CISZEWSKI ET AL Contraceptive Price Changes

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findings by those who set contraceptiveprices. Indeed, prices vary widely fromcountry to country, and these variationsgreatly exceed (and sometimes even runcounter to) differences in economies andgeneral wage and price levels.

For example, in relatively new socialmarketing programs in Burkina Faso,Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nige-ria and Zimbabwe, condom prices wereset at 3–10 times the levels (in U.S. dollars)charged in Bangladesh, India and Pak-istan.3 Yet, per capita gross national prod-uct is lower in many of these African coun-tries than in the Asian countries, which

have traditionally kept prices low.How do contraceptive prices influencedemand for supplies and services? If pricesare being set without regard to either percapita gross national product or availableresearch findings, how are they being set?And could such decisions be made morewisely? The results of price changes inBangladesh may provide new informationto help answer these questions.

What Is Known?A study published in 1986 summed upmost of what was then known about the

effect of contraceptive prices on demand.4

Reviewing the results of 15 experimentalprograms, the investigator concluded thatcharging a modest fee for contraceptiveservices and products (rather than pro-viding them free) did not have a negativeimpact on demand. On the other hand, thereview found that price reductions con-sistently led to increases in demand. Fur-thermore, efforts aimed at full cost recov-ery seemed to deter low-income andmoderate-income couples from obtaining

Robert L. Ciszewski is vice president, Population Services

International, Washington, D. C., and Philip D. Harvey

is president, DKT International, Washington, D. C.

Contraceptive Price Changes: The Impact on Sales in Bangladesh

By Robert L. Ciszewski and Philip D. Harvey

Social marketing of contraceptives hasachieved notable success in creatingand satisfying demand for family

planning in developing countries.1 Charg-ing a small price to the consumer, as is al-ways the practice in social marketing pro-grams, has distinct advantages. First,wastage is minimized, since consumersare likely to use products for which theypay. Second, the price charged can moti-vate retail traders to offer the productsover the widest geographic area, thus al-lowing easy and affordable access to prod-ucts that might otherwise be inaccessible,too expensive or both.

In family planning programs generally,and particularly in social marketing pro-grams, the issue of contraceptive prices hasattracted increasing attention, as demandfor family planning in developing countrieshas outstripped the funds available to sup-ply free or low-cost services. Social mar-keting programs, perhaps because of the“commercial” connotations of this methodof delivering family planning, have beenunder intense pressure to maximize con-sumer prices, thus lowering costs to donors.

Yet, when prices are raised, the poorestclients are the first to drop out.2 As in any

other family planning program, low-in-come consumers are the priority clients forsocial marketing, and their loss to a pro-gram is of substantial concern to planners.

Another reason the pricing issue has be-come controversial is that there has beenlittle systematic analysis of this subject, andeven less practical application of research

contraceptive services and supplies.A 1991 review of the literature on this

subject recapitulated the findings of theearlier report and included additionaldata.5 The conclusions were consistentwith those of the earlier review: A low ormoderate price (as opposed to no price)can be charged without significantly de-creasing demand; lowering or eliminat-ing fees attracts new users; and price in-creases have mixed results, but largeincreases generally dampen demand.

More recent information on condomprices—particularly from social market-ing programs in Haiti and Pakistan andfrom a study that related prices to percapita sales—confirms that large price in-creases depress demand and that too-highconsumer prices impede expansion of contraceptive prevalence.

In Haiti,6 the program lowered condomprices three times over a period of one andone-half years. First, the cost of one im-ported brand of commercial condoms wasreduced by about 50%; sales increased by134%. Next, the program introduced anew brand at a consumer price 50% belowthe (already decreased) price of the other

condom; sales grew by 24%. Finally, theprice of this cheaper condom was cut inhalf, and sales rose by 94%.

In Pakistan,7 the program doubled theprice of a four-pack of one brand of con-doms in two selected towns and simulta-neously increased the price by one-half inthe rest of the country. Intercept and follow-up interviews conducted both before andafter the price change revealed that in theareas with the smaller increase, 21% of pur-chasers had discontinued use six monthsafter the price increase, while in the areaswith the larger increase, 56% had discon-

tinued (a difference that was statisticallysignificant). This finding confirms the ear-lier conclusion that drastic price increasesmay have a seriously detrimental effect,whereas more moderate increases may not.

Finally, a 1991 review of condom dis-tribution in 24 social marketing programsshowed a significant inverse correlation between per capita sales and prices (basedon an index that took into account percapita gross national product).8 The fourmost successful programs (in Bangladesh,

In April 1990, the Bangladesh social marketing project increased the prices of the contraceptives it sold by an average of about 60%. In the year following these increases, condom sales

dropped by 29%, and pill sales fell by 12%, despite a well-established trend of annual increas-

es. When sales had not returned to their previous levels after about two years, the project low-

ered prices; sales returned to earlier levels within a few months and have increased since. These

events occurred in a large and mature program, where major variables affecting project perfor-

mance are well understood. Therefore, the results appear to constitute strong evidence that, at

least in social marketing structures, contraceptive prices, and changes in those prices, have a

substantial impact on demand. (International Family Planning Perspectives, 21:150–154, 1995)

International Family Planning Perspectives



151Volume 21, Number 4, December 1995

Because the SMC has such a long histo-ry, its sales levels are generally predictablewithin certain parameters. Targets are seton the basis of long experience, and reflectmanagement’s understanding of the mar-ket, of the planned magnitude of expand-ed distribution, and of Bangladeshi menand women’s ever-increasing motivationtoward family planning. Further, given thesize and coverage of the program, transi-tory actions of the sales force or ordinary,temporary fluctuations in distribution areunlikely to produce sizable, unexpectedchanges in sales. During the late 1980s, pilland condom sales increased each year byan average of 8–10%. Similar increaseswere expected in 1990 and 1991.

Price ChangesSmall increases in the prices of consumergoods are normal, and people take themin stride. Thus, periodic price increases forcondoms and pills in the social marketingproject before 1990, averaging 10% or so,had practically no effect on wholesale orretail sales. In 1990, however, the SMC im-plemented far larger price increases; twoyears later, the project rolled prices back.(The pricing histories of the products dis-cussed in this article are given in Table 1.)

Factors Leading to IncreasesFrom the social marketing project’s in-ception in 1976 through 1993, the 1.4 bil-lion condoms and 60 million cycles of pillsit distributed were donated by USAID, ata cost to the donor in excess of $60 million.

Sales revenues—provided, ultimately, bythe users of the products—recovered some$20 million, but the remaining subsidy isa major and continuing consideration.

By 1989, these subsidies had become of great concern to USAID. Because the SMCreceives contraceptives at no cost and sellsthem at below-cost prices, higher sales re-sult in rising costs to the donor. Also, thereis no economy of scale in an open-endedprovision of large quan-tities of contraceptives:Each sale costs thedonor a fixed amount

for procuring and ship-ping the product, plus asubsidy to cover the dif-ference between repack-aging and marketingcosts and funds recov-ered through wholesaleand retail sales.

Thus, with costs ris-ing as sales increase, thevolume of sales rev-enues takes on great im-

Costa Rica, Jamaica and Pakistan) had av-erage sales of 0.75 condoms per capita,and all had very low prices. In the sevenleast successful programs, average salestotaled 0.07 condoms per capita, andprices were more than six times those inthe successful programs. While a numberof programs had both low per capita salesand low prices, the evidence clearly sug-gested that high prices dampen sales.

Social Marketing in BangladeshThe social marketing project in Bangladeshhas long been an integral part of the nationalfamily planning program. The governmenthas traditionally provided free contracep-tive services, including both condoms andpills supplied by the U. S. Agency for In-ternational Development (USAID), and thesocial marketing project has provided brand-name contraceptives at a very lowprice through the commercial distributionsystem. On the assumption that the verypoorest family planning clients would availthemselves of the free supplies distributed by the government, but also that govern-ment clinics, and even government out-reach workers, could never hope to reachall of the rural poor dispersed throughoutBangladesh, prices in the social marketingprogram have always been set very low.

The Bangladesh social marketing proj-ect is a very large and mature program.Begun in 1976, the project has been liber-ally funded by USAID, and became thesecond-largest social marketing effort inthe world (after the government of India’s)

shortly after it got under way. It has beenwidely recognized as a particularly suc-cessful effort in terms of per capita cov-erage and cost per couple-year of protec-tion provided. By the end of 1993, theproject—now called the Social MarketingCompany (SMC)—was providing 2.2 mil-lion couple-years of protection, 60%through condom sales and 40% throughsales of oral contraceptives.

The SMC employs almost 500 people,of whom about 150 are salespersons orsales supervisory staff. The company’scontraceptives and other health products

are available in an estimated 130,000 re-tail outlets throughout the country, rang-ing from large urban pharmacies to tinyrural stalls. In addition, over the years, theSMC has created and carried out the mostintense mass media campaign inBangladesh’s history (and a massive fam-ily planning campaign by any standard)to inform people of the benefits of limit-ing family size, as well as to advise themabout the availability of affordable con-traceptives and how to use them.

portance. And product pricing is a key toacquiring these revenues. If the consumerpays more, the project can charge a high-er price to wholesalers and retailers, andthus recoup more to cover other costs, re-ducing the burden on the donor.

When weighing the pros and cons of aprice increase, donor representatives andprogram managers faced several complexissues. Past research had suggested thatcharging a “modest” price would not re-duce contraceptive demand, and the rel-atively small price increases in theBangladesh program throughout the1980s had had only negligible impact onsales. Further, planners felt that higherprices might actually enhance the imageof the SMC’s products as consumers andretailers came to recognize the value of theexpensive imported contraceptives thatthe project offered.

On the other hand, because the productswere priced so low, program managerswere concerned that a change that seemedmodest when considered in absolute termswould be large in percentage terms (whichis the way retailers characteristically viewsuch matters). Furthermore, a retail priceincrease that may have seemed small to aWestern planner—one U.S. cent or less percondom, or three cents per cycle of pills,for example—could make a considerabledifference to the low-income target con-sumers in a social marketing program.

In looking for guideposts to help directtheir pricing decision, managers reluctantlyruled out operations research, such as re-

gional experiments on price elasticity.Bangladesh is a compact and crowdedcountry, and traders are very familiar withthe prices of the commodities in which theydeal. Attempts to test price elasticity by ap-plying different prices to different areas of the country have not been successful; there-fore, the increases under discussion werenot tested or otherwise researched.

Eventually, as pressure to increase prices

Table 1. Retail prices (in taka) for contraceptives sold through theBangladesh social marketing project, 1976–1992

Year Condoms* Pills†

Raja Panther Maya Ovacon

1976 0.13 na 0.70 na

1980 0.15 na 1.00 4.00

1983 na 0.50 na na

1985 0.20–0.25‡ na 1.50 na

1988 na na 2.00 na

1990 0.33–0.50‡ 0.75 3.00 6.00

1992 0.20–0.25‡ 0.75 1.00 6.00

*Price per piece. †Price per cycle. ‡Price range reflects that Raja condoms were sold both

singly (or in unpacked strips) and in three-packs. Notes : Prices are shown only for years in

which products were introduced or prices were changed. One taka is roughly equivalent to

2.5 U.S. cents. na=not applicable.



board would prove once and for all whetherrevenues could be increased without los-ing large numbers of clients. The result wasthat at the beginning of April 1990, the SMCraised all of its prices. The increases aver-aged about 60%, but varied somewhat; theprice of a three-pack of Raja condoms, forexample, doubled (see Table 1).

Effect of IncreasesThe market reaction was immediate andemphatic: Many of the largest-volume re-tailers and wholesalers refused to buySMC products, stating they were unwill-ing to stock supplies whose prices had been unfairly and inappropriately raised.Consumers also resisted the increases. Notonly was the extra expense seen as bur-densome, but the social marketing projecthad spent some 15 years establishing theapproximate value of condoms, in partic-ular; the sudden, large increases cast doubton that perception. Retailers reported thatthe rural poor perceived prices as too high,and sales staff, unable to reach the targetson which their commissions are based,were forgoing considerable income.

As the consumer and trade resistance be-came apparent, the SMC attempted to com-pensate through increased marketing ef-forts. Short of cutting prices, the companytried everything: Its medical representa-tives emphasized to doctors the high qual-ity of Maya pills, as well as their low cost

became irresistible, the reservations of someprogram staff and managers gave way tothe perceived need for more revenues. Inaddition, there was a feeling that at the veryleast, a significant price elevation across the

relative to that of other pills; sales person-nel reminded traders of the enduring pop-ularity of Raja condoms and Maya pills (themarket leaders), and promised that de-mand would return. Nothing brought thedesired results, even a redesigned and ex-panded mass media campaign, devised toupgrade the products’ image to more close-ly conform with their new prices.

The lowest priced, most popular prod-ucts were severely affected. Sales of Rajacondoms fell the most, declining by 29% be-tween 1989 and 1990 (see Figure 1), whilesales of Maya pills declined by 15% (seeFigure 2). The smaller decrease in Mayasales may have been at least partially dueto the fact—or at least the widely accepted belief—that the pill is likely to be the choiceof more strongly motivated (and financially better-off) users. A factor with perhapsgreater impact, particularly on condomsales, is the probability that poor familiesare more profoundly affected by price in-creases than are those with higher incomes,and therefore react more strongly.9

Overall, the effect on project sales andincome was severe. Instead of the increasesnormally anticipated, distribution of thetwo key products was declining, and rev-enues grew only marginally, rather thanrising to an extent that would provide a no-ticeable difference in the required subsidy.Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of thepoorest clients were lost to the program.

152 International Family Planning Perspectives

Contraceptive Price Changes in Bangladesh

Figure 1. Annual sales of Raja condoms, so-cial marketing project, Bangladesh, 1988–1993

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

No. (in millions)

Source: Population Services International, annual sales reports.

Figure 2. Annual sales of oral contraceptives, by brand, social marketing project, Bangladesh, 1985–1993

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1993*1992*1991*199019891988198719861985

Maya

Ovacon

Total

*Total also includes small numbers of cycles of Norquest, another oral contraceptive brand introduced into the social marketing project in 1991. Source: Population Services International, annual sales reports.

No. of cycles (in millions)



153Volume 21, Number 4, December 1995

(see Figure 1). In 1992, sales rebounded toabout 104 million pieces, and the follow-ing year, to nearly 125 million, reestab-lishing the condom sales trends that theprice increases had interrupted. Further-more, sales of Maya pills, with their newlow price, reached 6.6 million cycles in1992, nearly triple the figure for 1990.While this number fell in the followingyear because of a shift in emphasis to theOvacon brand, total pill sales remainedstrong and have maintained a level of more than 10 million cycles per year.

The SMC’s more expensive products areaimed at a more affluent target group andtherefore had not been greatly affected bythe price hikes. A comparison of Maya saleswith those of Ovacon—a higher-priced al-ternative promoted mainly in urban cen-ters—shows that the upward trend of bothproducts was arrested during the period of increased prices, but that Maya sales fellconsiderably behind (Figure 2). Similarly,sales of the “upmarket” condom brands,Panther and Sensation, maintained theirusual, modest levels. Prices were not re-duced in 1992, and these products contin-ue to serve their limited target groups.

On the basis of this experience, the SMChas concluded that in Bangladesh, pricesof low-cost socially marketed contracep-tives are not very elastic, and that price in-creases, while periodically necessary,should be minimal and should be under-taken with great caution. By returning tothe lower prices, the project reestablishedinterest in the SMC’s contraceptives (see

Figure 3); the number of couple-years of contraceptive protection that the SMCprovided rose from 1.3–1.4 million in1990–1991 to 2.2 million in 1993.

DiscussionThe Bangladesh experience bears out pre-vious research findings suggesting thatlarge increases in contraceptive prices willdampen demand. The fact that sales inBangladesh dropped sharply after theprice increases, remained low and rebounded once prices were rolled backlends special credence to this conclusion,

particularly because these events occurredin a well-established program where theother variables likely to influence contra-ceptive sales are well understood.

Although the absolute size of the priceincreases seemed quite small to programplanners, these increases had a dramaticimpact. Thus, one lesson to be learned fromthese events is that program managersshould take the relative magnitude as wellas the absolute size of an increase into ac-count whenever considering raising prices.

During this same period, governmentpill distribution—through maternal andchild health services and family planningclinics, as well as through the door-to-doorefforts of more than 40,000 governmentand nongovernmental organization work-ers—rose by 25–30% per year. It seemedthat pill acceptance had reached a criticalmass in Bangladesh, but that because of price considerations, the SMC’s potentialpill clients remained unwilling (or unable)to take advantage of the convenience of private-sector outlets.

Public-sector condom distribution, on theother hand, declined around the same time,after the government initiated a require-ment that its workers collect a small price(Tk 0.50, or about 1.25 cents, per dozen con-doms) from acceptors. Field reports fromSMC sales staff indicated that some of thecondoms and pills distributed through thepublic sector found their way into shops tofill the vacuum left by shopkeepers’ reluc-tance to stock SMC contraceptives. Also,considerable anecdotal evidence indicatesthat during this period, significant numbersof contraceptive users switched from con-doms, all of which now bore a price, to freegovernment oral contraceptives.

Ultimately, the effect of the price in-creases on consumers is difficult to assess:On the one hand, contraceptives were stillavailable, although at lower levels and infewer shops. But with public-sector con-dom distribution decreasing at the sametime that the SMC’s sales were down, andwith SMC pill distribution also declining,

it became apparent that the overall effi-ciency of the country’s contraceptive de-livery system was falling. In 1992, fearingthat the company was not going to be ableto contribute its expected share to the na-tional program under this pricing structure,the SMC staff and board of directors de-cided to roll prices back to pre-1990 levels.

Effect of the RollbackThe 1992 reduced-pricing strategy hadtwo objectives: to attract consumers backto the project with prices no higher thanthe earlier ones; and to allow traders an

additional margin in order to win backtheir loyalty and return SMC products tothe shelves. In February 1992, the price of Raja condoms was reduced to the level ithad been in the late 1980s (see Table 1); sixmonths later, the price of Maya pills wasrolled back to early 1980s levels.*

The response to the price reductionswas dramatic. During the two years of in-creased prices, Raja condom sales haddropped from more than 100 millionpieces per year to fewer than 80 million

Furthermore, this experience demon-strates that substantial price increasesshould not be contemplated again for theBangladesh program in the near future.However, smaller increases, such as thosethat accompany inflation, need not be

ruled out. It would be a mistake to con-clude that all price increases will be dele-terious, even in Bangladesh. Previous,smaller increases have not been.

This experience also suggests ratherstrongly that condoms are particularlyprice-sensitive—more so, at least, than thepill. As we have noted elsewhere,10 be-cause the condom requires a small indi-vidual outlay and is perceived as an itemthat can be bought only when needed, itis often the contraceptive choice of thepoor. Pill users, by contrast, may be morelikely to continue using their method be-

cause it requires both consistent motiva-tion and a regimen that women may notwish to interrupt. Program planners,therefore, should be especially careful insetting or changing the prices of condoms.

On the other hand, price reductions forall contraceptive products may merit spe-

*The pricing of Maya was set lower not only becauseMaya was meant to serve the poorest women, but also because inventories had built up during the slow salesperiod and some pills would have expired if not con-sumed quickly.

Figure 3. Annual number of couple-years ofprotection provided by the Bangladesh socialmarketing project, 1988–1993

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

199319921991199019891988

Couple-years(in millions)

Note: One couple-year of protection equals 100 condoms or 13cycles of pills. Source:Population Services International, annualsales reports.



and DKT International, “1994 Contraceptive Social Mar-keting Statistics,” Washington, D. C., 1995.

2. See, for example, P.D. Harvey, “In Poor Countries,‘Self-Sufficiency’ Can Be Dangerous to Your Health,”Studies in Family Planning, 22:52–54, 1991.

3. P. D. Harvey, “The Impact of Condom Prices on Salesin Social Marketing Programs,” Studies in Family Plan-ning, 21:52–58, 1994.

4. M. A. Lewis, “Do Contraceptive Prices Affect De-mand?” Studies in Family Planning, 17:126–135, 1986.

5. R. E. Lande and J.S. Geller, “Paying for Family Plan-ning,” Population Reports, Series J, No. 39, 1991.

6. M. Donald and P.D. Harvey, “The Impact of Price Re-ductions on Condom Sales in Haiti,” DKT Reports/Find-ings, No. 1, Washington, D. C., 1992.

7. J. Davies, Monthly Progress Report from Pakis tan,Population Services International, Jan. 1992.

8. P. D. Harvey, 1994, op. cit. (see reference 3).

9. M.A. Lewis, “Costs and Cost Sharing in Family Plan-ning: Review of the Evidence & Implications for the Fu-ture,” paper presented at the UN Expert Group Meetingon Family Planning, Health and Family Well-Being, Ban-galore, India, Oct. 26–30, 1992, pp. 16–17.

10. R. L. Ciszewski and P.D. Harvey, ”The Effect of PriceIncreases on Contraceptive Sales in Bangladesh,” Jour-

nal of Biosocial Science, 26:25–35, 1994.11. M. A. Lewis, 1986, op. cit. (see reference 4); R.E. Landeand J. S. Geller, 1991, op. cit. (see reference 5); and M. Don-ald and P.D. Harvey, 1992, op. cit. (see reference 6).

12. J. Davies, 1992, op. cit. (see reference 7).

ResumenEn abril de 1990, el proyecto de mercadeo so-cial de Bangladesh aumentó los precios de losanticonceptivos en un promedio de aproxi-madamente el 60%. Al año siguiente, la ventade condones cayó en un 29% y la de píldorasen un 12%, a pesar de haberse mantenido hastaese momento una tendencia de aumentos anua-

les. Cuando después de dos años en los que nose recuperó el nivel de ventas el proyecto redujolos precios, en pocos meses las ventas volvierona su nivel anterior y desde ese momento se hanmantenido en ascenso. Esto ocurrió en un

proyecto grande y bien establecido en el que re-sulta fácil interpretar las variables que afectansu funcionamiento. Por consiguiente, los re-sultados señalan que hay pruebas fehacientesde que, al menos en un sistema de mercadeo so-cial, los precios de los anticonceptivos y los cam-bios de los mismos surten un impacto sustan-cial en la demanda de anticoncepción.

RésuméEn avril 1990, le projet de marketing social auBangladesh a augmenté, d’environ 60% enmoyenne, les prix des contraceptifs qu’ilvendait. Durant l’année suivant ces haussesde prix, les ventes de préservatifs ont chuté de29% et celles de contraceptifs oraux de 12%,en dépit d’une tendance bien établie de hauss-es annuelles. Les ventes n’étant pas revenuesaux niveaux antérieurs après environ deuxans, le projet a baissé les prix; les ventes sontalors revenues aux niveaux précédents dans

cial consideration. The fact that Maya pillsales responded dramatically to the pricereduction suggests the need for careful at-tention to this issue. A review of the liter-ature indicates that price reductions havealways increased sales of contraceptives.11

Managers of programs selling contracep-tives at relatively high prices should con-sider the potential for improved coverage by the simple act of lowering their prices.

Although operations research on pricechanges was not deemed possible inBangladesh, in most countries—particu-larly developing countries with significantregional, linguistic and cultural diversity—it may be possible to experiment with pricechanges in one or two relatively isolatedareas before making nationwide changesin the price of family planning products.Such an experiment, indeed, was conduct-ed in Pakistan, as decribed earlier.12 Wherefeasible, such price tests may provide valu-able information for decision-makers beforethey implement nationwide changes.

Another possibility, even in relatively ho-mogeneous societies such as Bangladesh,is to experiment with changing the pricesof secondary brands. Even when the sec-ondary brands are priced significantlyhigher than the major brands, testing theirprices may shed some light on trade andconsumer response to contraceptive priceincreases generally.

Finally, when family planning profes-sionals set prices for contraceptives (and,we believe, for contraceptive services), theconsumer’s ability to pay should be the

overriding consideration. While social mar-keting programs in some countries may not be intended to serve the poorest citizens,low prices for socially marketed productsstill serve the overall objectives of a nationalfamily planning program best. This is truenot just because lower prices mean moreclients for social marketing, but also be-cause persons who are lured away fromfree government supplies to the sociallymarketed brands will be paying at leastsome part of the cost of their own birth con-trol needs, thus reducing the costs to gov-ernments and donors. It is almost always

better to have large numbers of clients pay-ing a small fraction of the cost of their con-traceptive services than to have small numbers paying the full cost, with theremaining clients availing themselves of free government services or, perhaps, miss-ing out on family planning altogether.

References1. D. L. Altman and P.T. Piotrow, ”Social Marketing: DoesIt Work?” Population Reports, Series J, No. 21, 1980; J. D.Sherris et al., “Contraceptive Social Marketing: Lessonsfrom Experience,” Population Reports, Series J, No. 30, 1985;

un délai de quelques mois, et ont augmenté depuis. Ces événements s’inséraient dans lecadre d’un programme étendu et mûr où les

principales variables influant sur la perfor-mance du projet sont bien comprises. Par con-séquent, les résultats semblent démontrer ef-

ficacement que les prix des contraceptifs et leschangements de ces prix ont un impact con-sidérable sur la demande, du moins dans lesstructures de marketing social.

154 International Family Planning Perspectives

Contraceptive Price Changes in Bangladesh

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CISZEWSKI ET AL Contraceptive Price Changes