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7/31/2019 Chapter 17-Section 9
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Crisis and Coexistence,
1961-1964 Cold Wars most dangerous phase coincided
roughly with Kennedys presidency
Staunch Cold Warrior who loathed communism Feared nuclear war
Anxious to alleviate Third World discontents so that
Moscow could not capitalize on them
Blamed Russia for the Cold War and determinedthat the US would end it
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The Bay of Pigs
July 26, 1953- Fidel Castro launched a revolution against theBatista dictatorship
Castro stood for agrarian reform, reduced dependence on thesugar harvest, and the purification of Cuban society from USinfluence and corruption
December 31, 1958- Batista fled to Miami
January 8, 1959- Castros 26th of July Movement to control of theCuban government
July 1960- split was imminent between Cuba and the US
Diplomatic ties were cut off in January 1961
USSR jumped right in and declared that they would buy largequantities of Cuban sugar
Cuba now tilted toward the Soviet camp
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The Bay of Pigs
USSR gained a foothold in the Western Hemisphere some 90 miles
from Key West and a place to put their missile silos
Ike had given preliminary assent to a CIA plan to depose Castro
Using thousands of anti-Castro refugees who had fled to theUS in 1959-60
1961- Kennedy gave his final approval to what would become
known as the Bay of Pigs invasion
Kennedy believed that Khrushchev would unlikely move
against the US if they invaded Cuba
Others in the US thought that he would, but in Central
Europe- around Berlin
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The Bay of Pigs
CIA assumed that anti-Castro feeling in Cuba would lead to rioting in the streetsand defections from the Cuban army in the event of a US invasion
CIA believed that a brigade of fewer than 3,000 Cuban exiles could provide thespark to ignite the revolution
US involvement would be limited to two pre-invasion air strikes to disable theCuban air force
What went wrong?
No reliable evidence of widespread anti-Castro feeling in Cuba
Island too large for a quick coup with a small invasion force
Air strike failure would leave the land forces vulnerable
No back up plan
Original plan (Operation TRINIDAD) was to occur at a site from which thebrigade could take refuge in the mountains
Revised plan (Operation ZAPATA) would bring it ashore at The Bay of Pigs, fromwhich the mountains were inaccessible
Change never made clear to Kennedy or other key officials (US governmentwould take the heat on this tragic mistake)
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The Bay of Pigs
April 15, 1961- first air strike destroys only half of Castros fighterplanes, then Kennedy cancelled the second strike
CIA objected to the presidents cancellation
Told to call the president, but waited until April 17 so that hewould not scrub the whole attack
April 17, 1961- CIA asks for permission to have the aircraftcarrier Essex provide air cover for the landing forces
Kennedy denied the request and the landing failed
The invaders were routed
114 killed, 1,189 captured, the rest escaped to the sea
April 19, 1961- invasion over and the fallout begins
Kennedy privately blamed the CIA, but took full responsibility-then fired CIA director Allen Dulles and ordered a housecleaningof the agency
US self-image had not been lower since Pearl Harbor
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The Vienna Summit,
June 1961 Worst of all the Cold War summits
June 3-4, 1961- led to two major crises
One in Berlin and one in Cuba
In the two years following this summit, the two superpowersgoing to war with each other was a real possibility
Kennedys misperceptions about Khrushchev led to a series of
talks that were tense, grinding, and often not amicable
Issues that divided the two leaders
Bay of Pigs Invasion and Laos (peripheral issues)
The German Question (central issue)
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The Vienna Summit,
June 1961 Khrushchev proposed a limited compromise in the form of an
interim accord, by which the superpowers would indicate theirintent to turn the problem over to the Germans
Kennedy would not accept this proposal sensing that it couldundermine US credibility
Khrushchev stated that he wanted peace, but it seemed Kennedywanted war
Kennedy stated that the calamities of war will be sharedequally
Khrushchev threatened to sign a treaty with East Germany byDecember 1961 unless the US accept an interim agreement
Kennedy replied if that is true, its going to be a cold winter
Such hostilities had not been spoken to this point in the ColdWar
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The Vienna Summit,
June 1961 Kennedy learned that the US must respond
firmly to any challenge over Berlin
Especially after the Bay of Pigs and Vienna
Khrushchev returned home with the knowledgethat Kennedy was no match for him
But he sensed greater belligerence in Kennedy thanin Ike
Kennedys immaturity in the invasion of Cubadid not result in nuclear war, but it might overthe question of Germany
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The Berlin Wall, August 1961
July 8, 1961- Khrushchev rescinded the 1.2 million-man cut in
Soviet army strength he had announced in January 1960
July 25, 1961- Kennedy responded with a televised address in
which he asked Congress for authority to call up US reserves anddisclosed plans for a large military buildup, including
preparations for an encore of the Berlin airlift
With measures to provide fallout shelters in the event of
nuclear war (yikes!)
Showdown over Germany was looming Thousands of East Germans used the Brandenburg Gate to get
to West Berlin everyday
2,500,000 had used this place as an escape since 1949
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The Berlin Wall, August 1961
US knew that the Soviets could shut down the border without
breaking any previous agreements
East German commie boss Walter Ulbricht had been pushing
Khrushchev for months to let him close the border July 31, 1961- Ulbricht proposed that the air corridor between
Berlin and West Germany should be cut in order to keep refugees
from leaving
Khrushchev rejected this proposal for fear of war
Finally agreed to allow Ulbricht to seal the border with barbedwire and if the West did not try to break through, the wire
could be replaced by a wall
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The Berlin Wall, August 1961
August 12, 1961- construction of the wall began
US State Dept. had not prepared for the possibility that West
Berlin would be isolated from East rather than West Germany
Kennedys advisors suggested restraint National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy pointed out the
obvious propaganda advantages Ulbricht had handed the US
Berlin Wall actually defused the German Question
Khrushchev was able to stem the flow of East German refugees
and keep critics who urged him to deal resolutely with Berlin
at bay
West got a propaganda windfall from a highly visible symbol
of Communism
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US Arms Buildup and the
Soviet Response Kennedy accelerated the weapons-building programs begun under
Ike
Far exceeded the number of missiles beyond those that Ike hadconsidered more than adequate
1,000 solid-fueled Minuteman ICBMs
As many as 41 nuclear submarines
Each carrying 16 Polaris missiles capable of reaching theUSSR
Mid-1960s- US had an overpowering triad (land-based,submarine-launched missiles, and bombers) of awesomedestructive power far beyond anything the USSR could hope tohave operational by then
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (and many European andUS defense experts) felt that the Dulles doctrine of massive
retaliation had lost its credibility
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US Arms Buildup and the
Soviet Response McNamara introduced a policy of flexible response designed to
provide decision makers with options for gradual escalation ofhostilities in the event of a conventional attack by Soviet forces inCentral Europe
McNamara also introduced a policy of counterforce whichimplied that US weapons would be launched not against Sovietcities but only against military targets
Soviets viewed these policies as moving toward a first-strikecapacity
Believed that with a well-coordinated attack on Soviet militarytargets might be able to destroy Moscows ability to retaliateand thus render the USSR defenseless
Soviets, whether the threat was imagined or real, saw little choicebut to protect themselves against it
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US Arms Buildup and the
Soviet Response October 1961- Kennedy authorized Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell
Gilpatric to reveal to the world the extent of US superiority
missile gap had been exposed by McNamara in February, but withno specific numbers
Gilpatric stated- 5,000 warheads to 300
USSR deployed only 6 ICBMs capable of reaching the US (althoughthey had sub-based missiles that could reach the US also)
Result-
Soviet pressure on West Berlin eased noticeably
Disarmed and humiliated Khrushchev
Kennedy, in a March 1962 magazine interview, stated that in certainconditions, the US might launch a nuclear first strike against theUSSR
Khrushchev turned to Cuba
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
If you have time, check out the movie 13 Days to enhance your knowledgeof this topic
US, since the failed Bay of Pigs, had tried to overthrow or kill Castro in anoperation known as MONGOOSE
USSR knew about this and used it to their advantage Spring 1962- Khrushchev decides to station nuclear missiles in Cuba
Two immediate aims with this tactic-
To defend Cuba against a US invasion and to redress the strategicbalance by locating Soviet missiles close to America
Medium-range SS-4s (1,200 miles) and intermediate-range SS-5s(2,500 miles)
Khrushchevs plan to visit the UN in November suggests he may haveintended to reveal the missiles in Cuba at that time and use theresulting leverage to reopen the German Question from a morefavorable negotiating position
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
Summer 1962- Soviets offered and Cuba accepted up to forty missilelaunchers each equipped with two missiles and one nuclear warhead
Khrushchev thought that this could be done in secret as he underestimated theUSs surveillance ability
He also thought that Kennedy would wait to tell the US public until after theNovember Congressional elections
He also expected Kennedy to allow the missiles in Cuba as Moscow hadaccepted US Jupiter-C missiles in Turkey
All of this was assumption and proved to be false
CIA director John McCone reported in August that Cuba was receivingfrom Russia large shipments that probably included missiles
Kennedy and McNamara did not believe it
Neither did CIA analysts as agents in Cuba were deemed not credible
Until they reported 80-foot cylinders being carried on trucks that couldntmake wide turns
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
This got Kennedys attention- he issued warnings to Moscow onSeptember 4 and 13, but it was too late for Khrushchev to stop theoperation
They hadnt thought about what to do if the Soviets ignored the warnings
October 14, 1962- U-2 flight over Cuba brought back clear photographicevidence of missile launcher construction
Kennedy was alerted on October 16, 1962 and the Cuban missile crisiswas on
October 20, 1962- Executive Committee of the National Security Councilproposed and the president had agreed that the US objective should be
the removal of the missiles, not the Castro regime Kennedy was posited with three options
To negotiate removal of the missiles- unworkable since he had no bargainingchip
Conventional air strike to destroy the missiles
Naval blockade to prevent warheads and other weapons from reaching the
island
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
Kennedy decided on the third option (naval blockade)
Against the advice of many, if not most of the ExComm
Kennedy had little faith in naval interdiction, but chose this option because itseemed the lesser of two evils
Air strikes may require multiple sorties followed by a land invasion Blockade offered a first step that could always be escalated if necessary
October 22, 1962- Kennedy addressed the nation about the missiles and theblockade
The US began a massive military buildup in south Florida
Khrushchev was taken aback at Kennedys maneuvering and stalled for time
For two days, Soviet reps answered questions with standard public relationsresponses
Kennedys approach in telling the nation about Gromykos failure to discloseinformation about the missiles assured NATO backing for the US and the OAS(Organization of American States) as well as several African nations
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
October 23, 1962- Khrushchev warned the US that Soviet subs would sink USblockaders
The world watched and waited in horror as Cuba-bound Soviet vesselsapproached the American ships
October 24, 1962- Soviet ships stopped and turned around
Khrushchev had been bluffing (as he always had)
Khrushchev feared that Soviet ships would be boarded and searched andimportant Soviet info would be found out
Game over as Cuba could not fight the blockade and the Soviets were unwilling todo so
October 26, 1962- Khrushchev writes a letter which arrived at the US embassy in
Moscow He claimed that the missiles were deployed for defensive purposes only, but
admitted he could not convince Kennedy of this
He also stated that nuclear war was out of the question and proposed that hewould send no more weapons to Cuba in return for a US promise not to invadethe island
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
The letter clarified several things-
Khrushchev knew that the blockade was highly effective
Khrushchev knew that Americas massive superiority in the Caribbeanprecluded him from using force to break it
Khrushchev knew from Kennedys prior warnings that to bring pressure onWest Berlin could lead to nuclear war
Khrushchev knew that he could not fire his Cuban missiles without ensuringnuclear war
Khrushchev knew that nuclear war was unacceptable
October 27, 1962- the most trying day of the crisis
Radio Moscow broadcast a second letter from Khrushchev
He offered to remove the missiles from Cuba but demanded in return both ano-invasion pledge and the removal of 15 US Jupiter-C missiles from Turkey
Kennedy knew that an agreement would look reasonable to the rest of theworld
He also knew that the Jupiter-C missiles were obsolete
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
October 27, 1962- a U-2 spy plane is shot down over Cuba and thepilot is killed
Soviet higher ups tried to rebuke the general who called for theplane to be shot down, but too late
Khrushchev was now reeling and Kennedy knew that he couldntreact with an inflammatory public address
But he wondered how long he could wait for an air strike andland invasion of Cuba
Also caused Kennedy to become even more suspicious of
Khrushchevs intentions Reality was that Khrushchev meant what he said in his letter as it
was later found out that Castro begged Moscow to launch anuclear attack against the US that was ignored
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
US decided to accept the first letter as an agreement, pledging not toinvade Cuba as long as the missiles were removed
The second letter would be ignored altogether (the one aboutremoving US missiles in Turkey)
US informed Khrushchev that the US was resolved to remove the missilesand that an invasion of Cuba was near
Robert Kennedy (then Attorney General) reiterated this sentiment toa Soviet ambassador and added that after the crisis the Jupiterswould be removed from Turkey (this part could not be publicized andremain a secretive part of the deal)
October 28, 1962- Radio Moscow broadcast another letter fromKhrushchev accepting the US assurance that Cuba would not be invaded,he would remove the missiles and return them to the USSR
No mention of the US missiles in Turkey
Cuban Missile Crisis was over and the Cold War was changed irrevocably
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The Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuban Missile Crisis carried several keylessons for the Soviets
US naval power, not nuclear weapons, had provendecisive
The USSR would have to build a navy to match
Khrushchevs attempt to close the missile gapcheaply and quickly had failed
The US would not allow nuclear rockets so near itsborders
If they wanted nuclear parity, they would have tofollow the arduous and expensive path of buildingtheir own vast fleet of ICBMs
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The Western Alliance Waivers
Europe publicly supported the US during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, but privately wondered about the USs failure to consult
them on key issues
De Gaulle began to push the notion that a prosperous WesternEurope could take on a role of a third force between the US and
USSR
They sought to maintain ties with the US, but began to build their
own identity as a third force
By 1962, France seemed poised to make its own way in the ColdWar
Nuclear capability, thriving economy, and effective, farsighted
leadership
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The Western Alliance Waivers
Macmillan then joined the EEC, more so for economic benefits (asKennedy had hoped would happen), but France viewed itdifferently
De Gaulle didnt want Britain too close to France
He did not want them to dilute their dominance of the EEC
Brits had asked for special arrangements to protect their ownagriculture and the economies of their Commonwealthassociates
De Gaulle believed (as well as other W. Euro leaders) that any
country with special privileges would harm the EEC He also believed that Britains entry was to act as a monitoring
entity for the US (still had ill feelings over his treatment byAnglo-American forces during WWII)
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The Western Alliance Waivers
1962-63- turned out to be devastating years for Brit PM Macmillan as the USpulled out of a joint development project for Skybolt missiles and then the Frenchvetoed British entry into the EEC
Moreover Kim Philby (top official in Brit espionage service MI-6) defected to theUSSR and then Secretary of State for War John Profumo shared state secrets with
prostitutes Christine Keeler and Mandy Rice-Davies, who in turn passed them onto their Soviet clients
Macmillan resigned in October 1963
His replacement, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, would then lose the 1964 election toHarold Wilsons Labour party
Konrad Adenauer (87) preceded Macmillan into retirement by three days
His party had barely won the elections in W. Germany in 1961 and managedto sign the Franco-German Friendship Treaty early in 1963
US changed leaders that year also due to the assassination of Kennedy
De Gaulle never got his Europe that would stretch from the Atlantic to the Uralsby the time of his retirement in 1969
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Limited Test Ban Treaty
of 1963 Renewed talk of a nuclear test ban circulated
through both superpowers capitals
The obstacle of on-site inspections continued todefy an easy solution
Improved communications between theKremlin and the White House were developed
Creation of a hot line between the two leaders Very slow by todays standards and no voice contact, but it
did allow for messages to be wired more quickly thanprevious years
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Limited Test Ban Treaty
of 1963 June 10, 1963- Kennedy gives his Peace
Speech at American University in Washington
Proposed that a reexamination of Cold War
attitudes was imperative if humanity hoped to avoidannihilation
Promised that America would not conductatmospheric nuclear tests as long other nations
refrained from doing so Sought to develop broad public backing for a test
ban treaty and to impress Khrushchev with acommitment to dtente with the USSR
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Limited Test Ban Treaty
of 1963 June 26, 1963- Kennedy was in Berlin for the 15th anniversary of the Berlin Airlift
He was greeted by over a million people, gathered in a plaza within sight of the
Wall
An emotionally charged Kennedy gave an anticommunist speech in which he
stated that all free menare citizens of Berlin and concluded with the nowfamous words Ich bin ein Berliner
Made him a hero among the W. German people
More importantly, this anticommunist rhetoric did not hinder test ban talks
US had finally dropped its demand for on-site inspections and Moscow agreed to
what became known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed on August 5, 1963
Forbade atmospheric tests by its signatories (US, USSR, and Britain, but notFrance), but allowed underground blasts
Did not halt or even slow the arms race, but it did deal effectively with the
fallout problem and it showed that the Superpowers could work out an arms
agreement
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Exit Kennedy and Khrushchev
With a test ban in place and status quo in Germany, South Vietnam nowtook center stage in the Cold War
Buddhist demonstrations, a military coup, and Kennedys gnawingfear that the US was being drawn into a highly dubious venture
Kennedy rightly believed that Southeast Asia was too much on theperiphery (as Laos was in 1961) to cause an escalation in the ColdWar
November 22, 1963- Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon Johnson tookover the presidency
Strong in domestic issues, but not experienced in foreign affairs
Fiercely anticommunist sentiment brought the US deeper intointernal affairs of Vietnam
Also proved unwilling to continue along the path of cooperationinitiated by the test ban
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Exit Kennedy and Khrushchev
Khrushchev was devastated by Kennedys assassination
He feared for the future of dtente and lamented the premature deathof an adversary with whom he had shared more than one seriouscrisis and whom he felt he had begun to understand
In the final year of his rule, Khrushchev kept a low profile in world affairs He quietly tried to restrain the Vietnamese communists, but failing
this he showed little interest in Southeast Asia
March 1964- rumors of his removal or death spread throughout the US,but they were premature
He had kept silent during the US presidential campaign hoping all the
while that the right-wing Republican Barry Goldwater By election time in the US, Khrushchev himself was gone, forcibly retired
on October 14 by a conspiracy fronted by Leonid Brezhnev and AlexeiKosygin, but orchestrated by party ideologist Mikhail Suslov
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Exit Kennedy and Khrushchev
Khrushchevs fall can be attributed to his failures in foreign
affairs, particularly Cuba and Berlin, but also for his plan to
restructure the Soviet Communist Party- a threat to standing and
careers of many party functionaries
Khrushchevs fall and Brezhnevs taking of the party first
secretary and Kosygin being named premier gave a huge boost to
the Soviet military establishment
These men would preside over a sustained weapons buildup of epic
proportions- no matter the cost to the Russian economy This would enable the USSR to surpass the US in number of
strategic missiles
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What to Expect from Brezhnev Colorless and unimaginative, yet determined and effective
Injected the Soviet leadership with an aura of stability, prudence,and pragmatism
Management by patronage and consensus, satisfying the variouselements of his coalition while consolidating his power andundermining his rivals
Clamped down on dissent and got rid of the more extremeinitiatives of Khrushchevs
Relations with communist China would deteriorate, he would
eventually seek to improve relations with the West meanwhilecontinuing the relentless arms buildup
Within a single year (October 1963 to October 1964) W. Germany,US, Britain, and the USSR changed leaders and the focus of theCold War would shift from Europe to Southeast Asia