Bruckner, "Considerations on the Morality of Meat Consumption"

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Considerations on the Morality of Meat Consumption:

Hunted-Game versus Farm-Raised Animals

Donald W. Bruckner

Introduction

There are debates in the animal rights and environmental ethics literatures

concerning the morality of hunting. There are also debates in the literature con-

cerning the ethical treatment of farm animals. The discussions to date, however,

have systematically overlooked one central question relevant to both debates:What is the moral status of consuming meat produced from hunted-game animals

in comparison to the moral status of consuming meat produced from farm-raised

animals?1 In this paper, I argue that eating meat from hunted-game animals is

morally preferable to eating meat from farm-raised animals. To take some of the

roughness out of this claim, I need to add some provisos and delineate the topic

more precisely.

First, for the purposes of this paper, we must set aside hunting without an

intention of consuming the game killed. At least three (non-exclusive and non-

exhaustive) subcategories of hunting fall into this category. (1) Trophy hunting ishunting in order to have all or some part of the killed animal mounted for display.

For instance, one might go on a pheasant hunt in order to kill a brilliant cock and

have it mounted by a taxidermist. (2) Sport hunting is hunting for the challenge of

hunting, as recreational activity. For example, a “Grand Slam” hunter attempts to

take a ram from each of the four types of North American wild sheep, in order to

meet this very difficult challenge. (3) Varmint or nuisance animal hunting is

hunting for the purpose of reducing the population of animals that cause some

kind of damage to property or otherwise interfere with human activity, but the

meat of which is usually not consumed. Examples include hunting crows that eatgerminating corn seed or coyotes that prey on livestock.2 I set these aside because

each of these subcategories of hunting is different enough from the type of hunting

I shall treat, hunting for the sake of meat consumption, that a discussion of its

morality would necessarily differ from the discussion to follow.3 More to the

point, these are set aside since they are not directly relevant to the main topic of

concern here, which is consumption of hunted meat in comparison to farm-raised

meat.

Second, we must set aside three types of hunting, the moral statuses of which

are certainly questionable, whether done for the purpose of meat consumption ornot. First, we set aside hunting in conditions other than fair chase. Fair chase



hunting can be defined as hunting free-ranging wild animals in a sporting and

lawful way, in a manner that does not give the hunter an improper advantage over

such animals.4

What is “sporting” or “an improper advantage” is a subject of debate among hunters,5 but some of the things ruled out are clear. For example, it

is unsporting and takes improper advantage to target animals trapped in deep snow

or to “jacklight” deer (shine light in their eyes at night causing them to stand still

and make easy targets). Second, we must set aside hunting game without taking

due care to see that the game is humanely dispatched. This due care requires the

selection of a proper hunting instrument and ammunition, and learning the basic

ballistics and effective range of the ammunition. This involves practice to develop

shooting proficiency and learn one’s own capacity and limitations. It also requires

learning the basic anatomy of the game one is hunting in order to ensure a clean,one-shot kill, as well as the proper selection of shooting opportunities while afield.

Third, we must set aside hunting animals whose populations cannot sustain being

hunted. State game agencies usually ensure this by employing game biologists

who examine (among other things) population trends, habitat, niche, ecosystem

changes, hunter success statistics, and carrying capacities,6 and who then set

hunting seasons and harvest limits.

At last, then, our topic is hunting animals whose populations can sustain

hunting, with the intention of consuming their meat, under conditions of fair chase

when the hunter takes due care to humanely dispatch the game.7

Having clarifiedwhat kind of hunting is at issue, we should clarify what kind of farming is at issue

as well. The farming practices I wish to criticize and set against hunting are most

often associated with industrialized agriculture or “factory” farming. This type of

farming has been widely discussed in the philosophical literature and in the

popular press. Some of the morally questionable aspects of industrialized live-

stock production will be described in Section 1.1. For now my thesis can be stated

as: eating meat that has been hunted as described is morally preferable to eating

meat that has been farm-raised, where “farm-raised” means “raised, transported,

and slaughtered under a system of industrialized agriculture.”Finally, we must note the very limited purpose of this paper. This paper

remains agnostic on the issue of whether consuming meat is morally permissible.

The limited topic of this paper is the moral status of consuming farm-raised meat

in comparison to the moral status of eating hunted meat. So I am not taking a

position on the rightness or wrongness of meat consumption considered merely as

such but am instead taking a position on the moral status of consuming farm-

raised meat relative to the moral status of eating hunted meat. Therefore, my

arguments and thesis can be accepted regardless of one’s position on the morality

of meat consumption considered in itself. In particular, someone who holds that allmeat consumption is wrong can retain that position and also accept my thesis that

consuming factory farm raised meat is morally inferior to eating hunted meat

312 Donald W. Bruckner



human value more generally. The central arguments are based on welfare. In the

first section, the claim is that the net effect on animal welfare brought about by

consuming hunted-game animals is superior to the net effect on animal welfarefrom consuming factory-farmed animals. Similarly, the second section argues that

the net effect for human welfare is better from consuming hunted-game animals

rather than factory-farmed animals. Since a non-utilitarian moral theory can place

moral weight on animal and human welfare, these arguments do not presuppose

that some version of utilitarianism is the correct moral theory. Finally, in Section

3, I consider a series of important objections to my arguments and claims, and

further develop the views developed in the first two sections in response to these

objections.

1. Animal Welfare

I assume that there is such a thing as animal welfare, that rough comparisons

of welfare can be made, and that animal welfare has moral force. All else equal,

animal welfare ought to play a role in our moral decisions.

1.1 Life and Death on the Factory Farm

The abuses of factory-farmed animals are well established. The philosophicaland scientific literatures, as well as the popular news media, contain scores of

accounts of the living, transportation, and slaughter conditions of such animals.

These accounts make a convincing case that many factory-farmed animals are

often ill-treated and suffer discomfort and pain, to put it mildly. Mother pigs

(sows) live in isolated gestation crates that are too small for the pig even to turn

around.8 The veal industry has long been criticized for raising the male offspring

of dairy cattle in confined spaces to limit movement in an attempt to improve the

growth and appearance of the meat.9 Unnatural selection among strains of broiler

chickens has led to chickens that gain muscle weight so fast relative to the gain inbone strength that leg abnormalities and lameness often occur.10 Design of housing

systems and methods of handling spent laying hens on their way to slaughter have

been criticized in the scientific literature for resulting in an “unacceptably high”

number of broken bones.11 Injury and death of pigs during transport is a serious

problem. One report from the National Pork Board claims that 420,000 hogs are

injured in transit each year, while 170,000 die.12 At least one cattle slaughterhouse

has been criticized for sometimes dismembering fully conscious cattle.13 At one

processing plant, the scalding of live pigs that had not been properly stunned has

been documented.

14

These are merely examples of what I take as established, thatfactory-farmed animals often suffer in their lives, transportation, and slaughter.15

Compare the situation of factory farmed animals with that of wild animals

Morality of Meat Consumption 313



those of unconfined wild pheasants, turkeys, or geese. It seems reasonable to

believe that the welfare of animals kept in confinement is lower than that of

unconfined animals. One of the reasons to believe that animals kept in confine-ment fare less well than those that are not confined is that confinement frequently

limits the range of natural behavior that an animal can perform. For example, a

wild boar can root and nest, but a confined pig cannot. There is good scientific

evidence that animals unable to engage in some natural behaviors suffer stress, as

indicated by increased levels of stress hormones.16 Certainly not every wild animal

will live under less stress or pain than every factory-farmed animal, but just

considering that factory-farmed animals are generally confined and wild animals

are not, it seems reasonable to conclude that, on average, the living conditions of

wild-game animals are better for them than the living conditions of factoryfarm-raised animals are for factory farm-raised animals.17

Game animals are not transported to slaughter. The analogue of transportation

of factory-farmed animals in the case of hunted game might be the hunting itself.

Hunting certainly can cause fear and stress to the animal hunted equal to or great-

er than the stress involved in some forms of transportation of farm animals to

slaughter. No doubt flushed upland game birds (e.g., grouse, pheasant, quail), or

waterfowl landing into decoys and being shot at suffer stress, as do rabbits chased

out of a thicket and the members of a group of deer, some of which have just been

shot. Yet, this stress is fleeting (the frightened game either escapes or is killed bythe shot), and unlike, for instance, the prolonged torture-like state that hogs can be

subjected to without food or water in the back of a tractor trailer. Moreover, this

stress of being hunted is not unlike the stress that might be inflicted by a natural

predator, such as a fox or hawk.

Finally, what can we say about the death of the hunted animal in compari-

son to the death of a factory farm-raised animal? Recall that we are considering

only hunting where the hunter takes due care to ensure a clean and humane kill.

Does the game animal experience pain with such a kill? The best answer here

is “sometimes,” as the answer will depend on the case. A wild turkey, forinstance, that is hit in the head and neck with several shot pellets from a rea-

sonable range will die immediately due to the instant devastation of the central

nervous system. Death may not be instantaneous for a big game animal (e.g.,

deer, bear, sheep) even in the case of a textbook broadside hit to the heart/lung

region with adequate ammunition. An animal hit in such a manner, however,

usually runs less than one hundred yards in a matter of seconds, during which

time the brain is starved of oxygen due to loss of blood pressure, consciousness

is lost, and the animal dies. It has been established that slaughterhouses fre-

quently do not take due care to ensure the same rapid death for farm animals.

18

Thus, from the standpoint of the actual death experience and the care taken to

avoid needless suffering hunted game animals would seem to fare better than




than for a factory-farmed animal. It is important to stress that it is the average and

the whole package that is of concern. It would be easy to point out individual cases

where, for example, the stress caused by hunting an individual animal is greaterthan the stress caused by transportation of the specific animal the hunter would

otherwise have consumed. Thus, the emphasis on the average is important. As

well, one might claim, for example, that the comparison between the life of av-

erage wild animals and the life of average factory-farmed animals is too close to

call.19 Nevertheless, the whole package of life, transportation (or hunting), and

death experience is still plausibly much better for hunted-game animals than for

factory-farmed animals, even if the comparison for a particular component of the

package is questioned.

Thus, from the standpoint of animal welfare, eating hunted meat is morallybetter than eating factory farm-raised meat. By reducing demand for factory-

farmed animals, the consumer of hunted meat raises average animal welfare.

1.2 Game Management

There is another argument from animal welfare that contributes to establish-

ing the moral preferability of eating hunted meat over factory farm-raised meat. In

nature, an animal species naturally tends to be in balance with its available habitat

and food sources, with those competing for the same habitat and food sources, andwith its predators (or prey). This balance is sometimes disturbed. A disturbance

can have a natural cause, for example, a cold, wet spring that reduces the survival

rate of newborn rabbits, but not of their predators. A disturbance can also be

caused by human action, for instance, the introduction of a non-native species to

an area without predators to control the population.

Whatever the cause, a game species can become overpopulated relative to its

available habitat and food20 and several consequences may result. First, due to the

shortage of preferred food, animals may turn to less preferred food sources,

thereby eating other animals out of house and home (e.g., overpopulated deer,without enough fallen acorns to go around, eat a great deal of understory which

is home to grouse). Second, some of the animals may starve as a result of the

inability to obtain sufficient nourishment. Third, due to the unnaturally high

population density, disease may spread rapidly in the overpopulated species,

causing decimation.

Hunting overpopulated game animals can reduce populations and thus help

avoid these consequences, thereby raising average levels of welfare for the tar-

geted species. Thus, although it is clearly not better for an individual animal for it

to be hunted and killed rather than not, it is clearly better for wild animals as awhole for some of them to be hunted so that the consequences listed above are

avoided for most of them




animals. Second, hunting overpopulated game animals (or game animals that

would become overpopulated if not hunted) is better for wild animals as a whole

than not hunting them.

2. Human Welfare and Value

In Section 1, the focus was on the claim that hunting and consuming game

animals is better, from the perspective of animal welfare, than consuming factory-

farmed animals. In this section, I shall argue that it is better for human welfare for

wild-game animals to be hunted rather than not, and that hunting furthers impor-

tant human values.

2.1 Game Management from a Human Perspective

Having just considered game management and animal welfare, let us consider

game management in connection with human welfare. Homeowners are often

initially thrilled to see a few deer or a flock of Canada geese in their residential

developments, but when the animals devour vegetable gardens and expensive

ornamental plants or leave volumes of droppings around a well-manicured public

pond, humans grow impatient. Beyond these inconveniences, perhaps the most

serious negative impact wildlife has on human welfare is through motor vehiclecollisions. Each year in the United States, there are more than one million deer-

vehicle collisions resulting in about 29,000 human injuries, more than two

hundred human fatalities, and an estimated $1.1 billion in property damage (1993

dollars).21 As well, each year, wildlife destroys an estimated $498 million in

agricultural crops22 and deer cause more than $367 million in damage to timber.23

The concern now is that human welfare is negatively impacted by the popu-

lation density of the game animals, and humans are not willing to tolerate the

negative impacts, at least at such levels.24 When these animals are hunted for food,

their populations are lowered, the negative impacts are reduced, and humanwelfare is raised.

It should be mentioned here that one frequently alleged source of overpopu-

lation of some species (e.g., deer) is that wildlife management officials set hunting

seasons and harvest limits too conservatively in order to ensure a plenitude of the

animals for hunters, who usually pay their salaries through license fees.25 If this is

true, then it is a criticism not of hunting, but of game management as currently

practiced. Thus, the criticism acknowledges the human benefit from game man-

agement, and argues for even more hunting on the basis of human welfare.

2.2 Positive Economic Impact of Hunting




ing equipment, books and magazines devoted to hunting, and so on. As well,

hunters spend money on transportation, lodging, and meals while traveling to

hunt. One study puts the total U.S. hunting expenditures in 2001 at $20.6 billion,including $10.4 billion on equipment and $5.3 billion on trip-related expenses.26

These economic impacts clearly improve local economies and contribute posi-

tively to the national economy. In addition, more than 575,000 jobs were sup-

ported in the United States by hunting activities in 2001.27 This economic impact

is a clear contribution to human welfare.

It would be legitimate to respond to this point about the positive economic

impact of hunting by pointing out the negative economic impact produced by

reducing demand for industrially raised farm animals. Surely we should factor in

that negative impact as well. Indeed, we should, but as one anti-hunting organi-zation is quick to point out “[w]hen all costs are considered . . . hunting is not an

economical way to provide food.”28 For instance, in 1990 Maryland hunters spent

more than $51 million to kill 46,317 deer, which translates to $24.44 per pound of

venison.29 Surely this is not a surprising result. Factory farms are designed to

produce the largest quantity of the highest-quality meat for the lowest total cost,

and this method of producing meat is much more efficient than hunting. The result

is that by increasing demand for hunting-related expenses and decreasing demand

for factory farm-raised meat, hunters make a greater net contribution to the

economy.

2.3 The Value of Hunting for Food as Activity

There is more to be said for the positive contribution of hunting for food to

human welfare, and to human value more generally. My aim in this subsection is

merely to submit some of the more important features of hunting for food that

make it a valuable human activity, without launching into a deep exploration.30

In considering the value of hunting for food as activity, I have in mind

Aristotle’s distinction between praxis (activity) and poeisis (making, production).Aristotle claims that eudaimonia (human happiness, or thriving) consists in activ-

ity valued in itself, rather than in a goal to be attained. For Aristotle, happiness

does not consist in attaining (i.e., producing for oneself) a certain level of wealth,

or political honor, or anything else. Rather, human happiness consists in living in

a way that manifests the excellences (virtues) of a human being.31 So in consid-

ering hunting for food as activity, I have in mind the ways in which hunting for

food is valuable in itself, apart from the production of nourishment and other

positive consequences.

One clear element of the value of hunting is a heightened experience andknowledge of nature. A successful hunter does not simply walk into the woodlot,

traipse into the field or wade into the marsh and wait for the game animals she




movements would be elicited from which imitation vocalizations (game calls)?

Can the animal’s next action be predicted from its current body language? Does

the presence or absence of a given animal, plant, or terrain feature signal thepresence or absence of the targeted game? Although a hiker, photographer, or

other non-hunting nature enthusiast might have a similar experience and knowl-

edge of nature, hunting provides a unique access point for this experience and

knowledge.32 Certainly this is something valuable about hunting.

Given the complex skills called for by hunting, one is put in mind of a general

principle of human motivation put forward by Rawls, the Aristotelian Principle.33

According to this principle, “human beings take more pleasure in doing something

as they become more proficient at it, and of two activities they do equally well, they

prefer the one calling on a larger repertoire of more intricate and subtle discrimi-nations.”34 The general idea is that humans are not generally content mastering an

activity, and then performing that activity over and over. Rather, after mastering an

activity, people seek a variation or refinement on the activity that calls on the skills

needed for the original activity, yet that presents new and greater challenges that

require more strenuous exertion or more refined action, as well as practice or

training to meet the new challenges. Beginning equestrians find it sufficiently

challenging to attend to the elements of horse care, keeping themselves in the

saddle, and mastering the walk, trot, canter, and gallop. As these basics are

mastered, individuals naturally seek new challenges, perhaps through jumping,rising through the levels of dressage, or taking on the challenges of barrel racing.

Now not only is storming into an area that may hold game animals usually an

ineffective way to hunt but, if Rawls’ principle is right, hunters naturally take

more pleasure in hunting as their skills develop and the complexity of their

hunting methods increases. As one example, one does find that some hunters, once

content to harvest big game within the range of a modern rifle (200–300 yards),

grow tired of what they perceive as an exercise of mere shooting skill. They turn

instead to mastering a different hunting instrument with a shorter lethal range, for

example, a primitive flintlock muzzleloading rifle (125 yards), a hunting pistol (75yards), or a bow and arrow (40 yards). New challenges are then provided. First,

one must gain knowledge of the new instrument and develop skill in its use.

Second, one must learn new hunting techniques, or master familiar techniques at

a new level, in order to stalk or attract the quarry within shooting range. The

demand for knowledge of the game animal increases as the demand to get closer

to it increases. This opportunity for human development and the attendant increase

in pleasure provided by hunting are of value.

Finally, the social value of hunting cannot be disputed. Many families spend

significant time together at their hunting camps. Hunting provides bonding ex-periences between parents and children, and a child’s first successful hunt often

marks an important rite of passage Social networks beyond the family are often




2.4 The Use of Humans in Animal Slaughter

A large slaughterhouse is an extremely dangerous workplace. Some slaughter-house employees relate stories of live cattle being shackled and hoisted while fully

conscious after the “knocker” failed to deliver an accurate blow to the head with his

captive bolt stunning device. These cattle can kick and thrash, causing severe injury

to the “sticker,” the worker responsible for severing the animal’s carotid artery once

it is stunned and hoisted.35 Other slaughterhouse employees report broken bones

from falling cattle.36 Other workers have been cut––by themselves or other

workers––while trying to keep pace with the rapidly moving disassembly line or as

a result of an improperly stunned pig kicking the sticking knife out of a worker’s

hand.37

The data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics corroborates this

anecdotal evidence. In 2004, the occupational injury and illness rate for all animal

slaughtering and processing was 9.8 percent––that is, 9.8 percent of people

working in the animal slaughtering business reported some type of work-related

injury or illness that year. The rate was higher for non-poultry slaughtering, at 13.3

percent. These rates stand in contrast to the average injury and illness rate for all

manufacturing jobs, which was 6.6 percent. The rates are roughly the same for

2003: 10.3 percent for all animal slaughtering and processing, 12.9 percent for

non-poultry slaughtering, and 6.8 percent for all manufacturing.38

Thus, the illnessand injury rate for non-poultry slaughterhouse jobs is roughly twice that of

manufacturing jobs in general. Due to perverse incentives from the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration, these reported injury rates are likely much

lower than actual injury rates.39 Given these facts, it is not surprising that annual

turnover rates at slaughterhouses can be as high as eighty to one hundred percent.40

It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that reducing demand for meat pro-

cessed in slaughterhouses is beneficial for humans. All else equal, therefore,

actions that reduce demand for meat processed in slaughterhouses are morally

preferable to actions that do not. Eating hunted meat reduces demand for meatprocessed in slaughterhouses. Hence, eating hunted meat is morally preferable to

eating farm-raised meat that is processed in slaughterhouses.

To summarize Section 2: hunting is morally preferable not only from the

perspective of animal welfare, but from the perspective of human welfare (and

human value more generally) as well. This follows from the considerations of

game management, economics, the value of hunting for food as activity, and the

use of humans in animal slaughter.

3. Objections




3.1 Hunted Meat versus Non-factory-farmed Meat

The first objection to consider does not challenge the view that it is morallypreferable to obtain meat through hunting than through industrialized agriculture.

Instead, this objection asks whether it is not even more morally sound to obtain

meat through non-factory farming methods in which the living, transportation, and

slaughter conditions are perhaps better for the farm animals than the correspond-

ing conditions for hunted-game animals.41 That is, instead of farming as it is ac-

tually practiced to produce most of the meat that is consumed, why not consider

a reformed or ideal method of farming? After all, the objector might continue, the

type of hunting that has been presented so far is at least somewhat idealized (e.g.,

few if any hunters can claim a one hundred percent one-shot kill rate), so it seemsonly reasonable to consider idealized farming.

Let us suppose that we could agree on a formula of morally ideal farming.42

What is the moral status of consuming farm animals raised according to the

morally ideal standard in comparison to the moral status of consuming game

animals hunted according to a morally ideal standard? In what follows, I claim

that morally ideal hunting and morally ideal livestock production are morally

equivalent in the sense that neither is morally superior to the other. For this

conclusion, I offer two independent arguments.

First, notice that we are comparing morally ideal hunting and morally ideallivestock production. Since we are considering moral ideals, all that is morally

objectionable has been removed from each. Thus, they are on equal moral ground.

This argument might appear spurious, because it may not necessarily follow from

the moral purification of two practices that they are morally equivalent. To see

this, suppose A and B are two practices or forms of activity that can be practiced

in morally better or worse ways, for example, (A) making a living as a trader on

the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, and (B) making a living as a public

school teacher. Purify A and B morally so that, for example, the morally ideal

trader does not engage in insider trading, and the morally ideal teacher does notabuse the position in order to engage in pedophilia. Nevertheless, it might be

argued that the morally idealized forms of A and B are not on equal moral ground.

The ideal practice of A could fall short of the ideal practice of B morally, for two

possible reasons. First (it could be argued), A is intrinsically wrong (perhaps

because it is part of a system that alienates workers from the means of production),

but there is nothing intrinsically wrong in B. No amount of purification of A could

make it morally acceptable, unlike B. Thus, the idealized forms of A and B do not

stand on equal moral footing. A second reason one might give for this conclusion

is that the consequences (for humans) of the practice of A are less positive than theconsequences (for humans) of the practice of B. Since an assessment of A and B

must take account of consequences for humans one might argue idealized A is




argument used to illustrate that morally purified stock trading and teaching might

not be on equal moral ground does not go through in the case of morally purified

hunting and livestock production. First, if either hunting or livestock production isintrinsically wrong, then both are, for the most plausible intrinsic wrong is the

same for both––violating an animal’s rights by killing it.43 So either both practices

are intrinsically wrong or neither is. In each case, they are morally equivalent.

Second, the idealized forms of hunting and livestock production will differ from

the actual forms in that the negative consequences of each real-world practice for

humans and for animals will be removed: Slaughterhouses will not be dangerous,

livestock will be transported and killed humanely, and so on; no hunters will

accidentally shoot humans, all hunted-game animals will be killed quickly with

one shot, and so on. Thus, the differential negative consequences of farming andhunting will have been removed, so there can be no distinction between the two

on those grounds. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that idealized hunt-

ing and idealized production of farm animals raised for slaughter are morally

equivalent.

There is a second, independent argument for this conclusion. The first ar-

gument was a conceptual argument to the effect that two morally ideal and

otherwise comparable practices must, by virtue of their ideality, be morally

equivalent. The second argument is practical, as opposed to conceptual, and

claims that to try to compare the moral statuses of idealized hunting and live-stock production is to try to slice things too thinly and to try to make moral

distinctions where it is practically impossible to do so. The reason for the prac-

tical impossibility is that the considerations that now confront us appear inde-

cisive. For example, meat that is currently raised according to elevated moral

standards (organic, etc.) is in relatively low supply, so the meat often has to

travel long distances to reach consumers. One could expect the same for meat

raised according to the ideal standard, which may result in a greater use of

petroleum per pound of ideally raised meat, a negative consequence for humans.

Yet hunters also burn petroleum traveling to their hunting grounds, so this con-sideration is indecisive. As well, hunting is a very economically inefficient

means of securing food. It would perhaps be more socially responsible for

hunters to stop hunting and buy ideally raised meat, and then redirect the money

saved to important social causes. On the other hand, raising meat according to

the ideal moral standard would surely be less economically efficient than indus-

trialized livestock production, so this consideration is also indecisive. Another

consideration might be that increasing demand for morally ideal meat from

livestock would reduce demand for goods and services related to hunting, a

negative effect on humans. Yet it might be equally negative to shift demandfrom livestock production to hunting goods and services. We appear to have a

dizzying constellation of indecisive considerations It appears practically impos




3.2 Real-World Hunting

The objection just canvassed claimed that the discussion to that point wasfocused exclusively on the most prevalent type of farming as it is actually practiced,

factory farming, and did not account for alternative methods of farming. In brief, the

objection claimed that the focus was on actual farming rather than reformed or ideal

farming. The next objection claims that I have made exactly the reverse error in

my characterization of hunting, focusing on an unrealistic and idealized form of

hunting that is far from reality. Thus, the tasks in this section are to examine the

image of hunting presented so far, to amend that picture as necessary to reflect

reality more accurately, and then to compare the resulting realistic picture of

hunting with the realistic picture of factory farming presented above.Consider, first, that not every animal shot during the course of hunting for

consumption dies a swift and painless death as a result of one well-placed shot.

Some are wounded and die an agonizing death, sometimes without being recov-

ered for food. Estimates of wounding rates vary widely. One frequently cited study

of bow hunting wounding rates for whitetail deer estimates that thirteen percent of

deer shot with bow and arrow are not recovered and either die or heal.44 One South

Dakota State Waterfowl Biologist estimates a wounding loss rate on ducks of at

least twenty-five percent.45 Anti-hunting organizations claim much higher rates.

Whatever the true wounding rates, it is clear that some hunted-game animals dosuffer painful wounds and protracted deaths.46

Not only do real-world hunters sometimes cause this gratuitous pain for

animals, but some also negatively impact the welfare of other humans. The

so-called “slob” hunters hunt drunk, trespass, litter, cut fence, act belligerently,

and violate game laws by hunting out of season or exceeding harvest limits. Such

hunters prompt other outdoor enthusiasts to curtail their outdoor recreational

activities (e.g., hiking, horseback riding, cross-country skiing) during hunting

seasons out of fear of confrontations with hunters or, worse, being hit by a bullet

intended for a game animal. Indeed, annually hunters shoot and injure or killhundreds of their own ranks as well as innocent non-hunting bystanders, often as

a result of violating basic firearm safety rules or by shooting at human movement

mistaken for the movement of a game animal.47

Surely not every meat hunter can be defended morally. Indeed, it would be

antithetical to my project of establishing the moral superiority of a certain type of

hunting over factory farming to try to defend hunters who engage in clearly

immoral behavior such as hunting drunk or taking shots in which they are not

confident. Clearly, then, I cannot be expected to defend every instance of hunting

or even hunting generally, as it is actually practiced. If the result is that my defenseapplies to less than all of the actual hunting that goes on, that is acceptable and

should not be surprising The valuable point will still stand that those meat hunters




To be clear, the objection under consideration claims that to defend eating

hunted meat over eating farm-raised meat, I must establish that real-world hunting

is morally superior to real-world farming, as both are actually practiced. That is nota reasonable demand, for it is not and should not be my aim to defend all real-world

hunting, with all of its warts. My goal is to examine a certain type of hunting and

compare it with real-world farming. Now certainly, if the type of hunting I am

defending is so idealized that it comprises only an insignificant portion of the

hunting that actually goes on, then that is a serious problem. So the relevant question

is: How far from reality is the idealized picture of hunting that I have presented?

The objection raises two main points. First, it claims that some hunted

animals suffer and experience agonizing deaths. Second, it claims that hunting

often negatively affects humans, by forcing non-hunters to curtail outdoor recrea-tional activities and by injuring or killing both hunters and non-hunters. I shall

address these objections in reverse order.

There is no doubt that slob hunters exist. Many readers surely could relate

firsthand encounters. Non-anecdotal evidence, however, tends to support the view

that most hunters are law-abiding. For example, in 2002–2003 the Pennsylvania

Game Commission successfully prosecuted 8,622 cases against hunters.48 Given

that Pennsylvania hunters spent at least 8.6 million days afield in the same

period,49 this means that a violation that was successfully prosecuted occurred

once in every one thousand hunter days afield. Given that approximately ninetypercent of hunters indicate that they would report other hunters they discovered

breaking laws regulating hunting,50 this sort of data tends to show that hunters are

generally law-abiding, which speaks against the slob hunter stereotype.

Statistics on hunting accident rates (the vast majority of which are shooting-

related) relative to other forms of outdoor recreation mitigate the concern over

shooting accidents. In the United States in 2002, there were approximately twenty

million hunters and 850 total accidents, eighty-nine of which were fatal. Non-

hunting bystanders were involved in just fifteen of these accidents.51 In 2004, there

were only 445 total accidents, forty-two of which were fatal.52

By way of com-parison, in 2004 out of 40.3 million participants, 524,000 bicyclists were injured

severely enough to require treatment in a hospital emergency department.53 Out

of 9.5 million participants in horseback riding in 2002, nearly 71,000 required

treatment.54 Thus, relative to some other common recreational activities, hunting

is safe and does not present unreasonable danger either to participants or to

bystanders.55

Turning to the first point raised by this objection, it is indeed worrisome that

some game animals are not killed quickly and suffer as a result. Although animal

welfare is one of the main considerations that I have used to argue for the moralpreferability of eating hunted-game meat over factory farm-raised meat, three

points help to answer this otherwise very damaging objection




defend, who do take due care to dispatch the hunted game quickly, will be at least

somewhat lower than those cited.

Surely, however, I must be prepared to defend some instances of hunting thatresult in a wounding loss to a game animal. Even a careful and skillful shooter will

sometimes make a poor shot due to unexpected animal movement, wind gust,

equipment or ammunition failure, or simple human error. This leads to the second

point: as long as due care is taken to dispatch the game animal humanely and the

hunter can reasonably expect the shot to be humane, even if the success rate is not

one hundred percent, the due care and intention carry significant moral weight. It

is worth pointing out that in a recent study by sociologist Jan Dizard, all of the

hunters he interviewed emphasized the importance of endeavoring for a one-shot

kill, and many reported frequently passing up shots with which they were notcomfortable.56 The literature cited in Section 2.4 tends to show that the same due

care to ensure a humane death experience is frequently not taken in slaughter-

houses. These differences between careful hunting practices and the practices of

slaughterhouses contribute to mitigating the concern raised by non-one-shot kills.

Finally, it is also important to remember that the death experience is just one

component of animal welfare. As stressed in Section 1.1, it is the whole package

of living, transportation (or hunting), and death experience that is better, on

average, for game animals than for factory-farmed animals. Again, it would be

easy to point out an individual case of a particular game animal whose deathexperience is much worse than that of a particular factory-farmed animal. It

would also be easy to point out an individual case of a particular game animal

whose whole package of living, being hunting, and experiencing death is worse

than the whole package for a particular factory-farmed animal. The point still

stands, however, that it is the whole package, on average, that is better for game

animals than for factory-farmed animals.

To sum up this section then, we considered whether the characterization of

hunting presented at the outset is true to reality. The worry was that I had unfairly

compared a sanitized representation of hunting with factory farming. I argued thatI need not defend every instance of real-world hunting, but that the characteriza-

tion of hunting presented at the start of this essay is not that far from reality.

Further, I argued that even when considering more fully some of the negative

consequences of hunting not originally canvassed, hunting is still morally prefer-

able to raising livestock on a factory farm. Thus, the central claim of this paper still

stands: consuming hunted-game meat is morally preferable to consuming indus-

trially raised meat. In brief, I am defending hunting of a particular sort, that sort

of hunting does go on, and eating meat from game that is hunted that way is

morally preferable to eating factory-raised meat.

3 3 The Depravity of the Hunter




Nevertheless, one might wonder if this thereby makes the hunter morally praise-

worthy. Indeed, the contrary might be claimed that the hunter, by his very will-

ingness to stalk and kill wild-game animals, reveals moral traits that, to say theleast, are less than praiseworthy and not of the sort that we want to encourage in

civil society. The willingness to inflict pain on animals and treat them as mere

objects to be used for our purposes shows that the hunter considers killing for fun

to be acceptable recreation, as the Humane Society of the United States puts it. 57

This kind of character can hardly be something we want to encourage in society,

for this uncaring attitude of hunters of “[k]illing for fun teaches callousness,

disrespect for life, and the notion that ‘might makes right’.”58

Since hunting for meat is the topic here, we can set aside the uncharitable

identification of hunting with killing for fun as mere rhetorical flourish inessentialto the objection.59 At root, the objection asks: Does the hunter not display a

questionable moral character by his willingness to kill? I would argue that the

non-hunting meat-eater who is content with blissful ignorance about the produc-

tion of meat is actually in a worse position morally. For she likely causes more

animal pain than the hunter––indeed she causes cruelty in some cases––yet has

someone else do the dirty work for her. Her hands are cleaner only literally.

Hunting and killing force the hunter to confront reality in the production of his

food in a way similar to the way in which Henry David Thoreau “wished to live

deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life” in retiring to live in the woodsat Walden Pond.60 The hunter shows––or is forced to get––a real understanding of

nature and of the source of his food by participating in the hunt, killing the game,

confronting the dead animal, getting splashed with blood while removing its

entrails, and dragging or carrying the animal from the hunting place. Watching a

beautiful animal die from one’s own shot and then gutting and transporting it

are––for many hunters––decidedly unpleasant tasks. They are necessary parts,

however, of the whole (rather enjoyable) experience of hunting for consumption.

One gains an appreciation and knowledge of one’s food by participating directly

in this enterprise, which is unlike the appreciation the non-hunting meat-eatermight get from a visit to the county fair. So, far from showing the hunter’s thirst

for blood, a hunter’s willingness to kill the source of his food is worthy of respect

rather than contempt. He moves much more deliberately through his moral prac-

tices than the non-hunting meat-eater who turns a blind eye to the facts about the

production of factory farm-raised meat.

Conclusion

Those for and those against eating meat ought to agree that consuming hunted

meat is morally better than consuming most farm raised meat that is meat raised




meat also ought to realize that whatever the moral status of hunters is, consumers

of industrially raised meat are in a worse position morally.

To be sure, much farming and hunting, as they are actually practiced, fallshort of the morally ideal versions of these practices. Yet as both are actually

practiced, hunting for meat is morally preferable to raising animals industrially. As

well, morally ideal versions of hunting and farming appear to be on morally

equivalent ground. These conclusions follow on the basis of human and animal

welfare.

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 33rd Conference on Value

Inquiry in April 2006. I am grateful to Eric Cave and other participants for dis-

cussion. Thanks go as well to three anonymous referees from this journal for critical feedback, to Lynne Dickson Bruckner for many conversations on the

arguments herein, and to Dale Miller and Emily Nelson for initially prompting me

to think carefully about hunted-game and farm-raised animals.

Notes

1 For instance, John Alan Cohan (“Is Hunting a ‘Sport’?” The International Journal of Applied

Philosophy 17 (2003): 291–326) argues that hunting is morally wrong, but takes solace in our

ability to “go to the market to purchase meat, fish, and poultry” (p. 317), without examining the

moral status of doing so in comparison to the moral status of eating hunted meat. Other authorsskirt the issue by presenting a faulty dilemma, for instance, by arguing that eating animals raised

for slaughter is morally wrong, therefore, we should be vegetarians. For this claim, see Bart

Gruzalski, “Why It’s Wrong to Eat Animals Raised and Slaughtered for Food,” in Food for

Thought: The Debate over Eating Meat , ed. Steve F. Sapontzis (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,

2004), 124–37, at 128. Jordan Curnutt argues that hunting is wrong because it harms animals, but

does not consider the question whether it might prevent more harm (to farm animals) than it causes

(to game animals) (Jordan Curnutt, “How to Argue for and Against Sport Hunting,” Journal of

Social Philosophy 27 [1996]: 65–89, 78ff.). Michael Pollan does consider this question and

reaches some of the same conclusions reached here in The Omnivore’s Dilemma (New York:

Penguin, 2006), his popular discussion of the sources of human food.2 In the philosophical literature on hunting, authors frequently fail to define what they mean by hunt-

ing. Thus, these several types of hunting are almost never distinguished. For some notable except-

ions, see Curnutt, “How to Argue;” Roger Scruton, “Ethics and Welfare: The Case of Hunting,”

Philosophy 77 (2002): 543–64; and Charles List, “On the Moral Distinctiveness of Sport

Hunting,” Environmental Ethics 26 (2004): 155–69.3 Other philosophers have been more ambitious in their attempts to defend or criticize hunting, broadly

conceived and without much distinction among types of hunting. See, for example, List, “Moral

Distinctiveness;” Margaret Van de Pitte, “The Moral Basis for Public Policy Encouraging Sport

Hunting,” Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (2003): 256–66; Theodore Vitali, “The Ethics of

Hunting: Killing as Life-Sustaining,” Reason Papers 112 (1987): 33–41; and Theodore Vitali,

“Sport Hunting: Moral or Immoral?” Environmental Ethics 12 (1990): 69–82.4 This is a paraphrase of the Boone and Crockett Club’s definition (“Fair Chase Statement,” http://

www.boone-crockett.org/huntingEthics/ethics_fairchase.asp [accessed February 3, 2007]). They


http://www.boone-crockett.org/huntingEthics/ethics_fairchase.asp






and Editorial Staff, “What Is Fair Chase: An In-Depth Look at What ‘Fair Chase’ Really Means

to Hunters,” Hunting Illustrated , 4, no. 1 (2004): 64–75. See also Vitali, “Ethics,” 39; and Jim

Posewitz, Beyond Fair Chase: The Ethic and Tradition of Hunting (Guilford, CT: Falcon, 1994),

57ff.6 The biological carrying capacity of a game species in a geographic area is the population density of

the game animal that can be sustained by the habitat. The biological carrying capacity may be

greater than the social carrying capacity, the density that society is willing to tolerate.7 Note that we are only considering hunting wild-game animals, as opposed to animals that have been

raised on game farms and released into the wild to be hunted. Since the aim is to compare the

moral status of consuming hunted meat as opposed to farm-raised meat, we must exclude animals

that are both farm-raised and hunted, at least in this initial inquiry.8 Marc Kaufman, “In Pig Farming, Growing Concern; Raising Sows in Crates Is Questioned,” The

Washington Post , June 18, 2001. See also Bernard E. Rollin, Farm Animal Welfare: Social,

Bioethical, and Research Issues (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1995), chap. 3, esp. 75–91.9 Apparently this attempt is misguided. See T. L. Terosky et al., “Effects of Individual Housing Design

and Size on Special-Fed Holstein Veal Calf Growth Performance, Hematology, and Carcass

Characteristics,” Journal of Animal Science 75 (1997): 1697–1703. In this study, “stall, pen

design, and width did not affect the growth, hematology, carcass weight, or muscle color (grade)

of special-fed veal calves” (p. 1701).10 David Fraser, Joy Mench, and Suzanne Millman, “Farm Animals and Their Welfare in 2000,” in The

State of the Animals 2001, ed. Deborah Salem and Andrew Rowan (Washington, D.C.: Humane

Society Press, 2001), 94.11 T. G. Knowles and L. J. Wilkins, “The Problem of Broken Bones During the Handling of Laying

Hens––A Review,” Poultry Science 77 (1998): 1798–1802.12 Joe Vansickle, “Quality Assurance Program Launched,” National Hog Farmer , February 15, 2002.

These injuries and deaths may be due to unnatural selection for rapid growth and leanness, which

has led to more fragile pigs more likely to be injured or die during transport. See Temple Grandin,

“Progress in Livestock Handling and Slaughter Techniques in the United States, 1970–2000,” in

The State of the Animals 2001, ed. Deborah Salem and Andrew Rowan (Washington, D.C.:

Humane Society Press, 2001), 108.13 Joby Warrick, “ ‘They Die Piece by Piece’; In Overtaxed Plants, Humane Treatment of Cattle Is

Often a Battle Lost,” The Washington Post , April 10, 2001.14 Ibid.15 To be clear, this abuse is not established by the foregoing smattering of examples. The broader

philosophical and scientific literatures and the media accounts establish the abuse. For a very good

overview of practices in the U.S. livestock production, see Rollin, Farm Animal Welfare. Chapter3 of Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed. (New York: New York Review of Books, 1990)

covers much of the same ground.16 For instance, see A. B. Lawrence et al., “The Effect of Environment on Behaviour, Plasma Cortisol,

and Prolactin in Parturient Sows,” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 39 (1994): 313–30.17 As an anonymous referee points out, advocates of hunting sometimes argue that life in the wild is so

nasty, brutish, and short that shortening it further is a kindness. Further, and contrary to what I claim

in the text, one might argue that it is impossible to establish whether life in the wild is generally better

than life on the factory farm or generally worse, since so much depends on factors such as climate,

ecosystem, and species mix. Thus, the argument I give in the text is inconclusive. To this I respond

with the following dilemmatic argument: either life in the wild is better than life on the factory farm,

or it is worse. If it is better, then my argument in favor of hunting on the basis of animal welfaresucceeds: Hunting reduces demand for factory-farmed animals, so fewer animals are produced and

live in those conditions which increases average animal welfare If life in the wild is worse then




18 See, for example, the references in the notes above as well as Gail A. Eisnitz, Slaughterhouse: The

Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect, and Inhumane Treatment inside the U.S. Meat Industry

(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1997).

19 See note 18.20 That is, the biological carrying capacity of the habitat can be exceeded.21 Michael R. Conover et al., “Review of Human Injuries, Illnesses, and Economic Losses Caused by

Wildlife in the United States,” Wildlife Society Bulletin 23, no. 3 (1995): 407–14, at 409.22 Ibid., 411.23 Ibid., 412.24 That is, the social carrying capacity of the species has been exceeded.25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.26 U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service and U.S. Department of Commerce,

U.S. Census Bureau, 2001 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated

Recreation, 23.27 Animal Use Issues Committee, Economic Importance of Hunting in America (Washington, D.C.:

International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, 2002), 8.28 Humane Society of the United States, “Learn the Facts about Hunting,” http://www.hsus.org/

wildlife/issues_facing_wildlife/hunting/learn_the_facts_about_hunting.html (accessed February

3, 2007).29 Ibid.30 Extended critical discussions of the value of hunting can be found in List, “Moral Distinctiveness;”

John A. Pauley, “The Value of Hunting,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (2003): 233–44; Jan E.

Dizard, Going Wild: Hunting, Animal Rights, and the Contested Meaning of Nature (Amherst:

University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), esp. chap. 4; James A. Tantillo, “Sport Hunting,

Eudaimonia, and Tragic Wisdom,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (2001): 101–12; and

Jon Jensen, “The Virtues of Hunting,” Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8 (2001): 113–24.31 For the praxis/poeisis distinction, see Nichomachean Ethics 1094a4–7 and 1140a1–24. For some

relevant parts of Nichomachean Ethics on eudaimonia, see bk. I, chaps. 4–5, 7.32 This point is frequently discussed in the literature. See, for example, List, “Moral Distinctiveness,”

161–63 and Pauley, “Value,” 235.33 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), sec. 65.34 Ibid., 426.35 See Eisnitz, Slaughterhouse, chap. 2.36 Ibid.37 Ibid., 85. Eisnitz’ approach is that of an investigative journalist, and her book is largely a transcrip-

tion of interviews with slaughterhouse workers and others. These anecdotes, however, are cor-roborated by further interviews and, more importantly, statistical data reported in Eric Schlosser’s

Fast Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).38 See “Incidence Rates of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry and Case Types,

2004,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, November 2005 and “Incidence

Rates of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry and Case Types, 2003,” Bureau

of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, December 2004. The lower rates of injury and

illness in poultry slaughtering can be attributed to the more thorough mechanization of the poultry

slaughtering process, due to greater uniformity in chicken size. On this point, see Schlosser, Fast

Food , 172–73.39 “Here’s the Beef: Underreporting of Injuries, OSHA’s Policy of Exempting Companies from

Programmed Inspections Based on Injury Record, and Unsafe Conditions in the MeatpackingIndustry,” Forty-Second Report by the Committee on Government Operations (Washington, D.C.:

U S Government Printing Office 1988) H Rep No 542 100th Cong 2d Sess


http://www.hsus.org/

http://www.hsus.org/



comes from an interview with Brett Fox, director of industry affairs and media relations, ConAgra

Beef Company, for Schlosser’s Fast Food , see 325.41 One might be tempted to take the next step: Would it not be even more correct morally to stop eating

meat altogether? This question takes us well outside the focus of this paper, which is the moralityof eating hunted meat in comparison to factory-farmed meat. The brief answer is that it does not

follow on the considerations presented here that vegetarianism is morally preferable to eating

hunted meat. As argued in the text, hunting not only prevents negative consequences of factory

farming, but it also produces positive consequences for humans and animals, which would be lost

with vegetarianism. Vegetarianism would prevent the negative consequences of hunting and

produce its own positive and negative consequences. All of this would have to be considered in

comparing hunting with the option of eating no meat.

One may still wonder, however, what is morally superior: the hunting of game or the eating of the

meat produced from hunting? Some of my arguments tend to support the hunting, but not

necessarily the eating. I have made it clear from the outset, however, that it is hunting for meat that

is at issue. As well, eating hunted meat (instead of letting it rot or going to the trouble to dispose

of it, for instance) increases human welfare by providing nutrition and gustatory pleasure. So

eating the meat once the animal is killed adds to human welfare. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer

for these questions and the tools for both replies.42 In formulating such a standard, we would presumably start with some of the practices of farmers

whose livestock is certified organic or certified humane. (The latter is a relatively new certification

regulated by a private organization, Humane Farm Animal Care.) Considering the standards for

these certifications is beyond the scope of this paper. Let it suffice to say that these and other

standards are commendable and vast improvements over the status quo of factory farms, but still

fall short of morally ideal treatment of livestock.43 See the work of Tom Regan, beginning with The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: The University

of California Press, 1983).44 Wendy J. Krueger, “Aspects of Wounding of White-Tailed Deer by Bowhunters” (master’s thesis,

West Virginia University, 1995), 43.45 Spencer Vaa, “Reducing Wounding Losses,” South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and Parks,

http://www.sdgfp.info/Wildlife/hunting/waterfowl/WoundingLosses.htm (accessed February 3,

2007).46 As a reviewer points out, one cause of wounding losses may be the use of the more primitive and less

lethal weapons mentioned in Section 2.3, which are more difficult to use effectively.47 Thanks to Eric Cave and an anonymous referee for the combination of points here.48 Pennsylvania Game Commission, 2002–2003 Commission Annual Report (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania

Game Commission, 2003).49 Christopher Rosenberry, Game Take Survey (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Game Commission, 2003).

This is a survey of small game hunters. To the days afield for small game hunters, I added one day

afield for every licensed big game hunter (including deer), an extremely conservative estimate.50 This statistic is not from a scientific study, but from an online poll by a popular publication. See

“2003 National Hunting Survey,” Field and Stream, http://www.fieldandstream.com/fieldstream/

hunting/article/0,13199,458217,00.html (accessed February 3, 2007).51 “Incident Report––Non-hunting Victims” (press release), International Hunter Education Associa-

tion, December 10, 2005, http://www.ihea.com/documents/Incident_PSA.pdf (accessed June 2,

2006). See also 2002 Hunter Incident Summary, Hunter Incident Clearinghouse, International

Hunter Education Association, http://www.ihea.com/documents/ihea2002.pdf (accessed February

3, 2007).52 2004 Hunter Incident Summary, Hunter Incident Clearinghouse, International Hunter Education

Association http://www ihea com/documents/2004 report pdf (accessed February 3 2007)


http://www.sdgfp.info/Wildlife/hunting/waterfowl/WoundingLosses.htm

http://www.fieldandstream.com/fieldstream

http://www.ihea.com/documents/Incident_PSA.pdf

http://www.ihea.com/documents/ihea2002.pdf

http://www.ihea.com/documents/2004_report.pdf

http://www.ihea.com/documents/2004_report.pdf

http://www.ihea.com/documents/ihea2002.pdf

http://www.ihea.com/documents/Incident_PSA.pdf

http://www.fieldandstream.com/fieldstream

http://www.sdgfp.info/Wildlife/hunting/waterfowl/WoundingLosses.htm



55 Sociologist Jan Dizard has a useful discussion of the public image that hunters portray and how

hunters are partially to blame for what he claims is the non-hunting public’s irrational fear of

hunting. See his aptly titled chapter “Bad Apples and Human Frailty,” in Jan Dizard, Mortal

Stakes: Hunters and Hunting in Contemporary America (Amherst: University of MassachusettsPress, 2003), 145–69.

56 Dizard, Mortal Stakes, 126, 129–42.57 Humane Society, “Facts.”58 Ibid.59 This conflation is common, not just among anti-hunting groups that tend to be less charitable in their

interpretation of hunters’ actions, but in the philosophical literature as well. For example, Cohan

claims that hunters take “pleasure in killing” (“Hunting a ‘Sport’?” 313) and that “the purpose of

hunting is to kill animals for pleasure” (ibid., 317). Van de Pitte also equates sport hunting with

“killing animals for sport” (“Moral Basis,” 263). List, “Moral Distinctiveness,” 157–59, defends

the view that killing is not the goal or defining purpose of hunting. Cultural anthropologist Marc

Boglioli recently studied rural Vermont hunters and their attitudes. Of the fifty hunters he inter-

viewed formally, only two claimed to enjoy killing deer and many others found killing disturbing

or unsettling; see Marc A. Bogioli, “A Matter of Life and Death: A Cultural Analysis of Hunting

in Rural Vermont.” PhD diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2004, 31, 112–17 (on killing for

fun) and 97–98 (on being disturbed by killing). Dizard, Mortal Stakes, 134–35, 138 reports similar

findings.60 Henry David Thoreau, Walden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), chap. 2. Thoreau has mixed

views on hunting, so I do not mean to co-opt him. While he advocates it for boys, apparently as

part of their environmental education and for fostering their connection with nature, he renounced

it for himself in adulthood. For a nice discussion of Thoreau’s views on hunting, see Jensen,

“Virtues,” 116–17.






Documents

Bruckner, "Considerations on the Morality of Meat Consumption"