Cases for Consti

7/29/2019 Cases for Consti

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G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and

CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.

The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.

Constitutionality of section 32 of RA 4670 the magna carta for teachers

FACTS: this is a petition to set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte branch 4 penned by herein

respondent judge and granting the petition forcertiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein

private respondents. Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No.

4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32

thereof. The private respondents were charged of violations of RA 4670. And that accordingly the, municipal trial

court handling the criminal case against the respondent shall be restrained upon proceeding the case due to the fact

that it has no jurisdiction over the matter. Private respondents further contends that that the facts charged do not

constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following

reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to

reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of

imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the

Government.

(1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and

(2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.

When the complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act

No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P

3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555

against herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang,

Leyte.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal

Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court

of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a

minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide

latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that

the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused.

Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature

and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-

delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, thepenalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.


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Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated FEBRUARY 14, 2012, which reads as follows:

In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as

witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution

Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Prefatory Statement

The Court states at the outset that this Resolution is issued not to favor or prejudice the Chief Justice whose

impeachment gave rise to the letters and the subpoenas under consideration, but to simply consider the requests and

the subpoenas in light of what the Constitution, the laws, and our rules and policies mandate and allow.

From the constitutional perspective, a necessary starting vantage point in this consideration is the principle of

separation of powers through the recognition of the independence of each branch of government and through

the protection of privileged and confidential documents and processes, as recognized by law, by the rules and by

Court policies.

The I ndependence of the Judiciary

The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential component of our democratic and republican system of

government. The doctrine inures not by express provision of the Constitution, but as an underlying principle thatconstitutes the bedrock of oursystem of checks and balances in government.[5] It divides the government into three

branches, each with well-defined powers. In its most basic concept, the doctrine declares that the legislature enacts

the law, the executive implements it, and the judiciary interprets it.

Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within its own sphere, under

the legal and political reality ofoneoverarching Constitutionthat governs one governmentand one nationfor

whose benefit all the three separate branches must act with unity. Necessarily under this legal and political

reality, the mandate for each branch is to ensure that its assigned constitutional duties are duly performed, all for the

one nation that the three branches are sworn to serve, obey and protect, among others, by keeping the government

stable and running. The Court's mandate, in so far as these constitutional principles are concerned, is to keep the

different branches within the exercise of their respective assigned powers and prerogatives through the Rule of

Law.[6]

A lesser known but no less important aspect of the principle of separation of powers - deemed written into

the rules by established practice and rendered imperative by the departments' inter-dependence and need for

cooperation among themselves - is the principle of comity or the practice of voluntarily observing inter-

departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutional duties for the harmonious working of

government.

The Judiciary applies the principle of comity at the first instance in its interpretation and application of

laws. In appreciating the areas wholly assigned to a particular branch for its sole and supreme exercise of discretion

(i.e., on political questions where the courts can intervene only when the assigned branch acts with grave abuse of

discretion), the courts tread carefully; they exercise restraintand intervene only when the grave abuse of discretion

is clear and even then must act with carefully calibrated steps, safely and surely made within constitutional

bounds. The two other branches, for their part, may also observe the principle of comity by voluntarily and

temporarily refraining from continuing with the acts questioned before the courts. Where doubt exists, no hard andfast rule obtains on how due respect should be shown to each other; largely, it is a weighing of the public interests

involved, as against guaranteed individual rights and the attendant larger public interests, and it is the latter

consideration that ultimately prevails.

A case in point is on the matter of impeachment whose trial has been specifically assigned by the

Constitution to the Senate. Where doubt exists in an impeachment case, a standard that should not be forgotten is

the need to preserve the structure of a democratic and republican government, particul arl y the check and balance

that should prevail


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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.

FLORENCIO M. REYES, Officer-in-Charge, and RENE DE GUZMAN, Clerk, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Respondents.

Per curi am:*

Facts: De Guzman was filed with charges of gross misconduct. De Guzman was a Clerk, Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, is an offshoot of the complaint filed by Atty. Hugo B. Sansano, Jr.

(Atty. Sansano) relative to the alleged incompetence/inefficiency of the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, in

the transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G2 to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, mr De Guzman

was reminded always by his superior, Judge Sta. Maria to be efficient enough in the conduct of his duties as an

employee of the court. however, as the same situation continues, many of the cases have not moved due to fact that

the respondent did brought the same to the attention of the judge and remained sleeping in his drawer. On May 24,

2004, Judge Sta. Romana requested the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office to conduct a drug test on

De Guzman. On May 26, 2004, De Guzman underwent a qualitative examination the results of which yielded

positive for Tetrahydrocannabinol metabolites (marijuana) and Methamphetamine (shabu), both dangerous drugs.

The court for several times, demanded answers from the respondent regarding the complaints filed against him, but

the latter did not entertain them. A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC9 dated January 17, 2006, the Court has adopted guidelines

for a program to deter the use of dangerous drugs and institute preventive measures against drug abuse for the

purpose of eliminating the hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, particularly in the first and second level courts.

The objectives of the said program are as follows:1. To detect the use of dangerous drugs among lower court employees, impose disciplinary sanctions, and

provide administrative remedies in cases where an employee is found positive for dangerous drug use.

2. To discourage the use and abuse of dangerous drugs among first and second level court employees andenhance awareness of their adverse effects by information dissemination and periodic random drug testing.

3. To institute other measures that address the menace of drug abuse within the personnel of the Judiciary.In the instant administrative matter, De Guzman never challenged the authenticity of the Chemistry Report of

the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. Likewise, the finding that De Guzman was found positive for

use of marijuana and shabu remains unrebutted. De Guzmans general denial that he is not a drug user cannot

prevail over this compelling evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents be dismissed due to guidelines drafted by the court through its delegated

legislative power in the administration of its offices.

RULING: ACCORDINGLY, Rene de Guzman, Clerk, Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, is

hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and

disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled

corporations. It must be emphasized that De Guzmans dismissal is not grounded only on his being a drug user. His

outright dismissal from the service is likewise anchored on his contumacious and repeated acts of not heeding the

directives of this Court.

Government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by

the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public

service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should

pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional demand, are required to be accountable at all times to the

people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency

The legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort tosustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of this Courts constitutional

power of administrative supervision over courts and court personnel. The legislative power imposing policies

through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both

in the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.15 As such, it cannot limit the Courts

power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel. Neither should such policy

be used to restrict the Courts power to preserve and maintain the Judiciarys honor, dignity and integrity and

public confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety

governing the conduct of justices, judges and court employees.


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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

EDUARDO ERMITA

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition. This case is a question of constitutionality of the EO

464 entitled "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation

Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes". Due to this EO, the heads or the departments of the government

are not allowed to appear before any house of congress without the approval of the president. Section 2b thereof

defines who are the officers which are to seek approval of the president before subjecting themselves to the power

of congress in investigation in aid of legislation. This process is what they call as executive privilege, being a co-

equal branch of the government. Thus the petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the said EO and is alleged

honorable secretary Ermita, being the alter ego of the president to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior

to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress

of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding ofinformation violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information,

otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of theexecutive branch of the government.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for

information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere

expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

That is impermissible.

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt

from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in

general, Taada v. Tuvera states: The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general

application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply tothem directly. Thus the law must be published.

Blacks law

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from

disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the

discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and

extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the

executive domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression

necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.


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CASIBANG vs. AQUINO

The petition grounded on the denial of respondent judge of an election protest filed before hisjurisdiction against the private respondent on the ground political question. The respondent judgebolstered the fact that ratification of the new constitution, protects the incumbent political leaders holdingoffices upon ratification of the same. Thus, as contended, whether the petitioner will win in the election

protest, he cannot then assume office for the respondent was protected by the transitional provision of thenew constitution. And therefore, it is up to the chief executive or the national assembly to fix the term ofoffice, salaries etc of the present officials. This is a political question, thus making it outside the range of

judicial review.

Whether or not case at bar falls on the ambit of the political question doctrine.

The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of

political question is who between protestantherein petitionerand protestee herein respondentYu was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights,

privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations ofthe position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office;

otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issuetherein involved a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or

sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and afterthe ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as theconsequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein

involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into thiscase. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectlyreviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political

question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those

questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or inregard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch ofthe government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particularmeasure" (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S.

Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface ofany case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitmentof the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageablestandards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kindclearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need forunquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from

multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question"