PROGRAM  ON  STRATEGIC  STABILITY  EVALUATION  (POSSE)  www.posse.gatech.edu  

China-Pakistan Nuclear Relation after the Cold War

and Its International Implications

Zhang Jiegen

Institute of International Studies

Fudan University

Though China-Pakistan relations have been viewed by both countries as ‘all weather, time-tested’

strategic cooperative partnership all along, there are comparative few studies relating to this

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bilateral relations in the research field of Chinese foreign affairs in China. Considering the

extraordinary importance of Pakistan in the integral structure of China’s foreign relations, this

kind of phenomenon in the academy of China is quite abnormal. The year 2011 marked the

sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relations between China and Pakistan.

There are a series of papers relating to China-Pakistan relations published to celebrate this

occasion. However, these papers are mainly macro-level studies and focus on the strategic aspects

of the bilateral relations, but lacking in in-depth studies for detailed aspects and specific issues in

China-Pakistan relations.1

In retrospect of China-Pakistan relations in the past sixty years, it’s not difficult to conclude that

the security relation is the most important aspect in the bilateral relations, which can be viewed as

the key pillar of the whole China-Pakistan relations. Generally speaking, China-Pakistan nuclear

cooperation is an unavoidable subject when it comes to talk about the security relation between

them. Nevertheless, due to the sensibility of this topic in China, very few scholars have been doing

some research relating to China-Pakistan nuclear relation by far. Consequently, there is a serious

lack of special research on this important issue from Chinese perspective. Unfortunately for China,

with the consistent development of Chin-Pakistan nuclear relation, overseas media often

exaggerates the facts and suspects the real intention of China following each step of

China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. At the same time, quite a few scholars from India and

Western countries have published many papers and articles in the academic journals or

newspapers. However, being subject to the discriminatory standpoints, the media and academy

from India and the Western countries often misunderstand the China-Pakistan nuclear relation.

Moreover, some scholars even criticize the ordinary nuclear cooperation between China and

Pakistan intentionally. This paper aims at arguing against these misperceptions. To do so, it starts

with the retrospect of the history of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation and then tries to study the

main factors influencing China-Pakistan nuclear relations objectively. After that, the paper then

1 See for example: DU Youkang, ‘Sino-Pakistan Strategic Cooperative Partnership: Mutual Perceptions, Characteristics and Prospects’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, No. 2, 2011; SHEN Dingli, ‘Developing Sino-Pakistan Strategic Relationship in the New Century’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, No. 2, 2011; SUN Hongqi, ‘The 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between China and Pakistan and Its Basic Experience’, Journal of Xuzhou Normal University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition), May 2011; ZHANG Guihong, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Position and the Future of Sino-Pakistan Relations’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, No. 2, 2011; ZHOU Yushu, ‘A New Analysis of the Relationship between China and Pakistan’, Journal of Inner Mongolia Normal University (Philosophy & Social Science), No. 2, 2011; ZHEN Ruixiang, ‘On the Course and Prospect of Sino-Pak Relations’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, No. 4, 2011.

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probes into the future of China-Pakistan relations and puts forward the author’s thinking about its

international implications.

�The exotic perspectives on China-Pakistan nuclear relation

Both the structure of international system and the geopolitical situation of South Asia have

changed greatly after the Cold War, but the traditional friendly security relation between China

and Pakistan still preserves its original status. Undoubtedly, the friendly cooperation on nuclear

issue plays a pivotal role in the process of boosting up mutual confidence and stabilizing strategic

cooperation between China and Pakistan. To China and Pakistan, as far as the nuclear cooperation

is concerned, it not only results from given history background, but also roots in the objective

review of each other’s strategic interests by the two countries. Ignoring the history background

and being short of understanding the strategic needs of China and Pakistan, scholars from India

and Western countries often evaluate China-Pakistan nuclear relation from exotic factors or still

understand this relation with the mind of the Cold War Era. As a result, it’s not inevitable for them

to misunderstand the friendly cooperation between China and Pakistan in the nuclear field with the

discriminatory vision.

The first and most popular argument about China-Pakistan nuclear relation is to understand the

nuclear ties between them from the traditional realist point of view. “Balance of power” is the core

conception for these scholars to analyze it. T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor from McGill

University at Canada, is a typical supporter for this argument. In his words, “China has continued

to interpret its nonproliferation commitments narrowly with regard to supplying nuclear and

missile-related materials to its key allies in the developing world, especially Pakistan”. He argues

that “Beijing’s motivations in transferring materials and technology to Pakistan derive largely

from Chinese concerns about the regional balance of power and are part of a Chinese effort to

pursue a strategy of containment in its enduring rivalry with India”. He adds that “if acute conflict

and an intense arms race between India and Pakistan persist, India would continue to be bracketed

with its smaller regional rival Pakistan and not with China”.2 His view point seems logical and

often is cited by some other analysts working on China’s non-proliferation policy. However, he

2 T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power”, The Nonproliferation Review, Summer, 2003.

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overlooked two key important facts which have been going along from the end of the Cold War to

now. One is that China has made great progress in participating in international non-proliferation

regime. Another fact is that Sino-Indian relations have continued to be reconciled and improved in

the post-Cold War Era.

The second misperception on China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is to overstate the nuclear

cooperative depth between China and Pakistan, which views the nuclear relation between China

and Pakistan as ‘nuclear alliance’. In a paper named “China-Pakistan nuclear alliance”, Siddharth

Ramana, a research officer from the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies which is based in India,

points out that there exits a security alliance between China and Pakistan. He says that

“this alliance was to take the form of nuclear cooperation, especially in the aftermath of the Indian

nuclear test of 1974”. In his perspective, China makes use of this alliance to “achieve twin

strategic objectives of encirclement of India, and a proliferation buffer, wherein Pakistan in turn

further proliferate Chinese nuclear technology, giving China leeway in investigations”. He argues

that China doesn’t extend its nuclear umbrella to Pakistan but use Pakistan as an “extended

deterrence proxy” towards India. 3This perception exaggerates China’s strategic objectives on the

one hand, and neglects not only the equal essence of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation but

also Pakistan’s strategic independence in the nuclear area on the other hand.

A more discriminatory argument comes from Ashley J. Tellis, a Washington DC-based influential

scholar. As a steadfast supporter of U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, he deployed a totally

different criterion to criticize China-Pakistan civil nuclear cooperation. From his view, the

differences between the two are significant because “unlike the U.S.-India civilian nuclear

initiative, whose terms were publicly debated, the Sino-Pakistani agreement is a secret covenant,

secretly concluded” and “whereas the United States respected the international nonproliferation

regime by requesting a special NSG waiver to permit nuclear trade with India, China seeks to

short-circuit the NSG rather than appeal to its judgment”. So he argues that “it’s time for United

States to raise its voice” to “convey to China its strong concern about the planned reactor sale to

Pakistan”.4 From the Chinese perspective, his arguments not only exhibits a hegemonic logic but

3 Siddharth Ramana, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis”, IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011. 4 Ashley J. Tellis, “The China-Pakistan Nuclear ‘Deal’: Separating Fact from Fiction”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/07/16/china-pakistan-nuclear-deal-separating-fact-from-fiction/39ow.

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also shows the western intention to intervene the independent right of China to develop relations

with its strategic partner.

Contrasting with the three arguments mentioned above, the viewpoint from Mark Hibbs looks

much softer. He mainly attributes China’s nuclear deal with Pakistan to “the growing confidence

and assertiveness of China’s nuclear energy program”. In his mind, “China’s increasingly

ambitious nuclear energy program is becoming more autonomous” and “China will likely become

the world’s second-biggest nuclear power generator after the United States by 2020”. In this

context, he concludes that China’s nuclear export to Pakistan is a part of China’s nuclear export

strategy and the political function of the nuclear trade between China and Pakistan can’t be

exaggerated. 5 To some extent, I partly agree with him. But I argue that the whole China-Pakistan

nuclear relation should be considered comprehensively.

II A Brief Historical Review of China-Pakistan Nuclear Relation

One important reason that some exotic scholars misread the China-Pakistan nuclear relation is that

they do not take into account the historical background of the development of China-Pakistan

nuclear cooperation, and therefore, with the time going on, do not see the actual changes of

China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. In this case, it is not difficult to understand that, as mentioned

earlier, some scholars believe that China has been engaged in nuclear proliferation in South Asia

area till now. Frankly speaking, this phenomenon is related to the opaque nuclear cooperation

adopted by China and Pakistan. However, this ambiguity just mainly existed in the era of the Cold

War. In this special historical context, it is unfair to evaluate China-Pakistan nuclear relation of

that period with today’s nuclear non-proliferation requirements when it comes to such sensitive

areas as nuclear cooperation. After the end of the Cold War, it is extremely unscientific to look at

the China-Pakistan nuclear relation in the post-Cold War era, especially in the new century with

the China-Pakistan cooperation model in the Cold War. Overall, divided by the two historic events,

the end of the Cold War and South Asia Nuclear Test, the development of China-Pakistan nuclear

relationship has gone through three historical periods.

The first period is from the mid-1970s to the end of the Cold War. As early as in 1950, Pakistan

5 See Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness”, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/04/27/pakistan-deal-signals-china-s-growing-nuclear-assertiveness/4su.

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formally recognized the People's Republic of China, being the third country in the world and also

the first Islamic country to establish formal diplomatic relations with China. However, a close

political relationship between China and Pakistan began only after the Sino-Indian War in 1962; it

is a premise for the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation later on. Pakistan's nuclear program

started much later than that of India. In deed, it can be traced back to the early 1970s.

Fundamentally speaking, Pakistan developing its nuclear program is to safeguard its own national

security, as its conventional military power is much weaker than India and India has been secretly

developing nuclear weapons much earlier. Seeking cooperation with the outside power is an

important way to develop its nuclear weapons. Due to the increasingly close China-Pakistan

political relations, Pakistan opens the door of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation at the

beginning of the start of its nuclear program, and China is also willing to carry out cooperation

with Pakistan in the nuclear area. It is obviously inconsistent with historical facts that western

scholars tend to ignore Pakistan’s inherent drive to seek nuclear cooperation with China, while

blaming China to engage in nuclear proliferation in South Asia by nuclear cooperation with

Pakistan. It is a difficult thing to confirm the specific starting nuclear cooperation time between

China and Pakistan, but the last will and testament of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reveals that the

China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in 1976 and he has made 11 years of efforts to work it

out prior to this.6 The conversation between Bhutto and Henry Kissinger, the former U.S.

Secretary of State, reveals that during this period, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is mainly

focused on the nuclear reprocessing technology, instead of uranium enrichment technology.7

What pushes further nuclear relationship between China and Pakistan is an official China-Pakistan

nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1986; it is the agreement that forms the close relationship

of nuclear technology transfer between China and Pakistan. 8 China and Pakistan have never

officially made this agreement public and disclose the specific transfer content of the nuclear

technology. Western scholars draw the conclusion that China helped Pakistan develop nuclear

weapons during this period mainly based on the information from those intelligence agencies of

6 Yogesh Kumar Gupta, “Common Nuclear Doctrine for India Pakistan and China”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 20 June 2004, accessed at http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/common-nuclear-doctrine-for-india-pakistan-and-china-1413.html. 7 William Burr, “The China-Pakistan nuclear connection revealed”, The National Security Archive, 18 November 2009, accessed at http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2009/11/18/the-china-pakistan-nuclear-connection-revealed/ 8 See Siddharth Ramana, “China-Pakistan Nuclear Alliance: An Analysis”, IPCS Special Report 109, August 2011.

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the United States as well as the western media reports, which might be suspected and exaggerated.

The end of the Cold War sees the second historical period of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.

Compared to the Cold War era, the external environment faced by the China-Pakistani nuclear

relationship has changed a lot in the post-Cold War era. There are two major changes: First, along

with the accelerated process of the world arms control and nuclear disarmament, China has

gradually been integrated into the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which resulted in

more and more constraints on its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan; Second, the United States has

taken more stringent measures on arms control, and has launched a series of sanctions on Pakistan

and China because of the nuclear-related sensitive products transfer between them. Before an open

nuclear test by Pakistan in 1998, the nuclear cooperation between China has been questioned by

the western countries, whose intelligence is mainly from the United States. Such accusations

include not only transfer the complete nuclear device design model, develop its uranium

enrichment program and develop nuclear weapons-related materials, such as ring magnets, but

also gradually focus on criticizing China transferred missiles technology to Pakistan. China

formally joined the NPT in 1992, followed by joining the IAEA a year later; therefore, the nuclear

cooperation between China and Pakistan has been increasingly supervised by the international

regime. China increasingly focuses on its international responsibilities and obligations when

developing the traditional friendly nuclear relationship with Pakistan, therefore, despite the

skepticism of the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship, the U.S. government only mentioned in

public that China has been in helping Pakistan develop nuclear weapons before 1992. 9

The third historical period of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation starts from South Asian open

nuclear tests in 1998. The nuclear tests in South Asia marked the open nuclear weaponization for

both India and Pakistan. Despite the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, only the

counties with an open nuclear test before 1967 can be called nuclear weapon state, the fact can not

be denied that India and Pakistan have became two de facto nuclear weapon states. By then,

China-Pakistan nuclear relation has evolved into a relation between a nuclear state recognized by

the international nuclear regime and a de facto nuclear state drifting away from the international

nuclear regime. After the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan, the international community, led by 9 Archived material, “China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan”, accessed at http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/npakpos.htm

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the U.S., implemented nuclear embargo. It encountered difficulties to develop nuclear relationship

with the two countries, by the rules or in practical. In addition, China joined the NSG in 2004,

which further compresses the space of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation. Therefore, the

China-Pakistan nuclear relationship will inevitably be affected. Because this impact is caused by

external factors, the nature of the China-Pakistan friendship and cooperation in the nuclear field is

not interrupted. On the contrary, with the tremendous progress of Pakistan's nuclear technology

and the rapid development of civilian nuclear technology in China, there is a broader space in the

field of civilian nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries. In this context, the two

countries significantly speed up the pace of civilian nuclear energy cooperation in recent years. In

2005, China began to provide Pakistan with a second nuclear power station, which is 14 years

later than Pakistan's first nuclear power plant provided by China. Since 2010, China has agreed to

continue the construct two another 650 MW nuclear power reactors in Chashma, a place in central

Pakistan’s Punjab province, and decided to supply the fifth nuclear reactor to Pakistan. At this

point, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has been no longer in the area of

security mainly, but in the energy, commercial fields, which is fully under the supervision of the

International Atomic Energy Agency. Although still questioned by the West and India, the

cooperation process is now irreversible, and will play a positive role in promoting China-Pakistan

relations in the new era.

III Main factors affecting the development of China-Pakistan nuclear relation

China-Pakistan nuclear relationship is an important part of the overall configuration of

China-Pakistan relations. The perceptions on its importance relating to their respective diplomatic

strategy are critical. It is the internal and the most important factor to think about the development

and trend of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship in the post-Cold War era. At the same time, every

step of the progress of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship affects the nerves of countries in South

Asia and related countries outside of this region. The international community pays high attention

to it, and therefore it can not be free from constraints of external factors.

First, the long-term nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan is the product of

comprehensive and friendly China-Pakistan relations. As mentioned above, the cooperation

between China and Pakistan on the nuclear issue began in the mid-1970s, and it has been more

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than 40 years of history till now. During this period, though the international situation has

undergone dramatic changes and the international pressure from various sides has always been

there, the friendly relation of the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation has never been interrupted,

and will continue to develop further more. To Pakistan, India is the first prevention object for its

national security; however, because of the gap of its national power as well as conventional

military power with those of India, it is a natural choice to develop strategic nuclear power to

balance India with outside help. Among the major powers, the United States is certainly important

for Pakistan, but the history of the development of US-Pakistan relationship indicates that the

United States has never been a Pakistani trusted ally, while China is completely different. The

attitudes towards Pakistan's nuclear issue, which is a vital security interest for Pakistan, reflect the

difference. The United States has generally been suppressing the nuclear program of Pakistan, and

deregulation happens only when it needs Pakistan's cooperation on regional issues; China has

always been respecting Pakistan's security concerns and supports Pakistan in maximum with its

own resources, within the extent permitted by international rules. As far as China is concerned,

Pakistan has an important strategic position in its neighbor environment and diplomacy.10 But in

the relations between China and Pakistan, there have been problems of uneven structure, that is,

economic cooperation, personnel exchanges and cultural exchange (‘low politics’), and the

political and military cooperation (‘high politics’) has a big gap between the two countries.11

Because the problem of serious structural imbalance exists, it is especially important for long-term

friendship cooperation of key areas such as nuclear issue to maintain "all weather" cooperative

relationship between the two counties.

Second, South Asian geopolitical situation is the most direct factor that affects China-Pakistan

nuclear relationship. Western scholars tend to interpret China-Pakistan relations in this perspective,

putting geopolitical consideration as the dominant factor of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation.

While exaggerated, South Asian geopolitical factors really can not be ignored. In South Asia, a

basic geopolitical fact is the long-term confrontation between India and Pakistan. After the open

nuclear tests of South Asia in 1998, it has evolved into a nuclear confrontation between two de

10 See ZHANG Guihong, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic Position and the Future of Sino-Pakistan Relations’, South Asian Studies Quarterly, No. 2, 2011. 11 YE Hailin, ‘The Problems of Structure Imbalance and its Implications on China-Pakistan Relations in the New Era’, Contemporary Asia Pacific, No. 10, 2006.

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facto nuclear-weapon states. Because both India and Pakistan are in the process of pursuing a

credible nuclear deterrence, strategic stability in South Asia is facing severe challenges.12

Correspondingly, another geopolitical reality that can not be ignored is the gradually reconciled

India-Pakistan relations in recent years. The traditional view is that, as long as the Kashmir issue

is not resolved between India and Pakistan, the hostility between the two countries will not come

into an end. However, with the rise of India and its changing regional policy, as well as Pakistan's

economic difficulties and its desire to change its undeveloped status to narrow the disparity in

power with India, the motivation for cooperation is increasingly enhancing in terms of reconciling

the hostile relations between the two countries in the security field and the development of

cooperation in other areas. In addition, the terrorism situation is getting worse after the Cold War,

the terrorists’ seeking to possess weapons of mass destruction shadowed this region greatly, which

affect not only on China-Pakistan nuclear relationship, but the triangle nuclear relationship among

China, India and Pakistan. In facing of the common enemy of terrorism, the non-state actors,

China, India and Pakistan also need to find a breakthrough point for cooperation on the nuclear

issue.

Third, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and the trend of nuclear proliferation are

important external factors affecting China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. Existing international

nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on NPT. According to the NPT definition of the

nuclear-weapon state, India and Pakistan, though tested their nuclear weapons openly in 1998, are

clearly illegal. Therefore, to develop nuclear relations with these two countries is subject to the

constraints of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the period of Cold War,

because China did not participate in this regime, while leading country of the regime , the United

States, implemented double standards of the nuclear non-proliferation policy with obvious

benefit-oriented policy, China and Pakistan nuclear relation has not been severely constrained by

international nuclear non-proliferation regime because of Pakistan’s importance to the United

States during that time and the large triangle relationship among China, the United States and the

Soviet Union. But after the Cold War, with China's accelerating process of integration into the

international nuclear non-proliferation regime by joining the NPT, CTBT (Comprehensive

12 Relating to the instability of South Asian nuclear stability, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous deterrent: nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia, Stanford University Press, 2007.

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Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) and NSG, China’s transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan is

necessarily under the comprehensive supervision of International Atomic Energy Agency. At the

same time, the incident of Abdul Qadeer Khan, “the father of nuclear bomb” of Pakistan, allegedly

engaged in nuclear proliferation at the beginning of this century, made China-Pakistan nuclear

relationship further constrained by the international non-proliferation regime. Since the end of the

Cold War, the international non-proliferation regime is more and more accepted by international

community, but the momentum of nuclear proliferation in Asia is not optimistic. So far, the

countries with more serious nuclear proliferation problems are basically in the surrounding areas

of China. This can not fail to affect the development of China's foreign nuclear relationship,

including the nuclear cooperation with the friendly and long-term strategic partnership, Pakistan.

Finally, the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship has obviously been affected by major power

factors, mainly the United States and India. India factor obviously plays a more important role in

the early stages of the development of China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. In addition to the

obvious geopolitical factors, it is also closely related to India's nuclear weapons development

program. India's nuclear weaponization resulted not only in the strategic imbalance in South Asia,

but also in China-Indian confrontation in the nuclear area because the main objective of India’s

nuclear development is China. The close China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation in the Cold War

focused on security is closely related with this. However, with the deepening of the process of

nuclear weaponization in India and Pakistan, especially after open nuclear tests of the two states,

India’s impact is not as obvious as before in China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. Accordingly,

Unite State’s impact increased significantly in China-Pakistan nuclear relationship. On one hand,

the strategic position of Pakistan declines in diplomatic strategy of the United States after the Cold

War. On the other hand, the friction between China and the United States in the field of nuclear

non-proliferation increased. Between 2000 and 2004, the United States sanctions Chinese

companies up to 50 times with the name of preventing non-proliferation.13 This nominal friction

generated by the nuclear issue, in fact, reflects the United States’ contention of the right to speak

as a hegemony with the rapid rise of emerging powers in the international system. Based on the

13 Daniel. A. Pinkston, “Testimony before: U.S.-China economic and security review commission hearing on China’s proliferation practices and its role in the North Korea nuclear crisis”, US Congress, 10 March 2005, accessed at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/pinkston_daniel_wrts.php, 09 July 2011.

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psychology of such precautions, the United States stepped up the cooperation with India in the

military field, especially in the nuclear field. In addition to the impact of the China-Pakistan

nuclear relationship individually, cooperation between the United States and India becomes

important motivation to strengthen nuclear relation between China and Pakistan. The evolution of

US-India civil nuclear agreement and the United States positively helping India look for special

NSG waiver to permit nuclear trade with India lead to the discrimination of international nuclear

regime towards Pakistan. As a key friend of Pakistan, China can not fail to take into account

Pakistan’s nuclear cooperation requirements.

Ⅳ Conclusion: Prospect and International Implications

Summing up from the above analysis, although the China-Pakistan nuclear relationship has

changed greatly in the post-Cold War era, comparing with that relation in the Cold War era, the

suspicion on the persistent China-Pakistan relation has never stopped. Due to the overall

configuration of China-Pakistan relation, the respective needs in terms of strategic security and

commercial interests for China and Pakistan, and the geopolitical factor, China-Pakistan nuclear

relation doesn’t change its characteristics of friendly cooperation in essential. But with the

evolution of international nonproliferation regime, China’s nonproliferation policy adjusting by

itself, and the changing geopolitical configuration of South Asia, China-Pakistan nuclear relation

should also keep up with the times. For China and Pakistan, to further the cooperative relation

more closely in nuclear area, some kinds of policy adjustments are necessary and imperative on

the premise of keeping the traditional friendly cooperation.

Firstly, both China and Pakistan should not avoid making response to the international pressure

straightforward despite that the nuclear cooperation between them is not recognized legally by

international nonproliferation regime. On the contrary, if they strive to integrate into the

international nuclear cooperative regime positively in the long run, the China-Pakistan nuclear

relation may gain wider space to develop in the future. It’s true for China and Pakistan to achieve

this goal because of Pakistan’s proliferation record in the past and the limited diplomatic

capability of China in the international nonproliferation field. However, China should also help

Pakistan look for special NSG waiver to permit nuclear trade with it just as what the U.S. has done

for India. Though the possibility of the success on this achievement is very slim, the positive

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meaning of it can’t be denied because of two important reasons. One is that it can keep the mutual

communication between China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation and international nuclear regime.

Relating to this, another reason is that it can help the international community understand

Pakistan’s needs to get cooperation from outsides and stop criticizing Pakistan blindly with

completely prejudice.

Secondly, the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan itself also needs to be mechanized.

So far, the agreement for the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation still needs to be traced back to

the Cold War era, namely 1986 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. But today due to the

background of the nuclear cooperation changing totally, the contents of the agreement also need to

be adjusted. At the same time, the form of agreement should not be in a secretive way, because

opaque deal for the nuclear cooperation can only lead to more suspicion from the international

society. Corresponding to the US-India nuclear deal, a clear and integral civilian nuclear

cooperative agreement, in despite of the difficulty to be recognized by the international society,

can reduce the international anxiety for China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation at least.

The third, the goal orientation of the nuclear cooperation should also need to be adjusted.

Differentiating from the traditional way that both China and Pakistan pay too much attention to

the strategic value, the bilateral nuclear cooperation now should emphasize on commercial value

as much as the strategic value, and pay more attention to realize the business value in practice.

Therefore, the emphasis of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation will inevitably be transferred from

the traditional security domain to the commercial trade domain.

Looking into the future, as long as the orientation of bilateral nuclear relation between China and

Pakistan is clearly made, the nuclear cooperation between them will go deepening irreversibly

due to the traditional basis of friendly bilateral cooperation and the constant practical cooperation

in specific areas. With China's overall integration into the international nuclear nonproliferation

regime, China’s foreign nuclear cooperation will also be accepted by the international community

more and more. At the same time, after Pakistan became the de facto nuclear countries, its

nonproliferation policy have continued to be changed in a meaningful way and its image of

proliferation will also slowly get changed. Therefore, the external environment for China-Pakistan

nuclear cooperation will be improved. The benign interaction between China-Pakistan nuclear

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relation and international nonproliferation regime will not only be in favor of enhancing the

bilateral nuclear relation in itself forward, but also produce an active and far-reaching influence on

the integral nuclear relations of the whole Asian region.