Children's Hospital Okland, Dec 30, 2013 Court of Appeal Filing by Family online Document

8/13/2019 Children's Hospital Okland, Dec 30, 2013 Court of Appeal Filing by Family online Document

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IN THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALFIRST APPELLATE DISTRICTDIVISION

LATASHA WINKFIELD,Petitioner,v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIAFOR THE COLINTY OF ALAMEDA,

Respondent,

CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL 8. RESEARCHCENTER AT OAKLANDReal Party in Interest.

FROM THE SUPERIOR COIJRT OF THE STATE OFCALIFORNIA, COTINTY OF ALAMEDAHONORABLE EVELIO GRILLOCASE NO. RPl3 -707s98

PRELIMINARY OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR \ryRIT OF'MANDATE, PROHIBITION, SUPERSEDEAS, OR OTHERAPPROPRIATE RELIEF AND TO REQUESTFOR IMMEDIATE STAY

*Gary A. Watt (SBN 191265)gw aIt@arch erno rri s . c o mTiffany J. Gates (SBN 279447)ARCHER NORzuSA Professional Law Corporation2033 North Moin Streot, Suits 800Walnut Creek, California 94596Telephone: 925,930,6600Facsimile: 925,930,6620

Douglas C. Straus (SBN 96301)Brian W. Franklin (SBN 209784)Noel M. Caughman (SBN 154309)ARCHERNORzuSA Ptofessional Law Corporation2033 North Main Street, Suite 800V/alnut Creek, California 94596Telephone: 925,930.6600Facsimile: 925.930.6620

ATTORNEYS F'OR REAL PARTY IN INTERESTCHILDREN'S HOSPITAL RESEARCHCENTER AT OAKLAND


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COURT OF APPEAL, FIRgT APPELITE DISTRICT, DIVISION court of Appol Care Numbcr:ATTORNEY oR PARTY WTHoUT ATToRNEY lNams, sll gar numbaL and addss):

-Gary A, Watt (SBN 191265)Archer Norrls2033 North Main Street, Suite 800Walnut Creek, CA 94596TELEpHoNE No.i (925) 930'6600 FAx No.lopnonr,; (925) 930-6620E-MA|L ADDREss (oprioael)r 9Wtt@archernorris, comArroRNEy FoR rNa'o' Children's Hospital Research Center at Oakland

Superlor Courl CaFe Numb3RP1 3-707598FOR COURTUSE OI\,LY

PETITIONER: LATASHA WI NKFI ELDRESPoNoENT/REAL PARTY lN INTEREST: SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIAFOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS(check one): X tlrtnl CERTIFIoATE SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFIoATE

Notice: Please read rutes 8.208 and 8.488 before completing this form. You may use this form for the inltialcertfcate in an appeal when you file your brlef or a prebrlefing motion, applicatlon, or opposition t9 such amotion or appltcalion ln the Court of Appeal, and when you flle a petition for an extraordinary writ. You mayalso use thi-s-form as a supplemental certlflcate when you learn of changed or additlonal informatlon that mustbe disclosed.

TO BE FILED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1. This form is being submltted on behalf of the following party (name): OAKLAND2. a, X there are no lnterested entitles or persons that must be llsted in this certlficate under rule 8,208,b, n lnterested entltiEs or persons requlred to be lleted under rule 8.208 are as follows:

Full name of interestedentlty or prson

APP.OOS

Nature of inerest(Explatn):

other1 0 percent orjustices

(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)

n Continuod on attachment 2,The underclgned oertlfles that the above-llsted persons or entlties (corporatlons' partnershlpe, flrms, or anyassoclation, but not lncluding government entltles or thelr agencles) have elther (1) an ownerchip lnterestofmore in the party lf it is an entlty; or (2) a flnanclal or other interest in the outcome of the proceedlng that theshould consider in determining whether to disquallfy themselves, as deflned ln rule 8.208(eX2)'Date: Decemer',ZOlsGary A, Watt

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PARry OR ATTORNEY)Pge I of I

Form Approved for Option.l U3Judlclal Coundl of CslifomiAPP-000 fRev. Jenurry 'l, 2oo9lCal Rulo8 of Courl, rules 8.200, 8.48swww.coudnlo as ,gov

Amer@n LeglNol, lnc.www Formsl4/orlllow, com

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED ENTITIES OR PERSONS


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I There Is No Question That California s Statutes HaveBeen Followed and That Ms. McMath Is Dead,....,....,,,,,,.., l1The Legislature Has Never Provided a Long-LastingParental Veto When [t Comes to Terminating theOperation of a Ventilator After a Proper Determinationof Death,., l5Any Purported Constitutional or Federal StatutoryRights Asserted in the Petition Do Not Warrant anImmediate Stay Because There Are No Such Rights ..,,.,,. , l8A. Parents Do Not Possess Fundamental Rights To

Defne Death, Determine Death, and To DecideWhen a Hospital Can Remove a Ventilator froma Brain-Dead Patient. l8

B The California Statutes Defining Death andCreating a Reasonably Brief Period for FamilyTo Gather at Bedside Before Ventilation CanBe Removed Do Not Implicate the FirstAmendment, the Fourth Amendment or the

II

III,

CONCLUSION

Fourteenth Amendment.Death Is Not a Disability

253l

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TABLE OF'AUTHORITIES

United States Supreme Court CasesChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye v, City of Hialeah(19e3) so8 U.S, s20.,.,,,,,..,Cutter v, Wilkinson(2005) s44 U.S, 70eEmployment Dv. v, Smith(19e0) 494 U.S. 872,.,,,.,,,..

Page

,.,,25

28

25

20

22

Prince v. Mas sachusetts(re44) 321 U,S, 158 ,..Washington v, Gluc ks berg(te97) s2l u.s. 702.,,,,.Watson v. Maryland(1910) 218 U.S. t73.....,.,...United States Court of Appeals CasesBlackhawk v, Pennsylvana(3d Cir, 2004) 381 F,3d 202,.,...,,.,,

18,19,27

26

Carnohan v, Unted Sttes(9th Cir, 1980) 616 F.2d 1120 .,.,...,, .. ... '.',...,,.',..21Combs v. Homer-Center Sch, Dist,(3d Cir. 2008) s40 F.3d 23L.,.,..,...

-ll-

,,.,.26,27,29


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Mtchell y. Clayton(7th Cir. 1993) e95 F,2d772

Rutherrd v. Unted States(lOth Cir, 1980) 6t6F.2d 4ssStormans, Inc, v, Seleclcy(9th cir. 2009) s86 F,3d I 109

Barber v, Superior Court147 Cal,App.3d 1006, 1014 (1983)

2t

2l

Nat'l Ass'nr the Advancement of Psychonalysis v, Calirnia Bd,of Psychology(gth Cir,2000) 228F,3d 1043 ......,,. ,',,, .,..,'..,..,,.21'Pickup v, Brown(9th Cir, 2013) 728F.3d 1042 .,,,.,,. 20,24

25,28United States District Court CasesWashingtonv. King Cnty, Hosp.(W,D, Wash, 1967) 278F , Supp. 488.,.,...,... ,.,,,',,20California Supreme Court CasesReid v. Google, Inc,

(2010) 50 Cal,4th stz,.,..,.,,,California Court of Appeal Cases

24Dorty v, Superior Court(1983) 145 Cal.App,3d273 ..,,,..,..,ir,'.,..,,, 1, 10,23Reed v, Superior Court(2001) 92 Cal,App,4th 448,455 '..,..,...,, 6StatutesAmericans with Disabilities Act(42 U.S,C, $ 12101)..'

-l1l-

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Cal, Health & Safety Code $ 1254.4,.,.,,r,.,,..,.r.,r'.,,,r...r,.r.,,.r,r. . l, passmCal. Health & Safety Code $ 7180,,,,,. .r,..,,,.r.1.,,.. l, passimCal. Health & Safety Code $7181,.,.r,,.rir,,,r,r.,,1,,.. ..r ,1, pAssimRehabilitation Act of 1973(29 U,S,C, $ 794) rr..,.r.r','.,. ,,,,.,...., 3lOther Authoritles14 Witkin, Summary of Cal, Law(lOth ed. 2010) V/ills, $ 11 ,,,,...,, ..,,,.,.,.].'..,..,.i.''..,,,...,,,,'.,22The President's Council on Bioethics, Controversies n the Deterrninationof Death (January 2009), fn, ii, available at

http ://bi oethi cs, georgetown. edu/pcb e/rep orts/death/chapter 1, html. .,,, ... 23

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INTRODUCTIONPetitioner/Appellant Latasha Winkfield's request for a stay

compelling Children's Hospital and Research Center of Oakland( Children's Hospital ) to keep Petitioner's deceased daughter JahiMcMath on a ventilator for an indefinite periocl of time should be deniedfor multiple reasons:

o Ms, McMath has already died, so no irreparable harm resultsfrom turning off the ventilator,

o 'I'he Superior Court did not commit any reversible error muchless prejudicial error. Rather the Court not only followedHealth & Safety Code sections 7180,7181 & 1254,4 andDority v, Superior Court (19S3) 145 Cal,App,3d273, but alsoprovided additional safeguards by appointing an independentneurologist from Stanford Medical Center to examine thedeceased.

o No due process violation occurred here because the SuperiorCourt conducted an evidentiary hearing, received evidenceflom three physicians (Petitioner offered no contrary evidence)and required Children's Hospital to prove the fact of death byclear and convincing evidence,

. There is no violation of any constitutional or federal statutoryrights raised for the first time in this Court because there is no


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parental, religious, or privacy right to reject the scientificdeflrnition of death developecl by medical professionals andenacted by the California Legislature into State law withappropriate saf'eguards,l

The Superior Court correctly concluded, afler three days of hearingsand based on uncontroverted evidence, that Ms. McMath is, sadly, deceasedHer brain has not received oxygen for well over two weeks according to theS uperior Court-app ointed expert, Stanford neurolo gist Paul F'isher'.Accordingly, the Superior Court ruled that the decedent's ventilator can beturned off after 5:00 P.M, today. Turning off a ventilator that assists indelivery of oxygen to a dead person causes no irreparable harm-regardlessof the parental or religious belie of the decedent's family.

California llealth Safety Code sections 7180-81 defining deathand Alameda County Superior Court Judge Evelio Grillo's decision thatMs, McMath is dead do not violate any constitutional or due process rightof Ms, McMath or Petitioner. No constitutional or federal statutory claimswere raised below, and there is no constitutional right to define death basedon parental or religious belie rather than medical science. Petitioner wasafforded three evidentiary hearings, as well as the benefit of a court-

I Children's Hospital, of course, had to prepare this opposition without thebenefrt of reviewing the petition. Nevertheless, as set forth herein, thisCourt should deny the petition without further delay.

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appointed expert. There was clear and convincing evidence before JudgeGrillo that Ms, McMath had died-that she had sufTered total andirreparable cessation of brain function, Despite hearings conducted overthree days, Petitioner offered no oontrary evidence.

Petitioner has had ample time to find another facility that mightaccept her deceased daughter s body. No such facility has been identifiedand it is not plausible that a medical facility will be located that is willing tocare for such a deceased person, Ordering any further protection for Ms,McMath s body would imply that it is plausible that the United StatesConstitution allows parents/family members, not State legislatures andmedical professionals, to define death. Because there is neither precedentnor logic for such an astonishing assertion, any purported constitutionalchallenges raised for the first time on appeal, as well as the claims raisedbelow, lack any probability of success on the merits--despite the tragedy ofher daughter s death, And because Ms. Winkheld s daughter isirreversibly dead, no irreparable harm is threatened by allowing thetemporary restraining order to expire at 5:00 PM today, Given that theseessential prerequisites for a stay are not present, the petition should bedenied.

As to the purported constitutional and federal statutory issues, Petitioner issimultaneously appearing in the United States Court for the NorthernDistrict of California today, seeking a temporary restraining order andpreliminary injunction based on the same claims.3


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BACKGROUNDThe California Legislature has declared that An individual who has

sustained. .. irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,including the brain stem, is dead, (Health & Saf. Code, $ 7180, subd, (a),)Three doctors, including a court-appointed child neurologist from StanfordUniversity Medical Center, have determined and stated under oath thatthirteen-year-old Jahi McMath has sustained an irreversible cessation of allfunctions of the brain, including the brain stem. To put it more plainly, thethree doctors have determind that Ms, McMath is, unfortunately, dead.There is no contrary evidence.

After the initial diagnosis of death by treating physicians, PetitionerLatasha Winkfield applied for, and the Alameda County Superior Courtissued, a temporary restraining order, requiring Respondent Children'sHospital to maintain Ms. McMath on a ventilator pending furtherproceedings. The Superior Court subsequently appointed a preeminentchild neurologist, Dr, Paul Fisher, to provide an independent examinationof Ms. McMath. Dr. Fisher determined that Ms, McMath has suffered aknown, irreversible brain injury meeting all criteria for brain death' Dr,Fisher testif,red to that effect in court, including responding to cross-

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examination by Ms. Winkfield's counsel.3 Other testimony was taken,evidence received, and the matter submitted to the Superior Court fordecision.

The Superior Court, applying the highest evidentiary standard-clear and convinoing evidence-ruled that the temporary restraining ordershould be lifted because such evidence leads inexorably to a singleconclusion, that [Ms, McMath] suff'ered brain death and wasdeceased , , , , Death having been conftrmed, the Superior Court ruled thatthe ternporary restraining order will expire at 5:00 p.m, on Monday,December 30, 201 3. In other words, given the irrefutable fact of Ms,McMath's death, then after such time, Children's Hospital is no longerunder any court order to keep the ventilator going.

It is against this fctual and procedural background that Ms,V/inkfield asks this Court to postpone removal of the ventilator bycontinuing the trial court stay, Her request is based upon her desire that herdaughter be maintained on a ventilator indefrnitely, despite theconhrmation of her daughter's death. As diffcult as it undoubtedly is toaccept given the sudden nature of the tragedy, Ms. McMath is dead.

' Petitioner stipulated that Dr. Fisher had conducted a proper examinationand followed accepted procedures in determining that Ms. McMath died,(Exh, 26,p,172, lines 1-18)-5-


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There are two ways to seek a stay from a qourt of appeal: (1) requestthe stay by a petition for a writ of supersedeas ancillary to an appeal; or (2)request the stay from the appellate court ancillary to a petition forextraordinary relief on the merits, (Reed v. Superior Court (2001) 92Cal,App,4th 448,455.) Regardless of the procedure selectd by Petitioner,it follows logically that the same standard should apply in both situations,And a writ of supersedeas may be granted only upon a showing that (a) theappellant would suffer ineparable harm absent the stay, and (b) the appealhas merit, (Eisenberg et al., Cal, Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs('fhe Rutter Group 2013) l7:279, p. 7 -57 .) Applying this standard here, astay could only issue if Ms, Winkfield oan demonstrate that she wouldsuffer irreparable harm absent the stay and that her petition has rnerit-things she cannot do,

First, there is no threat of ineparable harm to justifr extension of thestay. Nor is there any serious question of a constitutional right to compelmedicalprofessionals to disregard science and law and continueministering to a deceased body. However the claim is articulated, there isno danger of any ineparable harm here, nor is there any chance of successon the merits.

PROCED HISTORY STA OF'F'ACTSOn Deernber 9, 2013, Jahi McMath, a minor, was admitted to

Children's Hospital to undergo a surgical procedure, (Exh. 3, p.20,line 3)

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On December 1l ,2013, following complications from that procedure, Ms,McMath was diagnosed as brain dead by Dr, Shanahan, a physician atChildren's [Iospital, (Exh, 9, p. 48) This diagnosis was confirmed by anindependent evaluation, conducted by Dr. Ileidersbach the following day.(Exh. 8, p, 45) After providing at least eight days for Ms, McMath's familyto gather at her bedside, Children's Ilospital notifed the family of itsintention to withdraw the ventilator that is supplying oxygen to Ms,McMath's body. (Exh, 10, P. 5l)

On Friday, December 20,2013, Latasha Winkfreld, the mother ofJahi McMath, filed a verified petition and ex parte application with theSuperior Court for Alameda County, seeking (1) an order authorizing Ms.Winkfreld to make medical care decisions for Ms. McMath and (2) aninjunction prohibiting Children's Hospital from removing Ms, McMathfrom the ventilator, (Exhs, l-6) Children's Hospital filed its opposition tothe petition and application that same day. (Exh. 7,p,36) In its opposition,Children's Hospital argued that there were no medical care decisions left tobe made for Ms. McMath because she had been cliagnosed as brain deadwithin the meaning of the applicable California statute-Health and Safety

Code section 7180,4 (Exh, 7,pp,39-41) Children's Hospital turther arguedthat all of the proper procedures for such a diagnosis-includinga All futther statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code, unlessotherwise indicatecl.

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independent confirmation by another physician, a diagnosis made inaccordance with accepted medical standards, and a reasonably brief periodof accommodation for the family of the deceased-had been followed, (/d.,citing 7180,7181, 1254,4)

The matter was heard by the court that same day and, following thehearing, the court issued an order temporarily restraining Children'sHospital from changing Ms. McMath's level of medical support, (Exh, l l,pp. 56-57) The order also continued the hearing to Monday, December 23,2013, and directed the parties to attempt to contact other physicians,unaffiliated with Children's Hospital, and determine whether any of themwould be available to conduot yet another evaluation of Ms. McMath. (/d,)

On December 23, the court reconvened the hearing. At the hearing,the parties agreed to allow Dr. Paul Fisher, a physioian and the Chief ofChild Neurology for the Stanford University School of Medicine, toconduct another independent evaluation of Ms, McMath. Accordingly, byan order issued that same day, the court appointed Dr. Fisher to conduct anindependent evaluation, (Exh, 16, pp. Il7-18) Dr, Fisher examined Ms'McMath that same afternoon, The December 23rd order also continued the

hearing to the next day and, by separate order, the court extended therestraining order until Dccember 30, 2013, (Exh, 16, p. I I 8; Exh. 17, pp.l l9-20)

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At the continued hearing on December 24, the court received severalexhibits and heard testimony from Drs. Shanahan and Fisher. (See Ex},.26,pp.171-73;see also Exhs. 19-25 fexhibits received by court]) Both doctorstestified that Ms. McMath was brain dead, (Exh.26,pp, 17t-73) The courttook the matter under submission, (Id,)

In a verbal order from the bench on December 24,2013 that wasconfirmed in a subsequent written order, the court denied Ms. Winkfield spetition for an injunction prohibiting Children s Hospital from removingMs. McMath from the ventilator, but stayed the effect of thc order untilMonday, December 30,2073, at 5:00 p,m,, when the previously-extendedtemporary restraining order would no longer be in effect. (RT 123:21-127 :5; Exh. 26, pp. I 8a-85)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTThere is no basis for an immediate stay. Contrary to the petition,

Ms. Winkfield s daughter is irreversibly dead,s ln addition, Judge Grillometiculously ensured that all of the following procedures and protectionsoccuned and committed no legal error,

o He imposed the highest civil evidentiary standard, clear andconvincing evidence and held three contested hearings;5 As previously noted, because of the late filing by Petitioner, Children sHospital has not seen the petition nor had time to evaluate it, Nevertheless,this opposition should demonstrate why no immediate stay is warranted andthis Court should immediately reject the petition.

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He snsured compliance with sections 7180,7181 & 1254.4;He sua sponte appointed an independent physician toexamine the deceased when state law requires only anindependent confirmation by another physician,He followed the Court of Appeal's decision in Dority v.Superior Court (1983) 145 Cal,App.3d273, and Petitioneroffered no evidence, let alone a showing of a reasonableprobability of diagnostic eror or failure to follow recognizedmedical protocols;No showing has been made that any missing medicalrecords were material-Dr, Fisher's independent examinationis conclusive. No medical records can bring Ms. McMathback to life, nor can any alleged access to such records.iusti$'an immediate stay.

In addition, the constitutional and federal statutory rights (notpursued in the Superior Court) do not justifu an immediate stay because nosuch rights exist. Therefore, this Court should deny the petition.

LEGAL ARGUMENTThe Superior Court here detcrmined, using the highest civil

evidentiary standard-clear and convincing evidence-that Ms. McMath isdead, (See Exh. 26, p. l82,lines 1 l - 1 3) It appointed a well-respectedneurologist from Stanford Medical Center, Dr, Paul Fisher, to conduct ariindependent examination of Ms. McMath. In so ruling, the Superior Courtacknowledged the essential fact that should not be lost on this Court whenexamining Ms. Winkfield's claim of irreparable harm and the need to issuea stay-that dead people do not need additional health care treatment:

oo

o

o

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It would appear to be self evident that wherelegal death has occurrecl, one cannot , , . makehealth care decisions on behalf of a deceasedperson, i.e,, a person for whom additionalmedical treatment would be futile.

(See Exh. 26,p,169, lines 20-22,fn,2,italics original)Yet that is what this Court is now being asked to do-issue a court

order requiring that Children s Hospital continue to treat Ms. McMath as ifshe were still alive. Extension of the stay means that Children s Hospitalmust continue to administer futile additional medical treatment simplybecause Ms. Winkfield continues to insist that her claughter is not dead,(See Exh. 3,p,2l,lines 2l-25;p.22,line 1;p,23,lines l-21) But noirreparable harm oan come to a dead person from the failure to provideadditional medical care aimed at sustaining hfe. And assuming that thequestion of Ms. McMath s death rnay have been open when Ms. Winkfieldfrrst went to court seeking the TRO, that question has now been defintivelyclosed. There is nothing left to resolve with respect to medical treatment orthe question of whether Ms. McMath is dead. And because she is dead,there is no basis to extend the stay or to order Children s Hospital to refrainfrom taking Ms.McMath off of the ventilator

I. There Is No Question That California s Statutes Have BeenFollowed and That Ms. McMath Is DeadPetitioner Winkfield sought an order from the Superior Court

requiring Children s Hospital to continue to treat her deceased daughter as

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if she was still alive, The Superior Court conducted hearings and tookevidence establishing that all pertinent statutory procedures were followedand that Jahi McMath is dead.

The relevant statute, Section 7180 provides that [a]n individual whohas sustained , , , irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,inoluding the brain stem, is dead, ($ 7180, subd. (a).) That section alsostates that [a] determination of death must be made in accordance withaccepted medical standards, ($ 7180, subd. (a),) And section 7181 requiresindependent confirmation by another physioian when a determination ofbrain death has been made. ($ 7l8l ,) Notably, section 7l 8l does notrequire confirmation by an independent physioian (i.e,, a physician who isnot affiliated with the hospital where the original diagnosis of death wasmade), Rather, as its language plainly states, section 7181 requires only anindependent confirmationby another physician. ($ 7181, emphasisadded; Reid v. Google, Inc, (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512,527 lreciting settledcanons of statutory construction and explaining that a statute's words aregiven their usual and ordinary meaning ].)

Children's Hospital followed that statutory requirement bere Ms,Winkfield went to court, On December I I ,2013, Dr, Robin Shanahanmade a determination that Ms, McMath had suffered irreversible cessationof all functions of her entire brain, including her brain stem, (See Exh' 9,p.48, lines l2-14) The very next day, anotherphysicia -, Robert

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Fleidersbach- independently confirmed through his clwn testing that Ms,McMath had suffered an ineversible cessation of all the functions of theentire brain, including her brain stem and had no respiratory brain stemfllnction. (See Exh, 8, p.45, lines l8-20)

Nonetheless, the Superior Court appointed Dr. PaulFisher toconduct his own independent examination of Ms, McMath pursuant tosections 7l 80 and 7181. (See Exh, 16, p, 1 17 [enoneously referring tosections 7800 and 7801 ]; see also Exh, 26,p.171, lines 16-18 fexplainingthat Dr, Iisher was appointed as the independent 71 81 physician ]) Thus,although section 7l8l does not require it, Judge Grillo provided Ms.Winkfield with additional non'statutory protection and process'

As a result, on Decembet 23,201'3, Dr' Fisher performed anindependent examination of Ms, McMath for the purpose of determiningwhether, under the applicable medical standards, she is brain dead. Hisconclusion that Ms. McMath is brain dead is unequivocal:

Overall, unfortunate circumstances in 13-year-old with known, irueversible brain iniury andno\ry complete absence of . , . brainstemfunotion. Child meets all criteria for brain death,by professional societies and State ofCalifomia. , . . By my independent exam, child[is]braindead..,.

(See Exh. 19, p. 128, emphasis added)On December 24,2013, the Superior Court conducted a hearing that

included the testimony (and cross-examination by Winkfield's counsel) of

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Dr, Fisher and Dr. Shanahan, (See Exh. 26,p,171, line 24 through p.173,line l8) The court admitted into evidence Dr, Shanahan's and Dr, Fisher'sexamination notes, a litany of exhibits on brain death from medicaljournalsand similar sources, ancl Dr, Shanahan's declaration as well as consultationand examination notes. (Exh, 26,p.171, line 25 through p.l72,line 1l)Ms. Winkfield's counsel cross-examined both Dr, Fisher and Dr, Shanahan.(Exh. 26, p. l72,lines I l-20) And, as the court's order indicates, [a]t theconclusion ofl Dr. lisher's cross-examination, [Ms. Winkfield's] counselstipulated that Dr, fisher conducted the brain death examination and madehs brain death diagnosis in accord with accepted medical standards, (Exh,26,p.172, lines 16-20; R'f 55:t-12.) Dr, Fisher testified that Ms. McMathis brain dead under accepted medical standards, (Exh. 26, p. 172,lines 19-20) After further proceedings, Dr, Shanahan also testified that Ms'McMath is brain dead under accepted medical standards, (Exh. 26,p.173,lines l3-14)

There have been three separate statutory determinations that Ms'McMath is brain dead: one by Dr, Shanahan, one by Dr' Heidersbach, andone by Dr, F-isher, The Legislature requires only two: an initial diagnosisand independent confirmation by another physician, ($ 7l8l ') By itsplain language, section 7l8l does not require an independent physician(i.e,, a physician who is not affrliated with the hospital where the originaldiagnosis of death was made); instead, it requires only an independent

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confirmation." ($ 7181.) Here, Dr, Shanahan made the initialdetermination and Dr, Heidersbach provided the independent confirmation.Yet ening on the side of due process and caution, the Superior Courtprovided for an additional determination by an independent, court-appointed expert-the preeminent child neurologist, Dr, Fisher. He toodetermined that Ms. MeMath is brain dead.

Life-sustaining rnedical treatmcnts-such as a ventilator-serye nopurpose when a patient is dead, Neither does a stay when the sole pulposeof the limited duration injunction is to ensure that the determination ofdeath had been correctly made, Here, there is no room to dispute that thethrice-confirmed diagnosis of death is correct. Therefore, given that theSuperior Court provided due process in the form of contested hearings withprocedural safeguards such as testimony under oath and cross-sxamination,and a requirement by clear and convincing evidence, this Court shouldreject any arguments that statutes were not followed or that procedural dueprocess was denied.II. The Legislature Has Never Provided a Long-Lasting ParentalVeto When It Comes to Terminating the Operation of aVentilator After a Proper Determination of Death

Given that Ms, McMath is dead, the basic question before this courtbecomes an issue of who gets to decide when to terminate a ventilator-theparents of the deceased or a hospital? The gravamen of Ms. Winkfield'scunent request for an immediate stay boils down to her assertion that

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diagnosis of death notwithstanding, it is the parents of the deceased thathave the right to decide when a ventilator can be removed, There is nostatutory support for such a contention and any new constitutional orfederal statutory rights asserted in the petition cannot be raised for the flrrsttime on appeal.

As to any alleged parental statutory right, section 1254,4, enacted in2008, strikes the appropriate balance between a family's need for areasonably brief period of time to handle the shock of death and ahospital's right to terminate a ventilator at a time it deems appropriate,(See Stats. 2008, ch. 465, $ l,) Section 1254,4, subdivision (a) states thatA general acute care hospital shall adopt a policy for providing family ornext of kin with a reasonably brief period of accommodation . . . from thetime that a patient is declared dead by reason of irreversible cessation of allfunctions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, in accordance withSection 7l 80, through discontinuation of cardiopulmonary support of thepatient. Subdivision (b) defines a reasonably brief period very specificallyand narrowly'. a 'reasonably brief period' means an amount of timeaffbrded to gather family or next of kin al the patient's bedside, ( 1254,4,subd. (b), emphasis added.) And during this reasonably brief period ofaocommodation, a hospital is required to continue only previouslyorderecl cardiopulmonary support, (1254,4, subd. (a), emphasis added')No other meclical intervention is required, ($ 1254'4, subd, (a).)

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f'his statutory scheme makes it clear that it is thc hospital-not thedecedent's family or next of kin-that retains the right to discontinuecardiopulmonary support, As to when such support is terminated, thestatute provides that the hospital's exercise of its professional discretion issubject only to providing a rsasonably brief period for family and next ofkin to gather to be with the deceased patient at bedside.

A fortiori, section 1254,4 does not require an indefinile period forpurposos other than gathering at bedside, such as maintaining a ventilatoruntil a parent decides to terminate support or completes a search for analternative hospital willing to receive the now-deceased patient andcontinus ventilation indefinitely. Nor does the stattlte vest the finaldecision in the parents. The plain language of the statute also makesanother thing abundantly clear: no hospital is required to provide anymedical intervention beyond the preexisting cardiopulmonary support,Thus, any procedures required to prepare a deceased patient for transport toa different hospital are also not rcqued of Children's Hospital,. Here, Children's Hospitalprovided Ms, Winkfield and the other

family/next of kin with the statutorily required period of accommodation'

As the Division Chief of the Critical Care Division, Dr. Sharon Williams,stated under oath, Children's Ilospital provided the family and next of kinwith far more time than the 'reasonably brief period of accommodation'fbr the family to gather at Ms. McMath's bedside called fbr by the CFIO

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Guidelines and California Health & Safety Code section 1254.4. (See Exh.10, p, 5 1, lines 6- I 1) Dr, Williams, who signed her declaration some eightdays after hospital stafinformed Ms. MoMath's family and next of kin ofher death, noted that the eight-day time period was far in excess of the 2'3days that Children's fHospital] has considered to be rcasonableaccommodation in all brain death cases in the past 10 years, (1d.) Ms,Winkfield never objected to Dr. Williams' testimony during the SuperiorCourt proceedings,

Taken together, sections 7180,7181 and 1254.4 demonstrate that Ms.Winkfeld does not possess any statutory right to tell Children's Hospitalwhen it can terminate the ventilator, As with the determination of death,Children's Hospitalhas at alltimes complied with the statutoryrequirements. And because Ms, Winkfield has no statutory right to definedeath or to decide when the ventilator can be removed from her deceaseddaughter, there is no basis for a stay aimed at enabling her to achieve thosevery ends,III, Any Purported Constitutional or Federal Statutory RightsAsserted in the Petition Do Not Warrant an Immediate StayBecause There Are No Such Rights

A. Parents Do Not Possess Fundamental Rights To DefineDeath, Determine Death, and To Decide When a HospitalCan Remove a Ventilator from a Brain-Dead PatientIt is true that the Due Process Clause provides heightened

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rights and liberty interests. (Washingtonv. Gluclcsberg(1997) 521 U,S.702,720,) However, as the nation's highest aourt put it, oowe 'have always

been reluctant to expand the concept ofsubstantive due process becauseguideposts for responsible decision making in [the unchartered area ofmcdical self-determination] are scarce and open-ended, ' (Ibid,) Courtsmust therefore 'exercise the utmost care whn asked to break new groundin this lreld . . , , ' (Ibid,)

Substantive due process analysis contains two primary features-acareful description of the asserted fundamental interest and anexamination of whether the right as narrowly de/ned is 'deeply rooted inthis Nation's history and traditior,' . , .such that'neither liberty nor justicewould exist if they were sacrificed. ' (Glucksberg, supra, 521 U'S. at pp,720-721.) Where the nation's history and traditions tend to demonstrate thecontrary of the assertecl right, no suoh right will be found, (Id. atp,723,)This is particularly true when to announce a new fundamental right, a courtwould have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strikedown the considered policy choice of almost every State' (Ibid.)

Here, the gravamen of Ms. winkheld's constitutional claims is

presumably thalunder the Due Process Clause and/or First Amendment, aparent, not a state legislature, should define death, And similarly, aparent's beliefs, not accepted medical practices, should determine whendeath has occurred. Thus, goes Ms, Winkflreld's constitutional reasoning, a

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parent-not a hospital-has a funclamental right to decide when hercleceased child will be taken off of a ventilator,

Even the most cursory examination of the Nation's history andtraditions confirms there is no such fllndamental right. Rather, history isreplete with examples of legislative prerogatives taking precedence overparental control, In the health care arena, for example, parental rights havelong yielded to state legislative powers. (Pckup v, Brown (9th Cir. 2013)728 F.3d 1042,1060,) So while parents do have a constitutionally-protected right regarding the care, custody, and control of living children,that right is 'not without limitations. ' (Ibid.) Thus, over parentalobjection, states may require compulsory vaccination of children, (Prince v,Massachusetts (1944)321 U,S. 158, 166.) And parental beliefbnotwithstanding, states may also intervsne when a parent refuses neaessarymedical care based on spiritual belie. (Jehovah's Witnesses ofWashington v. King Cnty. Hosp. (W.D, Wash, 1'967) Z78F, Supp, 488, 504(per curiam), affd, (1968) 390 U.S, 598 (per curiam).) Indeed, it hasalways been regarded as constitutionally unremarkable that a state hascontrol over parental cliscretion in dealing with children when theirphysical or mental health is jeopardized;' (Parham v. J,R. (1979) 442 U'S'5 84, 603,) In all such instances, the state's interest does not give way tothat of a child's parent,

The constitution does not even provide a fundamental right for

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patients To choose a particular form or method of health care treatment forthemselves, (Nat'l Ass'nr the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v.Clrnia Bd. of Psycholog (9th Cir, 2000) 228F,3d 1043, 1050; Mitchellv, clayton (7th cir, 1993) 995 F,2d 772,775.) Even when terminally illpatients have asserted substantive due process rights to certain drugs andtreatments that states have refused to allow them to take, courts haverejected such claims as falling well within the area of governmentalinterest in protecting public health. (Rutherrd v, United States (1Oth Cir,1980) 616 F ,2d 455, 457; see also Carnohan v. United States (9th Cir, 1980)616 F .2d 1120, ll22 (per curiam),) Thus, that many of the rights andliberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomydoes not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important,intimate and personal dceisions are so protected . . . . (Glucksberg, supra,521 U.S, at pp. 727-728.)

If patental beliefs concerning fheir livng children's health mustoften yield to legislative mandates contrary to such beliefs, then surely theirbelie as to when a child is dead and when a ventilator can be removedwill also similarly yield to legislative judgments, In other words, there canbe no fundamental right of the sort Ms, Winkfield urges this Court to create,After all, there can be no question that state legislatures can regulate thedetermination of when dealh has occurred, how that determination is madeandwhen a ventilator can be removed from a brain dead patient, It is too

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well settled to require discussion at this day that the police power of thestates extends to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly

those which closely concern the public health. (Watson v. Maryland(l9lo) 218 u,s. 173, 177.)At bottom, the governmental action that Ms, Winkfeld challenges in

claiming a fundamental right is the State of California's enactment of thedefrntion of a dead porson under Health and Safety Code section 7180,Section 7180 provides that [a.ln individual who has sustained . , .irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brainstem, is dad. 6 ($ 7180, subd. (a),) Section 7180 also statesthat [a.]determination of cleath must be made in accordance with accepted medicalstandards. ($ 7180, surbd, (a).) And seotion 7181 requires independentconfirmation by another physician when a determination of brain deathhas been made, (S 7181.)

Section 7180 is found in Article L Unifbrm Determination of DeathAct in California's Health and Safety Code. As Witkin states, theUniform Determination of Death Act ( UDDA ) upon which California'sstatute is modeled (and similarly named) was approved by the National

6 As on. appellate court put it, California's enactmsnt of section 7180 is aclear recognition of the fact that the real seat of 'life' is brain functionrather than mere metabolic processes which result from respiration andcirculation , Barber v, Superior Court,I47 CaL App. 3d 1006' 1014(1e83).-22-


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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1980, (14Witkin, Summary of Cal, Law (lOth ed,2010) Wills, {i 11,) California isnot alone in adopting the UDDA-far from it. Forty-five U,S,jnrisdictions have adopted a determination of death actthaf is eitheridentical to, or shares basic elements with, the UDDA. (The President'sCouncil on Bioethics, Controversies in the Determination of Death(January 2009), fn. ii, available at http://bioethics.georgetown,edulpcbelreports/de ath/ohapter L htm l, )

I.'or substantive due process analysis purposes, the widespreadadoption'of the statutory definition of brain death by 45 states runs contraryto Ms, Winkfield's parental and personal definitions of death. History andtradition go against her. There is no history or tradition in this country of aparental veto over properly-trained medical doctor determinations of death,As the California Court of Appeal put it when construing sections 7180 and7181, a determination of death is made in accordance with 'acceptedmedical standards. ' (Dorityv, Superior Court (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d273,278.) And when a treating and consulting physician agree that braindeath has occurred, the medical profession need not go into court every

time it cleclares brain death where the diagnostic test results are irrefutable,(rbid.)

From time immemorial, physicians have determined when peopleare dead and have accordingly ceased giving treatment, Here, the treating

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physician and consulting physician both determined that Ms, Winkfield'sdaughter is brain dead, (Exh. 8, p. 45; Exh, 9, p, 48) Then, after Ms,Winkfield went to court, a preeminent, court-appointed child neurologistfrom Stanford Medical Center also determined that Ms. Winkfield'sdaughter is dead, (Exh. 19, p. 128)

As the Court of Appeal n Barber observed, physicians have l'noduty to continue life sustaining machinery] once it has become futile in theopinion of qualifed medical personnel. (Barber, supra,l47 Cal.App.3dat p, 1014.) But Ms. Winkfreld refuses to believe her daughtcr is dead, andinvites this Court to create a now, fundamental parental right to veto suchscientifrc determinations based onher personalbelief* As the NinthCircuit very recently put it, a substantive due process claim will be rejectedwhcn to hotd otherwise would be to compel the California legislature, inshaping its regulation of , . , health providers, to accept Plaintiff s viewson the subject. (Pickup, supra,728F.3d at p. 1061,) Ms. Winkfield seeksinjunctive relief based upon a similar argument that she possesses aconstitutional right, vested in the Due Process Clause or the FirstArnendment, not only to define and determine death, but also to control

when a ventilator will be removed from a brain dead child, Since there isno such fundamental right, there is zero probability of success on the merits.The petition should be denied.

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A parent is not relieved of the obligation to comply with mandatorystate laws affecting her child sirrrply because the laws require conduct that

does not comport with the parent's exercise of their religious beliefs, In ananalogous case, the l'hird Circuit denied a group of parents' FirstAmendment Free Exercise Clause challenge to a Pennsylvania statute thatrequired mandatory review and reporting for all children receivinghomeschooting within the state. (Combs v. IJomer-Center Sch. Dist. (3dCir. 2008) 540 F.3d 231,234,) The parents held a common religious beliefthat all education was religion and that God assigned religious matters tothe exclusive jurisdiction of the family; thus, according to the parents, thestatute establishing homeschool review requirements violated their freeexercise of religion. (lbid.) The court found the statute at issue to be aneutral law of general applicability, 'A law is neutral if it does nottarget religiously motivated conduct either on its face or as applied inpractice. ' (Id. atp,24l-242, quoting Blackhawkv, Pennsylvania (3d Cir,2004) 3 S I F,3d 202,209.) The statute at issue in Combs neither targetedreligious practice nor selectively imposed burdens on religiously motivated


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Finding the laws to be neutral and of general applicability, theCombs court applied rational basis rcview to determine whether the laws

violated the parents' First Amendment rights. (Combs, supra,540 F.3d at p.243.) ' [R]ational basis review requires merely that the action be rationallyrelated to a tegitimate government objective, ' (Ibid,) The court explainedthat the state had a legitimate interest in ensuring that children who aretaught under home education programs are achieving minimum educationalstandards and are demonstrating sustained progress in their educationalprogram. (Ibid,) The court further explained that the statute's disclosurerequirements and corresponding school district review rationally furtherthese legitimate state interests. 'Ihus, the statute survived rational reviwand did not violate the parents' First Amendment rights under the FreeExercise Clause. (Ibid.)

Here, Ms. Winkfield asks this Court to relieve her from ChildrenI-Iospital' s policy regarding discontinuation of cardiopulmonary support,implemented pursuant to the requirements of California Health and SafetyCocle scotions 7180, 7181 and 1254.4, because the law requires her, and allpersons within the State, to allow medicalprofessionals to make a

determination of death and take subsequent lction that does not comportwith Winkfield's religious belief about her child's death. But it is notenough that Ms. Winkfeld's religious beliefs about how to define deathconflict with California's statutory dehnition and its attendant procedures.

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As the Ninth Circuit articulated, the mere possession of religiousconvictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political societydoes not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities,(Stormans, supra,586 F.3d at p, 1129.) Ms, Winkfield's individualreligious beliefs do not excuse her from compliance with an otherwise validlaw regulating conduct that does not interfere with her religious beliefs.

Health and Salety Code section 1254,4 is a valid law that regulatesthe conduct of all general acute care hospitals in the State and rcquireshospitals to provide family or next of kin of a person who has been declareddcad, by reason of irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain, with areasonably brief period of aocommodation.to gather at the patient's bedside.($ 1254,4,) Thc statute is neutral as to religious beliefs and applies to allhospitals within the State, A state or local law that is neutral in its text andin its effect is only subject to rational basis review to be upheld asconstitutional, (Stormans, supra, 586 F,3d at p, 1130,) Additionally, a lawthat is neutral and of general applicability is not required to pass strictscrutiny review and need not be justifred by a compelling governmentalinterest even if the law has the inoidental effbct of burdening a particularreligious practice. (Id. atp, ll29; Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v, City ofHialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 53L)

Health and Safety Code section 1254.4 does not target religiouspractices nor selectively impose burdens on religiously motivated conduct.

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(See Combs, sttpra,540 F.3d atp.242.) lnstead, it vests hospitals, notfamilies or next of kin, with the discretion to decide what are reasonableacoommodations to allow the family and next of kin to gather at the bedsideof a deceased, and to make reasonable accommodations for those whovoice a request for any special religious or cultural practices related topaying last respects, ($ 1254.4, subd, (c)(2).) Section 1254,4 also guidesthe exercise of that discretion, providing that hospitals shall consider theneeds of other patients and prospective patients in urgent need of care indetermining what is reasonable, ($ 1254.4, subd. (d)), thereby implicitlyrecognizing that hospitals are in the best position to make suchdeterminations.

Since section 12454,4 is a neutral law of general applicability, theonly question that remains is whether it is rationally relatcd to a legitimategovernment objectivc. (See Combs, supra,540 F,3d at pp, 242-243,)Undoubtedly, it is. Specifioally, section 1254,4 seryes the legitimate stateinterest of allowing hospitals to establish procedures to follow once apatient is dead and no longer requires medical treatment. The statute,which balances the needs of family members and next of kin who wish togather by the bedside of their deceased family member, and the needs ofother patients and prospective patients in urgent need of care, is rationallyrelated to this legitimate state interest, And although the hospital's policymay have the incidental effect of burdening Ms, Winkfield's particular

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religious praotice, it does not infringe on her First Amendment rights.Ms, Winkfield wants Children's Hospital, in defiance of state law, to

conform to her religious practices by indefinitely prolonging the time herdeceased child's body remains on cardiopulmonary support. The FirstAmendment protects Ms, Winkfield's fieedom to believe that her child isnot dead, However, the First Amendment does not permit Ms, Winkfield toact on her belicfs by oompelling Children's Hospital to disregard a validstate law that serves a legitimate state objective, Nor does it to allow her topractice religious beliefs in contradiction to Children's Hospital policiesand expertise. There is no such First Amendment right; so there is zeroprobability of success on the merits,

The Irourth and Fourteenth Amendment analysis is no different.Contrary to Ms, Winkflreld's allegations, the constitutional rights to privacyunder the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments do not grant parents the rightto have total control over medical treatlnent decisions of thir children, Infact, the Supreme Court has held that claims concerning medical treatmentsare propey analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest,rather than in terms of a privacy interest. (Blouin v, Spitzer (2d Cir. 2004)356 F.3d 348, 361 ,) This liberty interest is not absolute, The failure of ahealthcare provicler to agree with a patient's unreasonable demand formedical treatment is a consequence of the exercise of professionaljudgment, not a basis for a claim the patient's constitutional right of privacy

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and decision making was violated. There is simply no recognizedconstitutional privacy right that allows a party to impose its private,

scientifoally unfounded definition of death upon society as a whole. Ms.Winkfreld cites no authority for the general proposition that she has aconstitutional right to deny that her daughter has died and prevent the bodyfrom being handled in the,manner of all deceased bodies.

Here, the privacy argument advanced by Ms. Winkfield has broaderimplications, Ms, Winkfreld is demanding that this Court force Children'sto continue ventilation, provide nutrition to a dead body and performsurgical and othcr medical procedures on that dead body, Even if therewere a right of privaoy that allowed each individual to define death in apersonal manner (a specious, unwarranted assumption), there would be noright to impose ons's personal definition of death on others to compel themto treat a dead body as if it were alive.

Therc is no colorable merit to the constitutional claims, The petitionshould be denied.

C. Death Is Not a DisabilitYMs. Winkfield asserts that the refusal to provide medical treatment

to her daughter's dead body somehow violates section 504 of theRehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U,S,C. $ 794) and the Americans withDisabilities Act (42 U,S.C. $ 12101 et seq.). These statutes protectindividuals with disabilities. No court has ever found that death is a

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disability; nor could a court logically do so. Ms. Winkfield's argument isbased on the false premisE that her daughter is alive and disabled. BecauseJahi McMath is dead, this argument lacks even a scintilla of merit,

CONCLUSIONThe Superior Court properly denied Ms. Winkfield's request for

injunctive relief. Three separate physicians have confirmed that Ms'McMath is dead, and children's Hospital has provided more than areasonably brief period for Ms. McMath's family to gather at her bedsideto pay their respects, The temporary restraining order issued by theSuperior Court should be allowed to expire on December 30 at 5:00 p.m.,and Children's Hospital should be allowed to proceed with its decision toterminate ventilation support. Therefore, this Court should deny thepetition and the request for an immediate stay.

Dated:December'92, zotl A. WattAttorneys for R.eal Party In InterestCHILDREN'S HOSPITAL &,RESEARCH CENTER ATOAKLAND

c04tt00111724796-l

9

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CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.20a(c)(f))The text of this Preliminary opposition to Petition For writ of

Mandate, Prohibition, Supersedeas, or Other Appropriate Relief and toRequest for Immediate Stay consists of 7,393 words as counted byMicrosoft Word, a word processing program used to generate thisPreliminary Opposition to Petition For Writ Of Mandate, Prohibition,Supersedeas, or Other Appropriate Relief and to Request for ImmedateStay.Dated: December 30,2013 ARCHERNORRIS

A, WattAttorneys for Real Party in InterestChildren's Hospital Research Center atOakland


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PROOF OF SERVICEI, the undersigned, declare that I am over the age of eighteen years

and not aparty to this action or proceeding. My business address is 2033North Main Street, Suite 800, Walnut Creek, California 94596'3728. Onthe date set forth below, I caused the following document(s) to be served:

PRELIMINARY OPPOSITION TO PETITION F'OR \ryRIT OFMANDATE, PROHIBITION, SUPERSEDEAS, OR OTHERAPPROPRIATE RELIEF'AND TO REQUESTFOR IMMEDIATE STAY

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true andat Walnut Creek, California.

Christopher B. Dolan, Esq. (SBN 165358)Quinton B, Cutlip, Esq. (SBN 168030)THE DOLAN LAV/ FIRM1438 Market StreetSan Francisco, Califom ia 941 02Tel: (415) 421-2800Fax: (415) 421-2830

Attorneys r P etitioner* Semed One Copy by email perogreemenl

COURT OF APPEALFirst Appellate District350 McAllister StreetSan Francisco, CA 94102-3600

Court of Appeal* Served Original and FourCopes (one copyws also served vi electronics ubmssion) by Pers onlmessengel

Hon. Evelio GrilloJudge of the Superior CourtCounty of Alameda1225 Fallon Street,Oakland, CA 94612

Respondent Court:Superior Court of Califomia,Alameda County, Case RPl3-707598* Semed One Copy by UPS,nexl dsv 10:30 .m deliver.v

correct, Executed on December,X,20l

Documents

Children's Hospital Okland, Dec 30, 2013 Court of Appeal Filing by Family online Document