Chapter II War[1] - Copy

7/25/2019 Chapter II War[1] - Copy

1/77

MILITARY THOUGHT


2/77

The course, military thought, essentially deals with a

social phenomenon evolving in the history of society. Italso tries to show how war becomes the continuation of

political struggle indifferent forms.

The course examines the army, as an organization,

formed to fight wars and its institutional links with thesociety at large.

The characteristics of the army are portrayed in relation

to the conduct and nature of wars.

The course gives attention to the study of militaryscience and art; and also provides the Students with the

concepts of military doctrine, strategy, operation; and

relationship between them.

ourse description


3/77

Course objectives

!pon completion of this course, the students would

be able to"

#.$nalyze the foundation of basic military thought, the

causes and characteristics of war, its development and

its links to economy and politics.%.&xplain the origin of military science and art.

'.!nderstand and analyze the concepts of military

doctrine and strategy as well as their relation.

(.!nderstand the relation between national interestsand instruments of national power.


4/77

)ode of *elivery

+ecture

+Individual and group exercise+-roup discussion

)ode of $ssessment

+)id exam Test '/0+-roup assignment %/0+1inal exam 2/0

Total-------------------- 100%


5/77

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY THOUGHT2. WHAT IS WAR?

2.1 CAUSES OF WAR

2.2 TYPES OF WAR

2.3 LEVELS OF WAR2.4 PRINCIPLES OF WAR

3. ARMY/MILITARY ORGANIZATION

4. CONTRIBUTORS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF

ARMY AND WAR5. MILITARY DOCTRINE

. MILITARY SCIENCE AND ART

!. MILITARY STRATEGY


6/77

Introduction

Military thought is a field of study helping

military students, historians and otherresearchers to understand the concepts and

thoughts on arand on military issuesin the

past present and future .

hapter I


7/77

3n 4ar! -+1ocuses on its meaning, nature, character and conduct

of war

3n military issues 5$ffairs5 ! -1ocuses on those issues related with preparation for 4ar

)ilitary organization, training,mobilization, development of weapons

The study of strategy and tactics

*eveloping and organization of reserve forces etc


8/77

02/02/16 8

" FrenchRevolution

" WW I" WW II

" etc

Military

"trategy

#eveloped

Theory

$ar

"ociety

"un t!u"M"chi"veli"#o$$ini"Cl"use%it!

"etc

"&cono$ic"oci"l"'olitic"l"Technolo(ic"l) N"ture W"r

) Ch"r"cter o*%"r) Con+uct o*W"r

h",e- Develo,- i$,rove

I$,rovestheor/

Contri0utesto ne%Milit"r/

str"te(/

Lessonle"rne+

tr"te(/ is

teste+

Teste+ in %"r

Military Thought


9/77

Important Issues to be considered while studying

military thought

#. It should be based on the scientific laws that govern war and military

issues

%. The political nature of war must be taken in to consideration+4ar is the instrument of achieving political ob6ectives

+!nderstanding the politics that governs and leads the war is the

key

'. !nderstanding the evolving character of war that each war has its ownpeculiarities, no identical war exists

(. !nderstanding the political, economic, technological contexts in which

the war is conducted


10/77

CHA'T&R

Theor/ o* W"r


11/77

W"r h"s 0een " ,ersistent ,"ttern o*inter"ction 0et%een "n+ %ithin st"tes "n+other ,olitic"l units *or $illenni".

In its $"n/ v"rieties- it is ,ro0"0l/ the $ost+estructive *or$ o* hu$"n 0eh"vior.

W"r 2ills ,eo,le- +estro/s resources- slo%+o%ns econo$ic +evelo,$ent- +estro/s

environ$ents- s,re"+s +ise"se- e3,"n+s(overn$ents- $ilit"ri!es societies- resh",escultures- +isru,ts *"$ilies- "n+ tr"u$"ti!es,eo,le.

're,"r"tion *or %"r- %hether *or occu,"tionor *or ,rotection- +iverts v"lue+ resources*ro$ $ore constructive soci"l "ctivities- "n+it o*ten un+er$ines securit/ r"ther th"n

enh"nces it.


12/77

Wh"t is W"r

W"r +e4nes 0ro"+l/ "s sust"ine+- coor+in"te+violence 0et%een ,olitic"l or("ni!"tions.

uch " +e4nition inclu+es (re"t ,o%er %"rs li2e

Worl+ W"r I-II Coloni"l %"rs li2e those *ou(ht 0/ the &uro,e"n

(re"t ,o%ers in A*ric" "n+ Asi" *ro$ the ei(hteenthcentur/ to e"rl/ t%entieth centur/

Civil %"rs " %"r %ithin the +o$estic socitiesOr("ni!e+ insur(encies %"r %ith (overn$ents

Tri0"l %"rs "$on( ,re ) $o+ern societies- "n+ " %i+ev"riet/ o* other *or$so* violence.

It involves the use o* *orce to

2ill "n+ in5ure ,eo,le"n+ +estro/ $ilit"r/ "n+ econo$ic resources.

W"r $"/ Interst"te 6%"rs 0et%een +i7erentcountries8 or intr"st"te 6Do$estic8 %"rs


13/77

I# $%%&'&(# '( )*+'* ('+,- '$', ',-'$',$-0 '$', )*+' %(,'& +$,#*,- ',-#$(- && $- (- '+, (#'-( ( '+, '$', (- (-

,,&(# -( '+, '$',.T+(, %(,'& +$,#*,- $6 )*+' ,$+ ('+,-.

S'$', $6 $( )*+' &'+ #(# 7 '$', $'(-.

L,' & 8$-&9, '+, %,)#&'&(# ( $- '$:* '+,

;(;8$- %,)#&'&(# ( C$8,&'9. A(-%* '(+&0 6 ('+,-,$#. T+& ,$# $- & #(' $# ,#% >6 &', &'& $ ,$# '( $+&,, '+, ;(&'&$ (>@,'&,

8* &&'$-6 (-,.

W$- +$, &' (# #$'8-,0 +$-$',- $#% $6( (#%8'.


14/77

N"ture o* W"r Ch"r"cter o* %"r

9Who 4(hts *or%h"t ,ur,ose9

Con+uct o* %"r

9Ho% 4(ht9

D"n(er

FrictionUncert"int/Flui+it/Ch"osCo$,le3'h/sic"l-e$otion"l-,s/cholo(ic"lin:uenceHu$"n *"ctoris +ecisive

O05ective*ocus9countri

es co"lition

t"tes

(overn$ents

Technolo(/

tr"te(/Out co$eT/,es o* %"r6Convention"l

9unconvention"l 6(uerrill"8

14

N"ture- ch"r"cter "n+ con+uct o*%"r


15/77

A. Nature of War

W$- $ $ 8#&8, (&$;+,#(,#(# I' &


16/77

D$#*,-F-&'&(#

U#,-'$'6F8&%&'6C+$(

C(;,=P+6&$0 ,('&(#$0 ;6+((*&$,#,H8$# $'(- & %,&&,The n"ture o* %"r +oes not ch"n(e 0utthe ch"r"cter "n+ con+uct o* %"r %illch"n(e

Nature of War


17/77

1. D$#*,-

$ar is danger iolent &rmed conflict its out come'result is destruction' catastrophic #eath, sufferings

its immediate result is bloodshed, destruction, and

suffering( $hile the magnitude of violence may vary

ith the object and means of ar, the violent essence

of ar ill never change(

)oever, the danger can be reduced through unit

cohesion, training and increasing ar efficiency e(t(c.


18/77

2. Friction 9Friction o* I+e"sIt is a clash beteen opposed ills creates friction(In this dynamic environment of interacting forces,

friction abounds(*riction may be mental, as in indecision over a course

of action(It may be physical, as in effective enemy fire or a

terrain obstacle that must be overcome(*riction may be e+ternal, imposed by enemy action,

the terrain, eather, or mere chance(*riction may be self-induced lie lac of a clearly

defined goal, lac of coordination, unclear or

complicated plans, comple+ tas organiations or

command relationships, or complicated technologies(


19/77

&dversaries enter in to ar ith inade.uate/incomplete some times deceived information as ar is

not natural science hich tested using laboratory

mechanism(

)oever, Continuous noledge of belligerent'nemy', maintaining constant readiness and improving

leadership capacity can simplify the problem of

uncertainty,

e must realie that e cannot eliminate them2oreven come close(The very nature of ar maes certainty impossible3 all

actions in ar ill be based on incomplete, inaccurate,

or even contradictory information(

Uncert"int/


20/77

F8&%&'6

4ar is*luidity it re7uire mental flexibility. In war

there exists constant change of time in both enemy

and friendly situations.

This indicates that, it re7uires close fallow up and

appreciation of situations studying the nature and

character of enemy and preparing oneself


21/77

Ch"os In %"r "ll $entione+ cre"te ch"os. In "n

environ$ent o* *riction- uncert"int/- "n+

:ui+it/- %"r (r"vit"tes n"tur"ll/ to%"r+ ch"osor +isor+er.

Li2e the other "ttri0utes o* %"r- ch"os or+isor+er is "n inherent ch"r"cteristic o* %"r;

%e c"n never eli$in"te it. In the he"t o* 0"ttle-,l"ns %ill (o out o* 2ilter- instructions "n+in*or$"tion %ill 0e uncle"r "n+ $isinter,rete+-co$$unic"tions %ill *"il- "n+ $ist"2es "n+

un*oreseen events %ill 0e co$$on,l"ce. It is ,recisel/ this n"tur"l +isor+er %hich

cre"tes the con+itions ri,e *or e3,loit"tion 0/"n o,,ortunistic %ill.


22/77

W"r is co$,le3 $ar is Comple+ ith diverse eapon systems,

several units ith their specific tas and functions( $e have described ar as essentially a clash

beteen opposed ills( In reality, each belligerent is

not a single, homogeneous ill guided by a single

intelligence( Instead, each belligerent is a comple+ system

consisting of numerous individual parts( & division

comprises regiments, a regiment comprises

battalions, and so on all the ay don to fire teamshich are composed of individuals(

ar is not governed by the actions or decisions of a

single individual in any one place but emerges from

the collective behavior of all the individual parts in


23/77

Mor"l "n+ ,s/cholo(ic"l F"ctors $ar is characteried by the interaction of physical,

moral, and mental forces(

The physical characteristics of ar are generally

easily seen, understood, and measured! e.uipment

capabilities, supplies, physical objectives seied,

force ratios, losses of materiel or life, terrain lost or

gained, prisoners or materiel captured(

The moral characteristics are less tangible( The

illingness to fight,

) f t i d i i t h ld ll th b d


24/77

)uman factor is decisive to shoulder all the burden

of ar and achieve desired end state 'victory ' human

being is the decisive force(

In other ards it human that determine the outcomeof the ar(

4ecause ar is a clash beteen opposing human

ills, the human dimension is central in ar(

It is the human dimension hich infuses ar ith its

intangible moral factors(

T+ ' % ' + > '


25/77

T+, #$'8-, ( $- %(, #(' +$#*, >8''+, +$-$',- $#% (#%8' ( $- &

+$#*,

H$* @8' $8,0 %,,(;* ,&,#'&&'$-6 '+,(-60 $#% >,'',- ',+#((*6 ;$6

$@(- -(, #* $-.

C l i


26/77

Conclusion

W"r "s instru$ent o* "chievin( ,olitic"lo05ectivesW"r "s co$,le3 *ull o* ch"os %here +e"th-su7erin( "n+ e3c"v"tion ,rev"ilW"r "s "r$e+ con:ict o* "nt"(onistic"ll/contr"+ictin( interestsThese "re *"cts ,rev"ilin( "n+ $"/ not 0ech"n(e+ in *uture

*


27/77

. C"uses o* %"rC$8, ( $- $ ;-(;(,% >6 $-&(8 '+:,-(>,-,- %&,-,#' '&,J

Scholars from a wide range of disciplines 8 philosophy,

history, political science, theology, anthropology,

sociology, psychology, economics, mathematics, biology,

literature, and others 8 have engaged the 7uestions ofwhat causes war and how humankind might eliminate

war or at least bring it under greater control.Their efforts have led to a proliferation of theories but

to no consensus as to the causes of war or of otherforms of social violence.Scholars disagree not only on the specific causes of

war, but also on how to approach the study of war.


28/77

It is not sur,risin( th"t there "re+ivisions 0et%een schol"rs in +i7erentcountries 6W8 "n+ in +i7erent

+isci,lines ? th"t,s/cholo(ists (ener"ll/ e$,h"si!e

,s/cholo(ic"l *"ctors-

th"t econo$ists e$,h"si!e econo$ic*"ctors- th"t

"nthro,olo(ists e$,h"si!e cultur"l*"ctors- "n+ so on. Let us see ho%

+i7erent +isci,lines ,ut the c"use o*%"r

T+,((*&$ -,$(#*


29/77

T+,((*&$ -,$(#*"C8-, -( '+, C-,$'(-

G,#,'& ,=;$#$'&(#A((ressive 0eh"viour o* hu$"n0ein(s

P6+((*&'K ,=;$#$'&(#"F-8'-$'&(#"M&;,-,;'&(#"M&8#%,-'$#%*

"M&$8$'&(#E-&'-,$ $- ( $**-,&(# (# E'+&(;&$


30/77

S(&((*&'K ,=;$#$'&(#

I#$>&&'6 '( (, (#'-$%&'* ',-,' ,$,8 ,$#

S(&$ %&&&(# ( $, $ '+, (#6 $8, ($-

T+, ,,-*,#, ( (&$ $, -,$',%-&$-6 (# -,(8-,

A>(&+* $,K %&,-,#, & '+, (#6

(8'&(# '( ,#% &'+ $-.

&cono$ic e3,l"n"tion


31/77

&cono$ic e3,l"n"tion

I#',-#$'&(#$ ,8-&'6 ,=;,-' M&+$, T. $-, $-*8,'+$' '+, ,$-6 %,$%, ( '+, #, &,##&80

$- & >, (8*+' #(' (,- &%,((*6 >8' (,- $,'( %%* 8;;&, ( ;-,&(8 #$'8-$((%&'&, &:, (&0 $',-0 %&$(#%0 *(% ,.'..

N$'8-$ -,(8-, $-, #,,- '+, (#6 (8-, ( $

(#&'. A#6 *&,# (#&' & >-(8*+' $>(8' >6 $(;,= ,' ( ,,#'J (',# ;(,-'60 ,'+#& (--,&*&(8 *-&,$#,0 $#% 8#'$>, *(,-#,#' $(;$6 $@(- -(,.

B8' ,,# $',- '+,, $'(- +$, >,,# '$:,# '($(8#'0 '8%&, (#&',#'6 )#% '+$' #$'8-$-,(8-, +,&*+',# '+, %$#*,- '+$' $ && $- &>-,$: (8'0 $#% (#, &' >-,$: (8'0 '+$' (#&' & >,(-, %&8' '( -,(, P-(. M&+$, R(0 22.


32/77

Let us t"2e %"ter "s e3"$,le. W"ter con:icts"re +is,utes or %"rs tri((ere+ or *uele+ 0/co$,etin( "ccess to %"ter resources 0/

countries- st"tes- or (rou,s.W"ter 0e"rs $"n/ si$il"rities to oil. It is

essenti"l *or " %i+e r"n(e o* hu$"n "ctivities-"n+ it e3ists in rel"tivel/ 4nite "$ounts.

Once the "v"il"0le su,,l/ is e3h"uste+-$oreover- "++ition"l @u"ntities c"n 0e "c@uire+onl/ throu(h heroic "n+ costl/ e7orts.

W"ter h"s historic"ll/ 0een " source o* tension"n+ " *"ctor in con:icts th"t st"rt *or otherre"sons. Interst"te con:icts occur 0et%een t%oor $ore nei(h0orin( countries th"t sh"re "tr"ns)0oun+"r/ %"ter source- such "s " river-se"- or (roun+ %"ter 0"sin.


33/77

As the en/"n ,ro*essor '"trici"st"tes- in 1=B=- &(/,ti"n 'resi+ent

An%"r "+"t s"i+The onl/ $"tter th"t coul+ t"2e

&(/,t to %"r "("in is %"ter.E

In 1=>> then)&(/,ti"n Forei(nMinister outros)Gh"li- %ho l"ter0ec"$e the Unite+ N"tions

ecret"r/)Gener"l- ,re+icte+ th"tthe ne3t %"r in the Mi++le &"st%oul+ 0e *ou(ht over the %"ters o*the Nile- not ,olitics.


34/77

E-&'-,$ $- ( $**-,&(# (# E'+&(;&$

DISCUSS THE CAUSE OF THE WAR

o un ers an mo ern eor es o ar an con c


35/77

o un ers an mo ern eor es o ar an con cand to prosecute them successfully, the military

professional must thoroughly understand the levels of

ar and ho they are interrelated(

ach level is concerned ith planning /maing

strategy, hich involves analying the situation,

estimating friendly and enemy capabilities and

limitations, and devising possible courses of actionW"r "s " co$,le3 soci"l ,heno$enon- it isnot the t"s2 o* the $ilit"r/ or("ni!"tion "lone0ut "ll hu$"n $"teri"l recourses o* the

n"tion "re involve+.W"r "s " ,eculi"r soci"l ,heno$enon- itre@uires to h"ve le"+ershi, "n+ +ivision o*

+uties9 res,onsi0ilities "t "ll its levels. There

"re three levels str"te(ic- o,er"tion"l "n+

tr"te(ic Level


36/77

tr"te(ic Level The str"te(ic level *ocuses on +e4nin( "n+

su,,ortin( n"tion"l ,olic/ "n+ rel"tes +irectl/ tothe outco$e o* " %"r or other con:ict "s " %hole.

Usu"ll/- $o+ern %"rs "n+ con:icts "re %on or lost"t this level r"ther th"n "t the o,er"tion"l ort"ctic"l levels.

The str"te(ic level ",,lies to "ll *or$s o* %"r "n+

con:ict *ro$ $ilit"r/ "ctivities short o* %"r throu(hinsur(ent- convention"l- "n+ "n+ other *or$s o*%"r*"re.

This level involves " str"te(ic conce,t- ,l"ns *or

,re,"rin( "ll n"tion"l instru$ents o* ,o%er *or %"ror con:ict- ,r"ctic"l (ui+"nce *or ,re,"rin( the"r$e+ *orces- "n+ le"+ershi, o* the "r$e+ *orces to"chieve str"te(ic o05ectives.

Is the level o* %"r %hich +eter$ines the n"tion"lsecurit/ o05ectives.

& t 0li h 05 ti i iti ti


37/77

&st"0lish o05ectives; se@uence initi"tives;+e4nes li$its "n+ "ssess ris2 *or the use o*$ilit"r/ "n+ other instru$ents o* n"tion"l ,o%er

&nco$,"sses the %hole "ctiv"tes o* $o0ili!in("n+ ,re,"rin( the "r$e+ *orces- ,l"nnin( "n+con+uctin( %"r in the interests o* the n"tion

O,er"tion"l Level

The o,er"tion"l level is concerne+ %ithe$,lo/in( $ilit"r/ *orces in " the"ter o* %"r orthe"ter o* o,er"tions to o0t"in "n "+v"nt"(eover the ene$/ "n+ there0/ "tt"in str"te(ic(o"ls.

Where "n+ %hen to con+uct " c"$,"i(n is 0"se+on o05ectives- the thre"t- "n+ li$it"tionsi$,ose+ 0/ (eo(r",hic"l- econo$ic- "n+ cultur"lenviron$ents- "s %ell "s the nu$0ers "n+ t/,eso* $ilit"r/ resources "v"il"0le.

I th l l * h th li 2 0 t t t i


38/77

Is the level o* %"r %here the lin2"(e 0et%een str"te(iclevel o* %"r 6str"te(ic o05ectives8 "n+ the t"ctic"l",,lic"tion o* co$0"t ,o%er.

'rovi+es inter$e+i"te c"te(or/ o* $ilit"r/ "ctivit/ o*

WH&N- WH&R& "n+ HOW to 4(ht It is the level "t %hich c"$,"i(ns "n+ $"5or o,er"tions

"re ,l"nne+ con+ucte+ "n+ sust"ine+ to "chievestr"te(ic o05ectives

e@uence events- initi"te "ctions- ",,l/ resources "n+sust"in to "chieve o,er"tion"l o05ectives

Uses t"ctic"l results to "chieve str"te(ic o05ectives

T"ctic"l level

T+, '$'&$ ,, '-$#$', ;(',#'&$ (>$' ;(,- '(

8, >$'', $#% ,#*$*,,#' '+-(8*+ %,&&(# $#%$'&(#. '+$' -,$', $%$#'$*, +,# (#'$' &'+ (- -(=&&'6 '( '+, ,#,6. T$'& %,$ '+, %,'$& (;-(,8'* ,#*$*,,#' $#% $-, ,='-,,6 ,#&'&, '('+, +$#** ,#&-(#,#' ( '+, >$'',),%.

d t l iti t th h i i t


39/77

and are e+tremely sensitive to the changing environment

of the battlefield

The level o* %"r "t %hich 0"ttles "n+

en("(e$ents "re ,l"nne+ "n+ e3ecute+ to"cco$,lish $ilit"r/ o05ectives "ssi(ne+ tot"ctic"l units or t"s2*orces

Activities "t this level *ocus on the or+ere+

"rr"n(e$ent "n+ $"noeuvre o* co$0"tele$ents in rel"tion to e"ch other "n+ to theene$/ to "chieve co$0"t o05ectives

Co$$"n+ers "t this level "re concerne+

o05ectives set "t o,er"tion"l level


40/77

National Policy

National Security StrategyNational Military Strategy

Campaign 8lan8lan Major 9perations

4attlesngagements


41/77

.J T/,es o* W"r

.J.1 "se+ on con+uct o* %"r- %"r c"n 0eConvention"l or Unconvention"l %"r

Convention"l %"r is " *or$ o* %"r*"re con+ucte+0/ usin( convention"l %e",ons "n+ 0"ttle4el+t"ctics 0et%een t%o or $ore st"tes in o,encon*ront"tion.

The *orces on e"ch si+e "re %ell)+e4ne+- "n+ 4(htusin( %e",ons th"t ,ri$"ril/ t"r(et theo,,onentKs $ilit"r/.

It is nor$"ll/ *ou(ht usin( convention"l %e",ons-"n+ not %ith che$ic"l- 0iolo(ic"l- or nucle"r%e",ons.

The (ener"l ,ur,ose o* convention"l %"r*"re is to%e"2en or +estro/ the o,,onentKs $ilit"r/- there0/to %e"2en its "0ilit/ to en("(e in convention"l

%"r*"re..


42/77

Unconvention"l %"r +e4nes "s "ctivitiescon+ucte+ to en"0le " resist"nce $ove$entor insur(enc/ to coerce- +isru,t- or

overthro% " (overn$ent or occu,/in(,o%er 0/ o,er"tin( throu(h or %ith "nun+er(roun+- "u3ili"r/- "n+ (uerrill" *orcein " +enie+ "re".

In unconvention"l %"r "s/$$etr/ isco$$on. One si+e $"/ h"ve so,histic"te+technolo(/- hi(hl/ tr"in $"n,o%er- l"r(esi!e "n+ %ell +esi(n structure th"t theother ,"rt +o not h"ve. Unconvention"l%"r*"re is the ,ri$"r/ $etho+ 0/ %hich lo%intensit/ con:ict is *ou(ht.

+ i4 i 0 5 5


43/77

.J. "se+ on #usti4c"tion- %"r c"n 0e 5ust or un5ust%"r

In or+er to un+erst"n+ %hether the %"r is 5ust or

un5ust it is 0etter loo2in( &thics o* %"r. Three vie%s "re consi+ere+ %hen t"l2in( "0out the

$or"lit/ or &thics o* %"r.

The/ "re re"lis$- ,"ci4s$- "n+ the 5ust %"r theor/.&"ch o* the$ h"s its o%n 0elie*s re("r+in( the ethicso* %"r*"re.

Re"lis$ The re"list s"/s th"t %e c"nnot 4n+ $or"lit/ in %"r

"n+ th"t $or"lit/ c"nnot 0e ",,lie+ in %"r.

The re"list 0elieves th"t " st"te shoul+ "l%"/s 0ethin2in( "0out its o%n n"tion"l interest.

A st"te shoul+ there*ore +o %h"tever it thin2s to 0e0ene4ci"l to its n"tion"l interest- even i* it is to %"(e

" %"r "("inst other st"tes.

Th h + h i 2 i h


44/77

The st"te then $ust +o %h"tever it t"2es to %in the%"r "n+ (et %h"t it %"nts- so $or"lit/ is never",,lic"0le to %"r "n+ intern"tion"l "7"irs.

Re"lists 0elieve th"t $or"lit/ is *or in+ivi+u"l,ersons onl/ "n+ not *or the st"te 0ec"use thest"tes ,l"/(roun+- the intern"tion"l (roun+- ish"rsh "n+ the st"te nee+s to ,rotect its ,eo,le "n+its interest *ro$ other st"tes.

The st"te c"nnot there*ore "7or+ to ",,l/ $or"lit/%hen +e"lin( %ith intern"tion"l "7"irs. o$e o* the,ro$inent re"lists "re M"chi"velli "n+ Tho$"sHo00es.

'"ci4s$T+, ;$&)' >,&,, '+$' , +(8% #,,- -,8' '(

&(,#, (- $- (- +$',,- -,$(#.

P$8 C+-&'(;+,- -(', '+$' 6 &(,#,0 (#8%, '+$' $- &(#8$', ,& $#% -,@,' &' 8#%,- $ &-8'$#,.

The ,"ci4st "r(ues th"t %"rs c"n never 0e $or"ll/


45/77

The ,"ci4st "r(ues th"t %"rs c"n never 0e $or"ll/5usti4e+ "n+ th"t %e shoul+ not result into %"r no$"tter %h"t.

The roots o* ,"ci4s$ c"n 0e *oun+ "n+ tr"ce+ 0"c2

%ith the e"rl/ Christi"ns %here the use o* violence isnever ,er$issi0le.

#ust W"r Theor/

The thir+ o* these vie%s re("r+in( the $or"lit/ o* %"r

is the 5ust %"r theor/ %hich 0elieves th"t so$eti$es%"rs "re 5ust "n+ so$eti$es the/ "re not.

&ven i* %"r is evil- %e c"n 4n+ $or"lit/ in it.

At the ,resent ti$e- the 5ust %"r theor/ is $"inl/

+ivi+e+ into three ,"rts "n+ "re s"i+ to 0ein+e,en+ent o* e"ch other- $e"nin( the 5usti4c"tion*or e"ch "re se,"r"te *ro$ one "nother. The three$"in ,rinci,les o* the 5ust %"r theor/ "re 5us "+0ellu$- 5us in 0ello- "n+ 5us ,ost 0ellu$.

#us "+ ellu$


46/77

#us "+ ellu$

T+, @8 $% >,8 & '+, ;-&;, +&+ &(#,-#,% &'+ '+, @8'&)$'&(# ( -,(-'* '(

$- '+, )-' ;$,. I' '-&, '( )#% $ @8'&)$'&(#+,'+,- '+, $- $ $*,% @8'6 (- 8#@8'6.W$- & @8'&),% & $#% (#6 &

1 8' $8, +6 &' -,(-',% '( $-0

2 P-(;,- $8'+(-&'6 '( %,$-, $ $-

3 R&*+' ',#'&(# (- -,(-'* '( $-

4 D,$-,% '+, $- $ $ $' -,(-'

5 H&*+ ;-(>$>&&'6 ( 8, P-(;(-'&(#$&'6 ( '+, *((% '+, $- & ;-(%8,

'( &' ('.


47/77

P-&;, ( 8' W$-


48/77

8' $8,

P-(','&(# -( ,=',-#$ $''$: & '+, )-' $#%

(-,('$#% '+, ,6, ( (,0 '+, (#6@8' $8, ( $-J >$,% (# '+, -&*+' ( ,%,,#,.

S(, +$, $'$,% '+, +8$#&'$-&$#

',-,#'&(# & $( @8'&),%0 +,-, , *( '($- '( $, '+, &, ( #(,#' ;,(;, +($-, >,* $''$:,% >6 $# $**-,(-.

R& +' & ' '&


49/77

R&*+' ',#'&(#T+, $- 8' >, ;8-8,% (- $ @8'

$8,.U#$,;'$>, ',#'&(# R,,#*,

P(&'&$ ,=;$#&(# L$#% $8&&'&(#


50/77

P-(;,- $8'+(-&'6 $#% ;8>& %,$-$'&(#

Tr"+ition"ll/- onl/

n"tions h"ve the"uthorit/ to +ecl"re%"r.

W"rs $ust 0e ,u0licl/+ecl"re+- not ,ursue+in secret.

L$' -,(-'


51/77

L$' -,(-'

I* there "re other $e"ns o*

"chievin( the s"$e o05ectives-such "s ne(oti"tions or econo$ic0loc2"+es- the/ shoul+ 0e,ursue+ e3h"ustivel/ 4rst.


52/77

P-(>$>&&'6 ( 8,

T+, -$'&(#$, +,-, & ,$- $#% &;, $- & $

*-,$' ,&0 $#% &' & -(#* '( $8, 8+ :&*08,-*0 $#% %,'-8'&(# $ 8'&, ,(-'.

P-(;(-'&(#$&'6


53/77

P-(;(-'&(#$&'6

Are the ,ossi0le 0ene4ts 6es,eci"ll/ inter$s o* " 5ust ,e"ce8 ,ro,ortion"l to the

+e"th- su7erin(- "n+ +estruction th"t the,ursuit o* the %"r %ill 0rin( "0out

It $e"ns to s"/ th"t the +"$"(e or thecosts %"r 0rin(s $ust 0e out%ei(he+ 0/

the (oo+ th"t %ill co$e out o* it

#us in 0ello


54/77

#us in 0elloT+, 8' C(#%&'&(# (- C(#%8'* $ W$-#us in 0ello is the ,rinci,le o* the 5ust %"r theor/

th"t is concerne+ %ith the 5usti4c"tion +urin( thecon+uct o* %"r.

The con+ition th"t shoul+ 0e $et *or 5us in 0ello "rethe *ollo%in(

1.Discri$in"te+ 0et%een co$0"t"nts "n+ non)co$0"t"nts

.Uses *orce ,ro,ortion"l to the (o"l the/ %"nt to"chieve

.'er*or$s ri(ht tre"t$ent o* ,risoners o* %"r

J.Follo%s intern"tion"l rules on %e",ons ,rohi0ition

.Does not use $etho+s %hich "re evil in the$selves

.'er*or$s no reven(e

Jus post bellum:


55/77

Jus post bellum:C-,$'* $ 8' P,$,

ri"n Oren+ (ives con+itions *or " 5ust,e"ce

1. #ust c"use *or ter$in"tion.. Ri(ht intention.

. 'u0lic +ecl"r"tion "n+ le(iti$"te"uthorit/.

J. Discri$in"tion.

. 'ro,ortion"lit/.


56/77

8' $8, (- ',-$'&(#

+ O-,#% , %&$'&(# ('+(, -&*+' +(, &($'&(#*-(8#%,% '+, -,(-' '( $- '+,

)-' ;$,.8 U#@8' *$ -( $**-,&(# +$, >,,#

,&$',%

8 V&'&K -&*+' -,'$',%

8 F(-$ $;((*6

8 A,;'$#, ( -,$(#$>, ;8#&+,#'


57/77

R&*+' ',#'&(#

+ E=8%, (- :,,; (8' ('&, 8+ $-,,#*,

+ P-(,8'&(# ( $- -&, #,,% '(

>, $;;&,% '( $0 #(' @8' '+,$#8&+,%.


58/77

P8>& %,$-$'&(# $#%

,*&'&$', $8'+(-&'6+ T+& -,8&-,,#' & $&-6

'-$&*+'(-$-% $#%8#(#'-(,-&$.


59/77

D&-&$'&(#

+ D&,-,#'&$', >,',,#

8 P(&'&$ $#% &&'$-6 ,$%,-

8 M&&'$-6 $#% &&&$# ;(;8$'&(#

+ P8#&+ '+, ,&', -,;(#&>, (-;-(,8'* '+, $-0 #(' '+,8#(,% &&&$#.


60/77

P-(;(-'&(#$&'6

+ T+, $#8&+,% %( #(' (, '+,&--&*+'

8 N( Q&'+ +8#'K

+ P-(;(-'&(#$ '( -,$(#$>, -&*+'%&$'&(#

In conclusion


61/77

In conclusionW$- & #(' $ $'',- ( +(&,0 >8' '+,

8,'&(# ( 8-&$.I# (' $, ;$-'&, ,#',- '( $-+,# $: ;,$,8 (8'&(#.H( ,,-0 #(' $ $- '$-' $ '+, $'-,(-'I' & >$,% (# '+, ;(&6 $#% (>@,'&,( '+, ;$-'6 / *(,-#,#' / ( '+, %$6 '(

8;+(% '+, (8#'-6K #$'&(#$ ',-,'


62/77

'rinci,les o* W"r

'rinci,les o* W"r


63/77

, 'rinci,le o* %"r "re not cre"te+ overni(ht. The/

Develo,e+ "n+ re4ne+ in the lon( histor/ o* %"r "n+serve "s " (ui+e in to+"/Ks "n+ *uture con+uct o*

%"r. For centuries- $"n/ $ilit"r/ or("ni!"tions

su0scri0e+ to the i+e" th"t there e3ists " set o*(ui+in( ,rinci,les or i+e"s th"t (ui+e the con+uct"n+ stu+/ o* %"r.

There h"s never 0een univers"l "(ree$ent on oneco$$on list o* ,rinci,les. Most n"tions h"ve theiro%n list o* ,rinci,les- 0"se+ on their $ilit"r/culture- e3,erience "n+ herit"(e.

'rinci,les o* W"r "re " (ui+e to "ctions concernin(

the ",,lic"tion o* co$0"t ,o%er 'rinci,les "re not su0stitutes *or ,ro*ession"l

un+erst"n+in(- e3,erience "n+ e+uc"tion. The/ hel,,rovi+e " 0etter un+erst"n+in( o* %"r*"re 0ut these"re onl/ (ui+elines "n+ not " ,rescri,tion- *or$ul"-reci,e or chec2list *or success.

The/ serve "t "ll levels o* %"r in


64/77

The/ serve "t "ll levels o* %"r ininterrel"te+ $"nner. The/ +o not ",,l/ inthe s"$e %"/ to ever/ situ"tion.

The/ su$$"ri!e the ch"r"cteristics o* "success*ul o,er"tion.

The/ "++ Gre"test v"lue in the e+uc"tion o*the $ilit"r/ ,ro*ession"l

U2s 'rinci,les o* %"r


65/77

U2 s 'rinci,les o* %"r

election "n+ M"inten"nce o* Ai$

M"inten"nce o* Mor"leO7ensive Actionur,riseConcentr"tion o* Force

&cono$/ o* Forceecurit/Fle3i0ilit/Coo,er"tionust"in"0ilit/

A(-%* '( U %('-, ;8>&$'&(# ( 25


66/77

oviet9Russi"n ,rinci,les

're,"re+nessIniti"tiveC","0ilit/Coo,er"tion

Concentr"tionDe,thMor"leO0e+iencete"+*"stnessecurit/Lo(istics

Chinese 'rinci,les o* W"r


67/77

Chinese 'rinci,les o* W"r

"F8 P-,;$-$'&(#

"#( 6(8- ,#,60 :#( 6(8-,"I#&'&$'&,"C(#,#'-$'&(# ( F(-,"C(;-,+,#&, A$8'"C$'+ '+, ,#,6 U#$$-,"C(, ((-%$'&(#"C(#'(8 )*+'*

"A -(8#% S8;;(-'"B-* '+, ;(&'&$ S8;,-&(-&'6 '( P$6

U 'rinci,les o* %"r "s Univers"l


68/77

'rinci,lesO05ective

o7ensive$"ssecono$/ o* *orce$"noeuvre

unit/ o* co$$"n+si$,licit/securit/ur,rise

O#&CTIP&


69/77

N( (#, '$-' $ $- (- -$'+,-0 #( (#, +&,#, (8*+' '( %( ( &'+(8' )-' >,* ,$-

+& % +$' +, ',#% '( $+&,, >6 '+$'$-.D&-,' ,,-6 &&'$-6 (;,-$'&(# '($-% $ ,$-6%,)#,%0 %,&&, $#% $''$$>, (>@,'&,

O;,-$'&(#$ $#% '$'&$ (>@,'&, (#'-&>8', '('+, *($ ( HH STRATEGIC

C($#%,- S+(8% +$, ,$- 8#%,-'$#%* ('+, ,=;,',% (8'(, &' &;$'A' '-$',*& ,, .+$* ,$- &&(# ( '+,E#%S'$', %* '+, ;(&'&$ %&,#&(#

OFF&NIP&


70/77

9ffensive operations are the ay you seie the

initiative hile maintaining freedom of action and

achieving decisive results(This principle of offensive action is critical to all

levels of ar you might e+perience(

O7ensive o,er"tions "re essenti"l to

$"int"in *ree+o$ o* "ction *or success-e3,loit vulner"0ilities- re"ct to ch"n(in(situ"tions

MA& hi i i i ll h l


71/77

&chieving mass means organiing all the elements

of combat poer at your disposal to have decisive

effect on your enemy very .uicly(Commanders mass the effects of combat poer to

overhelm enemies or gain control of the situationConcentr"te the e7ects o* co$0"t ,o%er "tthe +ecisive ,l"ce ti$e.

M"ssin( the e7ect o* co$0"t ,o%er toover%hel$ ene$ies to ("in control o* thesitu"tion

M"ssin( in ti$e ",,lies ele$ents o* co$0"t,o%er on $ulti,le t"r(ets si$ult"neousl/

M"ssin( in s,"ce concentr"te the e7ects o*+i7erent ele$ents o* co$0"t ,o%er on "

sin(le t"r(et.

&CONOMY OF FORC&


72/77

&CONOMY OF FORC&

In battle, all parts of your force must act( :ou should

never leave part of the force ithout a purpose(That doesn;t mean everyone has to do the same

thing(Alloc"te $ini$u$ essenti"l co$0"t ,o%er

to secon+"r/ e7orts.Involves the +iscri$in"tin( e$,lo/$ent "n++istri0ution o* *orces

MAN&UP&R


73/77

Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the

flexible application of combat power.

Concentrate and disperse combat power to place and eepenemy at a disadvantage

Maes enemy confront new problems and dangers faster

than they react! thus eeps enemy off balance

Manoeuvre allows to gain and preserve freedom of action!

reduce vulnerability and exploit success.

Maneuver is more than "ust fire and movement. It includes

the dynamic! flexible application of leadership! firepower!

information! and protection as well.It re#uires flexibility in thought! plans! and operations and

the sillful application of mass! surprise! and economy of force.

UNITY OF COMMAND


74/77

UNITY OF COMMAND

For ever/ o05ective- ensure unit/ o* e7ort

un+er one res,onsi0le co$$"n+er.Unit/ o* Co$$"n+ +irects "n+

coor+in"tes the "ctions o* "ll *orcesto%"r+s " co$$on o05ective.

In the "0sence o* co$$"n+ "uthorit/co$$"n+ers coo,er"te- ne(oti"te "n+0uil+ consensus to "chieve unit/ o* e7ort.

uccess on the 0"ttle4el+ +e$"n+s th"t "

sin(le co$$"n+er hol+ the "uthorit/ to+irect "ll *orces to%"r+ the o05ective in "uni4e+- coor+in"te+ e7ort.

&CURITY


75/77

W"r is " ris2/ 0usiness. To 0e success*ul- /ou nee+ to 0e %illin(to t"2e necess"r/- c"lcul"te+ ris2s to ,reserve /our *orce "n++e*e"t /our ene$/.

'rotectin( "n+ securin( /our *orcein turn- le"ves /ou *ree tot"2e those ris2s.

ecurit/ results *ro$ $e"sures t"2en 0/ " co$$"n+ to ,rotectitsel* *ro$ sur,rise- inter*erence- s"0ot"(e- "nno/"nce- "n+thre"t IR.

Milit"r/ +ece,tion (re"tl/ enh"nces securit/. The thre"t o*"s/$$etric "ction re@uires e$,h"sis on securit/- even in lo%)thre"t environ$ents.

Never ,er$it the ene$/ to "c@uire "n une3,ecte+ "+v"nt"(e

+ .

+ S,8-&'6 ;-(',' $#% ;-,,-, (>$' ;(,-

+ S,8-&'6 -,8' -( ,$8-, '$:,# >6 $ ($#% '( ;-(',' '+,8#&' -( 8-;-&,0 ',-,-,#,0 $>('$*,0 ..,' $##(6$#,.

+M&&'$-6 %,,;'&(# ,#+$#, ,8-&'6

UR'RI&


76/77

UR'RI&

tri2e the ene$/ "t " ti$e or ,l"ce or in "

$"nner *or %hich he is un,re,"re+. Results *ro$ "ction *or %hich "n ene$/ is

un,re,"re+

'o%er*ul- 0ut te$,or"r/ co$0"t $ulti,lier

Not essenti"l $"2in( ene$/ un"%"re 0utlet hi$ to l"te

IM'LICITY


77/77

IM'LICITY

're,"re cle"r "n+ unco$,lic"te+ ,l"ns "n+cle"r- concise or+ers to ensure thorou(h

un+erst"n+in(

i$,licit/ re+uces $isun+erst"n+in( "n+con*usion

i$,le ,l"ns le"+ to 0etter un+erst"n+in( o* "co$$"n+ers intent "n+ "ssist le"+ershi, "t "lllevels to "cco$,lish the $ission.

i$,licit/ is es,eci"ll/ critic"l %hen /ou "n+/our ol+iers "re tire+ or stresse+. o 2ee, the

nu$0er o* $ovin( ,"rts to " $ini$u$. All thin(s 0ein( e@u"l- the si$,lest ,l"n is

usu"ll/ the 0est.

Documents

Chapter II War[1] - Copy