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CHAPTER-I

A HISTORICAL SURVEY

The great uprising of 1857-58, the ‘most marvelous and

unforgettable event of modern times’,1 may well be considered as an

epoch-making happening and a turning point in the history of British

India. John Lawrence,2 Charles Raikes,3 John Seeley4and many more

British scholars/historians characterized it as only ‘sepoy mutiny’ or

military rising, whereas the nationalist scholars like Asoka Mehta,5 V.D.

Savarkar6 and others called it as a ‘national rising’, ‘Indian war of

independence’ and a ‘revolution’. Even if we accept that it began as a

mere sepoy mutiny, there is no denying the fact that it soon afterwards

developed into a stupendous revolt or rebellion.7 It assumed the character,

at any rate, of ‘the biggest upsurge against the British’ up-to-then most

serious challenge to the British imperialism, colonialism and supremacy

in India.8 Whatever be the origin of this formidable upsurge, there was

very little doubt that the policy followed by the Company’s Government

towards the Native States in the course of the earlier decades, and 1 G.B. Malleson (ed.), Kaye’s and Malleson’s History of the Indian Mutiny of

1857-58, London, 1906, p. VIII. 2 Minute of John Lawrence, 9 April 1858, quoted by R.C. Majumdar, The Sepoy

Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857, 2nd edition, Calcutta, 1963, p. 441. 3 Charles Raikes, Notes on the Revolt in the North- Western Provinces of India,

London, 1858, pp. 156-63. 4 Sir John Seeley, quoted by Asoka Mehta, The Great Rebellion, Bombay, 1946,

p. 39. 5 Asoka Mehta, op.cit., pp. 39-47. 6 V.D. Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence, 1857, 8th edition, New Delhi,

1970, pp. ix, 1-12. 7 R.C. Majumdar supports this view and hence the title of his books ‘The Sepoy

Mutiny and the Revolt of 1857’. Canning soon ceased to speak of it as a mutiny and called it a ‘rebellion’-a ‘revolt’; See John Williams Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War, Vol. I, 4th edition, London, 1878, pp. 616-17.

8 John William Kaye, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 617; Canning wrote, “The Indian Empire was in flames”.

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particularly during the decade preceding the rising of 1857, was one of

the potent factors leading to this powerful outbreak. Dalhousie’s

annexation “had caused a thrill of uneasiness, suspicion and unrest

throughout India”.9 According to Metcalfe, it was ‘foremost among the

causes of the revolt’.10 By his ruthless implementation of the doctrine of

lapse he had annexed the States of Satara, Nagpur, Jhansi, Jaitpur,

Sambhalpur, Udaipur and Baghat. He had contrived war against the Sikhs

and annexed Punjab in 1849. It was an act of ‘violent breach of trust’11 on

his part. Despite the traditional loyalty of the Nawab of Oudh, he had

annexed his State on the plea of gross misrule. Dalhousie had deprived

Nana Sahib, late Peshwa Baji Rao II’s adopted son, of the huge annual

pension that had been granted to the latter. Regarding the titular Mughal

Emperor of Delhi, it was decided that on the death of Bahadur Shah, his

successor would leave the ancestral palace. All these high-handed and

unjust measures provoked, as in fact they were bound to provoke,

resentment and revolt. And the persons like Nana Sahib, Bahadur Shah,

Rani Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi and many others, who were the victims of

these measures, became the most leading and prominent leaders of the

revolt. However, fortunately for the British imperialists, the Chiefs,

especially the dispossessed Chiefs and their associates who took part in

the rising were not in a large number,12 nor did they posses' forces or

resources of great consequence. More fortunately yet for the British

Government, the other Native Princes and Chiefs who had the military

strength and resources to turn the balance against the foreign rulers, such

9 P.E. Roberts, History of British India, 3rd edition, London, 1958, p. 361. 10 Thomas R. Metcalfe, The Aftermath of Revolt, India 1857-70, London, 1965,

p. 219. 11 Major Evans Bell, The Annexation of the Punjab and the Maharajah Duleep

Singh, London, 1882, p. 13. 12 The proportion of the Chiefs who joined the rebellion would not probably

exceed one per cent. See R.C. Majumdar, op.cit., p. 396.

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as the Sindhia, the Holkar, the Gaekwar, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the

Begum of Bhopal, the Maharajas and Rajas of Rajasthan, Mysore and

Travancore and the Sikh Chiefs of the east Punjab states, either remained

aloof from the upsurge or surely sided with the British.

The Sikh Chiefs of the Punjab were among the most conspicuous

Chiefs who threw themselves without hesitation on the British side. They

rendered active help to their Paramount during the great revolt. Under

1809 Proclamation, to be sure, the cis-Sutlej Chiefs were bound to assist

the British authorities with their armies in times of need; also to furnish

the British force with supplies of grain and other needs.13 However, that

was freely the lesson taught to these Chiefs during 1809-1856 by their

imperial masters. That ensured their loyalty and active support. Thus,

their loyalty could pay them dividends.14 But, their disloyalty would not

only mean for them the personal loss of their gaddis but might also

involve the loss of their territories and, perhaps, total annexation of their

States. These Chiefs could not forget that the Chiefs of Ladwa, Ropar and

Anandpur had been liquidated for their disloyalty; Raja Devinder Singh

of Nabha had been dethroned and Sardar Nihal Singh of Kapurthala

deprived of a part of his State for their so-called dubious role during the

First Anglo-Sikh War. In the episode of 1857, as it were, they found a

great opportunity to render substantial services to the British authorities

so as to win over their gratitude; then to procure some concrete territorial

and other concessions from them. To the Chiefs of Nabha and

Kapurthala, especially, the outbreak must have come as a god-sent chance 13 See Articles 4 and 5 of the Proclamation and also Appendix-I. 14 For example, the Maharaja of Patiala was granted sixteen parganas as a

reward for his services to the British during the Gurkha War (1814-16); and in recognition of their services rendered during the First Anglo-Sikh War, the Patiala, Jind and Faridkot Chiefs were granted certain estates and concessions. Vide. V.D. Savarkar, The Indian War of Independence, 1857, 8th edition, New Delhi, 1970, pp. 15-17; also see Major Evans Bell, The Annexation of the Punjab and the Maharajah Duleep Singh, London, 1882, pp. 14-15.

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to better the previous records of fidelity of their respective house to the

Paramount power, and thereby to regain the base that had been lost due to

the mistakes of their predecessors. Little wonder, therefore, that the Sikh

Chiefs vied with one another in extending whole-hearted assistance to the

British rulers at this most critical juncture.

No Prince in India displayed greater loyalty or rendered more

conspicuous service to the British power during the upsurge of 1857-58

than Maharaja Narinder Singh of Patiala.15 At once on hearing the news

of the rising at Meerut and Delhi, he placed himself ‘boldly and heartily’

on the side of the British. Under the order of the Commissioner and the

Commander-in-Chief, the Maharaja undertook the arduous responsibility

of safeguarding the territory between the Yamuna and the Sutlej. He time

and again expressed his desire ‘by letter and by word of mouth’ to go to

Delhi but he was advised and dissuaded by the Chief Commissioner and

the Commissioner from doing so on the basis that his presence in the cis-

Sutlej territory could not be spared. Probably a more significant reason

for not accepted with the repeated request of the Maharaja was that the

cautious British officials suspected lest this distinguished Chief of the

Punjab should be persuaded to join the rebels. Their doubts on this

account was not without base in view of the reality that Emperor Bahadur

Shah of Delhi had sent repeated requests to the Maharaja of Patiala “of

noble rank and lordly dignity, our own devoted vassal, worthy of our

confidence and favour”16 to rise against the British and march with his

army to Delhi. The latter, however, evinced showing loyalty to the British

cause and sent his troops to Delhi, Thanesar, Karnal, Jagadhri, Ambala

Cantonment, Ferozepur, Hissar, Sirsa, Hansi, quelling disturbances at,

15 Griffin, ROP, p. 213. 16 Salahuddin Malik, ‘The Punjab and the Indian Mutiny’, Journal of Indian

History (hereafter JIH), August 1972, p. 346.

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and safeguarding, all these places. The whole of the Maharaja’s troops

employed to help the British Government. They consisted of 2,156

horses, 2,846 foot, 156 officers, 970 camp followers and 8 guns.

Wherever these troops were employed, all the needs such as guns,

magazines, ammunition, supplies, etc., were provided by the Maharaja

himself. Besides, elephants, camels, carts, etc., were furnished by him to

the British whenever, and wherever by whomsoever required. The

Maharaja also advanced a loan of five lakhs of rupees to the British

Government in India. He too expressed willingness to contribute another

equal sum if needed by it.17 The Maharaja’s services were not confined

to the Punjab and Delhi only. During the year 1858, his contingents

rendered help in safeguarding Dholpur18 from the rebels, in clearing the

road between Agra and Gwalior. The Maharaja also sent forces to Jhajjar

and Lucknow; it rendered useful services and help at both these places.19

The material help/aid given by the Maharaja during the revolt was,

doubtless, of great value to the imperialist cause. He not merely provided

men, money, supplies and carriage to be used at various places, but also

kept the roads clear for marching of the British troops from the Punjab to

Delhi and skillfully guarded and protected cis-Sutlej region when most of

the British troops were away to Delhi. Of greater result to the British,

however, was the very reality of the joining of this prominent Chief on

their side. Being the master of the leading Punjab State situated in the

17 PGR, MR, VIII, I, pp. 4,7,18-19, 27-28, 31, 36-7; FD, Political Proceedings., 2

July 1858, Nos. 182-183; PP. 77 (HOC) of 1860 on Mutiny, pp. 18-23; Rev. J. Cave Browne, The Punjab and Delhi in 1857, I, Edinburgh and London, 1861, pp. 185, 190, 212, 222-223, and II, pp. 124, 236-237.

18 Dholpur was a Rajput State, situated between Agra and Gwalior. Its ruler, Rana Balwant Singh, had married the daughter of Maharaja Narinder Singh of Patiala. Most of the Rana’s troops and officials had joined the rebels and the Patiala forces came to the rescue of the Rana.

19 FD Pol. Cons., 20 May 1859, Nos. 74-75; PP 77 (HOC) of 1860 on Mutiny, pp. 33-38.

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centre of the cis-Sutlej territory, the Patiala Chief commanded special

position and impact in this region. He was the acknowledged Chief of all

the Princes and chiefs in the plains as well as hills of the cis-Sutlej

territory. He was looked upon by a large number of the Sikh community

with great reverence and concern. His instance, thus, was bound to

exercise a great impact on the attitude of the chiefs and also the people of

this region. Hesitation or indifference on his part would have been almost

as mischievous to the British interests as open revolt, for it would have

driven the wavier into rebellion, it would have encouraged the lawless

and perhaps rendered the British position in Ambala almost untenable.20

“Had he proved false or even hesitated to join our cause”, observed

the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab afterwards, “the whole cis-Sutlej

States would have risen and our communication with Delhi would have

been cut off”.21 By virtue of his extra-ordinary ability, character and high

position, Maharaja Narinder Singh could have proved ‘a most formidable

leader against the Government’.22 If the disloyalty of the Maharaja would

have been attended with disastrous results for the imperialists, his loyalty

proved to be a turning point in their favour. With the prompt and firm

stand taken by this influential ‘orthodox Hindoo’ Chief, all sorts of

rumours about the greased cartridges, about the adulteration of flour with

bone and about other subtle devices of the British to mar the caste of the

Hindus began to be discredited. As a result the wavier and rebellious

elements got discouraged. The Maharaja did help at such a critical time,

it was believed, “was worth a Brigade of English troops to us, and served

more to tranquillize the people than a hundred official disclaimers would

20 CCSS to CCP, 9 March 1858, FD, Political Proceedings, 2 July 1858, No. 182,

para 4. 21 PG to GOI, 29 March 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 29 April 1859, No. 42. 22 Griffin, ROP, pp. 213-14.

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have done”.23 While acknowledging the service rendered by the

Maharaja, the Chief Commissioner observed:

“The whole demeanor and attitude of the Maharaja brought

much moral influence to our side, and instilled confidence

into the minds of the people in the cis-Sutlej States. These

services were of very great importance to the success of our

cause”.24

The Maharaja’s loyalty and avowed assistance to their cause had

not only the impact of pacifying the people of the cis-Sutlej region, but

also won over for them the zealous co-operation and aid of the other Sikh

Chiefs. These Chiefs, indeed, “were drawn into his wake”.25

Raja Sarup Singh of Jind did not want to lag behind the Maharaja

of Patiala so far as serving the cause of his British masters was

concerned. Accordance with the Commissioner’s instructions, he

marched with all his troops26 ‘under a burning sun’ towards Thanesar and

from there to Karnal’. Having made the needed arrangements for the

protection of Karnal, he sent, at the Baghpat on the Yamuna, and ordered

his cousin, Punjab Singh, to escort Hudson to Meerut. The Raja himself

accompanied Captain Andrew and helped in the occupation and

protection of the towns of Panipat and Raee. He was then engaged in

keeping the road safe from Karnal to the Camp before Delhi. He was the

only Chief who was personally present with the British army at Delhi.

This all thereby gave the clear and strongest proof of his faithfulness and

courage. “He never showed the slightest hesitation but evinced from the

23 CCSS to CCP, 9 March 1858, op.cit., para 6. 24 CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, para 2. 25 Cave-Browne, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 237. 26 The whole contingent of Jind did not exceed 800 men but they were ‘a

soldiery and well-disciplined set’.

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outset a resolution to stand or fall with us”. He too sent his troops to

Hansi, Jhajjar, Rohtak and Gohana to assist the British in crushing the

rebels at all these places.27

Raja Bharpur Singh of Nabha, though hardly 18 years of age at that

time, “acted with the utmost loyalty and intelligence”28 for the British.

Under cis-Sutlej States, on the Commissioner’s instruction. He proceeded

to Ludhiana with his forces.29 He took charge of safeguarding that

important place. He remained there in person throughout the campaign.

He posted some of his troops for the protection of the roads between

Ludhiana and Nabha, between Nabha and Ambala, between Ambala and

Ludhiana and between Nabha and Feroepur. A Nabha contingent of 300

horses and foot soldiers were used for escorting heavy guns and

ammunition from Phillaur to Ludhiana and thence to Ambala and Delhi.

When the Jullundur rebels slipped towards Phillaur, the Deputy

Commissioner of Ludhiana took a detachment of the Nabha forces,

consisting of 50 horsemen, 100 infantry and 2 guns, to chase the rebels.

The Nabha soldiers fought gallantly against the rebels on the bank of the

Sutlej. They inflicted a crushing defeat on them. On requisition from the

British authorities, the Nabha Chief also sent his troops for assistance to

Delhi, Panipat, Ambala, Ferozepur and Lahore. He also advanced a loan

of rupees 2,50,000 to the British.30

27 PGR, MR, VIII, I, pp. 4, 7, 28; Cave-Browne, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 190-191, 209,

and Vol. II, pp. 239-41; FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, Nos. 171-172; PP 77 (HOC) of 1860 on Mutiny, pp. 13-18.

28 Griffin, ROP, p. 422. 29 The Raja’s troops consisted of 350 cavalry, 450 infantry, 2 guns, 15 camel-

guns and 25 artillery-men. 30 PGR, MR, VIII, I, pp. 4, 7, 18-19, 85, 102-104, 109 and Vol. II, pp. 205, 211

and 346; Cave-Browne, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 241-242; FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, Nos. 167-168; PP 77 (HOC) of 1860 on Mutiny, pp. 8-13.

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Thus the three Phulkian Chiefs, regarded as a whole, rendered

distinguished services to the British authorities. It was largely due to their

fidelity and active help that a major portion of the Punjab either remained

quiet or could be silenced without any mighty confrontation “The safety

of this province”, wrote the Commissioner, “may be attributed to their

loyalty and good example”.31 Besides, by dispatching their forces to

Delhi and keeping all the roads from Punjab to Delhi clear, they rendered

valuable assistance to the British in the capture of Delhi. And since the

safety of the British Indian Empire depended, to a large extent, upon the

safety of the Punjab and the capture of Delhi, the determined help of the

Phulkian Chiefs to the British cause may be regarded as a cause of great

significance in ensuring the safeguard of British Empire in India.

Therefore, this closely related faction of three Chiefs was rightly and

most liberally rewarded by the British authorities. The other Sikh Chiefs

of Kapurthala, Faridkot and Kalsia too exhibited conspicuous loyalty to

them, and supplemented the efforts of the Phulkian Chiefs in bringing

about peace and calmness in various parts of the province.

Raja Randhir Singh of Kapurthala, though he was not bound to

render any military help,32 sent every available soldier and gun to assist

the British, extended firm co-operation to them during the rising. As soon

as he got the news of the rising at Delhi, he marched to Jullundur with his

troops, accompanied by his brother Bikram Singh and also his principal

advisers. He remained at Jullundur throughout the emergency during the

most trying season of the year. He protected the city from the rebels. He

furnished guards, patrols and escorts to the Jullundur authorities. He too 31 G.C. Barnes (CCSS) to Robert Montgomery (Judicial Commissioner, Pb.), 5

February 1858, PGR, MR, VIII, I, para 12, p. 7. 32 Since 1846 the Kapurthala Chief paid an annual tribute of rupees 1,31,000 in

communication of military service. See G.C. Barnes (CCSS) to Robert Montgomery (Judicial Commissioner, Pb.), 5 February 1858, PGR, MR, VIII, I, para 12, p. 7, p. 16.

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sent a detachment of 100 cavalry, 200 infantry and 2 light guns for the

assistance of Col. Abbott at Hoshiarpur. The total force he placed at the

disposal of the British consisted of 1200 infantry, 200 cavalry and 5 guns.

Moreover, the conduct of his troops throughout was ‘most exemplary’.

He agreed to send a portion of his troops, required for the security of the

Jullundur Doab.33 The Government of India was appreciative of the

distinguished loyalty and ‘very valuable and well timed’ help of the Raja

who “placed all his troops and resources at our disposal…personally

came to the front, and openly sided with the British Government, thereby

giving a noble example, not only to his own followers, but to the people

of the Jullundur Doab”.34

The Raja of Kapurthala also offered his assistance to aid in the

restoration of order in Oudh. On the strong recommendation of the Chief

Commissioner, the Supreme Government accepted this offer. As a result,

the Raja, along with 2,010 troops and his brother Bikram Singh marched

to Lucknow in May 1858. During the following ten months the Raja and

his troops rendered valuable help to the British in various engagements

against the rebels. The Kapurthala contingent met the enemy in the field

six times; it captured nine guns. The British officer under whose charge

the Kapurthala contingent was placed, admired the ‘obliging and

effective’ aid rendered at all times by the Raja who sparred himself no

fatigue or discomfort, believing that his presence with his troops would

animate his men to fight courageously and work willingly, ardently and

laboriously.35

33 PGR, MR, VIII, i, pp. 147, 153, 158-61, 172, 177-78, 205, ii, pp. 223, 225,

344; Cave-Browne, op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 190-191, 235-249, and II, pp. 123, 247-248; FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, Nos. 191-192; FD, Pol. Cons. of 18 December 1857, Nos. 381-383 and of 30 December 1859, Nos. 1779-1781.

34 GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 193, para 7. 35 Lt. Chamier to Mil. Secy. To CCO, 29 January 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 15 April

1859, No. 502; also FD, Pol. Cons. Of 22 October 1858, Nos. 256-258, of 24

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Raja Wazir Singh of Faridkot did for his masters whatever his

limited sources could afford. At the first information of the disturbances

at Ferozepur, he at once went there. He placed himself and his troops at

the disposal of the Deputy Commissioner of Ferozepur. His troops

guarded the ferries of the Sutlej up to Harike. He sent 25 of his troops

with General Von Cortlandt, who served at Sirsa and elsewhere. He

captured several fugitive sepoys escaping through his territory. He

handed them over to the British authorities. Along with his five horsemen

and two guns he personally joined the force sent against the rebel, Sham

Dass. The Raja also contributed a sum of rupees 35,000 as loan to the

administration of the place.36

Sardar Sobha Singh of Kalsia too did good service to the British, of

course, within the limited means of his petty Chiefship. He and his son,

Lehna Singh, placed themselves at the disposal of the British authorities

along with their troops. They helped in guarding certain ferries on the

Yamuna. They provided men for patrolling the main roads between

Kalka, Ambala and Ferozpur. A Kalsia contingent of 100 men was also

sent to Oudh to render service there.37

The Mohammedan Chiefs of the Punjab neither showed so

conspicuous loyalty nor rendered such meritorious services to the

Paramount Power as characterized the attitude of the Sikh Chiefs during

the rebellion. On the other hand, they remained, by and large, lukewarm;

some of them even adopted definitely hostile attitude. Several of the

Muslim States of the Punjab, having been situated not far from Delhi, fell

under the rebels’ influence. Some of the Mohammedan chiefs seemed to

October 1858, No. 45, of 12 November 1858, Nos. 158-161, of 19 November 1858, Nos. 316-318, of 31 December 1858, Nos. 2500-2502; also GOI to COD, No. 23 of 12 July 1858 and No. 40 of 1 October 1858.

36 Cave-Browne, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 245-246; FD, Pol. Cons. of 23 July 1858, Nos. 312-314.

37 Griffin, Massy and others, op.cit., p. 556.

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have been won over, clearly or clandestinely, by the emissaries of the

King of Delhi. There was no hiding the fact that a great majority of the

Muslim Chiefs and their people in the Punjab had sympathies with the

rebels. The Nawabs of Jhajjar, Farrukhnagar, Dadri and Bahadurgarh

avowedly joined the cause of the rebels. They were all punished. The first

two were hanged, and their States were confiscated by the British.

Nawab Fateh Khan of Bahawalpur, the premier Mohammedan

State of the Punjab, displayed ‘no sincere desire’ to help the British.38

The Government of India, therefore, sent warning to him that if he

misbehaved, exemplary penalty would be inflicted upon him.39 Though

the Nawab lent no sincere co-operation, yet he took no part against the

British. He also sent a detachment of 80 horses and foot men to General

Van Cortlandt for aid in Sirsa. The help given was, of course ‘as

insufficient as it was constrained’. Nevertheless, the Nawab’s neutral

attitude was of worth for the British. For it he had joined the revolt,

British communication with Sind would have been cut off, the district of

Sirsa lost and probably the whole of southern Punjab thrown into a state

of disturbance and insurrection.40 After the fall of Delhi, however, an

important change took place in the attitude of the Nawab. He made offers

of help willingly. Such offers, when accepted, were fully acted upon.41

The Malerkotla Chiefs fared no better than the Nawab of

Bahawalpur. In response to summons from the British authorities, Nawab

Mahbub Ali khan and his son, Sikander Ali Khan, went to Ludhiana with

their troops. These were occasionally used for escorting ammunition, 38 CCP to GOI, 30 June 1857, FD, Sec. Cons., 31st July 1857, No. 21. There was

a general rumour that the Nawab of Bahawalpur had soon after the outbreak of disturbances received a messenger from the King of Delhi. Vide., PG to GOI, 13 October 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 30 December 1859, No. 100, para, 6.

39 GOI to CCP, 31 July 1857, FD, Sec. Cons., 31 July 1857, No. 23. 40 PG to GOI, 13 October 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 13 December 1859, No. 100,

para 8. 41 Ibid., para 6.

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patrolling the roads and checking the advances of the Jullundur rebels.

However, but these troops behaved ‘in a cowardly manner’. The Nawab’s

relative, the Bhatti Chief, was executed by the Judicial Commissioner’s

order for his rebellious designs. His Nawab had failed to restrain his

hostile attitude despite the Commissioner’s advice. Although Dilawar Ali

Khan, the second member of the family, remained loyal to the British, yet

the Commissioner, cis-Sutlej States and the Deputy Commissioner of

Ludhiana strongly suspected the loyalty of the two junior members of the

family, Ghulam Muhammad and Rustam Ali. The Vakil of Rustam Ali

was hanged at Ludhiana for carrying on seditious correspondence. For

their lukewarm attitude and dubious loyalty, the two junior Chiefs were

deprived of their independent jurisdiction and their authority was

transferred to the Nawab.42 After three years, however, their power was

restored to them on the basis that there was no tangible proof against

either of them.43 “On the whole, I fear the Malerkotla Chiefs”, wrote the

Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana “may be transferred without any

injustice from amongst the rolls of the staunch to the most indifferent and

lukewarm attitude of friends to our Government”.44

Nawab Muhammad Hasan Ali Khan of Dujana did nothing to help

the British during the disturbances of 1857. He also did not take any part

against them. His State hence escaped the fate of Jhajjar and

Bahadurgarh.45 Nawab Akbar Ali of Pataudi was believed to be having

communication with the King of Delhi in early stages. Soon after he

changed and then firmly sided with the British cause. He sent a

detachment of cavalry to help Mr. Ford, the civil officer of the district. He 42 FD, Pol. Cons., 7 May 1858, Nos. 182-188; PGR, MR, VIII, I, pp. 4, 7, 85,

102-4, 109 and II, pp. 206, 211. 43 FD, Pol. A, April 1861, Nos. 63-65. 44 G.H.M. Ricketts (DC Ludhiana) to G.C. Barnes (CCSS), 22 February 1858,

PGR, MR, VIII, I, para 52, p. 110. 45 Griffin, Massy and others, op.cit., p. 569.

14

also gave shelter to some Englishmen whose lives were in danger at

Gurgaon. He played an active role in suppressing the revolt of Tula Ram

at Bahora (Gurgaon). His troops also took part in the action outside

Jaurasi. In this more than 100 rebels were killed. When Muhammad Sher

Khan, a leader of the rebels, entered Pataudi with a detachment of cavalry

and asked for three lakhs of rupees in the name of the Delhi Emperor, the

Nawab fought against him and killed fifty of the rebels. After the arrival

of reinforcements, however, Muhammad Sher Khan defeated the Nawab.

The former forced him to run away to Narnaul. He freely indulged in loot

and plunder at Pataudi.46 It will have been natural that the Sikh Chiefs

evinced more conspicuous loyalty; they rendered far more valuable aid

and services to the British during the rising of 1857-58 than the

Mohammedan Chiefs of the Punjab. It was in the context of these

performances that the British authorities formulated its new policy

towards the several rulers of this region; more especially towards the Sikh

States.

Before dealing with the exceptional treatment accorded to the

major Sikh States in recognition of the distinguished services rendered by

them, it may be observed that after the revolt of 1857-58, an important

change was brought in the general policy of the British Government

towards all the Native States of India. In August 1858, by the Act for the

‘Better Government of India’, the East India Company was abolished.

The government and revenues of India together with the rights of

paramount power over the Indian States were transferred to the British

Crown. The Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 issued a few months after47

46 Ibid., pp. 560-61. 47 See GG’s Pol. Dispatches to SOS, NO. 1 of November 1858, No. 2 of 2

November, No. 3 of 6 November, No. 5 of 16 November, No. 8 of 1 December, No. 13 of 16 December, No. 22 of 31 December, and No. 6 of 16 January 1859; also Pol. Dispatch from SOS, No. 18 of 21 April 1859. The

15

proclaimed in clear terms the new policy to be followed or implemented

hereafter towards all the Native States in general. It was also declared, in

the first instance, that the treaties and engagements of the Princes and

Chiefs with the British would be ‘scrupulously maintained’ that evidently

implied that the British Government of India under the Crown would not

go beyond the previous stipulations signed with the States in asserting or

extending the scope of its paramount power. In the phrase, ‘we desire no

extension of our present territorial possessions’. The policy of annexation

and expansion of the British Government at the cost of the Native States

was announced to have been abandoned once for all. Her Majesty’s

Government also gave a solemn pledge to ‘respect the rights, dignity and

honour of Native Princes’ which were certainly identified with Her

Majesty’s own rights, dignity and honour. Finally, the Queen expressed

her earnest desire for the prosperity and social advancement of the

Princes and people of India, which could be obtained by internal peace

and good government.

In pursuance, and as a valuable elaboration of the policy declared

in the Queen’s Proclamation, Lord Canning, the first Governor-General

and Viceroy under the Crown addressed a long, and indeed a brilliant

Dispatch to the Secretary of State for India48 on the subject of the

suggested right of adoption to be conceded to the Native States in India.

The suggestions made and the principles laid down in this Dispatch were

Queen’s Proclamation was read out by Canning to the assembled Princes and people at a Darbar held at Allahabad on November 1, 1858. Special measures were taken by the Viceroy to give it a wide publicity at the courts of the Princes and Chiefs of India, and it was received with special honour, and responded to in language expressive of loyalty and devotion to the British Crown, by several notable Chiefs, including the Holkar, the Sindhia, the Gaekwar, the Chiefs of Rajputana and the Sikh Chiefs of the Punjab. Her Majesty’s Government received intimations about the reception of the Proclamation at the hands of the notable Chiefs of India with ‘feelings of the loveliest satisfaction’.

48 Dispatch to SOS, No. 43-A of 30 April 1860.

16

of great value in the evolution of the British policy towards these States

after the epoch-making event of 1857-58. Let it be noted so much so that

this document was frequently quoted afterwards by the British authorities

themselves as the basic document of the new policy. It may, therefore be

analyzed briefly here:

Firstly, the Governor-General discussed at length the controversial

views of the British authorities with reference to some previous cases to

display that the British Government’s policy regarding adoption of heirs

by the Native Chiefs had not been clear and coherent, that had caused ‘a

haze of doubt and mistrust’ in the minds of all the Native Chiefs’.49

Secondly, he held that that was the most opportune time of

removing all the suspicions from the minds of the Native Princes and

Chiefs by making the British policy about adoption plain and certain. For

the last vestiges of the Royal House of Delhi had gone the last pretender

to the gaddi of Peshwa had disappeared. Now, the British Crown stood

forth the unquestioned ruler in all India. He added, “There is reality in the

suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has never existed before

and which is not only felt but eagerly acknowledge by the Chiefs”.50

Thirdly, he suggested that it would be a step of sound policy to

give assurance to every Chief above the rank of a jagirdar that the

Paramount Power wanted to see his government perpetuated. On failure

of natural heirs, his adoption of a successor according to Hindu law and

customs of his race (if he be a Hindu Chief) or selection of a successor

which might be legitimate according to Mohammedan Law (if he be a

Muslim Chief), would be recognized. That nothing would disturb the

engagement hence made to him so long as his house remained faithful to

the Crown and sincere to the conditions of the treaties or sanads. He

49 Ibid., paras 1-20. 50 Ibid., paras 21-22.

17

suggested that such an assurance should be conveyed to each Chief

individually and not by a general notification.51

Fourthly, “The proposed measure will not debar the Government of

India from stepping in to set right such abuses in a Native government as

may threaten any part of the country with anarchy or disturbance, nor

from assuming temporary charge of a Native State where there shall be

sufficient reason to do so”.52 And further, neither will the assurance, if

worded as proposed, diminish our right to visit a state with the heaviest

penalties, even to confiscation, in the event of disloyalty or flagrant

breach of engagement.53

Fifthly, he forcefully held that instead of extending the British rule,

the British Government should give its first care to strengthen their rule

within the present limits of the Empire; for they had neither sufficient

European force, nor the requisite staff of the British civil officers nor

sufficient economic means to launch plans of further extension of their

territory. Further, any such undertaking would too make that difficult for

them to discharge satisfactorily their already existing duties in the

administration of justice, public works, etc. He, therefore, told “The

safety of our rule is increased, not diminished, by the maintenance of

Native Chiefs well affected to us”.54

Lastly, stressing upon the need of treating Native Chiefs with

consideration and kindness, he said that in the event of any danger from

an outside enemy or any other emergency, “one of our best mainstays

will be found in these Native States”, just as in the crisis of 1857-58 they

had “served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have

51 Ibid., paras 23, 28 and 29. 52 Ibid., para 30. 53 Ibid., para 31. 54 Ibid., paras 33-34.

18

swept over us in one great wave”.55 The Secretary of State approved the

recommendations made and the principles laid down in the Governor-

General’s Dispatch.56 Accordingly, adoption of Sanads was issued

individually to a large number of Native Chiefs of India including the

Chiefs of the Punjab, in 1862.

Soon after the above Governor-General’s Dispatch, Sir Barley

Freer wrote a separate minute relating to the subject of adoption. He

firmly supported Canning’s viewpoint that all doubts existing in the

minds of the Native Chiefs regarding British policy should be removed;

the right of adoption be conceded to all of them. He went a step further as

to suggest that an Indian Committee of the Privy Council, comprising of

such jurists and statesmen as had served in India, be formed. To this

committee might be referred all issues affecting the rights of the Native

States and of the interpretations of treaties and engagements of the

Princes with the British Government. Such a proposal he held “may

afford an easy and trustworthy solution of many questions connected with

native states and form a valuable addition to the concession of the right to

adopt”.57 This Minute was forwarded to the Secretary of State; the new

proposal made by Freer was, however not favourably considered by Her

Majesty’s Government.

But before these Dispatches were exchanged between Calcutta and

London the British Government of India had thrown some important

concessions to the major Sikh chiefs of the Punjab States. Even prior to

the assumption of authority by the Crown, the Supreme Government had

already conferred some rewards upon them for the valuable services

rendered by them during the disturbances of 1857-58. To the Maharaja of

55 Ibid., para 34. 56 Dispatch from SOS, No. 59-P of 26 July 1860. 57 Minute by Sir Bartle Frere, 19 June 1860, FD, Part A, June 1860, No. 261.

19

Patiala was granted the Narnaul division of the Jhajjar territory valued at

rupees 2,00,000 per annum in perpetuity, the jurisdiction over Bahadur

(together with the right of escheats therein and the annual commutation

tax amounting to rupees 5,265) and the confiscated house in Delhi

formerly belonging to Begam Zeenat Mahal and valued at rupees

10,000.58 The Maharaja’s honorary titles were also increased.59 The Raja

of Jind was given the Dadri territory valued at rupees 1,03,000 per annum

in perpetuity; thirteen villages in the Kularan pargana situated near

Sangrur and valued at rupees 13,813 per annum; and the confiscated

house of the rebel Shahzada Mirza Abu Bakr in Delhi valued at rupees

6,000. The Raja’s salute was increased to 11 guns; the number of trays of

gifts presented to him in Viceregal Darbars was raised from 11 to 15; and

he was given the privilege of having his state visits to the Governor

General returned by the Secretary.60 His honorary titles were also

increased.61 The Raja of Nabha was given the division of Bawal and

Kanti in the confiscated Jhajjar territory. It valued at rupees 1,06,000

annually in perpetuity, and equal privileges with the Jind Chief in respect

of salute-guns, the khillat on the occasions of Viceregal Darbars and

return state visits by the Secretary. Likewise, an addition was also made

to his titles.62 As a consequence of these rewards, the Nabha Chief won

back for his house an accession of revenue nearly equal to what his

58 GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, Ibid., No. 187, para 3; CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858,

FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, Para 4; Kharita from GG to Maharaja of Patiala, 2 June 1858, Ibid., No. 188.

59 For the exact addition in the honorary titles of the Maharaja, see section V of Ch. XII.

60 Kharita from GG to Raja of Jind, 2 June 1858, Ibid., No. 189; CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, para 6; GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, Ibid., No. 187, para 4.

61 For the exact titles granted to the Jind Raja, see section V of Ch. XII. 62 GOI to CCP, 2 June 1858, Ibid., No. 187, para 5; Kharita from GG to Raja of

Nabha, 2 June 1858, No. 190; also see section V of Ch. XII; CCP to GOI, 13 April 1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 169, para 7.

20

father’s treachery forfeited with an increase of honour and importance

which never before attached to the Nabha house.63 But it may be noted

that the territories given were rather troublesome and were indeed, a poor

compensation for the loss of one-fourth of the Nabha estates in 1846-the

estates which were never restored to the Nabha house despite of repeated

representations of the Nabha Chiefs after 1858. The Government under

the Crown not merely confirmed these rewards given to the Phulkian

Chiefs of Patiala Jind and Nabha but also gave certain concessions of

exceptional nature to these three Chiefs which for their unique

significance will be treated separately in some details. It is, however,

significant to say here that the British authorities had made a very

judicious and clever selection of territories from the confiscated Jhajjar

and Dadri estates for rewarding the services of the Phulkian Chiefs. By

doing so they placed friendly Sikh powers in the midst of turbulent

Mohammedan population. The territories granted to Patiala and Nabha

were also contiguous to the borders of the States of Rajputana, i.e. Alwar

and Jaipur. They were frequently disturbed by the border offences and

disputes. Evidently, their protection required a strong frontier police

backed by a large military force. The shrewd British statesmen knowingly

transferred this perpetual burden to the Phulkian Chiefs. This was done

by ostensibly rewarding them with the grant in perpetuity of these

territories. Little did the Phulkian Chiefs realize at the time that for the

most meritorious services rendered by them to the paramount power, they

were being rewarded not only with additional territories but also with

additional burdens, problems and troubles?

The Kapurthala Raja was rewarded with the remission of one

year’s tribute. The reduction of annual tribute by rupees 25,000, a khillat

63 Cave-Browne, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 242.

21

of rupees 15,000, a salute of 11 guns, and additional honorary titles,64 a

garden at Naraingarh in the Ambala district65 the estates of Bundi and

Bithouli in Istumrari tenure at half rates in Oudh,66 the annulment of the

will of his late father and the consequent restoration of full authority in

the whole of his state were other rewards that the British gave him.67 The

Raja’s brother, Kanwar Bikram Singh, was also rewarded for the services

rendered by him. He received the title of ‘Bahadur’ with a Khillat of

rupees 5,000. An estate in Oudh68 was also granted to him in perpetuity in

return for an annual tribute of rupees 25,000. However, the civil and

police jurisdiction of the estates remained with the British.69 The Raja

keenly desired, and repeatedly requested for, grant of full jurisdiction

over the estates. After about three years when the matter was reopened

even the Lieutenant-Governor strongly recommended that the Raja’s

desire should be compiled with.70 But despite all this, the British

Government of India refused to restore to him jurisdiction over the estates

which had been under the British jurisdiction for the last 15 years. The

Paramount Government thought it “politically more wholesome, as an

example, that the defection of the Aloowalia Chief, which lost to the

64 GG’s Kharita to the Raja of Kapurthala, Ibid., No. 194; GOI to CCP, 2 June

1858, FD, Pol. Progs., 2 July 1858, No. 193, para 8. 65 FD, Pol. Cons., 15 October 1858, Nos. 459-462. This garden valued at rupees

1300 had been taken over by the British Government on the confiscation of the cis-Sutlej estates of the Kapurthala Chief due to his doubtful loyalty during the First Anglo-Sikh War.

66 GOI to CCO, 15 April 1859, Ibid., No. 503; GOI to PG, 15 April 1859, Ibid., No. 504; CCO to GOI, 10 February 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 15 April 1859, No. 501.

67 See Infra, pp. 97-102. 68 These estates, consisting of 18 villages in the Lahore district and 21 in the

Amritsar district and valued at rupees 26,300 per annum, had been resumed by the British Government on the death of Raja Nihal Singh not due to any bad conduct on the part of the late Chief but simply in accordance with the rules applied to the cases of all conquest-tenure jagirdars. See Griffin, ROP, p. 531.

69 FD, Pol. Cons., 3 February 1860, Nos. 84-90. 70 PG to GOI, 12 December 1862, FD, Pol. A, January 1863, No. 141; also PG to

GOI 14 April 1863, FD, Pol. A, June 1864, No. 92.

22

family the Baaree Doab villages, should bear the stamp of a permanent

mark of the displeasure of the British Government”.71 The last and ‘the

most highly valued’ of the privileges bestowed on the Raja of Kapurthala

was the right of adoption granted by the Sanad of March 5, 1862. But this

privilege was not exceptional in its timing or for what it conceded. Also,

for the ‘Adoption of Sanads’ of much the similar nature had been granted

to most of the Indian Chiefs in March 1862.

The Raja of Faridkot was too rewarded for his services during the

upsurge of 1857-58. He was exempted from the service of ten sowars

which he was bound to furnish earlier. His khillat was increased from 7 to

11 pieces; even his honorary titles were increased.72 He was allowed the

honour of a salute of 11 guns as a further reward for his services.73 The

right of adoption was also granted to him by the Sanad of March 11 1862.

Nawab Sikandar Ali Khan of Malerkotla too claimed reward for

the services alleged to have been rendered by his late father during the

said revolt. However, on the recommendation of the Lieutenant-Governor

of the Punjab, his claim was considered ‘inadmissible’ by the Paramount

Government on the basis that the conduct of the Malerkotla family had

not been satisfactory. Moreover, the representative of that family had not

rendered any substantial service.74 Nor was any substantial reward in

terms of addition in the territories and titles conferred upon any other

Muslim Chief; the Nawab of Pataudi who had been ousted by the rebels

was, of course restored with all his authority. But the Muslim Chiefs of

Malerkotla, Loharu, Dujana and Pataudi, like the Muslim Chiefs in other

parts of the country, were granted Adoption Sanads in March 1862.

71 GOI to PG, 8 June 1864, FD, Pol. A, June 1864, No. 94. 72 FD, Pol. Cons., 23 July 1858, Nos. 312-315. 73 FD, Pol. A, April 1860, Nos. 374-375. 74 FD, Pol. A, June 1860, Nos. 12-15.

23

For their unwavering loyalty and distinguished services during the

disturbances of 1857-58, the Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala, Jind and Nabha

were granted some extraordinary concessions. These, in certain respects,

placed their relationship with the British Government on a peculiar

footing. It is significant to note that the initiative for acquiring such

concessions had come from the three Chiefs themselves. That was a

manifest proof of their sagacity and practical wisdom. This fact

incidentally suggested that it was not without a purpose that they had

been supporting their Paramount. Therefore, very ardently and

enthusiastically Maharaja Narinder Singh of Nabha, despite the spirit of

jealousy that they frequently harboured for one another, combined hands

together in their common interests, as indeed they very often did. Having

put their minds together they prepared a ‘Paper of Requests’. This paper

was submitted for the consideration of the Paramount Power at a very

opportune time, when the services rendered by the Chiefs were fresh in

the minds of the British Government. The paper contained eight requests

in all. These are as such:

(i) The Phulkian Chiefs’ request was that they should be given the

power of inflicting capital sentences on their own subjects without

requiring a reference to the Commissioner, cis-Sutlej States. As has

already been described earlier,75 it was after the First Anglo-Sikh War in

1844-45 that they had been deprived of their rights of giving death

punishment to their subjects without the approval and consent of the

Commissioner or British Agent. The Chiefs regarded it as an unjust

encroachment upon their rights. They viewed this limitation on their

independence as more serious than any other of the regulations issued in

the wake of the Sutlej campaign.76 They tried their best to evade this rule

75 See, Supra, p. 17. 76 Griffin, ROP, p. 224.

24

in practice. They either abstained from giving death punishment or gave it

secretly but would not lie to refer the cases to the British Agent or

commissioner. From 1845 to 1856 the Maharaja of Patiala did not refer a

single case to the Commissioner, cis-Sutlej States, whereas the Raja of

Jind referred only two cases. The Commissioner recommended the

removal of this restriction. He held that the existing rule had been very

embarrassing to him, as he was not empowered to try such cases. No

criminal was brought before him or any of the witnesses. Only a cut and

dried narrative was furnished to him. On perusing that he was expected to

concur in a sentence of death. The Chief might present the case in any

manner by so arranging the proofs that he had but to give his consent. He

was of the view that there was nothing to prevent the Chief from putting a

man to death secretly, and he referred to evasion of the rule by the

Maharaja of Patiala by imposing penalties other than death for the last

five years. Finally, he observed that during the late disturbances (1857-

58) he had authorized the Phulkian Chiefs to execute the heinous

criminals without making any reference to him. He added that he saw no

possible object in withholding the power for the future.77 The Chief

Commissioner concurred with the Commissioner. He observed that the

Chiefs were probably more sparing in the exercise of this power than the

European officers. He recommended that the request of the Chiefs should

be accepted. To add significantly that the Chiefs set greater store on this

concession than other things. So much so that the Raja of Jind had told

him that he would hardly care to accept the grant of Dadree unless this

power was given along with that.78 The British Government of India

accepted the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner and the

Commissioner had conceded to the three Chiefs the power of inflicting

77 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, paras 2-3. 78 CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 2.

25

capital sentences on their subjects without reference to the

Commissioner.79

(ii) The Phulkian Chiefs’ request was that in the case of an infant

heir succeeding to any of the three Chieftains, a Council of Regency

consisting of three of the old and trusty and most capable ministers of the

State might be selected by the Commissioner with the advice of the other

two surviving Chiefs. In the event of misconduct on the part of a member

of the Council, his successor be appointed by the same means, and that

strangers and relatives of the infant heir should not be admitted to this

Council. It implied three things. (a) The two surviving Phulkian Chiefs

should have a decisive hand, with the permission of the Commissioner, in

selecting the members of the Council of Regency. It is interesting to note

that the Phulkian Chiefs, though often very jealous of one another, would

willingly join hands together in dealing with the British and in other

matters of common interest. They, therefore, preferred to keep the

decisions about the Regency Council’s choice of the members in their

own house instead of leaving it to the outsiders. (b) The members of the

Council of Regency were to be selected from the old, trusty and most

capable ministers for the simple reason that they being experienced and

faithful would be able to run the administration smoothly and efficiently.

(c) The strangers and relatives of the infant ruler were to be excluded

from the Council. The exclusion of strangers was meant very probably to

remove the apprehension of the Phulkian Chiefs lest the British should

thrust their own nominee in the Council who might appropriate virtually

all or most of the powers of the State. The idea of exclusion of the

relatives of the infant ruler may be explained by the fact that there being

so many widows and relatives in the family, the inclusion of one might

provoke jealousies and intrigues from, others, as indeed had already been

79 GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 2.

26

experienced during the minorities of some Chiefs of Patiala and Nabha.

The Commissioner regarded the request as ‘characterized by much

common sense’. He observed that it had always appeared to him

necessary to employ the hereditary ministers for the management of a

Native State during the minority of the heir, adding significantly.

It was a mistake to introduce a nominee of their own or to engraft

on the native system any of their own institutions and customs. They

could not take permanent root, and would produce only hybrid results

prejudicial to good government.80 The Chief Commissioner agreed with

the Commissioner in the propriety of the proposed arrangement.81 The

Supreme Government too sanctioned it.82

(iii) Request of these Chiefs was that in default of a male survivor

in the direct line the reigning Chief should be permitted to adopt a

successor from among the descendants of their common ancestor, Baba

Phul. Closely related with this was the fourth request that in case of

sudden death of any of the three Chiefs without leaving a male issue and

without having adopted a successor, the two surviving Chiefs might in the

like manner be permitted to nominate his successor from among the

descendants of Phul. The Commissioner remarked that the question

should be disposed of by the Supreme Government according to the

maxims of general policy. He perceived no cause for making an

exception in favour of the cis-Sutlej Chiefs. He argued that the right of

adoption had not been allowed to Nagpur, Jhansi and other States which

had lapsed and he was, therefore, not in favour of conceding it to these

Chiefs, as that would tend, in practice, to the perpetuation of their

dynasties. He pointed out that there were, at that time, 31 male

descendants of Phul, and their number would further increase in future, so 80 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 4. 81 CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 3. 82 GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 3.

27

that the chances of escheat would become more and more remote. He,

however, concluded by saying that the privilege solicited “is tantamount

to the full recognition of the right of adoption and would lead to the

ultimate exclusion of Government from all escheats.83 The Chief

Commissioner accepted and supported the Commissioner’s view-point

and reiterated that whatever rules of Imperial policy were made in this

regard, should apply equally to these Chiefs. He, however, suggested that

if on reconsideration of the Government’s policy the right of adoption

was permitted, a fine not exceeding one year’s revenue of the Chief

should be levied in each case. He further observed that such fines would

be readily paid.84 In accordance with the Commissioner’s and the Chief

Commissioner’s recommendation, the Government of India declined to

accept these requests of the Chiefs on the ground that “these are

important innovations on the custom which has always prevailed among

the Chiefs of the cis-Sutlej territories”.85 But the Home Government,

adopting a more considerate attitude, ruled that in view of the very great

services rendered by these Chiefs, their long tried loyalty and fidelity to

the British and their great anxiety to obtain this boon, the desired

privilege was conceded to them as a special case.86 Accordingly, Canning

made the announcement of the grant of this privilege in the Ambala

Darbar held on January 18 1860. Regarding the fourth request, however,

the Governor-General wrote to the Secretary of State:

"If a Chief is so little careful to provide a successor of his own

choice as to neglect to adopt one during his life time, it appears to us

quite reasonable and in accordance with the established relations between

the Paramount Power and the native states that the succession should

83 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, paras 5-6. 84 CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 4. 85 GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 4. 86 Dispatch from SOS, No. 64 of 1 December 1859.

28

lapse to the British Government. I have no doubt that the Government

would in almost every case act wisely in reestablishing the Chief and in

forbearing to take the territory to itself, but I am certain that the selection

of the new Chief would be more judiciously and disinterestedly made by

the Government than by an association of kindred Chiefs.87

The Secretary of State, thereupon, consented that in such a case the

selection should be made by the Governor General of India in

communication with the surviving Chiefs.88 By the Sanads of May 5

1860 issued to the three Phulkian Chiefs, the power of adoption was

granted to each of them and his successors forever under Clause III. It

was also stated that in case any one of them should die suddenly without

a son and without having adopted heir, the two surviving Chiefs, in

concert with the Commissioner, might select a successor from among the

Phulkian family. In that case a nazarana to the extent of one-third of the

income of the State for one year would be paid into the treasury of the

British Government.89 The condition of the payment of nazarana was

considered to be somewhat unjust, yet the Phulkian “chiefs, on the whole,

felt much satisfied, as they valued the power of adoption conceded to

them more highly than the new territory, the reward for their loyalty.90 It

may be said that the Phulkian Chiefs were not the first to be granted the

right of adoption, as in November-December 1858 such a privilege had

already been conceded to the Chiefs of Rewa, Gwalior, Jaipur and

Chirkhari. Nevertheless, the three Phulkian Chiefs were among the first

few privileged to get this, for the adoption, Sanads were issued to most of

the Native States in March 1862.

87 Dispatch to SOS, No. 9 of 28 January 1860. 88 Dispatch from SOS, No. 32 of 18 April 1860, para 6. 89 See Appendix-II. 90 Griffin, ROP, p. 229.

29

Their fifth request was that women should not be allowed to

interfere in the affairs of the State either on the pretext of the Chief being

young or upon any other plea, and that no complaints of any sort

preferred by the women of the families of the Chief be received by the

British Government. The Commissioner observed that the exclusion of

women from the Council of Regency or from any participation in public

affairs was ‘a wise and sensible provision’, and that nothing but evil

could accrue from the nominal supremacy of women, uneducated and

secluded as they were in the country. He recommended that the

Government might give assurance to the Chiefs that it would entertain no

complaints from the women nor intervene on their behalf except in

extraordinary cases.91

The Chief Commissioner concurred with the Commissioner’s

opinion that women, placed as they were, should not take part in politics.

He observed that as a rule the Government did not interfere in the matters

of complaints from women but in extraordinary cases the Government

might be compelled to interfere on humane grounds, as they did in the

cases of the two sisters-in-law of the Raja of Faridkot which had come

before the Supreme Government last year.92 The Government of India

agreed with the Chief Commissioner’s viewpoint and accepted in

principle this request of the Phulkian Chiefs.93 Their sixth request was

that the British Government should promise never that it would interfere

on behalf of relatives, connections and dependants of the Chief, as it had

always bound itself by treaty and practice hitherto. Regarding this

request, the viewpoint of the Commissioner and Chief Commissioner was

that the Government very seldom interfered in such matters and would

91 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 7. 92 CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 5. 93 GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 5.

30

not do so unless it was very imperative.94 This viewpoint did concur in by

the Governor General in Council.95

The Phulkian Chief's seventh request was that each one of them

might be favoured with a Sanad assuring to them and to their heirs in

perpetuity the hereditary possessions together with the territories

bestowed upon them by the British Government under the thumb and seal

of the Sovereign of Great Britain. The Commissioner recommended the

acceptance of this request on the basis that the Chiefs “would highly

appreciate the honour and feel double confidence in the Government”.96

The Chief Commissioner too held that it would be ‘highly politic’ to

comply with this request.97 The Governor-General referred this request to

the Secretary of State for final order. He held that this request should not

be compiled with. He expressed fear that if the Phulkian chief's this

request was granted, similar requests of the Sindhia, the Holkar and even

of the smaller Chiefs would also have to be compiled with. He firmly

observed:

“I strongly deprecate leading the Chiefs to think that when

any substantial act of justice or favour is done to them, more

force and sanctity will be given to the act by its being done

in England than by its being done by the Queen’s

Representative in India”.

He recommended to Her Majesty’s Government that the request be

not acceded to, but that the Chiefs of the cis-Sutlej should be replied to

the effect that their possessions and rights were thoroughly secure under

94 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 8;

CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 6. 95 GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 6. 96 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 9. 97 CCP to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 7.

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the assurance and hand of the Queen’s Representative.98 The Secretary of

State recognized the validity of the arguments given by the Governor

General and declined to recommend the grant of Sanads to the cis-Sutlej

Chiefs under the thumb and seal of the Queen.99

The Phulkian Chiefs' eighth request was that no claim against their

subjects should be heard in the civil courts located in the British territory.

The rule existing at that time was that no such claims were entertained in

the British courts except when the cause of action cropped up in the

British territory or the defendant possessed property therein. The

Commissioner's remark that the Native States’ subjects freely resorted to

the British courts to prosecute claims against the parties' resident in the

British territories. As such they enjoyed a great benefit over the people

living in the British territories. It was made clear that the advantage that

would yet further be enhanced if this request was conceded. He,

therefore, was of the opinion that he was not in favour of any change in

the prevailing system.100 The Chief Commissioner and the Governor-

General in Council concurred with the Commissioner in thinking that no

change was essential in the system that prevailed.101

Though all the requests of the Phulkian Chiefs were not accepted,

yet most of them that appeared reasonable enough to the British

Government were accepted.102 The Sanads of May 5 1860103 issued

individually to the three Chiefs on their own application, formally

embodied many of the concessions given to them in response to their

98 Dispatch to SOS, No. 9 of 28 January 1860; Minute by GG, 23 May 1859, FD,

Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 86. 99 Dispatch from SOS, No. 32 of 18 April 1860, para 5. 100 CCSS to CCP, 20 May 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 85, para 10. 101 GOI to PG, 25 May 1859, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 87, para 8; CCP

to GOI, 16 June 1858, FD, Pol. Cons., 27 May 1859, No. 84, para 8. 102 For further details, see A.C. Arora, ‘Phulkian Chiefs’ Paper of Requests

(1858); in PPP, V-I, April 1971, pp. 227-246. 103 See Appendix-II.

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‘Paper of Requests’. These Sanads too defined the respective titles and

territories of the Chiefs. These papers gave renewed assurances to them

that they would exercise sovereignty over their possessions in accordance

with the ancient customs,104 that the British Government would not

entertain any complaint against them from their subjects, jagirdars,

dependents, brothers, servants, etc. They would respect the arrangements

made by them regarding internal management and household affairs of

their States.105 The British Government would continue to uphold their

‘honour, respect, rank and dignity’.106 Apart from specifying the Chiefs’

powers and privileges, these Sanads also defined the liabilities expected

of them. It was decided that the Chiefs would promote the welfare and

happiness of their subjects by all possible means. They would also redress

the grievances of the oppressed. They were to prevent the inhuman

practices like female infanticide, sati and slavery in their territories.107

They would not fail in their faithful and devoted obedience to the British

sovereign;108 they would co-operate with the British forces in repelling

the hostile troops, should they appear at any time, and render all possible

assistance in providing supplies, grains, carriage, etc., according to the

requirements of the British authorities.109 They would arrange to supply

the essential materials needed for the construction and repairs of roads on

payment. They would concede lands free of charge required for the

construction of rail-roads or Imperial roads.110

From what has been discussed above, it may be concluded that the

foundations of the new policy towards the Native States in General, and

the main Sikh States of the Punjab in particular, were laid during the

104 Ibid., Clause I. 105 Ibid., Clauses VII and VIII. 106 Ibid., Clause X. 107 Ibid., Clause IV. 108 Ibid., Clause V. 109 Ibid., Clause VI. 110 Ibid., Clause IX.

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viceroyalty of Lord Canning. Coming, as it did, in the wake of the great

revolt of 1857-58, this policy was based upon the lessons which the

British authorities had learnt from the stupendous rising. It reflected the

thinking of the Home Government of that time. It bore the imprint of the

personalities of Queen Victoria, the Empress, Lord Derby, the Prime

Minister, and Sir Charles Wood, the Secretary of State for India. Above

all, it was the product of the Lord Canning’s genius, the first Viceroy of

India under the Crown. It took into prominent consideration, in the

Punjab States’ case the conspicuous services rendered by the Sikh Chiefs

during the upsurge of 1857-58.

The Government of India under the Crown decided firmly to

abandon for ever the policy of any further extension of the British Empire

in India; the non annexation of the Native States was, indeed, a sine qua

non of the new policy. It may be observed, such an irrevocable decision

of the British Government, was not made due to any innate generosity on

the part of the Government under the Crown. On the other hand, it was

based upon cool calculations and realistic realization of their limitations.

Canning felt that, placed as the British were at that time, it was neither

possible nor desirable for them to resort to any further accession of

territory. They had already had a very bitter experience in the upheaval of

1857-58. They could not, hereafter, rely upon the Indian sepoys. They did

not have sufficient European force, nor could they afford to have a bigger

one than what they had,111 that could undertake the task of any fresh

annexation. The financial position of the Government after the revolt was

also not satisfactory, nor did they have sufficiently large number of

British officers. Under the circumstances it was decided, and very

prudently, that the Government of India should apply all its energy and

111 The total strength of the Indian army (1864) was 2,05,000 men, of whom only

65,000 were Europeans. Vide. IGI, IV, p. 345.

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efforts for the security of the British Empire, rather than for its extension.

And for the British Empire’s security, the friendliness and fidelity of the

Princes and Chiefs was regarded to be a requisite safeguard.

For the objective of keeping in fact the Natives States and also

ensuring the loyalty and devotion of their rulers, the British Government

promised, clearly and categorically, to maintain scrupulously the treaties

and engagements concluded earlier with them. The British also promised

to respect the rights, dignity and honour of these Native Chiefs. They

might well be regarded as a high watermark of the new policy, consisted

in the assurance that it wanted to perpetuate their governments and

houses. In the Adoption of Sanads it granted individually to each one of

them in fulfillment of that desire.

However, there were some British officials, who did not subscribe

to the wisdom of granting Adoption of Sanads to all the Native Chiefs.

They were prone to think that Canning’s Government was precipitate in

guaranteeing thrones to the hundreds of ruling Chiefs, their families.

Griffin, for example, opined:

At it is, the indiscriminate grant of the right of adoption by

Lord Canning, making the Government an earthly

providence whose favours are conferred alike on the just and

the unjust, has deprived it forever of the power of rewarding

loyalty and devotion most splendidly and of most effectively

punishing treason.112

But Canning, as already noted, felt firmly convinced of the

imperative need and undoubted wisdom of granting Adoption Sanads at

that most opportune time to all the Native Chiefs above the rank of

Jagirdars. He brought the Home Government round to his viewpoint.

There was little doubt that in the grant of Adoption of Sanads to a large 112 Griffin, Ranjit Singh, Oxford, 1892, p. 69.

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number of Native Chiefs in 1860-62. Right thing was done at the right

time; for nothing did more to win over the confidence and goodwill of the

Native Chiefs than this measure of the British. Also perhaps nothing did

more to strengthen the possibilities of the security of British Empire in

India after the uprising and disturbances of 1857-58.

Besides the above-mentioned solemn promises, assurances security

of the pledges which were given in general terms to the Rulers of all the

Native States, the Sikh Chiefs of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala,

Faridkot as also many other Chiefs in different parts of the country were

granted additional titles, territories and honours as rewards for the

valuable services rendered by them during the revolt of 1857-58.

However, the Chiefs, benefited the most from the new policy were the

Phulkian Chiefs of Patiala, Jind and Nabha. They had rendered most

conspicuous services to the British during the preceding disturbances. As

their houses remained traditionally loyal, they were granted some

exceptional concessions. The same were generally not granted to other

Chiefs and Princes of Punjab or India.

How far the British statesmen, in the following four and a half

decades, adhered to these strands of the vividly declared policy and to

what changes and considerations this policy was subjected in response to

the changing conditions and growing needs of the Paramount Power,

effort will remain to answer the same in the following chapters.