Caregiver attributions are not just for children: Evidence for generalized low power schemas

Caregiver attributions are not just for children:

Evidence for generalized low power schemas

Valerie K. Simsa,*, Matthew G. China, Melissa L. Eckmana,Brian M. Encka, Susanne M. Abromaitisb

aDepartment of Psychology, University of Central Florida, P.O. Box 161390, Orlando, FL 32816-1390, USAbTufts University, North Grafton, MA, USA

Abstract

Two studies demonstrated that cognitive attributional styles linked to child abuse are predictive of

responses during an interaction with a companion animal. Study 1 showed that individuals who

perceive children as having greater control than themselves over negative caregiving situations (low

perceived control, LPC) experienced more negative affect than high-perceived-control individuals

during a brief interaction with a puppy that was perceived as ‘‘difficult.’’ Study 2 showed that when

interacting with a young cat, individuals who experienced greater negative affect during the interaction

were those who perceive children as having a great deal of power over caregiving situations, regardless

of their own perceived power. Both studies suggest that parent attributions may be predictive of

affective responses in many caregiving situations, including those involving companion animals.

Further, the link between child abuse and animal cruelty may involve a general cognitive schema that

is activated by many difficult social interactions. D 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Animal cruelty; Child abuse; Perceived control

1. Introduction

In light of several recent cases of extreme animal cruelty, such as the disturbing

bludgeoning of cats at the Noah’s Ark animal shelter in Iowa as a ‘‘prank’’ (Bollinger,

1998), there has been increased research interest in the relationship between cruelty toward

animals and later aggression against humans (Ascione, 1993; Felthous & Kellert, 1987).

0193-3973/01/$ – see front matter D 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

PII: S0193 -3973 (01 )00093 -4

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-407-823-0343.

E-mail address: [email protected] (V.K. Sims).

Applied Developmental Psychology

22 (2001) 527–541

Although several studies have shown a link between animal cruelty and aggression against

humans (Ascione, 1993; Felthous & Kellert, 1986, 1987; Kellert & Felthous, 1985; Wax &

Haddox, 1974), some have yielded more equivocal results (see Felthous & Kellert, 1987, for

a review). In light of these mixed findings, several authors (e.g., Ascione, 1993; Boat, 1995)

have argued that there is a need for more research and for research that takes a novel approach

to examining this link. The present two studies examine the relationship between animal

cruelty and human abuse by looking at whether a cognitive attributional style (low perceived

control, LPC) that has been linked to child abuse (Bradley & Peters, 1991; Bugental, Blue, &

Cruzcosa, 1989; Bugental, Mantyla, & Lewis, 1989) can be used to predict individual

affective responses to a companion animal.

1.1. Low perceived control

When an interaction with a child is judged as unsuccessful by the adult, blame may be

placed on either oneself or on the child. ‘‘LPC’’ is an attributional style in which

responsibility for an unsuccessful situation with a child is placed to a larger degree on the

child, and to a lesser degree on oneself. Bugental, Blue, et al. (1989) have developed the

Parent Attribution Test (PAT) as a measure of a caregiver’s attributional style regarding

blame during interactions with children. The PAT asks a respondent to make attributions of

blame regarding successful and unsuccessful interactions with children. Attributions for the

failure scenario are scored on two scales: Adult Control Over Failure (ACF) and Child

Control Over Failure (CCF). Individuals who score low on ACF and high on CCF are

considered ‘‘LPC.’’ Individuals who show any of the three other possible scoring patterns are

considered non-LPC.

Empirical research using the PAT has shown that LPC individuals respond differently than

non-LPC individuals to situations in which they are attempting to teach an unresponsive

child. During the experiment, it is typical to have the adult meet a child whom he or she is

supposed to teach a computer game. Then, the child is taken to another room and the adult is

left believing that he or she is interacting with the child via the computer. In fact, the adult

is interacting with a simulation of either a ‘‘difficult’’ unresponsive child or an ‘‘easy’’

responsive child. Such methodology ensures that the experimental situation is controlled for

all participants. When placed in such a situation with a ‘‘difficult’’ child, LPC individuals

report and display more negative affect, and greater physiological signs of defensive arousal,

including increased heart rate and skin conductance (Bugental et al., 1993; Bugental, Blue, &

Lewis, 1990; Bugental, Brown, & Reiss, 1996). Other research has shown that LPC

individuals experience this increased physiological arousal even when anticipating an

interaction with a ‘‘difficult’’ child (Bugental & Cortez, 1988), suggesting that LPC

individuals may have stored schemas regarding power that can be activated by merely the

anticipation of an interaction with a ‘‘difficult’’ child. In addition to these affective and

physiological markers, LPC individuals show noticeable decrements in cognitive functioning

when engaging in a situation with a ‘‘difficult’’ child, including the inability to recall

thoughts after the interaction (Bugental et al., 1996) and the use of less complex and less

V.K. Sims et al. / Applied Developmental Psychology 22 (2001) 527–541528

effective linguistic structures during the interaction (Bugental & Lewis, 1999; Bugental &

Shennum, 1984).

Research done on live interactions with children has shown that LPC individuals are

particularly likely to display negative affect when engaging with children whose own

mothers rate as ‘‘difficult.’’ This negative affect increases with greater familiarity with the

children (Bugental et al., 1990). Similarly, research has shown that physical abuse more

often is directed at ‘‘difficult’’ children (Camras, Grow, & Ribordy, 1983; Main &

George, 1985; Oldershaw, Walters, & Hall, 1986). Based on these findings, Bugental,

Mantyla, et al. (1989) propose a model of physical abuse in which low power schemas

are activated more easily in LPC individuals, causing them to see the child as in power

and themselves as powerless. This schema activation leads to greater negative affect, and

decreased cognitive functioning, followed by mental overload, and eventually, the use of

abusive or coercive behavior with the child. In essence, the abuser has lost some of the

cognitive functioning that might be used to control negative behaviors. Furthermore,

Bugental, Mantyla, et al. argue that LPC individuals are especially likely to misinterpret

who truly has power in ambiguous situations. This model is supported both by empirical

research on child abuse and theoretical research on the activation of power schemas.

Mothers in counseling for child abuse are more likely to have physically abused one of

their children and to have used coercive parenting strategies if their PAT scores indicate

an LPC orientation. LPC mothers also show greater annoyance with ‘‘difficult’’ children

(Bugental, Blue, et al., 1989). Additional research by Bradley and Peters (1991) has

shown that physically abusive mothers are more likely to score high on the CCF subscale

of the PAT, meaning they attribute greater blame to children during unsuccessful

situations. This attribution is one component of the LPC attributional style. Additionally,

Bradley and Peters have shown that abusive mothers perceive more problem behavior in

their children than do nonabusive mothers. These pieces of research demonstrate that LPC

status, specifically, and attributional style, more generally, are related to physical abuse.

More theoretical research indicates that the activation of low power schemas may be at

the root of LPC behavior during interactions with children. Bugental et al. (1996) have

shown that LPC individuals have increased difficulty carrying out a cognitive arithmetic

task after being primed to think about difficult interactions with children, but not when

primed by positive interactions. They argue that thoughts of difficult interactions

constitute a threat to an LPC individual. Therefore, the individual devotes cognitive

resources to the perceived threat, and becomes unable to process other tasks at hand.

Because this effect happens only for LPC individuals, it appears that LPC individuals

have stored low power schemas that are easily accessed at the slightest provocation.

Further research (Bugental, Lyon, Krantz, & Cortez, 1997) has given credence to this idea

by demonstrating that LPC individuals retrieve information about dominance more

quickly, and that when given a mental workload, LPC individuals are more likely to

see a child as dominant.

The present research is based on the idea that LPC individuals have low power schemas

that may be activated any time a difficult social situation is perceived. We argue that for

many individuals, interacting with a companion animal constitutes a social interaction. If

V.K. Sims et al. / Applied Developmental Psychology 22 (2001) 527–541 529

such an interaction is unsuccessful, then an LPC individual might show the same affective

and cognitive changes that would take place during an interaction with a difficult child.

This hypothesis represents a novel approach to the research problem of relating animal

cruelty to human abuse.

1.2. Relating animal cruelty and human abuse

Much of the previous research on animal cruelty has focused on the definition of abuse and

whether animal cruelty is associated with other antisocial behaviors. Defining animal cruelty

is not easy, particularly given the social acceptability of consuming animals and animal

products (Ascione, 1993; Baenninger, 1991). In addition, cruelty appears to come in many

forms and to be related to different motivations (Ascione, 1993; Ascione, Thompson, &

Black, 1997; Vermeulen & Odendaal, 1993). In spite of the difficulty in defining and

categorizing cruelty, several authors have pointed toward the need to control as a potentially

important factor in animal cruelty cases. For example, Kellert and Felthous (1985) have found

that those who have abused animals often list ‘‘need to control’’ as a motivation, and

Vermeulen and Odendaal (1993) argue that a major predictor of animal abuse is an abuser

who is engaged in harsh dominance training over the animal. Similarly, Ascione (1993) notes

that animal cruelty may be related to the misattribution of aggression to animal behaviors, and

thus the attempt to control the perceived aggression. He also cites numerous pieces of

anecdotal evidence in which animal cruelty stemmed from the desire to control. Research by

Felthous (1980) also suggests that need for control may be at the root of aggression toward

animals. In particular, he argues that abusers are particularly likely to torture cats because

these animals are much harder to control. Summarizing work relating animal cruelty to

human abuse, Ascione argues that empirical research is needed to examine the role of

attributional style in relating to companion animals.

At least superficially, the need to control displayed during animal cruelty greatly resembles

that seen in child abuse situations. Another similarity with child abuse is that animal cruelty is

more likely to take place when dealing with a ‘‘difficult’’ animal who is mentally or

physically weaker (Vermeulen & Odendaal, 1993) or who is less responsive, as in the case of

cats being abused more often than dogs (Felthous, 1980). Research examining the link

between animal cruelty and human abuse has shown that cruelty directed toward socially

desirable companion animals (dogs and cats) is associated with a greater likelihood of

violence toward people (Felthous, 1980; Felthous & Kellert, 1986; Kellert & Felthous, 1985;

Wax & Haddox, 1974). Also, more violent criminals are more likely to have abused animals

(Felthous, 1980), and if so, to have abused a greater number of species, showing little remorse

(Kellert & Felthous, 1985). Research also has shown that in child-abusing families, pets also

are likely to be abused. This link is particularly strong when examining families where

physical abuse has taken place. DeViney, Dickert, and Lockwood (1983) found that 60% of

child-abusing families in their sample also had abused their pets, and that 88% of those who

had physically abused children also had abused pets. These figures compare to only 34% of

those engaged in other forms of child abuse also abusing their pets. Other reasons to make a

theoretical link between the causes of animal cruelty and the causes of child abuse include the


fact that abusive parents may kill or torture a family pet to hurt their children (Ascione, 1993),

and the fact that adolescents appear to make ethical judgements about punishment of children

based on their own experiences caring for a companion animal (Roscoe, Haney, & Peterson,

1986). In summary, there is reason to believe that abuse toward animals may be related to

abuse toward children, and perceived control may be an important mechanism in both types

of interaction.

1.3. Research hypotheses

The present research examines the role of perceived control in predicting behaviors during

human–animal interactions. In particular, we are interested in whether LPC individuals will

show the same affective changes when interacting with an unresponsive ‘‘difficult’’

companion animal as seen in previous research with children. In Study 1, LPC and non-

LPC individuals attempted to teach an untrained, and hence, ‘‘difficult’’ puppy three simple

tasks. The individuals were then asked to rate the puppy on a variety of scales. They also were

asked to rate their mood before, during, and after the interaction. In Study 2, LPC and non-

LPC individuals were asked to entertain a young cat using toys that had previously been

shown to be uninteresting to the animal. They then watched a videotape of the interaction and

were asked to rate their mood at different points during the interaction. Finally, they

completed ratings of the animal. Both of these methodologies are similar to those used in

the LPC studies with children cited earlier. We predict that LPC individuals will have a less

positive mood than non-LPC individuals when interacting with these animals, and that LPC

individuals will perceive the animals as more threatening, consistent with the idea that LPC

individuals more easily access low power schemas.

2. Study 1

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants and design

Fifty-four undergraduates, with a mean age of 19.89 (SD=2.92), participated in the study.

However, two of these participants were not included in the analyses because they failed to

complete portions of the PAT or the mood ratings. The participants received extra credit for

their participation.1 The study used a 2�3 mixed factorial design in which the main variable

of interest was LPC status. In addition to this subject variable, participants were asked to rate

their mood at three different times, yielding a second within-subjects variable.

2.1.2. Materials and apparatus

The participants completed several measures. The PAT (Bugental, Blue, et al., 1989)

was used to categorize participants as LPC or non-LPC. This measure asks the participant

1 This study was reviewed and approved by the University of Central Florida Department of Psychology IRB.


to read scenarios in which caring for a child is either successful or unsuccessful, and to

rate the causes of these outcomes. LPC status was determined using the scoring procedure

outlined in Bugental, Blue, et al. (1989), which involved creating median splits on two of

the subscales of the PAT: ACF and CCF. Participants who were above the median for

CCF and below the median for ACF were categorized as LPC. All other participants were

categorized as non-LPC.

Other paper-and-pencil measures were used to assess participant mood and attitudes toward

the puppy. The mood rating sheet was used to measure mood before, during, and after the

interaction. Ratings were made by placing a slash mark on a continuous 100-mm line, with

endpoints indicating very negative and very positive affect. Affect ratings were determined by

measuring the length of the line before the slash mark, with higher numbers indicating more

positive affect. Participants also rated the puppy on several scales. Three of these scales were

identical to those used to rate children in previous studies on LPC (Bugental et al., 1993).

These five-point scales had endpoints of unresponsive–responsive, uncooperative–coopera-

tive, and difficult–easy, with higher numbers indicating more positive perceptions. Additional

seven-point scales were used to assess the puppy on 10 different characteristics. Two of these

scales (aggressive–passive, and not cute–cute) measured variables of interest, since these

characteristics may be associated with the perception of a threat. On these two scales, higher

numbers again indicated more positive ratings. Three more seven-point scales were used to

examine participants’ attitudes toward dogs, cats, and animals in general.

Interactions took place in a small sparsely furnished room. Masking tape on the floor was

used to mark off a section of the room for the participant. The puppy was on a leash, which

was attached to the opposite wall, and could not walk into the subject area. Typically, the

puppy was approximately 4 ft from the participant. This arrangement was created to protect

both the human and animal participants, and to make the training situation more difficult. A

video camera was used to tape the interaction. It was placed on a tripod in the corner of the

room facing the participant. A stopwatch was used to time the interaction.

2.1.3. Procedure

Participants began by completing the informed consent form and a release form for the

audio and video portions of their recorded interactions. They were told that the main task

during the experiment was to lead Bailey, a 4-month-old chocolate Labrador Retriever,

through a series of tasks: sit, stand, and walk over a small wooden board. These tasks

were listed on a blackboard inside the room. Participants were to complete the tasks in

order and to repeat them as necessary during the interaction period. Instructions stated

that the interaction period would last a total of 2 min. Participants were asked to remain

inside an area taped off on the floor and not touch Bailey. For the safety of both the

human and animal participants, one of Bailey’s owners was seated behind the dog in the

corner of the room. Participants were told this person was Bailey’s owner and were asked

not to communicate with him or her. The owner did not make eye contact or

communicate with the participant.

The participant entered the room and the initial mood rating was taken. Videotaping began

and the experimenter left the room for 1 min. The experimenter returned, obtained a second


mood rating, and exited. After a second minute, the experimenter returned, stopped the

camera, and collected the final mood rating. The participant was taken outside the room

where he or she completed the rating scales about the puppy, the demographic questionnaire,

and the PAT. Finally, the participant was debriefed and thanked.

2.2. Results and discussion

To determine whether participants were successful during the 2-min teaching task, the

mean number of tasks completed was calculated. Overall, participants completed 1.65

tasks (SD=1.41) during the interaction period, indicating that the interaction was not

particularly successful. A t test indicated that LPC (M=2.22, SD=1.20) and non-LPC

(M=1.54, SD=1.44) individuals did not differ significantly in terms of number of tasks

accomplished. Additionally, ratings of the animal on three 5-point scales (unresponsive–

responsive, uncooperative–cooperative, and difficult–easy) indicated that participants

perceived the animal as somewhat unresponsive (M=2.44, SD=1.25), uncooperative

(M=2.19, SD=1.09), and difficult (M=2.10, SD=1.08). The t tests indicated that ratings

on each of these scales were significantly lower than a neutral rating of 3, responsive:

t(51)=5.46, p<.001; cooperative: t(51)=3.20, p<.01; difficult: t(51)=5.98, p<.001. These

results suggest that the experimental situation was in fact ‘‘difficult’’ and thus comparable

to those used in previous studies with children.

To examine the effect of LPC status on mood, a 2 (LPC status: LPC or non-LPC)�3

(time of mood rating: before, during, or after interaction) ANOVA was conducted. This

analysis was selected to parallel the analyses used in previous research examining

individual differences in perceived control as measured by the PAT (cf. Bugental et al.,

1993; Bugental & Lewis, 1999). Results of the ANOVA are shown in Fig. 1. The

analysis yielded a main effect for LPC group, F(1, 50)=4.48, p<.05. Across mood

ratings, LPC individuals (M=47.74, SD=26.00) had a more negative mood than non-LPC

individuals (M=63.61, SD=26.44). A main effect for time of mood rating was also

obtained, F(2, 100)=15.92, p<.001. Individuals showed a drop in mood across the three

ratings. Before the interaction, the mean mood rating was 72.77 (SD=19.29); during the

interaction, the mean mood rating was 58.83 (SD=24.10); and after the interaction, the

mean mood rating was 51.00 (SD=31.75). Additionally, planned comparisons showed that

the mood ratings of LPC and non-LPC individuals did not differ significantly before or

after the interactions. However, for the rating taken during the interaction, LPC

individuals (M=40.11, SD=21.36) had a lower mean mood rating than non-LPC

individuals (M=62.74, SD=22.97), t(50)=2.72, p<.01. These data are in line with the

research using the PAT to predict mood during difficult interactions with children. After

only 1 min with the puppy, LPC individuals had a significantly less positive mood. These

data suggest that the low power schemas of LPC individuals were accessed very quickly

and were accessible in a situation other than that with a child. Furthermore, the results

indicate that LPC individuals only differ significantly from non-LPC individuals during an

interaction with a ‘‘difficult’’ other.


Additional analyses showed that LPC individuals not only showed a more negative

mood during the interaction with the animal, but that they actually perceived the puppy

differently. LPC individuals perceived the puppy as less cute (M=5.22, SD=1.86) than

non-LPC individuals (M=6.72, SD=0.59), t(50)=4.45, p<.001. They also saw the puppy

as less passive (M=4.62, SD=2.20) than non-LPC individuals (M=5.95, SD=1.33),

t(49)=2.33, p<.05. The degrees of freedom on this analysis indicate that one LPC

participant failed to answer this question. In essence, LPC individuals saw a 4-month-old

puppy as less passive (more aggressive) and less cute, both of which indicate a more

threatening animal. Although we did not measure physiological arousal in this study, the

data are consistent with previous research suggesting that defensive arousal is the result of

a perceived threat during a difficult interaction with a child (Bugental et al., 1990, 1993,

1996; Bugental & Cortez, 1988).

A final set of analyses examined participants’ ratings of how much they liked dogs and

cats. Both LPC (M=6.00, SD=1.32) and non-LPC (M=6.35, SD=1.11) individuals

reported that they generally liked dogs, and their ratings did not differ significantly.

However, LPC individuals (M=3.44, SD=1.74) reported liking cats significantly less than

did non-LPC individuals (M=5.07, SD=2.28), t(50)=2.01, p<.05. Why LPC individuals

liked cats less than non-LPC individuals is unclear, although one possible explanation is

that cats are frequently reported as more difficult to train or control. These data also

suggest that LPC status may be important in supporting Felthous’ (1980) assertion that

Fig. 1. Mean mood ratings in Study 1 as a function of LPC status and time of measurement.


cats are more likely to be abused than dogs. Therefore, we argued that it was important to

complete a similar study examining an interaction with a young cat, which is reported in

Study 2.

In summary, Study 1 demonstrated that LPC status may be used to predict both mood

and perceptions during interactions with a companion animal. These data suggest that the

low power schemas activated by difficult interactions with children may be activated in

similar difficult interactions with companion animals. In essence, such schemas may be

activated whenever a difficult social situation is perceived. The study also showed that

LPC participants viewed the puppy more negatively on two dimensions (cuteness and

aggressiveness) that may indicate a perceived threat. Previous research (Hildebrandt &

Fitzgerald, 1978) has shown that adults’ ratings of infant cuteness are associated with a

greater amount of looking at the child. Based on such research, it is possible that those

who perceived the animal as less cute also spent less time looking at and thus engaging

the animal. Therefore, the participant would be less effective as a trainer, and perceive the

situation as even more difficult. This finding parallels previous research (Bugental &

Lewis, 1999; Bugental & Shennum, 1984) demonstrating that LPC individuals use less

effective linguistic structures when engaging with a difficult child. In short, the LPC

individual perceives a threatening and difficult situation, becomes less able to use

effective strategies as a caregiver, and thus creates an even worse situation. Because

LPC status was related to similar affective responses to children and companion animals,

and this attributional style has been linked to child abuse, it appears that LPC status could

be used to help understand abusive relationships with animals. Study 2 further explores

this idea by examining whether LPC status also predicts behaviors during interactions

with cats, who may be more likely to become the victims of animal cruelty.

3. Study 2

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants and design

Forty-four undergraduates who were enrolled in a general psychology course participated

for extra credit. None of the participants had previously participated in Study 1 or in

another study on human–animal interaction. The study used a mixed factorial design, with

LPC status as a subject variable, and time of mood rating as a within-subjects variable.

3.1.2. Materials and apparatus

The participants completed the PAT (Bugental, Blue, et al., 1989) and the mood rating

sheet as in Study 1. LPC status was calculated in the same manner as in Study 1.

Participants also completed a brief demographic questionnaire that included only the five-

point scales from Study 1. As in the first study, interactions took place in a sparsely

furnished room. Half of the room was marked off as the interaction area using masking

tape on the floor, and participants were asked to remain in there. The young cat was


allowed complete freedom to explore all parts of the room. Each participant was given a

toy (either a feather toy or a flashlight) to entertain the young cat. The interaction was

videotaped and was observed from behind a one-way mirror to insure the safety of both

human and animal participants. A stopwatch was used for timing.2

3.1.3. Procedure

Participants completed the PAT prior to their participation in the study. At the start of the

experiment, they completed informed consent forms and releases for the video and audio

tapes of their interactions. Then, participants were told to entertain an 11-month-old calico cat

named Whiskers for 2 min using one of the two toys. The interaction was varied somewhat

from the first study because it seemed unreasonable to teach the same tasks to a cat as had

been used with a dog. Simply engaging an unfamiliar cat with a toy that has been pretested to

be unappealing to the animal poses a ‘‘difficult’’ interaction for the participant. Immediately

after the interaction, participants rated the cat on the three 5-point scales: unresponsive–

responsive, uncooperative–cooperative, and difficult–easy. Then, participants viewed the

videotaped interaction and were asked to rate their affect at various points: before, after 30 s,

after 60 s, after 90 s, and at the end of the interaction. This paradigm has been used in other

studies of individual differences in LPC status (e.g., Bugental et al., 1993). Although five

total mood ratings were collected in this study, only three ratings (before, after 1 min, and

2 This study was reviewed and approved by the Kutztown University IRB.

Fig. 2. Mean mood ratings in Study 2 as a function of LPC status and time of measurement.


after) were used in the analyses in order to make the data more comparable to the first

experiment. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked.

3.2. Results and discussion

Ratings of the young cat on the three 5-point scales (unresponsive – responsive, unco-

operative – cooperative, and difficult–easy) indicated that participants had generally neutral

perceptions of the animal. The t tests indicated that the responsive (M=3.11, SD=1.30) and

difficult (M=3.25, SD=1.18) ratings did not differ significantly from a neutral rating of 3.

However, the cooperative rating (M=3.36, SD=1.04) was significantly more positive than the

neutral rating of 3, t(43)=2.33, p<.05. Additional t tests showed that all three ratings were

significantly lower than a somewhat positive rating of 4, responsive: t(43)=4.53, p<.001;

cooperative: t(43)=4.07, p<.001; difficult: t(43)=4.20, p<.001. Therefore, the situation was

perceived as ambiguous, unlike in Study 1, where the situation was perceived as difficult.

To examine the effect of LPC status on mood ratings, a 2 (LPC status: LPC or non-

LPC)�3 (time of mood rating: before, after 1 min, or after interaction) ANOVA was

conducted. Results are shown in Fig. 2. This analysis yielded only a main effect for time

of mood rating, F(2, 84)=11.95, p<.001. Individuals showed a drop in mood across the three

ratings. Before the interaction, the mean mood rating was 69.45 (SD=21.02), after 1 min, the

mean mood rating was 51.76 (SD=21.16), and after the interaction, the mean mood rating

was 48.00 (SD=27.85).

Fig. 3. Mean mood ratings in Study 2 as a function of CCF status and time of measurement.


In line with previous research by Bugental et al. (1990), a secondary analysis was

conducted using one of the subscales of the PAT—the CCF scale. A 2 (CCF status: high

or low)�3 (time of mood rating: before, after 1 min, or after interaction) ANOVA was

computed. Results are shown in Fig. 3. The analysis yielded a significant main effect for time

of mood rating, F(2, 84)=14.61, p<.001, and a significant CCF Status�Time of Mood

Rating interaction, F(2, 84)=4.14, p<.05. Planned comparisons indicated that the mood

ratings of high CCF and low CCF individuals did not differ significantly before or after the

interactions. However, for the rating after 1 min (during the interaction), high CCF

individuals (M=42.34, SD=23.79) had a lower mean mood rating than low CCF individuals

(M=58.92, SD=15.95), t(42)=2.77, p<.01.

The data from Study 2 indicate that individuals who place a relatively large amount of

blame on a child for an unsuccessful interaction, regardless of how much blame they place on

themselves, experienced more negative affect viewing themselves during the interaction with

a young cat. Although LPC status was not predictive of mood during the interaction, one

aspect of LPC status was an important predictor—CCF. One reason that LPC status itself

may not have predicted mood during the interaction is because LPC requires not only the

attribution of greater control to the child, but also the attribution of less control to the adult. It

may be the case that participants believe they can potentially control the behaviors of children

and dogs, but not the behaviors of cats. Therefore, scoring high or low on the ACF scale

would not be predictive of interactions with this animal. Instead, the relative blame placed on

the ‘‘other’’ in the situation would be most predictive.

4. General discussion

The evidence presented supports the hypothesis that the same social schemas underlie

interactions with both young children and companion animals. Specifically, the data show

that those who see the ‘‘other’’ in a position of power, particularly when they see themselves

as having little power, are at risk for a negative interaction with a ‘‘difficult’’ or even

ambiguous other. Study 1 demonstrated that participants with an LPC orientation reported

more negative affect during an interaction with a puppy, and that they perceived the puppy

more negatively. Study 2 demonstrated a similar effect using an interaction with a young cat.

However, in this case, those who had a high CCF orientation were most likely to report

negative affect during the interaction. In both studies, the negative affect was reported after

only 1 min of interaction with the animal, suggesting that low power schemas are accessed

very quickly. Our findings are consistent with the idea that low power schemas that have been

cited as important in child abuse situations also may underlie instances of animal cruelty.

Therefore, this research establishes the need to further examine the social relationships

between humans and companion animals.

Previous research relating animal cruelty and human abuse has focused on retrospective

studies of those who have engaged in child abuse or other forms of aggression against

humans. The current study suggests that it is possible to examine the relationship between

these forms of aggression predictively. Specifically, it appears that low power schemas may


be activated in both types of caregiving relationship. The data also provide a clue as to why

cats may be abused more often than dogs. In our research, a more general social interaction

schema was predictive of negative affect during an interaction with a cat. That is, the high

CCF orientation contains all LPC individuals plus a number of individuals who do not see

themselves as low in power, but do see the other as high in power. Therefore, there are more

people who are potentially ‘‘set off’’ by interactions with a cat. The data from Study 1 also

showed that LPC individuals, who already demonstrate negative affect toward difficult

children and puppies, reported much greater dislike of cats than dogs. Thus, if an LPC

individual were trying to control a difficult cat, the consequences for the animal might also be

greater. These findings are very much in line with the hypothesis that cats are abused because

they are difficult to control, and that the need to control also may negatively influence

interactions with other companion animals.

Although both studies underscore the importance of perceived control in predicting

interactions with companion animals, there are some important differences between the

studies. From our data, it appears that LPC status is more useful for predicting interactions

with a dog, whereas CCF status is more useful for predicting interactions with a cat. We have

argued that this difference may be based on differential beliefs regarding the perceived

capability of controlling the two species. However, there are other potential explanations. The

dog used in Study 1 was 4 months old, and appeared as a puppy, whereas the cat used in

Study in 2 was 11 months old, and although appeared very youthful, may have been

considered by some participants to be an adult animal. It is possible that a perception of

juvenescence in the ‘‘other’’ is required for LPC status to be an important predictor of mood

during an interaction. Additionally, there were methodological differences between the two

studies that may have accounted for the difference in the results. The first study used a task

that required teaching an animal, whereas the second study used a task that required

entertaining an animal. One could make the case that entertaining another is less threatening

than teaching another, and thus might be less likely to evoke low power schemas. Participants

in both studies interacted with the animal through a series of gestures and verbal commands.

However, in Study 1, participants were asked to complete specific tasks in a short period of

time, whereas the criteria for success in Study 2 were more nebulous. These specific criteria

for success in Study 1 may have been more likely to cause frustration for the participants, thus

activating low power schemas. In order to further elucidate whether interactions with certain

species are more likely to activate low power schemas, future research needs to consider both

the apparent juvenescence of the animal and the particular experimental task used.

In this research, we have started with the assumption that humans engage in social

interactions with animals, and the data we have presented support this hypothesis. However,

we have not been able to address the circumstances necessary for social schemas to be

generalized to interactions with other species. One might argue that anthropomorphism is

necessary for a social schema to be perceived, and this hypothesis appears to be worthy of

exploration in future research. Given that we observed a difference in the interactions

between cats and dogs, it might also be the case that certain animals are more likely to be

anthropomorphized, and thus, accorded a social status relative to a human. Future work may

wish to address this issue by examining the effect of power schemas on interactions with wild


animals or less socially desirable animals such as rodents. It also is important to explore

whether the triggering of such social schemas requires the presence of an actual animal, or

whether use of a computer simulation, as was used in studies with children, could be used to

elicit the same effects. If such a simulation elicits these social reactions, then it may be

possible to identify those at risk for abusing both animals and humans by observing negative

interactions in a simulation.

The data presented here also support the idea that aggression toward living things is

generalized, and that clinical evidence of animal cruelty may be predictive of later abuse of

humans. Given that social mores are less prescriptive regarding treatment of animals, it may

be possible to see the consequences of low power schemas much sooner in human–animal

interactions. If those at risk can then be identified earlier, then there may be a greater chance

for rehabilitation. In summary, a body of theoretical work on the activation of low power

schemas in difficult situations with children may be a strong impetus for making a theoretical

and practical link between animal cruelty and human abuse.

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Angela Biege and Lauren Gallina for assistance collecting data, and the

Psychology Departments at Kutztown University and Cedar Crest College for their assistance

in providing facilities and equipment. We also would like to thank two anonymous reviewers

for their helpful comments.

References

Ascione, F. R. (1993). Children who are cruel to animals: a review of the research and implications for devel-

opmental psychopathology. Anthrozoos, 6 (4), 226–247.

Ascione, F. R., Thompson, T. M., & Black, T. (1997). Childhood cruelty to animals: assessing cruelty dimensions

and motivations. Anthrozoos, 10 (4), 170–177.

Baenninger, R. (1991). Violence toward other species. In: R. Baenninger (Ed.), Targets of violence and aggression

(pp. 5–43). Amsterdam, Holland: North-Holland.

Boat, B. W. (1995). The relationship between violence to children and violence to animals: an ignored link?

Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 10 (2), 229–235.

Bollinger, V. (1998). One deadly night at Noah’s Ark. HSUS News, 43 (2), 36–40 (Published by The Humane

Society of the United States).

Bradley, E. J., & Peters, R. D. (1991). Physically abusive and nonabusive mothers’ perceptions of parenting and

child behavior. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 61 (3), 455–460.

Bugental, D. B., Blue, J., Cortez, V., Fleck, K., Kopeikin, H., Lewis, J. C., & Lyon, J. (1993). Social cognitions as

organizers of autonomic and affective responses to social challenge. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-

chology, 64 (1), 94–103.

Bugental, D. B., Blue, J., & Cruzcosa, M. (1989). Perceived control over caregiving outcomes: implications for

child abuse. Developmental Psychology, 25 (4), 532–539.

Bugental, D. B., Blue, J., & Lewis, J. (1990). Caregiver beliefs and dysphoric affect directed to difficult children.

Developmental Psychology, 26 (4), 631–638.

Bugental, D. B., Brown, M., & Reiss, C. (1996). Cognitive representations of power in caregiving relationships:


biasing effects on interpersonal interaction and information processing. Journal of Family Psychology, 10 (4),

397–407.

Bugental, D. B., & Cortez, V. L. (1988). Physiological reactivity to responsive and unresponsive children as

moderated by perceived control. Child Development, 59, 686–693.

Bugental, D. B., & Lewis, J. C. (1999). The paradoxical misuse of power by those who see themselves as

powerless: how does it happen? Journal of Social Issues, 55 (1), 51–64.

Bugental, D. B., Lyon, J. E., Krantz, J., & Cortez, V. (1997). Who’s the boss? Differential accessibility of

dominance ideation in parent–child relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72 (6),

1297–1309.

Bugental, D. B., Mantyla, S. M., & Lewis, J. (1989). Parental attributions as moderators of affective communi-

cation to children at risk for physical abuse. In: D. Cicchetti, & V. Carlson (Eds.), Child maltreatment: theory

and research on the causes and consequences of child abuse and neglect (pp. 254–279). Cambridge: Cam-

bridge University Press.

Bugental, D. B., & Shennum, W. A. (1984). ‘‘Difficult’’ children as elicitors and targets of adult communication

patterns: an attributional–behavioral transactional analysis. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child

Development, 49 (1) (Serial No. 205).

Camras, L. A., Grow, J. G., & Ribordy, S. C. (1983). Recognition of facial expression by abused children. Journal

of Clinical Child Psychology, 12, 325–328.

DeViney, E., Dickert, J., & Lockwood, R. (1983). The care of pets within child abusing families. International

Journal for the Study of Animal Problems, 4, 321–329.

Felthous, A.R. (1980). Aggression against cats, dogs, and people. Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 10

(3), 169–177.

Felthous, A. R., & Kellert, S. R. (1986). Violence against animals and people: is aggression against living

creatures generalized? Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 14 (1), 55–69.

Felthous, A. R., & Kellert, S. R. (1987). Childhood cruelty to animals and later aggression against people: a

review. American Journal of Psychiatry, 144 (6), 710–717.

Hildebrandt, K. A., & Fitzgerald, H. E. (1978). Adults’ responses to infants varying in perceived cuteness.

Behavioural Processes, 3, 159–172.

Kellert, S. R., & Felthous, A. R. (1985). Childhood cruelty to animals among criminals and noncriminals. Human

Relations, 38 (12), 1113–1129.

Main, M., & George, C. (1985). Responses of abused and disadvantaged toddlers to distress in agemates: a study

in the day care setting. Developmental Psychology, 21, 407–412.

Oldershaw, L., Walters, G. C., & Hall, D. K. (1986). Control strategies and non-compliance in abusive mother–

child dyads: an observational study. Child Development, 57, 722–732.

Roscoe, B., Haney, S., & Peterson, K. L. (1986). Child/pet maltreatment: adolescents’ ratings of parent and owner

behaviors. Adolescence, 21 (84), 806–814.

Vermeulen, H., & Odendaal, J. S. J. (1993). Proposed typology of companion animal abuse. Anthrozoos, 6,

248–257.

Wax, D., & Haddox, V. (1974). Enuresis, fire setting, and animal cruelty in male adolescent delinquents: a triad

predictive of violent behavior. Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 2 (1), 45–71.


Documents

Caregiver attributions are not just for children: Evidence for generalized low power schemas