Cho - Dual Identity and Issue Localization-East Asia in Global Governance.pdf

Dual Identity and Issue Localization: East Asia in Global Governance

Il Hyun Cho

This article examines the sources and consequences of East Asias partici-pation in global governance. Despite the rhetoric of global contribution,the article argues that global governance issues are reframed in East Asiato better suit domestic and regional priorities. Specifically, two underlyingmechanisms are at work to complicate, and often render ineffective, EastAsias foray into global governance: (1) the conflicting identities of thethree countries at the regional and global levels; and (2) the localizationof global governance issues. By examining the global role of China, Japan,and South Korea in climate change, peacekeeping, and nuclear nonprolif-eration, the article shows how the shared desire of enhancing global sta-tus in East Asia is tempered by the politics of dual identity and issuelocalization. KEYWORDS: East Asia, climate change, peacekeeping, nonpro-liferation.

THE IMPRESSIVE GROWTH OF CHINA HELPED PROPEL EAST ASIAS INCREASINGvisibility on the global stage. Some even suggest a Group of 2, closer coor-dination and cooperation between the United States and China, as a futuremodel of global governance.1 The desire to join the global ranks, however,is not limited to China. Japan, the worlds third largest economy, is a keyplayer in areas such as climate change and overseas development assistance.South Korea has also entered the fray by pledging its troops to Afghanistan,dispatching its navy to the treacherous waters off Somalia, and hosting theGroup of 20 (G-20) and the Nuclear Security Summit. Will East Asiasenthusiastic foray into the global arena translate into better global gover-nance? What are the likely consequences of East Asias increasing globalpresence for regional relations in East Asia?

To address these questions, in this article I examine the growing tensionbetween East Asias pursuit of global roles and its preoccupation withdomestic and regional considerations. In fact, different roles expected at theglobal level may hinder the effective management of regional priorities, orvice versa.2 For instance, Chinas focus on economic growth and regionalstability interferes with its global role in climate change and nuclear negoti-ations with North Korea and Iran. To varying degrees, Japans and SouthKoreas considerations of domestic and regional priorities often shape thecharacter and effectiveness of their involvement in global governance. By

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investigating the domestic debate on global roles in China, Japan, and SouthKorea, this article aims to explain the sources and consequences of EastAsias participation in global governance.3 Specifically, I examine theregional and global dimensions of three global governance issue areas: cli-mate change, peacekeeping, and nuclear nonproliferation.4

Assessing the global role of the three East Asian countries is importantfor several reasons. First, they matter in light of their potential impact onglobal governance (e.g., China as the biggest emitter), their capacity tomeaningfully address various challenges (e.g., Chinas and Japans materialresources), and their unique experiences (e.g., their nuclear expertise andparticipation in the Six-Party Talks aimed at defusing the North Koreannuclear crisis). Second, a comparative analysis of the East Asian countriesmay provide insight into domestic and regional factors shaping state behav-ior in global governance. Despite sharing similar interests in addressingglobal challenges, the three countries are quite different with respect to theirmaterial capability, political system, and ideational orientation. By system-atically investigating a group of countries in the same region, my researchaims to shed light on the regional dimension of global governance, whichcan also be applicable to other regions, and its effects on global governanceand regional politics.

The article is organized in the following manner. I first discuss existingaccounts of East Asias growing role on the global stage. With the objectiveof identifying regional patterns in addressing global governance issues, Ithen examine the nature and form of East Asian participation in global gov-ernance. Specifically, two underlying factors are important: the conflictingidentities of the three countries at the regional and global levels, and thelocalization of global governance issues. In this context, I discuss the threecountries understandings of, and policies toward, climate change, peace-keeping, and nuclear nonproliferation. By doing so, I seek to demonstratethe degree to which the East Asian countries new global roles interact withtheir traditional task of managing various domestic and regional priorities. Iconclude with a discussion on the effects of the three countries involvementin global governance on regional politics in East Asia.

Conceptualizing East Asias Participation in Global GovernanceEast Asias foray into the global stage comes at an opportune time when theG-20 summit, of which all three East Asian countries are members, hasemerged as a premier global forum. East Asias global drive is also part ofbroader efforts by emerging powers around the world to assume a greaterrole in global governance.5 As the world faces a variety of complex globalproblems that elude national solutions, the role of new global actors

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deserves systematic investigation. Yet careful attention is needed to discernthe nature of their participation and underlying motivations. In examiningthe key factors behind global governance and how to improve global gover-nance, however, existing research has tended to overlook how emerging orregional powers understand and approach issues of global governance.6

Instead, some scholars conceptualize the global participation of emerg-ing powers as a challenge to the dominance of current global powers.7 Real-ists, for instance, would view East Asias increasing global role as adeliberate attempt to maximize national power or material gains in theglobal competition for resources and geopolitical influence. In this regard,scholars note that Chinas global role is driven by its mercantilist tendencyto acquire material resources in various parts of the world. Rawi Abdelal andAdam Segal, for instance, suggest that the possibility of oil supply disrup-tions appears to fuel Chinas seemingly illogical drive to acquire stakes inoil production facilities abroad.8

While such material considerations are an undeniable part of global pol-itics, they provide only a partial picture of the East Asian reality concerningglobal governance. First, East Asias participation in global governance isdriven not just by material, hard power considerations, but also by softpower dimensions.9 East Asias global role is thus portrayed as an obliga-tion to do its part and contribute to the global system so as not to beaccused of free riding.10 As I examine below, however, East Asiasapproach is becoming more proactive than reactive. Moreover, the region-wide yearning for global participation has been consistent irrespective of theups and downs of material power considerations in each country.

Alternatively, a functionalist account would describe East Asias role inglobal governance as a problem-solving exercise extended to the globallevel.11 In this view, the East Asian states involvement in global governancewould reflect their desire to learn about global problems that directly affectthem as well. Through active participation in global venues, East Asian lead-ers may gain insight in resolving problems that travel across borders andincur significant costs such as financial crises, pandemics, and piracy.Chinas global participation may also secure a timely access to institutionalfora where global politics are decided that might affect Chinas autonomy.12The same can be said of Japans role in the Group of 8 (G8) meetings andSouth Koreas hosting of the G-20 summit amid the global financial crisisthat began in 2008.

While useful in many respects and particularly pertinent in crisis situa-tions, this functionalist account is oblivious to the mismatch between theregional countries stated goals and their actual behavior. For instance,China regularly publishes white papers on climate change and even formeda leading national governmental group on climate change.13 At the sametime, however, Chinese officials refuse to set total energy consumption tar-

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gets, only occasionally announcing efficiency goals.14 Despite SouthKoreas call for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it was alsoreluctant to join the ninety-four-nation Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)aimed at North Koreas transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)materials.15 Moreover, not much collaboration exists among the threeregional countries when they face similar challenges. For instance, at theSix-Party Talks, they often demonstrate competing views toward NorthKorea, making resolution of the nuclear crisis more difficult. They also lackregional coordination on peacekeeping. While more talk of regional coop-eration is pronounced in climate change, their effects are marginal in EastAsia. Although the three countries pledged to strengthen [their] cooperationto contribute to the successful outcome of [the 2010 Cancn Climate Con-ference], including the establishment of an effective post-2012 internationalcooperation framework on climate change,16 vigorous disagreement amongthe East Asian countries contributed to the failure of the Cancn conference.

Dual Identity and the Localization of Global Governance IssuesWhat the above discussion suggests is that accounts based solely on powerand interests do not sufficiently explain East Asias participation in globalgovernance. Instead of a priori assuming material considerations as the pri-mary source of state preferences, we need to empirically examine the waysin which regional countries interpret global governance issues and adopt aparticular set of strategies to advance their goals, both material and nonma-terial. What drives East Asias activism in global governance is a regionwidedesire to enhance global status.17 All three countries are pursuing a greaterglobal role as a means to recast their national identities and enhance theirglobal status and prestige. Specifically, Chinas notion of fu zeren de daguo(responsible global power), Japans chikyuu minsei taikoku (global civilianpower),18 and South Koreas drive to enhance its gukgyuk (national prestige)are all part of the regionwide soft power enhancing campaign.19

At the same time, however, East Asian countries are geared towarddomestic and regional priorities that undercut their role and effectiveness onthe global stage. Specifically, two underlying mechanisms are at work: (1)the politics of dual identity; and (2) the localization of global governanceissues. Despite their global activism, their conflicting identities tend toundercut their status-enhancing strategies and their potential contribution toglobal governance. In other words, although the new identity as an emergingglobal player calls for global leadership and better compliance with globalrules, their respective alternative identities often lead them to free riding oreven outright rejection of certain global norms and practices. For instance,while China is viewed as an unmistakable global power, it continues to


maintain that it is still a developing country. This dual identity results inconflicting policy behavior; whereas the global power identity pushes Chinafor a greater global contribution, its identity as the leader of the developingworld compromises its effectiveness at global venues.

Despite Japans substantial financial contribution to the UN, its identityas a pacifist nation, with its constitutional ban on the use of its militarybeyond self-defense, means that it can dispatch only limited, noncombattroops for peacekeeping missions. South Koreas desired identity as a globalplayer is also hamstrung by its purported role as a mediator between thedeveloped and developing worlds. Such a dual identity that East Asian coun-tries perceive at different levels leads to role conflict, compromising theireffectiveness in global governance.20 For instance, one central theme inChinas narrative about climate change is that of fairness and justice, a con-cern shared to varying degrees by the other East Asian states.21 Chinese for-eign minister Yang Jiechi thus claims that, while playing a positive andconstructive role in countering global warming, China is also seekingequality for developing countries in international affairs and a fair andrational international order.22

This role conflict caused by the dual identity often results in skewed ordistorted interpretations of global governance, prompting the localizationof global governance: a regionwide pattern in East Asia where global gov-ernance issues are locally interpreted and transformed to better suit domes-tic or regional needs.23 With environmental issues, for instance, the threecountries tend to highlight energy efficiency rather than climate change.Japans New National Energy Strategy offers a window into Japans currentfocus on energy efficiency.24 Recognizing the connection between climatechange and energy efficiency, Chinese local governments also tend to claimcredit for action on both issues even though they only take action related toenergy saving.25

This distorted interpretation of global governance is accompanied by theselective reframing of local policies to overstate their global contribution.For instance, Chinese officials tout Chinas one-child policy as a factorhelping slow the process of global warming, calling for population policyto be part of a comprehensive solution to climate change.26 Another Chi-nese tactic in promoting its global role is the claim that it promotes energyconservation even at the expense of economic growth. Highlighting thatsome local companies with high-energy use and emission were ordered tohalt their operations, Premier Wen Jiabao declared, We are willing toachieve this goal at the cost of reducing GDP [gross domestic product]growth rate.27

Despite such lofty rhetoric, however, Chinese officials seek to make theirparticipation largely voluntary.28 Stressing its identity as a developing nation(fazhan zhong guojia) and low per capita GDP, the Chinese argue that it is

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not realistic for China to assume the excess international responsibilitiesbeyond its capability.29 Although proud of its leadership role in climatechange and the site of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, Japanese policyelites are also critical of its assuming an unnecessary burden on the globalstage, as evident in its refusal to extend the Kyoto Protocol.30 Reflecting itsdual identity, the South Korean narrative of its global role also remainsambivalent. Although the term giyeo (contribution to the international com-munity) has become a common refrain in its diplomacy, the Lee Myung-bakgovernment also pursued a silyong (practical) and jawon (resource) diplo-macy, provoking a criticism that such a dualistic approach undermines SouthKoreas global role.31 In the following subsections, I examine the impact ofdual identity and the localization process as they shape East Asias global rolein climate change, peacekeeping, and nonproliferation.

Climate ChangeChinas activism in climate change has multiple sources, one of which is agrowing sense of its vulnerability to the harmful effects of global warmingsuch as the melting of the Tibetan glaciers that run through the Yangtze andYellow rivers in China.32 In 2002, it ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and a yearlater set up the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change(NCCCC).33 Nonetheless, climate change was hardly a priority in the longlist of Chinas domestic agendas. In fact, the word for climate change (qihoubianhua) did not even appear in its five-year national plans until theeleventh plan (20062010).34

A major shift came in 2008 when the State Environmental ProtectionAdministration (SEPA) became the Ministry of Environmental Protection(MEP) with a more prominent status and wider authorities.35 MEPs role,however, is limited and the implementation of its directives is also depend-ent on local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs). For financial sup-port, the EPBs rely on local officials who tend to view meeting GDPgrowth expectations as their primary objective.36 The focus on economicgrowth is also evident in the fact that Chinas chief negotiator at the UN Cli-mate Change Conference was not an MEP official, but a bureaucrat from theNational Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). For instance, theChinese delegation at the 2011 conference was led by Xie Zhenhua, vicechairman of the NDRC.37 At the conference, China agreed to join a legallybinding treaty limiting emission after 2020. Due to its dual identity, how-ever, it did so only on the condition that China and other emergingeconomies must be treated differently from the so-called rich countries.38

This is not to say that China has neither the will nor the capacity toaddress climate change. Instead of viewing it solely as a burden on eco-nomic growth, China now entertains the idea that clean energy may serveas a new engine of economic growth.39 However, its overall approach to cli-


mate change is localized to focus on energy efficiency, not the reduction oftotal emissions as envisioned by the United States and other countries.40Chinese analysts themselves acknowledge that, as long as climate change isnot internalized as a local issue, it would be difficult to expect any tangi-ble outcomes other than energy efficiency.41

At the same time, China is eager to boast its leadership position inrenewable energy. For instance, China emphasizes that its investment inrenewable energy was ranked first in the Asia Pacific, highlighting its newstatus as the biggest solar photovoltaic equipment producer in the world.42However, Chinas astonishing advances in energy efficiency have not beenmatched by its efforts to reduce carbon emissions. In fact, China has been ona spending spree for coal imports, signing a series of contracts with miningcompanies around the world, including a $60 billion deal with an Australiancompany. David Graham-Caso, spokesman for the Sierra Club, whoseBeyond Coal campaign has helped to prevent the construction of 139 coalplants in the United States, warns that Chinas coal import binge is under-mining everything weve accomplished.43

Japans activism in climate change is also driven by the desire to pro-mote its image as a global player. At a UN plenary session on climatechange, for instance, Japanese ambassador Tsuruoka Koji praised Japan asa responsible member of the international community and the host countryof the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol.44 Similar to the Chinesecase, Japan localized the environmental issue to highlight its leading role inenergy efficiency. Japans government documents on climate change oftenrefer to the fact that its level of energy efficiency is three times the globalaverage.45

Echoing Chinas narrative about economic growth, the Japanese alsorealized that eco-business, or green business, might well hold a key toJapans continued prosperity.46 Specifically, the Japanese governmentfocuses on high-efficiency coal thermal power, CO2 recapture/CO2 seques-tration, and fast reactors.47 In a similar vein, Kaieda Banri, Japans ministerof economy, trade, and industry, calls energy cooperation with five countriesaround the Mekong River a growth center for the world and Asia withwhich Tokyo hopes to advance industrial cooperation.48

Despite Japans rhetoric about its active role in climate change, Japanslack of leadership and visibility was criticized during the 2009 Copenhagenconference, which failed to reach a consensus on climate change.49 In thefollowing year in Cancn, Japan insisted that it would renew the Kyoto Pro-tocol only after China and other major developing economies make legallybinding reduction commitments.50 By rejecting the second round of theKyoto Protocol under any circumstance, thereby hardening the positionsof developing countries, Japan was again seen as a major villain thatblocked progress.51

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Similar to the Chinese and Japanese cases, South Koreas national strat-egy also addresses both climate change and energy security in a holisticmanner.52 Mirroring Japans approach, the South Korean government hasbeen approaching the climate industry as [a] new growth engine and seek-ing to take the lead in climate change in the context of a Global Korea ini-tiative.53 It is in this context that the South Korean government announcedits plan to invest $35.4 billion in the renewable energy sector over the nextfive years.54 Under the new motto of Green Growth, the South Koreangovernment has launched the Presidential Commission on Green Growthand the National Science and Technology Council to coordinate and over-see the development and research for green technologies among the aca-demic, industry, and research sectors.55 The desire to become a global playerin climate change has led to some initial successes. For instance, aspiring tobecome a green growth leader, the South Korean government pledged toincrease the amount of official development assistance, while raising theproportion of Green ODA to 20% by 2013 and 30% by 2020, compared to11% in 2007.56

At the same time, South Koreans tend to view the UN Climate ChangeConference as problematic because it has become too politicized to tacklethese issues, with developed countries pitted against developing ones.57 Sim-ilar to its neighboring countries, the South Korean government calls for abalance between environmental and economic aspects of climate changewhile respecting different economic and social conditions of each coun-try.58 Central to South Koreas ambiguous position is its perceived identityas a nation straddling both the developed and developing worlds. As a result,the South Korean position on climate change remains ambivalent, often pur-porting to play a vague role as a nation bridging between developed anddeveloping countries by forming a strong partnership between the two.59

PeacekeepingGiven that peacekeeping missions are sanctioned multilaterally at the UN,they have a veneer of legitimacy and help participants to bolster theiridentity as legitimate great powers.60 Chinese leaders thus perceiveChinas participation in UN peacekeeping as a means for signaling itschanging normative stance on use of force issues.61 Traditionally, Chinasview of peacekeeping operations was negative due to its long-standingpolicy of not interfering in other countries internal affairs. Chinas initialparticipation in UN peacekeeping came in January 2000 when it sent itsfirst contingent of troops to East Timor.62 Chinese policymakers came torealize that active participation in UN peacekeeping is a visible and effec-tive way to meet its obligations to the UN and further its multilateralagenda on the regional and global scenes.63 Chinas activism in peace-keeping is also driven by its regional priority, the concerted effort to pro-


ject a more benign and harmonious image beyond its borders, to reassureneighbors about its peaceful intentions, and to softly balance US and West-ern influence while gradually but more firmly establishing Chinas accept-ance as a great power.64

There is, however, a gulf between Chinas rhetoric about its contributionto UN peacekeeping and its actual performance. This is because Chinas rolein peacekeeping is also shaped by its domestic and regional considerations.In fact, China has blocked peacekeeping missions when they conflicted withits domestic priorities. For instance, two of Chinas six vetoes in the Secu-rity Council concerned peacekeeping missions in Guatemala and Macedo-nia, which maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan.65 Facing variousrequests for sending more forces, Chinese policymakers also resort to itsdual identity, stressing that it is a regional (not global) power, and that it isstill a developing country.66 While its contribution to the UN peacekeep-ing budget grew from 0.9 percent in the 1990s to above 3.0 percent by 2008,the amount is dwarfed by the US contribution that was about 26 percent for20082009.67

Overall, despite its rhetoric, China reinterpreted and localized the issueof climate change as it deliberately formulated its policy on [UN peace-keeping operations] in strategic terms to serve its strategic interests in thecontext of Chinas peaceful rise.68 Furthermore, due to its expanding globaleconomic interests, especially in securing oil and other raw materials, Chinaput a particular emphasis on its missions in Africa, most prominently inSudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. Not surprisingly, Sudan is thedestination for the largest number of Chinese peacekeepers, about 800 mili-tary and police personnel.69 This, however, contrasts sharply with its reluc-tance to engage in its vicinity, evidenced in Chinas veto of a 2007 SecurityCouncil draft resolution on Myanmar, a long-time regional pariah state untilrecently but Chinas regional ally, on the grounds that no regional institu-tions called for such a mission and that Myanmar was not considered athreat to international peace and security.70

Chinese leaders also came to view that Chinas peacekeeping experi-ence can contribute to various domestic priorities in China. Citing the 2008Chinese Defense White Paper, for instance, an International Crisis Groupreport notes that peacekeeping deployments have provided practical expe-rience for Chinese security forces and have helped improve their respon-siveness, riot-control capabilities, coordination of military emergencycommand systems and ability to conduct military operations other than warat home.71 In 2011 China dispatched four military transport aircraft and aguided missile frigate ship to Libya, which was reportedly in response to thedomestic criticism that the Chinese Peoples Liberation Armys initial han-dling of Chinese nationals trapped in Libya was not speedy and effective.But in the Chinese official statement, the dispatch was depicted as the

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biggest operation in Chinas history and as a clear indication that China isemerging as a responsible great power.72

In Japan, an earlier motivation for a greater role in peacekeeping wasto free itself from the accusation of its checkbook diplomacy during theGulf War of 1991 when it was under fire because it made only a financialcontribution of $13 billion, but not its own military forces. To avoid a repeatof the diplomatic embarrassment caused in part by its identity as a pacifistnation, the Japanese government adopted in 1992 the International PeaceCooperation Law which enabled Japan to dispatch its Self Defense Forces(SDF) to other countries.73 Beginning with the UN mission in Cambodia inSeptember 1992, the SDF has participated in several UN peacekeeping andother humanitarian assistance missions in Mozambique, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Iraq. As of February 2013, approximately 400 per-sonnel of the SDF are deployed to six peacekeeping missions.74

Reflecting its dual identity of a global, yet pacifist nation, however,Japans participation in peacekeeping missions remains marginal, and thenature of its contribution has often been reinterpreted in consideration ofvarious domestic or regional priorities. For instance, Japans 2010 DefenseWhite Paper called for the improvement and enhancement of equipment forinternational peace cooperation activities not only because it wouldimprove Japans performance in such activities, but also because it would beuseful for responding to domestic contingencies.75 Japan also announcedin May 2011 the SDFs first full-fledged overseas base in Djibouti.76However, according to a Foreign Ministry official, the decision was made inpart to appeal to African nations and thus to help win broad support forJapans bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.77Japan also switched its role in the war in Afghanistan to financial assistancesolely for medical purposes, mainly in response to opposition from theSocial Democratic Party.78

South Koreas first participation in peacekeeping mission came in 1993when it dispatched an engineering battalion to Somalia. Since then, SouthKorea has been an active participant in the UN peacekeeping missions. Asof March 2013, 446 South Korean soldiers were participating in variousmissions, with recent deployments that include Afghanistan, Haiti, theUnited Arab Emirates (UAE), and the Gulf of Aden for antipiracy opera-tions.79 The motto of enhancing national status through global contributionis also prominent in the South Korean discussion of peacekeeping. Situatedin a region surrounded by powerful states, South Korea has been particularlysensitive to its global and regional status. A country colonized by its neigh-bor for most of the first half of the twentieth century, South Korea also fellvictim to great power politics in the second half. With its global role andprosperous economy, South Korea is seeking a new national identity in thechanging regional and global contexts. In this vein, a central narrative with


regard to South Koreas global contributions in general and peacekeeping inparticular is the image of South Korea as an aiding country, no longer anaided country.80

This unique identity shift notwithstanding, South Koreas peacekeepingmissions are also shaped by its domestic and regional considerations. Alongthe lines of Chinas emphasis on Africa and Japans focus on its contributionto stability in the Middle East, South Koreas troop dispatch abroad is basedprimarily on considerations of its growing economic interests in variousparts of the world. A case in point is its decision in November 2010 to send130 Special Forces to the UAE. South Koreas Ministry of National Defenseannounced that the primary objective of the troop dispatch was to help theUAE train its Special Forces and to conduct joint exercises. Interestingly, theannouncement came after its successful billion-dollar bid for constructingnuclear power plants in the UAE. In a significant departure from its previ-ous focus on peacekeeping missions and US-requested coalitional support,the dispatch of Special Forces is now cast as a novel way to fulfill SouthKoreas expanding national interests.81

Nuclear NonproliferationAs the first nuclear power in Asia, China had traditionally been focused onmaintaining its nuclear deterrence capability, with little enthusiasm in sup-porting the nonproliferation regime. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, how-ever, Chinas stance on nuclear nonproliferation shifted, with a growingrealization that nonproliferation principles were genuinely global norms.82Overall, however, Chinas stance on nuclear proliferation has been largelydeclaratory, devoid of substantial behavioral changes or positive outcomes.This reflects its dual identity as an emerging global player and a regionalpower fixated on its domestic and regional priorities. Along with its long-standing policy of the no first use of nuclear weapons, China claims that to[safeguard] the international non-proliferation regime and maintainingworld and regional peace and security, China has been committed to pro-moting diplomatic solutions of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and theIranian nuclear issue.83 Yet whenever the international community dis-cusses sanctions on Iran and North Korea, China is reluctant to go alongwith the sanction drive. Chinese foreign minister Yangs comment in Febru-ary 2010 is emblematic of this tendency: To talk about sanctions at themoment will complicate the situation and might stand in the way of findinga diplomatic solution.84

Several motivations are behind Chinas position on nonproliferation.First, consideration of regional security appears to be a decisive factor inChinas thinking. In fact, China was widely viewed as a source of a blue-print for a nuclear weapon in Pakistan in the 1970s.85 Chinas technologi-cal support for Pakistan and their military cooperation continued in the

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1990s, as China attached strategic importance to Pakistan.86 More broadly,Chinas position on nonproliferation reveals a larger dilemma for East Asianstates: while China seeks to show its positive role as a responsible globalplayer by cooperating on the nuclear front, it also is yearning for greaterinfluence and leverage in East Asia. Not surprisingly, China has carefullyweighed the associated costs and benefits of norm adherence against itsstrategic position and international image.87

Various domestic priorities are another key factor. In this regard,Thomas Christensen argues that the impact of domestic politicsconcernsabout internal stability and the increasing role of domestic interest groupssuch as oil and other businesses and the militaryhas curtailed Chinas abil-ity to tackle various global problems. Specifically, state-owned oil compa-nies and other financial institutions in the case of Iran and the military in thecase of North Korea may challenge any Chinese policies that go againsttheir interests.88 More generally, while US officials acknowledge Chinasefforts to set up the bureaucratic structures and laws to control the exportof sensitive technologies, they complain that Chinas track record in actu-ally cracking down on those who violate the laws is far too limited.89 Anexample of Chinas lax approach to nonproliferation is the alleged sale ofhigh-quality carbon fiber used for centrifuges to Iran.90

In comparison to Chinas ambivalence, Japan has been a relatively con-sistent supporter of the nonproliferation regime. With the legacy of beingthe only country ever to have experienced nuclear devastation, Japanfirmly maintains the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessingnuclear weapons, not producing nuclear weapons and not permitting theirintroduction into Japan.91 Japans stance on nonproliferation solidified inthe 1990s as it boosted its public diplomacy in support of global nonprolif-eration. For instance, every year since 1994, the Japanese government hasproposed at the UN General Assembly a resolution calling for the totalelimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, since 2002, the Ministry of For-eign Affairs has published a biannual white paper, in both Japanese andEnglish outlining Japans policy position on arms control and nonprolifera-tion.92 Japan has also made a series of efforts to promote regional cooper-ation on nonproliferation, including the hosting of the Asian Senior-LevelTalks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo since 2003 and the conveningof eighteen Asia Export Control Seminars since 1993.93

Such admirable efforts aimed at enhancing its global status, however,have been undercut by Japans performance in the Six-Party Talks. Its offi-cial position has been calling for North Korea to take concrete actions toabandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in compliancewith the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and relevant SecurityCouncil resolutions.94 However, Japanese delegations at the Six-Party Talkshave often used the multilateral venue for nonproliferation as a site to


address domestic concerns about the abduction of Japanese nationals byNorth Korean agents in the 1970s, prompting negative reactions from NorthKorea and making resolution of the nuclear crisis all the more difficult. Thefact that Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo created an office in charge ofthe abduction issue (and later a cabinet minister in charge of it), but did notset up a similar office dealing with North Koreas nuclear situation, illus-trates the limits of Japans contributions due to domestic considerations.95

Similarly, South Koreas performance in nuclear nonproliferation hasbeen far from stellar. In the wake of the Nixon Doctrine set forth by Presi-dent Richard M. Nixon, which led to the withdrawal of substantial US forcesfrom South Korea and East Asia, the Park Chung Hee government secretlypursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. Amid the US pressure, thenuclear pursuit eventually ended after President Park was assassinated in1979. Since then, its track record in nuclear nonproliferation has improved.In 1991, the South Korean government went even further to declare that itwould not manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons andthat it would not acquire enrichment or reprocessing facilities.96 SouthKorea also issued and has maintained the declaration on denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula.97 At the global level where potential status gain isgreater, South Koreas position has also shifted in the positive direction.While South Korea joined other East Asian countries in stressing the impor-tance of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in effectively [enhancing]global nuclear security, it also used the venue as a means to showcaseSouth Koreas growing global status and influence.98 As a result, the SouthKorean government made substantial efforts toward the hosting of the sub-sequent nuclear summit in 2012.

However, South Koreas efforts for nonproliferation are also hamperedby its role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. Similar to the Chinese andJapanese cases, domestic considerations figure prominently in South Koreasrole in the Six-Party Talks. What is striking in South Koreas domesticdebate on North Korea are the competing narratives between conservatives,including the ruling Saenuri (New Frontier) Party, that portray the NorthKorean question as a nuclear issue and progressives that seek to addressboth the nuclear and inter-Korean dimensions simultaneously in a mutuallyreinforcing manner.99 Coupled with Chinas strategic considerations regard-ing North Korea and Japans preoccupation with the abduction issue, SouthKoreas domestic politics surrounding North Korea dims the prospect of for-mulating an effective regional approach to the nuclear crisis.

ConclusionWhat emerges from this analysis is a mixed picture: despite the three EastAsian states energetic foray into the global arena, their global contribution

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is tempered by the politics of dual identity and issue localization. The EastAsian cases suggest that other emerging powers global role may also belimited depending on their domestic considerations. For instance, Indias sta-tus as a nonsignatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty curtails its rolein nonproliferation while, despite its pursuit of global status, Brazils limitedrole in peacekeeping stems largely from domestic conditions under whichthe primary focus of its military remains internal security.100

The nature of the three East Asian countries participation in global gov-ernance is shaped to an important degree by their conflicting identities at theglobal and regional levels, and their understandings of the link betweenglobal governance issues and domestic and regional priorities. In a sense,beyond their shared desire of enhancing their global status, the East Asiancountries are interested primarily in localizing the issues of global gover-nance to deal better with various domestic and regional priorities. As aresult, despite their increasing visibility on the global stage, the East Asiancountries contribution to global governance has been limited.

This pattern of East Asias participation in global governance, in turn,has several global and regional consequences. Overall, there has been a lackof regional coordination on a wide variety of global governance problemsthat would otherwise help these countries contribute substantially to bothglobal governance and cooperative regional relations. The lack of regionalcoordination not only has squandered the opportunity to enhance their col-lective influence on the global stage, but also has prevented effective man-agement of global and regional problems. While China has long maintainedthat the role of regional institutions is critical in UN peacekeeping missions,it is not pressing for active participation of East Asian institutions in conflictresolution.

This is not to suggest that regional cooperation is impossible in EastAsia. China, for instance, called for East Asian cooperation on climatechange at the fifth East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2010, proposing the estab-lishment of an East Asia research and cooperation center for climatechange.101 Regular environmental cooperation among the three countriesis also taking place in the form of the Tripartite Environment MinistersMeeting (TEMM).102 Despite these positive developments and the rhetoricof greater cooperation, East Asias role in global governance has remainedlargely uncoordinated and often has led to regional competition and mutualsuspicion. More alarmingly, zero-sum competition and relative gains con-siderations have seemed to dominate the regional discussion on energy secu-rity, especially between Chinese and Japanese leaders.103 The result has beenthe emergence of an acute security dilemma in which China believes it isacting defensively by ensuring the global access to energy supplies that willbe needed to safeguard Chinese development goals, while Japan tends tointerpret these steps as aggressive and a threat to its own energy security.104


In the midst of this increasing regional competition over energy, the KanNaoto administration considered a substantial cut in Japans financial aid toChina.105 At the same time, the Japanese government strengthened its coop-eration with Pacific nations on climate change, pledging 50 billion yen tothis effort. The Japanese effort to boost ties with the sixteen-member PacificIsland Forum is viewed in Japan as a means to counter Chinas growinginfluence.106 The South Korean government also has pushed for coopera-tion with Vietnam over several environmental issues, including the safetymanagement of drinking water and environmental policy and technologycooperation for green growth. Echoing Japans involvement in the South-east Asian infrastructure market, the South Korean government has framedthe projects in Vietnam as opportunities for Koreas environmental busi-nesses to enter the Vietnamese market.107 In this competitive action-reac-tion dynamic among the regional countries, the prospect of East Asiascooperation on various global challenges appears to be remote.

To conclude, my findings suggest that we need to pay greater attentionto the interconnection between global governance and regional politics.Particularly important are the ways in which regional countries understandand exert their roles in global governance. In this vein, it is important tochannel the East Asian countries desire for a global role in ways that maketangible benefits to global governance while being mindful of their consid-eration of various domestic and regional priorities. For instance, given thatenergy efficiency and renewable energy are a key domestic focus for allthree countries, their efforts in this field should be further encouraged bothas a means to reduce carbon emission and as a way to improve their globalstatus.108 Similarly, giving due credit to East Asias leadership in renewableenergy and green technology and granting them more opportunities to hostor lead global initiatives would further satisfy their yearning for greaterglobal status, along the way contributing to global efforts to curb climatechange. By the same token, failing to take into account the conflicting iden-tities of China, Japan, and South Korea and their preoccupation withdomestic and regional priorities not only would reduce the chance to betteraddress various global challenges, but also would undermine regional coop-eration in East Asia in the years ahead.

NotesIl Hyun Cho is assistant professor in the Government and Law Department and theAsian Studies Program at Lafayette College. His research focuses on the nexusbetween international relations theory and contemporary East Asia, with a particularemphasis on nuclear proliferation, global governance, and regionalism. His publica-tions have appeared or are forthcoming in Review of International Studies, ForeignPolicy Analysis, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Chinese Journal of International Poli-tics, and Korean Journal of Defense Analyses. An earlier version of this article was

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presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal,Canada, March 2011. The author is grateful to Stefan Schirm, Seo-Hyun Park, par-ticipants in the ISA panel, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Healso thanks Melanie Furey for her research assistance.

1. The Group of 2 idea was put forth by Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Insti-tute for International Economics. It later gained wider salience when PresidentBarack Obama called for global cooperation between the two powers. See alsoWilliam Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kenneth Lieberthal, The China-USRelationship Goes Global, Current History 108, no. 719 (September 2009): 243249. For criticisms of the G2 idea, see Elizabeth C. Economy and Adam Segal, TheG-2 Mirage: Why the United States and China Are Not Ready to Upgrade Ties, For-eign Affairs 88, no. 3 (MayJune 2009): 1423.

2. Michael Barnett, Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the ArabStates System, International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 271296.

3. In comparing the nature of domestic debate in the three countries, one has tobear in mind an important political difference between authoritarian China and thetwo Asian democracies, which may influence the degree to which the global role iscontested domestically. That said, in all three countries there exist multiple views ofwhat constitutes an appropriate global role.

4. All three countries under study have shown particular activism in the threeissue areas, but with different emphases and approaches, which is ideal for system-atic comparison.

5. Stefan A. Schirm, Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers inGlobal Governance, European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010):197221.

6. Stefan Schirms study of emerging powers role in global governance is a rareexception. See Schirm, Leaders in Need of Followers. For prominent works on thesources and nature of global governance see, among others, Craig Murphy, GlobalGovernance: Poorly Done, Poorly Understood, International Affairs 76, no. 4(October 2000): 789803; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds., Power inGlobal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Narcis Serraand Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards aNew Global Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

7. One recent example of this in the economic realm is Stefan Halper, The Bei-jing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-firstCentury (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

8. Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, Has Globalization Passed Its Peak? ForeignAffairs 86, no. 1 (JanuaryFebruary 2007): 111.

9. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power(New York: Basic Books, 1990); Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York:PublicAffairs, 2011).

10. Jusuf Wanandi, East Asian Regionalism and Global Governance, in JusufWanandi and Tadashi Yamamoto, eds., East Asia at a Crossroads (Tokyo: Japan Cen-ter for International Exchange, 2008), p. 29.

11. An example of this reasoning is Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohanesstudy of the changing role of NATO from a narrowly focused military alliance intoa much broadened security institution. See Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane,Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane,and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time andSpace (London: Oxford University Press, 1999).


12. Jeffrey W. Legro, What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a RisingPower, Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 525.

13. China Active in Fight Against Global Warming, Peoples Daily, 17 Decem-ber 2009.

14. Keith Bradsher, China Reportedly Plans Strict Goals to Save Energy, NewYork Times, 4 March 2011.

15. South Koreas Roh Moo-hyun government refused to join the PSI largelybecause of concerns that South Koreas participation might jeopardize inter-Koreanrelations. After the second North Korean nuclear test, the conservative Lee Myung-bak government finally joined the PSI in May 2009. PSI gaip ppali gyeolon naer-ilgut [The Decision to Join the PSI Is Likely], Joongang Ilbo, 26 May 2009.

16. Trilateral Cooperation Vision 2020 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 30May 2010), www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit1005/vision2020.html.

17. For recent applications of Chinas and Japans status considerations in theirforeign policy approaches, see Shogo Suzuki, Seeking Legitimate Great PowerStatus in PostCold War International Society: Chinas and Japans Participation inUNPKO, International Relations 22, no. 1 (2008): 4563. Deborah Welch Larsonand Alexei Shevchenko, Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Pri-macy, International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 6395; Yong Deng, ChinasStruggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (London: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2008).

18. For the identity of a responsible great power, see Alastair Iain Johnston,Social States: China in International Institutions, 19802000 (Princeton: Prince-ton University Press, 2008), p. 148. For the concept of a global civilian power,see Christopher W. Hughes, Japans Economic Power and Security: Japan andNorth Korea (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 30; Akiko Fukushima, Japanese For-eign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: Macmillan, 1999),p. 178.

19. This is not to say that East Asian states are not concerned about material fac-tors. For instance, Chinas participation in UN peacekeeping not only is to bolsterits global status, but also to enhance the role of the Security Council in which it is aveto-wielding permanent member. Its peacekeeping activities are more prominent inresource-rich African states from which it imports oil and other resources. As for cli-mate change, all three East Asian states stress the importance of energy efficiency inorder to boost their ecofriendly image and promote economic growth.

20. Barnett, Institutions, Roles, and Disorder.21. Paul G. Harris, Global Warming in Asia-Pacific: Environmental Change vs.

International Justice, Asia-Pacific Review 9, no. 2 (2002): 145.22. China Ready to Assume World Obligations, Peoples Daily, 13 December

2010.23. Amitav Acharyas study shows how the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) states selectively localized several Western security norms inways that suit state- and regional-level realities. See Amitav Acharya, How IdeasSpread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in AsianRegionalism, International Organization 58 (Spring 2004): 239275.

24. Peter C. Evans, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series:Japan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, December 2006), p. 19.

25. Ye Qi, Li Ma, Huanbo Zhang, and Huimin Li, Translating a Global Issueinto Local Priority: Chinas Local Government Response to Climate Change, Jour-nal of Environment and Development 17, no. 4 (December 2008): 393.

26. Chinas Population Policy Helps Slow Global Warming, Says Official,Peoples Daily, 10 December 2009.

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27. China Sacrifices Economic Growth to Reduce Emissions, Peoples Daily,29 November 2010.

28. Anthony Faiola, Juliet Eilperin, and John Pomfret, Copenhagen ClimateDeal Shows New World Order May Be Led by US, China, Washington Post, 20December 2009.

29. Chinas Rise Needs Magnanimity, Sober Reflection, Peoples Daily, 15February 2011.

30. My analysis in this article is based primarily on the views of policy elites, notthe general public. However, echoing the government position, the Japanese publicperception of Japans global role also seems skeptical. In a poll, only 39 percent sur-veyed endorsed Japans global role while 55 percent did not view that Japan shouldbe a global power. Poll: 95% Fear for Japans Future, Asahi Shimbun, 12 June2010.

31. Insun Kang, Yije Silyong woigyo ganpanul bakwoyahanda [Its Time toReplace the Motto, Practical Diplomacy], Chosun Ilbo, 24 December 2009.

32. China Wont Compromise on Issues of Principle, Says Chief Negotiator,Peoples Daily, 5 December 2010.

33. Stephen Tsang and Ans Kolk, The Evolution of Chinese Policies and Gov-ernance Structures on Environment, Energy and Climate, Environmental Policy andGovernance 20, no. 3 (2010): 190.

34. Ibid., p. 191.35. Ibid., p. 187.36. Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, China, the United States, and Global

Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 195.37. John M. Broder, At Climate Talks, a Familiar Standoff Emerges Between

the US and China, New York Times, 7 December 2011.38. Ibid. 39. A Long Game: China Sees Opportunities as Well as Dangers in Climate

Change, The Economist, 3 December 2009.40. Edward Wong and Keith Bradsher, China Joins US in Pledge of Hard Tar-

gets on Emissions, New York Times, 27 November 2009.41. Qi et al., Translating a Global Issue into Local Priority, p. 398.42. China Active in Fight Against Global Warming, Peoples Daily, 17 Decem-

ber 2009.43. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Nations that Debate Coal Use Export It to Feed Chinas

Need, New York Times, 21 November 2010.44. Carin Holroyd, National Mobilization and Global Engagement: Under-

standing Japans Response to Global Climate Change Initiatives, Asian Perspective33, no. 2 (2009): 74.

45. Japans Initiative on Climate Change, version 3, (Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan, May 2009), www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/initiative0905.pdf.

46. Holroyd, National Mobilization and Global Engagement, pp. 8081.47. Japans Initiative on Climate Change.48. Japan, SE Asia to Ally in Energy, Japan Times, 16 August 2011.49. Eric Johnston, Japan Under Fire for Laying Low in Copenhagen, Japan

Times, 12 December 2009.50. Eric Johnston, Japan Says China Cuts Must Be Binding, Japan Times, 9

December 2009.51. Daisuke Yamamoto, ANALYSIS: Japan Cast as Villain at UN Climate

Talks, Japan Times, 14 December 2010.


52. Song Min-soon, Statement at the Major Economies Meeting on EnergySecurity and Climate Change, Washington, DC, 27 September 2007 (Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea), www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/template/read/engboardread.jsp?typeID=12&boardid=304&seqno=303768&c=TITLE&t=&pagenum=1&tableName=TYPE_ENGLISH&pc=&dc=&wc=&lu=&vu=&iu=&du=.

53. Kyoung-Sik Choi, Climate Change Measures and Kyoto Mechanism, Min-istry of Environment, 19 October 2009, http://eng.me.go.kr/board.do?method=view&bbsCode=res_mat_policy&docSeq=191.

54. Mridul Chadha, South Korea to Invest $35 Billion in Renewable Energy by2015 to Reduce Dependence on Fossil Fuels, Ecopolitology, 13 October 2010,http://ecopolitology.org/2010/10/13/south-korea-to-invest-35-billion-in-renewable-energy-by-2015-to-reduce-dependence-on-fossil-fuels/.

55. Road to Our Future: Green Growth, National Strategy and the Five-YearPlan (20092013) (Presidential Commission on Green Growth, Republic of Korea,2009), www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/common/download.jsp?boardid=11049&tablename=TYPE_ENGLISH&seqno=034023024004fdf01601504d&fileseq=069fef03400bfd6024feeff4.

56. Ibid.57. Conference Report: G-20 and Global Governance Reform (Seoul: ASAN

Institute for Policy Studies, October 2010), p. 14.58. Song, Statement at the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and

Climate Change.59. Song Min-soon, A Critical Turning Point of International Efforts Against

Climate Change, Korea Herald, 21 September 2007. 60. Suzuki, Seeking Legitimate Great Power Status, p. 55.61. Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order, p. 59.62. Huang Shan, A Decade of Chinas Peacekeeping Missions, 18 January

2010, www.china.org.cn.63. Chinas Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, Asia Report No. 166 (New

York: International Crisis Group, 17 April 2009), pp. 1, 1113.64. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, Chinas Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its

Significance and the Policy Implications, SIPRI Policy Brief (Stockholm: Stock-holm International Peace Research Institute, February 2009).

65. Ibid., pp. 5859.66. Chinas Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, pp. 78.67. Ibid., pp. 78.68. Yin He, Chinas Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations, Asia

Paper (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2007), pp.4849.

69. Andrew Higgins, China Showcasing Its Softer Side: Growing Role in UNPeacekeeping Signals Desire to Project Image of Benign Power, Washington Post,2 December 2009, p. 6.

70. Chinas Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, p. 25.71. Ibid., pp. 1113.72. Setting Sail for Libya, The Economist, 1 March 2011.73. Defense White Paper (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2010), p. 323.74. Japans Contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, February 2013), www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pdfs/contribution.pdf.

75. Defense White Paper, pp. 323324.

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76. SDF Readies Overseas Base in Djibouti: 1st Outpost Abroad to Help FightPiracy, Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 May 2011.

77. Hajime Furukawa, Djibouti Base in National Interests, Yomiuri Shimbun,29 May 2011.

78. Govt to Give Medically Targeted Financial Aid to Afghan Forces, YomiuriShimbun, 18 December 2009.

79. Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Monthly Sum-mary of Contributions, 31 March 2013, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/mar13_1.pdf.

80. International Peacekeeping Operations (Ministry of National Defense,Republic of Korea, January 2011), www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd_eng/subview.jsp?id=mnd_eng_020300000000.

81. Kwon Hyukchul and Sung Yeonchu, Wonjeon school daekaro UAE-e teuk-jeonsa pabyung [Deployment of Special Forces to the UAE in Return for OilExport], Hangyorye, 3 November 2010.

82. John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), p. 235.

83. Statement by H.E. Ambassador LI Baodong Head of the Chinese Delegationat the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, New York, 4 May 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of thePeoples Republic of China, www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjfywj/t689876.htm.

84. Glenn Kessler, China Could Block Sanctions Against Iran, WashingtonPost, 5 February 2010.

85. John Pomfret, US Says Chinese Businesses and Banks Are Bypassing UNSanctions Against Iran, Washington Post, 18 October 2010.

86. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? ReconsideringSoft Balancing and US Policy Toward China, Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 390.

87. Foot and Walter, China, the United States, and Global Order, p. 134.88. Thomas J. Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China, Foreign

Affairs 90, no. 2 (MarchApril 2011): 6162.89. Pomfret, US Says Chinese Businesses and Banks Are Bypassing UN Sanc-

tions Against Iran.90. Ibid.91. Japans Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Tokyo:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Autumn 2004).92. Llewelyn P. Hughes, Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International

and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan, International Security 31,no. 4 (Spring 2007): 74.

93. Japans Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy, 4th ed., Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan, 2008, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/pamph0812.html.

94. Statement by H. E. Tetsuro Fukuyama, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs ofJapan, 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-tion of Nuclear Weapons, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New York, 4 May 2010,www.mofa.go.jp/announce/svm/state100504.html.

95. Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, Not Going Nuclear: JapansResponse to North Koreas Nuclear Test, Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online, 19July 2007, www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/CoverStory. The abduction scandalbecame a major political scandal in Japan after Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirosvisit to Pyongyang in 2002. During the visit, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il for thefirst time acknowledged North Koreas involvement in the abductions in the late


1970s, confirming the earlier suspicion and providing ammunition for hardline con-servative politicians within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

96. T. V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000), pp. 122123.

97. Ibid., p. 123.98. Chairmans Statement of the East Asia Summit, Hanoi, Vietnam, 30 Octo-

ber 2010, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/pdfs/state101030.pdf. 99. Jongsuk Lee, Nambuk gwangye-eseo jinbowa bosuui sigak [The Perspec-

tives of Conservatives and Moderates on Inter-Korean Relations], Hangyorye, 28February 2010.100. Arturo C. Sotomayor Velazquez, Why Some States Participate in UN Peace

Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and ItsEffects on Latin Americas Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations, SecurityStudies 19, no. 1 (2010): 168.101. Chinese Premier Calls for Deepening East Asian Cooperation, Peoples

Daily, 30 October 2010.102. Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Korea-China-Japan), Min-

istry of Environment, Republic of Korea, http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=pol_int_coo_northeast.103. Elizabeth Wishnick, Competition and Cooperative Practices in Sino-Japan-

ese Energy and Environmental Relations: Towards an Energy Security Risk Com-munity? Pacific Review 22, no. 4 (September 2009): 403.104. Ibid., p. 409.105. Kan Eyes Drastic Cut to China Aid as Growth Soars, Japan Times, 3 March

2011.106. The forum, established in 1971 to share views concerning regional economic

growth, governance, and security, currently has seventeen members. Japan Looks toBuild Up Ties with Pacific Island Nations, Japan Times, 17 October 2010.107. Environmental Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Ministry of Environment,

Republic of Korea, http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=pol_int_coo_southeast.108. Joanna I. Lewis, Climate Change and Security: Examining Chinas Chal-

lenge in a Warming World, International Affairs 85, no. 6 (2009): 1208.

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