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Buffett’s  Addiction  

     

©  2013  ·  Phoenix  Capital  Research,  OmniSans  Publish,  LLC.  All  Rights  Reserved.  Protected  by  copyright  laws  of  the  United  States  and  international  treaties.  This  newsletter  may  only  be  used  pursuant  to  the  subscription   agreement   and   any   reproduction,   copying,   or   redistribution   (electronic   or   otherwise,  including  on  the  world  wide  web),  in  whole  or  in  part,  is  strictly  prohibited  without  the  express  written  permission  of  OmniSans  Publishing,  LLC.  ·  All  Rights  Reserved.  

   

 

 

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The  old  man  paused  to  lift  his  drink.    “I  can  understand  this,”  he  said  pointing  at  the  can.  “I  mean,  you  can  understand  this,  anyone  can  understand  this…  This  is  a  product  that  hasn’t  been  changed  much  since  1886.  It’s  a  simple  business…”    In  front  of  him,  the  audience  of  MBA  graduates  sat  dead  silent,  hanging  on  his  every  word.  These  young  men  and  women  had  spent  most  of  their  lives  sitting  in  classrooms  listening  to  lectures.  And  yet,  instead  of  rushing  to  the  nearest  bar  to  celebrate  their  graduation,  they  sat  and  listened  to  the  old  man  for  nearly  an  hour.      No  one  interrupted.  No  one  yawned  or  got  up  to  leave  even  when  the  old  man  rambled  about  castles  and  dragons.  Instead,  they  listened  as  though  their  livelihood  depended  on  it.      In  many  ways  it  did…    When  it  comes  to  investing,  book  learning  and  actual  experience  are  wholly  different.  These  students  of  business  and  investing  had  just  spent  tens  of  thousands  of  dollars  learning  the  former.  The  man  in  front  of  them,  Warren  Buffett,  specialized  in  the  latter.  And  few  things  are  as  educational  to  an  investor  as  hearing  Buffett  explain  how  he  became  the  richest  man  in  the  world  by  investing  in  “simple”  businesses  like  Coke.    

Buffett’s Addiction  August 28, 2013

In This Issue

• Reagan’s Tax Reform created a unique investment vehicle.

• The only dividend when

investor keep more than the tax man.

• A clean energy empire with a

6% yield. • Where the super-rich park

their capital.    

 

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According  to  Amazon.com,  there  are  over  3,500  books  on  or  about  Warren  Buffett.  An  entire  industry  has  sprung  up  around  trying  to  understand  how  he  does  what  he  does.  There  are  even  investment  newsletters  whose  entire  strategy  is  to  follow  his  actions.    However,  hearing  Buffett  explain  himself  in  his  own  words,  it’s  clear  than  99%  of  what’s  written  about  him  is  wrong.  For  Buffett,  there  is  no  model  or  formula  for  investing.  Instead  he  focuses  exclusively  understanding  the  business  he  is  buying  and  buying  it  at  a  reasonable  price.    During  his  entire  50-­‐minute  lecture  to  Florida’s  MBA  graduates,  Buffett  didn’t  mention  P/E  ratios  once.  In  fact,  very  little  of  his  talk  even  involved  financial  metrics.  Anyone  who  wasn’t  familiar  with  his  track  record  would  have  thought  they  were  listening  to  a  very  successful  businessman,  not  a  guy  who  picks  stocks  for  a  living.    And  they  would  be  right.    A  stock  picker  would  have  sold  Coke  at  its  peak  in  the  late  ‘90s.  In  fact,  a  stock  picker  probably  wouldn’t  have  invested  in  Coke  in  the  first  place,  since  the  business  is  not  particularly  glamorous  or  exciting.    However,  Buffett,  as  one  of  Coke’s  largest  business  owners,  would  note  the  following:    

• Based  on  his  purchase  price  ($3-­‐$4  per  share)  he  is  recouping  50%  a  year  on  dividends  alone.  

• Coke  is  an  inflation-­‐proof  business.  It  can  continually  raise  its  prices  without  damaging  sales.  

 The  final  point  is  the  ultimate  for  any  Buffett  business.  Looking  over  the  investments  he  made  in  the  latter  half  of  his  career⎯the  ones  that  made  him  the  richest  man  in  the  world  ⎯  he  almost  invariably  bought  companies  that  could  raise  their  prices  in  line  with  inflation…  or  better  yet,  hide  inflation  through  a  variety  of  methods.      One  of  the  biggest  myths  perpetuated  by  the  investment  community  is  the  notion  that  inflation  always  results  in  higher  prices.  Most  corporations  are  aware  that  they  cannot  simply  raise  prices  every  time  their  costs  go  up.  If  they  did,  their  customers  would  take  their  business  to  a  competitor.      As  a  result  of  this,  companies  resort  to  a  number  of  strategies  to  maintain  prices  without  hurting  their  sales.  One  of  the  most  common  tactics  is  to  sell  less  product  at  the  same  price  by  using  smaller  packages.    

 

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As  the  article  below  summarizes,  Kellogg’s  has  reduced  15%  of  the  cereal  in  its  boxes.  Snickers  has  reduced  its  bars  by  11%.    Haagen-­‐Das  has  reduced  content  by  12.5%.  Heinz  Ketchup  has  reduced  content  by  11%,  etc.  

 U.S.  Companies  Shrink  Packages  as  Food  Prices  Rise  

   Large  food  companies  have  recently  announced  that  they  will  raise  the  prices  they  charge  grocery  retailers  for  commodities-­‐based  products.  For  example,  a  chocolate  bar  will  cost  more  soon:  Hershey  last  week  announced  a  10%  increase  for  most  of  its  confectionery  goods.    Of  course,  straightforward  price  hikes  could  cause  consumers  to  buy  less  of  those  products  or  to  choose  less  costly  store  brands.  So  in  many  cases,  food  companies  are  trying  a  different  tactic:  Keeping  the  price  of  an  item  the  same  while  decreasing  the  amount  of  food  in  the  package.  The  company  recoups  the  costs  of  the  rise  in  commodities  and  hopes  consumers  don't  notice  that  they're  getting  less  of  the  product  for  the  same  price.    http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/04/04/u-­‐s-­‐companies-­‐shrink-­‐packages-­‐as-­‐food-­‐prices-­‐rise/  

 Another  policy  employed  by  companies  to  maintain  profits  is  to  swap  out  higher  quality  ingredients  for  lower  quality/  lower  cost  alternatives.    

Reuters  is  reporting  that  many  of  America's  major  brands  have  been  quietly  tweaking  their  coffee  blends.  While  most  coffee  companies  consider  their  blends  trade  secrets,  and  are  loath  to  disclose  exactly  what  goes  into  them,  both  circumstantial  and  direct  evidence  suggests  they're  now  substituting  lower-­‐grade  Robusta  beans  for  some  of  their  pricier  Arabica,  and  degrading  the  quality  of  our  coffee…  

 At  least  one  coffee  roaster  has  admitted  it.  In  November,  Massimo  Zanetti  USA,  which  roasts  for  both  Chock  full  o'Nuts  and  Hills  Bros.,  publicly  confirmed  upping  its  Robusta  usage  by  25%  this  year.    Why  the  switcheroo?  Prepare  to  not  be  shocked.  The  answer  is:  price.    Last  year,  a  shortage  of  Arabica  caused  prices  of  the  premium  bean  to  spike  as  high  as  $3  a  pound  -­‐-­‐  $2  more  than  what  a  pound  of  Robusta  would  cost.  This  compares  to  a  five-­‐year  historical  trend  of  Arabica  costing  closer  to  70  cents  more  than  Robusta.  In  recent  weeks,  the  trend  has  reversed,  with  Arabica  prices  falling  to  just  a  62-­‐cent  premium  over  Robusta.  

 

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 http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/06/19/noticed-­‐that-­‐your-­‐coffee-­‐tastes-­‐funny-­‐heres-­‐why/?a_dgi=aolshare_twitter    

Warren  Buffett  made  the  vast  majority  of  his  fortune  by  focusing  on  investments  that  can  either  raise  prices  or  engage  in  the  above  strategies  to  maintain  profits  during  periods  of  inflation  (between  the  1960s  when  he  started  investing  and  today,  the  US  Dollar  has  lost  over  80%  of  its  value).    In  the  case  of  Coke,  a  can  of  Coke  cost  under  15  cents  per  can  in  1964.  Today  it  costs  between  50  cents  and  75  cents  depending  on  whether  you  buy  it  in  a  24-­‐pack  or  from  a  vending  machine.  That’s  a  233-­‐400%  price  increase.  And  Coke’s  business  has  only  grown  throughout  that  period.    Buffett  calls  this  quality  “economic  goodwill.”  The  basic  notion  is  that  the  company  has  a  grip  on  people’s  minds  that  precludes  them  from  balking  at  price  increases.  Gas  prices  go  up  to  $3.50  and  people  start  driving  less.  However,  when  a  can  of  Coke  goes  from  $1.00  to  $1.25,  people  just  keep  on  drinking  it  by  the  case.    My  friends,  when  you  can  grow  sales  while  simultaneously  raising  the  price  of  your  product,  you  will  make  a  ton  of  money.  And  few  companies  can  do  this  better  than  this  month’s  pick.      As  most  of  you  have  no  doubt  guessed  by  now,  I’m  talking  about  Coco-­‐Cola  (KO).    Buffett  is  the  largest  single  owner  of  KO’s  stock.  All  told  he  owns  8%  of  the  company.    If  you  listen  to  Buffett’s  analysis  of  the  company  you  quickly  realize  why  this  is  his  single  favorite  investment.    Among  other  things,  KO  sells  a  product  that    

1) Has  changed  very  little  if  at  all  in  the  last  100  years.  2) Is  extremely  inelastic  from  a  price  perspective  (meaning  if  you  raise  prices,  consumers  

don’t  demand  less).    3) Has  no  taste  memory:  you  can  drink  six  Cokes  a  day  and  never  get  sick  of  the  taste.    

 Other  than  water,  there  is  no  other  foodstuff  on  the  planet  that  can  be  consumed  as  frequently  as  Coke  without  the  consumer  becoming  sick  of  the  taste.  For  this  reason  KO  meets  almost  every  criteria  Buffett  looks  for  in  a  company.  And  this  is  why  he  refuses  to  sell  it  no  matter  what  its  share  price  is  doing.    This  last  point  is  key.    

 

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 Let’s  say  tomorrow  Coke  collapsed  from  $55  to  $25  per  share.  Most  investors  would  panic  and  sell.  I,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  buying  greedily.  Why?  Because  Coke’s  business  has  a  fundamental  value.  Even  during  a  Financial  Crisis  and  Depression,  people  will  continue  to  drink  soda.    So  the  opportunity  to  buy  Coke  at  $25  a  share  (which  would  be  7-­‐8  times  cash  flow)  would  be  truly  an  extraordinary  opportunity.  Indeed,  from  an  income  perspective  alone,  the  opportunity  here  would  be  fantastic.      Consider  that  in  2009,  Coke  paid  out  $1.76  in  dividends.  With  shares  at  $55,  this  means  a    dividend  yield  of  3.2%  (roughly  three  times  what  you’d  get  by  leaving  your  money  in  a  savings  account).      However,  if  Coke  shares  fell  to  $25,  that  $1.76  suddenly  becomes  a  7%  yield  ($1.75/  $25.00).  That’s  a  heck  of  a  return  from  an  income  perspective.  Even  if  globally  the  world  entered  a  sharp  Depression  and  Coke’s  income  fell  by  30%,  pulling  its  payouts  down  to  $1.23,  you’re  still  looking  at  a  5%  yield.    Indeed,  companies  like  Coke  offer  the  potential  of  REAL  value  should  their  share  prices  drop.  Their  fundamentals  almost  ALWAYS  outperform  investor  sentiment.  What  I  mean  by  this  is  that  should  there  be  another  Collapse,  Coke’s  share  price  will  almost  certainly  fall  MORE  from  its  current  levels  than  Coke’s  cash  payouts  or  income  will  from  theirs.      During  2008,  Coke  shares  fell  30%  or  so.  However,  Coke  actually  INCREASED  its  dividend  that  year.  Anyone  who  bought  Coke  in  October  2008,  now  collects  a  4%  yield  on  their  shares  (four  times  what  he  or  she  would  get  from  a  bank  account).    This  is  why  companies  like  Coke  remain  so  strong  during  times  of  Crisis.  With  the  FDIC  broke  and  most  US  banks  insolvent,  investors  desperately  need  a  place  to  park  cash  that  will  still  EXIST  in  a  few  years.  Companies  like  Coke  are  a  reasonable  alternative  to  a  savings  account  in  the  sense  that  you’re  paid  a  higher  yield  for  your  deposit  (now  3%,  but  5%  or  higher  if  Coke  shares  plunge).      Buffett  currently  collects  a      Buffett  first  bought  Coke  back  in  1988.  Now,  we  can't  be  sure  of  the  exact  date  because  the  available  SEC  filings  don't  go  back  that  far,  but  Buffett's  1988  letter  to  Berkshire  Hathaway  shareholders  announces  that  he'd  purchased  $592  million  worth  of  the  company  by  the  year's  end.      

 

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However,  we  do  know  that  Coke's  1988  market  cap  was  $16  billion.  That  same  year,  Coke  had  $8  billion  in  sales  and  $1  billion  in  earnings.  Using  the  above  market  cap  numbers,  we  can  determine  the  following  valuation  for  Coke's  business  in  1988:      

     1988  Market  Cap   $16.3  billion  

Sales   $8.3  billion  P/S   1.9x  

Earnings   $1.03  billion  P/E   15.8x  

   So  investing  legend  Warren  Buffett  bought  Coke  when  it  was  trading  a  little  under  two  times  sales  and  a  little  over  15  times  earnings.  Moreover,  KO  was  growing  cash  flow  at  an  average  of  21%  per  year.      

    Coke's  Current   Buffett's  Buy  Range  P/E   21x   15.8x  P/S   4x   1.9X  

 Today,  Coke  is  more  expensive…  but  it’s  also  a  heck  of  a  lot  more  profitable.    In  1988,  Coke  had  gross  margins  of  57%.  Today,  they're  60%.  In  1988,  net  margins  were  12%.  Today,  they're  18%.  And  Coke  continues  to  grow  at  an  astounding  pace.  Indeed,  the  company  has  more  than  tripled  revenues  since  Buffett  bought  the  company.  Heck,  it’s  more  than  DOUBLED  revenues  in  the  last  10  years  alone!      Simply  put,  Coke  is  now  a  larger,  more  profitable  and  faster  growing  company  than  when  Warren  Buffett  first  bought  it.  In  this  context,  as  well  as  the  current  liquidity  fueled  market,  KO  is  going  to  be  more  expensive  than  it  was  when  Buffett  bought  it.    Action  to  Take:  Buy  Coco-­‐Cola  (KO)    Good  Investing!    Graham  Summers  Chief  Market  Strategist  Phoenix  Capital  Research      

 

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OPEN POSITIONS

STOCK PICKER ELITE PORTFOLIO

*  Prices  as  of  market’s  close  08/28/13  

POSITION SYMBOL BUY DATE

BUY PRICE

CURRENT/ SELL

PRICE GAIN/ LOSS

Nvidia   NVDA   6/26/2013   $14.14   $14.52   3%  Enterprise   EPD   7/31/2013   $62.03   $59.72   -­‐4%  Coke   KO   8/28/2013   $36.96   NEW   BUY!