Chiaradonna Plotinus Memory-libre

8/10/2019 Chiaradonna Plotinus Memory-libre

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In L. Castagnoli and P. Ceccarelli (eds.), Greek Memories: Theories and Practices(2015). Penultimate Draft.

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Plotinus on Memory, Recollection and Discursive Thought

Riccardo Chiaradonna

De natura Rationis est res sub quadam

ternitatis specie percipere.

Spinoza,Ethica, Pars II, Prop. 44, Corollarium

II

Plotinus has a lot to say on memory; but it is extremely difficult to outline his

theory of memory.1One reason for this is the fact that his most extensive treatment of

the topic, which takes up more than ten chapters in treatises 4.3 [27] and 4.4 [28]

according to Ficinos divisio textus, does not focus on memory as such; rather, Plotinus

aims to enquire into what it is that remembers (4.3.25.6: !" #$!% !& '()'$(%*+(

,-!.),2 which is to say: in what kind of realities memory naturally exists (25.9-10).

Plotinus research, then, focuses on the soul, since he regards this as the subject of

memory.3This view has crucial consequences on Plotinus treatment of memory, which

is intertwined with a set of further questions both metaphysical (the relation between the

souls nature, its embodied existence and its vicissitudes after leaving the physical

body) and epistemological (the distinction between the different cognitive powers of the

soul, from sense-perception to non-discursive thought). Plotinus numerous remarks on

memory should in no way be isolated from this wider background. Plotinus subsequent

and briefer discussion in treatise 4.6 [41] is explicitly devoted to memory and yet, once

again, it is the ontological and cognitive status of the soul as such that comes to the

forefront (see 4.6.3.5-19).

1On Plotinus views on memory see Warren 1965; Blumenthal 1971: 80-99; Guidelli 1988. A number of

recent studies has been devoted to this topic: Brisson 2006; DAncona 2007; Remes 2007: 111-119;

Chiaradonna 2009; Taormina 2011; Hutchinson 2011; Nikulin 2014. King 2009 provides certainly the

most accurate discussion of Plotinus theory of memory and recollection.2 For the translations see Armstrong 1984 (with slight alterations). The text is that of Henry and

Schwyzers editio minorin the OCT series.3As King 2009: 141 and 235 shows, this is Plotinus major point of disagreement with Aristotle, who

regards the concrete living being as the subject of memory. According to Plotinus, memory belongs to the

soul alone, unlike perception. However, memory does not belong to each kind of soul: souls of the

heavenly bodies and the world soul have no memory (see 4.4.12 with Brisson 2006: 25-26). Plotinusdiscussion of memory is actually limited to human souls.


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Plotinus inquiry into what it is that remembers in 4.3 and 4.4 is part of his

extensive discussion on the nature of the soul and the difficult questions this raises

(/%01234567#$0.8(: 4.3 [27]; 4.4 [28]; 4.5 [29]). More specifically, Plotinus aims to

answer the question of whether and to what degree souls have the power to remember

things after leaving these regions (4.3.25.1-2), i.e. their embodied lives. In order to

carry out this investigation, Plotinus addresses the question of what it is that has the

natural capacity of remembering (4.3.25.9-10). Plotinus claims that he has focused

elsewhere on what memory is, so that this question can now be left aside (25.8-9).

Actually, this is an obscure allusion to say the least, since no extensive treatment of

memory as such can be found in Plotinus previous treatises (arguably, in fact, no such

discussion is featured in the Enneads). I will not go into this question, however, and I

will limit myself to examining the structure of the first chapter of this section (4.3.25):

here we find the basic distinctions Plotinus draws with regard to memory and its

cognitive power.

When starting his discussion on what it is that remembers, Plotinus shows great

care in dealing with what it is that does notremember, i.e. with those realities whose

thought-activity is incompatible with memory. Why? I will propose a tentative answer

at the end of this paper. Let me first paraphrase Plotinus rather surprising argument; I

will then provide a more systematic outline of it and, after a number of supplementary

remarks, I will try to give an answer to the question I have just raised.

Memory is first presented as something whose object is acquired: it is either

learnt or experienced (4.3.25.11: ,#.9!:!$3 !.(&6 ; '

Accordingly, memory does not belong to those realities that are unaffected (!$>6

7#


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Plotinus remarks, it cannot even be said that the Intellect remembers its own thoughts,

for they did not come in such a way that it has to hold them fast to prevent them from

going away (25.25-26). When moving on to the soul, Plotinus first argues that in the

same sense (25.28: !&(


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what it is that cannot be connected with M1. Memory does not in fact belong to what

has no affection and is outside time. What follows, then, is a detour which includes the

following points. Plotinus focuses on:

Ci): Gods non-discursive and archetypal Intellect, which is not receptive of its

objects of thought and does not admit any temporal change;

Cii): The soul, which does not remember (in the above specified sense of M1,

which entails both an acquired object and time) those things which it possesses as part

of its nature (-3'KF!J(). Plotinus, however, argues that (i) the soul in its physical

existence (,(!of Platos recollection.E) Until now, Plotinus has not spent a single word on what it is that remembers.

He makes a break here and starts newly discussing this issue which he had announced in

A).7

Chapter 26 provides a detailed treatment of the soul as that which remembers.

Plotinus explains that memory (M1) is connected to (but not identical with or strictly

6

On Plotinus use of ,(%0C%>(in this passage, see Chiaradonna forthcoming.7King 2009: 139-146 outlines clearly the distinction between M1 and M2; also, see Nikulin 2014: 193.


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dependent on) perception. Now, according to Plotinus perception cannot be identified

with a bodily affection. Rather, perception entails a spontaneous judgement (90M-.6)

which the soul (an incorporeal and self-subsisting substance incapable of being affected

by bodies) makes in correspondence to the affections received by the sense-organs of

the living ensouled body (see 3.6.1.1-2; 4.4.23.3642). The details of Plotinus theory

of perception are complex to say the least, but they need not concern us here (in

particular, it is difficult to get a clear idea of the status of Plotinus perceptual

judgements).8 Suffice it to recall some general features of this theory. According to

Plotinus, neither perception nor memory entail any quasi-physical alteration of the soul

which perceives and remembers: accordingly, there is no physical impression of the

perceived qualities in the soul and Plotinus consistently rejects the theory according to

which sense-perceptions are impressions or seal-stamps on the soul. Memory, then,

cannot be conceived of as the retention (9

impressions (!3#O-%.6: 4.6.1.1-4).9Each cognitive activity of the soul, starting from

perception, is instead regarded by Plotinus as a spontaneous thought-activity, which is

based on a prioricapacities of the soul (and possibly a prioricontents too, although this

is never completely made clear in the texts about perception: but see 4.6.3.18-19). As

for memory, in 4.6.3 Plotinus argues that it cannot merely consist of the passive

capacity of storing past perceptions; rather, memory involves an active power of the

soul, which makes the objects of sense, which are, so to speak, connected with it, shine

out, by its own power and brings them before its eyes (4.6.3.16-18). Obviously these

views entail the rejection of materialist analogies like that of the wax block (4.6.1.19-

21; 4.3.26.29-32).

Plotinus views can interestingly be compared to those of Aristotle, who claims

that the objects of our knowledge are only incidentally remembered, since memorybelongs to the same part of the soul as representation (phantasia), so that all things

which are representational are essentially objects of memory, while those (such as

thought-objects) which necessarily involve representation (without being themselves

representational) are objects of memory only incidentally (Mem. 450a22-25; 451a28-

8See the standard discussion by Emilsson 1988. Further developments and criticism of Emilsson in

Lavaud 2006; Remes 2007: 145 and Magrin 2010. See also Chiaradonna 2012.9Note, however, that in 4.3.29.24 Plotinus claims that memory isretention or 9

contradict what he says 4.6.1.3, i.e. that memories are not retentions. On this, see Taormina 2011 andNikulin 2014: 191.


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29). Like Aristotle, Plotinus connects memory with phantasia or tophantastikon, i.e.

with the faculty of representation (4.3.29.31-32).10However, in 4.3.29 and 30 Plotinus

raises a further question, which hardly fits Aristotles conceptual framework: since we

have memory of thoughts as well, what remembers thoughts? Plotinus argues from the

very beginning of his enquiry that memory can be of what has been learnt. He also

points out that it is not only what has been perceived that can be remembered: for

example, the soul must have memory of its own movements, of what it desired, even if

it did not enjoy these desired objects and these objects did not enter the body

(4.3.26.346).

It is difficult to interpret Aristotles view that we do not properly remember

thought-contents. I would rely here on the reading proposed by Castagnoli, who draws

the following distinction.11According to Aristotle, one can only know for instance

what a triangle is or what the theorem of Pythagoras is and how to demonstrate it. Such

things, however, cannot properly be remembered, unless we use remembering in a

secondary (incidental) sense, according to which we can remember abstract thought-

contents, only in that we remember events or objects of our past experiences which are

related to them (e.g. we can remember episodes in which we thought of that theorem; or

we may remember the diagrams drawn on those occasions). Unlike Aristotle, Plotinus is

quite happy to apply both M1 and M2 to thought-contents: through M1 we can

remember thought-contents we previously learnt (4.3.25.11); through M2 we can

remember thought-contents that are latently connatural to our soul (25.29-33). The

difference between Plotinus and Aristotle can be explained in several ways:

1) Plotinus is not aware of Aristotles technicalities and simply uses the verb to

remember in its ordinary sense which corresponds to Aristotles incidental sense.

2) Plotinus is a Platonic philosopher and an exegete of Plato: accordingly, he cannot butassume as a starting point Platos well-known thesis in the Meno (81d), according to

which searching and learning are, as a whole, recollection.

10See, on these lines, King 2009: 176 n. 749. King 2009: 4-13 and passimsuggests thatphantasiashould

be translated with representation (rather than imagination). A phantasia is what remains when

perception is over and requires a preceding perception to exist (King 2009: 5). As he argues, Aristotle

and Plotinus regardphantasiaas a propositional and, thus, conceptual capacity, which cannot (merely) be

equated with the preservation of images or pictures in the soul (on Plotinus, see King, 2009: 183). As

King himself recognizes, however, sometimes Plotinus comes very close to suggesting that representation

is a kind of image of the thought: see 4.3.30.3-4.11See Castagnoli 2006. This proposal is expanded in Castagnolis contribution to this volume.


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3) There is a particular sense in which thought-contents can be remembered according

to Plotinus and this fact marks his difference from Aristotle.

In my view, explanation 1) is simply false, because Plotinus alludes to Aristotles view

(in the free manner that is usual of him) at the beginning of 4.3.30. Explanation 2) is not

implausible in itself, since Plotinus presents M2 as his own version of what the

ancients (presumably Plato) had called 7(P'()-.6(4.3.25.33);12and besides, Plotinus

is well-known not to have ever claimed to be original and to have presented his own

philosophy as an exegesis of Plato (4.8.1.23-28; 5.1.8.10-14). Still, explanation 2) is not

enough in itself, unless we get a clear idea of how Plotinus tries to make sense of

Platos view (indeed, Plotinus way of making sense of Platos authoritative views can

be remarkably different from what we actually find in Plato: among several possible

examples, I would refer here to Plotinus highly original interpretation of the 'QC.-!


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representation accompanies every intellectual act can be seen as a loose paraphrase of

Aristotle well-known view that while thoughts are not K

%E'Q(is at least very closely related to Aristotles view in the treatise De memoria et

reminiscentia: if representation accompanies (#

which our souls are nonetheless able to remember. If this is true, we must look for

some other explanation.

Some supplementary remarks are necessary. It is somewhat misleading to

distinguish between thought-activities and thought-contents in Plotinus philosophy,

because all proper thought-contents are conceived by Plotinus as essentially connected

to a corresponding thought-activity. I did not say because all thought-contents depend

on a corresponding thought-activity, since this would entail a psychologising notion of

thought-contents as the result of an independent thought-activity. Plotinus rejects this

position with regard to the divine non-discursive Intellect at 5.9.7-8: his view is rather

15 It is doubtful whether Plotinus would have claimed that we have thought-contents acquired from

perception through an Aristotelianizing process of abstraction. He rather suggests that our soul has in

itself everything (ta panta) as if written in it (see 5.3 [49] 4.212 and 4.6.3.18: the soul is logos pantn).

If this is the case, even the production of concepts derived from experience actually entails the activation

of formal a priori contents. On this, see Chiaradonna 2012. Yet it can still be argued that the a priori

contents involved in discursive and temporal thought (i.e. what Plotinus calls the imprints or traces of the

intelligible Forms in us: 5.3.2.713) are different from the a priori contents involved in M2 (i.e. our

direct and connatural thoughts of the Forms not of their discursive imprints in us). From this

perspective, the connection with phantasia can be seen as different too. In 4.3.30.3-4 Plotinus suggests

that a representation actually accompanies lower discursive intellectual acts. This does not hold true of

our higher and ordinarily unconscious thoughts. That said, a certain tension seems to subsist between

Plotinus account of acquired thoughts in 4.3.25 and 30 and his innatism about discursive thought-contents stated elsewhere (5.3.2-3).


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that of a necessary mutual entailment between thought-activity and thought-content.

Plotinus famously conceives of archetypal Forms (i.e. the highest possible type of being

and reality, since the One is situated beyond being) as the thought-contents of the divine

Intellect and, at the same time, as the aspects that are constitutive of the essence of the

divine Intellect. Thought-activity and thought-content coincide in the Intellect which,

accordingly, does not acquire its thought-objects from something else: rather, its

thought-objects and its thought-activities (i.e., its very essence) are one and the same

thing (see 5.5.1-2). Plotinus metaphysical hierarchy consists of several levels. The One

is the principle of being and thought, without being itself being and thought. At the

level of the divine Intellect, Forms are perfectly unified aspects through which the

internal plurality of the Intellect is structured; this perfect unification of plurality is

Plotinus highest type of being and thought. As we proceed downwards in the

metaphysical hierarchy, we encounter increasingly lower, less unified levels of Forms

which correspond to lower, more unfolded and less unified levels of thought; the

lower levels are images or (obviously non-corporeal) imprints (see 5.3.2.9-11)

deriving from the higher ones. The characteristic property of the soul lies in the fact that

it displays a kind of thought which entails a succession of contents and a temporal

structure (see 3.7 [45] .11). This kind of activity is a diminution of the Intellect

(4.3.18.4) and is what Plotinus calls A.P($.


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the contents which derive from sense-perception (5.3.2.7-11; 3.36-40). What we find in

our physical world are even lower, non-essential images of the souls Forms in matter,

which derive from the soul via the activity of the spermatic logoi(6.3.15.24-38). This

sketchy general account not only applies to Plotinus macrocosmos, but also to his view

of human nature. According to Plotinus we are structured according to the same

pattern which can be found at the level of the macrocosmos.18A key aspect of this view

is that a part of us never leaves the level of the transcendent Intellect. Even if we are

not ordinarily conscious of this fact, something in us (i.e. the highest part of our soul

or its noetic counter-part) always remains at the level of the Intellect and shares its non-

discursive, archetypal thought-activity. Hence we are never really cut off from the

nous(see e.g. 1.4.10; 5.1.11-12; 5.3.4.1-5; 6.4.14.16-22). Our ordinary thought-activity

is situated at the level of discursive thought, which entails a temporal succession and is

directed towards external objects. Furthermore, we have a body and this shares the non-

essential mode of existence that characterises the physical world. Still, as Plotinus

emphatically claims in 4.8.8.1-4, even our soul does not altogether come down, but

there is always something of it in the intelligible. Ordinarily we are not aware of the

activity of this undescended part of us.19 In everyday life, our thought proceeds

discursively and is directed towards external objects (see 5.3.2-3). This, however, is not

an unavoidable condition: we can in fact become aware of the highest thought-activity,

which is connatural to our soul, even if this escapes our ordinary conscious reasoning.

How is this possible? Plotinus answer in 4.3 is: thanks to a peculiar kind of memory,

namely M2. M2 (i.e., Plotinus version of Platos recollection) brings into act those

connatural activities of the soul, which we are ordinarily not aware of. It is through M2

(i.e. though the memory of our connatural and ordinarily latent thoughts) that the

recovery of the noeticself begins.20

Possibly representation accompanies all those thought-contents which have been

18Plotinus famously claims that the three highest principles are present in ourselves (#


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discursively learnt by our embodied soul.21But thoughts which are connatural to our

soul since they belong to its higher, non-discursive and ordinarily unconscious activity

are in all likelihood not accompanied by representational contents in themselves.

Plotinus actually claims that thought of the intelligibles is as such without images or

representational contents (see 1.4.10.17-22; 4.6.2.1819).22 In fact, such

representational contents proper to intelligibles should be different from those

representational contents ultimately derived from perception, which accompany

discursive thought.: Plotinus emphasizes that a hypothesis like this would have very

unwelcome consequences, as it would jeopardize the unity of the living being (see

4.3.31.69).23Aristotles account, then, cannot hold for thoughts of this kind: if such

thoughts (i.e. our connatural and superior thoughts of the intelligible Forms) are the

objects of memory, this cannot be because we remember the representational contents

which accompany these thoughts as such. Plotinus account of the role played by

phantasiawhen our soul remembers its higher thoughts is rather complicated:

Perhaps the reception into the power of representation would be of the logos, which

accompanies the thought. The thought is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out

into the open, but remains unobserved within, but the logos unfolds its content, andbrings it out of the thought into the power of representation and so shows the thought as if

in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and memory of it.

Therefore, even though the soul is always moved to thinking, it is when it comes to be in

the power of representation that we apprehend it. (4.3.30.5-13; see also 1.4.10.6-16)

I will limit myself to an examination of a couple of general points. 24Plotinus is here

describing the same memory, M2, he outlined in 25.27-34. As Plotinus argues in that

passage, the ancients applied the terms memory and recollection to the souls

21For qualifications, see above n. 15.22 Cf. PlatoR.509d511e and 532a534b. See Hutchinson 2011: 267 and Linguiti 2004-2005.23The interpretation of 4.3.31 is problematic. Plotinus raises the hypothesis that there are twophantasiai ,

i.e. that both the higher and the lower soul have representative faculties, each of which is responsible for

its own memories. Yet Plotinus clearly says that if this were the case, the living being would have no

unity at all (4.3.31.69: $X!J CD0 Y( #


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bringing into act what they possessed (!6 ,(%0C$F-


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downwards and upwards; it receives both acts of thoughts and perceptions. Its

highest power is described in 1.4.10 and 4.3.30 and resides in mirroring the non-

discursive thoughts of our higher soul.

Let us now turn to Aristotle again. It may be said that an abstract thought is

incidentally remembered when we have memory of a representational content

associated with it; however, the thought-content is not remembered in itself, but only

known as such. This entails that the known thought-content does not undergo any

change through the memory of the representational contents associated with it. For

example, we remember the particular diagrams by which we have first learnt the

theorem of Pythagoras and we know the abstract content of that theorem. These two

things remain, so to speak, independent of each other and our knowledge of the theorem

does not change when we remember the representational contents associated with it.

This, however, does not hold for M2, since apprehending our higher and latent thoughts

in the phantasiaentails a discursive unfolding of them. It is only when logosunfolds

our higher thoughts that they come to acquire a discursive structure such that

representation can mirror them. Or, rather, it is only the discursive counterpart of our

higher thoughts that can be mirrored by representation and, therefore, remembered.29

Insofar as our higher thoughts are only known in themselves, they are instead non-

conscious, independent of perception, free from images and non-discursive.30

It is not easy to make sense of Plotinus views; here I propose the following

tentative explanation. Each of us has an intrinsically double nature: our soul has

descended into a body and our ordinary cognitive activities have a discursive structure

and are ultimately directed towards the mundane objects of our experience. This,

however, does not exhaust our souls cognitive powers, since a part of us (our

undescended soul) never leaves the intelligible world and shares the Intellects non-discursive knowledge of the archetypal Forms. M2, Plotinus recollection, is the process

29On this, I fully agree with Hutchinson 2011: 274.30 It is debated whether according to Plotinus our soul has a direct cognitive access to the intelligible

Forms, independently of sense-perception, even during its embodied condition. I tried to develop the

interpretation set out here in Chiaradonna 2009 and 2012; for a different account, see Gerson 1994: 177

80. I suggest that M2 is a crucial but preliminary stage for attending the highest goal of our cognitive

activity, i.e. the condition in which our intellect functions without representation so that we fully recover

our higher and noetic self. At that stage, memory and phantasiado not play a role any more (see Remes

2007: 123 and Chiaradonna 2009: 27-28) and we fully share the noetic non-discursive mode ofknowledge (see Plotinus famous first-person description of this experience in 4.8.1).


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whereby we may become conscious, even in our mundane existence, of this higher

thought-activity which is connatural to us and ordinarily remains latent. By doing so,

we start to recover our noetic self. This process does not entail that we suppress our

discursive and representational knowledge. Those who attain M2 do not stop having

ordinary discursive thoughts and perceptions; they do no stop living in the bodily world.

According to Plotinus, however, their everyday experience is only superficially similar

to that of other human beings. Actually, in those who attain M2 discursive thoughts and

their perceptions acquire a different function, since they unfold and discursively mirror

a higher non-discursive knowledge of the archetypal Forms. A Plotinian sage obviously

perceives the same things as other people, but at least in some cases he can do so in

a different way (he does so, so to speak, sub specie aeternitatis), since the cognitive

activities of his soul are nothing but expressions of his higher knowledge of the

intelligible world.31We may suppose, then, that a Plotinian sage is able to understand

(at least some of) the aspects comprising his mundane experience as manifestations of

the intelligible principles of our world.

This may help answer the question about the a-temporal character of M2. Indeed,

M2 does not concern thoughts that have been acquired at a previous time; in this sense,

M2 does not involve time. One may object, however, that M2 entails discursive logos

and phantasia, which are, in turn, connected to time: so how can it be that time is not

involved in M2 (25.33-34)? In my view the answer to this question lies in the fact that

through M2 representation and discursive thought attempt to trascend, so to speak, their

constitutive boundaries and come to mirror temporally an eternal mode of knowledge. I

would call this a qualified use of our discursive thought (a use sub specie aeternitatis),

which is only possible in virtue of our direct preliminary intellectual grasp of the Forms.

What really matters is not only that our higher thoughts come to be mirrored in ourtemporal experience, but also that our ordinary and temporal experience acquires thus a

radically different sense, i.e. one that is influenced by our higher, non discursive and

non temporal thoughts of the Forms. I suggest that Plotinus refers to this favourable

condition when he describes the situation in which the higher soul exerts its influence

over the lower soul and the two souls are in tune, so that the phantasmabecomes one,

31

These conclusions come close to Wilberdings (2008) fine analysis of the way in which the Plotiniansage may performs some of his actions.


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as if a shadow followed the other and as if a little light slipped under a greater one

(4.3.31.11-13).32

We can now get back to the original question raised in this article: why does

Plotinus start his enquiry on the subject of memory with a long digression concerning

that which does not remember? The answer is simple, once we understand that

Plotinuss argument (here as elsewhere in the Enneads) is not linear but circular: the

beginning of his research points to its end.34Plotinus believes that right from the outset

we must have a preliminary grasp of the goal of his research, if we are to properly

understand the development of his argument. Plotinus discussion on what it is that

remembers is nothing but a complex discussion of the souls cognitive powers, from

the lowest to the highest. Memory has the crucial role of revealing the souls internal

structure, with its different and hierarchically ordered metaphysical and cognitive

levels. The highest kind of memory lies in the conscious apprehension of our highest

connatural knowledge of the archetypal Forms. It is not surprising, then, that at the very

beginning Plotinus outlines what it is that does not remember and lies outside time,

since this, so to speak, is the very goal of his discussion, which presents memory (M2)

as the temporal and discursive expression of our non-temporal and non-discursive grasp

of the intelligible world: as the discursive and temporal expression, that is, of a mode of

knowledge which is homogeneous to that of the divine Intellect.

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See Hutchinson 2011: 265.34See on this argumentative structure Chiaradonna 2002: 42; 156-157.


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Documents

Chiaradonna Plotinus Memory-libre