumanidad 2: 23 Aos de FalsosPositivos (Bogot:CINEP/PPP, 2011).

22 Based on statistics from the Ministryof Defence for 20022012, avail-able in the monthly Logros de laPoltica de Seguridad Democrticafor 20022006, Logros de la Polticade Consolidacin de la SeguridadDemocrtica for 20062010 andLogros de la Poltica Integralde Seguridad y Defensa para laProsperidad for 20102012, as well asspecic data provided by the Ministryof Defence.

23 See Logros de la Poltica Integralde Seguridad y Defensas para laProsperidad, 2012.

24 Authors interviews with peasants andpeasant leaders in Putumayo, 2009.

25 I. William Zartman, The Timing ofPeace Initiatives: Hurting Stalematesand Ripe Moments, Global Review ofEthnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 1, September2001, pp. 818.

26 Sergio Gmez Maseri, Inltrada en lasFARC se Convirti en Informante de laDEA porque le Hicieron Conejo en unNegocio, El Tiempo, 19 January 2007.

27 Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (19492010), p. 259.

28 Authors interviews with FARC ex-combatants, 10 and 17 September2012, Bogot.

29 La Historia de Tanja Nijmeier,Semana, 27 October 2012.

30 FARC piden indulto para Simn

Trinidad, Semana, 23 November 2012.


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31 Whereas the level of involvementin drug-tracking varies betweendierent FARC fronts, the authorsinterviews with ex-combatants from

the 16th and 48th fronts among othersprovide ample examples of FARC col-laborating closely with internationaldrug trackers.

32 John Otis, Colombian Peace TalksStart and so do FARCs DelusionalTirades, Times, 22 October 2012.

33 For just one example of the min-isters remarks see Las FARC yel ELN aliados con las Bandas

Criminales: Mindefensa, El Universal,13 November 2012. The minister,referring to FARC, also said, Whatconict? Killers are what they are.FARC no Tendrn Perdn Nunca:Mindefensa, El Tiempo, 30 October2012. For FARCs comments see,FARC Arman que Ministro deDefensa Intenta Sabotear los

Esfuerzos de Paz, El Colombiano, 24November 2012.34 On the Caguan negotiations, see

Pizarro Leongomez, Las FARC (19492010), pp. 25862.

35 The government has conceded on thispoint, allowing for a forum on agrar-ian development to be carried out inDecember in Bogot so that civil societycan present its proposals on the topic.

36 FARC also admied to still havingprisoners of war, (in other words, kid-napping victims), that they were lookingto exchange for imprisoned FARCguerrillas, a topic that had not been dis-cussed at all as FARC had stated they nolonger had any kidnapped people. SeeFARC arman que tienen Prisionerosde Guerra Canjeables, El Espectador, 2

December 2012.

37 Dilogos de Paz: Cinco Dudas en LaHabana, Semana, 17 November 2012.

38 Dilogos con las FARC, Mximohasta Noviembre de 2013: Santos, El

Tiempo, 2 December 2012.39 Colombia Rural: Razones para la

Esperanza(Bogot: PNUD Colombia,2010), p. 201.

40 One armed group known as theUrabeos has found support in largelandowners in the Urab regin andsouthern Crdoba. Hay gente inte-resada en mantener a los Urabeos:General Naranjo, El Tiempo, 26February 2012. There is also a groupcalled the Anti-Restitution Armyformed by landowners throughoutnorthern Colombia.

41 Maurico Romero, Paramilitares yAutodefensas: 19822003(Bogot:Instituto de Estudios Polticos yRelaciones Internacionales, 2003).

42 Alejandra Guqueta, The Way Back

In: Reintegrating Illegal ArmedGroups in Colombia Then and Now,Conict, Security & Development, vol. 7,no. 3, October 2007, pp. 41756.

43 Marcha Patritica, Pieza en elEngranaje de la Paz, Semana, 4September 2012; Hallan Bonos aNombre de Marcha Patritica enCaleta de las FARC, Seala Ejrcito,Semana, 24 October 2012.

44 Gobierno abro Dilogo deParticipacin Poltica con MarchaPatritica, El Tiempo, 28 November2012.

45 Authors interviews with FARC ex-combatants, Bogot, September 2012.

46 Acuerdo General para la Terminacin del

Conicto y la Construccin de una Paz

Estable y Duradera [General Agreement

for the Termination of the Conict


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and the Construction of a Stable andDurable Peace], p. 3, 3.4.

47 Quien era el Lder de la MarchaPatritica que Termin Asesinado?,

Semana, 23 November 2012.48 La Historia de John 40, el Chupeta

de las FARC, El Tiempo, 4 April 2011;Francisco Gutierrez-Sanin, Telling theDierence: Guerrillas and Paramilitariesin the Colombian War,Politics & Society,vol. 36, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 334.

49 Kyle Johnson, Neo-paramilitares yBACRIM, con su Mirada en la Paz,17 October 2012, hp://www.arcoiris.com.co/2012/10/neo-paramilitares-y-bacrim-con-su-mirada-en-la-paz/.

50 Colombian agricultural minister, citedin 70% de Tierras Despojadas porla Guerrilla pueden Tener Minas, ElTiempo,3 October 2012.

51 Marco Jurdico para la Paz[Judicial Framework for Peace],available at hp://congreso-visible.org/proyectos-de-ley/

por-medio-del-cual-se/6437/#.52 Corte Suprema neg la Extradicin

de Don Mario, Verdad Abierta,17 March 2010, hp://www.ver-dadabierta.com/component/content/article/47-extraditados/2302-corte-suprema-niega-la-extradicion-de-don-mario.

53 Corporacin Arco Iris dice queViolencia de las FARC Disminuy un

80%, Caracol Radio, 7 January 2013.54 Golpes contra las FARC en Cauca,

Nario y Meta, El Tiempo, 2 December2012; El Quinto Frente de las FARCfue Desmantelado: Comando FAC,Vanguardia, 2 January 2013.


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Documents

Colombia: Ending the Forever War? Kyle Johnson & Michael Jonsson