Chiaradonna Universals Commentators-libre

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SEMINARIE CONVEGNI

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Universals inAncient Philosophy

edited byRiccardo ChiaradonnaGabriele Galluzzo


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Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa

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Table of contents

Introduction

R C, G G

Universals before Universals: Some Remarks on Platoin His ContextM B

Platos Conception of the Forms: Some RemarksF A

Platos Five Worlds Hypothesis (Ti. cd),Mathematics and UniversalsM R

Plato and the One-over-Many PrincipleD S

Universals, Particulars and Aristotles Criticism of Platos FormsL M. C

Universals in Aristotles Logical WorksM M

Universals in AristotlesMetaphysicsG G

Epicureans and Stoics on UniversalsA B

Alexander, Boethus and the Other Peripatetics: The Theory ofUniversals in the Aristotelian CommentatorsR C


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One of a Kind: Plotinus and Porphyry on Unique Instantiation

P A Universals, Education, and Philosophical Methodologyin Later NeoplatonismM G

Universals in Ancient MedicineR C

Universals in the Greek Church FathersJ Z

Bibliography

Index locorum

Index of names


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Alexander, Boethusand the Other Peripatetics:The Theory of Universalsin the Aristotelian Commentators

. Dexippus, Simplicius and Peripatetic universals

is is how one must answer the arguments of the associates of Alexander

and Boethus and the other Peripatetics [

] and it is appropriate for those

interpreting theMetaphysicsto show that Aristotle gives priority to common

items ( ) even when considering sensible things (D., In Cat.,

, - Busse)1.

ese lines from Dexippus provide significant evidence about thetheory of universals developed in the Aristotelian commentary tradi-tion. e passage quoted above has a parallel in Simplicius (S., InCat., , ff. Kalbfleisch), who also mentions the common sourcethat lies behind both his report and that of Dexippus, i.e. Iamblichuslost Commentary on the Categories(S., In Cat., , and , Kalbfleisch). Unlike what happens elsewhere, however, here Dexip-pus provides a crucial detail which is missing in Simplicius. Whereas

Simplicius only names Alexander of Aphrodisias, Dexippus providesa fuller list of Peripatetic opponents which includes Boethus, Alexan-der and the other Peripatetics2. us, Dexippus makes an overt con-nection between Boethus of Sidon (first century BCE) and Alexanderof Aphrodisias (second-third century CE), the two main Aristotelian

English translations are generally adapted from those published in the series e

Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. See, in particular, H, F ; C (for Simplicius Commentary on the Categories); D (for Dexippus). I

have also made use of the translations in S , pp. - (Ontology). It is unclear to me whether in mentioning Boethus Dexippus was drawing from

Iamblichus or whether he added the name of Boethus to those found in his source.

Dexippus does not usually name his predecessors: this may speak in support of the

first hypothesis. On Dexippus, see now the excellent discussion in B .


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Riccardo Chiaradonna

commentators in the post-Hellenistic age. Some recent studies have

convincingly shown that Boethus and Alexander developed two differ-ent and alternative Peripatetic readings of Aristotle, which mirror twostages in the history of the reception of Aristotles school treatises3. Inthis contribution I aim to develop this point and show that Dexippuscriticism sets out Boethus and Alexanders positions misleadingly,since Dexippus (or his source Iamblichus) conflates the theories of hisopponents without considering their mutual differences within a com-mon Peripatetic philosophical background4.

It is worth quoting Dexippus passage in full:

SELEUCUS But what could we say to those who dispute this very point,

claiming that in fact universals are not prior in nature to particulars, but

posterior to them?

DEXIPPUS Well, if we were to consider the question carefully, we would

find that they actually take as agreed what is disputed. For when they say

that the universals are prior in nature to each thing taken individually, but

on the other hand absolutely5posterior in nature, they are postulating that

particulars are prior also by nature6, and are proceeding invalidly in taking

as a first principle that very thing that requires demonstration. Such attempts

at proofs [] as the following are also superficial: if the common

item exists, it is necessary that an individual exists also (for individuals are

comprehended in common items), but if an individual exists, it does not al-

ways follow that a common item exists, if at least a common item belongs to

many (instances). For it is obvious that a particular can be an individual only

See, first and foremost, the illuminating discussion in R . Also, see

C, R and the discussion of Rasheds volume by K

. Significantly, Dexippus simplifying account was shared by such an eminent

scholar as Paul Moraux. See M , p. : Fr Boethos und Alexander[]

ist das Gemeinsame nichts anderes als ein Produkt der abstrahierenden Fhigkeit des

Geistes, das aus den enzig un allein in der Wirklichkeit vorhandenen Einzeldingen

gewonnen wird; es besitzt nichts von der Selbstndigkeit und von der Prioritt derplatonischen ideellen Wesenheiten (my italics). Recent scholarship on Alexander has

changed this picture radically. At , Busse Dillon reads instead of (MSS), but this seems

unnecessary to me. (, - Busse) and not only with respect to us ( ) as

Dexippus too recognises (see , Busse).


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The Theory of Universals in the Aristotelian Commentators

if a common item is immanent in it and completes its essence, for a particular

human being is also Human Being. And it is also false to say that, when thecommon item is removed, the individual is not altogether removed; for if the

being of the common item consists in extending to all the things ranked under

it, the person who removes this immediately removes the whole existence of

the individual7, is is how one must answer the arguments of the associates

of Alexander and Boethus and the other Peripatetics and it is appropriate for

those interpreting theMetaphysicsto show that Aristotle gives priority to the

common items [ ] even when considering sensible things (D.,

In Cat., , - Busse)

8

.

According to Dexippus, the Peripatetics hold that universals or com-mon items are posterior in nature to particulars, because they are pos-terior to the extension of the particulars under them. Dexippus (seeS., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch) replies that his opponents sim-ply take it for granted that particulars are prior in nature, but do notprovide any demonstration of this fact. Simplicius parallel discussiongives further details, since he remarks that Alexander of Aphrodisiasclaims without any proof that common items ( ) derivetheir being and their essence ( ) from particu-lars ( , S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch).Some lines above, Simplicius sets out this thesis as distinctively Peripa-tetic (, - Kalbfleisch): koinado not exist at all independently, buthave their being in particulars ( , ).

e Peripatetic view rejected by Dexippus and Simplicius is not easy

to assess. As a matter of fact, the claim that universals do not existby themselves, independently of particulars, but are in particulars anddepend on them for their existence is an ambiguous statement thatcan be interpreted in two different ways. (a) Universals do not possessany kind of existence distinct from that of particulars: they are in par-ticulars since nothing exists but particular entities; (b) universals areentities distinct from particulars, although they are not independentof particulars and could not exist without particulars. e reading (a)

At , Busse I read instead of (MSS). As I see it, the

parallel with S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch is decisive. For discussion, see D-

, p. note (who, however, retains ). : on Dexippus at , Busse, see the last

section of this article.


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of the Peripatetic thesis is equivalent to an extensional position which

would lead us to equate universals with mere collections of particulars.e reading (b) is instead equivalent to a moderate kind of realismaccording to which universals are entities that can be determined inthemselves and are not identical to collections of particulars; however,these entities only exist insofar as there is some particular that instan-tiates them. According to (a), definitions ultimately refer to the par-ticulars that belong to the extension of a certain predicate. Accordingto (b), definitions refer to a feature proper to each particular; such a

feature satisfies the intension of the definitional account and is an en-tity in some sense of the word9. As I aim to show, the view (a) is thatheld by Boethus, whereas the view (b) is that held by Alexander. Fur-thermore, both (a) and (b) are different from (c), Iamblichus strongrealism about universals, according to which universals are universaliaante rem, i.e. self-subsistent paradigmatic entities that are prior, met-aphysically separate and independent with respect to particulars. Atthe level of the sensible world Iamblichus and his followers posit im-manent common entities (universalia in re), which are lower than theuniversalia ante rem and partake in them, but are nevertheless prior toparticulars.

Aer outlining the Peripatetic view on the priority of particulars,both Dexippus and Simplicius focus on the arguments (,D., In Cat., , Busse; , S., In Cat., , Ka-lbfleisch) developed by the Peripatetics in support of their theory.Dexippus and Simplicius (who follow their common source Iambli-chus) discard these arguments as unsatisfying (, D.,

In Cat., , Busse; , S., In Cat., , Kalbfleisch). etwo arguments rejected by Dexippus and Simplicius can be seen ascomplementary parts of the same demonstration, since they adopt twocanonical rules of natural priority that were taken to be equivalent bythe commentators:

() Fs are prior to Gs if and only if F co-removes but is not co-re-moved by G;

() Fs are prior to Gs if and only if F is co-introduced by but does notco-introduce G10.

For the distinction between the extensional and the intensional reading, see

R , p. andpassim. Also, see K , p. . On the rules of natural priority, see B , pp. -.


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e Peripatetics apply both rules to the relation between particulars

and universals, since () individuals are co-introduced by but do notco-introduce universals and () individuals co-remove but are not co-removed by universals. Interestingly, however, these rules of priorityare compatible with both the reading (a) and the reading (b) outlinedabove. According to (a), i.e. the extensional reading of the Peripateticposition, individuals are co-introduced by universals since universalsare nothing but collections of particulars: thus, given a certain collec-tion, the particulars that belong to this collection are also given. Fur-

thermore, particulars co-remove universals, since when all particularsare removed, their collection is also removed. e opposite does nothold: one could well consider a species, for instance, with a unique par-ticular member (e.g. the sun and the moon, according to the examplesgiven in A.,Met. )11. In such cases, the unique member of thespecies exists but does not belong to any universal collection: hencethe individual does not co-introduce the universal and the universaldoes not co-remove the particular. One may indeed remark that thecollection composed by one single individual is still an entity differentfrom the single individual member that belongs to it. To the best ofmy knowledge, however, the ancient commentators do not developany argument of this kind. Furthermore, the collection with one singlemember would still not be universal in the sense of being composedby several members12. e two rules of priority are also compatiblewith reading (b), i.e. the intensional reading of the Peripatetic posi-tion. In this case, individuals are co-introduced by universals, sinceuniversals are definable entities that exist only insofar as they are in-

stantiated by some individual. When all individuals are removed, theuniversal definable nature is also removed. e opposite does not hold,as is shown again by the example of a species with one single particu-lar instantiation. e situation, however, is more complicated here.In fact, one could well consider a definable entity corresponding tothe sun (the nature sun) which exists only insofar as it is instantiatedby a unique individual. is definable nature would not be universal,but would nevertheless be different from the unique particular that

instantiates it (the definable nature would be the same even if it were

See on this A, this volume. I consciously avoid talking of classes and of their members, but rather adopt

the term collection, which is more neutral and does not suggest any direct parallel

between these ancient views and modern logic.


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instantiated by several particulars). As we shall see below, Alexander of

Aphrodisias develops an argument of this kind and treats the definablenature (e.g. the genus animal, the species human being or sun) assomething separate from its being universal (see A. A., Quaest.I.a, , - and I.b, , - Bruns).

. Boethus of Sidon: the extensional position

Unfortunately, the commentaries on the Categoriesby Boethus andAlexander are lost. e situation is extremely difficult with Boethussince, unlike what happens with Alexander, none of his works are ex-tant. In order to assess his views, we depend completely on later secondor third-hand accounts furnished by Neoplatonist commentators13. Itis actually very unlikely that Dexippus and Simplicius read Boethus di-rectly. Probably they based their accounts on Iamblichus, who in turnhad relied on Porphyrys lost commentaryAd Gedalium for informa-tion about Boethus14. is should indeed recommend prudence. Forexample, Martin Tweedale has convincingly shown that Simpliciussometimes provides a misleading account of Alexanders position: thesame might well be the case with Boethus, but, unlike what happenswith Alexander, we cannot check Dexippus and Simplicius outlinesagainst Boethus own writings. Furthermore, the testimoniaare oenobscure: for instance, it is very difficult to separate Simplicius reportfrom his assessment of Boethus position. at said, we should notsimply give in to desperation, since what we can find in Dexippus and

Simplicius is enough to draw a sufficiently clear and consistent outlineof Boethus position15.

On Boethus, see M , pp. -. More recently, R ;

R , who provides an in-depth discussion of Boethus in relation to Alex-

ander; R a. S a focuses on Boethus position within the early

reception of Aristotles Categories; on this, see also C b. Several tes-

timonia on Boethus have now been translated and commented upon in S. G forthcoming provides an extensive discussion of Boethus interpreta-

tion of the Categories. It is controversial whether Simplicius read Porphyrys Ad Gedalium directly.

C , p. note andpassim suggests that Simplicius only relied on Iam-

blichus. e recently discovered commentary on Aristotles Categoriespreserved in the


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As noted above, Dexippus reference to Boethus and Alexander is

open to different interpretations. e most we can say is that the Peri-patetic position about the priority of individuals was different fromthe Neoplatonist realism about universals held by Iamblichus and hisfollowers. However, two different interpretations are possible withinthe same Peripatetic philosophical background, i.e. the extensionaland the intensional. Our testimonia on Boethus strongly suggest heheld an extensional view of the universals. First it is worth focusing onS., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch. Here Simplicius famously ex-

pounds Boethus views on sensible substance

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. As Simplicius reports,Boethus compared Aristotles theory of substance in the Categories, ac-cording to which ousiais a single category ( [] ), tothe division of substance into form, matter and composite which Aris-totle expounds elsewhere ( ). Boethus conclusion is radicalto say the least: while matter and composite substance satisfy the crite-ria of substantiality established in the Categories, form is in matter asin something else and is therefore cut off from substance. us, formshould be seen as belonging to non-substantial categories such as qual-ity, or quantity, or some other. Significantly, Boethus comes to thisconclusion by noting that Aristotles definition of primary substance( , S., In Cat., , Kalbfleisch) inthe Categoriescan only be applied to matter and composite substance,since the property of not being said of any subject and not being inany subject belongs to them (In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch, see A.,Cat., , a- and a-). From these remarks, Boethus infers thatform is outside the category of substance. Boethus, then, equates sub-

stance with primary substance without any further qualification;apparently, he does not focus on the status of Aristotles secondarysubstances (species and genera) that are said of a subject without be-ing in a subject (Cat., , a-b). Hence, he does not consider thehypothesis according to which form may be substance since it is saidof a subject with respect to matter without being, in consequence ofthis, in a subject in relation to matter. Accordingly, if Simplicius par-

Archimedes palimpsest (probably a section of Porphyrys Ad Gedalium) provides

some crucial new testimoniaon Boethus, which lend further support to the present

interpretation. Here I will leave out these passages. For further discussion, see C-

, R, S . On this passage, see now R ; S , pp. f.; R

a, who focuses on Boethus notion of quality.


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aphrase is trustworthy, Boethus makes a selection within Aristotles

criteria of substantiality in the Categories: he accepts Aristotles stricternotion of substance (as the particular bearer of properties) and passesover in silence the reasons that may lead us to regard genera and spe-cies as secondary substances.

Indeed, Simplicius second or third-hand paraphrase could well beinaccurate17. Yet, further testimoniasuggest similar conclusions and itis tempting to infer from the extant evidence that according to Boethusuniversals have no reality at all by themselves and are nothing but mere

collections of particulars. S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch containsBoethus answer to the aporiaaccording to which individual substancesare in a subject with reference to the place and time in which they aresituated. First Boethus denies that particular substances are in a subjectin relation to a particular place and a particular time: the reason for thisfact is that substances in motion change place and time flows continu-ally. One may say, however, that particulars are in universal time ( , In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch). Boethus answers that

e universal does not even exist [ ]18according to

Aristotle, and if it did exist, it would not be something [ ]; but

Aristotle said in something [ ]. So what is in something cannot be in

what is universal (S., In Cat., , -)19.

Again, an opinionated reading of the Categoriesis detectable in theselines. In order to counter the view that particulars are in universal time

Significantly, Simplicius paraphrase of Boethus is followed immediately by Por-

phyrys response (p. , ff. Kalbfleisch = P. F. Smith), which Simplicius read

either directly (if he had access to PorphyrysAd Gedalium) or via Iamblichus. e translation of is famously controversial. In what follows I will

variously render this term as reality, existence or real existence. A clear-cut dis-

tinction between essence and existence is actually difficult to find in the Greek com-

mentators (as well as in all ancient philosophers). Neither should we assume that an

extremely common term such as always possesses the technical Stoic mean-ing of subsistence. See on this B , pp. f.

D., In Cat., , ff. Busse provides a slightly different version of this argu-

ment and does not name Boethus. L , pp. ff. compares the two versions

extensively. She concludes that, their differences notwithstanding, [l]es lments uti-

liss dans les deux textes sont donc les mmes; ce qui change, ce sont leur disposition

et leur valeur (L , p. ).


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as in a subject, Boethus argues that time as a universal cannot in any

way be conceived of as a subject in the relation of being in a subject( ). From Boethus remark one may legitimately in-fer that nothing can be related to a universal subject according to therelation of esse in subiecto, since (i) what is universal has no reality() and (ii) even if universals had some kind of reality, theywould, in any case, not be something determinate ( ).erelation between (i) and (ii) is not completely clear to me. I would pro-pose that Boethus aims to separate the status of what is universal fromboth the status of substances and that of qualities. Both substances andqualities are, in fact, real entities, whereas universals are not. However,he might have added (ii) as sort of ad hominenremark: even if we grantthat universals are real, they cannot however in any way be regardedas subjects of inherence. His explanation is ultimately based on Cat.,, a-, where Aristotle defines what is in a subject as that whichis in something, not as a part [ ], andcannot exist separately from what it is in. Apparently, Boethus leavesout Aristotles remark on the notion of part and develops the idea that

what is in a subject should exist in something ( ). Even if wegrant that what is universal has some kind of existence, it cannot in anyway be taken to be a ; accordingly, nothing can exist in relationto a universal subject.

e parallel passage from Dexippus commentary ( , D., In Cat., , - Busse)suggests that Boethus used as a designation for Aristotles .In fact, both in the Categoriesand in theMetaphysicsAristotle denies

that what is universal (secondary substances, according to the jargonof Aristotles Categories) has the status of a . Rather, Aristotle isinclined to conceive of universals as quasi-qualitative entities ( ,Cat., , b; ,Met., , a). at said, it is worth notingthat Aristotle does not suggest that universals cannot have the positionof subjects in the relation of being in a subject ( ).As he argues in Cat., , a-, nothing prevents non-substantial itemsfrom being in a subject with regard to substantial species and gen-

era. Probably Boethus gave full emphasis to Aristotles remarks on thequasi-qualitative status of universal items and (unlike Aristotle) cameto regard universals as incapable of being subjects in the relation of .

As noted above, Simplicius account of Boethus theory of substancesuggests that Boethus simply took the category of substance to beidentical with Aristotles primary substance in the Categoriesand ruled


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out Aristotles secondary substances. In a similar way, Simplicius ac-

count of universal time suggests that Boethus used the (genuine Aris-totelian) remark that a universal item is not a tode tiin order to arguethat universals have no reality and that even if they did, they could notin any way be conceived of as subjects of inherence. Further passagesconfirm these provisional conclusions. Boethus view about the tode tiis referred to again in S., In Cat., , Kalbfleisch (Simpliciusdiscussion is paralleled in D., In Cat., , - Busse, but Dex-ippus account is cursory and Boethus is not named). Simplicius asks

in which respect we shall say that the individual substance is a tode ti:in respect of the form, the matter or the composite? In his answer, heexplains that the individual can be seen as a tode tion account of all ofthese. He mentions Boethus when he explains why the individual canbe called a tode tion account of its form: [] in respect of the form,insofar as it is determinate and one in number, for Boethus too deter-mines unity by means of this20.

e reference is cursory to say the least and Simplicius seems tomention Boethus view outside of its original context (significantly,Boethus name appears immediately aer a reference to Platos theoryof matter in Ti.b: see In Cat., , Kalbfleisch). us, Simpliciusdiscussion in these lines probably cannot be used in order to explainthe sense of Boethus original remark. at said, we can neverthelessassume with some certainty that Boethus determined () unityaccording to the tode ti. Prudence is necessary, but the parallel withthe passages discussed above suggests that Boethus regarded the todeti (i.e. the individual substance) as the only kind of reality provided

with genuine unity, whereas on his account genera and species do not

I follow the translation by de Haas in H, F , p. . e Greek text

is and it seems to me necessary to sup-

ply before ( : this suggestion was already made by Kalbfleisch

, p. ; see below, , - Kalbfleisch: []

). Sharples translation is different and closer to the received text: for Boethus

too defines in this respect [ ] what is one (S , p. ). As I see it,however, this interpretation is less convincing, because Simplicius does not focus on

the definition of what is one, but on the definition of what can be regarded as a tode

ti. Simplicius first points out that an individual substance can be seen as a tode tion

account of its form, since form makes the individual determinate and one in number.

en, in support of his point, Simplicius mentions Boethus view that being one is the

same as being tode ti.


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correspond to any determinate entity provided with unity (since, if the

present interpretation is correct, Boethus regarded genera and speciesas mere collections of particulars). is is simply an hypothesis, butit is nevertheless interesting that the cursory reference to Boethus ap.S., In Cat., , Kalbfleisch may be read according to the con-clusions reached so far.

e same holds for a passage from Syrianus Commentary on theMetaphysics (In Met., , ff. Kroll) where he critically discussessome erroneous interpretations of Platos Ideas. According to Syri-

anus, Boethus the Peripatetic goes astray as a result of Aristotlesteaching, identifying the Forms with generic items ( , , - Kroll). Syrianus specifies further thatthe Stoic Cornutus is not far from this position. e reference is againcursory and not very perspicuous. In particular, the status of Boethusgenikaneeds further scrutiny. Syrianus (In Met., , - Kroll) op-poses genikaand particulars and equates genikaand universals. ispassage may plausibly be read in connection to Simplicius discussionon the universal time ap.S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch. Presum-ably, Boethus conflated ideas and universal items in order to criticizeand undermine Platos Ideas. us, he probably argued that Ideas, aswell as universal items, do not exist. e parallel between Boethus andthe Stoic Cornutus is obviously interesting in this respect21. Signifi-cantly, according to Syrianus Boethus is led astray by Aristotles teach-ing: his position is set out as an interpretation of Aristotle and Syrianusdoes not point to any direct Stoic influence on Boethus. It is notewor-thy however that Syrianus regards Boethus distinctive reading of Ar-

istotle as convergent with Stoicism. us, even without postulating adirect influence of the Stoic view, we can reasonably assume that Boe-thus developed an opinionated reading of the Categoriesin which uni-versal items were conceived of as bere of any existence. Predictablyenough, Boethus position was perceived as close to that of the Stoics.

Here the dossier Boethus and the Stoa cannot be discussed exten-sively. Certainly Boethus was very well aware of the Stoic theories.Simplicius (In Cat., , Kalbfleisch) says that Boethus devoted a

whole book ( )22to the relative, in which he critically dis-

On universals in Stoicism, see B, this volume. Presumably, this book was part of his Commentary on the Categories, whatever its

literary form: see on this G forthcoming.


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cussed the Stoic views (see S., In Cat., , ff. Kalbfleisch)23.

Furthermore, some of his views are indeed similar to those of the Sto-ics: this is the case with his theory of the immanent form as an acci-dent of matter (ap.S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch), which hasbeen connected to the Stoic theory of quality24, and with his theory ofthe universals, whose affinities with the Stoic theory did not escapeSyrianus. Robert Sharples remarks that Boethus position is closer tothat of the Stoics than to Aristotle25, ese conclusions need somequalification, however, since Boethus position can also be seen as a

systematic reading of Aristotle which gives full weight to some aspectsof Aristotles thought and treats other aspects as secondary. MarwanRashed has interestingly presented that of Boethus as one among sev-eral possible Aristotelianisms. According to Rashed, Boethus devel-ops his systematic Aristotelianism by giving full weight to the onticpriority of individuals established in the Categories. As a consequenceof this fact, Boethus regards the status of the hylomorphic form as sec-ondary. us, no specific Stoic influence would be necessary to explainBoethus position, which would only be based on a selection of worksand themes internal to Aristotles corpus. Other Aristotelian commen-tators in the first century BCE, such as Andronicus, shared this atti-tude and their reading of Aristotle was mostly based on the Categories(as Rashed aptly remarks, their Aristotelianism was Catgories-cent-rique), whereas works such as the Physicsand theMetaphysicsplayeda minor role. As Rashed takes it, Alexander of Aphrodisias essentialistreading of Aristotle was a reaction against the reading of his ancientcolleagues26.

Rasheds reading sheds new light on the development of the ancientAristotelian tradition. Yet I would perhaps qualify his interpretationwith some further remarks. In my view, it is crucial to note that Aris-totles Categoriesdo not suffice to explain the genesis of Boethus read-ing of Aristotle27, Boethus rejection of the universals outside substancegoes in fact far beyond Aristotles views on species and genera as sec-ondary substances. Boethus radicalizes the secondary status of genera

See S , pp. f.; R a. See R , pp. f. S , p. . See R , pp. - and p. ; R . Here I am inclined to disagree with R , p. : Bothos et consorts

prennent les Catgoriespour seul guide du rel.


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and species, to the extent that they are conceived of as bere of real

existence. us, according to Boethus Aristotles substance is simplyidentical with the primary substance in the Categories, whereas sec-ondary substances are not substances at all. Probably Boethus does noteven take the status of universal items to be the same as that of non-substantial qualities or quantities. Rather, he is likely to be assumingthat universal items simply do not exist as distinct from individuals. Aswe shall see below, Alexander follows a different path and does his bestto give full emphasis to the substantial status of secondary substances.

Certainly, they are secondary, since they are not independent of indi-viduals and could not exist without any instantiation. Yet in Alexan-ders view genera and species are not mere collections of particulars,but definable natures that exist in particulars. Boethus view about theunqualified ontic priority of individual substances may well be read inconnection with the philosophical climate of his time, which was de-termined by the Hellenistic schools and by Stoicism in particular. I alsosuspect that the selection of Aristotles esoteric works among the earlycommentators was heavily influenced by late Hellenistic philosophicaldebates (this holds for Aristotles Categoriesand On the Heaven, thetwo star treatises of the early commentators)28. ese remarks are byno means intended to reject Rasheds systematic reading of Boethus.In my view, however, it is philosophically very interesting to situatethe genesis of Boethus reading of Aristotle within the philosophicalclimate of his time. is may help to explain why the early commen-tators developed an opinionated reading of Aristotle, which could beseen (and indeed later was seen) as convergent with Stoicism.

It is worth focusing on two further difficult testimonia from Sim-plicius. e first passage is about the theory of specific differentia:

Boethus, however, says that the differentiais properly placed with the spe-cies, not with the genus [

, ], because the differentiaeare oen

substituted for the species [ ] (S., In

Cat., , - Kalbfleisch)29.

In his discussion, Simplicius first reports the view of some exegeteswho regard the differentia as something which by nature separates

See C ; C c. Parallel in D., In Cat., , -, where Boethus is not named.


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items under the same genus (In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch). is

definition is an ancient one: it occurs in Porphryrys Isagoge and itsultimate source is the Topics (Z , a-)30. According to Sim-plicius, Boethus disagrees, since he claims that the differentiashouldproperly be placed with the species, not with the genus. Aer the linesquoted above, Simplicius makes some further remarks, but it is un-clear whether he is still reporting Boethus view or critically discuss-ing it (S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch)31: for this reason, I willnot consider these lines in the present discussion. Simplicius remark

against Boethus at In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch (cf. D., In Cat.,, - Busse) is however very interesting and can be used as a start-ing point in order to outline Boethus position. Simplicius says thatthe differentiais different from the species (Dexippus remarks that thedifferentiais different from the species as the part is different from thewhole) and it is a kind of form () of the genus, while the genus islike a subject ().

It has been suggested that Boethus echoesMet. , where Aristotleidentifies the ultimate differentiawith the eidos32. is is not impossi-ble, but I would be prudent about Boethus use ofMet., since Aristo-tles hylomorphism plays virtually no role in Boethus philosophy. AsI see it, Boethus silence about the genus, and his equation between thespecies and the differentiacan well be read as reflecting the extensionalinterpretation developed so far. If, in fact, we conceive of universals inan extensional way, i.e. as collections of individuals, any generic en-tity or nature will simply be suppressed. Accordingly, the genus can-not be like a subject that is determined by the differentia: this explains

Simplicius critical remark. In Boethus view, the genus simply doesnot exist as such (i.e. as a nature determined in an intensional way):this explains Boethus parallel between the genera and Platos Ideas. Ifthis is the case, the differentiamust be placed with the species, becausethe species is identical with the differentia. e species cannot in factbe composed of the genus and the differentia, since the genus in itselfsimply does not exist.

Unfortunately, we do not know how Boethus conceived of the dif-

ferentiaand its ontic status (we do not know, in particular, whether

See. P., Isag., , - Busse and the excellent commentary ad loc. in B-

, p. , with further parallels. See de Haas in H, F , p. note . De Haas in H, F , p. note .


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he regarded differentiae as tropes, something which would indeed

fit very well with the interpretation developed so far); neither do weknow what kind of relation Boethus established between the differen-tiaand the (in his view non-substantial) hylomorphic form. So, thepresent discussion cannot but be partial and speculative. It is how-ever at least possible to propose some hypotheses about Boethusview, which try to combine the information drawn from the passagesdiscussed above. According to Boethus, matter and individuals arethe only existing substantial subjects, whereas differentiae are merenon-substantial qualities (differentiae cannot be substantial, sincethey cannot be regarded as subjects of inherence). Species are merecollections of particulars grouped according to their differentiaeandthese differentiaeare somehow equivalent to the non-substantial for-mal properties inhering in matter mentioned ap.S., In Cat., ,- Kalbfleisch. us, differentiaemake it possible to class individu-als according to specific collections. For an individual, belonging toa species means belonging to a specific collection on account of thenon-substantial qualities inhering in it. According to this theory, a

genus would be nothing but the sum (or rather the logical product)of several specific collections (see also S., In Cat., , -.Kalbfleisch). Boethus overall attitude can aptly be characterized asnominalist and, as noted above, his position goes beyond what Aris-totle says in the Categories. InMet., , a- Aristotle famouslyprovides the following alternative: either the genus absolutely doesnot exist apart () from the species, or if it does exist existsas matter. If Boethus ever considered this text, he must have opted

for the first horn of the alternative. In his view, the genus has in itselfsimply no kind of existence and cannot be seen as the subject of anypossible information of the part of the differentia.

If general concepts have no real correlate apart from particulars, onemight well wonder just what their status is. Did Boethus regard gen-eral concepts as mere mental fictions? Again, all we can do is drawsome hypotheses. Possibly in his discussion about universals Boethusmade use of his semantic view that propositions are about things

( [] ), but their meaning is composed of concepts orthoughts (, see S., In Cat., , - and , -, Kalbfleisch), since according to Boethus there are no propositionalobjects which can be the meaning of statements. Boethus remarksare perhaps (and very interestingly) reminiscent of Platos distinc-tion between saying something and saying something about some-thing (P., Sph. e-d), and may well be directed against the Stoic


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33. us, we cannot directly refer these remarks to the status of

general concepts. at said, the difference between being and being (S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch) canplausibly be applied to the meaning of statements such as Socratesis man or Socrates is animal. Boethus could easily argue that thepredicate in these judgements does not stand for any general entity.So general terms only mean mental concepts. is, however, does notentail that species and genera are mere figmenta, since their real cor-relate is given by the particular members of their extension. According

to this overall view, general terms would have the status of commonnames: again, such a theory can aptly be characterized as nominalist.ese difficulties notwithstanding, the passages discussed above pro-

vide a sufficiently consistent picture of Boethus position about univer-sals. e same is not the case with S., In Cat., , - Kalb-fleisch. Here Simplicius focuses on some objections against the allegedcompleteness of Aristotles list of categories. Among these objections,he mentions the one concerning the categorial status of the monad andthe point. Aer mentioning Alexanders solution (the monad and thepoint should be placed among the relative), Simplicius says:

If, however, number is twofold one incorporeal, the other corporeal then, as

Boethus too would say the monad will also be twofold: one which is substance,

and is in intelligible number Aristotle also thinks that this one exists and

one which is a relative or quantified item. Later, however, Boethus says that

perhaps it is better to call it a quantified item, for as whiteness is to white, so

the dyad is to two. If, therefore, the former are both quantified, the latter are

also quantified (S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch)34.

Paul Moraux had already remarked that this passage is troublesometo say the least35. Boethus criticism of Platos Ideas and his view about

Boethus was certainly familiar with Platos Sophist: see below. On Boethus criti-

cism of the Stoic lekton, see R a.

, , , , , , , (

), .

,

, . Parallel in D., In Cat., , - Busse. On these

passages, see the extensive commentary in L , pp. -. See M , p. .


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the unqualified priority of particulars cannot easily be reconciled with

a theory of ideal numbers such as that which Simplicius seems to at-tribute to Boethus in these lines. Moraux, however, regards Simpliciusreport as trustworthy and suggests that Boethus followed Speusippuson this issue, since Boethus was certainly interested in Speusippusand referred to his theory of polyonyms (ap.S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch). Unfortunately, Simplicius words ( , , Kalbfleisch) do not help to settle the issue and it remainsuncertain whether his paraphrase can be trusted completely or not36.

Here I will propose a tentative explanation of this controversial pas-sage. Simplicius outline of Boethus theory of sensible substance openswith these words: (S., InCat., , - Kalbfleisch). e questions (ztmata) rejected by Boe-thus are those set out in Simplicius previous pages, where he focuseson Nicostratus and Plotinus criticisms against substance. To makea long story short, according to Simplicius Nicostratus and Plotinusclaim that Aristotles theory of substance in the Categoriesis unsatis-fying and incomplete, since Aristotle leaves out intelligible substance(S., In Cat., , -)37. Simplicius account misleadingly lendsthe impression that Boethus countered these objections raised by laterexegetes, arguing that their criticism was redundant since Aristotlesdiscussion of substance in the Categoriessimply does not focus on theintelligible ousia. Perhaps Boethus was addressing objections devel-oped by an early anti-Aristotelian exegete and similar to those laterraised by Nicostratus and Plotinus. Perhaps Simplicius (or Iamblichus)

incorporated Boethus in his account in order to counter Nicostratusand Plotinus later objections. It is also possible that Boethus was react-ing to an early Platonizing reading of the Categories: by his remark, hemight be warning that one should not read Platos Ideas into Aristo-tles ousia. Be that as it may38, Boethus certainly mentioned Aristotlesfirst mover in his discussion of and (S., In Cat.,, Kalbfleisch). Accordingly, if Boethus really claimed that oneshould not consider the when interpreting Cat. , by this

he did not intend to rule out intelligible beings from the interpretation

See the critical remarks against Moraux in T , p. f. G forth-

coming provides a full discussion. On Plotinus and Nicostratus, see C . For further discussion, see C b.


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of Aristotles Categories, nor suggest that intelligible beings do not ex-

ist at all. Rather, he was probably claiming that a discussion about in-telligible substances is redundant in the framework of Cat. (whereasin his view talking of the unmoved mover was certainly not redundantin the discussion on and ). Accordingly, nothing rulesout the possibility that Boethus might have referred to the theory ofintelligible numbers where he thought this to be relevant to his readingof Aristotle.

is is all the more likely, since Boethus was possibly reacting against

the Pythagorizing reading of Aristotles Categoriesdeveloped by Eu-dorus of Alexandria, a reading which is detectable in Ps.-Archytastreatise , as well in Philo and Plutarch. PerhapsBoethus remark about the irrelevance of the sensible substance forthe interpretation of Cat. was originally directed against Eudorus39.Given such premises, Boethus mention of the intelligible monad isnot really surprising: he might well have referred to this theory whendiscussing the views of his rival Platonic-Pythagorean readers of Aris-totle (and this could explain why he would seem to ascribe the theoryof intelligible numbers to Aristotle: this would in fact be an allusionto the exegesis developed by his opponents)40. Morauxs parallel withSpeusippus is plausible too, for the early commentators were certainlywilling to recall and possibly incorporate the views of Plato and theAncient Academy. As noted above, Boethus mentions Speusippuspolyonyms and refers to Plato (S., In Cat., , ff.). Andronicusmentions Xenocrates when discussing the categorial bi-partition perse/relative and the theory of the soul41. is attitude is easily justifiable

within the philosophical climate of the first century BCE, which wasstill rather fluid and marked by the renaissance of ancient dogmaticphilosophies within a philosophical debate dominated by the Hellen-istic schools. Perhaps Boethus and Andronicus appeal to the Academywas directed against the Stoics. Be that as it may, Boethus mention ofthe intelligible monad can plausibly be placed within this picture.

ese remarks, however, still do not answer to the main question

See C b; G forthcoming. is, however, is not completely sure, since the words

at , Kalbfleisch might well be a remark by Simplicius. According to C

, p. note Simplicius reference may be to Aristotles lost On the Good.Ap.S. In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch; T. In De An., , - Heinze. See

R .


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raised by the passage quoted above: given Boethus nominalist posi-

tion about substance and universals, is it plausible that he developeda Platonizing theory of ideal numbers and that he ascribed this viewto Aristotle? Certainty cannot be attained, and Simplicius passage isobscure. Actually Simplicius refers to two different solutions proposedby Boethus. According to the first solution, Boethus distinguished be-tween a substantial monad, which is in the realm of intelligible number,and a relative or quantified monad (which should obviously be placedin the sensible world). According to a second solution set out later,however, Boethus says that perhaps it is better to call it a quantifieditem, for the dyad is to two as whiteness is to white. Accordingly, ifboth whiteness and white are qualified, then both the dyad and thetwo are quantified. e Greek text at , Kalbfleisch runs as follows: . esubect of einai poson can plausibly be identified with the monad. Ifthis is the case, according to Boethus second solution both the monadand the dyad are quantified items. us, given a couple of particulars,the dyad is the quantity which corresponds to the quantified predicate

two. is view is not incompatible with those on the status of sub-stances and generic items and does not point to any metaphysics ofideal numbers.

According to Simplicius, however, Boethus first solution recognizedthe existence of intelligible numbers (among which we should placethe substantial monad). If Simplicius does not misleadingly ascribeto Boethus the Platonist-Pythagorean view that he aimed to rejectthrough his second solution (although this may well be the case, as

noted above), then we are forced to admit that Boethus acknowledgedthe existence not only of the unmoved mover, but also of ideal num-bers. While I would not endorse this reading without some hesitation,it is crucial to note that even in this case Boethus would not be conceiv-ing of ideal numbers as causal principles, nor taking them to be genericof universal entities. Rather, essential numbers would have the statusof intelligible individuals, and thus be different from Platos Forms(which Boethus regarded as non-substantialgenika).

We find a similar situation in Alexander (ap.S., In Cat., , -Kalbfleisch), who according to Iamblichus/Simplicius claims thatthe intelligible and separate form ( ) iscalled individual substance ( ). Simplicius explains thatthis view is probably characteristic of the Peripatus, since according tothe members of this school common items have no independent exist-ence ( ), but rather only have


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their being in individuals. is passage is indeed somewhat surprising

and might suggest that Alexander held some version of Platos theoryof separate forms. is is certainly not the case, however, and Simpli-cius later explains (In Cat., , ff. Kalbfleisch) that Alexander wasreferring to what he took to be a separate form, i.e. the first mover42.Possibly Alexander was replying to Nicostratus, who regarded Aristo-tles discussion in the Categoriesas partial, since Aristotle leaves outintelligible substances. Against Nicostratus, Alexander was perhapsattempting to show that the accounts of substance in Cat. andMet.

are compatible, since Aristotles definition of primary substancein the Categoriescan also be referred to the unmoved mover, whichis not a universal but an individual, and is not in subiecto. If Simpli-cius paraphrase of Boethus first solution is trustworthy, the passageabout the intelligible monad could be interpreted along similar lines,and Boethus view on the monad would in no way be opposed to hisnominalist view of generic items. In fact, whether he really admittedan intelligible monad or not, nothing suggests that he conceived of itas a universal.

is hypothesis might suggest further (indeed very speculative)conclusions. Alexander was probably inclined to equate the status ofmathematical objects and that of universals43. In both cases, he devel-oped an abstractionist view according to which these items are im-manent in sensible particulars and our soul is able to separate themfrom matter, thus conceiving them in themselves. is view shouldcarefully be distinguished from that according to which mathemati-cal objects are mere mental constructions. In fact, both universals and

mathematical objects are perfectly real entities that can be determinedobjectively. Our soul simply separates them from matter and con-ceives of in itself what de factoonly exists insofar as it is instantiated bymaterial objects. As noted above, Boethus view on universals is radi-cally different from Alexaders abstractionist essentialism and we canplausibly suppose that Alexander was reacting against his predecessor.According to Boethus, universals are mere collections of individuals,they are bere of existence and there is no entity that corresponds to

See on this G . On Alexanders approach to Platos forms, see

L . See M , pp. - with the supplementary remarks in R ,

pp. -, who convincingly rejects Muellers mentalistic interpretation of Alexan-

ders abstractionism.


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(e.g.) the general concept human being and is immanent in particular

human beings. It is at least possible that Boethus regarded human be-ing as a mere mental concept without any direct general real correlate,whereas the expression human being actually denotes the particularhuman beings classed according to their proper qualities. Given suchpremises, if Boethus was inclined to conceive of mathematical objectsas real independent entities, he could not have regarded their statusas parallel to that of the genika. Hence, it is not completely unlikelythat he held some (perhaps Speusippean) theory according to which

ideal numbers are individual and intelligible substances. If this is true,Boethus distinguished real individual and substantial numbers fromthose in the sensible world, which are mere quantified and collectivepredicates of particular items. is would explain the relation betweenBoethus first and second solution, without making the two incompat-ible. If this is the case, Alexanders essentialism was toto caeloopposedto Boethus ontology, both on the status of universals and on that ofmathematical objects.

To sum up: either Simplicius paraphrase is misleading and Boethusfirst solution does not express Boethus own view, but rather that of hisPythagorean opponents, or Simplicius paraphrase is correct, and Boe-thus first solution provides a realist view about mathematical objects,which is compatible with Boethus nominalism about universals. esecond solution expresses either Boethus own position (as opposedto that of the Pythagoreans), or his view about sensible and quantifiednumbers (as opposed to substantial and intelligible numbers).

. Alexander of Aphrodisias essentialism and his views on universals

is nominalist view on universals is repeatedly criticized by Alex-ander of Aphrodisias, whose own Peripatetic view is basically equiva-lent to the intensional position set out above44. Even if Alexander doesnot mention Boethus by name in these contexts (indeed, Alexanderrarely mentions the names of his adversaries), it is more than plausi-

ble that Boethus was his polemical target. Against Boethus nominal-ism, Alexander develops a kind of moderate realism about universals,

e literature on Alexanders views on universals is abundant. I would only refer

to L ; T ; S ; R , pp. -. S

, pp. - provides an excellent survey.


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which is part of his overall systematic essentialist reading of Aristotles

logic, physics and ontology. Here I will only cursorily recall some as-pects of Alexanders position.QuaestioI. probably provides the clearest way to approach all as-

pects of Alexanders sophisticated realism45. In this short work, Alex-ander aims to establish what kind of things are those referred to bydefinitions. e Quaestio opens by outlining two opposite theoriesthat Alexander rejects. According to the first position (, - Bruns),definitions refer to particulars. Alexander rejects this view because

particulars are what they are in conjunction with accidents; they arenot always self-identical, but are subject to change; and in additionto that, particulars are the object of perception rather than definition.According to the second position (, - Bruns), definitions referto a common entity separated from particulars, an entity that is in-corporeal and eternal. Alexander rejects this theory too. His remarkis rather cursory and he simply asks how biped could be somethingincorporeal and mortal something eternal. is remark is actually notvery convincing: for instance, one may well conceive of the separateform biped as an incorporeal entity, which is the principle that ex-plains why the quality biped is present in corporeal things. Signifi-cantly, Alexander himself regards qualities inhering to sensible par-ticulars as incorporeal (see De An., , - Bruns), since they do notinclude matter in their nature even if they exist only in conjunctionwith matter46. So his polemical remark against self-subsisting separateincorporeal forms could in principle also be addressed against his ownviews on qualities. However, Alexanders remark can perhaps better

be understood in connection to what he says against the nominalistposition in the immediately preceding lines. According to Alexander,definitions should refer to stable objects that only reason can graspadequately. is prevents definitions from referring to particulars thatexist in conjunction with accidents and are bere of stability. at said,one should not assume that there are definable entities independentof particulars: such entities would in fact be bere of any connectionwith particulars. His remark about the status of biped and mortal

can be read as an emphatic statement of this point. Definitions must insome way be connected to sensible particulars: using notions such asthat of biped or mortal in order to refer to entities separate from and

See now the commentated translation of this work in R , pp. f. See on this K .


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independent of particular biped and mortal living beings would make

little (if any) sense.is issue comes up at , - Bruns, where Alexander says thatdefinitions refer to (a) common entities that exist in particulars, or(vel) (b) to those particulars insofar as they are determined by the com-mon entities that are present in them ( , ). In hisview, (a) and (b) are not mutually exclusive hypotheses, but differentways of expressing the same fact. We can now clearly understand why

Alexander rejects both the nominalist and the realist Platonic posi-tions. Since definitions refer to entities that are common and differ-ent from particulars, the nominalist view must be rejected. Particulars,however, cannot merely be cut off from the object of definition: if thiswere the case, we could well define the universal Human Being, butthis definition could in no way be applied to particular human beings.Alexander takes a sort of middle path between Boethus nominalismand a kind of Platonic realism47.

According to Alexander, the fact that several individuals are suchand such is grounded on another more primitive fact, i.e. the existenceof a common entity according to which (cf. , , Bruns) thoseparticulars are such and such. As far as we can judge from the extantevidence, Boethus held a very different view and regarded the fact thatseveral particulars are such and such (in his jargon: that several par-ticulars have certain differences) as primitive: this primitive fact doesnot require any further explanation. Alexanders objection, however,points to an interesting problem. A radically anti-essentialistic view

should address the issue of how to establish a sufficient criterion inorder to select those aspects of particular beings which make it pos-sible to rank them under the same species. In other words, a philo-sophical position that suppresses the existence of generic or specific es-sences should nonetheless somehow account for our classifications ofthe natural world. Indeed, one may well argue that natural species arenothing but pragmatic arbitrary classifications with no ontic import.Alexander, however, would probably have regarded this conclusion as

simply nonsensical (and all ancient non-sceptic philosophers wouldshare such an attitude).

is explains Alexanders remark at , - Bruns that particulars

As R , p. aptly remarks, [l]es Aristotliciens ne doivent pas com-

battre le platonisme en sombrant dans le nominalisme.


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are such and such () in conjunction with accidents. In his view,

a definition entails that we select its object and isolate it from the otherfeatures which inhere to particulars. Alexander, therefore, demands asufficient criterion for establishing this selection and his essentialismactually provides an answer to the problem (indeed, an answer thatcould easily be criticized as circular), whereas Boethus radical anti-realist position is much more problematic from this perspective. Sig-nificantly, Simplicius reports that Porphyry raised a similar objection:according to Porphyry, Boethus envisaged enmattered form (what

Aristotle himself conceived of as substance) as nothing but a qualityor some other among the accidents (ap.In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch= F. Smith). us, he was not able to isolate essential features fromqualitative aspects in the structure of sensible particulars. Porphyrysobjections against Boethus recall Alexanders views and it is more thanlikely that Porphyry based his criticism on previous objections raisedby Alexander48. is is not enough to demonstrate beyond all doubtthat Boethus is polemically targeted at the beginning of AlexandersQuaestioI. (although this is a plausible hypothesis); be that as it may,the philosophical parallel between Boethus position and Alexandersnominalist polemical target remains interesting.

In the remaining part of the Quaestio, Alexander focuses on the onticstatus of immanent definable entities. As he explains at , ff. Bruns,the definition rational mortal animal49can be taken in conjunctionwith the material circumstances and differences accompanying itsconcrete existence: in this case, the definable entity produces (, ,) Socrates, Callias and all other individuals. erefore, we should not

suppose that particular beings and their definable natures are mutuallyseparated. Each definable nature (e.g. human being) only exists inso-far as it is instantiated by the particular material beings determined byit. If all particulars were suppressed, the definable nature would be sup-pressed with them (see also Quaest.I.b, , - and - Bruns).is, however, does not entail that particular beings are all that exists.Indeed, objects of definition are immanent to particulars and exist inactuality only insofar as they determine particular beings. at said, it

is crucial to regard each object of definition as an entity irreducible toparticulars, an entity that we can grasp through our mind in isolation

See C, R , pp. f. Here Alexander calls definition the definable nature which is the real correlate

of the definition.


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from the particulars which it is in. When grasped by our mind, the

object of definition becomes common ( , , - Bruns).is is a key aspect of Alexanders abstractionist realism, according towhich definitions refer to real natures that exist in individuals. eseare natures that are not universal as such, but only insofar as our soulisolates them from matter and conceives of them by themselves (seeDe An.,, - Bruns).

If we come back to the parallel between Boethus and Alexander es-tablished by Dexippus, we can easily see how Alexanders essential-

ist thesis about the ontic priority of individuals toto caelodiffers fromBoethus extensional theory. According to Alexander, what is commonis a nature that is definable and irreducible to particulars, a nature thatexists in each particular as a whole, the same in all (, - Bruns).Alexander conceives of both the specific (human being: see. Quaest.I.) and the generic (animal: see Quaest. I. a and b) definable naturesin this way50. In both cases, he aims to rule out all possible extensionalconclusions in the theory of universals. us, universals are connectedto formal natures that are definable in themselves and are the properobject of rational knowledge. Alexanders famous and controversialthesis according to which what we call a universal is an accident of agiven thing (, Quaest. I.a, , -; I.b, , -; see I.,, - Bruns) is part of this theory. As noted by M. Tweedale, thething which the universal is an accident of should not be equatedwith a particular being, but with a definable nature (animal or humanbeing)51. Alexanders terminology is not completely consistent, but ageneral theory is clearly at work in his writings. Formal natures can be

determined and defined by themselves and are not necessarily univer-sal as such. If, for example, there were only one human being, his defin-able nature would not be universal (at least de facto), since it would beinstantiated by only one particular being. Nonetheless, it would equallybe possible to isolate the definable nature human being from the uniquehuman being determined by this nature (Quaest. I., , - Bruns).Hence it is an accident that the definable nature is universal, while it

Here I ignore Alexanders sophisticated and somewhat ambivalent ontology of

the genus: see R , pp. -. I only focus on what Rashed would call la

teneur formelle of the genus. See T . Alexanders view that what is universal is an accident of the

definable nature should not be conflated with the view that existence is an accident of

the definable nature: see C, R , p. .


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not accidental that this nature is intensionally determined as it is. As

reported by S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch, Alexander appliedthis line of argument to some canonical examples of species instantiat-ed by only one particular, such as the sun, the moon and the cosmos 52.

As noted above, at the beginning of Quaestio I. Alexander raisesa quasi-Platonist criticism against the nominalist position: definitionscannot refer to particulars, since particulars change and definitionsshould refer to permanent objects. e concluding part of this shortwork explains how Alexander regards definable natures as permanent

objects without conceiving of them as separate quasi-Platonic forms.As he notes, common natures are incorruptible in virtue of the eter-nity by succession ( , , Bruns) of theparticulars in which they exist. us, the logico-epistemological real-ist analysis of definable natures is ultimately grounded in the Peripa-tetic hylomorphic analysis of generation. As noted by Marwan Rashed,the hylomorphic form provides objective content for the species andmakes it different from any arbitrary classification53. e close connec-tion between universality, the eternity of the species and hylomorphicform emerges in Alexanders On Providence(, -, Ruland)54. HereAlexander relies on Aristotles GC and explains that the eternaland universal species is the primary object of providence. Eternity anduniversality come to be taken as equivalent characters. As Rashed re-marks, the eidosis unique in the chain of generation: its continual andeternal realization directly entails that it is universal55.

A succinct comparison between Boethus and Alexanders views mayhelp to summarize our conclusions. According to Boethus, universals

are mere collections of individuals, whereas according to Alexanderuniversals are definable entities that happen to be universals insofaras they are instantiated by several particulars. As far as we can judge,according to Boethus definitions are simply based on the primitive factthat particulars are such and such, whereas according to Alexanderthe actual structure of sensible particulars depends on immanent de-finable natures. Boethus general view makes it very difficult to isolatethose essential aspects that allow us to rank several particulars under

T , p. shows that Simplicius does not understand Alexanders

point correctly. See R , pp. f. is text is preserved in Arab. Translation in R , p. . See R , p. .


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the same species. Alexanders position is instead completely ground-

ed on a clear-cut distinction between essence and accidents. Finally,Boethus ascribes unqualified priority to the notion of substance as sub-ject, thus relegating the status of enmattered forms outside substance.Alexander, instead, accords unqualified ontic priority to the essentialform and the theory of eidoscan be seen as the philosophical focus ofAlexanders reading of Aristotle.

. e Neoplatonic criticism and the levelling of the different Aristo-telianisms

If the present discussion is correct, Dexippus certainly simplifiesBoethus and Alexanders views when he presents them as identical.e parallel established by Dexippus, however, can easily be appreci-ated from the perspective of the post-Iamblichean Neoplatonist theoryof universals. Some preliminary remarks are necessary. Alexandersessentialist reading of Aristotle paved the way for the later incorpora-

tion of Aristotles ontology within Neoplatonism. On the one hand,Plotinus critical discussion of Aristotle is largely shaped by Alexan-der. Much work has still to be done on these issues, but Alexander cansafely be regarded as a filter through which Plotinus understands Aris-totles philosophy and criticizes some of Aristotles principal theories(in particular his hylomorphic account of nature). On the other hand,Porphyrys harmonizing of Plato and Aristotle is heavily influenced byAlexanders essentialist reading, which Porphyry incorporates into his

overall Platonist account of reality. is clearly emerges from the the-ory of the hylomorphic form and that of universals. Porphyry seemsto follow Alexander closely and takes a somewhat simplified versionof Alexanders essentialism as a valid account of physical reality, withthe fundamental proviso that this account should be placed within abroader Platonist view, which includes real intelligible principles too.

Porphyrys general programme of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle isbasically followed by all later Neoplatonists, but significant differences

and nuances are to be found between one philosopher and anotherwithin this general framework. Iamblichus (the source of the passagesfrom Dexippus and Simplicius discussed in this contribution) system-atically develops what might aptly be called a throughout Neoplatoni-sation of Aristotle. Simplicius (see In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch) saysthat Iamblichus followed Porphyry closely, but, unlike Porphyry, ap-plied his intellective theory ( ) everywhere. is expres-


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sion refers to the metaphysical account of intelligible beings which had

a key position in Iamblichus exegesis. In addition to that, Iamblichustook Aristotles Categories to be inspired by Archytas Pythagoreanteaching. As far as we can judge, this attitude was significantly differentfrom that of Porphyry, who extensively followed the Peripatetic viewsof Alexander. For example, Iamblichus interpreted Aristotles theoryof substantial predication from the perspective of the Neoplatonisttheory of derivation. Accordingly, he regarded substantial predicationas the logical expression of the metaphysical relation in virtue of which

physical realities partake in the separate ante remforms (ap.S., InCat., , - Kalbfleisch). Iamblichus pushed his reading of Aristotlealong Platonic/Pythagorean lines so far that (as D/E, In Cat.,, - Busse reports) he did not refrain from assuming that Aristotlewas not opposed to Plato on the theory of Ideas56.

e Iamblichean background is crucial to understanding Dexippusand Simplicius accounts of the Peripatetics, for the difference betweenthe extensional and the intensional readings of Aristotle becomes min-imal or irrelevant from the perspective of Iamblichus extreme Platon-ist realism. Dexippus sequence of questions (In Cat., , ff. Busse =S., In Cat., , ff. Kalbfleisch) clearly reveals the overall scope ofhis discussion. a) Why does Aristotle call the sensible substance pri-mary in the Categories, whereas elsewhere the sensible substance isranked second aer the incorporeal (D., In Cat., , - Busse= S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch)? b) Why is it that in the PhysicsAristotle ranks common items as primary, whereas in the Categorieshe ranks particulars first (D., In Cat., , - Busse = S., In

Cat., , - Kalbfleisch)? c) What could one reply to those whodispute this very point and claim that in fact universals are not prior innature to particulars, but posterior to them (D., In Cat., , -Busse = S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch)? Dexippus provides thefollowing answers (the parallel with Simplicius is extremely close andit is virtually certain that both were paraphrasing Iamblichus). a) Inthe CategoriesAristotle calls the sensible substance primary becausesensible realities are called substances in common parlance: here Ar-

istotles purpose is not to speak about incorporeal substances. b) Un-like what happens in the Categories, in the PhysicsAristotle follows the

In these paragraphs I summarise what I have tried to show in a number of recent

contributions. See esp. C, R , pp. f. (on Plotinus and Al-

exander); C c (on Porphyry and Iamblichus).


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natural order of things and not their order in relation to us. Accord-

ing to the natural order, one will give prior ranking to simple entities,causes, things which have their being in themselves, universal, immate-rial entities, indivisibles and such like ( , , , , , , D., In Cat., , - Busse = S., In Cat.,, - Kalbfleisch). c) To those who regard individuals as prior innature, we should reply that Aristotle takes common items as prior inhis theory of sensibles as well (D., In Cat., , - Busse). us,

Dexippus and Simplicius read their Neoplatonist theory of universaland intelligible beings into Aristotle and argue that this view is set outin the Physics57.Furthermore, they claim that universals are prior inthe account of sensible beings as well: accordingly, Dexippus and Sim-plicius conflate universals and immanent essential natures completely.

According to this view, the reality of an immanent nature is notgrounded in its instantiation. Rather, immanent natures exist becausethey derive from separate universals and partake in them (see Iambli-chus ap. S., In Cat., , - Kalbfleisch). is view is toto cae-lodifferent from both Boethus extensional reading of Aristotle andAlexanders intensional one, since in both of them the metaphysicalnotion of participation plays no role at all. According to the Neopla-tonist metaphysics of participation (which Iamblichus and his follow-ers read into Aristotle), we cannot in any way regard particulars asprimary according to the canonical rules of priority. In fact, Dexip-pus takes immanent common items to be primary because they com-plete the essence of particulars:

(D., In Cat., , - Busse). e being of the common itemwill exted to all the things ranked under it ( , D., In Cat., , Busse). us, if the common item is removed, the whole existenceof the individual is removed as well. It is along these lines, accordingto Dexippus, that one must reply to the arguments of the associates ofAlexander, Boethus and the other Peripatetics ( , D., In Cat., ,

Busse). AristotlesMetaphysicsis crucial for any attempt to reject the

According to Dillon , p. note Dexippus refers to A., Ph., ,

a; A , b and , b. De Haas in H, F , p. note

points out the parallel with S., In Ph., , -, ; , - Diels. See now

M .


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Peripatetic theory of immanent universals: in interpreting this work

one can show (paceAlexander and Boethus) that Aristotle gives prior-ity to common items ( ) even when considering sensible things( , D., In Cat., , - Busse).

Dexippus at , Busse raises some problems. Why should onereject Boethus and Alexanders views by showing the priority of com-mon items even when considering sensible things? Two hypothesesare possible. According to the first, Dexippus refers to the thesesheld by the Peripatetic commentators. Accordingly, Dexippus would

be suggesting that Boethus and Alexander recognized the priority ofcommon items in relation to intelligible beings, but not sensible ones.Against their view, Dexippus wishes to show that Aristotle gives priorranking to common items even when considering sensible beings. ishypothesis is ingenious, but remains unlikely in my view58. Dexippusallusion would be exceedingly cryptic. Furthermore, Boethus and Al-exander recognized the existence of intelligible substances but, as notedabove, they certainly did not regard such substances as universal. In-stead, Alexander overtly regards his separate form (i.e. the first mover)as a kind of individual substance (ap.S., In Cat., , - and ,- Kalbfleisch). As I see it, Dexippus can easily be explained inrelation to what Dexippus says above, i.e. in his discussion of the im-mediately preceding questions. ere he argues that Aristotle regardeduniversals as primary in nature when considering intelligible beings.According to Dexippus, this view can be found in the Physics. Whatabout sensible things? According to the Peripatetic commentators, Ar-istotle conceived of sensible particulars as primary. is, however, is

not the case according to Dexippus, and the Metaphysics shows thatAristotle regarded common items as primary even when consideringsensible beings (and not only when considering intelligible beings, asDexippus argues in the previous lines). us, I take the at , Busse to refer to Dexippus Neoplatonist philosophical agenda, whichreads a hyper-realist theory of universals into Aristotle, with regard toboth universalia ante rem (see D., In Cat., , - Busse) anduniversalia in re (see D., In Cat., , -, - Busse).

R C

A detailed defence of this hypothesis can be found in G forthcoming. Grif-

fins account of Boethus is astute and differs significantly from that of the present

study.


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