Civil Code Law Case Digests

8/10/2019 Civil Code Law Case Digests

1/37

FROILAN GAUDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN PENARANDA, respondent

G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987

Facts:On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gaudionco, filed with the

RTC-Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Senen Penaranda, a complaint againstpetitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment ofdamages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita Gaudionco also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, acomplaint against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, an application for the provisionalremedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by TeresitaGaudionco in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge then ordered the payment of supportpendente lite.

The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal separation is grounded on concubinage, so that allproceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal forconcubinage in the criminal case. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be

first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action forlegal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage. He also alleges that the judge acted in abuse ofdiscretion in ordering him for payment of support.

Issue:Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case?

Ruling:In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation,based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage,because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil

and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended toobtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of theconjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings support, and disqualification from inheriting from theinnocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may beissued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceedingor conviction is necessary.

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proofof grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendentelite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of thejudge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a

motion to modify or

Wherefore, the petition of petitioner is dismissed.


2/37

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992

Facts:

Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15 children. (wow) Prima Jo is allegedly the legalwife who has a daughter named Monina. Prima filed for separation of conjugal property and support. TheTC ruled in favor of Prima in the support case but failed to render a decision on the separation of property.Jose appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of property for lack of a cause of actionand on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed underArticles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no such separation was decreed by the TC- Jose sayssince the TC decision became final sorry nalang si Prima


3/37

Ruling:

The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in saying that the decision of the TC failed to state theseparation the Court cant let technicality prevail over substantive issues so the Court may clarify such an

ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have become final.On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the separation of the parties was due to theiragreement and not because of abandonment. It held that an agreement to live separately without justcause was void under Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by theaggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only remedy available to her was legal separation which willresult in the termination of the conjugal partnership.Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She says that theagreement was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and forhim to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, thisarrangement ended in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept her.Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on

either of these grounds:1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if shesaid spouse does not leave the other spouse.Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent never to return, followed by prolongedabsence without just cause, and without providing for one's family although able to do so. The acts of Josein denying entry to the conjugal home to his wife as early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give supportfrom 1968 constitutes abandonment.

Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask for the dissolution of their propertyregime. Jose used a dummy to keep the properties from Prima but the Court said that these properties that

should now be divided between them, on the assumption that they were acquired during coverture and sobelong to the spouses half and half. The division must include such properties properly belonging to theconjugal partnership as may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.


4/37

EDUARDO ARROYO J.R., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents .G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991

Facts:

On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare andwitness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they dropped first at thehouse of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines ViewPark Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At around 7 pm, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at theNeris' condominium. Jabunan opened the door for Arroyo who immediately went knocked at the master'sbedroom where accused Ruby Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request,Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused alone in themasters bedroom. About forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that shecould already come down. The event was made known to Dr. Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, whothereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the RTC-Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri,and Eduardo Arroyo. Both the RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of adultery.

Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by theCA. On appeal, both accused alleges the following: that they were into an illicit affair, however, they deniedthat they had sexual intercourse on November 2, 1982 which Dr. Neri claims; and finally, that a pardon hadbeen extended by Dr. Neri, and that he had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he ispresently co-habiting.

Issue:Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the two accused of their criminal liability?

Ruling:The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: "Art.344-The

crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offendedspouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they areboth alive, or in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent isgranted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for eitherconsent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In thepresent case, the compromise agreement stating the pardon given by Dr. Neri, was executed only onFebruary 16, 1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated December 17, 1987 finding


5/37

petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Because of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the twoaccused namely Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.

G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956

Facts:


6/37

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant LeonilaGinez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived withtheir sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. At about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling ofher sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother inAsingan, Pangasinan. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-

in-law and some from anonymous writers informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On cross-examination, Benjamin admitted that his wife also informed him by letter, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her.All these communications prompted him in to seek the advice of the navy legal department. In August,1952, Benjamin went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house ofLeonilas godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a cousin ofBenjamin,where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamintried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery butLeonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left. After that and despite such belief,Benjamin still exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "tosoothe his wounded feelings". On November 18, 1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance ofPangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila who filed an answer vehemently

denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joinedand convinced that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953.Benjamin presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for the dismissal of the complaint dueto the fact that there was condonation. Both the RTC and CA believed that there was indeed condonation.

Issue:Whether or not there has been condonation?

Ruling:Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or,

condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offensewhich the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently andvigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and even if we were to givefull weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Courtand link such evidence with the averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude that the factsappearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery preferred against thedefendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law, must have beentoo vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor theanonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, hiswife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was notestablished, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.

The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been nocondonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legalseparation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separationshall cause the dismissal of the petition.

A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband clearly shows that there was acondonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery"committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adulterywere committed by the defendant-wife, reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act ofthe latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented tobe brought to the house of his cousin and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and


7/37

one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise ashusband and wife- all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that areconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband.The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting toadultery. Although he believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded her wife.

It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continueto live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery, or sleepingtogether for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis ofcondonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living togetheras husband and wife, especially as against the husband.

Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CAs findings that there was indeedcondonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is hereby dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIOBONDOC, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951

Facts:In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc

against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and havingrepeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947. The defendant-wifeentered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which penalty sheserved. In the same court, on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for

adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. OnFebruary 21, 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that theywould be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention ofthe defendants and quashed the second complaint.

The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must bedeemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical personsand the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of1948 is within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision that No person shall be twice put injeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Issue:Whether or not consent attended the case?

Ruling:Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which is

consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourseconstitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants areagainst the same person- the offended husband; the same status- the union of the husband and wife bytheir marriage; and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and


8/37

preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against thecommission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long asthe status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass uponthat status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as manycomplaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetratethe crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummateit. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants againcommitted adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed.

Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts does notconstitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at the time of the commissionof the crime charged in the second complaint, the paramour already knew that his codefendant was amarried woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardonhis adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability foradulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not tosubsequent adulterous acts

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversedand set aside, and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance withlaw.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960


9/37

Facts:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, NuevaEcija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In March 1951, plaintiffdiscovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one

Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her toManila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered thatwhile in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towardsthe end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since thenthey had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relationswith another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legalseparation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in acriminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.

The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession ofjudgment by the defendant.

Issue: Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar?

Ruling:The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated

from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answerthe complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal.Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more thanconsent or lack of opposition to the agreement. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may notbe inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the otherparty to procure evidence necessary to prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the divorce andmakes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place withoutcollusion by the parties, according to the evidence. The Supreme Court does not think plaintiff's failureactively to search for defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterousrelations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and afterhe had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring herhome. Hers was the obligation to return.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse theappealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances againstSerafina Florenciano.


10/37

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960

Facts:Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For

failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to liveseparately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiffand defendant entered into an agreement,the significant portions of which are hereunder reproduced: (a)That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife; ( b) That both without anyinterference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any othercrime or suit arising from our separation; (c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from myhusband or any benefits he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from mywife; (d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated, that isfrom May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation into writing.

In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and deporting themselves as husband and wife whowere generally reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, saidAsuncion gave birth to their child. On April 24, 1956, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for legalseparation Alleging abandonment and concubinage on the part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissedthe case due to the presence of condonation on the part of the plaintiff.


11/37

Issue:

Whether or not condonation attended the case?

Ruling:

The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given by thetrial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first part having to dowith the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part, that which becomes alicense to commit the ground for legal separation which is admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellantsdefense. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are the most vital part in the said agreement. Thecondonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code) specificallyprovides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been nocondonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or consented in writing,the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaintshould be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal should not be those stated inthe decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and defendant have already been legally

separated from each other, but without the marital bond having been affected, long before the effectivity ofthe new Civil Code." Again, we cannot subscribe to counsel's contention, because it is contrary to theevidence.

Wherefore, the decisions of both RTC and CA are hereby affirmed.


12/37

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, defendant-appellantGR No. 48183. November 10, 1941

Facts:On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant Elena

Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, tolive separately from each other. And on May 25, 1935, they executed a document in which they agreed tolive separately and to choose who they want to live with. On June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving

the Philippines, secured a divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contractedanother marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for Bigamy inthe Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of Manila.The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the trial of concubinage, accused interposed theplea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. But upon appeal by the fiscal, accused wasconvicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence. Hence this appeal.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage?

Ruling:As to appellants plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense of bigamy for

which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two distinct offenses in law andin fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of the second marriage, with the first stillexisting, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who isnot his wife characterizes concubinage.

Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime ofconcubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that each party intendedto forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term pardon unquestionably refers to the offense after itscommission, consent must have been intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offenseprior its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent,for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/shebecomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. In arriving at thisconclusion, we do not wish to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation oflaw. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the partiesherein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party fromprosecuting the offense.

Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted in the crime of concubinage.


13/37

PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. URSULA SENSANO, defendant-appellant

No. 37720. March 7, 1933

Facts:Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. they had one child. Shortly

after the birth of the child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan where he remained for three yearswithout writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor andilliterate, she struggled for an existence of herself and her son until the day she met the accused MarceloRamos who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband in 1924, he filed a chargeagainst his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day. Aftercompleting her sentence, the accused left her paramour. Thereafter, she begged for the husbands pardonand promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or to live with her and


14/37


15/37

Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to Legal Separation. As conclusion oflaw from the foregoing facts, we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of Legal Separation againstthe other. That judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by her action.

WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957

Facts:

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legalseparation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japaneseinvaders, from 1942-1945, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom shebegot a baby girl; that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release frominternment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating theirconjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share, the complaint prayedfor confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage and that thedefendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just andequitable. The court subsequently directed the City Fiscal to investigate, in accordance with Article 101 ofthe Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties. As ordered, Assistant City FiscalRafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions elicited the fact that

after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her.Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that, while thewife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right ofaction under Article 100 of the new Civil Code that there had been consent and connivance, and becauseBrown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code since the evidence showed that thelearned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1955.

Issue:Whether or not the prescription barred the success of the case?

Ruling:ART. 100 of the New Civil Code states that The legal separation may be claimed only by the

innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or concubinage.Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusionbetween the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. It is clear in thiscourt that the case should be dismissed because of Browns illegal act of cohabiting with another woman.

This court also found, and correctly held that Browns action was already barred, because he didnot petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, whichwas upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal


16/37

separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of thecause; and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought,it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years alsoevidences condonation or connivance on his part. The decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint is

therefore affirmed.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960

Facts:Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva

Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In March 1951, plaintiff


17/37

discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with oneJose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man, plaintiff sent her toManila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered thatwhile in the said city, defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towardsthe end of June 1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then

they had lived separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relationswith another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legalseparation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in acriminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.

The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession ofjudgment by the defendant.

Issue:Whether or not the petition will not prosper?

Ruling:

Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendantcould not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail themoment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such apersonal risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact thatthe guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary toprove it. And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.

Moreover, Art. 102 of the New Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation cannot be filedexcept within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five yearsfrom and after the date when such cause occurred. This court decided that the 1-year requirement wasfollowed. The instance when plaintiff caught his wife in 1955 with another man was deemed to be start ofthe 1-year requirement period. Since he filed on that same year-1955, he properly followed the abovestated provision.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse theappealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances againstSerafina Florenciano.


18/37

ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

Facts:Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila.

Out of their Marriage, three children were born. Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant wasemployed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset.In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset forpropaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After theelections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacaang. He began tobe away so often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was outon a series of confidential missions.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was livingin Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal home,plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendantaway. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was seen with a woman whowas on the family way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again return to the familyhome in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did notwish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned tothe family fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a month. Afterplaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia,her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house in Singalong andbetween 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs.Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig


19/37

and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien MagelineMacaraig which she gave to plaintiff sometime in October 1963.

Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and toconvince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig; however, Macaraig refused. In November 1963, plaintiffrequested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and

arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she waswilling to give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refusedto break relationship with her. In the early part of December 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her twochildren went to talk to defendant at his place of work. Plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily AnnAlcala and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendantinformed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendantdid not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of the CityFiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received fromAsst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there was no collusion present, plaintiff wasallowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.

The RTC and CA dismissed the complaints because it failed to follow Article 102 of the New CivilCode providing that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff"became cognizant of the cause."

Issue:Whether or not the rule on Prescription should be followed?

Ruling:The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the

date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the causeof action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the lawprovides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.

In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's infidelity inSeptember, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring ways butfailed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterredher from taking timely legal action.

The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of theCivil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or fromDecember 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaintfiled on December 14, 1963 came a little too late.

The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here involved.Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever

knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he wasthen living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to her by the driver oftheir family car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thoughtit best, and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it, not to go deeper into the matter herselfbecause in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entirefamily, appellant still cherished the hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home to them. Indeed, whenher husband returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing upthe matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away." True, appellantlikewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way on


20/37

Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts toverify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy that defendant again returnedto the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him becauseshe did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all thesepainful information which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation,

appellant still made brave, desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the wordsof the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and toconvince him to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained stubborn.

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only timewhen appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two children went to talk to defendant where she pleaded buthowever was refused by the defendant.

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the precedingparagraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann toreturn to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to

sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must bedeemed to have commenced.Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that

appellant is entitled to legal separation.

LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner vs. HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION, respondent

G.R No. L-9667. July 31, 1956

Facts:The main action was brought by petitioner against his wife for legal separation on the ground of

adultery. Defendant filed an omnibus petition alleging that she was being molested and harassed, to securecustody of their three minor children and a monthly support of P5, 000.00. Plaintiff opposed the petition,denying the allegation and further alleging that defendant has abandoned the children; alleging thatconjugal properties were only worth P80,000.00, not 1 million pesos as alleged by defendant; also allegingthat defendant had abandoned them and had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had becomeunfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love,respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them.


21/37

The RTC granted the custody of the children to defendant. The main reason given by the judge, forrefusing plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibitioncontained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation shall in no case be triedbefore six months shall have elapsed since the fi ling of the petition.

Issue: Whether the cooling-off period is tenable in the case at bar?

Ruling:It is conceded that the period of six months fixed in Art. 103 is evidently intended as a cooling-off

period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against eachother in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another.

Take the case at bar for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery supported bycircumstantial evidence the authenticity of which cannot be denied? And why assume that the children arein the custody of the wife when it is precisely alleged in the petition and affidavits that she has abandonedthe conjugal home?

Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as tothe custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is that all provisions of the laweven if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them ifnecessary. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided itdoes not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling-off period.

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA ,respondentG.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994

Facts:On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the

marriage as well as for legal separation between her husband Enrico L. Pacete. In her complaint, sheaverred that she was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato,Cotabato; that they had a child named; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriagewith Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only onAugust 1, 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of largetracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces ofproperty either in his name and the name of Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita; that Paceteignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete wasimpossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were served withsummons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file ananswer. The court granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked for a second extensionwhich was again granted by the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked for another 15-dayextension which was however denied by the court. Initial proceedings using the evidence only ofConcepcion followed thereafter.

On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio Carriga promulgated the herein questioneddecision namely: the valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and Enrico Pacete anddeclaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void abinitio.


22/37

Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of certiorari questioning the period of trial bythe Hon. Carriaga.

Issue:Whether or not the cooling-off period is mandatory?

Ruling:Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for

legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of thepetition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should takesteps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrityof marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relationand its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the partiesto alone dictate.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy,whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse

compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. The 6-months period is clear in this courtto have been followed by the RTC judge.Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the proceedings are Nullified and Set

Aside. No costs.


23/37

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents

G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

Facts:As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours

of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, theadministration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children but to Thelma Cumareng whomhe conducted a second marriage on October 1981 and their three children. Four years later, he filed anaction for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro Manila, belonging tothe conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without

any income. Private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children. She alsoinformed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family andwas instead maintaining a separate residence. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree oflegal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share.After trial, the court decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's sharein the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.

This decision was appealed to the CA. Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance ofa writ of preliminary injunction to command the petitioner from interfering with the administration of theirproperties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. After hearing, the CA granted the preliminary injunction prayedfor by his wife.The petitioner argues that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal

properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other.

Issue:Whether or not the courts erred in their decision?

Ruling:The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as

clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after apetition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreementbetween the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While itis true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in thedecision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties. That designation wasin effect approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction nowunder challenge. The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quoof the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of theplaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, beforefinal judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus makeineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.


24/37

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatenedviolation.Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's legitimatewife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent hasa right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in our view, enough evidence toraise the apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition

to the detriment of his wife and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared theforfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in themeantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanentlyinstalled the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merelyallowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime without interference from thepetitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the FamilyCode.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

REYNALDO ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.G.R. No. 115640. March 15, 1995

Facts:Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu who was employed by the National Steel Corporation and respondent

Teresita Masauding who was a nurse, first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan. In 1977, Teresita left for LosAngeles to work as a nurse. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, to Pennsylvania as its liaisonofficer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife.On August 16 1986, their daughter was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation inthe Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their secondchild was born on January 12, 1988. The couple decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of givingtheir marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the childrenand went back to California. She claims however, the she keeps in constant touch with her children.Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was notyet completed, he was sent back to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitionerGuillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children becauseReynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Thejudgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita,


25/37

meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus against the two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the wholeproceedings to gain custody over the children.

The RTC suspended Teresita's parental authority and declared Reynaldo to have sole parentalauthority. On appeal, the CA however gave custody to Teresita.

Issue:Whether or not the CA erred in suspending petitioners parental authority?

Ruling:Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the

choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simplyfollowed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. Ascrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita is more intent on emphasizing the "torture andagony" of a mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her characterbeing made a key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best interest and welfare of her

children. While the bonds between a mother and her children are special in nature, either parent, whetherfather or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or hersuffering, pride and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramountconsideration. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custodysuffers a future character and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined. Decisionshould be based on the testimony of the daughter giving all negative characteristics about her mother.Teresita. Moreover, the court finds Teresita being as she entered into an illicit relationship with PerdencioGonzales right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo in Pennsylvania. The record shows that thedaughter suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging andkissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home andthe children.

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both overseven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear front the record. From allindications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the First paragraph ofArticle 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longerapplies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive valuefor children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there arecompelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The childrenunderstand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growthby her behavior.


26/37

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.

Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married on September 30, 1934; that they had lived togetheras husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; thatthey acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a

Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legalseparation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived ofhis share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses,and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initioof his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on theground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one GoHiok. But before the trial could be completed Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on May 31,1969. On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds,namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26,1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, MacarioLapuz Both the RTC and CA denied the substitution.

Issue:Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate

the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

Ruling:An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of

the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, byallowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that thespouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legalseparation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the actioncauses the death of the action itself.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even ifproperty rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source beingthe decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of adecree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of theaction, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and theexpected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

Accordingly, the decision of both the RTC and the CA are hereby affirmed.


27/37

Laperal vs. Republic

GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, sheceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed thispetition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the CityAttorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that


28/37


29/37

Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18million.

Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages,Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or TemporaryRestraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the

Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the acceptance of the otherspouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Marioprays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property uponhis payment of P9 million to Elvira.IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.

ISSUE:Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.

Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of thedecree of legal separation? NO.

HELD:This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition of the propertyoccurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of theconjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do notinclude the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the writtenconsent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbranceshall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of theconsenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptanceby the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo wasseparated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property. However, as soleadministrator of the property, Alfredo still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or theauthority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. The absence of the consent ofone of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining tothe spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for thesale of the property, that other spouses written consent to th e sale is still required by law for its validity.The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, theAgreement is entirely void.As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer whichmay be perfected by Elvirasacceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo toWinifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was alreadyforfeited in favour of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugalpartnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of thenet profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in


30/37

favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugalpartnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.

With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not a buyer in goodfaith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts andcircumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the

vendors title to the property.

People vs Jumawan

G.R. Nos. 39303-39305; March 17, 1934

FACTS:

On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976, and an affidavit executed by

Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court of Sariaya, Quezon, onJuly 19, 1976, by Station Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan,

Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo Magnaye.

The lower court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan, and Francisco

Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Art.

248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to

indemnify jointly and severally the parents of the victim in the amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos.

It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January 1974 to

Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left

the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the other hand, went and

stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.

The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to secure the signature of Rodolfo

Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry

again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document.

On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought Rodolfo Magnaye and his

mother to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to assist her daughter in

securing a separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellants be liable of the crime of parricide or simply murder?

RULING:

Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is not alleged

in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse of superior strength.


31/37

Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned against the

appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And as to the

others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime. The penalty for murder with an

aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion

perpetua.

IMBONG VS OCHOA

GR No. 204819; April 14, 2014

FACT:

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortionand contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their

perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to stickercampaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressiveliberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood andReproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

ISSUE:Whther or not the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as acondition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,breastfeeding and infant nutrition

RULING:

Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, familyplanning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, is areasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not even mandate the type of familyplanning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or rejectinformation they receive and they retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without theintervention of the State.

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURTOF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000

Facts:Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86

years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he wasChairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw andPotenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years. In 1972, theyseparated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium,


32/37


33/37

MARIANO ARROYO, plaintiff vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant

G.R No. 17014. August 11, 1921

Facts:Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage

in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together as husband andwife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention to liveseparately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her toresume marital relations, an action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home

and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that she had left her husbands home without hisconsent because of the cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Upon hearing the cause, the lowercourt gave judgment in favor of the wife, authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concludedthat the husband was more to blame than the wife and that his continued ill-treatment was a sufficientjustification for her abandonment of the conjugal home.

Issue:Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment favoring the wife?

Ruling:To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty

universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and 143 of the Civil Code.Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode, she can,compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties andthe society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for theseparate maintenance of the wife. From this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made forseparate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair hasbecome impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.


34/37


35/37

PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA ESCANO, defendant-appellee

No. L-19671. November 29, 1965

Facts:On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the marriage was

unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt. Lavares, an Army CatholicChaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with thelocal civil registrar.

Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house. Consequently, sheadmitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because Tanchavez never asked forthe hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the great scandal because of the clandestine marriagewould provoke.

Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to Manila to hisjob. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a petition to annul her marriage;however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case was dismissed because of her non-appearance at the hearing.

In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint fordivorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In 1954, Vicentamarried an American and she lived with him and begotten children.

Issue:Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties.

Ruling:It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her

desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through he fault. Thus, the husband is entitledfor indemnity.

DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al

No. L-72321. December 8, 1988

Facts:Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two children,

Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage. Said propertywas inherited by her from her parents.


36/37


37/37

Ruling:

The Court held that, Alex Go argues that when his wife entered into the contract with Ong, she wasacting alone for her sole interest. Thus, they found it with merit. Under the law, a wife may exercise anyprofession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband.

Thus, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract. She is solely liable to the complainantfor the damage awarded.

Documents

Civil Code Law Case Digests