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DEBATE PACK

Number 2016-0235, 29 November 2016

Chilcot Inquiry and Parliamentary Accountability

Compiled by: Nigel Walker Subject specialists: Ben Smith Jack Simson Caird

Opposition Day Debate (Scottish National Party)

House of Commons Chamber

30 November 2016

Motion

That this House recognises that the Chilcot Inquiry provided substantial evidence of misleading information being presented by the then Prime Minister and others on the development of the then Government's policy towards the invasion of Iraq as shown most clearly in the contrast between private correspondence to the United States government and public statements to Parliament and to the people and also in the presentation of intelligence information; and calls on the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, further to its current investigation into the lessons to be learned from the Chilcot Inquiry on the machinery of government, to conduct a further specific examination of this contrast in public and private policy and of the presentation of intelligence, and then to report to the House on what further action it considers necessary and appropriate to help prevent any repetition of this disastrous series of events.

Contents 1. Summary 2

2. Sir John Chilcot’s public statement 3

3. Press Articles 11

4. Journal articles 13

5. PQs 14

6. Other Parliamentary material 19

6.1 Debates 19 6.2 Statements 19 6.3 Early Day Motions 26

7. Further reading 28

The House of Commons Library prepares a briefing in hard copy and/or online for most non-legislative debates in the Chamber and Westminster Hall other than half-hour debates. Debate Packs are produced quickly after the announcement of parliamentary business. They are intended to provide a summary or overview of the issue being debated and identify relevant briefings and useful documents, including press and parliamentary material. More detailed briefing can be prepared for Members on request to the Library.

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1. Summary The Chilcot Inquiry reported on 6 July 2016 after seven years and a total cost of over £13 million. The full report and the executive summary can be accessed online.

It found that

• Military action had been taken before peaceful options had been exhausted, when Iraq posed no imminent threat to the UK

• The reliability of evidence on Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction was overstated and that evidence turned out to be flawed

• The legal justification was “far from satisfactory”

• Rather than bolstering the UN, the UK helped undermine it

• UK armed forces were poorly prepared

• Warnings about the consequences of removing Saddam were not taken seriously enough

• The UK overestimated its ability to influence the US

The action removed Saddam Hussein from power but did not establish a successful democracy and more than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict. By July 2009, at least 150,000 Iraqis had died, probably more.

Chilcot concluded that there were several occasions when issues should have been discussed by Cabinet but were not, and that clear Ministerial oversight of the UK post-conflict plan was not established.

Tony Blair told the Inquiry that he could not have foreseen the difficulties after the fall of Saddam. The Inquiry rejected this outright:

We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.

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2. Sir John Chilcot’s public statement

Sir John Chilcot's public statement, 6 July 2016

We were appointed to consider the UK’s policy on Iraq from 2001 to 2009, and to identify lessons for the future. Our Report will be published on the Inquiry’s website after I finish speaking.

In 2003, for the first time since the Second World War, the United Kingdom took part in an invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign State. That was a decision of the utmost gravity. Saddam Hussein was undoubtedly a brutal dictator who had attacked Iraq’s neighbours, repressed and killed many of his own people, and was in violation of obligations imposed by the UN Security Council.

But the questions for the Inquiry were:

• whether it was right and necessary to invade Iraq in March 2003; and

• whether the UK could – and should – have been better prepared for what followed.

We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.

We have also concluded that:

• The judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

• Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.

• The Government failed to achieve its stated objectives.

I want now to set out some of the key points in the Report.

First, the formal decision to invade Iraq, if Saddam Hussein did not accept the US ultimatum to leave within 48 hours, was taken by Cabinet on 17 March 2003. Parliament voted the following day to support the decision.

The decision was, however, shaped by key choices made by Mr Blair’s Government over the previous 18 months – which I will briefly set out.

After the attacks on 11 September 2001, Mr Blair urged President Bush not to take hasty action on Iraq.

By early December, US policy had begun to shift and Mr Blair suggested that the US and the UK should work on what he described as a "clever strategy" for regime change in Iraq, which would build over time.

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When Mr Blair met President Bush at Crawford, Texas, in early April 2002, the formal policy was still to contain Saddam Hussein. But, by then, there had been a profound change in the UK’s thinking:

• The Joint Intelligence Committee had concluded that Saddam Hussein could not be removed without an invasion.

• The Government was stating that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with. It had to disarm or be disarmed.

• That implied the use of force if Iraq did not comply – and internal contingency planning for a large contribution to a military invasion had begun.

At Crawford, Mr Blair sought a partnership as a way of influencing President Bush. He proposed a UN ultimatum to Iraq to readmit inspectors or face the consequences.

On 28 July, Mr Blair wrote to President Bush with an assurance that he would be with him "whatever" – but, if the US wanted a coalition for military action, changes would be needed in three key areas. Those were:

• progress on the Middle East Peace Process;

• UN authority; and

• a shift in public opinion in the UK, Europe and the Arab world.

Mr Blair also pointed out that there would be a "need to commit to Iraq for the long term".

Subsequently, Mr Blair and Mr Straw urged the US to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN. On 7 September, President Bush decided to do so.

On 8 November, resolution 1441 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council. It gave Iraq a final opportunity to disarm or face "serious consequences", and it provided for any further breaches by Iraq to be reported to the Security Council "for assessment". The weapons inspectors returned to Iraq later that month.

During December, however, President Bush decided that inspections would not achieve the desired result; the US would take military action in early 2003.

By early January, Mr Blair had also concluded that "the likelihood was war".

At the end of January, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for military action by mid-March. To help Mr Blair, President Bush agreed to seek a further UN resolution – the "second" resolution – determining that Iraq had failed to take its final opportunity to comply with its obligations.

By 12 March, it was clear that there was no chance of securing majority support for a second resolution before the US took military action.

Without evidence of major new Iraqi violations or reports from the inspectors that Iraq was failing to co-operate and they could not carry out their tasks, most members of the Security Council could not be

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convinced that peaceful options to disarm Iraq had been exhausted and that military action was therefore justified.

Mr Blair and Mr Straw blamed France for the "impasse" in the UN and claimed that the UK Government was acting on behalf of the international community "to uphold the authority of the Security Council".

In the absence of a majority in support of military action, we consider that the UK was, in fact, undermining the Security Council’s authority.

Second, the Inquiry has not expressed a view on whether military action was legal. That could, of course, only be resolved by a properly constituted and internationally recognised Court.

We have, however, concluded that the circumstances in which it was decided that there was a legal basis for UK military action were far from satisfactory.

In mid-January 2003, Lord Goldsmith told Mr Blair that a further Security Council resolution would be necessary to provide a legal basis for military action. He did not advise No.10 until the end of February that, while a second resolution would be preferable, a "reasonable case" could be made that resolution 1441 was sufficient. He set out that view in written advice on 7 March.

The military and the civil service both asked for more clarity on whether force would be legal. Lord Goldsmith then advised that the "better view" was that there was, on balance, a secure legal basis for military action without a further Security Council resolution. On 14 March, he asked Mr Blair to confirm that Iraq had committed further material breaches as specified in resolution 1441. Mr Blair did so the next day.

However, the precise basis on which Mr Blair made that decision is not clear.

Given the gravity of the decision, Lord Goldsmith should have been asked to provide written advice explaining how, in the absence of a majority in the Security Council, Mr Blair could take that decision.

This is one of a number of occasions identified by the Inquiry when policy should have been considered by a Cabinet Committee and then discussed by Cabinet itself.

Third, I want to address the assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and how they were presented to support the case for action.

There was an ingrained belief in the UK policy and intelligence communities that:

• Iraq had retained some chemical and biological capabilities;

• was determined to preserve and if possible enhance them – and, in the future, to acquire a nuclear capability; and

• was able to conceal its activities from the UN inspectors.

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In the House of Commons on 24 September 2002, Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s WMD. He said that, at some point in the future, that threat would become a reality

The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement, and in the dossier published the same day, were presented with a certainty that was not justified.

The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established "beyond doubt" either that Iraq had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued.

The Committee had also judged that as long as sanctions remained effective, Iraq could not develop a nuclear weapon, and that it would take several years to develop and deploy long range missiles.

In the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Mr Blair stated that he judged the possibility of terrorist groups in possession of WMD was "a real and present danger to Britain and its national security" – and that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s arsenal could not be contained and posed a clear danger to British citizens.

Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaida to the UK and to UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists.

The Government’s strategy reflected its confidence in the Joint Intelligence Committee’s Assessments. Those Assessments provided the benchmark against which Iraq’s conduct and denials, and the reports of the inspectors, were judged.

As late as 17 March, Mr Blair was being advised by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, the means to deliver them and the capacity to produce them. He was also told that the evidence pointed to Saddam Hussein’s view that the capability was militarily significant and to his determination – left to his own devices – to build it up further.

It is now clear that policy on Iraq was made on the basis of flawed intelligence and assessments. They were not challenged, and they should have been.

The findings on Iraq’s WMD capabilities set out in the report of the Iraq Survey Group in October 2004 were significant. But they did not support pre-invasion statements by the UK Government, which had focused on Iraq’s current capabilities, which Mr Blair and Mr Straw had described as "vast stocks" and an urgent and growing threat.

In response to those findings, Mr Blair told the House of Commons that, although Iraq might not have had "stockpiles of actually deployable weapons", Saddam Hussein "retained the intent and the capability ... and was in breach of United Nations resolutions".

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That was not, however, the explanation for military action he had given before the conflict.

In our Report, we have identified a number of lessons to inform the way in which intelligence may be used publicly in the future to support Government policy.

Fourth, I want to address the shortcomings in planning and preparation.

The British military contribution was not settled until mid-January 2003, when Mr Blair and Mr Hoon agreed the military’s proposals for an increase in the number of brigades to be deployed; and that they would operate in southern, not northern, Iraq.

There was little time to prepare three brigades and the risks were neither properly identified nor fully exposed to Ministers. The resulting equipment shortfalls are addressed in the Report.

Despite promises that Cabinet would discuss the military contribution, it did not discuss the military options or their implications.

In early January 2003, when the Government published its objectives for post-conflict Iraq, it intended that the interim post-conflict administration should be UN-led.

By March 2003, having failed to persuade the US of the advantages of a UN-led administration, the Government had set the less ambitious goal of persuading the US to accept UN authorisation of a Coalition-led interim administration.

When the invasion began, UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a well-executed US-led and UN-authorised operation in a relatively benign security environment.

Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance.

We do not agree that hindsight is required. The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability, and Al Qaida activity in Iraq, were each explicitly identified before the invasion.

Ministers were aware of the inadequacy of US plans, and concerned about the inability to exert significant influence on US planning. Mr Blair eventually succeeded only in the narrow goal of securing President Bush’s agreement that there should be UN authorisation of the post-conflict role.

Furthermore, he did not establish clear Ministerial oversight of UK planning and preparation. He did not ensure that there was a flexible, realistic and fully resourced plan that integrated UK military and civilian contributions, and addressed the known risks.

The failures in the planning and preparations continued to have an effect after the invasion.

That brings me to the Government’s failure to achieve the objectives it had set itself in Iraq.

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The Armed Forces fought a successful military campaign, which took Basra and helped to achieve the departure of Saddam Hussein and the fall of Baghdad in less than a month.

Service personnel, civilians who deployed to Iraq and Iraqis who worked for the UK, showed great courage in the face of considerable risks. They deserve our gratitude and respect.

More than 200 British citizens died as a result of the conflict in Iraq. Many more were injured. This has meant deep anguish for many families, including those who are here today.

The invasion and subsequent instability in Iraq had, by July 2009, also resulted in the deaths of at least one hundred and fifty thousand Iraqis – and probably many more – most of them civilians. More than a million people were displaced. The people of Iraq have suffered greatly.

The vision for Iraq and its people – issued by the US, the UK, Spain and Portugal, at the Azores Summit on 16 March 2003 – included a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbours. It looked forward to a united Iraq in which its people should enjoy security, freedom, prosperity and equality with a government that would uphold human rights and the rule of law as cornerstones of democracy.

We have considered the post-conflict period in Iraq in great detail, including efforts to reconstruct the country and rebuild its security services.

In this short statement I can only address a few key points.

After the invasion, the UK and the US became joint Occupying Powers. For the year that followed, Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. The UK was fully implicated in the Authority’s decisions, but struggled to have a decisive effect on its policies.

The Government’s preparations failed to take account of the magnitude of the task of stabilising, administering and reconstructing Iraq, and of the responsibilities which were likely to fall to the UK.

The UK took particular responsibility for four provinces in the South East. It did so without a formal Ministerial decision and without ensuring that it had the necessary military and civilian capabilities to discharge its obligations, including, crucially, to provide security.

The scale of the UK effort in post-conflict Iraq never matched the scale of the challenge. Whitehall departments and their Ministers failed to put collective weight behind the task.

In practice, the UK’s most consistent strategic objective in relation to Iraq was to reduce the level of its deployed forces.

The security situation in both Baghdad and the South East began to deteriorate soon after the invasion.

We have found that the Ministry of Defence was slow in responding to the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices and that delays in providing adequate medium weight protected patrol vehicles should not

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have been tolerated. It was not clear which person or department within the Ministry of Defence was responsible for identifying and articulating such capability gaps. But it should have been.

From 2006, the UK military was conducting two enduring campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. It did not have sufficient resources to do so. Decisions on resources for Iraq were affected by the demands of the operation in Afghanistan.

For example, the deployment to Afghanistan had a material impact on the availability of essential equipment in Iraq, particularly helicopters and equipment for surveillance and intelligence collection.

By 2007 militia dominance in Basra, which UK military commanders were unable to challenge, led to the UK exchanging detainee releases for an end to the targeting of its forces.

It was humiliating that the UK reached a position in which an agreement with a militia group which had been actively targeting UK forces was considered the best option available.

The UK military role in Iraq ended a very long way from success.

We have sought to set out the Government’s actions on Iraq fully and impartially. The evidence is there for all to see. It is an account of an intervention which went badly wrong, with consequences to this day.

The Inquiry Report is the Committee’s unanimous view.

Military action in Iraq might have been necessary at some point. But in March 2003:

• There was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein.

• The strategy of containment could have been adapted and continued for some time.

• The majority of the Security Council supported continuing UN inspections and monitoring.

Military intervention elsewhere may be required in the future. A vital purpose of the Inquiry is to identify what lessons should be learned from experience in Iraq.

There are many lessons set out in the Report.

Some are about the management of relations with allies, especially the US. Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq.

The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ.

The lessons also include:

• The importance of collective Ministerial discussion which encourages frank and informed debate and challenge.

• The need to assess risks, weigh options and set an achievable and realistic strategy.

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• The vital role of Ministerial leadership and co-ordination of action across Government, supported by senior officials.

• The need to ensure that both the civilian and military arms of Government are properly equipped for their tasks.

Above all, the lesson is that all aspects of any intervention need to be calculated, debated and challenged with the utmost rigour.

And, when decisions have been made, they need to be implemented fully.

Sadly, neither was the case in relation to the UK Government’s actions in Iraq.

To conclude, I should like to thank my colleagues, our advisers and the Inquiry Secretariat for their commitment to this difficult task.

I also want to pay tribute to Sir Martin Gilbert, who died last year. As one of the pre-eminent historians of the past century, he brought a unique perspective to our work until he became ill in April 2012. We have missed him greatly as a colleague and friend.

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3. Press Articles The following is a selection of press and media articles relevant to this debate. Please note: the Library is not responsible for either the views or accuracy of external content. Independent on Sunday 27 November 2016 Tony Blair must face new investigation over Iraq, MPs demand Samuel Osborne The Guardian 27 November 2016 Labour MPs to vote against investigating Tony Blair over Iraq war Jessica Elgot The Guardian 26 November 2016 MPs launch new attempt to interrogate Tony Blair over Iraq Chris Ames and Jamie Doward The Guardian 20 November 2016 Revealed: Chilcot inquiry was set up ‘to avoid blame’ Chris Ames and Jamie Doward BBC News Online 2 November 2016 Sir John Chilcot says Tony Blair damaged trust in politics over Iraq BBC News Online 29 October 2016 Peter Oborne's unofficial Chilcot Inquiry into Iraq war Peter Oborne Independent 11 July 2016 The Iraq War 'black ops' that caused a split between US and UK Kim Sengupta The Guardian 7 July 2016 We ignored the rule of law – the result was Iraq Elizabeth Wilmshurst Channel 4 News 6 July 2016 What do we learn from the Blair-Bush letters?

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The Guardian 6 July 2016 Tony Blair unrepentant as Chilcot gives crushing Iraq war verdict Luke Harding The Guardian 6 July 2016 Iraq was destined for chaos – with or without Britain’s intervention Hayder al-Khoei Daily Telegraph 5 July 2016 Chilcot Inquiry: What is it and what did the Iraq War report say? Emily Allen BBC News Online 29 January 2015 Iraq Inquiry: MPs criticise delays to Chilcot report The Guardian 21 January 2015 Chilcot confirms delay to publication of Iraq war report Patrick Wintour, Frances Perraudin and Nicholas Watt

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4. Journal articles Jean Seaton, ‘Chilcot Report: Introduction’, Political Quarterly Volume 87, Issue 4, October–December 2016, Pages 476–480, 20 October 2016

(Report of the Iraq Inquiry: By a Committee of Privy Councillors. The Chilcot Report 6th July 2016. House of Commons 264): Introduction

Instead of applying thought and realism to a risky enterprise, evidence that did not fit the agenda was ignored, undermined, batted away, seen as ‘politically motivated’ or, more worryingly, simply not recognised in the UK. Politicians are less likely to understand conflict and armies perhaps than they used to be. But although hundreds of thousands of people marched against the invasion—creating unlikely alliances across political divides—many others assumed that the government had secure knowledge of an imminent threat.

Michael Clarke, ‘Chilcot – The Judgement of History’, RUSI Commentary, 7 July 2016 “Tony Blair had created a British policy momentum, largely driven from Washington, which became impossible to slow down, still less reverse. The systemic failure to get off the rails that a prime minister, obsessed with leading from the front, had laid down is the real Chilcot story behind Tony Blair’s own.”

Patrick Porter, ‘The Chilcot Inquiry Shows Why the Iraq War Still Matters’, National Interest, 5 July 2016

Chilcot matters, for all its delays and incompleteness, because it reaffirms the danger of dogma and the deadliness of good intentions, the force of powerful ideas honestly held by decision-makers. Beyond rumors of the conspiratorial and the covert, the report is about the quality of decisions. The Inquiry’s hearings demonstrate the perils of wishful thinking, of doctrinaire ideological beliefs that go unchecked. It shows what can happen when the architects of policy operate without testing their own assumptions, move on the basis of an unquestioned “common sense”, making choices that are less calculated than axiomatic.

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5. PQs Engagements 26 Oct 2016 | 616 c277 Asked by: Sir David Amess Q12: My right hon. Friend became Prime Minister in dramatic and extraordinary circumstances, and she has proved more than capable of rising to the many challenges that—[Interruption.] It was not her fault that the Chilcot report took seven years and cost more than £10 million, but now that we know that Parliament was misled will she reassure me that she has a cunning plan to ensure that action is taken? Answered by: The Prime Minister | Department: Prime Minister I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. The Chilcot report was an important task. Although it looked at and criticised the way in which information had been handled, it did not say that people had set out deliberately to mislead, and it is important to recognise that. It is important also that we learn the lessons from the Chilcot report, which is why the National Security Adviser is leading an exercise to do precisely that. This was a long time coming. It was a serious report. There is much in it, and we need to ensure that we do learn the lessons from it. Iraq Committee of Inquiry 26 Jul 2016 | HL1269 Asked by: Lord Richards of Herstmonceux To ask Her Majesty’s Government, in the light of the report by Sir John Chilcot on the Iraq War, whether they have any plans to reform the decision-making process within the Ministry of Defence and place the Armed Forces under the command of the Chief of Defence Staff. Answering member: Earl Howe | Department: Ministry of Defence We are studying the report of the Iraq Inquiry in detail to identify how further to improve our structures, policies, procurement and training. Since 2010, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has implemented wide-ranging reforms to how it is structured and managed. This has clarified responsibilities, strengthened accountability and empowered the single Services. The Defence Secretary confirmed to the Defence Select Committee on 19 July that he has established a team to go through the report and make sure that the proper lessons are learned. This team will identify all of the areas where MOD needs to take action to improve its performance in the light of Sir John Chilcot's findings.

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Iraq Committee of Inquiry 11 Jul 2016 | 41752 and 41753 Asked by: Owen Thompson To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what steps his Department has taken to provide similar support for injured veterans of the Iraq conflict following the publication of the Chilcot Report to that provided to the next of kin of people who lost their lives in that conflict. Answering member: Matthew Hancock | Department: Cabinet Office The report of the Chilcot Inquiry was published on 6 July and is available to access online in searchable format. The Government takes very seriously its responsibility to all military veterans, especially those who have been injured in conflict, and a range of support mechanisms are available to Iraq veterans where required, including support in the transition to civilian life and access to pension and compensation schemes where injured as a result of their service. We will, of course, engage with and support any individuals who are concerned by any findings of Sir John Chilcot’s report. Asked by: Owen Thompson To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, pursuant to the Answer of 15 June 2016 to Question 38697, what steps his Department has taken to provide injured veterans of the Iraq conflict with free copies of the Chilcot Report. Answering member: Matthew Hancock | Department: Cabinet Office The report of the Chilcot Inquiry was published on 6 July and is available to access online in searchable format. The Government takes very seriously its responsibility to all military veterans, especially those who have been injured in conflict, and a range of support mechanisms are available to Iraq veterans where required, including support in the transition to civilian life and access to pension and compensation schemes where injured as a result of their service. We will, of course, engage with and support any individuals who are concerned by any findings of Sir John Chilcot’s report. Iraq Committee of Inquiry 11 Jul 2016 | 41744 Asked by: Owen Thompson To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, what support the Government plans to provide to veterans of the Iraq Conflict who are concerned by the findings of the Chilcot Report and its implications for their service records. Answering member: Matthew Hancock |: Conservative Party | Department: Cabinet Office The report of the Chilcot Inquiry was published on 6 July and is available to access online in searchable format. The Government takes very seriously its responsibility to all military veterans, especially those who

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have been injured in conflict, and a range of support mechanisms are available to Iraq veterans where required, including support in the transition to civilian life and access to pension and compensation schemes where injured as a result of their service. We will, of course, engage with and support any individuals who are concerned by any findings of Sir John Chilcot’s report. Engagements 06 Jul 2016 | 612 c881 Asked by: Mike Wood As Sir John Chilcot finds that the only people who came out of the 2003 invasion of Iraq well were servicemen and civilians, will the Prime Minister look at how he can make sure that the precedent that he set last autumn for transparency and scrutiny ahead of military action becomes the norm for his successor? Answered by: The Prime Minister | Department: Prime Minister I think we have now got a set of arrangements and conventions that put the country in a stronger position. I think it is now a clear convention that we have a vote in this House, which of course we did on Iraq, before premeditated military action, but it is also important that we have a properly constituted National Security Council, proper receipt of legal advice and a summary of that legal advice provided to the House of Commons, as we did in the case of both Libya and Iraq. These things are growing to be a set of conventions that will work for our country, but let me repeat that even the best rules and conventions in the world do not mean that we will always be confronted with easy decisions, or ones that do not have very difficult consequences. Engagements 06 Jul 2016 | 612 c875 Asked by: Angus Robertson Today is hugely important for Muslims, both at home and abroad, as it is the end of Ramadan, and I am sure we wish them all Eid Mubarak. Today is also a day when our thoughts are with all those who lost loved ones in Iraq and all those hundreds of thousands of families in Iraq who also mourn their loved ones. The Chilcot report confirms that on 28 July 2002 Tony Blair wrote to President Bush, stating: “I will be with you, whatever”. Does the Prime Minister understand why the families of the dead and the injured UK service personnel and the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis feel that they were deceived about the reasons for going to war in Iraq?

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Answered by: The Prime Minister | Department: Prime Minister First, I join the right hon. Gentleman in wishing Muslims in this country and around the world Eid Mubarak at the end of Ramadan. We will discuss the report in detail later and I do not want to pre-empt all the things I am going to say in my statement, but clearly we need to learn the lessons of the report, so we should study it very carefully—it is millions of words and thousands of pages. I think that we should save our remarks for when we debate it in the House following the statement. Asked by: Angus Robertson The Chilcot report catalogues the failures in planning for post-conflict Iraq and then concludes that: “The UK did not achieve its objectives”. That lack of planning has also been evident in relation to Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and, most recently, with no plan whatsoever, to Brexit. When will the UK Government actually start learning from the mistakes of the past so that we are not condemned to repeating them in future? Answered by: The Prime Minister | Department: Prime Minister The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that what Sir John Chilcot says about the failure to plan is very clear. In the statement that he has given, he says: “When the invasion began, UK policy rested on an assumption that there would be a well-executed US-led and UN-authorised operation in a relatively benign security environment. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that the difficulties encountered in Iraq after the invasion could not have been known in advance.” He then says: “We do not agree that hindsight is required.” Sir John Chilcot is very clear on that point. What I will say to the right hon. Gentleman about planning is that the things I put in place as Prime Minister following what happened in Iraq—a National Security Council, proper legal advice, properly constituted meetings and a properly staffed National Security Secretariat, including proper listening to expert advice in the National Security Council—were all designed to avoid the problems that the Government had had in the case of Iraq. The only other point I will make is that there is no set of arrangements or plans that can provide perfection in any of these cases. We can argue whether military intervention is ever justified; I believe that it is. Military intervention is always difficult, as is planning for the aftermath. I do not think that we in this House should be naive in any way about there being a perfect set of plans or arrangements that could solve these problems in perpetuity, because there is not.

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Engagements 29 Jun 2016 | 612 cc296-7 Asked by: Alex Salmond Turning to the Chilcot report, is the Prime Minister satisfied with the arrangements announced for prior access for the service families of soldiers who died in Iraq, given that Mr Blair has had months to prepare his PR defences and that he has seen the relevant passages? What are the parliamentary arrangements for secure prior access, so that the House can properly examine the findings and express any relevant views concerning future suitable accommodation for Mr Blair? Answered by: The Prime Minister | Department: Prime Minister First, in terms of members of service personnel families, we have ensured that they will not face the cost that they originally were going to face to access the report. I will check the details on the time they get to access the report and write to the right hon. Gentleman. On the parliamentary process, I can put that in a letter to him so that we are absolutely clear about what time the statement will be, how much time people, including the Leader of the Opposition and other right hon. Gentlemen, will have to study the report in advance. I remember how important having access was to me when I was Leader of the Opposition. As for those people who could be criticised in the report, the right hon. Gentleman will know that there is a process—letters have to go out so that people have a chance to respond to what is in the report. That is entirely independent of the Government. Ministers have not seen it and I have not seen it—it has been dealt with by the Chilcot report under long-standing conventions. Again, I will put that in my letter to the right hon. Gentleman.

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6. Other Parliamentary material

6.1 Debates Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Day 1 of debate) HC Deb 13 July 2016 | Vol 613 cc315-396 Report of the Iraq Inquiry (Day 2 of debate) HC Deb 14 July 2016 | Vol 613 cc441-518 Iraq Inquiry HL Deb 12 July 2016 | Vol 774 cc128-209 Iraq Inquiry Report HC Deb 14 April 2016 | Vol 608 cc530-65 Points of Order on the publication of the Iraq Inquiry Report HC Deb 29 October 2015 | Vol 601 cc525-7 Iraq Inquiry HC Deb 29 January 2015 | Vol 591 cc1035-89

6.2 Statements

Report of the Iraq Inquiry HC Deb 6 July 2015 | Vol 612 cc883-922 [Extract: Opening Statement only included here] The Prime Minister (Mr David Cameron): This morning, Sir John Chilcot has published the report of the independent Iraq inquiry. This is a difficult day for all the families of those who lost loved ones. They have waited for this report for too long, and our first thoughts today must be with them. In their grief and anger, I hope they can draw at least some solace from the depth and rigour of this report and, above all, some comfort from knowing that we will never forget the incredible service and sacrifice of their sons, daughters, husbands and wives—179 British servicemen and women and 23 British civilians who gave everything for our country. We must also never forget the thousands more who suffered life-changing injuries, and we must pledge today to look after them for the rest of their lives. This report would have been produced sooner if it had been begun when Conservative Members and others first called for it back in 2006, but I am sure that the House will join me in thanking Sir John and his Privy Counsellors, including the late Sir Martin Gilbert, who sadly passed away during the work on this report.

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This has been a fully independent inquiry. Government Ministers did not even see it until yesterday morning. The Cabinet Secretary led a process that gave Sir John full access to Government papers. This has meant an unprecedented public declassification of Joint Intelligence Committee papers, key Cabinet minutes, records of meetings and conversations between the UK Prime Minister and the American President, and 31 personal memos from the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to President George W. Bush. The inquiry also took evidence from more than 150 witnesses, and its report runs to 2.6 million words, in 13 volumes. It cost over £10 million to produce. Clearly the House will want the chance to study and debate it in depth, and I am making provision for two full days of debate next week. There are a number of key questions that are rightly asked about Iraq. Did we go to war on a false premise? Were decisions taken properly, including the consideration of legal advice? Was the operation properly planned? Were we properly prepared for the aftermath of the initial conflict? Did our forces have adequate funding and equipment? I will try to summarise the key findings on these questions before turning to the lessons that I believe should be learned. A number of reasons were put forward for going to war in Iraq, including the danger that Saddam posed to his people and to the region, and the need to uphold United Nations resolutions. However, as everyone in this House will remember, central to the Government’s case was the issue of weapons of mass destruction. Sir John finds that there was an “ingrained belief” genuinely held in both the UK and US Governments that Saddam Hussein possessed chemical and biological capabilities, and that he wanted to redevelop his nuclear capabilities and was pursuing an active policy of deceit and concealment. There were some good reasons for this belief. Saddam had built up chemical weapons in the past and he had used them against Kurdish civilians and the Iranian military. He had given international weapons inspectors the run-around for years. The report clearly reflects that the advice given to the Government by the intelligence and policy community was that Saddam did indeed continue to possess and seek to develop these capabilities. However, as we now know, by 2003 this long-held belief no longer reflected the reality. Sir John says: “At no stage was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the” Joint Intelligence Committee “or the policy community.” And as the report notes, the late Robin Cook had shown that it was possible to come to a different conclusion from an examination of the same intelligence.

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In the wake of 9/11, the Americans were also understandably concerned about the risk of weapons of mass destruction finding their way into the hands of terrorists. Sir John finds that while it was reasonable to be concerned about the potential fusion of proliferation and terrorism, there was “no basis in the JIC Assessments to suggest that Iraq itself represented such a threat.” On the question of intelligence, Sir John finds no evidence that intelligence was improperly included, or that No. 10—or Mr Blair personally—improperly influenced the text of the September 2002 dossier, but he does find that the use of Joint Intelligence Committee material in public presentation did not make clear enough the limitations or the subtleties of assessment. He says that the assessed intelligence “had not established beyond doubt either that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued”, and he says that the Joint Intelligence Committee “should have made that clear to Mr Blair.” Sir John also finds that public statements from the Government conveyed more certainty than the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments. There was a lack of clarity about the distinction between what the JIC assessed and what Mr Blair believed. Referring to the text in Mr Blair’s foreword to the September 2002 dossier, he finds “a distinction between” Mr Blair’s “beliefs and the JIC’s actual judgements.” But in his words Sir John does not question Mr Blair’s belief or his legitimate role in advocating Government policy. Turning to the question of legality, the inquiry has “not expressed a view as to whether or not the UK’s participation in the war was legal.” However, it does quote the legal advice which the Attorney General gave at the time and on which the Government acted—namely, that there was a legal basis for action. Nevertheless, Sir John is highly critical of the processes by which the legal advice was arrived at and discussed. He says: “The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation were far from satisfactory.” I am sure hon. Members will want to study that part of the report carefully.

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Sir John also finds that the diplomatic options had not at that stage been exhausted, and that “Military action was therefore not a last resort.” Sir John says that when the second resolution at the UN became unachievable, the UK should have done more to exhaust all diplomatic options, including allowing the inspectors longer to complete their job. Turning to the decision making, the report documents carefully the processes that were followed. There was a Cabinet discussion before the decision to go to war. A number of Ministers, including the Foreign and Defence Secretaries, were involved in much of the decision making. However, the report makes some specific criticisms of the process of decision making. In particular, when it came to the options for military action, it is clear that these were never discussed properly by a Cabinet Committee or Cabinet. Arrangements were often informal and sporadic, and frequently involved a small group of Ministers and advisers, sometimes without formal records. Sir John finds that at crucial points, Mr Blair sent personal notes and made important commitments to Mr Bush that had not been discussed or agreed with Cabinet colleagues. However, while Sir John makes many criticisms of process, including the way information was handled and presented, at no stage does he explicitly say that there was a deliberate attempt to mislead people. Turning to operational planning, the initial invasion proceeded relatively rapidly, and we should be proud of what our armed forces managed to achieve so quickly. This was despite the fact that the military did not really have time to plan properly for an invasion from the south, because they had been focused on the north until a late decision from the Turkish Government to refuse entry through their territory. It was also in spite of issues over equipment, which I will turn to later. But a bigger question was around the planning for what might happen after the initial operation, and we mentioned this briefly at Prime Minister’s questions. Sir John finds that “when the invasion began, the UK government was not in a position to conclude that satisfactory plans had been drawn up and preparations made to meet known post-conflict challenges and risks in Iraq.” He adds that the Government “lacked clear Ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy, planning and preparation and effective co-ordination between government departments” and “failed to analyse or manage those risks adequately.” The Government—and here I mean officials and the military, as well as Ministers—remained too fixed on assumptions that the Americans had a

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plan, that the UN would play a significant role, with the international community sharing the burden, and that the UK role would be over three to four months after the conflict had ended. Sir John concludes that the Government’s failure to prepare properly for the aftermath of the conflict “reduced the likelihood of achieving the UK’s strategic objectives in Iraq.” And Sir John concludes that anticipating these post-conflict problems—and I quote, as I did at Prime Minister’s questions— “did not require the benefit of hindsight.” Turning to equipment and troops, Sir John is clear that the UK failed to match resources to the objectives. Sir John says categorically that “delays in providing adequate medium weight Protected Patrol Vehicles and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces...for ISTAR and helicopters should not have been tolerated”, and he says: “the MOD was slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq from Improvised Explosive Devices.” The inquiry also identified a number of moments when it would have been possible to conduct a substantial reappraisal of our approach to the whole situation in Iraq and the level of resources required. But despite a series of warnings from commanders in the field, Sir John finds that no such reappraisal took place. Furthermore, during the first four years, there was “no clear statement of policy setting out the acceptable level of risk to UK forces and who was responsible for managing that risk.” Sir John also finds that the Government—and in particular the military—were too focused on withdrawing from Iraq and planning for an Afghan deployment in 2006, and that further drew effort away. Sir John concludes that although Tony Blair succeeded in persuading America to go back to the UN in 2002, he was unsuccessful in changing the US position on other critical decisions, and that “in the absence of a majority in the Security Council in support of military action at that point, the UK was undermining the authority of the Security Council”. While it is right for a UK Prime Minister to weigh up carefully the damage to the special relationship that would be done by failing to support the US, Sir John says that it is questionable whether not participating militarily on this occasion would have broken the partnership. He says there was a substantial gap from the outset between the ambitious UK objectives and the resources that Government were prepared to commit, and that even with more

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resources, the circumstances surrounding the invasion made it difficult to deliver substantive outcomes. While the territorial integrity of Iraq remained, deep sectarian divisions opened, and thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians lost their lives. While these divisions were not created by the international coalition, Sir John believes they were exacerbated, including through the extent of de-Ba’athification, and they were not addressed by an effective programme of reconciliation. Overall, Sir John finds that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government fell far short of meeting its strategic objectives and helped to create a space for al-Qaeda. Of course, the decision to go to war came to a vote in this House, and Members on all sides who voted for military action will have to take our fair share of the responsibility. We cannot turn the clock back, but we can ensure that lessons are learned and acted on. I will turn to these in a moment and cover all the issues around machinery of government, proper processes, culture and planning, some of which we discussed in Prime Minister’s questions, but let me be the first to say that getting all of these things right does not guarantee the success of a military intervention. For example, on Libya, I believe it was right to intervene to stop Gaddafi slaughtering his people. In that case, we did have a United Nations Security Council resolution. We did have proper processes. We did have comprehensive advice on all the key issues. And we did not put our forces on the ground. Instead we worked with a transitional Libyan Government. But getting these things right does not make the challenges of intervention any less formidable. The difficulties in Libya are plain for everyone to see today. As the Prime Minister for the last six years, reading this report, I believe there are some lessons that we do need to learn and, frankly, keep on learning. First, taking the country to war should always be a last resort and should only be done if all credible alternatives have been exhausted. Secondly, the machinery of government does matter. That is why, on my first day in office, I established the National Security Council to ensure proper co-ordinated decision making across the whole of government, including those responsible for domestic security. This council is not just a meeting of Ministers; it has the right breadth of expertise in the room, with the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the heads of the intelligence services, and relevant senior officials. The Attorney General is now a member of the National Security Council. I also appointed the UK’s first national security adviser, with a properly constituted team in the Cabinet Office to ensure that all the key parts of our national security apparatus are joined up. The national security machinery also taps the experience and knowledge of experts from outside Government. This helps us to constantly challenge conventional wisdom within the system and avoid, hopefully, group-think. It is inconceivable today that we could take a premeditated decision to commit combat troops without a full and challenging discussion in the National Security Council, on the basis of full papers, including written

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legal advice, prepared and stress-tested by all relevant departments, with decisions formally minuted. Thirdly, I would argue also that the culture established by Prime Ministers matters too. It is crucial to good decision making that a Prime Minister establishes a climate in which it is safe for officials and other experts to challenge existing policy and question the views of Ministers, and the Prime Minister, without fear or favour. There is no question today but that everyone sat around the NSC table is genuinely free to speak their mind. Fourthly, if we are to take the difficult decisions to intervene in other countries, proper planning for what follows is vital. We know that the task of rebuilding effective governance is enormous. That is why we created a conflict, stability and stabilisation fund, and beefed up the cross-government stabilisation unit, so that experts are able to deploy in post-conflict situations anywhere in the world at short notice. Frankly, none of this would be possible without the historic decision that we have taken to commit 0.7% of our gross national income on overseas aid. A lot of that money is spent on conflict-affected and fragile states, not only assisting with post-conflict planning but also trying to prevent conflicts in the first place. Fifthly, we must ensure that our armed forces are always properly equipped and resourced. That is why we now conduct a regular strategic defence and security review to ensure that the resources we have meet the ambitions of the national security strategy. We are meeting our NATO commitment to spend 2% of our GDP on defence, and planning to invest at least £178 billion on new military equipment over the next decade. We have also enshrined the armed forces covenant in law to ensure that our armed forces and their families receive the treatment and respect they deserve. Sending our brave troops on to the battlefield without the right equipment was unacceptable, and whatever else we learn from this conflict, we must all pledge that this will never happen again. There will be further lessons to learn from studying this report, and I commit today that that is exactly what we will do, but in reflecting on this report, and my own experience, there are also some lessons here that I do not think we should draw. First, it would be wrong to conclude that we should not stand with our American allies when our common security interests are threatened. We must never be afraid to speak frankly and honestly, as best friends always should. And where we commit our troops together, there must be a structure through which our views can be properly conveyed and any differences worked through. But it remains the case that Britain and America share the same fundamental values, that Britain has no greater friend or ally in the world than America, and that our partnership remains as important for our security and prosperity today as it has ever been. Secondly, I think it would be wrong to conclude that we cannot rely on the judgments of our brilliant and hard-working intelligence agencies. We know the debt we owe them in helping to keep us safe every day of the year. Since November 2014, they have enabled us to foil seven different planned terrorist attacks on the streets of the UK. What this

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report shows is that there needs to be a proper separation between the process of assessing intelligence and the policy making that flows from it. And as a result of the reforms since the Butler report, that is what we have in place. Thirdly, it would be completely wrong to conclude that our military is not capable of intervening successfully around the world. Many of the failures in this report were not directly about the conduct of the armed forces as they went into Iraq, but rather the failures of planning before a shot was fired. There is no question but that Britain’s armed forces remain the envy of the world, and the decisions we have taken to ensure that they are properly resourced will ensure they stay that way. Finally, we should not conclude that intervention is always wrong. There are unquestionably times when it is right to intervene, as this country did successfully in Sierra Leone and Kosovo. I am sure that many in this House would agree that there have been times in the recent past when we should have intervened but did not, such as in failing to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Intervention is hard. War fighting is not always the most difficult part. Often, the state-building that follows is a much more complex challenge. We should not be naive to think that just because we have the best prepared plans, in the real world things cannot go wrong. Equally, just because intervention is difficult, it does not mean that there are not times when it is right and necessary. Yes, Britain has to, and will continue to, learn the lessons of this report. But as with our intervention against Daesh in Iraq and Syria today, Britain must not and will not shrink from its role on the world stage or fail to protect its people. I commend this statement to the House. [This statement was repeated and debated in the House of Lords.]

6.3 Early Day Motions

Committee on Conduct of Former Hon. Members of the House and the Conduct of the Rt. Hon Tony Blair EDM 302 (Session 2016-17) 7 July 2016 David Amess That this House notes the findings of the Chilcot Report on the difference between the strength of evidence available to the former Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, and the use he made of that evidence in statements to the House; and calls for the establishment of a select committee to consider the conduct of former hon. Members of the House and, where appropriate, to seek redress against such former Members.

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Legacy of Iraq War EDM 155 (Session 2016-17) 7 June 2016 Paul Flynn That this House congratulates the BBC for a vivid and restrained account of the suffering of the loved ones of the British soldier Tom Keys who was killed in the Iraq War caused, in his father's opinion, by the lie of the threat from non-existent weapons of mass destruction; looks forward to the publication of the Chilcot Inquiry Report, but is concerned that attempts may be made to invent a fictionalised history of the reasons for the UK's involvement in the second Iraq War; and recalls a letter sent to Tony Blair by the hon. Member for Newport West in March 2003 which warned that the world would be a more dangerous place at the end of hostilities in Iraq than it was before, and that the UK's involvement in President Bush's Iraq War would deepen the sense of grievance among Muslims that the Western and Christian world seeks to oppress them and that this would provide a propaganda victory to Osama bin Laden that would increase his support and the likelihood of more acts of terrorism.

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7. Further reading House of Commons Library Briefing Papers The Chilcot Inquiry: a reading list CBP-7642, 6 July 2016 Public Inquiries: non-statutory commissions of inquiry [includes a chapter on The Iraq Inquiry (The Chilcot Inquiry)] SN02599, 1 July 2016 The Chilcot Inquiry SN06215, 1 July 2016 Impeachment CBP-7612, 6 June 2016 Iraq: calls for an inquiry and historical precedents SN02713, 4 June 2015 Parliamentary approval for military action CBP-7166, 13 May 2015 Historical Library papers Iraq: weapons of mass destruction and the '45 minutes' intelligence SN/IA/3130, 13 July 2004 Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction SN/IA/2890, 9 February 2004 Commons Divisions on Iraq: 26 February and 18 March 2003 SN/SG/2109, 24 March 2003 House of Lords Library papers Iraq Inquiry Report: Comment and Reaction LBP-2016-0079, 7 July 2016 Iraq Inquiry Report: Motion to Take Note LBP-2016-0078, 6 July 2016 Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot): Timeline of Principal Developments LIF-2016-0034, 28 June 2016

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House of Commons Committee reports and evidence sessions Follow up to the Chilcot Report Liaison Committee, HC 689, 2 November 2016 The Liaison Committee hears from the Rt Hon Sir John Chilcot GCB in a follow-up to the Iraq Inquiry. Chilcot Inquiry: Lessons for the Machinery of Government Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee HC 656, 14 September 2016 Evidence session with Sir Jeremy Heywood, Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service. Warsaw NATO summit and Chilcot Report Defence Committee HC 579, 19 July 2016 Evidence session with the Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP and officials from the MoD. The Chilcot Report is discussed from Q41-Q64. Foreign Policy Developments July 2016 Foreign Affairs Committee HC 552, 7 July 2016 Evidence session with the Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP and officials from the FCO. The Chilcot Report is discussed from Q69 onwards. Progress of the Iraq Inquiry Foreign Affairs Committee HC 1027, 4 February 2015 Evidence session with the Rt Hon Sir John Chilcot GCB.

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Miscellaneous articles and blogs The Chilcot Report: Lessons for the machinery of government A commentary by the Better Government Initiative September 2016 History matters blog 26 January 2015 Dr Catherine Haddon Institute for Government

DEBATE PACK 2016-0235 29 November 2016

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