Civil Procedure DigestsJudge WaganEmmanuel Emigdio D. Dumlao

I. JURISDICTION

Navales v. Abaya

FACTS: Last July 27, 2003 more than 300 junior officers and enlisted men – mostly

from the elite units of the AFP quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). The soldiers then made a statement through ABS-CBN News network that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo such as graft and corruption in the military, sale of arms and ammunition to the ‘enemies’ of the State, etc. They declared the withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration.

After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the Government team led by Ambassador Cimatu an agreement was forged between the two groups. Subsequently DOJ charged the 321 soldiers who took part in the “Oakwood incident” with violation of Article 134-A coup d’ etat of the RPC. Thereafter several of the accused filed in the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal. While such motion was pending, DOJ issued a Resolution finding probable cause for coup d’ etat against only 31 of the original 321 accused and the charges against them were dismissed.

RTC admitted the Amended Information charging only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup d’ etat defined under Article 134-A of the RPC. However, 1Lt. Navales, et. al who were earlier dropped as accused in the crime of coup d’ etat were charged before the General Court Martial with violations of the Articles of War.

At this point the RTC acted on the Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original accused declaring the petition for the court assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military court and requiring the prosecution to produce evidence to establish probable cause as MOOT AND ACADEMIC. Furthermore, it declared that all the charges before the court-martial against the accused are hereby declared NOT SERVICE CONNECTED BUT IS ABSORBED AND IN FURTHERANCE TO THE ALLEGED CRIME OF COUP D’ ETAT.

The General Court-martial then set the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War. Petitions for the issuance of temporary restraining order were filed and the court directed that parties to observe the status quo prevail before the filing of the petition. The petitioners then filed for writs of prohibition and habeas corpus in the RTC as relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus and obtain relief in the RTC.

HELD: NO. The Order of the RTC declaring that all the charges before the court-

martial against accused were not service-connected but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’ etat, cannot be given effect.

The RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion to assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal as moot and academic when the RTC accepted the Amended Information under which only 31 of the accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290. It has become moot against those charges that were dismissed.

However in said order it further declared that “all the charges before the court-martial against the accused and former accused are not service-connected”, believing that the crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’etat and thus absorbed by the said crime.

Thus, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was nothing left to be resolved after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. This dismissal made the petitioners no longer parties to the case and no further relief could be granted to them.

1Lt Navales, et al. since they are strangers to the proceedings in the criminal case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court, thus they cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were not service connected.

In view of the clear mandate of RA 7055 that military courts have jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered “service connected” crimes. It even mandates that it should be tried by the court martial.

The RTC thus has no legal basis to rule that the violation of the following Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup d’ etat and as such absorbed by the latter crime. In making such a declaration the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and is NULL AND VOID.

The writs of prohibition and habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioners must fail.

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by a court with jurisdiction and that the writ should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court or quasi-judicial body. Thus, the rules apply to petitioners who were detained under Commitment Order issued by the Chief of Staff of the AFP.

On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.

In this case, the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the charges filed against 1Lt. Navales, et. al under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.

Ceroffer Realty Corp. vs. CA

FACTS: Plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation) filed with the RTC, Quezon City, a

complaint against defendant Santiago, for "damages and injunction, with preliminary injunction." In the complaint, Ceroferr prayed that Santiago and his agents be enjoined from - claiming possession and ownership over Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. RT-90200 (334555); that Santiago and his agents be prevented from making use of the vacant lot as a jeepney terminal;

"In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged that the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110 (3538); that he was not claiming any portion of Lot No. 68 claimed by Ceroferr; that he had the legal right to fence Lot No. 90 since this belonged to him, and he had a permit for the purpose; that Ceroferr had no color of right over Lot No. 90 and, hence, was not entitled to an injunction to prevent Santiago from exercising acts of ownership thereon;

"In the course of the proceedings, an important issue metamorphosed as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties over the vacant lot actually used as a jeepney terminal – the exact identity and location thereof. There was a verification survey, followed by a relocation survey, whereby it would appear that the vacant lot is inside Lot No. 68. The outcome of the survey, however, was vigorously objected to by defendant who insisted that the area is inside his lot. Defendant, in his manifestation adverted to the report of a geodetic engineer. Mariano V. Flotildes, to the effect that the disputed portion is inside the boundaries of Lot No. 90 of the Tala Estate Subdivision which is separate and distinct from Lot No. 68, and that the two lots are separated by a concrete fence.

"Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties over the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of the respective titles of the parties. While both parties have been brandishing separate certificates of title, defendant asserted a superior claim as against that of the plaintiff in that, according to defendant, his title has been confirmed through judicial reconstitution proceedings, whereas plaintiff’s title does not carry any technical description of the property except only as it is designated in the title as Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision.

"It thus became clear, at least from the viewpoint of defendant, that the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction – which was the main objective of the complaint - but a review of the title of defendant vis-à-vis that of plaintiff. At this point, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his contention that the trial court

cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without passing over the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties over the disputed portion.

"On May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of this appeal which, as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiff was in effect impugning the title of defendant which could not be done in the case for damages and injunction before it. The court cited the hoary rule that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of collateral attack but can only be challenged through a direct proceeding. It concluded that it could not proceed to decide plaintiff’s claim for damages and injunction for lack of jurisdiction because its judgment would depend upon a determination of the validity of defendant’s title and the identity of the land covered by it.

"From this ruling, plaintiff appealed to this court insisting that the trial court could proceed to try and decide the case before it since, under present law, there is now no substantial distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in a regional trial court and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court.”On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the appeal.

ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot involved in the case.

HELD:On the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to

determine the identity and location of the vacant lot in question.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by

the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the court’s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.

In this case, respondent Santiago may be considered estopped to question the jurisdiction of the trial court for he took an active part in the case. In his answer, respondent Santiago did not question the jurisdiction of the trial court to grant the reliefs prayed for in the complaint. His geodetic engineers were present in the first and second surveys that the LRA conducted. It was only when the second survey report showed results adverse to his case that he submitted a motion to dismiss.Both parties in this case claim that the vacant lot is within their property. This is an issue that can be best resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.

After the land has been originally registered, the Court of Land Registration ceases to have jurisdiction over contests concerning the location of boundary lines. In such case, the action in personam has to be instituted before an ordinary court of general jurisdiction.

The regional trial court has jurisdiction to determine the precise identity and location of the vacant lot used as a jeepney terminal.

Lee vs. Presiding Judge

FACTS:On September 2, 1981, herein private respondents Spouses Roy Po Lam and

Josefa Po Lam filed a complaint for ejectment and/or unlawful detainer against herein petitioner Jose Lee with the then City Court of Legazpi, Branch III, on the ground that the oral contract of lease entered into between the private respondents and said petitioner, over a commercial lot and building owned by the private respondents, had already expired and the said petitioner refused to vacate said property despite demands from private respondents.

In his answer, herein petitioner Jose Lee, specifically denied the allegation of private respondents of ownership over the property, on the basis of a final decision rendered by the then Court of Appeals on March 11, 1981 in CA-G.R. No. 44770, wherein a certain Felix Lim intervenor therein, was declared as owner of a portion of the property in question as well as entitled to exercise the right of redemption over the remaining portion of said property from the subsequent buyer thereof who is the predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents.

Felix Lim, filed an answer in intervention in Civil Case No. 2687, which was admitted by the respondent trial court, wherein he, as the declared owner of a portion of the property in question and redemptioner of the rest thereof by virtue of the decision of the then Court of Appeals, questioned the right of the private respondents to receive rentals thereon.

It appears that previous to the filing of the answer in intervention, petitioner Felix Lim filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Albay against private respondents spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam, where he questioned the right of ownership and possession by the private respondents of the property.It appears further that petitioner Felix Lim filed another complaint with the Court of First Instance of Albay against the private respondents for the reconveyance and annulment of the sale and title involving the same property.

Lim reiterated his motion for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of the land in question pertains to the Court of First Instance of Albay, resolution of which was reserved while the case proceeded to trial.

On December 19, 1983, the respondent trial judge rendered his decision where he ruled that the Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the issue of ownership of the property in question. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) declaring the plaintiffs as lawful owners of, and rightfully entitled to the immediate possession of the leased commercial building and lot 1557, covered by TCT No. 8102 (formerly TCT 2580),

as described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; (2) directing the defendant his agent, or anyone acting in his behalf, to vacate said leased building and lot, and to restore the actual possession thereof, to the plaintiffs; (3) ordering the defendant to pay directly the plaintiffs the whole rentals which accrued, from October, 1982 up to the time he shall have vacated the leased premises, at the rate of P2,500.00 a month, minus the amounts already deposited with the City Treasurer's Office of Legazpi, which amounts are hereby retained to be withdrawn by the plaintiffs, their counsel or representative; (4) directing the defendant to also pay the plaintiffs the amounts of (a) P2,500.00, and Pl,200.00, as exemplary damages and attorney's fees, respectively; and (b) the costs of the suit.

The intervenor's claim and prayer are denied for lack of merit.Thereafter, petitioner Jose Lee filed a notice of appeal of the aforesaid

decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court.On July 9, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated a resolution in the case, copy of which was received by petitioner on July 12, 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, this Court RESOLVED to dismiss the present appeal, which should have been brought to the Regional Trial Court (Sec. BP 129).Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed on October 4, 1984.

ISSUES: I. Whether or not the respondent trial judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 1, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated its decision dated December 19, 1983 declaring private respondents as lawful owners of the property subject of Civil Case No. 2687.

II. Whether or not the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated its resolutions dated July 9, 1984 and September 5, 1984 dismissing the appeal sought by herein petitioners.

HELD:I.

Petitioners contend that the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment in Civil Case because the issue of ownership was raised in the pleadings, hence, when the court resolved the issue of ownership over the property in question, it acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The contention is without merit.When the complaint for ejectment was filed before the respondent trial court

on September 2, 1981, said court, as City Court of Legazpi City, had concurrent jurisdiction with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in ejectment cases where the question of ownership is involved. 'This is expressly provided for in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 which took effect on June 21, 1969, and which reads:

SEC. 3. Besides the civil cases over which the City Courts have jurisdiction under Section eighty-eight of Republic Act Numbered Two hundred ninety-six, as amended, it shall likewise have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over the following:(a) Petition for change of name of naturalized citizens after the judgment has become final and executory:(b) Cancellation or correction of entries in the City Civil Registry where the corrections refer to typographical errors only; and(c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. The issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession. (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, when the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 2, 1981, R.A. 5967 was the governing law; hence, the respondent trial court had jurisdiction over the case and had validly rendered the December 19, 1983 decision. For, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

It is true that intervenor Felix Lim, petitioner herein, filed Civil Case No. 6696 on November 3, 1981 with the then Court of First Instance of Albay against spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam, private respondents herein, questioning the ownership and possession of the property in question, and on February 9, 1982, he filed Civil Case No. 6767 also before the Court of First Instance of Albay, for the recovery and annulment of the sale and title of the property in question.

However, at that time when the aforesaid civil cases were filed before the Court of First Instance of Albay, the City Court of Legazpi had long acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2687 to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Albay.

It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts".In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to pre-vent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process.

Furthermore, assuming that the respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over the ejectment case, petitioners are already estopped to raise the question of jurisdiction. As found by the City Court (now Municipal Trial Court) the issue of ownership was formulated and raised not only in the September 2, 1981 complaint of plaintiffs Roy Po Lam and Josefa Po Lam but also in the answer and rejoinder of defendant Jose Lee which were filed on September 7, 1981 and September 23, 1981, respectively, as well as in the answer in intervention of Felix Lim which was filed on November 12, 1981. Likewise confirmatory is defendant's admission that "the issue

of ownership over the property in question is an integral part of the main issue in the instant case as well as the intervenor's submission that the question of possession is intimately linked with that of ownership. (Decision, Civil Case No. 2687; Rollo, pp. 108-109). Surely, petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2687, submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed their answer to the complaint and sought reliefs therefor; participated in the trial of the aforesaid case; examined private respondent's witnesses; and adduced testimonial and documentary evidence. They cannot now be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily. While generally, jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be conferred by consent of the parties or by their failure to object to the lack of it, the Supreme Court, however, in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy (23 SCRA 20, 35 [1968], has declared that ... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79)." Therefore, the respondent trial court has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the decision dated December 19, 1983.

II.Petitioners likewise contend that the respondent Intermediate Appellate

Court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or without or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal from the decision of the respondent trial court dated December 19, 1983 in Civil Case 2687 instead of certifying the case to the proper court.

The contention is impressed with merit.The appropriate procedure should have been to certify the case to the proper

court, which is the Regional Trial Court, instead of dismissing the appeal. While it is true that under Section 5 of R.A. 5967, decisions of the City Courts are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals, the said law, however, can be said to have been repealed when Batas Pambansa 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, took effect on August 14, 1981. 1 Under Section 22 of BP 129 the "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal 'Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions." Therefore, Civil Case 2687 was erroneously brought on appeal before the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. And Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court. states that:Where appealed case erroneously brought. -Where the appealed case has been erroneously brought to the Court of Appeals, it shall not dismiss the appeal, but shall certify the case to the proper court, with specific and clear statement, of the grounds therefor.

Under Sec. 22, B.P. 129 which was already in force and effect when petitioners appealed from the decision of the City Court, the appeal should have been brought to the Regional Trial Court. ( See Bello vs. Court of Appeals, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 509). Hence, respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in failing to certify the case to the Regional Trial Court.

Ignacio vs. The Honorable Court of First Instance of Bulacan

FACTS:The landholding in question was owned by Felizardo Lipana and tenanted by

Alipio Marcelo until his death on December 3, 1962. Two cases involving the land were pending in the Court of Agrarian Relations at the time of death between Alipio Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana. In both cases the deceased was subsequently substituted by Maximo Marcelo and Emilia Tabor Vda. de Marcelo, surviving son and wife, respectively. A third case was filed on December 20, 1962 by Maximo Marcelo against Felizardo Lipana and Magdalena dela Cruz (the latter having been the alleged common-law wife of Alipio Marcelo), praying that he, Maximo be declared as entitled to succeed to the tenancy and status of the deceased. One of the allegations of Lipana in his answer to the complaint was that he "signified his intention to recognize as his tenant Magdalena dela Cruz who is the widow of Alipio Marcelo." This is an admission that as far as Lipana was concerned it was Magdalena who had the right to succeed the deceased Alipio as tenant.

Thereafter, a compromise agreement in the three CAR cases was entered into by Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana, wherein the former surrendered all his rights over the landholding in favor of the latter. A judgment in accordance with the terms and conditions of said compromise was thereupon rendered by the trial Judge on November 5, 1964, declaring that CAR cases were deemed closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana.

On July 15, 1965 Magdalena dela Cruz filed a complaint against Lipana (Case No. 1221), asking the CAR to declare her the lawful tenant of the landholding, to fix the annual, rentals thereof during the past three years and to award damages in her favor by way of attorney's fees and consequential expenses.

On July 29, 1965 Lipana in turn went to the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on an action for "Ejectment and Forcible Entry", with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Magdalena dela Cruz and her husband Lorenzo Ignacio, alleging that he, Lipana, had been placed in possession of the landholding by the provincial sheriff of Bulacan by virtue of the order of the CAR dated January 27, 1965 in CAR cases.

On May 31, 1966 a decision in Civil Case No. 235 was rendered by the Municipal Court, ordering defendants to vacate the land and to remove their house therefrom. This decision was likewise appealed to the Court of First Instance. Again, defendants were allowed to appeal as paupers.

ISSUE:WON the CFI erred in dismissing the case

HELD:YES. While it is true that the jurisdiction of the court in a suit for ejectment or

forcible entry is determined by the allegations in the complaint, yet where tenancy is averred as a defense and, upon hearing, is shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The decision of the CAR, it should be

remembered, was rendered upon a compromise agreement between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana. The right of Magdalena dela Cruz, who was a co-defendant in CAR Case No. 895, was not touched upon in said agreement. There the decision simply stated that CAR Cases Nos. 750, 827 and 895 were "deemed closed and terminated as between Maximo Marcelo and Felizardo Lipana;" and the writ of execution was limited to "placing Mr. Felizardo Lipana immediately in possession of the landholding formerly cultivated by Maximo Marcelo or any person, agent, and/or representative acting in behalf of Maximo Marcelo."

It was therefore incorrect for respondent court to conclude from the decision and writ of execution in the CAR cases that Lipana had actual possession, as against Magdalena dela Cruz, over the landholding prior to the alleged unlawful detainer and/or forcible entry. While both Maximo and Magdalena asserted the right to succeed to tenancy of the same landholding after the death of Alipio Marcelo, the CAR did not adjudicate that right to either of them nor did it resolve the question as to who had actual possession of the landholding after the death of Alipio. What it did, in order to prevent further trouble between Maximo and Magdalena was to place the landing under the administration of the Agricultural Extension Officer, with instruction that Maximo and Magdalena should be given preference in working on the land as laborers. The allegations in the complaint in CAR Case No. 1221 reveal that they worked on different portion of the land in accordance with the CAR's order. This was how things stood when Maximo entered into a compromising agreement with Lipana surrendering his rights over landholding in favor of the latter. For all intents purposes, therefore, the decision and writ of execution effected only the claim of Maximo Marcelo as tenant and actual possession of the portion of the land on which he was working by virtue of the provisional arrangement ordered by the CAR. Since the tenancy dispute remained unresolved with respect to Magdalena dela Cruz and was actually the subject of litigation in CAR Case No. 1221, the filing of the ejectment case was an intrusion upon the jurisdiction of said court.

Serdoncillo vs. Spouses Fidel

FACTS:The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako. The

legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC) which subdivided the property into 14 lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots were then offered for sale with first priority to each of the tenants, including the private respondents and petitioner.

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako’s wife, Mrs. Rosario de Jesus.  Thereafter, the collection of rentals was stopped prompting petitioner to file on June 30, 1987, Civil Case No. 5456 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City for consignation of rentals against UCRTC, Rosario de Jesus and the spouses Carisima.  The consignation was granted by the trial court and was eventually affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 on October 25, 1989.

On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondents-spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H. This sale was annotated at the back of UCRTC’s title on Lot 666-H .

On June 2, 1989, after unsuccessful oral and written demands were made upon petitioner, UCRTC instituted an action against her for recovery of possession of the subject premises before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 docketed as Civil Case No 6652. On July 15, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint of UCRTC for lack of merit.UCRTC did not appeal the aforesaid decision of the Regional Trial Court, hence, the same became final.

On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the Exercise of Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-spouses Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of sale of   a portion of lot 666-H sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground that said transfer or conveyance is illegal.  She claimed that she has the preferred right to buy the said property and that the same was not offered to her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and void.  UCRTC and private respondents prevailed and this case was dismissed.  On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the same was dismissed on July 9, 1992.

On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on petitioner reiterating their previous demands to vacate the property. On December 13, 1990, private respondents filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the subject premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, docketed as Civil Case No. 7785.

The issues having been joined, trial on the merits ensued. On June 30, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of private respondents.

Aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court should have dismissed the complaint of private respondents considering that based on the letter of demand dated November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been unlawful detainer and not an action for recovery of possession. On July 14, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision sustaining the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal of petitioner.

ISSUE:WON the respondent regional trial court and the court of appeals committed grave abuse of jurisdiction in deciding as an accion publiciana an ejectment or unlawful detainer case (the jurisdiction of which clearly pertains to the inferior court), a case basically involving an easement of right of way.

HELD:NO. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court

over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.  As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the

motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.  The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Accordingly, the issues in the instant case can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785.

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.  When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria.

A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably show that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being the absolute owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected therefrom.  There is nothing in the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of the means of dispossession that would constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor is there any assertion of defendant’s possession which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the expiration of the right to possess.  It does not characterize petitioner’s alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which petitioner was able to construct the house and the pig pens thereon.  The complaint merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by private respondents and its right of way have been occupied by petitioner and that she should vacate.  The action therefore is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a dispute relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land allegedly encroached upon by petitioner and its adjoining right of way.

Tinitigan v. Tinitgian Sr.

FACTS: Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with

the land. The consent of Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later amended to include “restrain defendants from encumbering or disposing property in the name of Molave Development Corp & those in their name as husband and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was then set for hearing primarily on the the issue of preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which was tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by

Payuran because allegedly the Loring property is suitable for condo site therefore command a higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the administration of the conjugal property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of which the Loring property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for certiorari at the CA which affirmed the same, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the court where respondent Judge acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell.

HELD: YES. In the amended complaint, respondents prayed among others "to

restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect, brings the Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the court which issued the order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but proper. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the said motion to seek judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent amounts to compliance with legal requirement delineated in Article 166, supra. The issuance of the order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a validly acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein - a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction be properly involved or called into activity by the firing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed. That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change".

The well-settled rule that "jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is finally terminated" is hereby observed. "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first innocence, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached".

Amigo vs CA

FACTS:Petitioners Lolita Amigo and Estelita vda. de Salinas leased in 1961 from

Mercedes Inigo, a parcel of land, located along Leon Garcia St., Agdao District, Davao City. Petitioners constructed their houses on the lot. Mercedes Inigo later sold and transferred her ownership of the land to Juan Bosquit and herein private respondent Jesus Wee Eng.

Bosquit and Wee entered into a deed of exchange with the City Government of Davao. Bosquit and Wee exchanged a portion of their lot for also a portion of a lot in the name of the city.

Bosquit and Wee instituted an action for unlawful detainer against petitioners before the City Court of Davao. After almost seven years, or on 19 July 1976, the city court finally dismissed the action on the technicality that the plaintiffs did not observe the required 15-day period from the sending of the letter of demand before filing the action, the letter having been sent instead on 19 September 1969 or only twelve days before the filing of the action.

Bosquit sold his rights and interests over the lots to Wee.22 July 1977, Wee, herein private respondent, filed a complaint against

petitioners in the then Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, for recovery of the real property in question. On 08 September 1978, after the petitioners had filed their answer, the court appointed Bueno, a duly licensed geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation survey of the boundaries of the land. In his report:“x x x portions of about two-thirds (2/3) of the houses of Lolita Amigo and that of Estelita Vda. de Salinas is inside of Lot of Wee; the remaining one-third of it lies on the road widening and the creek respectively.”

Private respondent sought an amendment of his complaint which was allowed by the lower court, as so amended, the complaint prayed not only for the recovery of real property and damages but also for an abatement of nuisance.

In their amended answer, petitioners denied the material allegations of the amended complaint. Petitioners stressed that their houses stood neither on private respondent’s land nor on the sidewalk or shoulders of Leon Garcia Street but along the banks of the Agdao Creek.

TC: in favor of plaintiff/private respondent WeeCA: dismissed the appeal for the failure of petitioners to file an appeal brief

within reglementary period.Private respondent moved for execution of the judgment.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for the annulment of the trial court’s decision, as well as all orders and proceedings subsequent thereto, including the various writs of execution and demolition. Petitioners contended that the judgment rendered by the lower court was void for want of jurisdiction.

CA dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and their person in the case at bench.

HELD:Petition denied.Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and

determined by the allegations of the complaint. It should hardly be of any consequence that the merits of the case are later found to veer away from the claims asseverated by the plaintiff. The suit below is aimed at recovering real property, an action clearly well within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil action is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. In this case, by their filing of an answer and later an amended answer, petitioners must be deemed to have formally and effectively appeared before the lower court. Unlike the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be invoked at any stage of the proceedings (even on appeal), the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, however, as has been so held lately in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, must be seasonably raised, and it can well be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense in an answer. The records bear out the fact that petitioners have allowed the issue of jurisdiction to pass unquestioned until the rendition of the judgment. It is now too late in the day for petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the lower court over their person, a somersault that neither law nor policy will sanction.

Tijam vs Sibonghanoy

FACTS:Spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a Civil Case in the

Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of money. A counter-bond was filed by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety.

After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs, and issued a writ of execution after such decision became final. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond, against which the Surety filed a written opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. The court denied the motion. The court granted another writ of execution against Surety.

Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.

CA affirmed the orders appealed from.Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially

that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case.

The CA certified the case before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss must be granted.

HELD:It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court

of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it

invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Calimlim vs Ramirez

FACTS:Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money was rendered in favor of

Independent Mercantile Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali by the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 85136. After said judgment became final, a writ of execution was issued on July 31, 1961. The Notice of Levy made on September 21, 1961 on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title. " The Certificate of Sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan on October 17, 1961 in favor of Independent Mercantile Corporation also stated that the sale referred only to the rights and interest of Manuel Magali over the land described in TCT No. 9138. Manuel Magali is one of the several children of Domingo Magali who had died in 1940 and herein petitioner Modesta Calimlim.

However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title".

Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title.

Independent Mercantile Corporation filed an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and in its Order dated July 13, 1967, it directed the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Independent Mercantile Corporation.

Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, for cancellation of the title issued to Independent Mercantile, but the same was dismissed.

Petitioners did not appeal the dismissal. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they filed the complaint praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property. Named as defendant in said civil case

was herein private respondent Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation on July 25, 1967. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.

Private respondent Francisco Ramos filed a Motion To Dismiss the case on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court, in its Order dated April 21, 1971, dismissed Civil Case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment. Thus, the petition before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Res Judicata applies.

HELD:It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein

petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently considered.

The petition filed by the herein petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court, Although the said petition did not so state, that reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It has been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.

In the order of the respondent Judge dated September 29, 1971 denying the second motion for reconsideration, he cited the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, to uphold the view that the petitioners are deemed estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the respondent Court in having taken cognizance of the petition for cancellation of TCT No. 68568, they being the ones who invoked the jurisdiction of the said Court to grant the affirmative relief prayed for therein. We are of the opinion that the ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the philosophy of the doctrine therein expounded fits the case at bar.

A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any

stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a cadastral court, it lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years after the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.

Francel Realty Corp vs. Sycip

FACTS:Petitioner Francel Realty and Respondent Fernando Sycip entered into a

contract to sell a house and lot. Respondent was able to pay the downpayment which value was considered as monthly rentals. However, despite the transfer of the title in the name of [respondent], the latter refused to pay the balance of P250,000.00. The downpayment was then applied to defendant’s monthly rental, said amount has been reduced to nothing.Despite several demands made by petitioner, respondent refused to reconvey the subject property to petitioner. Petitioner then filed an illegal detainer case against respondent before the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite, which was accordingly dismissed by the MTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Agreeing with the trial court, the CA held that the case involved not just reconveyance and damages, but also a determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957; hence, the case fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. Hence tis petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2 of the RTC, Imus, Cavite, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: YES. "A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in

decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncement such as the case of Sibonghanoy (where the court ruled that estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction). In this case, petitioner argues that the CA’s affirmation of the trial court’s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in Sibonghanoy case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. Indeed, the general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.

From the very beginning, the present respondent has been challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court and asserting that the HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, he had raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in his Motion to Dismiss. Even when the Motion was denied, he continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his

Answer with affirmative defenses, his subsequent pleadings, and verbally during the trial. This consistent and continuing objection to the trial court’s jurisdiction defeats petitioner’s contention that raising other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.Hence, petition is denied.

Venancio Figuerroa v. People

FACTS:An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed

against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Trial on the merits ensued and the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial court’s jurisdiction.

The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial court’s decision, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded.Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches ?

HELD:NO. Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way

estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.

Hence, petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

Manchester Development Corporation v. CA

FACTS:A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development

Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Should the amendment complaint be admitted?

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original

complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So the any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.

Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly

constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Hon. Asuncion

FACTS: On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity)

filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.

On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing

him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction for failure of the petitioner to pay the appropriate docket fees.

HELD:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. It stated the ff:1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims

and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Tacay v. RTC of Tagum

FACTS:In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, three actions for

recovery of possession (acciones publicianas 2 ) were separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants, docketed as follows:1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 22092) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 22103) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.

The complaints 3 all alleged the same essential facts (1) Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land measuring 790 square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the previous owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3) having himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but these demands had been refused; and (4) the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the commencement of suit.

The complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered to vacate and deliver the portions of the land usurped by them;3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:

1 ) P 2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;2 ) Actual damages, as proven;3 ) Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix ;4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation fees of P5,000.00 per day of appearance;"

And4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and remedies ... just and equitable in the premises.

The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently made by plaintiff's counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the entire phrase read, " P5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven. Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by common counsel . Every motion alleged that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the case —. . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the mandatory and clear provision of Circular No. 7 of the ... Supreme Court dated March 24,1988, by failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant;" and. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic requirement as to the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute.

ISSUE:WON the RTC has jurisdiction.

HELD:

The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's Circular No. 1-

88 (effective January 1, 1989). It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as

actual, moral and nominal damages. It is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property - in other words, a real action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike that in other cases e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of personal property, or actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 16 in which the amount claimed, or the value of the personal property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount claimed should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7, 1987), has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.

Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints "any specification of the amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee.

Ayala Corp. v. Hon Madayag of RTC of NCR

FACTS:Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific

performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this petition.

The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of P l,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.

However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for specific performance with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.

Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the amount of exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in accordance to Manchester.

The trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion.

ISSUE:WON the RTC has jurisdiction.

HELD:Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of

this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.

As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.

Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc. v. Pyramid Logisitcs and Trucking Corp.

FACTS:On November 8, 2000, the delivery van of Pyramid bearing license plate

number PHL-545 which was loaded with goods belonging to California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) valued at P907,149.07 left the CMC Bicutan Warehouse but the van, together with the goods, failed to reach its destination and its driver and helper were nowhere to be found, to its damage and prejudice; that it filed a criminal complaint against the driver and the helper for qualified theft, and a claim with herein petitioners as co-insurers of the lost goods but, in violation of petitioners’ undertaking under the insurance policies, they refused without just and valid reasons to compensate it for the loss; and that as a direct consequence of petitioners’ failure, despite repeated demands, to comply with their respective undertakings under the Insurance Policies by compensating for the value of the lost goods, it suffered damages and was constrained to engage the services of counsel to enforce and protect its right to recover compensation under said policies, for which services it obligated itself to pay the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) of any amount recovered as and for attorney’s fees and legal expenses. Pyramid was assessed P610 docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of P50,000 specified in the prayer representing attorney’s fees, which it duly paid.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction, Pyramid not having paid the docket fees in full arguing that in the prayer in the Complaint, plaintiff deliberately omitted to specify what these damages are in order to evade the payment of the docket fees. To the Motion to Dismiss Pyramid filed its Opposition, alleging that if there was a mistake in the assessment of the docket fees, the trial court was not precluded from acquiring jurisdiction over the complaint as “it has the authority to direct the mistaken party to complete the docket fees in the course of the proceedings.

RTC Makati: dismissed, saying that the case being for specific performance, it is not dismissible on that ground but unless proper docket fees are paid, the RTC can only grant what was prayed for in the Complaint

CA: partially granted, ordering Pyramid to pay the correct docket fees on the basis of the losses alleged in the body of the complaint, plus the attorney’s fees mentioned in the prayer, within a reasonable time which should not go beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

Petitioners' Argument: They invoke the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged, and that the court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Respondent's Argument: They invoke the application of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion and subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time, in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee.

ISSUE:whether respondent, Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corporation (Pyramid), which filed on November 7, 2001 a complaint, denominated as one for specific performance and damages, against petitioners Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc. (Philippine First) and Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1609, paid the correct docket fee if in the negative, whether the complaint should be dismissed or Pyramid can still be ordered to pay the fee.

HELD:Yes, Pyramid filed the correct docket fee. **(Di ako sure dito, pasensya na. :()In the case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, the

SC clarified the effect of the Sun Insurance ruling on the Manchester ruling as follows:

The requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the complaint or similar pleading wil not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended

pleading, the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the awards of claims not specified in the pleading – i.e., damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading – as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

In the case at bar, Pyramid failed to specify in its prayer the amount of claims/damages it was seeking both in the original and amended complaint. It reasoned out that it was not aware of the extent of the liability of the insurance companies under their respective policies. It left the matter of liability to the trial court’s determination.

Even assuming that the amounts are yet to be determined, the rule in Manchester, as modified by Sun Insurance, still applies. In the case of Ayala Corporation vs. Madayag, the SC pronounced the following: While it is true that the determination of certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.

Lapitan v. Scandia

FACTS:On April 17, 1963 he purchased from Scandia, Inc., through its sub-dealer in

Cebu City, General Engineering Co., one ABC Diesel Engine, of 16 horse power, for P3,735.00, paid in cash; that he bought the engine for running a rice and corn mill at Ormoc City, Leyte; that defendants had warranted and assured him that all spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores, enabling him to avoid loss due to long periods of waiting, and that defendants would replace any part of the engine that might break within twelve months after delivery. Plaintiff further charged that on June 28, 1963, the cam rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship and it stopped functioning; that the sellers were unable to send a replacement until August 29, 1963; that barely six days after replacement the new part broke again due to faulty casting and poor material, so he (Lapitan) notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of sale; that he sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay. He, therefore, prayed (1) for rescission of the contract; (2) reimbursement of the price; (3) recovery of P4,000.00 actual damages plus P1,000.00 attorney's fees; (4) recovery of such moral and exemplary damages as the court deems just and equitable; and (5) costs and other proper relief.

After filing answers disclaiming liability, Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the total amount claimed was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, under Republic Act 3828,

amending the Judiciary Act by increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases involving P10,000.00 or less.CFI Cebu: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

ISSUE: WON the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are capable of pecuniary estimation

HELD:No. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is

not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a rescission being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation — a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.

Of course, where the money claim is prayed for as an alternative relief to specific performance, an equivalence is implied that permits the jurisdiction to be allocated by the amount of the money claim (Cruz vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 627). But no such

equivalence can be deduced in the case at bar, where the money award can be considered only if the rescission is first granted.

The SC therefore, rules that the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and that the court below erred in declining to entertain appellant's action for lack of jurisdiction.

Sps. De Leon v. CA

FACTS:On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land against petitioners, praying for the following reliefs:Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale (Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract.

Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; andOrdering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00, broken down as follows:P450.00 - Docket fee for the Judicial Development Fund under Official Receipt No. 1877773150.00 - Docket fee for the General Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834215 10.00 - for the Legal Research Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834450

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents’ nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, private respondents should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale sought to be annulled.

RTC: denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss but required private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.

CA: reversed and held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.

ISSUE:Whether in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be

considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, §7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.

HELD:In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a “rescission” being a counterpart, so to speak, of “specific performance”. In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation ¾ a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.

Conformably with this discussion of actions “where the value of the case cannot be estimated,” the Court in Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the former Rule 141, §5(10).

The SC hold that Judge Dalisay (CA) did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 as basically one for rescission or annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation

Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by plaintiff, now respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal research fund fee, if she has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the U.P. Law Center).

Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling

II. CAUSE OF ACTION

Pioneer v. Guadiz

FACTS:Antonio Todaro filed a complaint against petitioner, Pioneer Concrete

Philippines Inc., Pioneer Philippines Holdings Inc., John McDonald, and Philip Klepzig. They were served copies of the summons through Cecille De Leon, Exec. Assistant of Klepzig.

The complaint was based on alleged breach of contract by PIL. Todaro and petitioner allegedly entered into a contract that for Todaro’s consulting services for a business venture of PIL to enter the Philippine Market, that Todaro be also given a permanent employee status of the new local enterprise of PIL (which is PPHI, managed by Klepzig). However, after the said consulting services, PIL and PPHI did not place Todaro as its permanent employee. Hence this complaint.

Petitioner now then argues that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it was not shown properly in the complaint that there was indeed a breach of contract.

ISSUE:WON the complaint of Todaro fails to state a cause of action.

HELD:The complaint states a cause of action. The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to

constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

It should be emphasized that the presence of a cause of action rests on the sufficiency, and not on the veracity, of the allegations in the complaint. The veracity of the allegations will have to be examined during the trial on the merits. In

resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the trial court is limited to the four corners of the complaint and its annexes. It is not yet necessary for the trial court to examine the truthfulness of the allegations in the complaint. Such examination is proper during the trial on the merits.

The allegations in the complaint of Todaro are sufficient to fulfill all three requisites earlier mentioned.

*no cause of action and lack of cause of action are different*former can be a ground to dismiss the complaint before hearing, upon

motion or court’s initiative*latter can only be upon motion by the defendant and only during trial and

based on evidence

Galicia v. Manliquez*case is more on parties to a civil actionFACTS:

A complaint was filed in the RTC of Rombon by herein petitioners, as heirs of Juan Galicia, alleging that they are the true owners of a parcel of land occupied by Milagros and her tenants.

The case went to trial but the Milagros et al were declared in default. Petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex parte. As a result the judgment rendered was in favor of petitioners.

However, an answer-in-intervention was filed by the compulsory heirs of a certain Ines. Among the compulsory heirs were herein respondents, who are also co-heirs of defendant Milagros. The intervenors contended that the subject parcel of land forms part of the estate of Ines which is yet to be partitioned among them; an intestate proceeding is presently pending in the RTC of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 81; the outcome of this case, would adversely affect their interest; their rights would be better protected in the said civil case; and their intervention would not unduly delay, or in any way prejudice the rights of the original parties. Motion to intervene was denied for having been received after judgment.

An appeal was made by Milagros et al to the RTC judgment to the CA but was denied. A writ of execution was issued.

A petition for annulment of judgment was filed to the CA. The CA annulled the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:WON the motion to intervene should have been granted.WON the annulment of the decision of the RTC by the CA was valid.

HELD:The motion to intervene should have been granted.It is true that the allowance and disallowance of a motion to intervene is

addressed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the case. However, jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein the Court ruled that a motion to intervene may be entertained or allowed even if filed after judgment was rendered

by the trial court, especially in cases where the intervenors are indispensable parties.

Since it is not disputed that herein respondents are compulsory heirs of Ines who stand to be affected by the judgment of the trial court, the latter should have granted their Motion to Intervene and should have admitted their Answer-in-Intervention.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

Parties are reverted back to the stage where all the defendants have filed their respective Answers.

III. PARTIES TO A CIVIL ACTION

Sps. De La Cruz v. Joaquin

FACTS:The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and

ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in the amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on June 29, 1979.  To secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale.

Respondent now then alleges the validity of their Kasunduan for it being an equitable mortgage. Petitioners contend that it was an accommodation for him to repurchase the property within 5 years, to which Joaquin failed to do.

RTC ruled in favor of Joaquin on April 1990. Joaquin died on December 24, 1988. CA gave an order for substitution of Joaquin. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. An order for substitution was given.

ISSUE:WON the trial court had lost its jurisdiction upon death of Joaquin.

HELD:NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,

the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision.  The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied.

The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment was binding.

The records of the present case contain a “Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff” dated February 15, 2002, filed before the CA.  The prayer states as follows:“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Heirs of the deceased plaintiff-appellee as represented by his daughter Lourdes dela Cruz be substituted as party-plaintiff for the said Pedro Joaquin.“It is further prayed that henceforth the undersigned counsel for the heirs of Pedro Joaquin be furnished with copies of notices, orders, resolutions and other pleadings at its address below.”

Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case.  We stress that the appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and substitute for him.  The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly.  In all proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to protect the interests of the deceased. After the rendition of judgment, further proceedings may be held, such as a motion for reconsideration or a new trial, an appeal, or an execution.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin.  There being no violation of due process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial court’s Decision. 

Columbia Pictures v. CA

FACTS:Columbia Pictures is a foreign company engaged in the creation of

copyrighted films. Respondent Sunshine Video Inc. is a local business in Manila. By virtue of an anti-piracy campaign, together with petitioner’s counsel and the NBI while armed with a search warrant proceeded to respondent’s place of business. Various media materials were obtained including some TV sets, laser discs and video tapes alleged to be infringing the copyrights of petitioner.

Respondent then filed with the CA a motion to lift the search warrant contending that the master tapes of the allegedly infringed copyrighted films were not submitted together with the application of the search warrant and therefore said warrant cannot have been based on a true probable cause. It was first denied by the CA but on MOR was granted.

Hence this petition to the Court.

ISSUES:1. WON petitioner herein has legal personality to sue. (CIVPRO issue)2. WON the ruling in 20th Century Fox can be retroactively applied in requiring

a submission of master tapes in procuring a search warrant for alleged copyright infringement of media.

HELD:1. It has legal personality to sue. The terminology used by respondents is

erroneous. The term “lack of capacity to sue” should not be confused with the term “lack of personality to sue.”  While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest.  Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action. What respondents actually mean is that petitioner lacks capacity to sue.

On to the merits, Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code cannot apply. What the section pertains to is the act of doing business without license that prohibits a foreign corporation from maintaining a suit or action in Philippine courts or administrative tribunals. The case at bar is merely a lack of license without doing business in the Philippines. Petitioner is not actually doing business in the Philippines.

2. The ruling in 20th Century Fox requiring such master tape be submitted cannot be given retroactive effect. It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

IV. VENUE

Westmont v. Samaniego

FACTS: