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Citizen Insecurity in Venezuela: Poverty or Institutions ?. Roberto Brice ño -Leó n Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Universidad Central de Venezuela. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Citizen Insecurity in Venezuela:Poverty or Institutions?
Roberto Briceño-LeónWoodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Universidad Central de Venezuela
In Venezuela there has been an increase in violence and killings that is surprising and is unique
in its speed and the magnitude
19761978
19801982
19841986
19881990
19921994
19961998
20002002
20042006
20082010
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
Fuente: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales
VenezuelaTotal homicides 1976-2011
For decades Venezuela was a country with low violence and low homicide rate.
How can we explain this change?
Objectives• The thesis that we hold in this presentation is that the increase
in homicides in Venezuela occurs for political reasons.• Not as political violence in the sense of conflict between
groups competing for power, but as the existing political settlement that allows society to regulate conflicts, define social norms and enforce compliance. The political agreement that underlies and supports the rule of law.
• This also means that violence in Venezuela does not originate from social reasons such as poverty or inequality. Or economic reasons such as increasing unemployment and decreasing the country's GDP.
To demonstrate this I will present the following:
• First, I will make some comparisons of the violence, particularly homicides, between Venezuela and its two neighboring Latin American countries, Colombia and Brazil
• Second, I propose an explanation of the reasons that I argue can explain changes in violence in Venezuela in the last 25 years.
• Third, I will offer evidence of why the killings are not associated with social conditions. And I will show that these variations are associated with changes in institutions.
IHomicides in Venezuela,
Colombia and Brazil
In the 1980s, homicide rates increased in other countries, but not in Venezuela
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 19900
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Homicide rates
Hom
icid
es/1
00,0
00 in
habi
tant
s COL
BR
VEN
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Homicide rates (per 100,000 inhabitants)
Brazil Colombia Venezuela
VEN
COL
BR
However, the situation in the 2000s is radically different:
homicides decreased in Colombia, stabilized in Brazil, and increased in Venezuela
Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime
There are also changes in other areas of citizen securityKidnapping decreased notably in Colombia
and greatly increased in VenezuelaNumber of Reported Kidnappings 2000-2010
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
VenezuelaColombia
2What happened in Venezuela?
Violence and Institutions in Venezuela
• In Venezuela, the explanation lies in the political changes the country. On changes in the rules of social and political life.
• There are three different phases in the institutional and security situation in Venezuela: its crises, recovery and destruction.
In phase 1, after years of stability, an institutional crisis begins
19761978
19801982
19841986
19881990
19921994
19961998
20002002
20042006
20082010
Source: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales
1989:Caracazo
1992: Coups d’état
Phase I: 1989-1993Institutional Crisis
Venezuela 1976-2011 Homicides
In phase 2, there is an effort by the institutional reconstruction
19761978
19801982
19841986
19881990
19921994
19961998
20002002
20042006
20082010
Fuente: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales
Political Stability Rafael Caldera
Phase II: 1994 -1998Institutional Recovery
In phase 3 starts the destruction of institutions
19761978
19801982
19841986
19881990
19921994
19961998
20002002
20042006
20082010
Source: Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia sobre datos oficiales
Bolivarian Revolution Hugo Chavez
Phase III: 1999-2011Institutional Destruction
PHASE 1In February 1989, there was a revolt with looting, destruction of
businesses and a strong repression that resulted in more than 500 fatalities in Caracas in one week
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
1989 First increase with the looting and popular re-
volt
InstitutionalCrisis
PHASE 1In February and November of 1992, there were two attempts at coups d’état,
with deaths in the clashes and bombing of the capital. The president was removed from office and in one month, there were three different presidents.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
1992 Increase in homicides during and after the two coups d’état in February and November of 1992
Institutional Crisis
PHASE 2In 1994, the elected government of R. Caldera began and the political situation was stabilized. For 5 years, homicides were
maintained without change and the rate decreased.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
1994 to 1998: Stabiliza-tion linked to the efforts to pacify the country and reinforce institutionality.
Institutional Stability
PHASE 3In 1999, a “revolution” began that sought to destroy the institutions of the
past and install a new socialist regime. As its security policy, the government decided that social policies should be made and crime should not be
persecuted.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
Since 1999: increase in homicides as a result of the institutional destruction and political division in the country
Institutional Destruction
In our view this occurs because of the institutional policy of destruction run by the government
• The government as a revolution wants to destroy the ancien regime
• The government believes that violence is rooted in poverty and therefore social policies alone are enough.
• The government believes that violence is part of the class struggle, that stealing is not wrong if you're hungry, that violence is suitable a political tool.
• The government considers that the police use is a policy of the right wing politics
• This led to a decision to do nothing and not enforcing the law
3Insecurity: Poverty or Institutions?
The thesis of poverty and inequality
• The explanations of insecurity and violence are said to have originated from the increased size of the youth population, poverty, education and illiteracy, inequality, unemployment or lack of resources country.
• Consider what has happened in the relationship of these variables in Venezuela with the killings.
Young population and HomicideThere is no association between the change in homicide rate
and the size of the young population .
1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
Venezuela
% of population between 15-34 Homicide rate
Illiteracy and HomicidesVenezuela was the country that had the best results in education and, in addition, was the LA country that
“reported the best results” in the Millenium Goals, althought it shows the highest increase in homicide
1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60 Venezuela
Illiteracy rate (% of total population) Homicide rate
Poverty and HomicidesThere is no assocation between the percentage of the country living in poverty and homicides.
Venezuela reported the greatest decrease in poverty in LA and is the country with the most homicides
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0 Venezuela
% of population living below poverty lineHomicide rate
Unemployment and Homicides Venezuela shows a decrease in unemployment during the analyzed period. Even
though the type of employment created in this period is generally public employment in Venezuela with a decrease in industrial and private agricultural employment.
Homicides increased. There is no association
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60 Venezuela
Homicidios Unemployment
Gini Index and Homicides Social inequality measured by the Gini coefficient shows results contrary to what is
expected. In Venezuela, there is an increase in equality while homicides also increased
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Venezuela
Gini index Homicide rate (in hundredths)
GDP per capita and HomicidesMeasured per capita, the country that had the greatest increase in income
was Venezuela, the country that has the highest homicide rate
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Venezuela
GDP per capita (in tens) Homicides per 1 million inhabitants
The case is different with institutional variables
Country Delay R2 RMSE BIC
Brazil 3 0.773 1.832 2.300
Colombia 2 0.646 4.931 4.226
Venezuela 5 0.752 3.509 3.731
The analysis with ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) showed association and modest
significance between governance variables and predicting the results of homicides.
Rule of Law and HomicidesIn Venezuela, the fall of rule of law starting in 2001 is strongly associated with the increase in homicides.
1996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920100
10
20
30
40
50
60Venezuela
Rule of Law (percentile rank) Homcide rate
Government Effectiveness and HomicidesThe lack of government effectiveness in Venezuela is negatively related to the increase in
violence.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
Venezuela
Government Effectiveness (percentile rank) Homcide rate
Regulatory Quality and HomicidesIn Venezuela, the decrease in regulatory quality starting in 1999 is negatively associated with the
increase in homicides.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60Venezuela
Regulatory Quality (percentile rank) Homcide rate
Voice and Accountability and HomicidesFor Venezuela, the results show a negative association as
accountability decreases and homicides increase. In Venezuela, this is something particular since, starting in 2004,
the government prohibited the release of criminality and homicide data and removed the existing data from official
websites.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
Venezuela
Voice and Accountability (percentile rank)Homcide rate
Political Stability and Homicides In Venezuela, there is a decrease in the value, which is negatively
associated with the increase in homicides
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
10
20
30
40
50
60
Venezuela
Political Stability (percentile rank) Homcide rate
There is an inverse association between incarceration and homicide in the three
countries.
In Brazil, imprisonment for homicides increased and the number of homicides
remained stable
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
Homicides and Imprisonment
Inmates form Homicide Total Homicidios Brasil
Source: Ministério da Justiça, Departamento Penitenciário Nacional, Sistema Integrado de Informações Penitenciárias--InfoPen
In the state of São Paulo, arrests for homicide increased and the number of
homicides decreased
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20110
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
Homicides and Imprisonment
Inmates for Homicide Total Homcidios Sao Paulo
Source: Ministério da Justiça, Departamento Penitenciário Nacional, Sistema Integrado de Informações Penitenciárias--InfoPen
In Colombia, arrests increased and homicides decreased
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20100
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Colombia 1990-2010Rates of homicide and imprisonment
(per 100,000 inhabitants)
Homicide rate Imprisonment rate
Source: Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras, Centro de Estudios Económicos
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20090
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Homicides Imprisonments for homicide
Fuente: Archivos del CICPC
In Venezuela, those detained for homicide decreased and homicides increased from
1998 to 2010
Conclusions• The explanation for the increase in homicides and insecurity in
Venezuela is political, because it has its origin in the institutional destruction caused passive policies of doing nothing, not to force compliance with the law, or punish offenders.
• And the active policies of the president and the national government that praise violent methods and violent individuals
• Institutions, understood as the social and political life governed by rules, are the only what can help reduce homicides and increase security.
• Social policies, devoted to reducing poverty and inequality, are valuable in themselves. But they do not reduce crime or increase safety if they are not accompanied by a strengthening of social organization and institutions.
Will this situation of insecurity electoral political consequences?
• It is difficult to know, because it is a reality that is interpreted with a polarized view.
• Our survey of 2011 shows a skewed perception of the problem and who is responsible.
The same reality is seen differently by government supporters and opposition or non-aligned
Aumentado Igual Disminuido0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
ChavistaNo ChavistaDe NingunoNacional
Axis Title
According to you, insecurity has increased, decreased or
the same?
Fuente: LACSO Encuesta de Violencia 2011
The attribution of responsibility to the government or the president is given differently depending on the political position
Mucha Algo Poca Niguna.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
CHAVISTA NO CHAVISTA DE NINGUNO NACIONAL
Fuente: LACSO Encuesta de Violencia 2011
how confident are you that President Chavez will solve the
problem of insecurity?
Conclusion
• At the end there are two groups: the supporters of the government on one side, and opponents and non-aligned on the other.
• If non-aligned blame the president and the government and act accordingly, this can become a relevant political factor in elections.