Case Digests on Civil Procedure Part I

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW ICASE DIGESTS

[G.R. No. 129680. September 1, 1999]CARRARA MARBLE vs. COMMISIONER OF

CUSTOMS

FACTS: Collector of Customs conducted a public auction sale of various articles duly declared abandoned after appropriate proceedings. Included in the sale was Lot 15 advertised as “15 tons more or less, of marble processing machine and grinding machine, rusty and in junk condition.” Lot 15 was awarded to Engr. Franklin G. Policarpio as the highest bidder thereof. Engr. Policarpio had taken delivery of said lot, he wrote the Collector of Customs informing him that the following items supposed to be part of Lot 15 were missing. The missing machineries were later found installed in the compound of petitioner Carrara Marble Philippines, Inc., Lipa City, Batangas, true to the information furnished by Engr. Policarpio himself.

Consequently, the aforesaid machineries were seized (per Warrant of Seizure and Detention from the compound of petitioner. During the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, Carrara Marble Philippines, Inc., failed to present evidence of payment of duties and taxes on the subject machineries. In its defense, it claimed, that the machineries were purchased locally from a certain Jaina Perez as evidenced by two notarized deeds of absolute sale. Meanwhile, Engr. Policarpio intervened in said proceedings, claiming ownership over the subject machineries as the successful bidder in the public auction sale conducted by the Bureau of Customs wherein said machineries were part of Lot 15.

Collector of Customs declared the machineries forfeited in favor of the government. Petitioner appealed from the Collector of Customs’ decision to the Commissioner of Customs who affirmed said decision.

CTA dismissed the petition for review filed by petitioner; affirmed the authority of the Customs Commissioner to seize the machineries; and ordered the Commissioner to deliver the articles to Policarpio as the highest bidder in accordance with its decision in CTA Case No. 5057. On appeal, the

Court of Appeals sustained the CTA. Hence this petition.

RULING: Incidentally, the forfeiture of the subject machineries rests on a different statutory basis from Policarpio’s right to receive the property as winning bidder in the auction sale. The forfeiture proceedings were based upon the government’s right to recover property illegally withdrawn from its custody. On the other hand, Policarpio’s right stems from the government’s contractual obligation to deliver the machineries to Policarpio as buyer in good faith at the public auction sale.

[G.R. No. 109355. October 29, 1999]SERAFIN MODINA vs. CA, ET. AL.

FACTS: The parcels of land in question are those under the name of private resp CHIANG. He theorized that subject properties were sold to him by his wife MERLINDA, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, and were subsequently sold by CHIANG to the petitioner MODINA, as shown by the Deeds of Sale.

MODINA brought a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Damages against the private respondents, Ernesto Hontarciego, Paul Figueroa and Teodoro Hipalla before the RTC of Iloilo City.

Upon learning the institution of the said case, MERLINDA presented a Complaint-in-intervention, seeking the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale between her husband and MODINA on the ground that the titles of the parcels of land in dispute were never legally transferred to her husband. Fraudulent acts were allegedly employed by him to obtain a Torrens Title in his favor. However, she confirmed the validity of the lease contracts with the other private respondents.

MERLINDA also admitted that the said parcels of land were those ordered sold by Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceeding No. 2469 in “Intestate Estate of Nelson Plana” where she was appointed as the administratix, being the widow of the deceased, her

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first husband. An Authority to Sell was issued by the said Probate Court for the sale of the same properties.

After due hearing, the Trial Court decided in favor of MERLINDA declaring as void and inexistent the sale of Lots. CA affirmed the aforesaid decision in toto. Petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition for Review under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

Raised for resolution here are: (1) whether the sale of subject lots should be nullified, (2) whether petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith, (3) whether the decision of the trial court was tainted with excess of jurisdiction xxx.

RULING: Anent the first issue, petitioner theorizes that the sale in question is null and void for being violative of Article 1490 of the New Civil Code prohibiting sales between spouses. Consequently, what is applicable is Article 1412 supra on the principle of in pari delicto, which leaves both guilty parties where they are, and keeps undisturbed the rights of third persons to whom the lots involved were sold; petitioner stressed.

Petitioner anchors his submission on the following statements of the Trial Court which the Court of Appeals upheld, to wit:

“Furthermore, under Art. 1490, husband and wife are prohibited to sell properties to each other. And where, as in this case, the sale is inexistent for lack of consideration, the principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio does not apply. (Vasquez vs Porta, 98 Phil 490).

Thus, Art. 1490 provides:

Art. 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:(1) when a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or(2) when there has been a judicial separation of property under Art. 191.

The exception to the rule laid down in Art. 1490 of the New Civil Code not having existed with respect to the property relations of Ramon Chiang and Merlinda Plana Chiang, the sale by the latter in favor of the former of the properties in question is invalid for being prohibited by law. Not being the owner of subject properties, Ramon Chiang could not have validly sold the same to plaintiff Serafin Modina. The sale by Ramon Chiang in favor of Serafin Modina is, likewise, void and inexistent.

The principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio denies all recovery to the guilty parties inter se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract. When two persons are equally at fault, the law does not relieve them. The exception to this general rule is when the principle is invoked with respect to inexistent contracts.

In the petition under consideration, the Trial Court found that subject Deed of Sale was a nullity for lack of any consideration. This finding duly supported by evidence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not disturb such finding absent any evidence to the contrary.

Petitioner’s insistence that MERLINDA cannot attack subject contract of sale as she was a guilty party thereto is equally unavailing. But the pivot of inquiry here is whether MERLINDA is barred by the principle of in pari delicto from questioning subject Deed of Sale.

The Trial Court debunked petitioner’s theory that MERLINDA intentionally gave away the bulk of her and her late husband’s estate to defendant CHIANG as his exclusive property, for want of evidentiary anchor. They insist on the Deed of Sale wherein MERLINDA made the misrepresentation that she was a widow and CHIANG was single, when at the time of execution thereof, they were in fact already married. Petitioner insists that this document conclusively established bad faith on the part of MERLINDA and therefore, the principle of in pari delicto should have been applied.+



These issues are factual in nature and it is not for this Court to appreciate and evaluate the pieces of evidence introduced below. An appellate court defers to the factual findings of the Trial Court, unless petitioner can show a glaring mistake in the appreciation of relevant evidence.

Since one of the characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is that it does not produce any effect, MERLINDA can recover the property from petitioner who never acquired title thereover.

As to the second issue, petitioner stresses that his title should have been respected since he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. The Court of Appeals, however, opined that he (petitioner) is not a purchaser in good faith. It found that there were circumstances known to MODINA which rendered their transaction fraudulent under the attendant circumstances.

As a general rule, in a sale under the Torrens system, a void title cannot give rise to a valid title. The exception is when the sale of a person with a void title is to a third person who purchased it for value and in good faith.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.

In the case under scrutiny, petitioner cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith. There are circumstances which are indicia of bad faith on his part, to wit: (1) He asked his nephew, Placido Matta, to investigate the origin of the property and the latter learned that the same formed part of the properties of MERLINDA’s first husband; (2) that the said sale was between the spouses; (3) that when the property was inspected, MODINA met all the lessees who informed that subject lands belong to MERLINDA and they had no knowledge that the same lots were sold to the husband.

It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which would put a reasonable man upon his guard to make the necessary inquiries, and then claim that he acted in good faith. His mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his wilful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor’s title, will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a prudent man in a like situation.

Thus, petitioner cannot claim that the sale between him and MODINA falls under the exception provided for by law.

In a Petition for Review, only questions of law may be raised. It is perceived by the Court that what petitioner is trying to, albeit subtly, is for the Court to examine the probative value or evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below The Court cannot do that unless the appreciation of the pieces of evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. But this is where petitioner utterly failed.

[G.R. No. 132753. February 15, 1999]SIASOCO, ET. AL., vs. CA, ET. AL.,

FACTS: Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer the subject properties for sale. Petitioners made a final offer to the INC. The latter’s counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner Mario Siasoco on December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was accepted, but that the INC was “not amenable to your proposal to an undervaluation of the total consideration.” In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC had not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already “contracted” with Carissa for the sale of the said properties “due to the absence of any response to their offer from INC.”



Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused.

Private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific [p]erformance and [d]amages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and Development & Properties. Pending resolution of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of Carissa Homes by private respondent. Private respondent filed an [A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a mere case for damages.

CA ruled that although private respondent could no longer amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from doing so with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting private respondent’s Amended Complaint.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in affirming the two Orders of the RTC which had allowed the Amended Complaint?

RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. We sustain the Court of Appeals, but for reasons different from those given in the assailed Decision.Preliminary Issue: Propriety of Certiorari

For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, the petitioner must show not only that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, but also that “there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Since the questioned CA Decision was a disposition on the merits, and since said Court has no remaining issue to resolve, the proper remedy available to petitioners was a petition for review under Rule 45, not Rule 65.

Furthermore, as a general rule, certiorari under Rule 65 cannot issue unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed error. Although

there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioners do not claim that this case is one of them. For this procedural lapse, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.

Nonetheless, inasmuch as the Petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 45, and considering the importance of the issue raised and the fact that private respondent did not question the propriety of the instant Petition, the Court treated the action as a petition for review (not certiorari) under Rule 45 in order to accord substantial justice to the parties. We will thus proceed to discuss the substantive issue.Main Issue: Admission of Amended Complaint

It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from amending its original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein petitioners. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.

The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially altered. Such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place, where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that “[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party



by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.”

True, Carissa had already filed its own Answer. Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege that their defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondent’s claims against the latter and against petitioners are different. Against petitioners, whose offer to sell the subject parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private respondent, the latter is suing for specific performance and damages for breach of contract. Although private respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right, its Complaint against Carissa, it could do so against petitioners who, at the time, had not yet filed an answer. The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the action. Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to expedite its disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an action for damages, since the claims for specific performance and declaration of nullity of the sale have been deleted.

RTC Had Jurisdiction

Petitioners also insist that the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the original Complaint; hence, it did not have any authority to allow the amendment. They maintain that the original action for specific performance involving parcels of land in Montalban, Rizal should have been filed in the RTC of that area. Thus, they chide the CA for allegedly misunderstanding the distinction between territorial jurisdiction and venue, thereby erroneously holding that the RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint, although the venue was improperly laid.

We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original Complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court. In the present case, however, the RTC had jurisdiction because the original Complaint involved specific performance with damages. In La Tondeña

Distillers v. Ponferrada, this Court ruled that a complaint for “specific performance with damages” is a personal action and may be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside, viz.:

“Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioner’s argument that venue should be lodged in Bago City where the lot is situated. The complaint is one for “specific performance with damages.” Private respondents do not claim ownership of the lot but in fact [recognize the] title of defendants by annotating a notice of lis pendens. In one case, a similar complaint for “specific performance with damages” involving real property, was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the proper court where the party resides. Not being an action involving title to or ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the RTC of Bacolod City.”

[G.R. No. 117925. October 12, 1999]TENSOREX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

vs. CA

FACTS: The present controversy arose as a consequence of the execution of judgment in the case of “Tensorex Industrial Corporation vs. Alicia Gala and Heirs of Manuel Gala”, for ejectment with damages. MTC rendered judgment against defendants and in favor of plaintiff.

Private respondent then appealed the judgment of the MTC in the ejectment case to the RTC of Makati. In the meantime, even before said appeal could be raffled, the Branch Sheriff of MTC-Makati served the alias writ of execution and levied upon the personal properties of the private respondent, threatening to sell said properties. Confronted with this dilemma, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC of Makati to enjoin the sheriff from carrying out the threatened sale of its properties. The RTC, after preliminary hearing, issued a writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the posting of an injunction bond.



After hearing, the RTC, dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued. From this dismissal, private respondent filed its notice of intention to appeal Civil Case No. 91-2148 to the Court of Appeals. RTC gave due course to the appeal to the CA. CA dismissed private respondent’s appeal for its failure to file Memorandum.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration premised on the ground that it did not receive any notice to file memorandum and as such its period within which to file the required memorandum had not yet lapsed. CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. In the meantime, even before private respondent could receive said order of denial of the motion for reconsideration, it filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with prayer that its Comment filed on January 7, 1994, be considered as its Memorandum.

Private respondent filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, the resolution of which along with other pending incidents of the case was deferred by the CA. CA promulgated a Resolution accepting private respondent’s explanation and proceeded to treat the Comment filed by private respondent as its Memorandum. It also ordered the petitioner to file its Memorandum within 10 days from receipt of the Resolution after which the appeal shall be deemed submitted for decision. According to the Court of Appeals: “It appears that the appellant’s counsel did not receive the aforesaid notice to file Memorandum xxx & we denied the motion in a Resolution on May 26, 1994 on the mistaken premise that the appellant had received the notice to file memorandum, which was previously ordered to be re-sent to the appellant.”

Hence, this petition.

RULING: The sole issue now for consideration in this case, in our view, is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the appeal of the private respondent.

It is petitioner’s contention that the remedy of private respondent in regard to the decision of the RTC is a petition for review pursuant to Supreme Court Circular 2-90. This is because the RTC decision sought to be reviewed was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, the filing of a notice of appeal with the RTC was the wrong mode of appeal and as such the appeal should have been dismissed.We find, however, that petitioner’s argument is without merit. It is worth noting that what private respondent filed with the RTC was a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

One of the basic distinctions between certiorari as a mode of appeal and an original special civil action for certiorari is that in appeal by certiorari, the appellate court acts in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and power of review, while on certiorari as an original action, the higher court exercises original jurisdiction under its power of control and supervision over the orders of lower court. Moreover, the period for filing appeal is much shorter than for filing an original action for certiorari. Consequently, where the appealed judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the appeal to the Court of Appeals may be taken by writ of error or ordinary appeal. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal.

Furthermore, the mere fact that private respondent earlier appealed the decision of the MTC to the RTC does not preclude the filing of a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC concerning an entirely different incident. Settled is the rule that availability of an appeal does not foreclose resort to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. In the case at hand, private respondent had no choice. The appeal proved to be inadequate as its properties were being attached, with the possibility of their sale imminent. Private respondent was left with no choice but to avail of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to protect its interest.



With respect to the second assignment of error, it is petitioner’s contention that the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals is null and void for it unduly set aside its earlier resolution dismissing the appeal, as well as private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. It is also argued that the filing of the second motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for perfecting an appeal and therefore, the order of denial of the first motion for reconsideration, along with the earlier resolution dismissing the appeal had already become final and executory.

The argument fails to persuade us. The Court of Appeals in the questioned resolution ruled that it denied private respondent’s motion for reconsideration “on the mistaken premise” that private respondent received the notice to file memorandum which was previously ordered to be re-sent. Considering that private respondent did not receive a copy of the notice, the period within which to file said memorandum could not be said to have already expired.

While it is true that a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed, courts in the exercise of their functions, and in rendering decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict itself to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences; a complete and holistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment. In addition, it has often been stressed that procedural laws should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.

In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals merely corrected itself when it issued the questioned resolution of November 7, 1994. Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to any error or defect therein. To do otherwise would be tantamount to an abrogation of its solemn duty to do justice to every man.

Here we find that the Court of Appeals, in issuing its questioned resolution, committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. There are factual bases and legal justification for the assailed order. The burden is upon the petitioner to demonstrate that the questioned resolution constitutes a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. This, petitioner has not done. To reiterate our established rule, certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by certiorari. Moreover, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the relief of prohibition is also unavailable.

[G.R. No. 95897. December 14, 1999]HUIBONHOA vs. CA

FACTS: Florencia T. Huibonhoa entered into a memorandum of agreement with siblings Rufina Gojocco Lim, Severino Gojocco and Loreta Gojocco Chua stipulating that Florencia T. Huibonhoa would lease from them (Gojoccos) 3 commercial lots at Binondo, Manila.

The consequent hoarding of construction materials and increase in interest rates allegedly affected adversely the construction of the building such that Huibonhoa failed to complete the same within the stipulated eight-month period from July 1, 1983. Projected to be finished on February 29, 1984, the construction was completed only in September 1984 or seven (7) months later.

Under the contract, Huibonhoa was supposed to start paying rental in March 1984 but she failed to do so. Consequently, the Gojoccos made several verbal demands upon Huibonhoa for the payment of rental arrearages and, for her to vacate the leased premises. On December 19, 1984, lessors sent lessee a final letter of demand to pay the rental arrearages and to vacate the leased premises. The



former also notified the latter of their intention to terminate the contract of lease.

However, on January 3, 1985, Huibonhoa brought an action for reformation of contract before Branch 148 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati. Docketed as Civil Case No. 9402. She (lessee) alleged that the Gojoccos had erroneously considered the first accrual date of the rents to be March 1984 when their true intention was that during the entire period of actual construction of the building, no rents would accrue. Thus, according to Huibonhoa, the first rent would have been due only in October 1984.

The Gojoccos filed Civil Case No. 106097 against Huibonhoa for “cancellation of lease, ejectment and collection” with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. They theorized that despite the expiration of the 8-month construction period, Huibonhoa failed to pay the rents that had accrued since March 1, 1984, their verbal demands therefor notwithstanding; that, in their letter of December 19, 1984, they had notified Huibonhoa of their intention to “terminate and cancel the lease for violation of its terms” and that they demanded from her the “restitution of the land in question” and the payment of all rentals due thereunder.

Makati RTC rendered a decision holding that Huibonhoa had not presented clear and convincing evidence to justify the reformation of the lease contract. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 102604, the MTC of Manila ordered Huibonhoa to vacate the lots owned Gojocco. RTC of Manila, Branch 55, reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court and ordered the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 106097.

Hence, Civil Case Nos. 9402 and 106097 (that was docketed before the RTC of Manila as Civil Case No. 90-54557) were both elevated to the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a Decision affirming the decision of the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 9402 and the decision of the RTC of Manila in Civil Case No. 106097.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the complaint for “cancellation of lease, ejectment and collection” in Civil Case No. 90-54557.

RULING: Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession and not possession de jure. So that, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, as in this case, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership-such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession. This is why the issue of ownership or title is generally immaterial and foreign to an ejectment suit.

Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on real property are incidentally discussed. In fact, any evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4, Rule 70 except to resolve the question of possession. Thus, all that the court may do, is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve the latter. But such determination of ownership is not clothed with finality. Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership.

Undoubtedly, the complaint avers ultimate facts required for a cause of action in an unlawful detainer case. It alleges possession of the properties by the lessee, verbal and written demands to pay rental arrearages and to vacate the leased premises, continued refusal of the lessees to surrender possession of the premises, and the fact that the action was filed within one year from demand to vacate.

However, forging contracts for parties in a case is beyond the jurisdiction of courts. Otherwise, it would result in the court’s substitution of its own volition in a contract that should express only the parties’ will. Necessarily, the Metropolitan Trial



Court could not favorably act on the prayer for cancellation of the contract with another containing terms suggested by the plaintiffs as the allegations and prayer therefor are no more than superfluities that do not affect the main cause of action averred in the complaint. The court therefore granted only the main relief sought by the plaintiffs-the eviction of the defendant.

The Regional Trial Court incorrectly held that the complaint was also for rescission of contract, a case that is certainly not within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. By the allegations of the complaint, the Gojoccos’ aim was to cancel or terminate the contract because they sought its partial enforcement in praying for rental arrearages. There is a distinction in law between cancellation of a contract and its rescission. To rescind is to declare a contract void in its inception and to put an end to it as though it never were. It is not merely to terminate it and release parties from further obligations to each other but to abrogate it from the beginning and restore the parties to relative positions which they would have occupied had no contract ever been made.

Termination of a contract is congruent with an action for unlawful detainer. The termination or cancellation of a contract would necessarily entail enforcement of its terms prior to the declaration of its cancellation in the same way that before a lessee is ejected under a lease contract, he has to fulfill his obligations thereunder that had accrued prior to his ejectment. However, termination of a contract need not undergo judicial intervention. The parties themselves may exercise such option. Only upon disagreement between the parties as to how it should be undertaken may the parties resort to courts. Hence, notwithstanding the allegations in the complaint that are extraneous or not essential in an action for unlawful detainer, the Metropolitan Trial Court correctly assumed jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 90-54557.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24654, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of origin which dismissed the ejectment case instituted by the

petitioners against the private respondent is SET ASIDE; the order of ejectment issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court a quo on July 30, 1980 is UPHELD; and the private respondent and all persons claiming authority under her are ordered to vacate the land and portion of the building corresponding to Lot No. 26-B covered by TCT No. 80728 of petitioner Severino Gojocco, and the portion corresponding to Lot No. 26-C covered by TCT No. 155450 of petitioner Loreta Chua.

[G.R. No. 123050. January 20, 1999]SUICO INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION vs. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Suico Industrial Corporation, represented by Esmeraldo Suico, its President, secured a loan payable in 5 years, from respondent PDCP Bank. As security thereof, petitioner spouses mortgaged their 2 real estate properties situated at Mandaue City, Cebu. For failure to pay the balance of the loan respondent PDCP Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. It was adjudge as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was duly issued by the Sheriff of Mandaue in its favor. Petitioner failed to redeem the said properties. After expiration of the 1-year redemption period, ownership over the properties were consolidated and were correspondingly issued in the name of respondent PDCP Bank.

Respondent PDCP Bank filed with RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 28 an “Ex parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession” which was granted. However, the writ could not be enforced because petitioners filed a “Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and Damages (with Prayer for Restraining Order)” before the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56 seeking to enjoin respondent PDCP Bank from selling the mortgaged properties and from taking physical possession over the same during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC Branch 56 can enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch 28.



RULING: The petition does not deserve merit.

First. RTC Branch 56 acted with grave abuse of discretion for having issued the writ of injunction which prevented the implementation of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch 28. The issuance of the writ of injunction was not proper in the absence of any legal right on the part of petitioners to enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession in favor of respondent PDCP Bank.

We espoused in Arcega v. Court of Appeals that:

“For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.”

"In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitute grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights, Where the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no ground for an injunction.”

When petitioners failed to pay the balance of the loan and thereafter failed to redeem the properties, title to the property had already been transferred to respondent PDCP Bank. Respondent PDCP Bank’s right to possess the property is clear and is based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale to whom title has been conveyed.

Second. Indeed, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant such writ of possession. In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, the rule was applied in this manner:

“No discretion appears to be left to the Court. Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent

cancellation of the writ is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8, and it cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte. Such recourse is available of the mortgagee, who effects the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, even before the expiration of the period of redemption provided by law and the Rules of Court.”

This is stated also in A.G. Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals:

“A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property is extrajudicially foreclosed. In this regard, the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. As such, the Court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.”

Third. The statute books are replete with jurisprudence to the effect that trial courts have no power to interfere by injunction with the orders or judgments issued by another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. In this regard, RTC Branch 56 therefore has no power nor authority to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by RTC Branch 28.

[G.R. No. 125473. June 29, 1999]ESPIRITU vs. CA, ET. AL.

FACTS: On 6 January 1994 petitioner Constancio Espiritu lodged a complaint against private respondents Gideon Natividad and Jose Caysip with the MTC Bulacan, for unlawful detainer and recovery of reasonable rentals for the use of the land plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Petitioner alleged in his complaint that private respondents Mr. Natividad and Mr. Caysip had been illegally occupying/squatting on his land by building a chapel thereon although no building



permit was ever issued for its construction. He also claimed that notices and demands for the removal of the chapel were made but private respondents failed to comply therewith.

Private respondents, averred that petitioner had no valid cause of action against them as the property in question was donated to their congregation, the Church of Christ, and thus owned by their church and not by them. They further claimed that the Municipal Trial Court of Baliuag, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case as it did not fall within the meaning of “any action” under Rule 70) of the Rules of Court. They maintained that since petitioner failed to allege that he had prior possession of the property, and that he was deprived of possession thereof through any of the means specified in the Rules of Court (Rule 70), petitioner should ventilate his right of possession by way of an action other than unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

MTC rendered its decision in favor of petitioner. The trial court declared that it had jurisdiction over the case because what determined which court had jurisdiction over the case as well as the nature of the action were the allegations in the complaint. Moreover, a court was not deprived of its jurisdiction over an action for ejectment simply because defendants set up a claim different from that alleged by plaintiff. It upheld the right of petitioner to eject private respondents from the subject property for failure of the latter to substantiate their claim that the property had been donated to their church or that there was an existing contract of lease between them. Thus, their possession of the subject property was deemed to be one of mere tolerance with an implied understanding that they would vacate the premises upon demand.

RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice to its refiling with the proper court. The lower court noted that TCT No. 31808 was issued in the name of the heirs of Agustin Espiritu and Apolonia dela Rama only on 16 April 1993 while the property was in the possession of private respondents since 1954 or for more than forty (40) years. It ruled that it was mandated by Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court

that ejectment cases (forcible entry and unlawful detainer) should be filed within one (1) year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Since private respondents had deprived petitioner of possession of subject property for more than one (1) year, the filing of the complaint before the Municipal Trial Court was inappropriate.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review. He contended therein that the RTC erred in holding that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint as it failed to allege facts constitutive of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.

CA declared the petition devoid of merit based mainly on the ground that the Municipal Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint.

The sole issue before this Court is whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition for alleged jurisdictional infirmities. Petitioner, maintaining that what determines the jurisdiction of the court as well as the nature of the action are the allegations made by the plaintiff in his complaint, argues that the complaint was clearly one for unlawful detainer; consequently, allegation of prior possession of the property need not be made.

RULING: Petitioner’s contention is devoid of merit. While petitioner is correct in stating that the nature of an action as well as the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint, a careful scrutiny of the complaint reveals that petitioner’s cause of action is neither for unlawful detainer nor for forcible entry but some other action involving recovery of possession.

In forcible entry the deprivation of physical possession of land or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer the unlawful withholding of possession is made after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry the possession is illegal from the beginning and the issue centers on who was in prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer the possession was



originally lawful but became unlawful upon the expiration or termination of the right to possess the subject property.

Clearly, the complaint failed to aver facts constitutive of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Forcible entry must be ruled out as there was no allegation that petitioner was denied possession of the land in question through any of the means stated in Sec. 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court. Neither was the action one for unlawful detainer as there was no lease agreement between the parties, and the demand to vacate by petitioner on private respondents did not make the latter tenants of the former. Petitioner should therefore avail of other remedies provided for by law to recover possession of subject property.

[G.R. No. 111676. March 4, 1999]VDA. DE CRUZ vs. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Silvina Torres Vda. de Cruz and private respondent Priscilla Cruz-Gatchalian are sisters-in-law. Petitioner is the widow of private respondent’s brother, Jose Cruz, Sr. Private respondent and her siblings (Jose, Maria, and Emilio) inherited from their mother, Emilia Gloria-Cruz, a parcel of land in Bulacan.

Private respondent, through counsel, sent a letter to petitioner demanding that she vacate the premises and remove the house built thereon. As petitioner refused to do so, private respondent brought the matter to the barangay authorities for conciliation. However, the parties failed to settle their dispute amicably, prompting private respondent to file the case in the MTC of Bulacan. Private respondent alleged that she was the owner of the lot in question and that petitioner had been merely allowed to stay on it.

MTC rendered a decision in the ejectment case ordering petitioner to vacate the property.Petitioner appealed to the RTC which affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in toto.

Petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, which rendered the questioned decision. The appellate court upheld the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and affirmed private respondent’s right to material possession, as distinguished from possession de jure, of the property in question.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that the primary issue in this case is the ownership of the land in question since private respondent relies on a certificate of title while she (petitioner) relies on a tax declaration in support of their respective right to the possession of the lot. She contends that the question of possession cannot be determined without first resolving the question of ownership. For this reason, petitioner maintains that the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over this case.

ISSUE: Whether the municipal/metropolitan trial court is ousted of jurisdiction when the issue of ownership is raised.

RULING: We rule in the negative. In the recent decisions of this Court, we have repeatedly held that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for the annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the Municipal Trial Court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it. . . This is so because, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/ or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same. . . The respondents in ejectment proceedings cannot defeat the summary nature of the action against them by simply filing an action questioning the ownership of the person who is trying to eject them from the premises.

More importantly, the law has undergone a change since Ching v. Malaya, the case in fact cited by petitioner, was decided. R.A. No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), §88, under which the case was decided, allowed inquiries into questions of ownership only for the limited purpose of determining “the character and extent of possession



and damages for detention.” But after the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), municipal/ metropolitan trial courts have been given the power to determine ownership questions, though provisionally, in cases where the issue of ownership is intertwined with the question of possession.

With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.

The jurisdiction of inferior courts to resolve the issue of ownership in ejectment cases, while not plenary, is certainly broader than merely for the purpose of determining the extent of possession. One of the guidelines set forth in the same case of Refugia indicates the scope of their power, thus:

Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.

Nor does the fact that the parties base their respective claims of possession on evidence of ownership make ownership the principal issue in the case or qualify the action as one for reconveyance instead of ejectment. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Since there is no dispute that the allegations of the complaint filed by private respondent sufficiently qualify the case as one for ejectment, the inferior court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof.

[G.R. No. 137718. July 27, 1999]MALONZO vs. ZAMORA

FACTS: During the incumbency of then Macario A Asistio, Jr., the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City passed Ordinance No. 0168, S. 1994, authorizing the City Mayor to initiate proceedings for the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT Relaty Development Corporation (CLT).

It turned out, however, that the Maysilo Estate straddled the City of Caloocan and the Municipality of Malabon, prompting CLT to file a special civil action for Interpleader with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, branch 124.

“Pending the final determination and resolution of the court on the issue (territorial jurisdiction) raised in Civil Case No. C-18019 before Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the expropriation of the subject property be cancelled and/or abandoned.” In the meantime, “since the expropriation of CLT Property is discontinued, the appropriation for expropriation of FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P50M) can be reverted for use in a supplemental budget” stating further that he certifies “(F)or its reversion since it is not yet obligated, and for its availability for re-appropriation in a supplemental budget.”



Alleging, however, that petitioners conspired and confederated in willfully violating certain provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter the "Code") through the passage of Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998, a certain Eduardo Tibor, by himself and as a taxpayer, filed on July 15, 1998, an administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office, and Abuse of Authority against petitioners before the Office of the President (OP).

OP hereby adjudged guilty of misconduct and each is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION.

RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. Preliminarily, we find a need to resolve a couple of procedural issues which have a bearing on the propriety of this Court’s action on the petition, to wit: xxx whether the Supreme Court may entertain the instant petition despite the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners with the OP.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations (sic) so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money. That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.

With respect to the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, we do not see the same as a fatal procedural lapse that would prevent us from entertaining the more pressing questions raised in this case. In any event, jurisprudence is replete with instances instructing us that a motion for reconsideration is neither always a prerequisite nor a hard-and-fast rule to be followed where there are particularly exceptional attendant circumstances

such as, in the instant case, patent nullity of the questioned act and the necessity of resolving the issues without further delay.

[G.R. No. 124374. December 15, 1999]MATHAY JR. vs. CA, ET. AL.

FACTS: Brigido R. Simon appointed private respondents to positions in the Civil Service Unit (“CSU”) of the local government of Quezon City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 which was allegedly signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972.

The Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from issuance of the said Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on the ground that the same never became law. Among those affected by the revocation of appointments are private respondents in these three petitions.

On May 11, 1992, petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On July 1, 1992, Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents effective July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments, however, were no longer renewed.

The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private respondents’ appointments became the seed of discontent from which these three consolidated petitions grew.

RULING: In the case G.R. 126354, the standing of petitioner Civil Service Commission to bring this present appeal is questionable. We note that the person adversely affected by the Court of Appeals decision, Jovito C. Labajo has opted not to appeal.

Basic is the rule that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” A real party in interest is the party who



stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action.

In the case at bar, it is evident that Jovito C. Labajo, not the Civil Service Commission, is the real party in interest. It is Jovito C. Labajo who will be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement.

We are aware of our pronouncements in the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Pedro Dacoycoy which overturned our rulings in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission. In Dacoycoy, we affirmed the right of the Civil Service Commission to bring an appeal as the aggrieved party affected by a ruling which may seriously prejudice the civil service system.

The aforementioned case, however, is different from the case at bar. Dacoycoy was an administrative case involving nepotism whose deleterious effect on government cannot be overemphasized. The subject of the present case, on the other hand, is “reinstatement.”

We fail to see how the present petition, involving as it does the reinstatement or non-reinstatement of one obviously reluctant to litigate, can impair the effectiveness of government. Accordingly, the ruling in Dacoycoy does not apply.

[G.R. No. 127367. May 3, 1999]GOLD LOOP PROPERTIES, INC., vs. CA

FACTS: Petitioner Gold Loop Properties (GLP), entered into a Deed of Exchange with Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC), a government controlled corporation. In that Deed, GLP, owner of a 16-storey residential condominium exchanged ten (10) condominium units for 304,071.38 bags of cement belonging to PITC, each bag containing 50 kilos. Subsequently,

GLP offered an additional condominium unit in exchange for what is referred to as “bad stock” cement, or cement that was beginning to harden. PITC indicated it was amenable to the offer and suggested that lawyers prepare the necessary contract documents. MOA was executed between GLP and PITC.

Pursuant to the MOA, GLP issued a check in the amount of P2,520,000.00 bearing the signature of its president Emmanuel Zapanta. With the issued check having reached maturity, PITC deposited the check for encashment but it was returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

PITC filed charges against Estrella and Emmanuel Zapanta for estafa and violation of BP 22. Pending preliminary investigation of the charges, a civil complaint was filed this time by GLP against PITC with the prayer that PITC be ordered to comply with the agreement for the swapping of cement in exchange for the condominium unit, and that the check issued to PITC be declared null and void for want of consideration. It also prayed that PITC pay GLP costs and damages. Concurrently, GLP filed a Motion for Suspension of the Preliminary Investigation of the criminal case initiated by PITC, on the ground that the civil complaint filed by GLP constitutes a prejudicial question.

Petitioners’ main allegation Memorandum of Agreement did not reflect the true intent of the parties. They claim that the MOA should only refer to the subject of the contract, namely the bad stock cement. What governs the swapping of petitioners’ condominium unit for the cement would be another matter, vide the Deed of Exchange.

RULING: We find merit in private respondent’s contentions. There is no ambiguity in the terms of the contract to which both parties had indicated their consent. It was never denied that the MOA, the promissory note and the check issued, came from the petitioners. It is too late for petitioners to question the intent of the contract, on the self-serving ground that it did not reflect the parties’ real agreement. Petitioners’ claim that the swapping (or barter) was what the parties intended does not



square with the terms of the MOA, which shows a sale on credit. They cannot now claim that contract should not be enforced. There was no reason found by both lower courts to go beyond the terms stated in the contract, which are unambiguous.

To recapitulate, it is not the function of this Court to weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Our review is generally confined to correcting errors of law, if any, that might have been committed below. In the case at bar petitioners have not shown exceptional circumstances that merit disturbing the findings of fact below. Not only are the terms of the assailed MOA between the parties clear, in our view, but the contractual obligations of the parties thereto are also unambiguous. No reversible error could be attributed to the assailed decision, much less could any grave abuse of discretion be imputed to respondent court.

[G.R. No. 93090. March 3, 1999]ROMEO CABELLAN vs. CA

FACTS: Private respondent Nathaniel Dinoro acquired the rights to the land in question by purchase. Petitioner Romeo Cabellan had been in possession of the subject land since 1968 through tolerance. After acquiring the land on May 27, 1986, private respondent asked petitioner to vacate the occupied portion, but the latter refused. Private respondent brought the matter to the barangay authorities of Suarez, Iligan City for conciliation, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Consequently, the case was certified for trial by the courts.

Private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner in the MTC of Iligan City which rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate the land and pay private respondent attorney’s fees in the amount of P3,000.00, plus P500.00 as litigation expenses, and monthly rental at the rate of P100.00 a month from the date of filing of the case until petitioner had fully vacated the premises.

Private respondent filed a motion for execution which the MTC granted on the ground that its judgment had become final and executory.Thereafter, the deputy sheriff issued a notice of ejectment, for which reason petitioner filed, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition.

RULINGS ON THE ISSUES:

First. Petitioner contends that the land in question is owned by the government and, hence, the MTC and RTC have no jurisdiction to order his ejectment.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals is based on a certification of the District Land Officer of Iligan City to the effect that the land occupied by petitioner Romeo Cabellan is “within a proposed road” and that “there is no person [who has] filed any public land application” with respect to the same. The public ownership of the land was raised in the MTC by petitioner, but the court held that “it could be presumed as shown by the Sketch Plan of the land of plaintiff [respondent Nathaniel Dinoro] that said road where defendant’s [petitioner Romeo Cabellan] house is, is a part of the plaintiff’s [Nathaniel Dinoro] land.”

When the case was appealed to it, the RTC at first found the land to be owned by the government on the basis of the aforesaid certification of the District Land Officer and, hence, reversed the decision of the MTC. However, on motion of private respondent, the RTC reconsidered its decision and held that even “granting that [the land in question] is a part of the proposed road right of way or of the public domain, [petitioner] had not shown, not even by a scintilla of evidence, that he possesses the same area in [the] concept of an owner by making or introducing some kind of improvements; [There is] not even an indicia of possession like a tax declaration, tax payments, or any semblance of authority from the government to possess and occupy the same area in question.” On the other



hand, it found private respondent to have a better right of possession as shown by the deed of sale, a tax declaration, a transfer tax receipt, and a real estate tax receipt. Consequently, the RTC reconsidered its decision and dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Thus, the public character of the land was considered irrelevant by both courts in the ejectment case.

The RTC, we think, acted correctly. As this Court held in Molina v. De Bacud, the public character of the land in dispute does not exclude courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions. Indeed, in Molina, this Court upheld the right of a party, who had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a parcel of public land, against another who had already acquired a sales patent from the government over the same. Clearly, the only issue in ejectment cases is possession, regardless of the claim of ownership of a party. As the judgment in ejectment cases is binding only with respect to the issue of possession, the government cannot possibly be prejudiced by the ruling that private respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject land.

There was thus no jurisdictional issue justifying resort to the special civil action of certiorari. The resort to this remedy appears to have been due to the fact that the decision of the RTC, affirming the judgment of the MTC, had already become final and executory rather than to the existence of any jurisdictional question.

Indeed, petitioner failed to appeal from the decision of the RTC. Clearly, the petition for certiorari, which was filed more than seven months after the decision of the RTC had become final, was being used as a substitute for a lost appeal.

Second. Even if a petition for certiorari were the appropriate remedy, it should nevertheless be dismissed for having been filed after an unreasonable period of time. The petition was filed on April 27, 1989, more than seven (7) months after the RTC had affirmed the decision of the MTC ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the subject land on September 8, 1988. A period of seven (7)

months is certainly more than the period considered reasonable for filing such a petition.

Third. On the other hand, even if the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner were treated as a petition for review, the same should also be dismissed, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, for late filing of the petition and payment of docket fees, and for lack of statement of material dates specifically showing the timely filing of the petition as required by Rule 6, §3(a), (c), and (d) in relation to §1(b) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Rule 6, §3 of the said Internal Rules provides that a petition for review filed after the 15-day period to appeal or after the 15-day additional period granted by the Court of Appeals shall be dismissed. A petition which is not sufficient in form and substance should, likewise, be dismissed.

Well-settled is the rule that the right to appeal is a mere privilege and, therefore, should be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and noncompliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.


Documents

Case Digests on Civil Procedure Part I