1  

  CENTRO ALTI STUDI PER LA DIFESA

ISTITUTO ALTI STUDI PER LA DIFESA

3rd International Capstone Course

Individual Paper

Rome – 24/04/2015

Brig. Gen. ANTÓNIO LAMAS BENEDITO XAVIER REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

   

  Regional Collective Security Systems vs the prevention and management of the crises (conflicts)                                                

2  

 

 

 

 

SUMMARY

 

Pág.

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 3

CHAPTER II – COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS 4

CHAPTER III –THE AFRICAN SECURITY SYSTEM 5-8

CHAPTER IV – THE AFRICAN REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY

SYSTEMS

9-12

4.1 The Economical Community of African Central Countries Security System

4.2 The Southern African Development Community Security System

CHAPTER V – ACIRC – A WAY TO OVERCOME THE RE

DEFFICIENCIES

9-10

CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION

15

Bibliography 16

3  

I – INTRODUCTION

The social differentiation of communities, the differences of income, power, prestige and other social items, quite often result in conflicts, that, in past were exclusively resolved coercively, by the “law of the strongest”. With the development of the human intellect, the concept of security was also developed and has successively transited from personal security to clan security, to tribe security and finally to state security. The upshot of the first world war, also known by most people as “the Great War”, made necessary the disarmament, prevention of wars in the future and led the international community to the concept of collective security, resulting from this, in 1919, the Nations League, which was the first interstate organization created in order to guarantee peace and security and was the embryo for the Organization of the United Nations, born in 1945. Subsequently, the completion of the independence processes as well as self-determination of African peoples and others from the so called “third world”, made it possible to set up in the international arena new actors and consequently led to the need of setting regional mechanisms for peace and security guarantee, closer to the problem and with higher local sensibility – regional collective security systems. In this individual paper I proposed myself to approach contemporary situation of collective security, and at the end frame my country in regional contemporary collective security organizations. As General of an African country with high responsibilities in the context of peace and security, I have elected as central question to be highlighted, the analysis of effectiveness of the African system of collective security, and as supplementary topic, the effectiveness of sub- regional systems where Angola belongs to, and when drawing conclusions, will try and produce a solution to the gaps of those organizations, identified during this small research.

The methodology of research will be the thorough study of the constitutional documentation of the United Nations, Africa Union and its Regional Economic Communities (security wise) and the subsequent enrichment of the findings by the consultation of internet sources. My modest experience in peacekeeping missions and related exercises both in SADC and ECCAS regional organizations will be boosting and shaping element for present work.

4  

CHAPTER II – COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNIVERSAL SYSTEM

A collective security system sets the system of joint activities of states all over the world or of a certain geographical region, undertaken for preventing and stopping peace threats, as well as repression of attack actions.

A collective security system comprises two main characteristics: The first one is the adoption by member states the principle of not appealing to force in their relations with other members, resolve all disputes in pacific way and cooperate in an active way in order to eliminate any peace threats.

The second characteristic is the existence of an organizational union of member states in a system.

The collective security system is formalized by treaty or systems of treaties. There are three types of collective security systems: global (universal), non-regional intergovernmental (NATO for instance) and regional.

Currently, collective security is based on the UN functioning. In the mechanism of assuring universal security, priority goes to pacific and non-coercive measures. The UN was created in 1945 aiming to promote International peace and security, friendly relations between nations, cooperation in the resolution of international problems, creation of a centre of harmonization of actions of the nations.

The organ with the primary responsibility to guarantee international peace and security under the Chart of the UN is the Security Council of the United Nations.

The six main UN organs

GENERAL ASSEMBLYTUTORING COUNCIL

INTERNACIONAL COURT

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETARIAT

Pict. 1 The UN structure

This organ comprises 15 members, from which five permanent ones - China,

France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States of America – and 10 non permanent, eligible by the General Assembly for a 2 years term (in 2015, the 10 non permanent members are Angola, Chad, Chile, Spain, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Nigeria, New Zeeland e Venezuela). Each member is entitled to one vote. Decisions on substantial issues require nine votes, including the concurrent one of the permanent members. This is the law of the ’’Great Power Unanimity”, frequently referred to as the power of “Veto”. In addition to the international global security system, the UN statute foresees the possibility to create regional systems to sustain world peace.

For the purpose of this research we will stick to the African System of Collective Security.

5  

CHAPTER III – THE AFRICAN SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Africa faced significant changes after decolonization, at the beginning of the 60s. Afterwards a new process of changes started soon after the end of the cold war and the “democratization boom” of the early 90s led to turbulence and violent conflicts. Since 1970, more than 30 wars took place having as causes, the internal conflicts. There has been always the tendency in exploiting the main profound causes of African conflicts, blaming them to colonialism. It is true that colonial heritage has part in the cause of conflicts, but it will not be the only explanation.

It is true that:

The artificial borders (Berlin 1885), recognized by the AUO in 1964 that do not match ethnic and religious realities could not inspire the feeling of national unity;

The economical infrastructure inherited from the former colonies made the colonized side keep depending on them;

The native populations were very illiterate or had no training at all to take on the state administration.

BUT above all, to those major difficulties, the answer of the African countries was:

AUTHORITARIANISM (installation of dictatorships); Single Party regimes; Politicization of ethnic belongings.

During the cold war each of the blocks supported illegitimate political regimes. Thus, the influence of the blocks on the continent created, fed and perpetuated the conflicts that satisfied their interests, maintained as military and financial support that however, did not help to stop the so many conflicts in Africa. The finding of this reality made the African leaders be aware that after reaching independence, there was a need to design ways of setting African mechanisms for peace and security. Thus, the OAU was created in 1963 (53 out of 54 African countries), but although amongst other objectives, it prosecuted ways of working out a mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, the following relevant difficulties would be barrier to the success of those organizations:

• Structural, logistics and financial weaknesses; • Absence of commitment of some member states; • Fears related to political consequences (local and regional) of interference in matters of those frequently targeted.

Therefore, this organization had real challenges to reveal itself a true actor in the management of crisis due to lack of credibility of member states in assuming themselves in this domain. Since 1990, the OAU intensified, nevertheless, its efforts in terms of prevention and management of conflicts.

Thus, some States did not hesitate to ask the OAU to supervise the elections, for instance, which demonstrates their willing to make the situation improve. In this view, the OAU had sent missions of observers to Rwanda 92-93, Burundi 93-96, RDC 99, Eritrea/ Ethiopia 2000.

6  

To deal with these new commitments, the OAU created in 1993 an organism of decision, as well as a Fund for Peace, with an amount of USD 40 million to fund-raise the OPS activities of this organ.

However, financial difficulties and the weak implication of member states, limited the range of commitments. In July 2001, in the 1st OAU Summit, was launched the NEPAD and there was decided the creation of the African Union, which happened in July 2002, to provide appropriate tools for a collective and comprehensive acting of African states in times of violent crisis, mostly due to the shared value of non-interference into the internal affairs of states which was not longer valid. The Constitutive Act now gave the AU the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

COMMISSION OF THE AFRICAN UNION

Department Political Affairs

Department Trade & Industry

DepartmentSocial Affairs

Department Rural

Economy & Agriculture

Department Science,

Technology & Human

Resources

Department Economic

Affairs

Department Infrastructure

& Energy

Administration & HR Department

Programming, Budgeting & Financial Accounting

CMD PSOD DSD PSC Secretariat

Ops & Supt Unit

ASF & MSC Unit

Commissioner Political Affairs

Commissioner Trade & Industry

Commissioner Social Affairs

Commissioner Peace and Security

Commissioner Rural

Economy & Agriculture

Commissioner Science,

Technology & Human

Resources

Commissioner Economic

Affairs

Commissioner Infrastructure

& Energy

Department Peace and Security

Chairperson of the AU Commission

Deputy Chairperson

Pict. 2 The African Union Structure

The AU mandating process for peace support operations is hinged on the African

Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which is the AU mechanism for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as outlined in the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000 and the PSC Protocol of July 2002”.

According to this protocol, all AU Member States are Member States of the UN and contribute resources (especially Human) to UN peacekeeping efforts.

AU peacekeeping doctrine and practices follow the general lines of those of the UN. Generally speaking, all AU missions are expected to be taken over by the UN when the situation stabilizes.

The APSA is illustrated in pictures 3 and 4 and works synthetically as follows: A set of sensors captures the signs of a potential risk to peace in a given country (region) and relays it to a situation centre, which after analysis in case of relevant danger, informs the Conflict Management Division (CMD) of the necessity to submit the issue to the African Union Commission (AUC). Based on the AUC report, the Chairperson of the AUC summons and addresses the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for deliberation on an eventual Peacekeeping Operation (picture 4).

7  

Continental Early Warning System

PSC

AUC

Pict. 3 The Continental Early Warning System

After considering the issue, the AUC deploys the Panel of Wise for further

assessment of the situation through an inclusive interaction with the local stakeholders, civil society, spoilers, diplomatic community, etc. Upon collected data and achieved results in settling the problem by this panel, adequate elements of the African Stand by Force are deployed to the country (region).

Seeing the APSA as chain as shown in the picture 4, we can easily conclude, that ultimate and more sensible link is the African Stand By Force (ASF), which state of readiness is being chronically adjourned due both to lack of funding and instability in the contributing countries (RECs), since they must be comprised of military, civilian and police elements from the five RECs which state of readiness is unbalanced.

PSC

CEWS

APF

ASF

POW

Peace & Security Framework

(APSA)(APSA)African Peace and Security Architecture

PSD

OrganisationalStructures

Mission

REC/RegionPLANELMs

Planning

AU Commission

AU Commission Police

•Police•Gendarmerie

•Observers•Advisors (PSC &

PC)

Police

•Police•Gendarmerie

•Observers•Advisors (PSC &

PC)•Rule of Law

•Civil administration•Humanitarian affairs•Good Governance

•Advisors

Military•Standby Brigades•Rapid Deployment

•Military Liaison Officers

•Military Observers•Advisors (PSC &

FC)Civilian

ASF Capabilities

SASF

CASF

SASF

CASF

Mandate 

APSA

UN AGENCIES, 

PARTNERS/NGOs

AU PSO CONCEPT

Planning

Pict.4 The 5 contributing RECs

Despite all hindrances above mentioned, the AU has performed some PSO missions:

8  

Burundi (AMIB) 2003 – 2007 [3,500 personnel]; Darfur (AMIS) 2004 – 2007 [7,700 personnel]; Comoros 2007 [1,300 personnel]; AMISOM (Somalia) 2007 [17,731 uniformed personnel]; AFISMA (Mali) 2013 [7,197 unifomed personnel]; AFISM-CAR 2013.

We can summarize the success of these missions as:

No thorough planning – sacrifice accuracy for speed; Planning not as integrated as it should be; Inability to redeem pledges need to find reasons why; End up deploying weak missions; Difficulty in raising multinational forces for deployment – legitimacy of force?; Force generation going to be more complicated in the employment of the ASF if

legal issues are not sorted out; 90 days self sustainment policy – difficult for member states; Over reliance on development partners for funds; AU reimbursement rates not competitive; Missions not as attractive as UN Missions; Command and Control: Whose responsibility. AU or Lead Nation?

As a conclusion to this chapter, we can say that the advantages of APSA mechanism are its high level of legitimacy, inclusiveness. However, its drawbacks are heavier on the scale, since they range from the higher political level (time consuming, very bureaucratic, subject to the lack of political will, lack of financial capacity of the member states to self sustain their forces while participating in PKO), to operational level (command and control undefinition, shortage of strategic airlift to reach the scenario, interoperability challenges, etc), hindering the Africans in undertaking peacekeeping missions, thus leading Africa to relying on external partners to solve African problems as the case of the French in Mali, RDC, CentroAfrican Republic, etc.

9  

IV. THE AFRICAN REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS With the objective of approaching the organisms that work on searching for peace and security to the theater and in order to get higher sensibility when tackling regional matters, regional organizations were created. Although they have the common designation of Regional Economic Communities, they have, along with the objective of promoting economic development, also the main task of watching over the peace and security. In accordance with the topic of this research, I will only focus on the peace and security aspect. The picture 5 illustrates the division of the African continent into five regional blocks.

African Security sub regions

12 Pict.5 African Regional Organizations of Collective Security

Due to the fact of occupying a hinge position between two regions, Angola is inserted into the Central Africa States community (CEEAC) and into the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 4.2 Economical Community of Central African Countries Security System The Economical Community of Central African Countries (ECCAC) has a surface of 6.666.904 square kilometers and has as peculiarity, the fact of the region to be hinged among other regions of the continent, being the only region that has borders with all other regions of the continent.

10  

Pict. 6 The ECCAC map This region comprises 10 member states: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo,

Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, CAR, DRC, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Chad. The majority of states of the region are facing situation of conflict or post conflict. ECCAC was created in 1983 with the aim of regional integration and cooperation but progress was initially slow. Member states were bitterly divided over the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which broke out in 1998. Chad and Angola sent troops to defend embattled President Laurent Kabila; Rwanda and Burundi backed rebels advancing on Kinshasa.

Its peace and security mechanism, (COPAX), adopted in February 2000 in Malabo served to appraise the problem. and given a mandate not only to deploy civilian and military missions, but to help mediate in crises. However, critical to the AU’s long-term security plans is the African Standby Force, which viability is premised on efficient standby arrangements with Africa’s five sub-regions, which should “enable Africans to respond swiftly to a crisis unhampered by any heavy political and instrumental burden.” Compared to the experience gained by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops in West African conflicts, including Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, Central African soldiers saw little combat in regional missions, but no shortage of capacity-building and practical collaboration.

Loango 14, which took months in the planning, was the latest in a series of multinational training events, going back nearly a decade, which have become increasing ambitious in their scale and objectives. Chad played host to the Barh el Ghazel exercises in 2005 and 2007. Over 3,500 personnel took part in Kwanza 2010 in Angola. The succession of crises in CAR gave Central African troops their first exposure to a regional war zone in Bangui with a brief to support the CAR Armed Forces, which had been hit by a wave of mutinies, threatening the rule of President Ange-Félix Patassé. Funded in part by the EU and working closely with French troops, its mandate was to help establish peace and security.

11  

Often overshadowed by the French military presence, in December 2013,

after lengthy talks between the AU and ECCAC, peacekeeping operations were formally transferred to the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), which in turn transferred authority to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA) in September 2014. 4.2.2 Southern Africa Development Community Security System

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is a continuation of the

SADCC, which was established in 1980 by the Frontline countries and Zimbabwe. The objective of SADCC was to reduce the dependence of those countries towards South Africa and Namibia, while the native people were still fighting for their independence.

Originally it was merely a political structure. After the end of apartheid in South Africa, independence of Namibia and the peace processes in Angola and Mozambique, SADCC redefined its missions, changing from political confrontation with South Africa to the establishment of a regional market. So, in 1992 SADC was created.

The SADC peacekeeping history can be summarized as follows:

SADC countries are active contributors in United Nations and African Union peace support operations with contributions ranging from military observers, civilian police and the "blue helmets". A significant number of civilians are also serving in African Union and United Nations operations on an individually-recruited basis.

The SADC Brigade was established in 2008 as the regional component of the African Union's Standby Force. Training of the Brigade is a key priority for SADC and prompted the establishment of the Regional Peace Keeping Training Centre. The Centre is one of the main implementing entities of the SADC Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in areas of peace keeping training.

As per real Peacekeeping operations, despite the existence of conflicts in two member states (DRC and Lesotho), SADC did never acted as body in those countries, instead some countries like South Africa and Angola have sent financial help and troops to help in resolution of the conflicts.

12  

Pict. 7 The SADC region

Conclusion to chapter III: The creation of RECs did not improve the security landscape of Africa, as they seem to have inherited the old chronic problems of the continental organization. Notwithstanding the peace and security structure put in place, these organizations seem to have huge problems when it comes to a real collective concertation toward a peacekeeping operation.

13  

CHAPTER V – ACIRC – A WAY TO OVERCOME THE REC´S (SECURITY WISE) DEFICCIENCIES

In order to overcome the gaps identified in Regional Economic Communities in dealing with peace support tasks, the Assembly of the African Union (AU) decided -Decision 489 (XXI) in its 22nd Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa, in May 2013, to establish the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) as a transitional arrangement to provide Africa, through AU forum, a robust full-bodied military force with a capability to intervene quickly to Crisis upon political decision to intervene, pending the full operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) and its Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC). This military force is composed of Volunteering Nations (VN), within which is drawn a Framework Nation (FN) on a rotation principle.

These tasks depend on the judicious use of negotiation skills at all levels to secure political, operational and tactical objectives and require a closer understanding of local realities, conflict dynamics as well as the development of good relationships with civilian populations.

The idea is that African Union as global peace contributor in Peace and Security matters will manage its own conflicts with own resources with minimal support from External Partners. Africa will have its own Rapid Deployment Capability that can respond immediately to crises. Strategic Centers of Gravity (CoG) will be the Spirit of inclusivity and Funding. Likely Scenarios for Deployment are: a. Grave circumstances such as crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. b. Bridging Force (provide surge capacity or reinforcement to an existing AU/UN mission) c. Operations against terrorist groups and negative forces that threaten national and regional security. d. Response to external aggression e. Facilitation of humanitarian assistance in case of natural disaster and f. Any other scenario permissible by the AU legal framework and deemed necessary.

Concept of intervention of (ACIRC), as originated from Article 4 (h) and 4 (j) of

AU Constitutive Act, calls for a robust form of peacekeeping that is capable of responding swiftly and rapidly to crises in order to control violence and facilitating Intercultural Dialogue while other stakeholders work to promote political and civilian peacekeeping roles, can be spelt as follows:

ACIRC should rapidly intervene to Conduct Operations of limited duration and objectives in a conflict affected AU MS till ASF and its RDC is established, in order to contain violence, demobilize and hand over to AU/UN mission, by deploying AUC element, CEWS and other APSA elements to conflict affected Nation before the mandate is issued to assess and find the root course of the conflict, followed by the deployment of SF and deployment of FN (Bn strength) and FHQ in 7 days from Mandate (Advance

14  

guard). This force will establish FHQ, secure deployment areas, secure main supply routes and protect tactical terrain to allow main force to safely deploy. The force will be able to sustain itself for 30 days without replenishment and it will be supported by all VNs, AUC as Combat Support (CS) and Combat Support Services (CSS), to attain Initial Operation Capability in 14 days.

The deployment of Follow up Nations (VNs 2x Bns) with Combat Support (CS), deployment of Combat Support Services (CSS) Bde troops and G Staff, deployment of force multipliers and force enablers from 7-14 days to deployment areas to execute limited operations independently is as follows: Patrol, escorts, protection of vulnerable areas, protection of civilian, protection of safe heavens (IDP and Refugee camps), Offensive operations on limited objectives, Defense operation, CIMIC operations and Protection of VIP for limited duration, supported by own inherent CS and CSS and by VNs for administration and sustainment. End state force to attain Full Operational Capability with subsequent hand over to AU or UN mission. The Assembly may authorize the PSC at the level of Heads of State and Government to mandate the operationalization of ACIRC in all its aspects and later to be ratified by the Assembly.

The PSC once granted mandating authority shall invite the Framework Nation (FN) and Volunteering Nations (VN) to its meetings. AU and VN internal decision making process is flexible enough to accommodate the requirement for quick deployment of ACIRC (21 days from CEWS and 7 days from Mandate). Force deployment will commence immediate after mandate issuance (M Day). The issues of self-sustenance, reimbursement and funding will be as follows: a. Volunteering Nations (VN) contributing troops and other capabilities shall self-sustain their forces for thirty (90) of which 30 days without re-imbursement and 60 days subjected to re-imbursement after deployment within the period of six months; b. AU shall take care of common costs from the first day to include Strategic Lift, Level III/ Medical Evacuation out of theatre; and the said fund shall be earmarked and limited to ACIRC activities and operation.

Deployment of ACIRC will be based on the AU decision on any of the following: Early warning; credible information; request from MS, in accordance with AU Constitutive Act 4(j); and existence of legitimate security reasons for intervention. Command and Control of ACIRC Task Force will be as follows:

a. Political control and oversight of an ACIRC mission will be vested in the AU (Strategic HQ, to provide strategic direction) and exercised through a Special Envoy;

b. The Force HQ (within the theater) is the Operational HQ and will be established to direct the operations of ACIRC and will also act as a link between Strategic HQ and Tactical HQs. Operational control will be vested in the Force Commander; c. ACIRC will be structured as a quick reaction force; d. Volunteering Nations shall exercise administrative control over their forces.

15  

CHAPTER V – CONCLUSIONS

1. Africa will have to count with regional organizations for human and economic integration as well as for peace and security promotion in the continent.

2. The actual African and Regional Collective Security Systems are not effectively functional, making Africa to fail to guarantee peace and protection of the civilian. 3. The concept of ACIRC empowers the African Countries to overcome all together the shortfalls of existent African and Regional Collective Security Systems as it enables countries to volunteer, as the principle of ‘’non-interference’’ must be replaced by the concept of ‘’non- indifference’’ in order to create legal and political basis, so that the states and regional organizations, sub-regional and other similar mechanisms will be able to exert their right of solidarity and able to exploit their potentialities to intervene towards peace and security keeping.

4. To my point of view which, by the way coincides with that of my country, the main merit of the ACIRC is that it releases the African countries from the ties of regional belonging and the concomitant obligation to refer to the regional state of readiness to contribute to peace support operations, regardless of the region where a crisis erupts and gives them the political freedom to freely exercise solidarity. Frequently, the lack of resources obliges the regional countries to rely too much on their wealthiest members and this dependence can create hegemonic complex from the strongest member states. As an example, in 2010, my country was pulled out of Guinea Bissau, where it was performing a mission of “normalization of the security situation and creation of new national forces”, based on a bilateral agreement between the two sovereign states. The reason of withdrawal was the pressure from ECOWAS MS on the claim that Angola did not belong to the region. This regional position was influenced by a local giant country, moved by hegemonic feelings.

5. However I am aware that under this “solidarity”, some countries can cover their will to pursue national objectives, so the ACIRC mechanism must be reasonably customized to the existent regional arrangements.

16  

Bibliography I. Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000

PSC Protocol of July 2002 The Concept of ACIRC

II. Internet sources

1. GOOGLE a) New paradigms of collective security, by Ricardo Seitenfus; b) The United Nations and the concept of collective security, by Marcos Castrioto

de Azambuja. c) IRIN Africa - Central African Peacekeeping forces gear up for action d) The Regionalization of Peacekeeping – A solution to African Violence? By

Laura Elizabeth Encalade 2. yandex.ru Kolectivnaia Sistema bezopassnosti