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Catalogue Reference:CAB/65/5/27 Image Reference:0001

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1940.

S E C R E T . Copy N o . ,

W.M. (40) 27th Conclusions.

T O B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y .

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

W A R C A B I N E T 27 (40) .

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, January 30, 1940, at 11-30 A.M.

P r e s e n t : The R i g h t Hon . N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN, M . P . , P r i m e Min i s t e r (in the Chair).

The R i g h t H o n . S i r J O H N S I M O N , K . C , The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , M . P , Chancellor of the Exchequer . Secre tary of S t a t e for Fore ign

Affairs. The R i g h t Hon . S i r SAMUEL H O A R E , A d m i r a l of the Fleet the R i g h t Hon .

B t , M . P , L o r d P r i v y Seal. L O R D C H A T F I E L D , Min is te r for Co­ord ina t ion of Defence.

The R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. The R i g h t Hon . O L I V E R STANLEY, M R , C H U R C H I L L , M . P . , F i r s t L o r d of the Secre tary of S ta t e for W a r . A d m i r a l t y .

The R i g h t Hon . S i r K I N G S L E Y W O O D , The R i g h t Hon . L O R D H A N K E Y , M . P , Secre tary of S ta t e for A i r . Minis te r w i thou t Por t fo l io .

T h e following were also present The R i g h t Hon . S i r J O H N A N D E R S O N , The R i g h t Hon . A N T H O N Y E D E N , M . P ,

M . P , Secre ta ry of S ta t e for the Secretary of S t a t e for Dominion Home D e p a r t m e n t a n d Min i s t e r of Affairs (Items 4-9) . Home Securi ty .

The R i g h t Hon . S i r J O H N G I L M O U R , T h e R i g h t Hon. MALCOLM M A C D O N A L D , B t , M . P , Min i s t e r of S h i p p i n g M . P , Secre ta ry of S ta te for the (Item 1). Colonies (Item 2).

The R i g h t Hon . Si r J O H N R E I T H , Mr . R. H . C R O S S , M.P . , Min is te r for Min i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n (Items 2 Economic W a r f a r e (Item 4). and 3).

Si r H O R A C E J . W I L S O N , P e r m a n e n t Secre tary t o the T reasu ry (Items 1-4).

Secretariat. Si r E D W A R D B R I D G E S . C a p t a i n A . D . N I C H O L L , R . N . Mr. F . H E M M I N G . Mr . W . D . W I L K I N S O N . Mr . G . N . F L E M M I N G . Mr . P . D E B E N H A M .

[20747]

W A R C A B I N E T 27 ( 4 0 ) .

- C O N T E N T S . Minute

No. Subject. Page 1 Sh ipbu i l d ing 205

Transfer from the Ministry of Shipping to the Admiralty of the responsibility for Merchant Shipbuilding and Repairs.

2 W e s t Ind ies 2 0 5 ' Publication of Report of Royal Commission.

3 P r o p a g a n d a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Principles and objectives of British wartime propaganda.

4 C o n t r a b a n d Contro l 209

The case of the Soviet ship Seletiga.

5 T h e A i r S i t ua t i on . . . 210

6 T h e N a v a l S i t ua t i on 210

7 T h e Mi l i t a ry S i t u a t i o n 211 Western Front . Finland.

8 F i n l a n d 211 Intercession service in St. Pau l ' s Cathedral.

9 T h e F a r E a s t 212 Relations with J a p a n : ease of the Asama Maru.

10 U.S.S .R. . . . . . . . . . 214 Issue of warning to Soviet merchant ships.

Shipbuilding. Transfer from the Ministry of Shipping to the Admiralty of the responsi­bility for merchant ship­building and repairs. (Previous Eef erenee: W.M. (40) 18th Conclusions, Minute 15.)

West Indies.Publication ofreport of EoyalCommission.

1. The W a r Cabine t had before them a Memorandum by the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y ( W . P . (G.) (40) 28).

The First Lord of the Admiralty sa id t h a t h is a r rangement s for t a k i n g over the responsibi l i ty for merchan t sh ipbui ld ing and r e p a i r s h a d been m a d e in consul ta t ion wi th the Depar tmen t s concerned a n d migh t be r ega rded as agreed measures. H e had been fo r tuna te in securing the assis tance of Si r J a m e s L i thgow as Control ler of Merchan t Sh ipbui ld ing , and of Si r Amos Ayre as Di rec tor of Merchan t Sh ipbu i ld ing a n d Repa i r s .

I n discussion, i t w a s expla ined t h a t the only po in t a t issue w a s the word ing of the four th p a r a g r a p h of the d r a f t announcement. Th i s p a r a g r a p h read as follows :—

" The Min i s t e r of S h i p p i n g will cont inue to be responsible for advis ing, af ter consul tat ion w i t h representa t ives of Sh ip ­owners, upon the types of merchan t vessels to be built , while the A d m i r a l t y will assume the responsibi l i ty for ensur ing the necessary p roduc t ion of Mercan t i l e Sh ipp ing , as well as t h a t of meet ing the r equ i rement s of the N a v y . "

Nei ther the F i r s t L o r d nor the Minis te r of Sh ipp ing an t i c ipa t ed any difficulty in r ega rd to the point of substance mentioned. B u t the l a t t e r feared t h a t the sh ipp ing world, who would r ead the announcement closely, m igh t resent the implicat ion t h a t the decisions as to the types of vessels to be bui l t would be taken by the A d m i r a l t y .

The Prime Minister t hought t h a t th i s difficulty could be met if the p a r a g r a p h were reworded as follows, to follow more closely the Cabinet decision of the 19th J a n u a r y :—

" The A d m i r a l t y wil l assume the responsibil i ty for ensur ing the necessary p roduc t ion of Mercant i l e Shipping , as well as t h a t of meet ing the requ i rements of the Navy, i t being unders tood tha t , as r egards the types of merchan t ship to be buil t , the A d m i r a l t y will meet the requi rements of the Min i s t ry of Sn ipp ing , a f te r consul ta t ion wi th representa t ives of sh ip ­o w n e r s . "

The W a r Cabine t—

(1) Gave a genera l approva l to the a r rangements proposed in W . P . (G.) (40) 28.

(2) Approved the d ra f t announcement, subject to the subst i tu­t ion for p a r a g r a p h 4 of the new p a r a g r a p h proposed by the P r i m e Minis te r .

2. The Secretary of State for the Colonies said t h a t he wished to consult the W a r Cabine t as to whether the Repor t of the Royal Commission on the W e s t Ind ies should be published. The investi­

ga t ions of t h a t Commission had revealed deplorable s t anda rds of hea l th and housing, and in social condit ions generally, among the work ing popula t ion in the Wes t Indies . The work ing popula t ion themselves were now very conscious of th is . Serious dis turbances would probably have taken place in the I s l ands if the Royal Commission h a d not been appoin ted , and were liable to break out if the R e p o r t Avere now withheld . The Repor t contained some very s t rong passages on th i s subject. The Repor t w a s unanimous, bu t there would have been a minor i ty repor t if the Cha i rman (Lord Moyne) h a d a t t empted to secure the deletion of the p a r a g r a p h s condemning present condit ions.

The Secretary of S ta te handed round copies of two sample passages .

*" [20747] B 2

I n peace the re would have been no ques t ion of w i t h h o l d i n g pub l ica t ion of t he Repor t , however severe i t s c r i t ic isms of B r i t i s h admin i s t r a t i on . B u t i t w a s obvious tha t publ ica t ion of such a R e p o r t in w a r t ime would be fastened on by our enemies, who wou ld m a k e the fullest use of the s t rong cr i t ic isms, whi le i gno r ing passages which deal t w i t h the favourable s ide of t he quest ion. N o t w i t h ­s t a n d i n g these developments, he h a d reached the conclusion t h a t publ ica t ion w a s be t te r t h a n suppress ion.

The chief a r g u m e n t s which we ighed w i t h h im were as follows : —

(1) The advice he h a d received from the W e s t I n d i a n Governors . Op in ion in the is lands, where much of the evidence before the Commission h a d a l ready been publ ished, w a s in a s ta te of fe rment a n d would become intensely suspicious if the r epor t were suppressed. R i o t s m i g h t ensue.

(2) The p ressure on behalf of publ ica t ion which might be expected from some members of the Royal Commission itself, and p a r t i c u l a r l y from S i r W a l t e r C i t r i ne . A n added difficulty w a s the fac t t h a t Si r W a l t e r w a s now on a, v is i t to F i n l a n d .

( 3 ) The probable a t t i t u d e of the Opposi t ion P a r t i e s and of the P re s s .

The Sec re ta ry of S ta t e apologised for h a v i n g b rough t t h i s quest ion before the W a r Cabine t a t such shor t notice. H e h a d been engaged in p r e p a r i n g a pape r , when his h a n d s h a d been forced by a leakage in the P r e s s . The newspape r s in ques t ion h a d i n s inua t ed t h a t the Government were cons ider ing the norr-publication of the Repor t . W o u l d the W a r Cabine t au thor i se a dementi be ing issued ?

The Prime Minister po in ted ou t t h a t the consequences of the pub l ica t ion of the R e p o r t m i g h t be much more serious t h a n the consequences of pub l i sh ing the evidence. The R e p o r t would be r ega rded as quas i - jud ic ia l .

The Secretary of State for the Colonies exp la ined tha t he h a d in m i n d the publ ica t ion , s imul taneously w i t h the Repor t , of a W h i t e P a p e r con t a in ing a s t a t emen t of policy by H i s Ma je s ty ' s Govern­ment . T h e W h i t e P a p e r , indeed, m i g h t cover a wider field t h a n the W e s t I n d i a n Colonies, a n d m i g h t lay down a p r o g r a m m e of development covering the Colonial E m p i r e as a whole. I t would have to be m a d e clear, however, t ha t , in general , the recommenda­t ions of the W e s t I n d i a n Commission would be accepted by the Government a n d would be implemented .

The R e p o r t a n d the W h i t e P a p e r m i g h t be published, say, on the 20th Feb rua ry . T h i s would give t ime :—

(a) for h is proposals for remedia l ac t ion to be p u t i n t o final s h a p e ; he was a l r eady in consul ta t ion w i t h the C h a n ­cellor of the Exchequer :

(b) for the M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n to create in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d other n e u t r a l countr ies a n a tmosphere favour­able to the recept ion of the two documents. Every endeavour would be m a d e to place the m a i n emphas i s on the W h i t e P a p e r , r a t h e r t h a n on the Repor t .

The Minister of Information said t h a t he a n d his Dej jar t ­men ta l advisers h a d seen advance copies of the Repor t . The genera l view of his advisers favoured publ ica t ion , subject to the announce­m e n t of definite a n d immedia te remedia l act ion, a n d subject also to t ime being allowed for the p r e p a r a t i o n of opinion in neu t r a l countr ies . T h e assessment of the possible dange r s resu l t ing from publ ica t ion w a s a m a t t e r which w a s more for the Fore ign Secre ta ry

a n d the Colonial Secre tary t h a n for himself. Subject to thei r views, he was p r e p a r e d to s u p p o r t publ icat ion.

I n discussion, i t became clear t h a t the general view of the Cabine t was s t rongly opposed to publ ica t ion d u r i n g the war .

The Prime Minister said tha t , when he had discussed the m a t t e r previously w i t h the Secre tary of S ta te for the Colonies, he h a d not seen the ex t rac t s which were now before the W a r Cabinet . These convinced h im t h a t i t would inflict serious damage on our w a r effort to publ i sh such a R e p o r t a t a t ime when the G e r m a n M i n i s t r y of P r o p a g a n d a was r eady to t ake advan tage of any m a t e r i a l made avai lable for it . I n neu t r a l countr ies publ ica t ion of the R e p o r t m i g h t well have t he effect of lead ing to a genera l revision of opinion among those who h a d h i the r to though t of G r e a t B r i t a i n as a lead ing Colonial P o w e r t h a t p a i d due r e g a r d to i t s responsibi l i t ies as t rus tee for the welfare of the nat ives . Op in ion in the U n i t e d S ta tes was a t the present t ime very much on the look-out for i tems of in format ion t h a t were d a m a g i n g to the B r i t i s h case, a n d publ ica t ion of the R e p o r t would have a very bad effect in t h a t country.

Discussion then t u r n e d on the var ious poin ts which mus t be dea l t w i t h if publ ica t ion of the R e p o r t were wi thheld .

(1) The Members of the Royal Commission. I t was n a t u r a l t h a t they should wish for publ icat ion, bu t no

g r e a t difficulty was an t i c ipa t ed in pe r suad ing them to agree to the opposi te course, if i t were p u t to them clearly t h a t this w a s the decision reached by the W a r Cabine t a f te r cons ider ing the probable effects of publ ica t ion on the course of the W a r . The Prime Minister suggested t h a t the Secre tary of S t a t e for the Colonies should convey the view of the W a r Cabinet a t once to L o r d Moyne, but should stave off the answers to any quest ions in r e g a r d to publ ica t ion u n t i l he h a d been able to see Si r W a l t e r C i t r i ne on h is r e tu rn from F i n l a n d .

(2) The Ovposition in the House of Commons. I t should be possible to pe r suade members of P a r l i a m e n t not

to make t rouble by represen t ing to them the d i sas t rous consequences of publ ica t ion from the po in t of view of the war . This was no p a r t y ma t t e r .

(3) Opinion in the West Indies. The posi t ion here was pa r t i cu l a r ly difficult, bu t the real anx ie ty

about the publ ica t ion of the R e p o r t arose from the fear t h a t non­publ ica t ion would mean the pos tponement of remedia l action. I f we could make i t clear t h a t such act ion would be taken quickly, the a g i t a t i o n about publ ica t ion of the R e p o r t would probably die down. I n h i s communicat ions w i t h the Governors, the Secretary of S t a t e would make i t clear t h a t the Government in tended to make a s t a t emen t in about th ree weeks ' t ime of the i r in tent ions to set on foot remedia l measures .

T h e W a r Cabine t : ­(i) Decided to wi thhold approva l to the publ icat ion of the

R e p o r t of the Royal Commission on the Wes t Ind i e s . A s a t present advised, i t was not contemplated t h a t

H i s Ma je s ty ' s Government would be able to sanct ion publ ica t ion u n t i l a f t e r the end of the war .

(ii) I nv i t ed the Secretary of S ta t e for the Colonies to com­munica te th i s decision to Lord Moyne and to the ' Governors of the W e s t I n d i a n Colonies.

Propaganda. Principles and objectives of British wartime propaganda. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 15th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

(Previous Reference: W.M. (39) 45th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

Every endeavour should be m a d e to secure the adhesion of L o r d Moyne and h is colleagues on the Royal Commission a n d of the Governors to th i s decision, bu t no hope was to be held out t h a t i t could be reversed.

(iii) Inv i t ed the Secre ta ry of S ta t e for the Colonies, in con­sul ta t ion w i t h the P r i m e Minis te r , to make a s imi la r communicat ion to the Leader s of the Oppos i t ion P a r t i e s .

(iv) Inv i t ed the Secre tary of S ta t e for the Colonies to c i rcu la te to the W a r Cabine t the text of the recommendat ions of the Royal Commission, w i th a v iew to cons idera t ion being given to the ques t ion whe the r these recommenda­t ions should be publ ished,

(v) Recorded the view t h a t the real solut ion to the presen t difficulties lay in t a k i n g remedia l measures a t the ear l ies t oppor tun i ty , a n d invi ted the Secre tary of S t a t e for the Colonies to c i rcu la te to the W a r Cabine t a d r a f t of the proposed W h i t e P a p e r on the measures to be taken.

(vi) Suggested t h a t the Secre ta ry of S t a t e for the Colonies should give a non-commit ta l answer to any P a i i i a ­men ta ry Quest ions u n t i l s teps h a d been t aken to com­munica te the W a r Cab ine t ' s decision, a n d the reasons therefor, to the members of the Roya l Commission a n d to the Leader s of the Opposi t ion P a r t i e s .

3 . The W a r Cabine t h a d before them a M e m o r a n d u m by the Min i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n covering a d r a f t s ta tement on the P r i n c i p l e s and Objectives of B r i t i s h w a r t i m e p r o p a g a n d a , for use as a gu ide w i t h i n ' t h e M i n i s t r y ( W . P . (G.) (40) 20).

The Minister of Information exp la ined t h a t th i s out l ine did not differ in substance from the M e m o r a n d u m d r a w n u p by h i s predecessor ( W . P . (G.) ( 3 9 ) 162), bu t t h a t i t h a d been d r a f t e d in a different style, so t h a t i t could more easily be t r ans l a t ed in to act ion. I f the out l ine were approved in genera l by the W a r Cabinet , i t would be a help for h im to know w i t h w h a t v igour they would like the objective, or p a r t i c u l a r p a r t s thereof, prosecuted.

T h e view general ly expressed was t h a t the out l ine represented in genera l a sound a n d useful s ta tement for D e p a r t m e n t a l guidance , bu t t h a t i t should not receive publ ic i ty . I t w a s of the essence of p r o p a g a n d a t h a t i t should not be recognised as such. A u t h o r i t a t i v e s t a t ements of B r i t i s h policy h a d a l ready been publ ished, as, for example , in the s t a tement m a d e by H i s M a j e s t y ' s Government in rep ly to H i t l e r ' s speech in the Re ichs tag on the 6th October, 1 9 3 9 .

Discussion took place on the following po in t s in the D r a f t out l ine : — " A compromise peace with an unbeaten Germany tvould be defeat

in the long run." (Section B (5).)

T h e view was expressed t h a t whi le th i s was a t r u e s t a t emen t i t was somewhat ' ' telescoped ' ' a n d was l iable to mi s in t e rp re t a t i on . I t was therefore agreed t h a t th i s sentence should be omi t ted a n d t h a t the following sentence should be inser ted between (6) a n d (7), Sect ion B : " N o peace could be justified Avhich does not secure these t h i n g s . " " This is your war, the peopled ivar." (Section A (1).)

The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence suggested t h a t th i s m i g h t be i n t e rp re t ed as d r a w i n g a d i s t inc t ion between " t he people ' ' as r ep resen t ing the mass of the popu la t ion as d i s t inc t f rom the governing classes, whereas the impor t an t , po in t was to

emphas ise t he responsibi l i ty of the whole people for the wa r . The M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n was invi ted to amend the s ta tement so as to avoid any r i sk of th i s mi s in t e rp re t a t i on .

The reference to " sacrifice " in Section A (6).

The Chancellor of the Exchequer d rew a t t en t i on to the savings c a m p a i g n being conducted u n d e r S i r Rober t Kinders ley . I t was very i m p o r t a n t to secure a w ide r u n d e r s t a n d i n g among the intel l i ­gent wage-ea rne r s as to the re la t ion between wages a n d pr ices a n d ' 1 the vicious s p i r a l ' ' and so on, a n d he welcomed the co-opera­t ion of the M i n i s t r y of I n f o r m a t i o n to t h i s end. Some of th i s g r o u n d w a s indi rec t ly covered by the Savings Campa ign , though i t was not i t s direct concern. I t was very i m p o r t a n t t o avoid any impress ion of over- lapping or in ter ference in th i s ma t te r , and he therefore suggested t h a t the M i n i s t e r of I n f o r m a t i o n should discuss the m a t t e r w i t h S i r Rober t K inder s l ey wi th th i s end in view.

The W a r Cabinet agreed :— T o approve the s t a tement of the pr inc ip les and objectives of B r i t i s h w a r t i m e p r o p a g a n d a set out in the Memorandum ( W . P . (G.) (40) 20), for c i rcula t ion as a work ing guide w i t h i n the M i n i s t r y of In fo rma t ion bu t not for publica­t ion , subject to amendmen t as ind ica ted in discussion.

Contraband 4. T h e W a r Cabine t h a d before them a M e m o r a n d u m by the Control. Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e on the case of the Soviet ship The case of the Selenga ( W . P . (G.) (40) 24). Soviet ship The Minister for Economic Warfare sa id t h a t the a l te rna t ive Selenga. courses of act ion open to us in r e g a r d to th i s sh ip , which h a d been

taken in to H o n g K o n g for con t r aband examina t ion and h a d been found to be ca r ry ing , among other th ings , 1,190 metr ic tons of wol f ram ore, were set ou t in p a r a g r a p h 8 of his memorandum. W e could d e t a i n the cargo indefinitely, bu t such act ion could not be justified as a measure of con t raband control. Al te rna t ive ly , if we decided to release the cargo, we could do so e i ther af ter some delay, on receiv ing fu r ther publ ic assurances from Russ i a t h a t the goods were in t ended for i n t e rna l consumpt ion, or we could do so a t once as a f r i end ly act to t h e Chinese Government . H i s own suggest ion w a s t h a t the sh ip should be released a t once, b u t t h a t we should a p p r o a c h the Chinese Government wi th a view to secur ing from them, in r e t u r n for th i s release, an a r r a n g e m e n t unde r which—

(a) they disclosed to us the terms of the ba r t e r agreement between themselves a n d Russ ia , unde r which they received m i l i t a r y suppl ies in r e t u r n for ce r ta in r a w mate r i a l s ( inc luding the present cons ignment) ; and

(&) they under took to r a t i o n supplies of wolfram to Russ ia a t a level of, say, 350 to 400 tons a month .

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t ha t he agreed w i t h the l ine of ac t ion proposed by the Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e . Pie w a s influenced by the posi t ion of Ch ina in th i s m a t t e r . H e was, however, r e luc t an t to base any action on assurances received f rom Russ ia . H e agreed tha t the cargo should be released —especia l ly as in all p robabi l i ty i t was in tended for consumption in R u s s i a — a s a favour to Ch ina . For the fu ture , the Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e and himself should examine the p r inc ip les on w h i c h our policy w i t h r e g a r d to Chinese expor t s to R u s s i a should be based. H e agreed t h a t we should a t t e m p t to secure an agreement w i t h Ch ina , based on in fo rmat ion suppl ied by her as to her ba r t e r ag reemen t wi th Russ ia , to r a t i on her expor t s of ce r t a in r a w

The Air Situation. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 26th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

The Naval Situation. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 26th Conclusions, Minute 3.) Air attacks on shipping.

ma te r i a l s to Russ ia . Such an agreement would have to be a u n i l a t e r a l agreement between ourselves and China , to which R u s s i a would not be p a r t y .

T h e W a r Cabine t agreed— (a) To au thor i se the release of the Soviet sh ip Selenga as a n

ac t of favour to the Chinese Government . (b) T h a t the Chinese Government should be in formed tha t , in

agree ing to the release of th i s cargo, we h a d in m i n d t h a t they should come to an a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h us to r egu la t e Chinese expor ts of cer ta in r a w ma te r i a l s to Russ ia .

(c) To invi te the Secre tary of S ta te for Fore ign Affairs and the Min i s t e r for Economic W a r f a r e to examine the p r inc ip les on which the a r r a n g e m e n t re fe r red to in (b) should be based.

5. The Secretary of State for Air sa id t h a t a considerable number of a t t acks had been ca r r ied out on E a s t Coast s h i p p i n g on the previous day, in which a total of possibly 15 enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been engaged. Enemy a i r c r a f t h a d also opera ted in the She t l ands area. Twelve enemy a i r c r a f t h a d a t tacked a convoy w i t h o u t r e su l t ; and a total of 15 other merchan t vessels h a d been engaged by the enemy, by bombs or machine guns .

The s teamship Manela, the R . A . F . flying-boat depot sh ip in the Shet lands , h a d been a t t acked by 4 a i rc raf t . Only s l ight damage by concussion h a d been caused.

Desp i t e the bad aerodrome condit ions, a to ta l of 99 fighter­a i r c r a f t had been sent up . Three of the enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been engaged, but w i t h inconclusive resul ts . Condi t ions for our fighters h a d been extremely bad. Al l our a i r c ra f t h a d r e t u r n e d safely.

A n t i - a i r c r a f t guns h a d been in act ion in the Newcast le a n d Bly th areas .

There was a n in te res t ing repor t of a duel between one of o u r Hudson a i r c r a f t a n d a Messerschmit t 110 of the la tes t type. T h e H u d s o n appea red to have h a d the bet ter of the engagement a n d h a d obta ined some h i t s on the Messerschmit t .

The W a r Cabinet took note of the above s ta tement .

6 . The First Lord of the A dmiralty gave the W a r Cab ine t de ta i l s of the a t t acks on merchan t sh ipp ing refer red to in the fore­going Minu te .

A summary of the a t t acks is as follows :—­

(ft) Two a t t acks on a convoy. No damage . (b) T w o l igh t vessels a t tacked. One badly damaged—-crew

(c) H .M.S . Coventry a t t acked a t Sollum Voe. No damage . (a) Fou r t een B r i t i s h merchan t vessels a t t acked . One s l ight ly

damaged, two badly damaged. One L a t v i a n ship set on fire and abandoned. One F rench sh ip at tacked. No p a r t i c u l a r s of damaged . (/)

F u t h e r a t t a c k s on t r ade were as follows :-January 27.

D a n i s h s.s. Fredensborg (2,094 tons), S u n k south-east of the Orkneys. Crew—probably 20. N o news of survivors .

January 28. S.S. FjSton (1,487 tons). Miss ing , p resumed sunk as one

of her boats a n d a body had been washed ashore.

Coal supplies.

The Military Situation. Western Front. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 26th Conclusions, Minute 4.) Finland.

Finland. Intercession service in St. Paul 's Cathedral.

January 29. D u t c h sis. Nora (298 tons). D a m a g e d by mine whi le a t

anchor off Deal . Beached. Convoys on the E a s t Coast h a d been delayed owing to the

weather .

The F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y sa id t h a t a i r a t t a c k s of the type which the G e r m a n s h a d ca r r i ed out on the previous day would, if cont inued, affect the morale of our merchan t crews. Whi le , there­fore, the wea the r made condit ions so difficult for our fighters, i t m i g h t be advisable to r e t u r n to the convoy system on the E a s t Coast in sp i te of the delays which th i s would inevi tably cause.

The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence emphas ised the feeling of secur i ty which convoy gave to merchan t sh ipp ing .

The Lord Privy Seal emphasised the des i rab i l i ty of consul t ing the Min i s t e r of S h i p p i n g in connection w i t h any decision to re-establish convoy.

There was some discussion as to whether the re in t roduc t ion of convoys would have a serious effect on the a l ready unsa t i s fac to ry posi t ion as r e g a r d s coal suppl ies in the South of Eng land . I t was po in ted out t h a t the shor tage of coal was due fundamenta l ly to the shor tage of a n d delays to sh ipp ing , accentua ted by the long spell of bad wea ther .

The W a r Cabine t : ­(i) Took note of the above s ta tement .

(ii) I n v i t e d the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y and the Secre ta ry of S t a t e for A i r , in consul ta t ion w i t h t he Min i s t e r of Sh ipp ing , to examine whether convoys should be r e - in t ro ­duced for E a s t Coast sh ipp ing whi le condi t ions con­t i nued favourable to enemy a i r a t t ack .

7. The Secretary of State for War sa id t h a t one G e r m a n division w a s repor ted to have a r r ived in the W e s t from P o l a n d . One division w a s believed to have moved from the Aachen a rea to the Eife l a rea . A s a resul t of these changes, the number of divisions in the W e s t was increased by one to 100, a n d the number in the E a s t reduced by one to 38.

The R u s s i a n s h a d cont inued their a t t acks N o r t h of L a k e Ladoga , bu t w i t h o u t success. A t t e m p t s on the 26 th J a n u a r y to cross the ice South of K i t e l a h a d met w i t h heavy loss.

Elsewhere there was no th ing to repor t . The W a r Cabine t took note of the above s ta tement .

8. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t h e h a d received a le t ter f rom L o r d Ph i l l imore , w r i t t e n on behalf of L o r d P l y m o u t h as C h a i r m a n of the F i n n i s h Fund , i n q u i r i n g whether the W a r Cabinet would be represented a t the special I n t e r ­cession Service to be held in St . P a u k s Ca thed ra l on Thu r sday , the 1st Feb rua ry , 1940, a t 2 P . M . The Archb ishop of C a n t e r b u r y would t ake p a r t in the service.

The W a r Cabinet : ­(a) Ag reed t h a t the Secre tary of S ta t e for Fore ign Affairs

should inform L o r d Ph i l l imore t h a t the W a r Cabine t would be represented a t the Intercess ion Service for F i n l a n d a t St . P a u k s Ca thedra l .

[20747] c

(b) Took note t h a t the Fore ign Secre ta ry proposed himself to a t t e n d the service.

(c) I n v i t e d any o ther member of the W a r Cabine t who proposed to be p resen t to in fo rm the Secre ta ry of the W a r Cabine t accordingly.

The Far Bast. Relations with Japan : case of the s.s. Asama Maru. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 26th Conclusions, Minute 8.)

9. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d rew a t t en t ion to the fol lowing fu r the r developments in r e g a r d to the case of the s t eamsh ip Asama Maru:—

(i) The J a p a n e s e Ambassador in London (who d id not speak Engl ish very well) had a p p a r e n t l y given the J a p a n e s e Government the impress ion t h a t we m i g h t be p r e p a r e d to h a n d back all the twenty-one men whom we h a d removed from the s teamship A sama Maru. Th i s seemed to be clue to a, genu ine m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g on the p a r t of the J a p a n e s e Ambassador as to w h a t he (the Fore ign Secretary) h a d sa id a t the i r first in terv iew on the subject.

H e (the Secre tary of S ta te ) proposed, therefore, to see the J a p a n e s e Ambassador t h a t af ternoon a n d to correct any mi sunde r s t and ing . H e proposed also to take the l ine t h a t any suggest ion from the J a p a n e s e side tha t we should now r e t u r n all the twenty-one men in question would c rea te a posi t ion of ex t reme difficulty. H e would t e l eg raph to Si r Rober t C r a i g i e in the same sense.

(ii) I n te legram Mo. .159, da ted the 29th J a n u a r y , 1940, Si r Rober t C r a i g i e a rgued the quest ion whe ther in the last resor t we should be p r e p a r e d to r e t u r n all the twenty-one men. Cons idera t ion of th i s quest ion could be deferred, since Sir Rober t Cra ig i e could for the presen t hold the posi t ion on the bas is of his present ins t ruc t ions . I n the same te legram Sir Rober t Cra ig ie h a d expressed the view t h a t t he J a p a n e s e Government m i g h t be able to obtain from the G e r m a n Government an u n d e r t a k i n g tha t , if these men were allowed to r e t u r n to Germany , they would not be used for any purpose connected w i t h t he prosecut ion of the w a r ; and, whi le a d m i t t i n g t h a t l i t t le re l iance could be placed on any u n d e r t a k i n g by the G e r m a n Government , Sir Rober t asked w h a t answer he should make if such a proposal were p u t to h im by the J a p a n e s e Government . The Secre tary of S t a t e though t t h a t Si r Rober t Cra ig i e should be told tha t , if he found it impossible to secure the agreement of the J a p a n e s e Government to e i ther of the a l t e rna t ives set out in the ins t ruc t ions already conveyed to him, we should be p repa red , as a t h i r d best, to r e t u r n all the twenty-one men to the J a p a n e s e Govern­men t on receiving from the l a t t e r an u n d e r t a k i n g tha t they would be held in J a p a n , or that , if they were p e r m i t t e d to r e t u r n to Germany, the G e r m a n Govern­men t should first give an u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t they should not be p e r m i t t e d to t ake any p a r t in the wa r .

The Prime Minister t hought tha t , if cons idera t ion was to be given to such a proposal , we should t r y to make the J a p a n e s e Government accept responsibi l i ty for the due d ischarge by the G e r m a n Government of any u n d e r t a k i n g so given. This w a s the suggest ion which h a d been made by S i r Rober t Cra ig ie in his t e l egram No. 163 of the 29th J a n u a r y , 1940. Personal ly , he doubted whether , in dea l ing w i t h an or ien ta l people l ike the J a p a n e s e , i t was necessary, or even wise, a t th i s s tage to give our Ambassador p a r t i c u l a r s of th i s t h i r d a l t e rna t ive u n t i l the first two h a d been fully explored.

3)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t the J a p a n e s e Die t reassembled on the 1st Februa ry , and t h a t i t was desirable to make some progress before the Die t met. W h a t he h a d in mind was merely to give Si r Rober t Cra ig ie a genera l indica t ion of the possible courses of act ion which in ce r ta in c i rcumstances the W a r Cabinet m i g h t be p r e p a r e d to consider.

The Prime Minister sa id tha t , in view of the meet ing of the J a p a n e s e Diet , he agreed t h a t a communicat ion should be sent to S i r Rober t Cra ig ie on the lines suggested.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r e w a t t en t ion to the suggest ion conta ined in the l a t t e r p a r t of te legram No. 159 tha t , a s p a r t of an eventual set t lement. S i r Rober t Cra ig i e m i g h t be au thor i sed to convey a general message of goodwill from the P r i m e Min i s t e r to A d m i r a l Yonai , the J a p a n e s e P r i m e Minis te r . Al te rna t ive ly , p e r h a p s the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y migh t send a s imi lar message to the J a p a n e s e Min i s t e r of Mar ine .

The Prime Minister t hough t t h a t the quest ion of sending such a message did not ar ise a t th is j unc tu re . H e enqui red whether , hav ing r ega rd to the Secre tary of S t a t e ' s in ten t ion to inform the J a p a n e s e Ambassador t h a t he h a d been undu ly opt imis t ic in the r epor t which he had made to the J a p a n e s e Government , i t was sti l l desired t h a t he (the P r i m e Min is te r ) should include in the speech which he was to make on the following day a concil iatory reference to J a p a n on. the lines of the d ra f t which the Secretary of S ta te had communicated to him.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs agreed t h a t there w a s no need to consider fu r ther the suggest ion of the despatch to J a p a n of a conci l ia tory message, bu t he hoped tha t the P r i m e Minister ' would include in h i s speech a f r iendly reference to J a p a n on the l ines which he h a d suggested. I t would be very valuable if, as soon as the P r i m e Min i s te r h a d decided on the terms of th is reference, the exact text could be communicated to h im (the Secre tary of Sta te) for t ransmiss ion to Sir Rober t Cra ig ie for h is informat ion.

The W a r Cabinet agreed—­

(a) t h a t the Secretary of S ta t e for Foreign Affairs should address a te legram to H i s Majes ty ' s Ambassador , T o k y o ­(i) in fo rming h im of the communicat ion which he (the

Secre tary of Sta te) proposed to make to the J a p a n e s e Ambassador to correct the undu ly opt imis t ic repor t which he (the Ambassador) h a d sent to the J a p a n e s e Government r e g a r d i n g the eventual possibi l i ty of our h a n d i n g back to them all the twenty-one Germans - t aken from the s teamship Asama Maru;

(ii) i nd i ca t i ng in general terms the possibil i ty tha t , as a las t resort , and in order not to lose a genera l agreement w i t h the J a p a n e s e Government con­cern ing the fu tu re t r ea tmen t of Germans app ly ing for passages in J a p a n e s e ships, the W a r Cabinet m i g h t be p r epa red to consider h a n d i n g back the Ge rmans in quest ion in r e t u r n for an u n d e r t a k i n g from the J a p a n e s e Government e i ther (i) to in te rn the men in question in J a p a n , or (ii) tha t , if the men were allowed to r e t u r n to Germany, the J a p a n e s e Government would first obta in from the Ge rman Government an under ­t ak ing t h a t they would not be used for any purpose connected w i t h the prosecution of the

war , and , secondly, tha t the J a p a n e s e Government would m a k e themselves responsible for ensu r ing the due observance by the G e r m a n Government of the u n d e r t a k i n g so g iven ;

(b) t h a t the P r i m e M i n i s t e r should include in a speech on the 31st J a n u a r y , 1940, a conci l ia tory reference to J a p a n as previously proposed ; a n d t ha t , as soon as the P r i m e Min i s t e r h a d set t led the t ex t of the s t a t emen t wh ich he proposed to make in th i s connection, the t ex t should be t e legraphed to S i r Robe r t Cra ig i e for h i s i n fo rma t ion and guidance .

U.S.S.R. 10. The First Lord of the Admiralty sa id tha t , accord ing to Issue of warning a r e p o r t received from a confidential source, the Soviet Government to Sovietmerchant ships,

h a d issued orders to al l m e r c h a n t sh ips flying the Soviet flag r e t u r n home or to t ake refuge in n e u t r a l po r t s by a c e r t a in da te .

confirmed, t h i s r epo r t m i g h t not be w i t h o u t significance.

to I f

The W a r Cabine t took note of the above s ta tement .

Richmond Terrace, S. W. 1, January 30, 1940.