British Geostrategy RUSI

8/13/2019 British Geostrategy RUSI

1/7 RUSI JOURNAL APRIL/MAY 2011 VOL. 156 NO. 2 pp. 5258 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2011.576475

THE RUSI JOURNAL

In the pages of this journal a year ago,we warned of a return of geopolicalcompeon in Europe, poinngto the formaon of bilateral groupings

among the main connental powers

(chiey Russia, France and Germany).1

Importantly, these relaonshipshave started to bypass the post-war

mullateral structures the Atlanc

Alliance and, increasingly, the European

Union which, for over six decades,

have organised European polical and

economic cohesion around integraon

and representave government. Having

idened the USs gradual withdrawal

and downscaling of Europe as a focus

of its geostrategy, we argued that the

proliferaon of bilateral groupings could

lead to a de-structuring of a largely

Brish-inspired Europe. Over the last year

things have moved quickly; both in terms

of tectonic geopolical shis globally and

in Europe, and Britains response to those

changes.

The rise of Asia (and China in

parcular) is now a dominant theme for

foreign policy experts. Chinas economy

has, so far, emerged from the global

nancial crisis stronger, with larger

capital reserves to buy itself inuence

across the world including in Europe.2

Economic growth has come hand-in-hand with military modernisaon: in

2011, a new an-ship ballisc missile,

specically intended to push American

carrier groups deeper into the Pacic

Ocean, reached inial operaonal

capability, and a prototype stealth ghter

has generated widespread interest

among military experts and polical

pundits.3Furthermore, Japans increasing

asserveness as evidenced by a new

defence review that breaks with thecountrys post-war introspecve tradion

and Americas whopping investment of

over 8 billion for upgrading its military

staon in Guam are among many other

examples illustrang the increasing

geopolical centrality of East Asia.4

These developments exerta pull eect

emanang from eastern Eurasia, which

connues to weaken Americas presence

on the European connent, removing the

decisive factor that has helped Britain to

manage the regional geopolical balance

for over six decades.

At the same me, budgetary crises

across the EU have highlighted tensions

among key member states over the

strategic direcon of the European

Monetary Union, tesng the resilience

of European economic integraon and

polical stability.5The US reset buon

with Russia has crystallised into a new

Atlanc Alliance-Russia strategic concept

and forced Polands hand into a more

accommodang stance toward Moscow.6

Russias gains and role in Eastern Europe,southeastern Europe and the Caucasus

are now broadly recognised, and Moscow

takes part in an informal yet increasingly

instuonalised framework with Berlin

and Paris (and Warsaw) to discuss

European security arrangements. To

the connents southeast, Turkey is also

emerging as an important geopolical

actor, oen adopng posions that clash

with the interests of Britain and the rest

of the European Union on energy securityor Middle Eastern aairs (parcularly

concerning Israel, Iraq and Iran).

Against this backdrop, this arcle

assesses the extent to which Britain can

prevent the collapse of the balances

that have underpinned economic

prosperity and general security on the

European mainland since the Second

World War. We move from geopolics

to geostrategy. We argue that Britains

posion in the unfolding decade will

depend on the decisions over the next

few years. Here, new and strengthened

bilateral alliances can and must play

a key role in safeguarding Britains

inuence over an increasingly challenging

regional environment. Indeed, the

Brish Conservave-Liberal coalion

government, in oce for almost a year,

has already started to adapt to new

realies: not only has it renewed an

historic military alliance with France,

but it has also strengthened economic

and polical es with the Nordic space.

However, these successes aside, Britainsbilateral policies must also be anchored

in an instuonal framework such as

the European Union; otherwise, the

chances for long-term success will

BRITISH GEOSTRATEGY FOR A NEW

EUROPEAN AGELUIS SIMN AND JAMES ROGERS

For decades, European security has been assured by a grand, Anglo-American inspired

polical and economic project on the connent. Today, there is a risk that the old

certaines are unravelling. In a previous RUSI Journalarcle, Luis Simn and James

Rogers warned of the new risks in Europe; now, the authors oer a strategy for Britain toretain its vital place at the crux of an open, liberal European system.


2/753

be poor due to the sheer scale of the

forces working against Brish interests.

In this spirit, we propose a series of

policy recommendaons that include a

strengthening of the bilateral relaonship

with Germany, an opening of the military

agreement with France to other European

countries and a greater willingness

towards economic and polical

government at the European level.

The European Plain and Brish

SecurityThe UK has, for over three centuries,

been the ulmate arbiter of European

aairs. The Brish, safe in their island

citadel, have been free to gear their

military towards power projecon,

providing the means to usurp budding

European overlords. The central logic of

Brish geostrategy has been to maintain

a favourable balance of power on the

European mainland and parcularly

the European plain to prevent a

threat from materialising to the heavilypopulated English core, which, in

turn, would jeopardise Britains wider

global interests.7 Stretching from the

French Atlanc coast to the Russian

steppe, the European plain has ferle

farmland, numerous river systems and

good harbours that have, over the last

few centuries, underpinned trade and

unrelenng agricultural and industrial

development.8 These geographic

enablers provided Europeans with the

smulus necessary to forge the worlds

rst modern industrial naon-states

and build go-anywhere empires. The

European plains northwestern p is

parcularly signicant: it has long served

as the geopolical pivot of Europe. SinceCharlemagne, all the European great

powers France, Spain, Germany and the

UK have struggled to control this zone.

For Britain, this makes the Low

Countries parcularly signicant. Control

of the northwestern pivot is essenal for

the two overriding and deeply entwined

objecves of Brish geostrategy: rstly,

the maintenance of a favourable balance

of power on the European plain and

the European mainland more broadly;

and secondly, ensuring that Britainsglobal marime power projecon a

prerequisite for commercial acvity is

unhindered. So it was in the Netherlands

that the Brish poured the resources

necessary to quash Imperial Spains bid

for Universal Monarchy in the sixteenth

century. It was against growing Dutch

naval power that the Brish fought to

negate the dominance of the United

Provinces in the seventeenth century. It

was at Waterloo, in Belgium, in the early

nineteenth century, that Britain delivered

the nal knockout blow to Frances bid

for European hegemony. And, it was

only for the northwestern pivot during

the tweneth century that London was

prepared to sacrice its global imperiumon not one, but two occasions to prevent

the Low Countries incorporaon into a

hosle German order or, indeed, get

swallowed up by the Soviet empire that

followed.9

Aer 1945, the UK (backed by the

US) concentrated on devising a lasng

instuonal arrangement in Europe to

prevent another devastang great power

run on the Low Countries. The Atlanc

Alliance and European integraon were

central to this enterprise. Here, it iscrucial to remember that in spite of

its early reluctance to directly engage

in the European Community (and its

reservaons to fully engage in the EU

No room for the UK? French President Nicolas Sarkozy, centre, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, right, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, le, meet for a

two-day summit in Deauville to discuss joint security challenges, October 2010. Courtesy of AP Photo/Remy de la Mauviniere.


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RUSI JOURNAL APRIL/MAY 2011

British Geostrategy for a new European Age

today), Britain has always understood

European integraon as part of a wider,

largely Brish-inspired, French-executed

and American-backed geopolical

agenda. Aer all, the soware

governing European geopolics over

the past six decades free trade and

representave government was only

made possible when ltered through a

parcular hardware, that is, a Brish

and American-led marime Europe,

tamed through instuons but ulmately

backed by their overwhelming military

power.10Ever since, European geopolics

has been organised around two

principles (free trade and representavegovernment); one geographic pillar (the

northwestern pivot); and two instuons

(NATO and the European Union).

This constellaon was given renewed

emphasis aer the end of the Cold War:

1991 marked the high point of Britains

approach; all existenal threats to Brish

security were erased. The rollback of

Soviet and Russian power ensured that

the geopolical fulcrum of power nally

rested in the Low Countries, with the

Atlanc Alliance and the EuropeanUnion with Britain dominant in both

in a posion of economic, ideological and

military supremacy.

Is Britains Post-Cold WarEuropean Order Falling Apart?The challenges to Britains preferred

European selement are now very

real. Firstly, European aairs are no

longer at the top of US geostrategic

priories, as they were during the Cold

War and for much of the 1990s, when

the management of the Soviet demise

demanded greater aenon towards

European developments ranging from

German reunicaon, through the crises

in the Western Balkans, to the concepon

and implementaon of eastern

enlargement. Recent events illustrate

this US disengagement. Irrespecve of its

direct causes, Russias invasion of Georgia

in 2008 conrmed the re-establishment

of Moscows grip in the Caucasus a

geographic corridor vital for the future

of European energy security.11 TheRussian invasion showed that neither

Americans nor Europeans were the

exclusive actors in the European Unions

eastern neighbourhood anymore. And

Moscows asserveness towards what it

regards as its near abroad snued out

the likelihood of further pro-European

democrac revoluons throughout the

region.

Likewise, the 2008 conict was

crucial in undermining Ukraine and

forcing it into rapprochement with Russia,

best illustrated by the recent change of

government in Keiv and the renewal of

Russias lease over the naval staon in

Sevastopol.12Not only does this represent

a setback in Ukraines European

orientaon, but it also amplies Russias

presence around the Black Sea. Similarly,

Turkeys rapprochement with Syria,its irng with Iran and increasingly

confrontaonal approach towards Israel,

threaten to disrupt the balance of power

in the Middle East, just as closer Russo-

Turkish relaons would eecvely shut

the European Union out of the Middle

East and Central Asia.13 Finally, Irans

acquision of nuclear weapons and

long-range missiles could destabilise the

Middle East, and bring Central Europe

under direct threat for the rst me.

Next, mainland Europeans havegrown progressively more interested

in Russian designs. In October 2010,

German, French and Russian leaders

met at the French resort of Deauville

to discuss the so-called Medvedev

Proposal for a new European security

architecture.14 Moscows objecve

is simple: to transcend the Brish-

inspired European status-quo. Russia

loathes this order for circumvenng its

potenal reach deeper into the European

peninsula. But this is old hat; Russia has

always sought more inuence in Western

Europe. Back in the Cold War Moscow

welcomed West Germanys Ostpolik

and Charles de Gaulles project for a

Europe stretching from the Atlanc to

the Urals. Russia saw these as windows

of opportunity for revising the Brish and

American-led European order. However,

the sheer danger of the Soviet threat

and Brish-American determinaon

marked strict limits to France and (West)

Germanys irng with Soviet Russia.

But unlike in the past, the condionsare today ripe for a renewed pull from

the east especially from Russia (and

from behind it Turkey and China)

resulng in a qualitave reshue of the

polical and economic rules that have

governed European polics for decades.

In this regard, the emergence of the

triumvirate between Russia, Germany

and France (recently joined by Poland) to

discuss European security arrangements

has acquired a dierent meaning, not

least due to Americas reset buon

rhetoric vis--vis Russia. Paris and

Berlin, in parcular, see the rise of an

increasingly mulpolar European order

as almost inevitable, underpinned by

Russias resurgence in the east, Turkeys

rise to the southeast and the emergence

of an American-Russian relaonship to

hedge against China.15 In such changingcircumstances, and without prejudging

their dierent perspecves and interests,

France and Germany see Russias return

to a prominent place in European

geopolics as necessary in order to

increase predictability and stability on

the connent.

The raonale for a pan-European

selement might have taken a

180-degree turn in the space of ten years.

If in the late 1990s France and Germany

saw the concept of a pan-Europeansecurity community as instrumental

for hedging against excessive American

power, they see todays Medvedev

Proposal as a means to overcome

Washingtons ongoing disengagement

from the connent. In some European

capitals, the belief is taking hold that a

new instuonalised framework that

comprises the connents remaining

great powers (chiey Russia, Germany

and France, but also Poland) is required

to buress European stability.16 Insofar

as this threatens to disintegrate the

established European architecture and

displace the epicentre of European

geopolics away from the northwestern

pivot and towards Central and Eastern

Europe, Britains ideological, geographic

and instuonal framework risks

coming apart. An eastwards shi in the

balance of power may, to some extent,

undermine the basic economic and

polical liberalism of post-war European

geopolics.

Whither the SpecialRelaonship?Over the past sixty years, the US has been

crucial in helping provide Britain with


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Luis Simn and James Rogers

the means to secure its key geostrategic

objecves on the European plain. But as

the aacks of 11 September 2001, the

subsequent intervenons in Afghanistan

and Iraq and the geopolical rise of East

Asia have sucked American power out

of Europe and into the east and south

of Eurasia, Britain has progressively, and

quickly, lost its geopolical anchor.17

This compounds Britains new European

queson.

Recent developments in Russia,

Georgia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have

run against Brish naonal interests,

and represent a setback to tradional

Brish objecves in and around Europe;namely, the maintenance of a balance

of power centred on the northwestern

pivot and spread of economic openness

and democrac government throughout

the connent. Why has Britain stood

idle while the polical structures so

meculously put together over the past

three centuries are pulled apart?

The answer is simple: current

Brish strategy is not equipped to

respond adequately to the ongoing

assault on the post-1991 Europeanorder, due to strategic complacency and

an over-reliance on the so-called special

relaonship with the US. During the

Second World War, many Britons came

to believe that the US was indispensable

for sustaining the fulcrum of European

power in the north western pivot. But

as Washington lowers its guard in the

connent, Britains tried-and-tested

approach may no longer be appropriate.18

Recent events clearly prove that the

special relaonship no longer provides

an appropriate framework for defending

Brish interests and values in and around

the European peninsula, though we

should not overesmate the extent of a

potenal American retreat.19

There must be no misunderstanding

here: the Anglo-American partnership

will connue to be of great importance

to the UK. Britons and Americans are

united in their commitment to a global

order based on free trade, representave

government and, ulmately, a balance of

power in Eurasia that does not threaten,but rather underpins those principles.

Addionally, a close relaonship with

Washington will connue to full

important funcons for Londons

European endeavours. It will help Britain

hedge against the potenal failure of any

new polical order and the UKs inferior

alliance infrastructure, and would also

connue to provide an insurance policy of

last resort against a hypothecal Russian

resurgence let alone any aempts

of the laer to extend its power to the

Balc states, or beyond the Vistula or

Carpathians. While the possibility of an

eventual American return to Europe

should not be discounted, the Special

Relaonship cannot remain the nexus

of Brish geostrategy, if only for the

simple fact that the importance the US

now aaches to the Pacic and IndianOceans far outweighs its aenon to

contemporary Europe.20And this cannot

be the case for Britain, for obvious

geographical reasons. Britains European

strategy must be autonomous of the

many uncertaines that surround the

evoluon of American foreign policy.

The longer it takes for Britain to realise

that there is a growing need for a

change of direcon, the sooner new

narraves and instuons like grand

European bargain, Franco-German-Russian triumvirate, new security

architecture will gain hold among

mainland European elite and public

opinion, to the detriment of Brish

interests.

Bilateralism withinMullateralismIndeed, to assume that the UK can stay

aloof from the European mainland or

conceive of a future where connental

Europeans underperform economically

and militarily while Brish power thrives

next to the US, or some sort of renewed

Commonwealth, is a dangerous fantasy.

Historically, Brish power has thrived to

the tune of military, nancial and polical

developments on the European plain.21

The Brish owe their power and historical

capital to their posion in Europe, the site

of so many key innovaons over the last

ve hundred years: nancial innovaon,

modern science, geographical discovery,

military technology, democracy, free

trade and the rise of the modern naon-state.22Such values nd their origins in

Ancient Greece and Rome, and were

further nessed by Renaissance Italy

and the Netherlands during the Gouden

Eeuw. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-

century Britain gave this great European

vision its maximum expression, not least

in a geographical sense. But it remained,

ulmately, a European enterprise. As

such, the acceleraon of European decay

whether due to a resurgence of regional

conict or the inability of Europeans to

project their power in pursuit of their

security would inevitably drag Britain

down too.

As it confronts an increasingly

uncertain European environment, Britain

is le with two opons: the rst one is

to recognise that a mulpolar Europe

is inevitable; the second is to play toBritains geopolical strengths by making

the successes of the past three centuries

permanent. If Britain accepts a mulpolar

Europe, it should devote its eorts to

couching the eects of mulpolarity

by craing a network of bilateral

partnerships with all great European

powers. Britain has already fallen behind

in this version of the game: whilst Britain

has improved its relaonship with France,

its es to Germany could be improved

and its relaonship with Russia is ratherweak. All the other three major European

powers have a far more advanced

infrastructure of bilateral relaonships

than Britain has. Although Britain must

do its best to improve its bilateral

standing with key European partners, it

cannot limit itself to such steps. In fact,

bilateralism alone would lead to a Europe

scaered economically and polically,

posing a threat to a Brish-inspired

order whose essence necessarily requires

it to be mullaterally tamed through

Brish-backed instuons. In order to

succeed in restoring the balances that

have governed European geopolics

over the past few decades, Britain

needs to complement a reinvigorated

approach towards bilateral alliances in

Europe with a broader policy that es

all of those together in a mullateral

framework, which not only ensures the

maintenance of economic and polical

cohesion around internal free trade and

constuonal government, but also

maintains London at its heart.

Re-Centring BritainAs an island surrounded by the sea,

Britain is geopolically exceponal. It has


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developed a marime persona, which has

been both a strength and a weakness: a

strength because it has provided the

incenve to maintain formidable naval

power, which has enabled Britain to

project its interests overseas; and a

weakness because it has somemes

discouraged acve Brish parcipaon

in European aairs. When the European

mainland seems stable Britain tends to

disengage, hiding behind the sea and its

navy while pursuing interests elsewhere.

When the mainland becomes unstable

Britain eventually gets stuck in, bringing

its full power to bear. This leads to a

see-saw eect in Brish geostrategy. Thismust stop. As history shows, isolaon

from the European mainland can never

be splendid: it is during periods of Brish

isolaon that the European balance of

power tends to go awry. Today, Britain

faces a similar choice: it can either

connue to pursue other interests,

seemingly oblivious to European aairs,

with all the consequences that are bound

to follow; or it can take a renewed and

deeper interest.

Accordingly, if Britain is to succeedin restoring the geopolical system that

has governed European geopolics

through the last six decades, it requires

a mutually inclusive two-track strategy.

First, Britain needs to develop its

bilateral partnerships more rapidly, and

more eecvely. Second, it must engage

mullaterally by seeking the transion

of the European Union to a polico-

military associaon, while simultaneously

posioning itself in the European driving

seat. Both tracks are inseparable. Lack

of engagement in the European Union

limits Britains ability to develop special

relaonships with its main European

partners. Likewise, without a porolio

of strong bilateral relaonships London

cannot seriously aspire to lead and

engineer European integraon in a way

that benets Brish interests.

Alliance-makingThe UK has enjoyed some inial success

in diversifying its alliance porolio in

Europe. The coalion government hasmoved quickly in driving forward a new

grouping of Nordic states to create a

European vanguard for industrial and

technological innovaon, and possibly

an alternave to Franco-German primacy

in economic maers.23 However, the

Nordic drive serves another, perhaps

more important, purpose: to consolidate

Brish power in the Balc and hedge

against Russia. In part in response to the

sensivies of the Nordic states, some of

which have set up their own iniaves to

co-operate in military maers, London

has seized the moment to build up its

inuence around the Balc Sea and

perhaps send a signal of its interest

in the geopolics of the future of the

wider Arcc region, and its potenal

mineral wealth.24 Most signicantly,

though, the new Brish governmenthas worked hard to upgrade Britains

o-overlooked entente with France. On

2 November 2010, the Brish prime

minister and French president signed

two historic treaes to foster deeper

military co-operaon over the next

y years, including nuclear weapons

research.25 The nancial boons aside,

a ghter alliance with France will also

bring important geopolical benets

to the UK. Aer all, France is the only

other European state with a great-power-style strategic culture; not only

is France willing to deploy force and

maintain an extended regional military

posture through its military staons in

Africa, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean,

but it is also willing to spend money on

military research and development.26By

working together, London and Paris could

ensure that they remain and entrench

themselves as Europes leading

powers, thereby reinforcing a strong and

strategic Europe as opposed to a weak

and pacist one.27

Nevertheless, it is imperave that

neither Britains Nordic drive nor

the Anglo-French grande entente are

conceived of in a narrow sense, as merely

another asset to strengthen Londons

posion within a mulpolar Europe or

as a soluon to address immediate and

pressing nancial dicules. Closer

co-operaon, parcularly between

London and Paris, must be set within a

wider European design whose objecve

must be the re-invigoraon of theEuropean Union, remodelled to more

eecvely suit Brish interests. This is

crucial to both reverse the increasing

de-structuring of Europes regional

balances, as well as to serve as the

basis for European global power in

a world where the rise of connent-

sized superpowers is inevitable. Given

its populaon, size, resources and

central geographical posion on the

European plain, Germanys inclusion

in any such design is essenal. For

obvious geographical and historical

reasons, Frances security and economic

prosperity are directly ed to that of

Germany. France will not simply choose

Britain to the detriment of Germany: a

strong Franco-German relaonship is

not oponal for Paris. Further, without

a sign of a Brish commitment to thewider European framework, France will

perceive Britains aempts to improve

bilateral relaons as a simple hedging

strategy devoid of deeper meaning.

This would only encourage France to

connue invesng in a diverse alliance

porolio on the connent including a

highly developed bilateral relaonship

with Russia and, ulmately, accelerate

the crystallisaon of a mulpolar

Europe. Furthermore, aside from being

indispensable to the economic andpolical success of Europeans, a greater

Brish input into Brussels and a stronger

Anglo-German relaonship would

also serve a more specic purpose for

Britain: compensang for the fact that

France enjoys a more developed alliance

infrastructure in the connent, and

reinforcing Britains own posion in the

framework of a Brish-French grande

entente at that.28 In this regard, Britain

must idenfy key issues where it can work

with Germany, such as the promoon of

market reforms in general, and that of a

liberalised European military-industrial

and technological market in parcular.

Finally, if London is to preserve the

balances that have assured its security

and economic prosperity for decades,

it cannot seek anything other than

absolute control over the European

mainlands adjacent seas. This requires

a strengthening of bilateral alliances

with other key European partners and,

crucially, the anchoring of all those

iniaves under the broader mullateralframework of a renewed EU under

Brish leadership. A strong, Brish-led,

marime Europe requires command over

the Mediterranean Sea; the projecon


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Luis Simn and James Rogers

of a strong presence in the Arcc; and,

via the Atlanc Ocean and Red Sea,

deep oceanic power projecon into

the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and

beyond. This mandates that Britain step

up its relaonship with key partners

along those routes, with a view to both

courng them bilaterally and integrang

them mullaterally. Beyond the European

northwestern pivot, Spain and Portugal

are key to Brish-led European marime

security, especially in relaon to control

of the Mediterranean and Northern

Africa, as well as European power

projecon into Lan America and West

Africa. Parcularly important for theMediterranean, as well as Northern

Africa and the Levant, are Italy, Greece,

Malta and Cyprus. Poland, Lithuania,

Latvia and Estonia, and the Nordic states

of Sweden, Denmark and Finland, are key

to the Balc zone crucial as the outer

defensive perimeter of the European

plain as well as for deeper European

projecon into the Arcc. Finally, Bulgaria

and Romania are mandatory for the EUs

inuence around the Black Sea, itself

crical to its presence in the Caucasus,the Middle East and Central Asia. Both

stronger bilateral relaonships with those

countries and their integraon within

an expanded (EU-anchored) version

of the recent Anglo-French military

agreements is crucial for Britain to secure

its inuence within the wider European

neighbourhood. Through this wide

Brish-led, EU-anchored polico-military

enterprise, the foundaons could be laid

for the execuon of Britains historical

European objecves, namely a regional

balance of power that underpins free

trade and representave government.

Furthermore, it would oer Britain

access to the nancial and industrial mass

needed to aord state-of-the-art military

capabilies, whose possession would

deter potenal aggressors and contribute

to silent security in the twenty-rst

century.29

ConclusionInsofar as Britain and the US have framed

the European system since the end of

the Second World War, they have looked

on in recent years as the structures

they built have started to dissolve.

The UK bears a special responsibility for

this situaon because its geopolical

posion as an oshore balancer par

excellence provides it with enviable

inuence over the European mainland.

The US was fully commied to Britains

agenda both during and immediately

aer the Cold War. Aside from

facilitang Britains global presence,

the Anglo-American special relaonshipserved a crucial regional end: ensuring

Britains objecves in Europe were

upheld. However, following 9/11 and

the prolongaon of its intervenons in

Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as rising

uncertainty in East Asia, the US has grown

less able and willing to place Brish

designs at the centre of its own eort

a trend that will only connue with the

rise of China in East Asia and India in the

Indian Ocean.

This is not theorecal abstracon.Recent events in Georgia, Ukraine,

Turkey, Iran and elsewhere are powerful

illustraons of the ongoing retreat of

Brish power in the wider European

neighbourhood. Equally, closer bilateral

relaonships between Germany, France,

Poland and Russia that bypass the Brish-

backed post-war instuons are further

evidence of change. In response, the

UK needs beer partnerships with the

Nordic countries, France, the Netherlands

and Belgium to secure its inuence

in its immediate neighbourhood.

London then needs to use the EU to

maintain the connents power fulcrum

around the northwestern pivot; this

will require a step-change in Brish

strategic thinking. Last year, the former

Brish ambassador to Washington, Sir

Christopher Meyer, stated at RUSI that

the special relaonship was a means to

an end.30As the means no longer deliver

Britains ends, an uncomfortable queson

has arisen: is the UK able to adapt its

means to its ends, through a reappraisal

of bilateral European relaonships and

a leadership posion in the European

Union, or has its geostrategic insight

been swallowed by sixty years of

eecve dependence on the US? Can

Britain nd the courage to prevent a

mulpolar European system from taking

hold, while simultaneously ensuring that

the EUs geopolical retreat, economic

underperformance, polical disarray

and global irrelevance are halted and

reversed? The jury is sll out.

Dr Luis Simn recently obtained his PhD

at Royal Holloway, University of London.

He is currently a postdoctoral researcher

at the Instute for European Studies

(Vrije Universiteit Brussel) and co-

ordinates the security and defence panel

at Fundacin Alternavas in Madrid. In

2009 he was a Vising Fellow at the

European Union Instute for Security

Studies, where he published an

occasional paper on the planning aspectof EU military operaons. He has been a

guest researcher at RUSI.

James Rogers is a DRS Scholar at the

University of Cambridge, where his main

interests are European security and

military policy, and geostrategy. In 2008,

he was a Vising Fellow at the European

Union Instute for Security Studies,

where he compiled a report on the

geopolics of the Eurasian coastal zone.

He has also given presentaons on

marime geo-strategy to the European

Parliaments Sub-Commiee for Security

and Defence, Frances Instute of Higher

Naonal Defence Studies and Belgiums

Royal Instute of Internaonal

Relaons.

NOTES

The authors would like to thank Professor

Christopher Coker for his comments on an

earlier dra of this arcle.

1 Luis Simn and James Rogers, The

Return of European Geopolics: All

Roads Lead Through London, RUSI

Journal, (Vol. 155, No. 3, June/July 2010),

pp. 5864.

2 Wieland Wagner, Capitalizing on the

Euro Crisis: China expands its inuence

in Europe, Spiegel Online Internaonal,

14 December 2010.


7/7



3 Oce of the Secretary of Defence,

Annual Report to Congress: Military

and Security Developments Involving

the Peoples Republic of China 2010,2010, .

4 Japanese Ministry of Defence, Defence

of Japan 2010, . See

also Praveen Swami, US to build 8bn

super base on Guam, Daily Telegraph, 25

October 2010.

5 See Charles A Kupchan, The Potenal

Twilight of the European Union, Council

on Foreign Relaons Working Paper,

September 2010.

6 Euracv, Poland invites Russia to

Weimar Triangle, 7 February 2011.

7 Brendan Simms, Three Victories and

a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First

Brish Empire, 17141783(London:

Penguin, 2007).

8 George Friedman, The Geopolics of

France: Managing its Inuence in a

Changing Europe, Straor Geopolical

Monographs(Ausn, TX: Straor,September 2010).

9 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made

the Modern World(London: Penguin,

2003).

10 The UK and US provided the hard

security that allowed the so projects to

ourish. See Robert Cooper, What does

power mean today? in French Ministry

of Foreign and European Aairs (ed.),

Europe and Power(Paris: Culturesfrance,

July 2008), p. 199.

11 For an authoritave overview of Russias

invasion of Georgia, see Ronald Asmus,A

Lile War that Shook the World: Georgia,

Russia, and the Future of the West

(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

and Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Russia:

A Return to the Past, RUSI Journal(Vol.

153, No. 5, October 2008), pp. 4047. On

Georgias importance to Europe, see Dov

Lynch, Why Georgia maers, Chaillot

Paper No. 86, European Union Instute

for Security Studies, February 2006.

12 BBC News, Parliamentary chaos as

Ukraine raes eet deal, 27 April 2010.

13 On Turkeys new approach to the Middle

East, see Turkeys bid to raise inuence

in Middle East, IISS Strategic Comments

(Vol. 16, No. 38, October 2010). On the

Russo-Turkish rapprochement, see Suat

Kiniklioglu, The Anatomy of Russian-Turkish Relaons(Washington, DC:

Brookings Instuon, 2006).

14 Katrin Bennhold, At Deauville, Europe

embraces Russia, New York Times, 18

October 2010.

15 Simn and Rogers, op. cit.

16 Euracv, op. cit.

17 See Paul Newton, Paul Colley and

Andrew Sharpe, Reclaiming the Art ofBrish Strategic Thinking, RUSI Journal

(Vol. 155, No. 1, February/March 2010).

For a broader overview on the challenges

to Western power and cohesion, see

Christopher Coker, Reboong the West:

the US, Europe and the Future of the

Western Alliance, RUSIWhitehall Paper

(No. 72, 2009).

18 If anything, Americas mounng debt

and global military commitments point

towards a further coolness towards

developments in Europe, at least in the

short and medium term. See StephenWalt, Wither Europe (and NATO)?,

Foreign Policy, 10 May 2010; and Foreign

Policy, Is NATO Ready for Rerement, 24

September 2010.

19 See Nicholas Spykman, The Geography of

the Peace(New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace

and Company, 1944).

20 On this, see for example: James Rogers,

From Suez to Shanghai: The European

Union and Eurasian Marime Security,

Occasional PaperNo. 77, European UnionInstute for Security Studies, 2009; and

Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian

Ocean and the Future of American Power

(New York, NY: Random House, 2010).

21 Simms, op. cit., p. 684.

22 Sally Dugan and David Dugan, The Day

the World Took O: The Roots of the

Industrial Revoluon(London: Channel 4

Books, 2000).

23 Andrew Reman, UK: Northern Summit

was not an-European, EU Observer, 21

January 2011.

24 Straor.com, The Balc-Nordic-Brish

Relaonship Summit, 18 January 2011.

25 Declaraon on Defence and Security

Cooperaon, 2 November 2010. For

an overview, see Luis Simn and James

Rogers, The New Franco-Brish Ententeand European Defence: Implicaons

for Spain, OPEX Memorandum No.

151/2010, Fundacin Alternavas,

Madrid, November 2010. For addional

analyses on the need for Franco-Brish

military co-operaon, see Eenne de

Durand, Entente or Oblivion? Prospects

and Pialls of Franco-Brish Co-operaon

on Defence, RUSI Future Defence Review

Working Paper 8, September 2010; and

Julian Lindley-French, Britain and France:

A Dialogue of Decline? Anglo-French

Defence Co-operaon and Implicaonsfor the European and Euro-Atlanc

Security and Defence Relaonships,

Chatham House Internaonal Security

Programme Paper 2010/02, 2010.

26 In this regard, Franois Heisbourg has

famously spoken of France and Britain

sharing an extrovert strategic culture,

in contrast with the more introvert

insncts of other connental Europeans.

Franois Heisbourg, Europes Strategic

Ambions: The Limits of Ambiguity,

Survival(Vol. 42, No. 2, 2000), pp. 515.

27 Britain and France look set to dominate

Europe in the future, populaon-wise.

See Ian Traynor, Europe of the Future:

Germany shrinks, France grows, but

UK populaon booms, Guardian,

27 August 2008. It seems likely that

Britain and France will also connue

to account for roughly one-third of the

European Unions total economic output;

approximately three-hs of European

military expenditure; and almost two-

thirds of European military research and

development. These projecons are

based on a combinaon of data from

the European Defence Agency, Goldman

Sachs, Internaonal Futures, the

Stockholm Internaonal Peace Research

Instute and the World Bank.

28 Simn and Rogers, op. cit.

29 On the concept and importance of silent

security, see Jeremy Blackham and

Gwyn Prins, Why Things Dont Happen:

Silent Principles of Naonal Security,

RUSI Journal(Vol. 155, No. 4, August/

September 2010), pp. 1422.

30 Christopher Meyer, The UK-US Alliance:

Sll Special or Just Another Partnership?,

Remarks at RUSI-Legatum Instute

Conference, London, 18 May 2010.

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