China Missile Milestones

CHINA’S DANEROUS EXPORTS

TO IRAN

1. Supplies C-801 and C-802 ship-based anti-ship cruise missiles

2. Negotiates a deal worth $4.5 billion, pending funding, to supply combat aircraft, missiles, missile launchers, armored vehicles and warships

SYRIA Capable missiles

China Missile Milestones - 1956-2005The Risk Report

Volume 11 Number 6 (November-December 2005)

1956: China's Ministry of Defense creates Fifth Academy to develop ballistic missiles.

1964: China tests its first atomic bomb; first flight of the Dong Feng-2 medium-range missile.

1966: Combined test flight and detonation of a nuclear-armed DF-2 missile.

1970: First flight of Long March-1 space rocket; first flight of DF-4 medium-range missile.

1971: First flight of DF intercontinental ballistic missile; DF-3 missile first deployed. Both used as boosters for Long March rockets.

1975: First flight of Long March-2C space rocket.

1983: U.S. intelligence discovers China gave Pakistan tested nuclear bomb design.

1984: First flight of Long March-3 space rocket.

1988: China ships CSS-2 medium-range missiles to Saudi Arabia.

1991: U.S. sanctions China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation and China Great Wall Industry Corporation for selling missile technology to Pakistan.

1992: China joins the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

1993: China Aerospace Corporation succeeds Ministry of Aerospace Industry to oversee production of space rockets; sanctioned with nine other firms for selling missile technology to Pakistan.

1994: China promises to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) after the U.S. lifts sanctions.

December 1996: The Washington Times reports that in December 1996 Russia agreed to sell China two Sovremeny-class guided-missile destroyers armed with SS-N-22 high-speed anti-ship missiles.

March 1997: China increases its official military spending by 12.7 percent.

May 1997: The U.S. State Department confirms that China has sold "a number of C-802 ship-based anti-ship cruise missiles" to Iran.

July 1997: The National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) reports that China is upgrading its medium-range missile force. This includes replacing liquid-fuel CSS-2 missiles with mobile solid-propellant CSS-5 Mod 1 missiles.

September 1997: According to an Israeli intelligence report, China Great Wall Industry Corporation and several Russian firms are helping Iran produce two missile systems based on North Korea's Nodong missile.

January 1998: China's Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian, promises U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen that China will not sell any more C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.

April 1998: China rejects an American proposal under which China would become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime in return for greater access to American space technology.

May 1998: The Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) reportedly believes that China has 13 of its 18 CSS-4 long-range strategic missiles pointed at U.S. cities.

July 1998: China reportedly tests a rocket motor for the DF-31 ballistic missile at the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center. The test occurs during President Clinton's trip to China.

July 1998: It is reported that China produced six new CSS-4 ICBMs in the first four months of 1998 and is expected to build two more.

December 1998: The Washington Times reports that China recently delivered missile technology to Iran, including telemetry equipment that could be used in the testing of medium-range missiles such as Iran's Shahab-3.

December 1998: A secret Pentagon report concludes that Hughes Space and Communications, without proper authorization, gave China vital technological assistance crucial to the successful launchings of Chinese ballistic missiles and satellites. The report concluded that Hughes

provided a "defense service" to China that violated U.S. rules against helping Beijing make better rockets and missiles.

February 1999: The Pentagon reports to Congress that by 2005 China will have an overwhelming advantage over Taiwan due to an intense buildup of ballistic and cruise missile forces.

April 1999: It is reported that China is continuing to transfer missile technology to the Middle East and South Asia, and has provided North Korea with special steel used in missile building.

May, 1999: It is reported that U.S. intelligence believes China will deploy the nuclear-capable 5,000 mile DF-31 ballistic missile within the next four years, and that it will be equipped with a warhead whose design uses secret American technology.

August 1999: China tests a new long-range surface-to-surface missile. Several days later, China confirms that the missile tested was a three-stage solid fuel DF-31.

August 1999: It is reported that China signed an $11 million deal to improve Iran's FL-10 anti-ship cruise missiles. The short-range missiles will be modified so they can be fired from attack helicopters and fast patrol boats.

September 1999: It is reported that China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) has developed a new long-range artillery system with a range of 360 kilometers, enough to target almost all of Taiwan from mainland China.

October 1999: In a military parade, China displays the DF-31 ICBM for the first time. It is displayed in its launch canister on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).

November 1999: U.S. intelligence reports that China is expanding a missile base at Yongan across from Taiwan. It is expected that the base will have a brigade of advanced CSS-7 (M-11) missiles.

December 1999: It is reported that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has discovered a second short-range missile base under construction near Taiwan. It is believed that the new base, Xianyou, will contain a force of short-range missiles that will allow China to target all of Taiwan's major military bases.

February 2000: In a report to Congress, the CIA says Chinese firms have supplied missile-related items, materials and assistance to Iran. The report also states that China has given "extensive" support to Pakistan's weapon of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

April 2000: It is reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) believes the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Company (CPMIEC) has been assisting Libya in the development of the Al-Fatah long-range missile.

May 2000: Sha Zukang, China's chief arms negotiator, tells the New York Times that the proposed American missile defense system poses a threat to China and could force China to significantly expand its own nuclear forces in response.

July 2000: The New York Times reports that China has increased its shipment of specialty steels, guidance systems and technical expertise to Pakistan since May 1998. It also reports that Chinese experts have been sighted around Pakistan's newest missile factory.

August 2000: A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) warns President Clinton that building a national missile defense system for the United States could result in a buildup of China's nuclear arsenal.

November 2000: The United States waives sanctions against Chinese companies that have made missile-technology transfers to Pakistan and Iran in return for a promise from Beijing that it will promulgate a list of missile-related items the export of which it would ban.

December 2000: The CIA reports that Chinese entities provided Pakistan with missile-related technical assistance during the last half of 2000.

2001: China illicitly receives six X-55 (KH-55) nuclear-capable cruise missiles from Ukraine.

September 2001: China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (CMEC or MECC) is sanctioned for transferring missile technology to Pakistan's National Development Complex. Because it is a state-owned company, certain sanctions apply to all missile-related activities of the Chinese government.

December 2002: China reportedly test-launches a medium-range DF-21 missile with multiple warheads.

June 2002: The CIA reports that Chinese entities are continuing to provide missile-related technical and material assistance to Pakistan.

August 2002: China issues regulations on export control of missiles and missile-related items and technology.

November 2002: China signs agreement to acquire Harpy anti-radiation attack drones from Israel Aircraft Industries.

May 2003: China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) is sanctioned by the United States, reportedly for selling missile technology to the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (in charge of Iran's ballistic missile development)

July 2003: China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC) is sanctioned by the United States for "missile technology proliferation activities."

December 2003: The CIA reports that Chinese entities continue to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects. Companies in China also provide "dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance" to Libya and North Korea.

February 2004: Beijing holds its first round of talks with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to discuss China's potential membership.

July 2004: China launches the first of its Type 094 nuclear submarines, which are designed to carry intercontinental ballistic missiles.

September 2004: Xinshidai (China New Era Group) is sanctioned for "missile technology proliferation activities"

June 2005: China reportedly test-launches a JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a submarine at sea toward an inland test range.

July 2005: In a report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China has 650-730 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles and is adding to this arsenal at a rate of 75-120 missiles per year.

China’s Rockets and Missiles

The Risk ReportVolume 11 Number 1 (January-February 2005)

The following are the most recent technical specifications of China’s missiles and rockets.

Chinese Missiles

Dong Feng-3 or -3A (DF-3/3A) (US: CSS-2)

The CSS-2/DF-3 is a single-stage, liquid fueled missile fitted with a thermonuclear warhead. It has a range of 2,800 kilometers and was the first indigenously designed Chinese ballistic missile. Several CSS-2 missiles were exported to Saudi Arabia in 1988.

Technical Specifications

Range (km): 2800Payload (kg): 2150Diameter (m): 2.25Weight (tons): 64Length (m): 24Stages: 1Propellant: UDMH and nitrogen tetroxide Mission: Nuclear-armed; mobile launcher

Status: First flight, December 1966; now deployed.

Dong Feng-4 (DF-4) (US: CSS-3)

The DF-4 is a two-stage, liquid fueled ballistic missile with a range of 4,750 kilometers. It can reach targets throughout European Russia, including Moscow.


Range (km): 4750Payload (kg): 2200Diameter (m): 2.25Weight (tons): 80Length (m): 28Stages: 2Propellant: UDMHMission: Nuclear-armed; ground-basedStatus: First flight, September 1971; deployed.

Dong Feng-5 (DF-5, DF-5A) (US: CSS-4)

The DF-5 is China’s only true intercontinental ballistic missile, with a range of over 13,000 kilometers. It is a two-stage, liquid-fueled missile that is virtually identical to the Long March-2 rocket. According to a report by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, China is replacing its approximately twenty DF-5 missiles with the CSS-4 Mod 2, an upgraded version which has greater range.


Range (km): 13,000Payload (kg): 3,200Diameter (m): 3.35Weight (tons): 183Length (m): 32.6Stages: 2Propellant: UDMH and nitrogen tetroxideMission: Nuclear-armed; silo-based Status: First flight September 1971; approximately 20 deployed.

Dong Feng-21 (DF-21) (US: CSS-5)

The DF-21 is the land-based version of the Julang-1 (JL-1) submarine launched missile (SLBM), with the same technical characteristics but deployed on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle. It can carry a 600 kilogram payload about 1800 kilometers.


Range (km): 1800 kmPayload (kg): 600 kgDiameter (m): 1.4Weight (tons): 14.7Length (m): 10.7 mStages: 2Propellant: SolidMission: Nuclear-capable; mobile launcherStatus: First flight, May 1985; deployed.

Dong Feng-15 (DF-15) (US: CSS-6 or M-9)

The DF-15 (M-9) is a short-range, mobile, solid-fueled missile, that can carry a 950 kilogram payload 600 kilometers. It is marketed abroad by the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC).


Range (km): 600Payload (kg): 950Diameter (m): 1Weight (tons): 6.2Length (m): 9.1 Stages: 1Propellant: Solid Mission: Short-range; mobile; nuclear-capable Status: First flight, June 1989; widely deployed.

Dong Feng-11 (DF-11) (US: CSS-7 or M-11)

The DF-11 is a short-range ballistic missile that can carry a 800 kilogram payload 300 kilometers. The DF-11 is believed to be deployed largely in the Nanjing Military Region, opposite Taiwan. The M-11, an export version of the DF-11, has been exported to Pakistan. The DF-11A (DF-11 Mod 2), an improved version of the DF-11, reportedly was displayed at a military parade in 1999, and may now be in service.


Range (km): 300Payload (kg): 800Diameter (m): Weight (tons): Length (m): Stages: 2

Propellant: SolidMission: Short-range; mobile; conventionally-armed; nuclear-capable Status: First flight, mid-1990; widely deployed.

Dong Feng-31 (DF-31)

The DF-31 is a long-range, mobile, solid-fueled ballistic missile estimated to have a range of 8,000 kilometers. Deployment of the DF-31 is expected by the end of the decade. The DF-31A, a longer-range follow-on version of the DF-31, reportedly is also under development. The DF-31A is expected to have a range of approximately 12,000 kilometers.


Range (km): 8000Payload (kg): 700Diameter (m): Weight (tons):Length (m): Stages: 3Propellant: SolidMission: Nuclear-capable; mobileStatus: Under development

Submarine Launched Missiles (SLBMs)

Julang-1 (JL-1) (US: CSS-N-3)

The JL-1 is a single-warhead, two-stage submarine launched ballistic missile. It is the first Chinese missile to use only solid fuel and China’s only deployed SLBM.


Range (km): 1700Payload (kg): 600Diameter (m): 1.4Weight (tons): 14.7Length (m): 10.7Stages: 2Propellant: SolidMission: Submarine-launched; nuclear-capableStatus: First flight, October 1982; 12 deployed on Xia-class submarines.

Julang-2 (JL-2) (US: CSS-N-4)

The JL-2 is a three-stage, submarine-launched ballistic missile currently under development. It is based upon the DF-31, a land-based long-range ballistic missile also still being developed. The JL-2 is expected to have a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers, far greater than the 1,700 km range of the JL-1. The JL-2 would be deployed on the Project 094 SSBN, currently under construction.


Range (km): 8000Payload (kg): 700Diameter (m): Weight (tons):Length (m): Stages: 3Propellant: SolidMission: Submarine-launched; nuclear-capableStatus: Under development

Note: According to a report in July 2003 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, China has approximately twenty ICBMs capable of targeting the United States. The report says that this number could increase to about 30 by 2005 and could reach 60 by 2010.

Chinese Launch Vehicles

Long March 2C/SD Launch Vehicle (LM-2C/SD or CZ-2C/SD)

The LM-2C/SD is a two-stage launch vehicle with a smart dispenser and a payload capacity of 2,500-2,800 kilograms. It is used to deploy recoverable satellites in low earth orbit (LEO). The original model, the LM-2, was renamed the LM-2C after a successful test flight in 1975. The LM-2C's design was derived directly from China's DF-5 (CSS-4) ballistic missile. It was renamed the LM-2C/SD in 1999, after being modified in preparation to launch Motorola's Iridium communications satellites. The modifications included upgrades to the first two stages and the addition of a smart dispenser (SD) as a third stage. The LM-2C/SD is capable of placing multiple satellites into different Low Earth Orbits (LEO).

Technical Specifications1st Stage 2nd Stage Smart DispenserDiameter (m): 3.35 3.35 2.7 Mass of Propellant (t): 162.7 54.7 12.5/50Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH HTPBEngine Type: DaYF6-2 DaYF20-1 (Main) Solid motorYF21-1 (Vernier) Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 742 (Main) 15711.8x4 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 213

Overall Length (m): 40.4 Fairing Diameter (m): 3.35

Long March 2D Launch Vehicle (LM-2D or CZ-2D)

The LM-2D is a two-stage launch vehicle adapted from the first and second stages of the Long March 4. The LM-2D can deploy a payload of 3700 kilograms into low earth orbit (LEO). The LM-2D is launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center.

Technical Specifications1st Stage 2nd Stage Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 Mass of Propellant (t): 182.07 35.408 Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH Engine Type: DaYF-21B YF-22B (Main)Engine Thrust (kN): 2250 742 (Main) 46.1 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 232.7Overall Length (m): 37.73 Fairing Diameter (m): 2.90/3.35

Long March 2E Launch Vehicle (LM-2E or CZ-2E)

The LM-2E is a two-stage launch vehicle using stages similar to those of the LM-2C. The LM-2E has four 15 meter strap-on boosters. It is used to deploy payloads up to 9,500 kilograms in low earth orbit (LEO). When equipped with a perigee kick motor (EPKM) as a third stage, the LM-2E can deploy a payload of 3,500 kilograms in geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). Kick motors for the LM-2E were originally supplied by foreign companies; however, China now has the ability to produce its own kick motors.

Technical SpecificationsBoosters 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage Diameter (m): 2.25 3.35 3.35 Mass of Propellant (t): 148 (4 x 37) 181 37 Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH Engine Type: 4 x YF-20 YF-21 YF-22 (Main) YF-23 (Vernier)Engine Thrust (kN): 4 x 740 2961 742 (Main) 47 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 460 Overall Length (m): 49.7Fairing Diameter (m): 4.20

Long March 2F Launch Vehicle (LM-2F or CZ-2F)

The LM-2F, China's largest launch vehicle, was developed on the basis of the LM-2E. The LM-2F has four boosters, two stages, and an escape tower. On October 15, 2003, an LM-2F launch

vehicle carrying a Shenzhou V spacecraft launched China's first astronaut into space.

Long March 3 Launch Vehicle (LM-3 or CZ-3)

The LM-3 is a three-stage launch vehicle with a cryogenic third stage. The liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen third-stage engines were developed by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). The LM-3 can deploy satellites up to 1,500 kilograms into a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). It was first launched in January 1984.

Technical Specifications1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 2.25 Mass of Propellant (t): 144 36 8.7 Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH LOX/LHEngine Type: 4 x YF-20 YF-22 (Main) YF-73(YF-21) YF-23 (Vernier)Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 2911 (Main) 44.42834 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 204 Overall Length (m): 44.56

Long March 3A Launch Vehicle (LM-3A CZ-3A)

Designed and developed using LM-3 technology, the LM-3A uses a more powerful cryogenic third stage engine, a more capable control system, and greater flexibility in the attitude control system. It can deploy a 2,600 kilogram payload into geosynchronous transfer orbit and can be used for low earth orbit and polar orbit missions as well. It was first launched in February 1994.

Technical Specifications1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 3.0 Mass of Propellant (t): 171.8 30.8 18.2 Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH LOX/LH2Engine Type: DaYF6-2 DaYF20-1 (Main) YF-75(4 x YF-20) DaYF21-1 (Vernier)Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 742 (Main) 15711.8x4 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 241 Overall Length (m): 52.52Fairing Diameter (m): 3.35

Long March 3B Launch Vehicle (LM-3B or CZ-3B)

The LM-3B launch vehicle was designed with a LM-3A vehicle as its core with four strap-on liquid propellent boosters. The core stage of the LM-3B is identical to the -3A except that the stage tanks have been extended and reinforced, the fairing has been enlarged, and the control and

telemetry systems have been modified to accommodate the strap-on boosters. The LM-3B can deploy a payload of 5,200 kilograms into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). The LM-3B can also perform payload attitude adjustments and dual or multiple launch requirements. The LM-3B is launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC) in Sichuan Province.


Boosters 1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage Diameter (m): 2.25 3.35 3.35 3.00 Mass of Propellant (t): 171.8 49.6 18.2Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH LOX/LH2Engine Type: DaFY5-1 DaFY6-2 DaFY20-1 (Main) YF-75DaFY21-1 (Vernier)Engine Thrust (kN): 740.4x4 2961.6 742 (Main) 78.5x211.8x4 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 426 Overall Length (m): 54.838Fairing Diameter (m): 4.00

Long March 3C Launch Vehicle (LM-3C or CZ-3C)

The LM-3C is a three-stage launch vehicle. It differs from the LM-3B in its use of two strap-on boosters in its first stage rather than four. The LM-3C is launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC). The LM-3C can be used to deploy payloads into GTO.


Boosters 1st Stage 2st Stage 3rd Stage Diameter (m): 2.25 3.35 3.35 3.00Mass of Propellant (t): Propellant: N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH N2O4/UDMH LOX/LH2Engine Type: DaFY5-1 DaFY6-2 DaFY20-1(main) YF-75DaFY-21-1(Vernier) Engine Thrust (kN): 740.4x2 2961.6 742 (Main) 78.5x211.8x4 (Vernier)Lift-off Mass (t): 345Overall Length (m): 54.838Fairing Diameter (m) 4.00

Long March 4 Launch Vehicle (LM-4 or CZ-4)

The LM-4 is a three-stage launch vehicle. The first and second stages are adapted from the LM-3, with a liquid propellant third stage. The LM-4 can deploy a 2,790 kilogram payload into sun synchronous orbit (SSO), a 1,419 kilogram payload into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), or a 4,595 kilogram payload into low earth orbit (LEO). The LM-4 is launched from Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center. It was first launched in September 1988.


1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage Diameter (m): 3.35 3.35 2.90 Mass of Propellant (t): 182.07 35.408 14.3Propellant: Nitrogen tetroxide/UDMH Engine Type: DaYF-21B YF-22B (Main) YF-40AYF-23 (Vermier)Engine Thrust (kN): 2962 742 (Main) 100.846.1 (Vernier) Lift-off Mass (t): 249.2Overall Length (m): 45.8Fairing Diameter (m): 2.90/3.35

Small Launch Vehicle J-1

Small Launch Vehicle J-1 is a small three-stage launch vehicle with an orbit-maneuver motor. It is used to launch small satellites into LEO or SSO. The Small Launch Vehicle conducted its first test flight in 1997.


1st Stage 2nd Stage 3rd Stage OM Motor Diameter (m) 2.25 2.25 2.05 Mass of Propellant (t):Propellant: N2O4/HNO3 N2O4/HNO3 HTPB HTPBEngine Type: YF-2A YF-3 SPAB-14B OM-1Engine Thrust (kN): 1101.29 320.19 161.5 7.93Lift-off Mass (t): 85.42Overall Length (m): 31.28

China's Ballistic Missile Update - 2004

The Risk ReportVolume 11 Number 1 (November-December 2004)

Introduction

China continues to modernize its ballistic missile arsenal. Although limited in number and capability when compared to their American counterparts, China's ballistic missiles are being improved in a number of key ways, making them a growing threat to the United States. The newly-developed DF-31 is capable of targeting the west coast of the United States, while its longer-range follow-on, the DF-31A, once deployed, may be able to reach much of the continental United States. These missiles will be mobile and require far less launch-preparation time than China's older missiles, making these new weapons more likely to survive a preemptive strike. Furthermore, advances in warhead design and multiple independently-targeted reentry

vehicle (MIRV) technology (including a successful test of a MIRVed DF-21) appear intended to enable China to overcome U.S. missile defenses, allowing it to maintain a credible deterrent. Information and technology purchased from foreign companies and stolen from U.S. weapons labs has contributed greatly to the success of China's modernization program.

Modernization efforts

DF-21:

The DF-21 is a two-stage, solid-fuel, mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile carried in a canister on a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). It can be armed with a single 200-300 kiloton-yield nuclear warhead, is reported to be 10.7m long and 1.4m in diameter, to weigh 14.7 tons, and to have a range of 1800 km with a payload of 600 kg. It is estimated that 48 DF-21s have been deployed. In 2002, according to a report in Japan's Daily Yomiuri newspaper, a DF-21 equipped with several MIRV-ed warheads was successfully test-launched, making it the first Chinese missile to be successfully armed with multiple warheads. The DF-21 is capable of reaching U.S. military bases in Asia, as well as targets in Russia, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.

DF-31:

The DF-31 is a three-stage, solid-fuel, mobile missile that forms an essential part of China's modernization effort. It has an estimated range of 8,000 km with a 700 kg payload, and is designed to carry a single 200-300 Kt nuclear warhead. The DF-31 was successfully flight-tested in August 1999, reportedly using a dummy warhead and several decoys. China conducted two more successful flight tests of the DF-31 during 2000. According to a report in the Washington Times, a 2002 test of the DF-31 re-entry vehicle was unsuccessful, ending in a mid-flight explosion. The DF-31 offers a number of operational advantages over older Chinese missiles such as the DF-4. Instead of being launched from a single location, the DF-31 can be transported on its TEL to one of many predetermined launch sites, providing greater survivability in the event of a first strike. Furthermore, liquid-fueled missiles such as the DF-4 require greater launch preparation time. The DF-31 may also be the first Chinese missile to be armed with a warhead based on the W-88 or W-70, U.S. warheads the designs for which were stolen from American weapons labs. Despite a number of successful flight tests, deployment of the DF-31 has not come as quickly as previously predicted. Currently, the system is expected to be deployed before the end of the decade. The JL-2 is the submarine-launched version of the DF-31.

DF-31A:

The DF-31A is an extended-range version of the DF-31. It is estimated to have a range of around 12,000 kilometers; however, few details are known about the new system. It will likely replace the now-canceled DF-41 as the future mainstay of China's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal. The DF-31A is likely to supplement, rather than replace, the DF-5/DF-5A, China's existing ICBM. Like the DF-31, the DF-31A would provide mobility and a shorter launch preparation time. The DF-5 is stored in silos and elevated prior to launch, making it vulnerable to a preemptive strike.

DF-5:

China currently has approximately 20 DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1) ICBMs in service, most of which are believed to be targeted at U.S. cities. This two-stage, liquid-fueled missile has a range of over 13,000 kilometers, highest among China's missiles. The DF-5 Mod 1 will reportedly be replaced by a longer range version, the DF-5 Mod 2 (CSS-4 Mod 2), possibly by mid-decade.

Outside assistance

China's ballistic missile program has received outside assistance from a variety of sources. A 1999 report by the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China found that information supplied by several U.S. firms to China intended to improve the reliability of its space launch vehicles could also be used to improve China's ballistic missiles. A number of well-known U.S. defense and aerospace firms were convicted of transferring data and technology to China in violation of U.S. export control laws. In 2003, Hughes Electronics Corporation and Boeing Satellite Systems, for example, were forced to pay $32 million in penalties for 123 such violations during the 1990s, while Loral Space and Communications Corporation and Lockheed Martin Corporation received fines of $20 million and $13 million, respectively. In June 2000, Lockheed Martin was also fined for supplying China kick motor technology in 1994 that could help position satellites in orbit.

China's efforts to deploy MIRVed warheads on several of its missile systems may also have been assisted by information received from U.S. firms in the 1990s. Hughes, for example, helped China improve the fairing of its Long March 2E rocket. This technology could potentially be used with MIRVed warheads, as well as with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Hughes also provided China with diagnostic and failure analysis techniques that could help it solve other problems in its missile programs. Such transfers have become all the more troubling since the revelation that China may have developed miniaturized warheads based on designs stolen from U.S. weapons labs, making the MIRV-ing of even mobile missiles– such as the DF-31– a distinct possibility.

The transfer of sensitive technology to China is also conducted by individuals– often Chinese nationals– living and working in the United States, as well as US-based companies with ties to the Chinese military. In 1998, Means Come Enterprises, a Florida company run by two Chinese nationals, was investigated for exporting to China several thousand radiation-protected computer chips, devices that can be used in ballistic missiles and other weapon systems. In 2004, three Chinese citizens– John Chu, Sunny Bai, and Zhu Zhaoxin– were indicted for attempting to export to China GyroChips (angular rate sensors) and military-grade power converters, both items with applications in missile systems. While it is difficult to gauge the impact that these comparatively minor transfers might have on China's overall missile program, it is reasonable to assume that they, like the larger transfers, have the effect of reducing the amount of time and resources China is required to devote to research and development of its own.

Threat outlook

China's ballistic missile arsenal presents a limited, but increasing, threat to the United States. China's missiles can target both cities on the American mainland and U.S. military bases in Asia. China's ICBM arsenal has always been small when compared to those of the United States and Russia, a reflection of China's belief that a minimal nuclear deterrent is sufficient. China's ongoing modernization of its missiles will result in both qualitative and quantitative improvements. The increased mobility and brief launch preparation times of the DF-31 and DF-31A will boost the PLA's confidence in its ability to survive and respond to a first strike.

Whether China's long-range missiles increase in number will depend on whether China chooses to continue to deploy its more outdated systems alongside its modern missiles. This decision will likely be influenced by the United States' development and deployment of a national missile defense system, which, if effective, could put the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent into question. Concerns over missile defenses were probably also a motivating factor behind China's efforts to develop multiple warheads for some of its missiles and to test decoys and other penetration aids on other missile systems. These efforts have been spurred by China's recent advances in nuclear warhead design, which may have benefitted greatly from leaked information on U.S. warheads. A series of nuclear tests conducted from 1992 to 1996 showed that China was capable of building small, light warheads that could be MIRVed or deployed on mobile missiles. As a result, the number of warheads capable of hitting the United States may be increasing more rapidly than the rate at which new missiles are being deployed.

China's ballistic missile modernization must also be viewed within the context of Beijing's long-term objective of taking possession of Taiwan, through force if necessary. While China's nuclear force has historically been intended to deter an attack on or invasion of the mainland, recently deployed missile systems and others still under development appear designed to both intimidate Taiwan and deter the United States from taking military action if a conflict arises across the Strait. China has devoted extensive resources towards producing short-range ballistic missiles such as the DF-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9). China currently has approximately 450 of these short-range missiles, most– if not all– of which are based in the Nanjing Military Region facing Taiwan. China has used test-firings of these missiles to try to intimidate Taiwan and influence the island's politics, most notably during the run-up to Taiwan's 1996 presidential election. China's newer missiles are also intended to pose a threat to U.S. military forces stationed in the region, in order to convince Washington that any U.S. intervention over Taiwan would be costly.

China's Ballistic Missiles Update - 1999

The Risk ReportVolume 5 Number 3 (May-June 1999)

China's ballistic missiles pose a limited, but growing threat to the United States. Although in June 1998 Chinese President Jiang Zemin said that he and President Clinton agreed "we will not target each other with the strategic nuclear arms under our control," Robert Walpole, the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, said in September 1998 that China has about 20 CSS-4 (DF-5) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), most of which "are targeted against the United States." According to Walpole, China's "modernization efforts will likely increase the number of Chinese warheads aimed at the United States." These efforts

include the new 8,000 km range road-mobile Dong Feng-31 (DF-31), which will be able to reach western parts of the United States, and the 12,000 km range DF-41, which could reach any part of the United States. China will also be able to target the United States with its forthcoming submarine launched ballistic missile, the Julang-2.

Estimates place China's total nuclear arsenal at about 400 warheads, of which about 250 are on land-based ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and about 150 are tactical nuclear weapons of various sorts. Estimates of the numbers of specific missiles deployed vary widely.

Historical development

China's missile program began in 1956, when Chairman Mao Zedong urged Chinese industry to start building nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Within a decade, China had tested both an atomic bomb and a nuclear-capable missile, the Dong Feng-2. The latter benefitted greatly from Russian tutelage and technology. China would proceed to build a series of DF missiles, each of greater range than the last.

Since 1981, the mainstay of China's long-range ballistic missile force has been the DF-5, which brought China intercontinental range. China has about twenty of these missiles, most of which are targeted at the United States. According to a Pentagon study, China had more than 100 nuclear warheads deployed on operational ballistic missiles by 1997. (For further information on the historical development of China's missile forces, see "Chinese Missiles: Threat and Capability," Risk Report, vol. 1, no. 4, May 1995.)

The Chinese are now modernizing their ballistic missile forces. This modernization consists in part of an increase in numbers, but also includes a move to more mobile, solid-fuel missiles. In addition, China appears to be interested in deploying multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) or multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on ballistic missiles.

The importance of mobile, solid-fuel missiles is that they reduce the period required before launching a missile and make basing less vulnerable, both of which enhance survivability. Mobility also adds a dimension of strategic surprise, since missiles may be launched from more than one area. According to one report, China is currently upgrading its medium-range missile forces with improved mobile systems designed to hit targets in Russia, India, Taiwan and Japan. In addition, all of China's newest and future ICBMs - the DF-21, DF-31, and DF-41 - are or will be mobile. There are reports that China is trying to deploy MIRVs on the DF-31 and the DF-41. MIRV capability would enable the Chinese to increase the threat from their ballistic missiles by delivering more than one nuclear warhead on each. Because China has far fewer missiles than either Russia or the United States, MIRV capability would maximize China's strategic deterrent. MIRVs would also help defeat any potential missile defenses that the United States or its allies may develop and deploy, leaving the Chinese with more strategic freedom of manoeuver.

China's modernization efforts

China's missile modernization effort comprises three major missiles: the DF-21, DF-31, and DF-41. (For details on China's other missiles, see "Chinese Missiles: Threat and Capability," Risk Report, vol. 1, no. 4, May 1995.)

DF-21:

The DF-21, a land-based version of the submarine-launched JL-1, is a two-stage solid-fuel, mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile. With a range of 1800 km and a payload of 600 kg, the DF-21 has a diameter of 1.4m, weight of 14.7 tons, and length of 10.7m. It carries a single nuclear warhead with a yield of 200-300 kilotons. The missile underwent its first test flight in May 1985 and has subsequently been deployed. Estimates of the number of DF-21 missiles deployed vary.

DF-31:

In 1978, China began the development of another road-mobile, solid-fuel ballistic missile, the DF-23, which was renamed the DF-31 in January 1985. The DF-31 reportedly will be a three-stage solid-propellant ICBM, with an 8000 km range carrying a 700 kg payload. The mobile DF-31 would be based underground and before firing, the transporter-erector-launcher would move the missile to a preselected launch site. Its nuclear warhead is estimated to have a yield between 250 and 500 kilotons. According to a report in the Washington Times, quoting a classified report by the National Air Intelligence Agency, the DF-31 will carry at least one nuclear warhead and penetration aids, such as decoys or chaff. It will be able to hit targets along the entire western coast of the United States and in several northern Rocky Mountain states. It is estimated that the DF-31 may enter service by the turn of the century, and that 10-20 may be deployed. China is reported to have tested a solid-fuel rocket motor for the DF-31 on July 1, 1998, at the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center. The test occurred during President Clinton's visit to China. In late 1998, U.S. satellites reportedly detected Chinese plans to conduct an "ejection test" at the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Center, in which a missile is ejected outside its launch canister shortly before the engines ignite. When this article went to press, this test had yet to take place.

DF-41:

China is also developing the DF-41, which will be a road-mobile, three-stage missile. This solid fuel ICBM will have a 12,000 km range, with a reported payload of 500-700 kg. The DF-41 may also have multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles. It is scheduled to replace the DF-5 in the first decade of the 21st century. This missile will be capable of reaching most of the United States.

In addition to these three land-based missiles, China has been expending great effort to develop a longer-range follow-on to its current submarine-launched ballistic missile, the JL-1. This new missile will be called the JL-2. (For a discussion of the JL-1 and JL-2, please refer to "China's Submarine Forces," Risk Report, vol. 5, no. 2, March-April 1999.)

Help from outside

China's missile program has long benefitted from the acquisition of foreign technology and know-how. One important source of that help has been the United States. A select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, recently issued a 700-page classified report which concluded that China has obtained sensitive American military technology over the past 20 years. One of the main issues before the Committee was whether US missile technology was transferred to China as part of the satellite launch contracts of Hughes Electronics and Loral Space and Communications.

An investigation of Hughes by the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency and National Air Intelligence Center determined that the company directly aided China's rocket program when it collaborated with Chinese engineers to assess the causes of the 1995 failed launch of the Apstar II satellite. This help included the provision of specific details on modifying the fairing design and launch operations of Chinese rockets to improve their performance. It also included insight into US diagnostic techniques that would allow Beijing's engineers to detect flaws in launch vehicles, whether they were used to launch satellites or missiles. This insight was sufficient to help the Chinese to perform more accurate Coupled Loads Analysis and to improve the Chinese Finite Elements Model.

Outside help may also contribute to the Chinese capability to develop MIRV technology. It has been reported that several Chinese engineers were arrested for trying to steal SS-18 blueprints from the Yuzhnoye missile plant in Ukraine in the summer of 1996. The two-stage SS-18 can deliver up to 10 reentry vehicles, so acquisition of SS-18 technology could help China resolve its remaining hurdles to achieving MIRV capability.

The United States may also be helping China in its attempt to develop MIRV capability. According to the Washington Times, in an article citing a secret report by the Air Force National Intelligence Center, China's new rocket stage developed for a Motorola Iridium satellite created a "technology bridge" that could help China deploy multiple warheads on missiles. The new Chinese rocket booster, called a "smart dispenser" was built in 1996 for the Long March 2C/SD rocket. The dispenser has its own solid and liquid fuel propulsion, avionics and guidance package, and communications that could provide China with maneuvering capabilities "not previously available with past Chinese space launch vehicles." The Air Force report noted that with a few minor modifications, the dispenser could "easily become a credible post-boost vehicle." Air Force intelligence analysts estimated the dispenser could be used on CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBMs or on the new DF-41 missile.

Threat outlook

China's ballistic missile program poses a growing threat to the United States and its security interests. China targets the United States with its long-range missiles and targets US forces and allies in the Asia Pacific region with its medium- and short-range missiles. Although this threat currently is a limited one, it is growing.

A larger issue is the likely uses to which China's capability will be put. One clear rationale for the modernization of China's ballistic missile forces is to provide a better strategic deterrent against a global foe, in particular the United States. The Director of the Defense Intelligence

Agency, General Patrick Hughes, stated in 1999 that "China will modernize and expand its relatively small and dated strategic deterrent force, and the number of Chinese warheads capable of hitting the United States will increase." Although Chinese President Jiang Zemin said in June 1998 that China would no longer target the United States with strategic missiles, CIA officials have cast doubt on whether this pledge has been fulfilled.

A second objective for China is to protect its interests with respect to Taiwan. During a 1995-1996 winter visit to China by former Pentagon official Charles Freeman, a Chinese official asserted that the United States would not challenge China militarily over Taiwan because American leaders "care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan." In other words, China's strategic deterrent would give it the ability to act against Taiwan without fearing reprisals from the United States. It is important to note that the Chinese government's July 1998 paper on National Defense does not rule out the use of force to reunify mainland China and Taiwan. When discussing Taiwan before Congress in February 1999, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet noted that China "refuses to renounce the use of force as an option and continues to place its best new military equipment opposite the island." And according to one report, China conducted military exercises in late November through early December 1998 that included simulated missile firings against Taiwan and, for the first time, also included mock attacks against US troops in the region. Road-mobile CSS-5s (DF-21) and silo-housed CSS-2s (DF-3A) were included in the exercises, though the missiles were not actually fired. The exercises appear to be a sign that China is willing to go to war with the United States over Taiwan.

In the past few years, China has been vastly increasing its deployments of its DF-11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) missiles in its southern regions facing Taiwan. The Chinese military has reportedly stationed 150-200 M-9 and M-11 missiles in these regions and is planning to increase this number to 650 missiles over the next few years. By comparison, China had only 30-50 such missiles stationed in these regions in 1995-1996 when it launched missile "tests" into the waters off Taiwan. The new deployments show China's intent to use such missiles in a regional conflict.

--

Documents

China Missile Milestones