THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN JAPAN:

IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN STRATEGIC

RELATIONSHIP

Patrick M. O’Donogue

September 2000

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ISBN 1-58487-035-4

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FOREWORD

This study, written by Colonel Patrick M. O’Donogue,USMC, as a strategy research project, considers a topic ofkey importance to U.S. national security Japan’sagreement to cooperate with the United States on thedevelopment of a theater missile defense (TMD). Chinavigorously opposes this plan and insists that U.S.development of TMD and national missile defense systemswill destabilize its strategic relationship with the UnitedStates. China’s concerns center primarily on Japan’s andKorea’s development of deployable upper-tier missiledefense capabilities and technology, along with equipmenttransfers of any kind to Taiwan.

Colonel O’Donogue, a member of the Army War CollegeClass of 2000, does a remarkable job of addressing thismatter in a thoughtful, articulate, and comprehensivemanner. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased topublish his study as part of our Letort Paper series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

PATRICK M. O’DONOGUE, a colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,is the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7, I Marine ExpeditionaryForce. From August 1999 to June 2000 he was a student atthe U.S. Army War College. His military career began whenhe was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduationfrom Oregon State University. Lieutenant ColonelO’Donogue is a Naval aviator and served in OperationsDESERT SHIELD, SOUTHERN WATCH, and SILENTASSURANCE. He earned an M.A. in National Strategy andStrategic Studies from the Naval War College in 1994.

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THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN JAPAN:IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE U.S-CHINA-JAPANSTRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Introduction.

The role of theater missile defense (TMD) in theU.S.-China-Japan strategic relationship has taken onincreased importance as its development and deploymentby the United States and, most likely, Japan becomesinevitable. The August 1999 agreement between the United States and Japan to cooperate on research and development of a sea-based TMD system raised the stakes in what hasbeen, so far, a “war of words” on the need for TMD in Japan,between the United States and Japan, on one side, andChina, on the other. American and Chinese perceptions ofthe efficacy and utility of theater missile defense in nationalsecurity planning differ radically. U.S. officials and scholars argue that missile defense promotes national andinternational security. The Chinese, however, reject theassumptions and logic of U.S. support for national missiledefense (NMD) and TMD.

U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy relies on both the U.S.strategic nuclear triad and U.S. ballistic missile defenses,with the latter reinforcing the stabilizing effects ofdeterrence. Unlike the United States, China reliesexclusively on land-based missiles as deterrents. So Chinaperceives a strengthened U.S. defense against herland-based missiles as destabilizing, because such defensesdeprive China of her power to deter. However, U.S. officialsperceive a growing missile threat from “rogue nations,”while the threats of accidental and unauthorized launchesremain. The United States also has an inherent obligationto protect forward-based and forward-deployed forcesagainst the threat of ballistic missile attacks. The 1998

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North Korean Taepo Dong-1 launch gave credibility to suchthreats.1

Chinese officials argue, however, that these threats arenot serious enough to justify NMD and TMD development. 2

They insist NMD and TMD pose serious negativeimplications for global arms control and nonproliferationefforts, specifically the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks(SALT) II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), theMissile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). U.S. officials counter thatarms control and nonproliferation are in the interests of thecommunity of nations, and are not threatened by NMD andTMD.3

Growing technological cooperation between the twonations means inevitable Japanese help with developmentand eventual deployment of TMD. At a minimum, lower-tier TMD deployments in Japan will be continually upgraded toprotect U.S. troops and military assets. The Chinese haveexpressed a willingness to accept lower-tier TMDdeployment that protects U.S. bases. But China opposes thedevelopment and deployment of upper-tier TMD systems,especially sea-based versions, which could be employed toprotect Taiwan.4 Shu Zukang, Director General of theChinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Control,best expresses the Chinese position:

We do not envisage a dispute concerning development of whatwe would call genuine TMD. Here I am referring to thoseanti-theater missile systems used solely in a limited area. WhatChina is opposed to is the development, deployment andproliferation of antimissile systems with potential strategicdefense capabilities in the name of TMD that violate the letterand spirit of ABM and go beyond the legitimate self-defense ofrelevant countries.5

This statement lends de facto legitimacy to the sale ofPatriot PAC-3 missiles, a lower-tier capability, to Taiwan.The Chinese insist, however, that Taiwan’s status as part ofChina obviates its entitlement to the independent receipt of

2

arms. But China seems confident that it maintainssufficient force, both in aircraft and ballistic missiles, tooverwhelm any Taiwanese defense, which renders suchsales more an issue of principle than practicality.

Japanese adoption of TMD introduces new dynamicsinto the U.S.-Japan alliance. If brought to fruition in arational way, TMD will precipitate a broad range ofoperational initiatives, will require changes to bilateraldoctrine and will redefine the role of the JapaneseSelf-Defense Forces (JSDF). TMD poses the sameimplications for bilateral integration at the operational andsupport levels as the Defense Guidelines do, with even moretangible consequences for the bilateral alliance. TMD willundoubtedly influence the way the United States and Japan plan, procure, consult, and operate in the future. 6

This study describes the historical precedence that led to a decision to develop TMD and seriously consider itsdeployment in Japan. It then explores the strategic settingthat shapes the positions of Japan, China and the UnitedStates with regard to TMD. Next, it analyzes possibleeffects of TMD on the U.S.-Japan alliance. It then reviewsChinese objections to TMD and their implications for theU.S.-China relationship. Following this, it explores the U.S.options for TMD development and deployment. The studyconcludes with a discussion of the desirability of the UnitedStates maintaining a firm, open dialogue with China thataddresses cogent concerns that, if carefully handled, offerreasons for optimism.

Background.

Theater missile defense encompasses a range oflower-tier (endo-atmospheric–within the atmosphere) andupper-tier (exo-atmospheric–outside the atmosphere)systems intended to intercept and destroy short (<1000 km)and medium range (1000-3500 km) ballistic missiles. (SeeTable 1.) Relevant lower-tier U.S. systems underdevelopment include the U.S. Navy Aegis Standard Missile

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II, also known as Navy Area Wide, and the U.S. ArmyPatriot missile, PAC-3 variant (Table 2). These systemsadvertise effectiveness against missiles with up to a1,500-km range.

They do not fall under the provisions of the 1972Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. 7 Upper-tier TMD

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Type Missile Range

Short Range Ballistic Missile(SRBM) <1,000 km

Medium Range BallisticMissile (MRBM) 1,000 km to 3,500 km

Intermediate Range BallisticMissile (IRBM) 3,500 km to 5,500 km

Table 1. Types of Ballistic Missiles.

System Type Missile

Patriot PAC-3 Lower-tier Patriot

Navy Area Wide Lower-tier Standard MissileII Block IVA

Medium ExtendedAir DefenseSystem (MEADS)

Lower-tier MEADS

Theater HighAltitude AirDefense (THAAD)

Upper-tier THAAD

Table 2. U. S. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems.8

systems are in various stages of development. They includethe Navy Theater Wide system, again, an Aegis-basedsystem using the Standard Missile III and the U.S. ArmyTheater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. (SeeTable 2.) Both systems would incorporate hit-to-killtechnology in an exo-atmospheric vehicle to intercept longer range, higher speed missiles. 9

U.S.-Japan dialogue on missile defense, especiallytheater missile defense, is well-established. Limiteddiscussions began as early as 1983, at the inception of theStrategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”). 10Given theimpetus of the 1990-91 Gulf War and U.S. experience withIraqi SCUD ballistic missiles, in June 1992 the BushAdministration proposed Japanese (and South Korean)TMD deployments. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin visitedTokyo in October 1993 and asked for formal Japaneseparticipation in TMD. But trade tensions between the twocountries limited the U.S. request for participation to onlythree options: joint development; buying TMD “off-the-shelf” (primarily from U.S. manufacturers); or engaging ingradual technology exchanges. 11 This approach met with acool reception in Japan. In fact, the Japanese perceived it asa blatant U.S. attempt to obtain their technology.

The TMD alliance revived in 1994 with theestablishment of the bilateral U.S.-Japan Theater MissileDefense Working Group. The limited U.S. offers of 1993faded from view while the partners concentrated onexamining Japanese missile defense requirements and thepotential for bilateral collaboration. 12 But several years ofdiscussion produced no impetus to move talks beyond theexploratory phases. Then, in 1996, developments in NorthKorean nuclear and ballistic missile programs and thesteady growth of Chinese military capabilities, specifically a significant ballistic missile force and its demonstrated usein the Straits of Taiwan, proved to be a catalyst: the UnitedStates and Japan began serious TMD negotiations. Theevent that most riveted Japanese attention to the threatfrom ballistic missiles, however, was the North Korean test

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of a three stage Taepo Dong-1 missile (See Table 3) inAugust 1998.

Table 3. North Korean Ballistic Missiles. 13

The Japanese concluded that the most logical programfor bilateral technology cooperation would be a NavyTheater Wide (NTW) program. The JSDF’s MaritimeSelf-Defense Force possessed the necessary platforms(Aegis cruisers), and the program lacked sufficient maturity that would guarantee meaningful participation byJapanese industry. This pragmatic approach todevelopment maximized potential profits and assuredfavorable bilateral technology cooperation for Japaneseindustry. The U.S. impetus for pressing the Japanese onTMD was the presence of over 100,000 U.S. militarypersonnel in Northeast Asia, with 55,000 of those stationedin Japan (to include Okinawa). The test of the North KoreanTaepo Dong-1 ballistic missile sharpened Japanese publicattention and underscored the apparent need for protectionfrom unpredictable nations. Thus in August 1999 theJapanese joined the United States in a 5-year defense

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Missile System Range/Payload

SCUD B 300 km/single conventionalor chemical warhead

SCUD C 550 km/single conventionalwarhead

Nodong-1 1,300 km/single conventionalchemical or nuclear warhead

Nodong-2 1,500 km/single conventionalchemical or nuclear warhead

Taepo Dong-1 2,000 km/single conventionalor nuclear warhead

program to cooperate on research and development of atheater missile defense system. 14

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Figure 1. Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential North Korean Ballistic Missiles.15

Likewise, the Japanese became more aware of theChinese ballistic missile program. The Chinese threat didnot seem as immediate as the one from North Korea;however, Japanese officials realized that missiles directedat Taiwan could be redirected toward them and thatroad-mobile missiles now under development in Chinacould be targeted against Japan. Should the Japan-Chinarelationship change, the Japanese knew the risks.

The Strategic Setting.

East Asia in general, and Northeast Asia in particular,appears to be in a dangerous strategic setting. The regionalcharacteristics include major shifts in the balance of power,skewed distributions of economic and political power withinand between countries, political and cultural diversity, ananemic security apparatus, and widespread territorialdisputes over natural resource issues. 16Chances forescalation of tension in the area seem great, especiallywithout a U.S. military presence in the region. The 20thcentury history of East Asia proves that mistrust betweentwo or more potential adversaries can lead each side to takeprecautionary and defensively-motivated measures thatare perceived as offensive threats. 17These perceptions canlead to countermeasures in kind, begetting an action-reaction cycle that increases regional tensions and creates aself-fulfilling prophecy about the region’s volatility. 18Inview of all these variables that might fuel insecurities, EastAsia appears quite dangerous. Not only could dramatic andunpredictable changes in the distribution of militarycapabilities increase uncertainty and mistrust, but theimportance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies toalmost all regional actors could encourage a destabilizingcompetition to develop power-projection capabilities on theseas and in the skies. Because of the perception as offensivethreats, power-projection forces heighten spiraling tensions as opposed to weapons that can only defend a nation’shomeland. Perhaps even more important in East Asia thanthese variables are psychological factors (such as the

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historical mistrust and animosity among regional actors)and political geography issues relating to the Taiwanquestion, which make defensive systems (such as TMD) inthe region appear threatening to other nations’ security. 19

Policy Concerns.

Japanese policy seeks to negotiate the delicate balanceamong its own security; its political, diplomatic, andeconomic alliance with the United States; and its political,diplomatic, and economic relationship with China. Japanstill depends on American strategic security, although some would argue this relationship approaches “normalcy.” 20SoJapan’s long-term policy goal may be self-sufficiency, evenin matters of security. But would a TMD alliance betweenthe United States and Japan hasten self-sufficiency or delay it? Other questions quickly arise: Is TMD effective? Howmuch would it cost?

Chinese policy seeks to further the development ofChina into the preeminent Western Pacific/NortheastAsian regional power.21Broadly stated, China believesmissile defense programs will undermine strategic stabilityby weakening its one viable deterrent capability andprecipitate a new arms race. Specifically, the Chinese worrythat Japanese TMD programs will obviate their ballisticmissile force; undermine their regional security; lead toJapan’s eventual remilitarization; aid in the defense ofTaiwan; and retard current global arms control efforts thatreduce or check stronger powers such as the United States.

The United States would ideally like to participate in abilateral theater missile defense that protects its forwarddeployed and forward based forces in Northeast Asia, thatprotects the Japanese main islands, and that does notprecipitate a regional arms race. To this end, key U.S.concerns are proliferation of the ballistic missile threat,compliance with agreed-to nonproliferation protocols, anddeployment of a viable TMD system without precipitating a

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Figure 2. Estimated Ranges of Current ChineseBallistic Missiles.22

cycle of improvements and counter-improvements inAmerican and Chinese arsenals.

Considerations.

The United States and Japan estimate TMD will cost$15 billion for research, development and deployment based on the U.S. Navy Theater Wide system. But investment ofthis magnitude (approximately 15 percent of the totalJapanese defense spending from 2000-2006) may adverselyaffect other necessary defense programs (such as FS-X, anindigenous fighter program). Fiscal constraint becomes asignificant consideration in light of the stated Japanesepolicy of no increased defense spending over the next 5years.

The U.S. side expresses concerns that the Japanesepartnership may lead to redistribution of monies within theinternal U.S. defense budget among competing missiledefense programs. In other words, now that the Japanesehave committed to cooperative research and development ofan upper-tier naval system, the U.S. upper-tier land systemmay not receive the planned and budgeted amounts neededso that the partnership with Japan on the naval system canbe kept on schedule.23

Japan is also very worried over Chinese reaction to itspursuit of TMD. Chinese officials encourage some of Japan’s fears by maintaining that TMD in Japan would trigger aregional arms race. First, they argue TMD would requireChina to build up its own missiles to overcome the missiledefense system; they warn that this “action-reaction” cyclecould spin out of control.24Second, they claim Japan coulduse TMD technologies to manufacture offensive missiles.The Chinese would consider this very provocative, requiring a military response, most likely in the form of increasedinventories of Chinese missiles.

For its part, the United States views the deployment ofthe North Korean Nodong-1 and Nodong-2 SRBM’s and the

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development of the Taepo Dong-1 MRBM and Taepo Dong-2 ICBM (Table 3) as the most immediate and realistic threats

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Missile System(U.S. Name in

Brackets)Range/Payload

EstimatedNumber in

Service

DF-3 (CSS-2)

2,800 km/singlenuclear orconventionalwarhead

38

DF-4 (CSS-3) 4,750 km/singlenuclear warhead 12

DF-5/5A (CSS-4) 13,000+ km/singlenuclear warhead 10

DF-21/21A (CSS-5)

1,800 km/singlenuclear orconventionalwarhead

8

DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6)

600 km/singlenuclear orconventionalwarhead

4

DF-11/M-11 (CSS-7)

300 km/singlenuclear orconventionalwarhead

unknown

DF-318,000 km/single orMIRV nuclearwarhead(s)

unknown

DF-4112,000 km/single orMIRV nuclearwarhead(s)

unknown

Table 4. Chinese Ballistic Missiles.25

in the region. Chinese CSS-5 and CSS-6 could also targetJapan, but Taiwan dominates Chinese targeteering. Roadmobile missiles under development in China (DF-31 andDF-41) (Table 4) are unlikely candidates for targetingJapan and by extension, U.S. forces, but they do retain thecapability.26

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Theater MissileDefense.

The current U.S.-Japan security relationship basesitself on the bilateral review that took place from October1994 to April 1996, the resulting East Asia Strategy Report(Nye Initiative), and the follow-on U.S.-Japan JointSecurity Declaration. This declaration attempted todemonstrate that the 2-year review of the securityrelationship had produced an alliance with great politicaland operational capability.27An initiative in the JointSecurity Declaration called for a review of existingGuidelines for Defense Cooperation, seeking to expandthem to include a focus on cooperation in responding toregional contingencies, as well as the direct defense ofJapan. Concurrent negotiations quickly incorporated TMDcooperation into the Guidelines review process, whichculminated in August 1999 when the United States andJapan signed a TMD cooperation agreement. Thisagreement calls for shared fiscal and technologyresponsibility in the development of a sea-based TMD.

U.S. Positions. U.S. proponents of TMD argue that,regardless of its impact on U.S.-China relations, or its effecton global arms control, or its effects on atomic states’nuclear strategy, TMD remains essential to defenddeployed U.S. forces overseas. Proponents further claimthat Japanese TMD offers the potential to enhance thebilateral security arrangement and provide funding,technology, and customers for an extremely costly andcomplex system.

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Advocates maintain that TMD provides a bulwark for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence against newly emerging“rogue states,” against emerging and established limitedballistic missile threats, and against chemical andbiological threats for which nuclear deterrence alone doesnot offer sufficient deterrence. Second, TMD protectscoalitions from intimidation. Third, TMD strengthens thereciprocal commitment for the United States to defendJapan and for Japan to defend forward-based U.S. forces.Fourth, assuming the U.S. deployment of TMD to protect its globally-based forces, TMD cannot be deployed to protectU.S. personnel without also affording protection to theJapanese population. Fifth, without TMD, Japan may feelmore vulnerable to limited ballistic missile attack and maybecome predisposed to develop its own nuclear deterrent. 28

Critics of Japanese TMD argue that the severity of thethreat does not justify the cost. Further, they assert thatTMD, as a tenant of counterproliferation, is faulty. TMDwill overwhelm Japan’s limited national securitycapabilities and leave Japan unprepared to handle thestrategic responsibilities inherent to TMD. The cost of TMDis prohibitive for Japan. And, finally, critics assert that onlyarms reduction, not deterrence, guarantees security.

Japanese Positions. The advantages of TMD dominatethe Japanese debate. The apparent lack of dissent resultsfrom the exceptional concern engendered by the NorthKorean Taepo Dong-1 missile flight test in August 1998 andthe apparent benefit of TMD development to Japaneseindustry. Such solidarity will be temporary, however, as thehigh cost becomes clear.

Proponents of TMD stress that a viable missile threatexists from North Korea and China that must be contained.Second, they point out the potential for a significant amount of bilateral technology exchange with the United States,noting that industrial cooperation, to include licensedindigenous production of TMD components, will be worthbillions of yen.29

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Opponents of TMD argue that the prohibitive cost willnot allow funding for other essential defense programs.They point out that upper-tier TMD systems prohibited bythe 1972 ABM Treaty will limit the usefulness of TMD toJapan. Most importantly, adoption of TMD systems willprecipitate confrontation with China. 30

Alliance Implications. The complexity of TMD isstaggering. Each partner must contemplate a broad rangeof detailed issues, not the least of which include formulationof an effective bilateral command and control strategy; thepotential for truly integrated combined missile defenseoperations; and bilateral military connectivity that faroutpaces what is now practical or even imagined in thealliance relationship.31

TMD will be effectively employed only if there exists aseamless and unimpeded command and control of disparatesensors and weapons, commanded by both nations, andcontrolled by a variety of interconnected militaryorganizations, doctrinally linked; only if Japan’s individualSelf-Defense Forces cooperate with each other and withU.S. forces in unprecedented intimacy; and only if Japan’sair defense system rebuilds from the ground up. 32If andwhen all this happens, Japan will achieve a significant rolein regional and global arms control and nonproliferationinitiatives. Likewise, it will bolster the U.S. nuclearumbrella. What may start as an alliance managementinitiative may become an alliance-defining initiative, on theleading edge of the revolution in military affairs as part of asystem that boasts unprecedented connectivity,interoperability and seamless command and control. 33

Strategic Implications for the U.S.-ChinaRelationship.

TMD Transfers to Taiwan: “Umbrella over Taiwan.”Theissue that arouses the most Chinese passion is Taiwan.Chinese nationalists vehemently claim Taiwan. Theydeflect any outside influence with charges of “interference

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in internal Chinese affairs” and “an affront to Chinesesovereignty.” The rulers of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) will address the Taiwan issue in terms of an “internalaffair” and rebuff all attempts to legitimize other states’contact with Taipei. This approach serves, in turn, to uphold the legitimacy of the mainland regime and further isolateTaiwan from vital sources of economic, political, andmilitary support.

China worries that if it wavers the slightest on Taiwanand the territory achieves viable independence, then otherregions of China seeking autonomy, such as Tibet andperhaps Xinjiang, would be encouraged in their struggles.The specter of internal disruption always looms large in theCCP’s leadership calculus.

The possibility of Japanese TMD equipment ortechnology being sold or transferred to Taiwan elicits avisceral, menacing reaction from the Chinese. Chinamaintains that TMD technology and equipment transferred to Taiwan would exacerbate missile proliferation, violatethe spirit and intent of the MTCR, and encourageTaiwanese ambitions for independence. Further, asea-based Japanese TMD might also be used to protectTaiwan in the event of a military confrontation betweenTaiwan and mainland China, despite China’s ability tooverwhelm Taiwan with sheer numbers of missiles. Theinclusion of Japan, and by extension the United States, inany cross-strait conflict dramatically raises the strategicstakes. This political issue, along with the potential forquick escalation to crisis proportions, causes the greatestconcern for the Chinese, not actual TMD missileperformance.

The importance of Taiwan in Chinese calculations aboutTMD cannot be overstated. The nature of the cross-straitconflict defies the usual arguments about the offense-defense balance and the “security dilemma.” In sum, thearguments that the buildup of defensive weapons and

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adoption of defensive doctrine should not be destabilizingfall on deaf Chinese ears.

According to conventional wisdom, defensive weaponsdestabilize because they shore up the territorial status quoby deterring or physically preventing aggressors fromachieving revisionist goals, whereas offensive weaponsdestabilize because they threaten the status quo. 34China,however, retains as its primary policy objective theprevention of Taiwan declaring permanent independencefrom the Chinese nation. A cross-strait relationship thatwould legalize and freeze the territorial status quo re mainsthe main threat to Chinese policy. China employs militaryand economic coercion as her primary means of counteringthat threat. Beijing considers traditionally defensiveweapons in the hands of Taiwan and any potential politicalallies (the United States and Japan) as dangerous, becausethey give Taiwan officials additional confidence in theirefforts to legitimize the territorial status quo. 35

TMD in Japan would reduce China’s ability to threatenTaiwan with ballistic missiles, her primary means ofcoercion. Significantly, the ship-based system underdevelopment causes acute worry because of its large“footprint” and easy deployability. Effectiveness of thesystem aside, China agonizes about the psychological andpolitical effect the system would have on Taipei’s attitudesabout seeking diplomatic latitude, as well as U.S. andJapanese attitudes about cross-strait relations. 36

TMD Cooperation Will Lead to Japan’s EventualRemilitarization. The Chinese perceive a shift in theU.S.-Japan alliance dating back to the mid-1980s. Theymaintain that de facto licensed coproduction programs suchas the F-15J and Patriot PAC 2+, coupled with changes inalliance structure precipitated by the Nye Initiative and thesubsequently revised Defense Guidelines, show awillingness, perhaps even an eagerness, by the UnitedStates and Japan to “normalize” Japan’s security.

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TMD heightens this concern when viewed in theaggregate with other U.S.-Japan alliance developments.These include the new Japanese LST (landing ship, tank), aship capable of launching and recovering aircraft; thefamily of Japanese space launch vehicles (SLV) regarded aspotential dual-use platforms; and the Japanese purchase ofPatriot PAC-3 missiles with their limited lower-tiercapability.37China views such developments as precursorsto the relaxing of Japanese law. 38

Indeed, U.S. pressures on Japan to accept a greatershare of the burden of its own national defense in effectencourages Japan to become self-sufficient. Further, in the56 years since the end of World War II, it has becomeinevitable that the post-war U.S.-Japan securityrelationship will change, especially in view of Japan’sgrowth as a global economic power. Wealth begets theimminent potential for military power.

TMD and the prospect of meshing national commandand control systems, both for regional defense and as an“early warning” for proposed U.S. NMD, mean that Japanwill develop capabilities beyond what its presentconstitution allows.39Complementary to TMD is a space-based sensor system to aid in early warning and detection ofincoming missiles. Japanese law prohibits themilitarization of outer space. Satellite sensors to warn of ahostile missile launch and perhaps to help guide anintercept constitute a necessary part of a TMD system.

China recognized these overt harbingers of change. Italso recognized the implications of the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs future diplomatic blueprint, Challenge2001.40Accordingly, the Chinese assert that TMDrepresents another, albeit significant, step by Japan to takeits national security into its own hands. The implications for China of a militarized, self-sufficient Japan defy descrip-tion. Japan’s technical ability, industrial potential, andgeographic position would inhibit the Chinese desire toremain militarily preeminent in Northeast Asia. The most

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discussed development of any “remilitarization” of Japanand the TMD implications of that action concern anindependent Japanese ability to build and deliver offensiveballistic missiles. China maintains that the technologytransfers of TMD components are directly applicable tooffensive systems. Hence, China views U.S. cooperationwith Japan on TMD as nothing less than U.S. support foremergent Japanese military power. In response, the UnitedStates reassures that all MTCR regimes would be followed.The United States contends that, in fact, Japan’sindigenous space program and its family of SLVs exhibitmore compatibility for this type of technology transfer thanTMD.41

TMD Will Lead to an Independent Japanese NuclearDeterrent. The Japanese debate on security normalizationand nuclear weapons development is in its infancy and theimplications of self-sufficiency remain unspoken. As theonly nation to endure nuclear attack, Japan can articulatethe most compelling reasons for not developing such acapability.

But China maintains that Japan revealed itspragmatism regarding the use of nuclear devices when itproceeded with the commercial development of nuclearpower in the 1970s. Perceptual differences here again takeon exceptional significance. Old hostilities from the waryears of the 1930s and 1940s do not allow for a Chineseacceptance of Japan’s benign use of nuclear power absentU.S. restraints.

More pragmatically, however, Japanese nuclear powerexhibits remarkable transparency (transparency addressesthe ability to verify that materials are not used for nuclearweapons making, etc.). So mutual confidence measures andtransparency exercises could keep the “nuclear genie in thebottle” and limit regional fears. Further, TMD obviates theneed for an independent Japanese deterrent by shoring upthe U.S. nuclear deterrent.42

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TMD Undermines China’s Nuclear Deterrent. This is thecentral issue to the U.S.–China missile defense debate. TheUnited States relies on both offensive forces (the strategicnuclear triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles,and bombers) and defensive forces (ballistic missiledefenses), with the latter providing reinforcement to thestabilizing influence of deterrence. China derives itsdeterrence solely from an offensive land based missile force.

These differences are stark. China’s reliance on only oneform of nuclear deterrence makes any attempt to restrain itdestabilizing. China consistently maintains TMDundermines its offensive nuclear deterrence. China’sdeclared no-first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons contradictsthis argument, however, unless its declared policy is falseand China, in fact, targets Japan (active targeting isconsidered a violation of NFU protocols). So China’sobjections to TMD reveal a significant inconsistency inChinese doctrine.43

TMD Will Provoke Changes in Chinese Nuclear Doctrine. Chinese responses to Japanese TMD suggest support for the evolution of Chinese nuclear doctrine from one of “minimum deterrence” to one of “limited deterrence.” Minimumdeterrence, according to China, means possession of a smallnumber of nuclear warheads sufficient to inflictunacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities. 44Intruth, Chinese missiles can presently do little else. As thepotential of Chinese weapons systems increases, however,there exist indications that the Chinese are building a morerobust limited nuclear deterrent. Limited nucleardeterrence (in concert with the technological and economiccapability of the Chinese state) originally envisioned theability to inflict unacceptable damage with severalwarheads aimed at enemy cities. It since matured into amore sharply defined concept that now promises limitedcounterforce warfighting capabilities. Limited deterrencenow means having enough capability to deter conventionaltheater and strategic nuclear war and to control andsuppress escalation during a nuclear conflict. 45

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This shift invites several questions. Has the Chinesenuclear stockpile expanded beyond the commonly accepted75-100 warheads available for targeting against Taiwan(and Japan) to a force that is more consistent with a limiteddeterrence capability (250-300 warheads)? We do not know,but remain convinced it has. The exceptional circum-spection of the Chinese about the size and capability of theirballistic missile force breeds mistrust. But doesn’t this shiftto greater capability justify TMD? Japan remainsunconvinced of benign Chinese intentions, while Chinainsists its declared NFU policy and strictly defensivenuclear weapons offer indications of peaceful intent thatshould be accepted at face value.

China’s threat of building to “limited” nucleardeterrence is a thinly veiled suggestion that Japanese TMDmay provoke an even greater increase in the number ofChinese missiles, the method by which they are deployed,and the technical capabilities of the missiles (addition ofMultiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles [MIRV], decoys,penetration aids, etc.). China developed and deployed itsfirst generation of missiles in 11 years. 46The secondgeneration will take somewhat longer. Forecasted with aninitial operating capability during the year 2000, China’smove to modernize occurred well before TMD became asignificant issue.

On the other hand, it can be argued that China isprogressing towards nuclear modernization anyway. Itcame to the conclusion to do so independent of, or minimallyaffected by, TMD considerations. Thus all the rhetoric about U.S.-Japan TMD could be viewed as a ploy to justify theexpansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, which would happenanyway.

TMD Undermines Arms Control. The most articulateexpression of Chinese sentiments comes from AmbassadorShu Zukang, who asserts that “the U.S. development ofmissile defenses does not contribute to global stability norwill it serve the interests of the U.S. itself.” 47He contends

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that NMD/TMD violates the 1972 ABM treaty, consideredby the Chinese as “the most important arms control protocol being implemented,” and that the loss of this treaty will lead to a disruption of the strategic balance between the UnitedStates and Russia.48This will, in turn, result in a greaterinstability for all countries. Specifically, Sha asks, “How can you expect progress in arms control and nonproliferationwhile you yourself are developing NMD at full steam? It isjust wishful thinking.”49Shu also hinted that rather thanengaging in an arms race, should the United States proceedwith its NMD/TMD deployments, “it would be quite possible for China to review its policies on various arms control,disarmament and nonproliferation issues, including FMCTnegotiations.”50Chinese officials also assert that TMDdeployments will lead to a complete halt in global armscontrol and nonproliferation, with direct implications forSTART II, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, MissileTechnology Control Regime and Fissile Material Cut-offTreaty. Chinese officials have gone so far as to declare“NMD will also cause many nations to build up their nuclear forces and further retard the disarmament process.” 51

Significantly, China avoids any overtures to participatein multilateral ABM controls and continues to upgradeSoviet designed surface-to-air (SAM) missiles for theballistic missile defense role. Since the U.S.-Russianagreement on threshold testing of missile defense systemsclarified permitted capabilities, Chinese arguments aboutundermining the ABM Treaty have lost their relevance. 52

China shows deep concern that should TMD/NMDundermine the ABM Treaty, then Russian ratification ofSTART II and participation in START III would beobviated, with negative consequences for Beijing.Specifically, by withdrawing from the START IIIpreliminaries, the Russian threat to the northern Chineseborder would return, albeit on a smaller scale than duringthe 1960s to 1990s rift between the two. This would divertChinese resources from development and modernization

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and inhibit the current free flow of technology and capitalbetween them.53

TMD missile legitimacy also received a challenge underthe 1987 MTCR. Some states construed TMD developmentas a form of missile proliferation. The United Statesmaintains that TMD development protocols do notconstitute a violation of the MTCR and will not contribute to missile proliferation.54

For its part, the United States maintains that it is notrushing toward upper-tier TMD deployment in Japan andthat it remains undecided about selling lower-tier TMD toTaiwan. The only TMD deployment decision the UnitedStates has made addresses lower-tier TMD deployments inJapan to protect U.S. troops and facilities. Taiwan cannot“plug into” an existing TMD system, thus Chinese views ofTMD should not be based on the misperception that theUnited States seeks to build a regional TMD architecture. 55

Possibilities.

The United States has four viable options in regard toNortheast Asia theater missile defense. First, the UnitedStates and Japan should continue to follow a path toeventual deployment of a viable TMD system in Japan andSouth Korea. The essential U.S. obligation to protect itsforward-based military personnel demands an effectiveTMD in these two countries. Anything less could beconstrued as gross negligence of a country’s obligation toadequately protect its forces from a known, viable threatthat is economically and politically feasible to address.Likewise, intermingling of the American and Japanesepopulation in Japan renders it impossible to protect onewithout extending that protection to the other.

The alliance partners, however, should be exceptionallycognizant of the remaining alternatives that would makethis bilateral choice more palatable to China and thus avoidescalating the arms race. The second alternative would be to

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pursue THAAD, rather than NTW. If effective, this couldprovide the home islands and the U.S. forces protection. Yet, THAAD’s relative immobility and inability to extend its“footprint” to Taiwan would be less likely to exacerbateChinese concerns about real or perceived alliance supportfor Taiwanese independence.56Of course, this would raisenew U.S.-Japan concerns, particularly with cooperativedevelopment and less Japanese industrial participation in a more mature system. But it may be worth this price not toovertly antagonize Beijing.

A third choice, less likely since August 1999, isproduction of TMD unilaterally by the United States.Chinese analysts have consistently pointed out thatU.S.-Japan coproduction of TMD carries a fundamentallydifferent and more provocative political meaning for Chinathan if the United States produced such systems withoutJapanese help as part of the U.S. strategy of protecting itsforward deployed forces. This directly challenges the“protect us, protect them” pillar of U.S.-Japan TMDpartnering.

The fourth option calls for no deployment of TMD at all.Proponents stress that this would obviate the Chinesearguments about arms control and nonproliferation and put real pressure on Beijing to be genuinely transparent aboutmissile development and deployment. Reconsideration ofdeployment might also open up an opportunity to exploitChinese concerns and encourage Beijing to participate in aformal trilateral security dialogue.

In contrast, the very real and more likely possibilityenvisions continued Chinese obfuscation on its militaryaffairs. The overwhelming desire to build, deploy, andmaintain the military trappings of a “great power” remainsso engrained in the Chinese leadership’s psyche that anyrisky attempt at placating Chinese fears with genuinemeasures of conciliation would more than likely be fruitless. Given the Taiwan problem and overwhelming superiority of U.S. military power, China shows the deep-seated desire to

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develop its missile capability to a significant degreeregardless of U.S.-Japan TMD cooperation.

Conclusions.

By persistently increasing U.S. capabilities andjudiciously incorporating increased Japanese capabilities in the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States can fulfill itsobligation to its forward-deployed forces and allies inNortheast Asia. The United States needs to be cautious,however, about what new roles Japan plays in the alliance,for TMD will fundamentally change that relationship. Theultimate responsibility of an American President is toprovide for the safety of the American people and the armedforces by deterring attack on the homeland and allies. Byincreasing U.S. capabilities, the United States will be better able to handle future regional crises and prevent them fromhappening. Consistent actions in the face of inflammatoryrhetoric will avoid the destabilizing effects of an arms raceand backsliding on arms control and nonproliferationagreements. Ultimately, such actions will contributemightily toward long-term peace and stability in NortheastChina.

ENDNOTES

Editor’s Note: For the reader/researcher seeking additionalinformation on this subject, please review the following publishedarticle: Thomas J. Christensen, “Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’sSecurity,” Orbis, Winter 2000, pp. 79-90.

1. Barbara Opall-Rome, “One on One,” Defense News, February 1,1999, p. 22.

2. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense, and Regional Stability.Second U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament andNonproliferation,” linked from the Center for Nonproliferation Studiesat the Monterey Institute of International Studies; available fromhttp://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/conf/uschina2/index.htm;Internet; accessed December 7, 1999, p. 2.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

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4. “Japan Moves,” China Daily, November 18, 1998, p. 4.

5. “Pyongyang’s Missile Program Threatens Area Peace,” IndianExpress, October 9, 1998, sec. A, p. 1.

6. Patrick Cronin, Paul Giarra, and Michael Green, “AllianceImplications of Theater Missile Defense,“ in The U.S.-Japan Alliance:Past, Present, and Future, Patrick Cronin and Michael Green, eds., NewYork: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp. 171-172.

7.Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. 172.

8. “Fact Sheets for Ballistic Missile Defense Systems” linked fromthe Ballistic Missile Defense Organization available fromhttp://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/meads.html; Internet;accessed November 30, 1999.

9. Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. 172.

10. Robert Wall, “U.S.-Japan Agree on Cooperative MissileDefense,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 23, 1999, p. 48.

11. Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. 172.

12. Ibid., p. 173.

13. Ibid., p. 50.

14. Wall, p. 48.

15. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat andResponse, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November1997, p. 7.

16. Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East China,” International Security, Vol. 23,Spring 1999, p. 49.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

19. Ibid., p. 50.

20.Paul Giarra, “Interim Report from an Evolving Alliance—Japan’s Changing Security Policy: Listening All These Years,” chapterfrom unpublished book, furnished December 1999.

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21. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense . . .,” p. 13.

22. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat andResponse, p. 11.

23. The ideas is this paragraph are based on remarks made by aspeaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series at the ArmyWar College, AY 1999-2000.

24. Giarra, p. 10.

25. “Chinese Ballistic Missiles” linked from the Center forNonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of InternationalStudies; available from http://www.cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/pubs/chinanuc/bmsl.htm; Internet; accessed December 5, 1999.

26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat andResponse, p. 10.

27. Cronin, Giarra, and Green, p. ix.

28. Ibid., p. 174.

29. Ibid., p. 177.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 180.

32. Ibid., pp. 181-182.

33. Ibid.

34. Christensen, pp. 64-65.

35. Ibid., p. 66.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Michael J. Green, “Theater Missile Defense and StrategicRelations with China,” in Restructuring the U.S-Japan Alliance:Toward a More Equal Partnership, Ralph A. Costa, ed., Washington,DC: CSIS Press, 1997, p. 116.

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40. Green, p. 116.

41. Green, pp. 116-117.

42. Ibid., p. 117.

43. Ibid., p. 115.

44. Alastair I. Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking,’”International Security, Vol. 20, Winter 1995/1996, p. 10.

45. Ibid., p. 19.

46. Ibid., p. 36.

47. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense . . .,” p. 4.

48. Ibid., p. 14.

49. Ibid., p. 4-5.

50. Ibid., p. 5.

51. Ibid.

52. Green, p. 116.

53. “Missiles, Theater Missile Defense . . .,” p. 14.

54. Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Who’s Behind China’s High-Technology‘Revolution’?,” International Security, Vol. 24, Summer 1999, p. 104.

55. Ibid., p. 13.

56. Christensen, p. 76.

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CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. International treaty whereby thesignatories agree not to conductnuclear device testing of any type.

EPCI Enhanced Proliferation ControlInitiative. An initiative that enablesthe U.S. Government to requireexport license of all items, even thosenot on the control list in the ExportAdministration Regulations, if theexporter knows, has reason to know,or has been informed that the itemswill be used in a nuclear missile.

Endo-Atmospheric Within the earth’s atmosphere. Generally regarded as less than 60miles altitude.

Exo-Atmospheric Outside the earth’s atmosphere. Generally regarded as greater than60 miles altitude.

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

JTMD Joint Theater Missile Defense. Theintegration of joint force capabilitiesto destroy enemy theater missiles inflight or prior to otherwise disruptthe enemy’s theater missileoperations though an appropriatemix of mutually supportive passivemissile defense; active missiledefense; attack operations; andsupporting command, control,communications, computers andintelligence measures.

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GLOSSARY

Lower Tier Those missile defense systemsdeveloped for engaging theaterballistic missiles in anendo-atmospheric role, usually in thedescent phase of flight. Missilesengaged are usually shorter rangeand lower speed (warheads traveling< 5 km/sec)

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime. An informal, non-treaty associationof states that have an establishedpolicy or interest in limiting thespread of missiles or missiletechnology and of limiting the risks of proliferation of weapons of massdestruction by controlling transfersthat could make a contribution to thedelivery of such weapons.

NAW Navy Area Wide. A U.S. Navylower-tier missile defense systemunder development by the UnitedStates. Deployed from Aegis-classcruisers, it uses a modification of anexisting surface-to-air missile toengage theater ballistic missiles.

NMD National Missile Defense. A U.S.Program, run by the Department ofDefense Ballistic Missile DefenseOffice (BMDO) tasked withdeveloping a system(s) that willprotect the continental United Statesfrom ballistic missile attack.

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty. A treatydesigned to limit the formation ofmultinational nuclear forces andprevent the uncontrolled spread ofnuclear weapons.

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NTW Navy Theater Wide. A U.S. Navyupper-tier missile defense systemunder development by the UnitedStates and Japan. Deployed fromAegis-class cruisers, it uses amodification of an existingsurface-to-air missile to engagetheater ballistic missiles

PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability 3. Anupper-tier missile system underdevelopment by modifying a versionof the Patriot surface-to-air missilefor intercepting theater ballisticmissiles.

SLV Space Launch Vehicle. Thosevehicles whose primary purpose is tolaunch into space with cargoes otherthan weapons.

TBM Theater Ballistic Missile. A missilewhose target may be within a giventheater of operations.

THAAD Theater High Altitude Air Defense. A U.S. Army upper-tier missile defensesystem that utilizes an exo-atmospheric “hit-to-kiss” missile andwarhead to intercept theater ballistic missiles.

Upper-tier Those missile defense systemsdeveloped for engaging missiles in anexo-atmospheric role, either in theboost, ascent, or descent phase offlight. Missiles engaged are usuallylonger range and higher speed(warheads traveling > 5 km/sec)

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