Bunyoro and the British

Journal of African History, IX, 4 (1968), pp. 603-619 603 Printed in Great Britain

BUNYORO AND THE BRITISH: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE CAUSES FOR THE DECLINE

AND FALL OF AN AFRICAN KINGDOM

BY M. S. M. KIWANUKA

I

THE full impact of colonial rule on African peoples, their societies and states is not yet fully assessed and the subject itself is still relatively new in colonial historiography. Consequently, some of the existing views regarding the effects of colonial rule derive from prior conviction rather than from

empirical study, and the history of Bunyoro Kitara seems to be an example in kind.1 The history of Bunyoro's decline and fall has unfortunately been more discussed than studied. We seem to know a great deal about it, largely because her oral traditions have already proved a quarry for articles in many learned journals. Yet one can equally contend that we know little, because Bunyoro's oral traditions have never been put to the test of empirical study. They have surprisingly suffered very little correction, criticism or interpretation. The aim of the present article therefore is to reappraise the existing views. It attempts to trace the causes for the decline of this African kingdom, and to evaluate the relative importance of each cause, including the coming of the British.

The disintegration of African states is generally attributed to intertribal warfare, though opinion differs on the degree of bloodiness of these wars.2 A detailed study, however, of the traditional history of Bunyoro and its neighbours before the colonial period suggests that there was no single cause for the rise or decline of states. One can isolate a number of these causes and assess their relative importance. Take, for example, the federal structure of Bunyoro. Its fundamental weakness lay in the natural in- stability of a system of feudal or near-feudal states which made up Bunyoro,3 and which tended to militate against the development of a strong central

1 Bunyoro is the country, Runyoro is the language, Kinyoro is the adjectival form (Nyoro-ish) and Mu-(s) Ba-(pl) Nyoro are the people. The first detailed record of the traditional history of Bunyoro was made by Mrs A. B. Fisher, Twilight Tales of the Black Baganda (London, I9II), by the Rev. J. Roscoe, The Bakitara (London, I923), by Bishop Gorju, Entre le Victoria, l'Albert et l'Edouard (Rennes, 1920); these were followed by P. Bikunya's Ky'Abakama ba Bunyoro (London, 1927), the accounts of K.W., the present Mukama (king) of Bunyoro, in the Uganda Journal of I935, 1936-7, and by J. W. Nyakatura, Abakama ba Bunyoro Kitara (St Justin, Canada, I947), I-304; similar studies have followed, but they all use the above as their primary sources.

2 See Basil Davidson, Black Mother (London, I963), 13I-2. Mr Davidson quotes Father Girolamo de Montesarchio, who spoke of a pitched battle between the Lord of Savo and a rebel army numbering many thousands in which only forty casualties had occurred.

3 J. Beattie, 'Bunyoro: an African feudality?', J. Afr. Hist. v, no. i (I964), 25-35. By the same author, Bunyoro: Kingdom (New York, I964).

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government. Bunyoro seems to have been weak in precisely this respect, for she had never solved the problem of how to unite the component parts of the kingdom, nor that of how to inspire loyalty in her subjects.

The situation was not helped by the existence of a ruling clan, which, though small, monopolized almost all positions of power and influence. Thus, making poor use of her human resources, there was always in Bunyoro a tendency for government to collapse, because large sections of the people were not interested in seeing that the kingdom survived. When, for instance, Prince Kaboyo carved out Toro for himself, the inhabitants are said to have supported him readily against their mother country.4 Buganda, on the other hand, had the military strength and the admini- strative efficiency which Bunyoro lacked. At the same time, it could inspire loyalty in all its subjects by allowing them to participate in national affairs. The effect was that most men of ability were always involved in the fate of their country.

Dynastic rivalries were another cause of weakness. As in Europe, these often erupted in war and secession. Though disastrous, the effects of secessions seem to have been exaggerated, presumably in order to justify the claim of the existence of a large empire.5 Detailed studies of the oral traditions of, for instance, Buganda strongly suggest that the Kinyoro claim that Buganda was once a Babito subdynasty is a patriotic fiction, one which, however, has proved extremely popular with historians. More syste- matic studies of oral traditions in other parts of the interlacustrine region are likely to reveal that, with the exception of Kooki and Toro, countries such as Kiziba have never been Babito subdynasties, although they were

subject to sporadic raids. Succession wars are as old as antiquity. Such struggles have been

regarded, and not without some justification, as a major cause of

Bunyoro's decline. The traditional history of Bunyoro lists several of

them, some of which were fought over a long period. Like all wars, these must be held responsible for the social, economic and political disintegration which were directly linked with them. Great energies went to waste, the country's manpower and generally the very flower of its youth was

destroyed. Industry came to a standstill and the economy suffered. Disease, famine and depopulation must have taken their toll as a result of this anarchy. A contemporary observer of some of these wars in Buganda during the i88os and I89os drew the conclusion that 'these were by far the most disastrous that could happen to the country, and during the few weeks that they lasted untold damage was done and great loss of life took place'.6 Nevertheless, a comparison of Kiganda and Kinyoro history suggests that the effects of succession wars upon Bunyoro may have been exaggerated.

4 Nyakatura, op. cit. 5 Ibid. Kinyoro tradition claims that Ankole, Rwanda, Buganda, Kiziba, Kooki and

Toro were all once parts of one empire. 6 J. Roscoe, The Baganda (Cambridge, I9II), 346.

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Buganda had a far longer record of these wars, as practically every successor to the throne between I700 and 1815 had to fight for it.7 Even during the nineteenth century, only two Kabakas, Sunna II and Mutesa I, ascended the throne peacefully. But even Mutesa's early years as Kabaka did not go unchallenged. Yet this was the period (I700-i880) when Buganda eclipsed Bunyoro. Constitutionally, Buganda was far more centralized than any of its neighbours, and it had become the most powerful military state in the north of the interlacustrine region. The strength of Buganda at this period may rightly be attributed to another aspect of succession wars, namely their constitutional advantage. In medieval Europe, for instance, dynastic struggles sometimes led to the strengthening of the central authority against the barons. In England the Wars of the Roses, which signify the same kind of internal struggle for power as that which prevailed in Africa, led to the rise of a powerful and authoritarian monarchy. Such a pattern seems to have manifested itself clearly in Buganda, where all the Kabakas who survived the struggles were outstanding leaders. Beginning with Kateregga, and going on to Mawanda, Kyabaggu, Junju and Semakokiro, we have men who were responsible not only for the territorial expansion of Buganda, but also for turning the monarchy into the strongest instrument of government. The weaker ones among them, such as Kabaka Namugala, chose abdication rather than face a conflict they knew they could not win.8

The centralized nature of the Kiganda monarchy has been regarded as one of the factors which tipped the balance of power between Bunyoro and Buganda. The man held responsible for this exceptionally centralized state was Kabaka Semakokiro, who inaugurated a policy of exterminating rivals, including his own sons. This policy was adopted by his successors with persistent skill, and the measure of its success may be judged by the fact that, in a period of nearly a hundred years, Semakokiro was the first Kabaka to die a natural death, and his successors had comparatively longer reigns than their predecessors. It has therefore been tempting to conclude that, by limiting the area of constitutional conflict, the policy of exterminating rivals eliminated succession wars in Buganda and thereby enabled Buganda to eclipse Bunyoro as a great power.

While it is true that Semakokiro's policy had some constitutional ad- vantages, it is equally true that it did not eliminate the scourge of succession wars. A study of the events of Semakokiro's own reign and those of his successors suggests that success in this direction was only partial. Sema- kokiro himself was never free from challenges, and he lived in constant

7 See Sir Apolo Kaggwa, Basekabaka be Buganda (I953 ed.). Kagula was overthrown by his brothers; Kikulwe, the successor, was overthrown by Mawanda. Mawanda himself was overthrown by his cousins. His successor, Namugala, was forced to abdicate by Kyabaggu. Kyabaggu himself was killed by his own sons, who nearly eliminated each other. Junju the successor of Kyabaggu was overthrown by his brother Semakokiro, who retained the throne until his death partly because of his policy of exterminating rivals.

8 Kaggwa, op. cit. 57-9. But this argument need not be overstressed because there is no conceivable reason why succession wars did not lead to the same results in Bunyoro.

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fear and had to change his capitals frequently. Moreover, after his death, his two surviving sons, Mutebi and Kamanya, had to settle the succession issue on the field of battle. It seems clear therefore that, so far as the balance of power between Buganda and Bunyoro was concerned, Semakokiro's

policy contributed nothing, because by the reigns of Suna II and Mutesa I -the two Kabakas who ascended the throne relatively peacefully-Buganda had already replaced Bunyoro as the dominant power. If succession wars

played a role (as they no doubt did) in causing Bunyoro's decline, it was not a decisive one.

But the economic way of life of the Babito was in certain respects a source of weakness. In this connexion, Professor Ingham's observation merits some consideration. He argues: 'The Babito remained at heart a cattle people and as such they had little incentive to investigate deeply the needs of a static society... Their joy lay more in raiding for cattle than in ruling.'9 This picture of Bunyoro contrasts sharply with Buganda, which was com-

paratively small and compact. The agricultural economy and sedentary population of Buganda were probably more amenable to authoritarian rule than the largely pastoralist and shifting population of Bunyoro. Never- theless, a closer examination of the political problems suggested by Bunyoro's supposed disadvantages as a pastoral country leads to the conclusion that these problems were less serious than they are often made out to be. A comparison of Kinyankole and Kinyarwanda histories tends to confirm this view, for the period of Bunyoro's decline was marked by the rise of strong monarchies, not only in the agricultural state of Buganda but also in Ankole and Rwanda.10 In the latter two countries the ruling groups of the Bahima and Batutsi, respectively, were far more pastoralists than the Babito themselves. Nor does devotion to raiding for cattle suffice as an explanation for the decline of Bunyoro. Her neighbours, particularly Buganda, were making raids far more frequently than Bunyoro itself during the late eighteenth century and

throughout the nineteenth century. In fact from about I8oo Buganda's war motives seemed to have changed from a desire for territorial aggrandize- ment to economic and material acquisition. Henceforth the hunger in

Buganda for cattle and other forms of wealth necessitated as many as

fifty expeditions in a single reign. What seems to have been far more disastrous to Bunyoro were the

territorial and economic losses she suffered partly as a result of the expansion of Ankole and Buganda, and partly due to the secession of Kooki and Toro. Loss of territory meant the loss not only of valuable grazing lands, but also of manpower, resources such as iron ore, and many other forms of wealth. During the eighteenth century Kabaka Mawanda extended

9 K. Ingham,' Some aspects of the history of western Uganda', Uganda J. xxI, no. 2 (I957), I31-49.

10 For Ankole, see H. F. Morris, A History of Ankole (Kampala, 962); Katate & Kamu-

gungunu, Abagabe Bankore (Kampala, I962). For Rwanda, see J. Vansina, L'evolution du

royaume Rwanda des origines d 1900 (Brussels, 1962), I-Ioo.

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Buganda's boundaries to the north in Bulemezi and to the west in Singo. He had also strengthened Buganda's authority in Kyaggwe, while his

exploits in the east marked the beginning of the end of Bunyoro's influence in Busoga and the resultant loss of whatever tribute Bunyoro may have received from there. Henceforth all the wealth went to Buganda, which could even draw on Kisoga manpower for war purposes. Northern Bule- mezi and Singo were cattle areas, and their annexation by Buganda inevit-

ably led to a shortage of grazing lands.11 The conquest of Buddu by Kabaka Junju and the secession of Kooki

involved large losses of further valuable grazing lands, manpower and

agricultural produce. From a military point of view, the effective extension of Kiganda rule in Kyaggwe by Mawanda, Junju's seizure of Buddu and the defection of Kooki meant that henceforth Buganda was in a position to exploit the iron deposits which were in those regions. Kiganda tradition eloquently stresses the military importance of these gains. Until then, the Baganda had been very short of iron and weapons and had had to buy their iron from Bunyoro. Now, however, Bunyoro had lost not only these metallic deposits, but also the rich reservoir of the technical know-

ledge of the smiths of Buddu and Kooki. Buddu was also important as the

gateway to and from the east coast and so to contact with the outside world. By annexing Buddu, Buganda was thus in a position to extend her

political influence to the south and to attract the first foreign travellers, such as the Zanzibaris and the European explorers and missionaries.

II

The Arab and Swahili penetration of the East African interior during the nineteenth century brought with it the twin partners, the slave-trade and firearms. In Africa as in other parts of the world, the introduction of firearms was responsible for the destruction of some societies, because warfare gradually became a more deadly affair. What must be remembered, however, is that these very firearms built up other societies. A number of

assumptions have been expressed by some scholars regarding the advent of firearms in Africa. The following statement by Wrigley about Buganda is typical of such assumptions: What the firearms did effect was the strengthening of the government's ascen- dancy over its own people and at the same time a major modification of the structure of the government. Since there were not nearly enough of the new weapons to rearm the militia as a whole, there developed a sharp cleavage between the body of the peasant spearmen, who now came to play a merely auxiliary role, and a new corps d'elite of fusiliers who decided the issue of battles. This change in military technique had consequences as far reaching in their way as the introduction of armoured cavalry in the early Middle Ages in Europe; just

11 See M. Posnansky, 'Towards an historical geography of Uganda', E. A. Geographical Review (I963), 7-20.

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M. S. M. KIWANUKA

as the possession of a horse and a suit of mail helped to create the sharp distinc- tion between armigerous and non-armigerous families...so in Buganda those who managed to acquire a firearm during the 'seventies and 'eighties of the nineteenth century were at once set apart from the mass of the population...12

Several assumptions seem to underlie this peculiar pronouncement, but we shall deal only with two which are relevant to the subject under dis- cussion. The first assumption is that firearms revolutionized the methods of warfare and eclipsed the traditional weapons soon after their introduction. The second assumption, which in fact springs from the first, is that the country which obtained firearms first immediately gained a military advantage over its neighbours. The traditional picture of the history of Buganda seems at first sight to fit into these stereotypes. For example, Buganda's supposed control of the main route to the north of the interlacustrine region has led to the belief, which is not unreasonable, that she obtained firearms before all her neighbours.13 It is also held that this acquisition of new weapons tipped the balance of power in her favour. Unfortunately these arguments have not been based on any form of critical investigation. First of all, although Swahili and Arab traders came to Buganda during the i84os, there is no evidence to show that they brought with them large quantities of firearms. No doubt supplies increased, but very slowly, and by the time of Speke and Grant's visit in I862 firearms were still sufficiently rare even to arouse the curiosity of the Kabaka himself.14

It is important to remember, however, that if Buganda controlled the flow of firearms from the east coast-and here the evidence is extremely speculative-she certainly did not control that from the north. For it is likely that the Khartoum traders or their agents reached Bunyoro in the early i86os.15 On leaving Buganda, the explorers Speke and Grant went straight to the Mukama Kamurasi's court and stayed there for two months before going to the Sudan. In 1864 another European, Samuel Baker, arrived from the north and spent nearly a year in Bunyoro.16 It is therefore reasonable to presume that these European visitors to Bunyoro left behind gifts of firearms of various makes which the Mukama could use. But, so far as Buganda was concerned, the second visit of a European was in 1874, by Chaille Long, which seems to suggest that during the i86os and I87os Buganda's contacts with the outside world with their resultant

12 The King's Men, ed. L. A. Fallers (London and Nairobi, 1964), 25. Wrigley's argument that the advent of firearms in Buganda strengthened the hold of the government over its people is not borne out by facts. The events of the I88os and I89os show that the con- trary was the case.

13 R. Dunbar, A History of Bunyoro-Kitara (Nairobi, I965), 1-253. 14 In a personal communication, Professor Oliver points out that this was a special kind

of gun. Nevertheless, the fact that by I862 the Kabaka of Buganda had not seen a gun of this particular kind suggests the relative scarcity of firearms in Buganda.

15 See J. R. Gray, History of the Southern Sudan, 1839-1889 (196I). See also G. N. Sanderson, Europe, England and the Upper Nile, 1882-99 (Edinburgh, I965).

16 S. Baker, Ismailia (London, I874).

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benefits were not better than those of Bunyoro. And, though we do not know the quantity of arms each country possessed, say during the i87os, there is no evidence to show that Bunyoro was worse off than Buganda.17

Talking about firearms today, one must be careful not to read the present back into the past. Far too little attention has been paid to the possible use of firearms. How effective were they in the early stages of their introduction? The bulk of the evidence suggests that many of the arms were inefficient, and had not been fired for years. The muzzle-loaders could even be put out of action by rain, while others burst in the hands of the users. Professor Beachey points out that they were of so little use that some Afri- cans refused to take to them.18 It seems clear therefore that the mere acquisition of firearms without training in using them was no guarantee of military success. A period of apprenticeship during which experience was gained was essential. This can be demonstrated from the history of Buganda itself. In spite of their possession of firearms during the I87os and early I88os, the Baganda lost battles against the Bavuma, the Basoga, the Banyankole and other supposedly ill-armed people. Following from this, we cannot confidently attribute Bunyoro's military plight during the second half of the nineteenth century to her non-possession of firearms. The conclusion regarding firearms and their immediate effects seems inescapable. African armies relied more on the spear and the arrow than on imported arms, and before the I89os, in the interlacustrine region at least, these traditional weapons continued to dominate the African battlefield. To attempt to explain Bunyoro's decline in terms of the possession or lack of firearms is to overstress the issue. The main causes of Bunyoro's decline and fall must be sought elsewhere.

III

In African traditional societies, as in medieval Europe, leadership and the survival of states were intimately connected. The traditional history of Bunyoro gives the impression that for a long period Bunyoro suffered from the rule of incompetent Bakama, and this at a period when her problems were far greater than those of Buganda, and when she therefore required men of greater abilities than Buganda. The importance of leadership is illustrated by the secession of Toro, and also by the succession of Kabarega to the Bunyoro throne about I869.19 Kabarega combined youth,

17 The actual quantities of firearms which passed into African hands is a subject which requires further investigation; it is beyond the scope of the present article.

18 R. Beachey, 'The arms trade in E. Africa in the late nineteenth century', J. Afr. Hist. II, no. 3 (1962), 451-67.

19 According to the history of Bunyoro, Prince Kaboyo, the founder of the kingdom of Toro, was forced to secede because his father, Kyebambe III Nyamutukura, lived so long that his ambitious sons saw no chance of ascending the throne. Confirmation of this view may be deduced from the fact that his father, Kyebambe Nyamutukura, did not contest the secession. In fact it was not until the accession of an energetic and outstanding leader to the throne of Bunyoro that the secession of Toro was seriously challenged. See also Ronald J. Harves, 'Mirambo the Napoleon of E. Africa', Tanganyika Notes and Records (1958), 0o-28.

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vigour, determination and courage. He was by far the most able of the nineteenth-century Bakama. From the period of his accession, Bunyoro was once again alive, and she probably had dreams of restoring her former

greatness. But the task was tremendous. For by this time Bunyoro had

already lost much territory to Ankole and Buganda. Kooki and Toro had seceded, and any political influence Bunyoro may once have had in Busoga was no more. In other words, she was confined almost to her present frontiers.

Kabarega's dynamism and military prowess have led historians to conclude that his life-long ambition was to recapture the territories lost to

Buganda. Thus Ingham has told us: 'Kitara was not yet a spent force...

Kabarega had reconquered Toro and a number of districts surrendered to

Buganda...Meanwhile Kabarega entered the very borders of Buganda itself as the champion of a renascent African empire at a critical moment in Buganda's history.'20 Dunbar, using Ingham as his source, has repeated the same statement, but like Ingham he has been careful not to mention the districts which Kabarega had regained from Buganda or which 'very borders' of Buganda Kabarega had entered. As a result of this preoccupation with Ganda-Nyoro rivalry, far less attention has been paid to what

Kabarega actually did, or even attempted to do, than to the speculations of the present Mukama.21 A study of the histories of Bunyoro, Buganda and Toro clearly shows that Kabarega's preoccupation and life-long ambition was the reconquest of Toro, and not of the districts lost to Buganda.

Toro, especially the region of Mwenge-an area of fine grass and plenty of water-was ideal for cattle keeping. According to Gorju:

This was the original Kitala, the seat of the ruling race (the Bakama). In this land running literally with milk and honey their wives came to wait in the shade of the kraals for the birth of their children. It was chiefly in Mwenge that the Muhima lived. Bugangazi was the province of the tombs and of the craftsmen: Mwenge was the province of the nobility.22

It is not surprising therefore that Kabarega should have been preoccupied with the reconquest of this beautiful and economically valuable country. And as a matter of fact, from the time of his accession in I869 until his

deposition in 1897, Kabarega never crossed swords with Buganda except when attacked by the latter.

The last fifteen years of the nineteenth century in Buganda were domi- nated by civil, religious and colonial wars of occupation.23 The Muslim

20 K. Ingham, 'Some Aspects...', loc. cit. 21 The present Mukama, who recorded the traditions of Bunyoro in 1934, speculated

on Kabarega's plan of reconquest of Buganda (K.W. Uganda J. I937), and he wrote: 'He was proposing to attack Buganda, and this was when he had erected his residence at Mukaiha Kinogozi, but the Europeans came before he had fulfilled his purpose...'

22 Gorju, op. cit. 41. 23 The wars of this period in Buganda are a very familiar subject, and we can only deal

with them lightly here. See M. Perham, Lugard, The Years of Adventure, 1858-1898, I

(London, 1956).

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party, which was aided by Kabarega, at one stage inflicted heavy defeat on the Christian Baganda, and this victory of one Kiganda political faction over another has been described by Mr Dunbar as a Banyoro victory over the Baganda. From there Mr Dunbar has gone on to assert that Kabarega was about to fulfil his ambition of gaining total victory over the Baganda 'only to find that their final defeat was frustrated by the British who

protected them with rifles and maxim guns'. What has been completely ignored in this case is the fact that Kabarega did not even bother to follow

up his supposed victory over the Baganda or even to exact compensation from Kabaka Kalema for the aid he had given. Instead, Kabarega was content to turn his attention to Toro, where he soon clashed with Lugard in I89I.24

Further examination of the historiography of Kiganda and Kinyoro relations reveals other assumptions. For instance, Mutesa has been por- trayed as the implacable enemy of Kabarega, whose sole aim was the destruction of the latter.25 These generalizations tend to obscure rather than clarify the nature of diplomacy, which has common features everywhere. Buganda and Bunyoro were indeed traditional rivals, as France and England were during the last two centuries. But this should not blind us to one important aspect of African wars. Although some African wars were aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy's country or even his person, this would seem to have been the exception rather than the rule. The motive of wars was generally to capture the cattle or women of one's neighbours rather than to lay waste their countries or to destroy their persons. Hence defeated rulers and claimants to the throne often took refuge in the supposed enemy countries.26 Everywhere the majority of African rulers seem to have had a common interest as rulers, and used to refer to each other as brothers or relatives. To interpret Mutesa's and Kabarega's relationships as Professor Low does, would therefore seem to be an exaggeration of the hostility between the two rulers.

IV The final and decisive contribution to the decline and fall of Bunyoro is supposed to have been made by the British. This is the stereotyped view, which has been repeated by many writers on Bunyoro. Dr Beattie's and Mr Dunbar's are perhaps the most representative examples of this point of view. Dunbar, for instance, argues that at the beginning of

24 According to Dunbar (op. cit. 84), the reason why Kabarega did not seize this opportunity for allying himself with the Muslim Baganda was that all Baganda, 'whether pagan or otherwise, were the sworn enemies of the Banyoro'.

25 See D.A. Low, Oxford D.Phil. thesis (1957). Seealso, bythesame author,' The North- ern Interior, I840-I884', in Oliver and Mathew, History of East Africa, I (I964), 297-357.

26 J. Ford and R. de Z. Hall, 'History of Karagwe', T.N.R. xxiv (I947), I-27. See also J. Cesard, 'Le Muhaya', Anthropos, xxxII (937), I5-60; Gorju, op. cit. 8I, I20.

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the period I891-99, Kabarega was again in control of the territories which had been lost. .. mainly to the emergent agricultural state of Buganda. ..His resur- gent power had already driven the Baganda back to their original boundaries... Almost immediately, however, he was faced with perils from a new direction. The partition of Africa among the European powers brought Uganda into the British sphere of influence.27

Dunbar stresses the British contribution to the downfall of Bunyoro by further asserting that 'although Kitara under Kabarega practically reconquered all the territories which had been lost, the coming of the British saved Buganda and permitted these territories to remain under Kiganda domination'.28 Beattie, referring to the period of Kabarega, comments: 'Bunyoro was still very much a power to be reckoned with; the final blow to its former greatness was struck not by the Ganda, or at least not by them alone, but by the Europeans.'29 What is valid in these assertions and what can be described as fiction?

Colonialism has justly been described by some writers as a calamity for Africa.30 And it can be abundantly demonstrated that nineteenth- century European imperialism was responsible for the disintegration of African states and the destruction of their societies. Kingdoms were re- duced to the status of districts, and rulers were dispersed or diminished to a shadow of their former greatness.31 Non-collaborating states often suffered territorial mutilation, while the collaborating states often reaped the benefits of the new regimes. Imperialism cut across ethnic boundaries and left for later generations the insuperable task of redrawing them.32 Fol- lowing the old maxim of divide and rule, the colonial regimes throve best where there were leadership disputes. These were exploited by actively supporting the so-called 'loyal' candidates against the 'rebels'. Accordingly, factions were supported against others, and in the process the traditional authority was severely undermined. In Buganda the civil and religious wars, and later those of colonial occupation, provided the British with a grand opportunity of furthering divisions. In the kingdoms of modern Toro and Ankole, the succession disputes were similarly exploited to the

27 Dunbar, op. cit. 81. 28 Ibid. 38. 29 Bunyoro: An African Kingdom, 17. 30 See Basil Davidson, Old Africa Rediscovered (London, I961), I-287, and Black

Mother. For a comprehensive study of American and European attitudes towards Africa and the Africans, see Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (London, I965). The views quoted in this book are of course pre-colonial, but they provided the background to the views held by later generations during the nineteenth century and the colonial period.

31 See A. R. Dunbar, 'The British and Bunyoro-Kitara, I891-1899', Uganda J. xxIv, no. 2 (I960), 229-41. Before the colonial period, many of the Bahaya groups in the north- west of modern Tanzania were fully fledged kingdoms, though small. See J. Cesard, loc. cit., and J. Ford and R. de Z. Hall, loc. cit.

32 The Kenya-Somali Border dispute is one of the numerous examples-see A. A. Castagno, 'The Somali-Kenyan controversy', Journal of Modern African Studies, II, no. 2 (1964), I65-88. In the same issue of the journal, see also Mesfin Wolde Mariam, 'The background of the Ethio-Somalian boundary dispute', I89-2I9.

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benefit of the British.33 In Bunyoro, where Kabarega resisted colonialism, he was deposed, deported and died in exile. In Buganda, Kabaka Mwanga was similarly treated and met with the same fate. On the west coast of Africa, King William Pepple and King Jaja of Opobo, to name but two, were deposed and deported. The catalogue of these victims of imperialism is endless, and the greatest shock to Africa was the introduction of colonial rule, when Europeans were determined to crush all opposition from the African resisters.

Contact with the outside world could be an agonizing experience, as Bunyoro, like most African countries, found to her cost. Kabarega's relations with the Europeans, which had begun with Baker, Gordon and Emin, reached their climax when Lugard arrived in i890 as the representative of the Imperial British East African Company. By now, Kabarega had already got a bad press among the Europeans as an enemy of their imperialism, and Lugard's attitude towards him was similarly hostile. By 1892 Buganda and the surrounding regions, including Bunyoro, were within the company's sphere of influence. Immediately after his arrival in Buganda, Lugard travelled westwards to enlist the Sudanese soldiers who had been left there by Emin. During the late i88os and early i89os, Buganda, the guardian and protector of Toro, was in turmoil. Kabarega had taken advantage of this situation and was in the process of reconquering Toro. Kasa- gama, the Mukama of Toro, had already been driven off the throne and had taken refuge in Buganda. But, in his march to the west, Lugard took Kasagama with him and reinstated him as a buffer against Kabarega. In order to weaken Kabarega further, Lugard built a line of forts across northern Toro, and garrisoned them with some of the Sudanese troops he had collected from the Lake Albert region.

This was the first effective blow of the British against Bunyoro. Toro's secession, which had lasted for at least two generations and which Kabarega was systematically challenging, was confirmed by the arms of the colonial power. Henceforth Kabarega's bitterness against the Europeans, who were now centred in Buganda, knew no bounds. Meanwhile Lugard's troops- a collection of riff-raff-began to lay waste the surrounding districts. This invited further reprisals from Kabarega, while Lugard became more and more convinced that nothing short of total war against this implacable African ruler would bring peace. Almost impossible conditions were put to Kabarega, such as the demand for guarantees for his good conduct and a heavy indemnity for his alleged misdeeds. Even after Lugard's departure from Buganda, the plan of his successors was to beat Kabarega by force

33 An interesting account of British violence is contained in D. A. Low's chapter' Uganda: the establishment of the protectorate, I894-I919', in History of East Africa, vol. II, ed. Harlow and Chilver (London, I965), 57-123. On the Kenya coast the Mazrui family, which had ruled for many generations, was smashed, and this meant the end of Arab dominance in that region. For an interesting account of the British military activities against the African resisters in modern Kenya, see G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (London, I966).

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of arms. Serious preparations for a final showdown were made, and soon afterwards an army of nearly I6,000 men under British leadership was sent against Kabarega. The country was overrun and Kabarega fled further north, but he carried on guerrilla warfare for some time. In I895 more troops were sent against him, armed with what were by contemporary standards heavy weapons.34

The fish had determinedly fought hard against the hook, but in I897 Kabarega was captured and deported to the Seychelles Islands. These wars against Kabarega had led to the building of another line of forts across south-eastern Bunyoro, which led to the alienation of part of her territory made up of the counties of Buyaga and Bugangazzi. This was the second serious blow dealt against Bunyoro by the British. Bunyoro's plight at the end of the century has been summed up by Dr Beattie in the following comment:

The Banyoro believed that Lugard was misled by the Ganda, and that Kabarega would have been willing to come to terms if he had been allowed to do so. They point out that his overtures were always repulsed, or else huge indemnities were asked, as though he were doing wrong in occupying and defending his own country. Nyoro believe that the British attitude towards their country was due largely to Ganda misrepresentation, and indeed the Ganda did profit hand- somely by the downfall of their old enemy. At the end of the Igth century, Bunyoro was thus in very poor shape. The country was largely depopulated by war, famine and disease. It was regarded as conquered territory, and its administration was for the most part in the hands of Ganda chiefs, who were sent there to teach the Nyoro how to govern themselves. With their King captured and exiled, their country devastated, disease and famine on all sides, and their hereditary enemies, the Ganda, lording it over them, Bunyoro's downfall was complete. Thus at a stroke the Nyoro were punished for their resistance and the Ganda rewarded for their assistance to the British campaign.35

It is appropriate to ask at this stage what the British gave to Buganda, and what they did not. The traditional view, based on the claims of the Banyoro themselves, is that seven of their former counties were given to

Buganda. These were Bulemezi, Singo, Buruli, Buwekula, Bugangazzi, Buyaga and Bugerere. This claim, however, is not based on historical

investigation, and it is in utter contradiction of the historical facts which the

present Mukama himself recorded, (as K. W.) in 1934-7. Both Nyaka- tura and K.W. agree that the northern parts of Singo had been conquered by Buganda between 1700 and 1820. The process of conquest was begun by Kabaka Kateregga, and continued by Mawanda, Mutebi and Kamanya. It was Kamanya, as Nyakatura tells us, who seized the county of Buwekula at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Much of the county of Bule- mezi was conquered by Kabakas Mawanda and Kamanya. Suna II extended Buganda's influence farther north into the modern county of Buruli.

34 A company of 6,ooo Sudanese soldiers, two Hotchkiss and three maxim guns. 35 Beattie, op. cit.

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So far as Bugerere was concerned, it is true that the northern part of the county, known as Ntimba or Namuyonjo, was still under the influence of Bunyoro when the British arrived,36 but the south-eastern part, known as Bulondoganyi, had been part of Buganda from the end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth century. The chief Namuyonjo, like all border chiefs, was semi-autonomous, changing his allegiance to Buganda or Bunyoro, depending on which country was more powerful.

So the picture when the British arrived was that Bunyoro had political influence (if she actually did not rule) in the northern parts of Bugerere. She had none in Bulemezi, Singo and Buwekula. Elsewhere Kinyoro influence in northern, eastern and western Uganda was also curbed. The only counties which were effectively under Kinyoro sovereignty were Buyaga and Bugangazzi. It was in these two counties that the royal graves of Bunyoro lay, and it is correct to describe these counties as 'lost', because their

36 This is discussed in greater detail in M. S. M. Kiwanuka, London Ph.D. thesis (1965), unpublished.

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incorporation into Buganda was effected by the British. What has remained unclear to many writers was the nature of their incorporation. Were they a gift to the collaborating regime in Buganda and a punishment to the Banyoro resisters? To answer these questions one needs to examine the history of British expansion in Uganda. The evidence clearly shows that it was not the so-called Uganda Agreement of 900o which conferred the counties on Buganda.

In pursuing Kabarega, Colonel Colville had in 1894 announced the annexation of Buyaga and Bugangazzi, but by this time the Uganda Protectorate had not yet been extended to Bunyoro. When in 1896 Commissioner Berkeley again announced the annexation, he was merely reaffirming Colonel Colville's announcement, and this time the Foreign Office gave its approval. The i900 Agreement merely confirmed the annexation, because it did not replace the previous announcements of the annexations which had been made in 1894 and I896. And it is clear from the evidence that these annexations were made chiefly in British military interests and for their convenience. They were never intended as a gift to Buganda.37 But the question still remains: What was the real extent of the empire of Bunyoro Kitara as opposed to that put forward in the sentimental claims of the Banyoro? We have been told that Kabarega was already in control of territories formerly lost to Buganda when the British intervened, but no historian has stated what these territories were, and the reason for this discreet silence is simply that there were none. So far as Toro is concerned, it is a fact that Kabarega was in the process of conquering it when the British intervened. However, one is still forced to ask whether Kabarega could have held Toro successfully even if the British had not intervened. It was nearly twenty years since he had come to the throne, but during these two decades he had not succeeded in recapturing Toro. And, even when he took advantage of the period of turmoil in Buganda in the late i88os and early i89os, his success was only partial.

There is another question which must be considered about the 'renascent African empire'. Tradition tells us that one of the causes of its downfall was its vastness and loose federal structure. Now Kabarega was fighting on the western frontier to reconquer the lost territories. By so doing he had, like many of his predecessors, left his frontiers in the east open to attacks and possible seizure by the Baganda. It is not unlikely therefore that Kabarega's preoccupation with the affairs of the west would have resulted in further loss of territory to Buganda. With regard to northern Uganda, although the region of Equatoria is supposed to have been Kinyoro territory, it is the view of the present writer that Kinyoro influence there was recent, dating from the years of the Mukama Kamurasi when he fought against Ruyonga. When Kabarega came under increased pressure from the

37 This question has been comprehensively discussed by A. D. Roberts, 'The sub- imperialism of the Baganda', J. Afr. Hist. iii (1962), 435-50; 'The lost countries of Bunyoro', Uganda J. xxvI, no. 2 (1962), I94-9.

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south at the beginning of the I89os, he was driven farther and farther to the north and thereby extended his influence, which, however, was too transient. In this respect, northern Uganda cannot be counted as one of the lost provinces.38

V

There has been much speculation as to whether the British Administration might not have co-operated with Bunyoro in the conquest of the rest of the interlacustrine region had it begun its take-over from the north instead of from the south; whether Uganda today might not be known as Unyoro; and whether, instead of using Baganda agents, the British might not have used Banyoro. This speculation is given force because of the belief among certain historians that Kabarega's failure to negotiate with the British was the cause of his downfall, and that this failure was largely due to the hostile influence of the Baganda. Also, Dunbar has speculated that, if Lugard had entered Bunyoro from the north, he might well have found himself the ally of Bunyoro against Ankole, Buganda and Toro. As it was, the Baganda chiefs, greedy for territory and spoil, probably threw diffi- culties in the way of Kabarega coming to terms with the British authorities.39 It is worth pointing out in this connexion that the use of Banyoro instead of Baganda agents by the colonial administration depended less on the direction from which the British initially came than on the existing system of administration and the dynamic ability shown by the people, which, in the case of the Baganda, impressed and influenced the British. Although the Kiganda and Kinyoro systems of administration were basically the same, that of Buganda had achieved a degree of cohesive- ness and efficiency which was far superior to the Kinyoro one. The men who operated this system were just as able, and reacted to the new changes with remarkable success. The views of many writers on this subject unfortunately tend to ignore the nature of European imperialism and the determination of the colonial powers to smash all kinds of opposition to their rule. Once the British or any other colonial power had decided to take over a country or throw their weight on the balance of African rivalries, they could not withdraw without accepting their own defeat or that of their allies,40 especially as such defeat would have meant victory for their 'enemies'. Moreover, prestige, which has always meant so much in politics, especially those of alien rule, was at stake. Writing about the Ethiopian defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896,

38 Most of the available sources tend to confirm this view. See Sir John Gray, 'Acholi history', Uganda J. xv, no. 2 (1951), 12I-43; also 'The Alur legend of Sir Samuel Baker and the Omukama Kabarega', Uganda J. xv, no. 2 (195 ), I87-90.

39 Dunbar, op. cit. p. 82. His statement here is a little puzzling because he goes on to add: 'on three occasions, Mwanga, Kabaka of Buganda, sent messengers to Kabarega saying that Mwanga would intercede on his behalf with the British'. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Dunbar's conviction that the Baganda were determined to see the Banyoro crushed.

40 See Curtin, op. cit. 315.

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Sir Arthur Hardinge, the Commissioner of the East African Protectorate, stressed to Lord Salisbury that European prestige had been dealt a stag- gering blow. Anxious to justify his own military ventures against the Ogadens so as to forestall such a calamity as that which had happened to the Italians, he claimed: 'These people must learn submission by the bullet-it is the only school; after that you may begin more modern and humane methods of education... In Africa to have peace you must first teach obedience and the only tutor who impresses the lesson properly is the Sword.'41 The views of Commissioner Hardinge were not confined to the new rulers of the East African Protectorate. They were typical of all the colonial powers, particularly at the beginning of their rule.

In Uganda, one finds that the views of Sir Hesketh Bell, the first governor, were almost identical with those of Hardinge. Writing about the Bagisu of north-eastern Uganda, Bell recorded that he would send two companies of King's African Rifles to make the Bagisu come into line with the rest of the people in the Protectorate. He went on to say 'that hardly a year passed without the need of punishing some of those "wild tribes ", and concluded that "nothing but a show of force" would induce them to mend their ways'.42 But one might ask, as Professor Low has done in a brilliant exposition of the British use of violence against the African resisters, what business of Bell's it was that the Bagisu should waylay traders. These, like all the other African resisters, found no reason why they should accept colonial rule without protest: they had never been a party to any European colonial agreements, nor heard of Acts of Parliament or of Orders in Council.43 But again, as Low has aptly observed, the issues were to be settled not by answers to questions such as these, but by a few fusillades from the King's African Rifles. 'It was not a question of law and right, but one of force and power.'44 It seems clear therefore that, faced with Kabarega's opposition, the British would have acted just as they did regard- less of what their African allies said. In view of this it was not surprising that even the Kabaka of the Baganda met with the same fate as Kabarega, because he too had challenged and resisted the imposition of European colonialism.

SUMMARY

The problem raised in this paper is fundamentally that of the value of oral traditions used as historical sources. There is a tendency to accept them uncritically and thereby to perpetuate myths which a little critical investigation would have ended years before. The present writer has attempted to demonstrate that a historian dealing with traditional history must widen his field far beyond the oral traditions which are of immediate interest to him. Like other sources,

41 Hardinge to Salisbury, 24 April 1897, F.O. 107/77, quoted by G. H. Mungeam, op. cit. 30.

42 H. H. J. Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life (London, 1946), I28. 43 D. A. Low, chapter mentioned in footnote 33 above, pp. 59-60. 44 Ibid.

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comparisons with and the cross-checking of the traditions of other countries are essential factors in reconstructing the pre-colonial history of Africa. The results of such an exercise have been shown in this paper, the main purpose of which has been to trace and reassess the causes for the decline and fall of Bunyoro, by using not only the oral traditions of Bunyoro, as has been the

practice hitherto, but also those of her neighbours such as Ankole, Buganda, Busoga, Kiziba and Ruanda. The results have shown that the effects of succession wars were less disastrous than is often believed. But the economic and territorial losses, coupled with the persistent lack of able leadership, were more important than the so-called federalism of the Babito. For a semi-

pastoralist population, cattle plagues may have been as disastrous as other factors.45 The British no doubt played a role, but it deserves less emphasis than it has hitherto received. By the time of their arrival Bunyoro had declined almost beyond recovery, and it is doubtful whether Kabarega could even have retained Toro. The British treatment of Bunyoro and Kabarega was typical of the reactions of colonial regimes against African resisters. Some of the questions raised in the concluding paragraphs regarding the possible future of Bunyoro had not the British intervened are perhaps too speculative. Nevertheless, they are worth asking, if the history of Bunyoro is to be seen in the right perspective.

45 Karagwe, for instance. Ford and Hall have pointed out that cattle epizootics during the late nineteenth century played a decisive role in ruining these semi-pastoral kingdoms.

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Documents

Bunyoro and the British