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7/31/2019 Chapter 17-Section 8
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German Neutrality
The Rapacki Plan (Polish foreign minister)
Proposal of the establishment of a denuclearized zone in
Central Europe
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both parts of Germany
Thoughtful and attractive alternative to the remilitarization of
Germany
Possible first step toward resolving the German Question
Response to a NATO decision to rearm West Germany W. German chancellor Konrad Adenauer asked the West to
provide bombers, artillery, and missiles
The West obliged immediately (except the missiles)
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German Neutrality
1958- US rejects the Rapacki Plan Premise that Western troops in Germany would be at
the mercy of the vast Soviet conventional forces inCentral and Eastern Europe
Plan also went against what the West wanted anyway(a rearmed Germany)
US had little to lose as they werent giving W.
Germany any nuclear weapons anyway USSR gained a propaganda advantage from the
proposal (but diverted by the news of Sputnik)
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German Neutrality
US publicly decried the tragedy of a dividedGermany, but secretly wanted nothing to dowith a unified, neutralGermany
W. German chancellor Adenauer rejectedSoviet offers of reunification as well Believed that a reunified Germany must be firmly tied to the
West
Despised East German Saupreussen (sow Prussians) Eastern European militarists with marginal ties to the West
Feared that his Catholic and capitalist ChristianDemocratic Union would be voted out of power ifreunified
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German Neutrality
US (Eisenhower) wanted a possibly reunited Germany to have ties toNATO and the European Economic Community (EEC)
France wanted to ally itself with the economic powerhouse of CentralEurope (W. Germany)
But feared a reunified, rearmed Germany 1958- Charles de Gaulle came to power in France
French opposition to a reunified Germany became more pronounced
The French were losing faith in NATO
Suggesting that the US would not risk an attack for defending
Paris Sought closer ties with W. Germany through the EEC
1963- Franco-German Friendship Treaty
Britain would side with the US on any policy toward Germany as theyknew who saved Europe from German domination in 1917 and 1941
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Khrushchevs Berlin
Ultimatum, 1958-59 March 1958- Bulganin was ousted as premier as Khrushchev took the
position himself
No more pretense of a collective Soviet leadership
November 10, 1958- Khrushchev declared his intent upon signing a treaty
with E. Germany Would force the West to negotiate access rights to West Berlin
directly with the E. German government
West immediately declared their rights in Berlin were guaranteed by the1945 Yalta agreements
Soviets were looking for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Berlin
Ike would agree, but only if both halves of the city would be abandonedand all access routes were patrolled by the UN
Khrushchev had abandoned Soviet push for reunification and neutralityand was now talking about turning over East Berlin to E. Germany
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Khrushchevs Berlin
Ultimatum, 1958-59 Khrushchev delivered an ultimatum to the West- six
months and out, or else!
Soviets hoped that W. Germany would withdraw from
NATO and E. Germany would withdraw from theWarsaw Pact
Effectively neutralizing Germany, even if it wasntreunified
Ike felt like Khrushchev was bluffing as he had before(Suez and Lebanon crises)
Had espionage info from U-2 sorties that showed theSoviets did not have nearly the capability to respondwith nukes
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Khrushchevs Berlin
Ultimatum, 1958-59 May 1959- US war scare as deadline of Khrushchevs ultimatum was
nearing
Ike demonstrated his willingness to negotiate and his refusal to panic
Ike also had contingency plan if E. Germany were to cut off access to
West Berlin A new airlift and severed relations with USSR
Britain and France pushed for a summit meeting with Khrushchev
Ike and Dulles wanted to avoid a meeting unless there were guaranteedresults
Offered a conference of foreign ministers in Geneva May 11, 1959- Geneva summit convened
Khrushchev hinted that his deadline would not expire if talks wereamicable, and then he invited Ike to Moscow
Tensions began to lift
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Khrushchevs Berlin
Ultimatum, 1958-59 July 1959- Ike decided in July he would invite Khrushchev to
America for a few days in September
Special representative, Robert Murphy, conveyed thesuggestion to Soviet first deputy premier Frol Kozlov
Murphy did not know that the invite was linked to how wellthe Geneva summit was going and delivered an unconditionalinvitation
Khrushchev accepted on July 22 stating that he would tour theUS for ten days
Ike was exasperated and knew that this wouldnt havehappened if Dulles would have been alive (died of cancer justas this was all going down)
Khrushchev was exhilarated as this would show the equality ofthe US and the USSR
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Berlin Ultimatum, 1958-59
Vice President Richard Nixon arrived inMoscow the day after Khrushchevs acceptance Purpose of Nixons trip was to accompany a US art
and technology exhibition
The Kitchen Debate Nixon and Khrushchev toured a typical American
kitchen all the while trading barbs and insults about
each others nations
All captured on film, which boosted Nixons publicimage
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Khrushchevs Trip to America
September 15, 1959- Premier and Mrs. Khrushchev arrived inWashington for what would turn out to be a 12-day visit
First ten days was spent meeting US politicians and film stars in NewYork, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh
Last two days were spent in private talks with Ike at Camp David Presidential retreat in Marylands Catoctin Mountains
Khrushchev pushed Ike on US-Chinese relations
Sino-Soviet split was widening and the Soviets wanted toreduce Chinas possible nuclear capabilities
Ike pushed for an end to Soviet ultimatum in Germany andendorsed a summit meeting of the four great powers
Khrushchev accepted and invited the entire Eisenhowerfamily to the USSR in June 1960 and flew back home to aheros welcome
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Khrushchevs Trip to America
Trip produced modest results, but tangibly its effects were
significant
Khrushchev had demonstrated his equality with Ike and had
defended Soviet interests with vigor and skill Ike now believed that Khrushchev was a man with whom he
might work for a truly lasting peace
The hope (in both the US and USSR) that a peaceful
reconciliation of both nations would occur soon
Helped to stabilize US-Soviet relations and furnished abenchmark against which later such trips would be judged
Even if the German Question had not been settled
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The Nuclear Test Ban Issue
Key issue to be discussed at the upcoming 1960summit Growing concern over the deadly fallout from testing nuclear
weapons by both superpowers 1954- US H-bomb testing produced radiation sickness in
Japanese fishermen near the test site
Einstein and Schweitzer (nuclear scientists) were calling for aban on tests
US refusal to ban nuclear testing was giving Moscow the edgein world opinion
As the world watched and waited for the fallout to worsen
Soviets constantly offered to suspend their testing for two /three year periods as long as the US would do so as well
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The Nuclear Test Ban Issue
US tried to counter with a proposal full of provisions that were
unacceptable to Moscow
March 31, 1958- USSR voluntarily suspended their own testing
program and invited the US to join them US refused and offended the court of world opinion
Ike offered a conference of nuclear techs to devise an
inspection and detection system
Khrushchev agreed
Summer 1958- US, Britain, and the USSR met in Geneva and
designed a workable approach
Ike sensed a chance to restore USs reputation invited the
Soviets to meet and negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty
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The Nuclear Test Ban Issue
October 31, 1958- Ike promised that the US would not test its
nuclear weapons for one year from this date
Brits followed suit
USSR agreed to talks beginning on that date A test ban looked to be within reach and the world rejoiced (yay!)
But difficulties remained (ahhh!)
No atomic tests by either side were detected for the next three
years
Early 1959- US and Britain agreed to decouple the test ban from
other arms issues
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The Nuclear Test Ban Issue
Talks in Geneva stalled
US announced that the detection system was deficient because
it could not identify small nuclear tests conducted
underground Delayed a resolution for over a year
Negotiators could not find a way around this problem
Early 1960- US and Britain suggest that the ban only apply to
above-ground testing and underground blasts large enough to be
detected with existing seismic equipment
March 1960- Soviets agreed
Provision added that declared a moratorium on underground
tests while the detection research was proceeding
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The U-2 Affair
Paris Summit, 1960-
Charles de Gaulle held up the original date for the meeting ashis government was testing its first nuclear weapon
France had now joined in the four-nation nuclear club May 16, 1960- Paris Summit convened
Khrushchev had earlier announced a reduction in the RedArmy by 1.2 million men (a bargaining chip that he no longerpossessed at the later Paris summit)
Ike believed, through Soviet reduction in conventionalmilitary, that the USSR was ready to make serious moves inthe direction of arms control
Inspections remained the most difficult obstacle to overcome
US Senate wouldnt ratify any treaty if it looked like theRussians could cheat
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The U-2 Affair
Since 1956- US had the capability to know the nature and extent of theUSSRs ballistic missile deployment through the use of U-2reconnaissance airplanes
Provided high-quality, top-secret photographic intelligence
Highly secretive CIA program U-2s could fly at 70,000 feet- some 25,000 feet higher than Soviet missiles
and had a range of 4,750 miles
Equipped with cameras that allowed for continuous pictures of a stripof land 750 miles wide
As late as 1960, photographs convinced Ike that the USSR had not one
operative ICBM
But couldnt tell anyone why he believed this
Khrushchev couldnt either for fear of exposing his bluffs about hiscountrys inability to stop the US from flying through Soviet airspace
Ike suspended all U-2 espionage flights over the USSR duringKhrushchevs visit to the US
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The U-2 Affair
CIA director Allen Dulles asked for resumption of U-2 flights in the spring of 1960
Ike approved wanting to know what Russia was up to, but only reluctantly as
the Paris Summit was approaching
April 9, 1960- first U-2 espionage run over the USSR went without incident
May 1, 1960- U-2 flight crashed in Soviet territory
US spun the story of it being a weather flight that had strayed off course
Incident presented Khrushchev with a dilemma
Hardliners pressed him to cancel the summit
Khrushchev decided to expose the spy plane
US denials were refuted when Khrushchev announced that they had captured thepilot
Khrushchev was hoping for an apology from Ike stating that the intelligence
services had extended their intended goals without his knowledge
This way, Khrushchev could still attend the summit in a position of triumph
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The U-2 Affair
Ike now had his own dilemma
How could subordinates create such a crisis without hisknowledge (didnt look good for the US president)
Ike couldnt lie because who knows what the pilot said underinterrogation
Ike couldnt tell the truth about espionage during peacetime
Would break the trust he had developed just recently withKhrushchev and mess up the Eisenhower visit in June
Ike decided to state that the U-2 flights had been carried out underhis general orders and might continue until the USSR agreed toreciprocal inspection of bases and installations
This put an end to the thaw in the Cold War and destroyedpersonal relations between Khrushchev and Ike
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The Collapse of the
Paris Summit Khrushchev responded to Ikes admittance about the U-2 Affair with an
emotional tirade
Would have been worse had he known that Ike wanted Air Force Oneto be equipped with cameras as he flew to the USSR in June
Paris summit was in danger Khrushchev arrived in Paris early hoping for a public apology from Ike
In hopes of continuing with the summit and Ikes visit to the USSR
May 14-15, 1960- de Gaulle and Macmillan (of Britain) were trying toconvince Khrushchev that no head of state would apologize for usingespionage during peacetime
May 16, 1960- de Gaulle opened the conference and immediatelyKhrushchev demanded the floor and read a lengthy statement denouncingthe US
Withdrew his invitation to Ike and suggested that the summit bepostponed for 6-8 months until a new American president wasinaugurated
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The Collapse of the
Paris Summit In response-
Ike promised that U-2 flights would not resume whilehe was still in office
De Gaulle defended the US by talking about a Sovietsatellite that flew over France 18 times a day
Khrushchev insisted on an apology for the sake of hiscountrys honor and his own internal political
situation Macmillan emotionally pled with the summit leaders
to not throw away the last two years of intense effortsfor negotiations
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The Collapse of the
Paris Summit The meeting broke up in turmoil anyway
Khrushchev refused to meet again until the US admitted regretover the incident
Would not negotiate with the US about the arms race or theGerman Question until a new man was in the presidency
Khrushchev claimed that from this point forward he did nothave full control over his government
Hardliners pushed for a huge military buildup to competewith the US
Sino-Soviet relations would crumble
He was forced to strengthen the Soviet global posture
Laid the foundation for the Berlin and Cuban crises of1961 and 1962
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The Collapse of the
Paris Summit Ike was enraged and frustrated believing that
Khrushchev was throwing away world peace over animpossible demand
More than likely upset at himself for letting the U-2sgo just prior to the summit
Heartened by de Gaulles support at the summit
De Gaulle was incensed at Khrushchev's conduct
Macmillan was devastated Britain was liquidating its African and Middle
Eastern colonies
Badly wanted a US-Soviet agreement
Reduced to a supporting role in the Cold War
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US Presidential Campaign
of 1960 Republican Richard Nixon
Democratic candidates included
John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Humphrey, andSymington
Much younger than Ike and ready to rip the
Republican Party for their handling of the Paris
summit and the perpetuation of the Cold War Kennedy accused Ike of irresponsibility in refusing to
apologize to the USSR
Kennedy won the nomination for the Democrats
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US Presidential Campaign
of 1960 July 1, 1960- an RB-47 bomber was shot down along the
north coast of the USSR Two survivors were in Soviet custody
UN Security Council debated the matter Meanwhile, a C-47 flew over the Kurile Islands north of Japan
and the Soviets attempted to shoot it down also
Escalating tension played into the hands of Nixon The US would be looking to a more experienced politician to
handle the Cold War
Khrushchev wanted Kennedy to win- he hated Nixonspolitics He kept the downed airmen until after the election
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US Presidential Campaign
of 1960 September, 1960- Khrushchev visits the US
To address the UN on its 15th anniversary
Threats on his life kept him restricted to Manhattan Met with Fidel Castro
Macmillan got up and discussed Khrushchevs behavior at theParis summit Khrushchev heckled him and took off his shoe and pounded it on the
desk
Assembly president broke his gavel trying to regain order
Khrushchev and Gromyko began pounding their fists in unison on
their desks US saw that Soviet leadership had changed dramatically
Reasonable Khrushchev of 1959 had been replaced by the uncouthbuffoon of 1960
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US Presidential Campaign
of 1960 John Kennedy won the election
Alleged existence of a missile gap helped get himinto office and that Ike and Nixon designed a defense
budget that starved the American missile programand that the Soviets were turning out ICBMs in largenumbers
Kennedy did not know the truth as Ike did thanks to
U-2 photos Couldnt tell Kennedy the truth due to the secrecy of US
policy towards the USSR
Kennedy took office in spring 1961 and found outthat there was no missile gap
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US Presidential Campaign
of 1960 Khrushchev was ready to make peace with Kennedy
Offered to release downed RB-47 pilots in exchangefor not using them as propaganda purposes and not
to authorize anymore recon flights over the USSR Kennedy agreed
U-2 pilot would later be released in exchange forSoviet agent Rudolph Abel in 1962
Kennedy hoped that espionage flights were the worst ofhis problems, but
A new communist regime in Cuba was established
The German Question had not been resolved